520bv$spin 07-19-99 16:17:24 UNITED STATES REPORTS 520 OCT. TERM 1996 520bv$titl 07-19-99 16:30:45 UNITED STATES REPORTS VOLUME 520 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT AT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 3 Through June 18, 1997 FRANK D. WAGNER reporter of decisions WASHINGTON : 1999 Printed on Uncoated Permanent Printing Paper For sale by the U. S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 520BV$ Unit: $UII [08-03-99 17:13:58] PGT: FRT Erratum 503 U. S. 66, final line, to 67, first line: "87 Eng. 808, 816" should be "91 Eng. 19, 20". ii 520BV$ Unit: UIII [07-19-99 16:56:37] PGT: FRTBX m J USTICES of the SU PREM E COU RT during the time of these reports WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, Chief Justice. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, Associate Justice. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, Associate Justice. ANTONIN SCALIA, Associate Justice. ANTHONY M. KENNEDY, Associate Justice. DAVID H. SOUTER, Associate Justice. CLARENCE THOMAS, Associate Justice. RUTH BADER GINSBURG, Associate Justice. STEPHEN BREYER, Associate Justice. retired LEWIS F. POWELL, Jr., Associate Justice. WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Jr., Associate Justice. BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice. HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice. officers of the court JANET RENO, Attorney General. WALTER DELLINGER, Acting Solicitor General. WILLIAM K. SUTER, Clerk. FRANK D. WAGNER, Reporter of Decisions. DALE E. BOSLEY, Marshal. SHELLEY L. DOWLING, Librarian. iii 520BV$ Unit: $UIV [07-19-99 17:00:27] PGT: FRTBX m SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Allotment of Justices It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, and that such allotment be entered of record, effective September 30, 1994, viz.: For the District of Columbia Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. For the First Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice. For the Second Circuit, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice. For the Third Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice. For the Fourth Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. For the Fifth Circuit, Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice. For the Sixth Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice. For the Seventh Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice. For the Eighth Circuit, Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice. For the Ninth Circuit, Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice. For the Tenth Circuit, Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice. For the Eleventh Circuit, Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice. For the Federal Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. September 30, 1994. (For next previous allotment, and modifications, see 502 U. S., p. vi, 509 U. S., p. v, and 512 U. S., p. v.) iv Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Note: All undesignated references herein to the United States Code are to the 1994 edition. Cases reported before page 1101 are those decided with opinions of the Court or decisions per curiam. Cases reported on page 1101 et seq. are those in which orders were entered. Page A.; Barry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 A. v. Giuliani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 AAF-McQuay, Inc.; Burns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Abdul-Salaam v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Abele v. Swigert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Abellan v. Fairmont Hotel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Abernathy v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Abidekun v. New York City Dept. of Housing Preserv. and Dev. 1241 ABN­AMRO Bank, N. A.; Red Rock Commodities, Ltd. v. . . . . . 1166 Acker; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Acker; Jefferson County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Adams v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Adams v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Adams v. Robertson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Adams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180,1253 Adams County Detention Facility; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Adkins v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Adkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Administracion Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (Antel) v. New Valley Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc.; Hess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am. v. Applied Materials . . . 1230 Aetna Health Plans of California, Inc. v. Ardary . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co.; Stanescu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Agcaoili v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159,1249 Agency for Health Care Admin.; Associated Industries of Fla. v. 1115 Agostini v. Felton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141,1154 Aguilar-Higuerra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Aguilos; McNeil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Ahern v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 v Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR vi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ainsworth v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172,1271 Aircraft Braking Systems Corp. v. Automobile Workers . . . . . . . 1143 Airmont v. LeBlanc-Sternberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Akamiokhor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Akins; Federal Election Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Akpaeti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Akujorobi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Alabama; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Alabama; Felder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Alabama; Hays v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Alabama; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Alabama; Knotts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Alabama; Payne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Alabama; Thornton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Alabama; Windsor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Alabama Aviation and Technical College; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Alabama Dept. of Human Resources; Bonner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Alamance County; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Alaska Bar Assn.; Triem v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Albertson's, Inc.; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Albright; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195,1208 Albuquerque Bd. of Ed.; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Alessi v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Alexander, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209,1284 Alexander v. Prewitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Alexander; Prince George's County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Alexander v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128,1160 Alford v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Algernon Blair, Inc. v. Walters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Al-Hakim v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Ali v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Allah v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Allbright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Allen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Allen v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Allen v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Allen v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Allen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202,1281 Allen v. Westwinds Apartments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Alliance Against IFQs v. Secretary of Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Allstate Ins. Co.; Sharp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Hibma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Almendarez-Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED vii Page Alpha Therapeutic Corp.; Madanat v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Alston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Altschul v. Logue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Altschul v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177,1244,1245 Alvarado Orozco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Alvarez Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Ambrosini; Upjohn Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 American Breeders Service; Pickett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 American Broadcasting Cos. v. Lundell Mfg. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 American Civil Liberties Union; Reno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1113 American Civil Liberties Union of N. J.; Schundler v. . . . . . . . . . 1265 American Express Travel Related Services Co.; Hashemi v. . . . . 1230 American National Red Cross; HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. v. . . . . 1264 American Public Gas Assn. v. FERC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 American Red Cross Blood Servs.; HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. v. 1264 American Savings Bank; Kabakow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 American States Ins. Co.; Labour v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 American Telephone & Telegraph Co.; Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. . . 1193 Ames Department Stores, Inc.; Finks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Amoco Production Co. v. Public Service Co. of Colo. . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Amoco Production Co.; Williams Natural Gas Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Amtex, Inc.; Bonnell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Amtrak National Railroad Passenger Corp.; Carter v. . . . . . . . . 1213 Anaheim v. California Credit Union League . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Anchorage; Area G Home & Landowners Organization, Inc. v. . . 1211 Anderson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Anderson v. Clow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Anderson v. Holifield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Anderson v. Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Anderson; Monroe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Anderson; Noe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256,1267 Anderson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1194 Anderson; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Andrews; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Andrews Federal Credit Union; McCrea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Anesthesia Partners, Inc.; Healow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Angelone; Buchanan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163,1196,1227 Angelone; Fett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Angelone; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Animashaum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Antonelli v. Fugett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Antonio Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 A­1 Contractors; Strate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR viii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page A. O. Smith Corp.; Klehr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142,1154 Applied Materials; Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am. v. . . . 1230 Aramony v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Aranda-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Arbeiter v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Ardary; Aetna Health Plans of Cal., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Ardary; Inland Healthcare Group v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Area G Home & Landowners Organization, Inc. v. Anchorage . . . 1211 Argent Chemical Laboratories, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Arias v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Arigoni v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Arizona; Arizonans for Official English v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43,1141 Arizona; Doody v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Arizona; Dunlap v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Arizona; Jewitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Arizona; Martinez-Villareal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Arizona v. Mendoza Duarte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Arizona; Molina Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Arizona; Mott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Arizona; Oberuch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Arizona; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Arizona v. Richcreek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Arizona; Soto-Fong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Arizona; Stapley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Arizona; Thornton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Arizona; Tripati v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43,1141 Arkansas; Echols v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Arkansas v. Farm Credit Services of Central Ark. . . . . . . . . . . 821,1154 Arkansas; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Arkansas; Mullinax v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Arkansas; Ugwu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Arkansas Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Arkansas Regional Blood Service; Pledger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Armstrong; Calder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Armstrong v. Executive Office of President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Armstrong; Mazurek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Arneson Products, Inc.; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Arnold v. Board of Comm'rs of Effingham County . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Aroostock Medical Center; Benjamin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Arroyo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Arteaga v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Arteaga v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Sixth Appellate Dist. . . . . . . 1233 Arteaga v. Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED ix Page Arteaga v. Superior Court of Cal., Santa Clara County . . . . . . . . 1233 Arteaga v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. . . . 1193 Artis v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Artuz; Barrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Artuz; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190,1283 Artuz; Dingle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Asam v. Devereaux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Asam v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Asam v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Ashing v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Ashmore; Morewitz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1225 Ashton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Asonye v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Associated Industries of Fla. v. Agency for Health Care Admin. 1115 Associated Press, Inc.; Newman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1141,1163 Associate Tribal Judge v. A­1 Contractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438 Association. For labor union, see name of trade. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.; Inter-Modal Rail Employees Assn. v. 510,1102 Atkins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Atkins v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Atkinson-Kiewit, J/V; Morehead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Atlantic Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Shaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Atlas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Atlas Turner, Inc. v. Straub . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 AT&T Communications, Inc.; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Attorney General v. American Civil Liberties Union . . . . . . . 1102,1113 Attorney General v. Bossier Parish School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471,1164 Attorney General; Gaither v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Attorney General; Spice Entertainment Cos. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Attorney General; Terry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Attorney General of Cal.; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Attorney General of Cal.; Stevenson-Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Attorney General of N. C.; Harrington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Attorney General of Tex.; Pugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Attorney General of Va.; Adkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Ault; Sisco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Ault; Thongvanh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Auriemma, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112,1261 Auten Electric, Inc. v. Berry Construction, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Automobile Workers; Aircraft Braking Systems Corp. v. . . . . . . . 1143 Avery; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR x TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Avnet, Inc.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 A & W Investors Group, Inc.; Markson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Ayala; Speckard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Aybar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Azubuko v. Board of Directors, British Airways . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Azubuko v. Board of Trustees, Framingham State College . . . . . 1193 Azubuko v. First National Bank of Boston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1205 Azubuko v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Azubuko v. Montgomery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1225 Azubuko v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157,1225 Baba v. 1133 Building Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Baba v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Babbitt; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187,1259 Babcock & Wilcox Co.; Clements v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Babigian v. Rehnquist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Badley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Badru v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Baheth v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117,1224 Baheth v. Regions Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117,1224 Bailey; Nagle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Bailey v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Bailey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Bain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Bajakajian; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Baker v. General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Baker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179,1220,1222 Baker, Inc.; Maxwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Bakery Workers; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143,1225 Baldree v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Baldwin v. George . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Baldwin; McKinney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Balisok; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 641 Ball v. Booker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Ball v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Ballard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Ballistrea v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Ballod v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Bank of Boston Corp.; Kamilewicz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Bank of N. Y.; Elison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Banks v. Randolph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Banks v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Banks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Barakat v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143,1225 Baramdyka v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xi Page Barbara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Barbour; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Barbour; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Barcella v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Bardin v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Baris; Caltex Petroleum Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Baris; Steamship Mut. Underwriting Assn. (Bermuda) Ltd. v. . . . . 1168 Barkley Seed, Inc. v. Botelho Shipping Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Barlow v. Herron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Barlow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Barnabei v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Barnes v. Pierpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Barnes; Shelton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Barnes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Barnett; Devin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Barnett; Hickmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Barnett v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Barnett Bank of Central Fla., N. A.; Mulligan v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1194 Barrett v. Artuz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Barrett v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Barrick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Barrios; Cohea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Barry; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Barry v. LaShawn A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Bartlett; Glenn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Bartlett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Bascue v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Basey v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 BASF Corp.; Parsons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Basic Energy Corp. v. Chiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Baskin v. Bath Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Bast v. Glasberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Bast v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Bates v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114,1253 Bath Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals; Baskin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Baticados v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Batson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Battle; Saffle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Bautista de la Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pens. Tr. v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal. 1209 Baybank, FSB; Gangi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Baylor; Duncan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Bean; Calderon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Beard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR xii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Beards v. Bible Way Church of Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Beasley v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Beasley; Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee v. . . . 1166 Beasley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Beaty v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Beck; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Beeman v. Cohen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Begier v. Begier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Behringer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1272 Behringer v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260 Beiswenger Enterprises Corp. v. Carletta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Belcher v. Lesley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Beldotti v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Bell v. DiMario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Bell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220,1281 Bell v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc.; Vrettos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Beller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Belton v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Belton v. Dow Chemical Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Beltran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Bemis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Bendet, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184,1272 Benjamin v. Aroostock Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Bennallack v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Bennett v. Spear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 Bentley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Bentsen v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Berard v. Gorczyk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Berger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Bergne v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Bermudez-Reyes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Bernard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Bernys v. Wing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244,1268 Berry Construction, Inc.; Floyd Auten Electric, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 1265 Bery; New York City v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Betancourt-Arestuche v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Bethley v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259 Bexar County Tax Office; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Beyong Chul Choi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Bianchi v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Bible Way Church of Jesus Christ of Washington; Beards v. . . . . 1155 Bickel; Korean Air Lines Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xiii Page Billy-Eko v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Bingman v. Ward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Bishop v. Bishop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Bishop v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Bisson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Bizberg-Gogol v. Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Black v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113,1149,1151 Blackburn; Craig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Blackburn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Blair v. Calderon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Blair, Inc. v. Walters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Blandino v. Lippold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Blessing v. Freestone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329 Block v. Wilkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Blouin v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Board of Comm'rs of Effingham County; Arnold v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown . . . . . . . 397,1283 Board of Directors, British Airways; Azubuko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Board of Ed. of Chattanooga; Rowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Board of Ed. of Downers Grove School Dist. 58; Steven L. v. . . . 1113,1198 Board of Governors of Univ. of N. C.; Viswanathan v. . . . . . . . 1115,1271 Board of Trustees, Framingham State College; Azubuko v. . . . . . 1193 Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill.; Smart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Board to Determine Fitness of Bar App., Sup. Ct. of Ga.; Newton v. 1283 Boehme, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153,1262 Bogan v. Scott-Harris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Boggs v. Boggs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1101 Boles; Stanley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Boliek v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Bonaccorso; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Bonds v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Bonnell v. Amtex, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Bonner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1194 Bonner v. Alabama Dept. of Human Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Bonsey; DiCicco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187,1283 Bonsignore; Overfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Bonta v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Booker; Ball v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Booker v. Worsham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Boone; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Boone; Lynch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Boone; Wiford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Borg; St. Joseph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Borg & Warner Auto Elec. & Mech. Systems Corp.; Williams v. . . . 1153 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR xiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Borkowski v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Borough. See name of borough. Bossier Parish School Bd.; Price v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471,1164 Bossier Parish School Bd.; Reno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471,1164 Botelho Shipping Corp.; Barkley Seed, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Botelho Shipping Corp.; Pacific Southwest Seed & Grain, Inc. v. . . . 1211 Bouie v. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Boulineau v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Bowen; St. Petersburg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Bowen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Bowers v. Saturn General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170,1283 Bowersox; Abernathy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Bowersox; Boliek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Bowersox; Feltrop v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Bowersox; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Bowersox; McCauley-Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Bowersox; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Bowersox; Reese v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Bowersox; Six v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Bowler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Bowman v. Gammon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Boyd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Boyer; Fitzpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Boykins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Boyle, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184,1272 Boyle v. Colorado Bd. of Medical Examiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Bracey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Bracy v. Gramley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Bradley v. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Bradshaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Brancato v. Fischer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Branch v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Branch v. Tower Air, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Branch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Branch Banking & Trust Co.; McLemore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Brandenburg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Brandt v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Brandt v. First Union Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Brasten v. Zindell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Brayall v. Dart Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123,1225 Breedlove v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Brekke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Brewer v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Brewster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xv Page Bridges; Yourdon, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Bridget and Lucy R.; Dry Creek Rancheria v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Bridgewater v. Hardison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Brigano; Rhodes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Britt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Britton; Crawford-El v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Britz v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Broadbelt, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Brock v. Caterpillar, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Brock v. Unknown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Brogan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Brooklyn Developmental Center; Tadros v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Brooks v. Sheppard Air Force Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Brother Records, Inc.; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Broussard v. Burkett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Broussard v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Broward County; Burick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Broward County; Kuchinskas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Brown; Agcaoili v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159,1249 Brown v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Brown; Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. . . . . . . . 397,1283 Brown v. Bonaccorso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Brown v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194,1195 Brown; McRae v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Brown; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Brown v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Brown; Richards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Brown; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Brown v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Brown v. Turpin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Brown v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179,1236 Brown Univ. v. Cohen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Bruce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Bruff; Nowicki v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Brumfield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Bryan v. East Stroudsburg Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Bryan; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Bryan Independent School Dist.; J. W. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Buchanan v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163,1196,1227 Buchler; Vines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Buell v. Gelman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Bueno-Sierra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Buford v. James T. Strickland Youth Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Buggs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR xvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Bulson; Burnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Bumpass v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Bunnell v. Shell Oil Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Burchill v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Burdex v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Bureau of Prisons; Merritt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Bureau Veritas v. Carbotrade S. p. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Burgess v. Easley Municipal Election Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Burick v. Broward County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Burkett; Broussard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Burks; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Burks v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co. v. FERC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Burnett v. Bulson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Burnett v. Chippewa County Bar Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Burnett v. Chippewa County Sheriff's Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Burnett v. Eastern Upper Peninsula Mental Health Center . . 1172,1283 Burnett v. Riggle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Burnett v. Willette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1225 Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Burns; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Burns; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Burrill; Grace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Burton v. Burton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Bush v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Buss v. Painesville Township . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Bustamante v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129,1225 Buster v. Thomas, Head & Greisen Employees Trust . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Butler; Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Butler v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176,1283 Butler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Byrd; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Byrd; Raines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Byrd; Stone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Cablevision Systems; Glendora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Caesar's Tahoe, Inc.; Lurie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Caffrey v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1194 Cain; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194,1195 Cain; Goins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Cain; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Cain; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Cain; Muse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Cain; Pizzo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190,1260 Cain; Trest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xvii Page Cain; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Cain; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Cajina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Calamia v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Calder v. Armstrong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Calderon, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Calderon v. Bean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Calderon; Blair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Calderon; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259 Caldwell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 California; Allah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 California; Arias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 California; Arteaga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 California; Edelbacher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 California; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 California; Hart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 California; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 California; Madrid v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 California; Marshall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 California; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 California v. Opuku-Boateng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 California; Pallan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 California; Peck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 California; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 California; Seward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 California; Stephen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 California; Sweeney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 California; Warren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 California; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 California Committee of Bar Examiners; Harrington v. . . . . . . . . 1106 California Credit Union League; Anaheim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 California Dept. of Water Resources Control Bd.; Etemad v. . . . . 1255 California Franchise Tax Bd. v. MacFarlane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 California Labor Comm'r; Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. . . . 1248 Califorrniaa v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Callins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Callum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Caltex Petroleum Corp. v. Baris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Calvert, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262 Campbell v. Towse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Campbell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179,1242 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564 Canady; Wronke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR xviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Cannon v. Simms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Cannon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Canseco; Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal. v. 1118 Canutillo Independent School Dist.; Leija v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Carbotrade S. p. A.; Bureau Veritas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Cardenas Cuellar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Cardwell v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Carey v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Cargill, Inc. v. Parsley Dairy Farm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Cargill, Inc.; Parsley Dairy Farm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Cargle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Carlen v. Department of Health Services of Suffolk County . . . . . 1166 Carletta; Beiswenger Enterprises Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Carlson v. Kristi Micander, P. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Carman v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Carner v. Townsend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Carpenter; San Francisco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Carpenter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130,1266 Carpenters Northern Cal. Jt. Apprenticeship Comm. v. Eldredge . 1187 Carr v. Raney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Carrasco Ramos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Carraway v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Carrington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Carroll v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Carson v. Coast Village Property Owners Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Carson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Carter v. Amtrak National Railroad Passenger Corp. . . . . . . . . . 1213 Carter v. Artuz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190,1283 Carter v. Hopkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Carter v. Neustrup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Carter v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Carter v. Siegler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Carter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193,1228 Caspari; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Caspari; Mack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Casteel v. Pieschek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Castillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Castro, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Castro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 CAT Contracting, Inc. v. Insituform Technologies, Inc. . . . . . . . . 1198 Caterpillar, Inc.; Brock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Catz v. Chalker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Catz v. McDonald . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Caudle v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xix Page Causey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 CEDC Federal Credit Union v. National Credit Union Admin. 1165 C. E. Fleming Corp.; Nagi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 CEMEX, S. A. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Cessna Aircraft Co.; Farley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Chalet v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Chalker; Catz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Chambers v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Chambers County Comm'n; Swint v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Chamorro-Torres v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . 1103 Champion; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Chancellor, Bd. of Ed. of New York City v. Felton . . . . . . . . . 1142,1154 Chandler v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Chandler v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 Chandler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Chapleau; Huff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Chapman; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Charles Schwab & Co.; Guice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Charlotte; Moffitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Charlotte v. Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Charlotte; Price v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Charm v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Chater; Forsman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Chater; Holt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Chater; Leal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130,1225 Chater; Lohse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Chater; Seeger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Chater; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Chater; Swaney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Chater; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Chater; Wall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Chatriand v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Chavez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Chen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Cherry v. Rocking Horse Ridge Estates Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Chesney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Chicago v. International College of Surgeons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Chicago; Leahy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Chicago; Van Harken v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Chicago Tribune Co.; Daily Herald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Chicago Tribune Co.; Paddock Publications, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Chief Judge, Court of Appeals of Mo., Western Dist.; Tyler v. . . . 1188 Chief Judge, Court of Appeals of N. Y.; McReynolds v. . . . . . . . . 1254 Chief Justice of U. S.; Babigian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR xx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Childress v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Chiles; Basic Energy Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Chin v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Chippewa County Bar Assn.; Burnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Chippewa County Sheriff's Dept.; Burnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Chiquito v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Choi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Chong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Cho Ng v. Quiet Forest II Homeowners Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1193 Chorney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Chris L.; Morgan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Christensen v. Griffes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Chubb Life Ins. Co. of America; Colford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Chul Choi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Chun; Wong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Churn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Cianchetti; Zaragoza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 CIGNA HealthCare of Conn., Inc. v. Napoletano . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Cincinnati Enquirer v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Cisneros v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Citibank, F. S. B.; Veale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114,1198 City. See name of city. Civil Service Comm'n of Los Angeles County; Dobos v. . . . . . . . . 1159 Clark v. Burns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Clark v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259 Clark v. Hermosa Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Clark v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Clark v. LeCureux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Clark v. Sikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Clark; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Clark v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133,1178,1271 Clarke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Clay v. Council of District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Clayton v. Clayton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Clayton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Clement v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Clements v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Clemons v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Clemy P. v. Montgomery County Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . 1267 Cleveland Heights; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Cliff v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Clinton; Califorrniaa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Clinton v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 681 Clinton; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1283 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxi Page Clinton; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Clinton; Tavakoli-Nouri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Clinton; Vey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Clorox Co. v. Haile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Clovis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Clow; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Coast Village Property Owners Corp.; Carson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Cobb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Cocivera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Cockrell v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Coffman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Coggins/Continental Granite Co.; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Cohea v. Barrios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Cohea v. Mueller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Cohea v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Cohea v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199,1243 Cohen; Beeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Cohen; Brown Univ. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Cohen v. Sarpy County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Cohen; Selland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Cohen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Coker v. Douglas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Cole v. Dickman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Cole v. Huntsville Memorial Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Cole v. Irvin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Cole; Marchman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Coleman v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Coleman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220,1234 Colford v. Chubb Life Ins. Co. of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Collagen Corp. v. Green . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 College Station Independent School Dist.; Shinn v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Colley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Colligan v. Trans World Airlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Collins v. Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Collins v. Welborn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1272 Collins, Inc. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Collyer v. Darling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Colonel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Colony of Stone Mountain; Hargrove v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190,1283 Colorado; Lorenz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Colorado v. Sanchez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Colorado; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Colorado; Sullivan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Colorado Bd. of Medical Examiners; Boyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR xxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Columbia Correctional Institution; Frederick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Commissioner; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Commissioner; Cuong Duy Nguyen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Commissioner v. D'Ambrosio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Commissioner v. Hubert's Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Commissioner; Karim-Panahi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Commissioner; Standifird v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Commissioner v. Texaco Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner. Commission on Civil Rights; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Commonwealth. See name of Commonwealth. Comsource Independent Food Service Cos.; Union Pacific R. Co. v. 1229 Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Indian Reserv. v. Washington . . 1168 Conley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Connecticut; Kiser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Connecticut; Phidd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Connecticut; Sundwall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Connecticut Statewide Grievance Committee; Kucej v. . . . . . . . . 1276 Connell v. Douglass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Consolidated Rail Corp.; Eckles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Constant, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Construction Ind. Training Coun. of Wash. v. Seattle Bldg. Coun. 1210 Construction Laborers Pens. Tr. for Southern Cal. v. Canseco . . . 1118 Conte v. Joe Conte Toyota, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Conte Toyota, Inc.; Conte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Continental Ins. Co.; Lords Landing Village Condo. Council v. . . 893 Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA Inc. . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Contra Costa County; Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Contreras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 C. O. N. T. R. O. L. v. Neilsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Cook v. Crogan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Cook v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Cooke v. Dinapoli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Cooley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Cooper v. Gammon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202,1284 Cooper v. Malone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Cooper v. Missouri Parole Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Cooper; Scanlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Cornett v. Longois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Cornforth v. Howard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Cornish v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Corrections Commissioner. See name of commissioner. Correia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Cosby; Isles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxiii Page Cosentino v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc.; Rosati v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Cottrell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Cottrill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Coulter v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Council of District of Columbia; Clay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Countryman; Song v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 County. See name of county. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co.; Schroering v. . . . . . . . . . 1118 Courtney v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Court of Appeal of Cal., Sixth Appellate Dist.; Arteaga v. . . . . . . 1233 Court of Appeals. See U. S. Court of Appeals. Court of Common Pleas for Sumter County, S. C.; James v. . . . . . 1245 Covelli v. Crystal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Cox v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Coyne; Jae v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Craig v. Blackburn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Craig v. Lee Rosenbaum & Associates, P. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Craig v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Crane v. Olsten Staffing Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Craven v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Crawford v. Bexar County Tax Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Crawford v. Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1249 Crawford v. Lungren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Crawford v. Martin-Marietta Technologies, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Crawford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Crawford-El v. Britton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Creager; MacKenzie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Creecy; Wambach v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Cribb; Paul v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Crite v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Crogan; Cook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Crosby v. Hospital Authority of Valdosta and Lowndes County . . 1116 Crosby v. Mazurkiewicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Crosby v. South Ga. Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Cross v. Cross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Crotts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Crowe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Crown Clothing Corp.; Speen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Crutcher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Cryo-Trans, Inc. v. General American Transportation Corp. . . . . 1155 Crystal; Covelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 CSC Credit Services, Inc.; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Sirbaugh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Cuartas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Cuellar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Culp v. Hood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Cummings-El v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Cunningham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179,1192 Cuong Duy Nguyen v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Curry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Curtis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Cuyahoga County; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Cvijanovic v. Loral Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Cypress; Martineau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Cypress Semiconductor Corp.; Texas Instruments Inc. v. . . . . . . . 1228 Cyrk Inc.; Freestyle U. S. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Cyrk Inc.; Sunburst Products, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Czerkies v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Daily Herald v. Chicago Tribune Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust; Gill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Dallas Area Rapid Transit; Tolbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Dallas Bd. of Adjustments; Mattox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 D'Ambrosio; Commissioner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 D'Ambrosio v. Shoppers Food Warehouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 D'Amelia v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Dancer v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Dangerfield v. Star Editorial, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Daniel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1272 Daniell v. Old Line Life Ins. Co. of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Daniels v. Kansas City Southern R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Daniels v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Danville v. Kentucky River Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Darden; Vann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Darden, III; Tatum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Darling; Collyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Dart Industries; Brayall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123,1225 Darwall v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 David v. Mosley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 David v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Davis v. AT&T Communications, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Davis v. Burks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Davis v. Hanover Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104,1182 Davis v. Hudgins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Davis v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Davis v. Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Davis; Pringle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Davis v. Service Employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119,1225 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxv Page Davis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129,1161,1258 Davis v. Wonderland Greyhound Park, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Davis v. Zavaras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Davison, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Davis Publishing Co.; Von Grabe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Daws v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Dawson; Huck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Dawson v. Richmond Heights Local School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Day v. Painter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107,1194 Day v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 DeBose; Bear Valley Church of Christ v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 DeBose; Wolfe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Debowale v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 De Buono v. NYSA­ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund . . . 806 Deep Sea Research, Inc.; California v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Deere Co.; Midcon Equipment Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Deere Co.; Taylor Equipment, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 DeGerolamo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Dehaene; De Wiest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 DeHart & Son, Inc.; Totoro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Delano; Goodroad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Delaware; Artis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Delaware; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 DelCourt v. Silverman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213,1283 Delespine, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Del Junco; Goehring v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Delk v. Ford Motor Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 DeLone v. Morris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 DeMorales; Rosenbalm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Dempsey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Denker, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113,1207 Denman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Denmark; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Denouden v. University of Wash. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Denver v. Sonnenfeld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Department of Ed.; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Department of Health Services of Suffolk County; Carlen v. . . . . 1166 Department of Interior; Grijalva v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Department of Interior; Owens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Department of Interior; Tobie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1237 Department of Justice; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216,1283 Department of Justice; Tin Yat Chin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Department of Justice; Weaver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Department of Revenue of Wash.; Digital Equipment Corp. v. . . . 1273 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Department of State; Lidman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1283 Department of Veterans Affairs; Belton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Despain v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 DeTella; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 DeTella; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 DeTella; Willis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202,1284 Detroit Pension Fund v. Prudential Securities, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Dever v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Devereaux; Asam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Devin v. Barnett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 De Wiest v. Dehaene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 DeWitte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Dexter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Diallo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Diaz v. Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Diaz; Sheppard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 DiCicco v. Bonsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187,1283 Dickerson v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Dickerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Dickey v. Hartsville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Dickman; Cole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Dickson Supply Co.; El-Badrawi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Dies v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Diggs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 DiGiovanni v. Traylor Brothers, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Digital Equipment Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wash. . . . 1273 Dillon; Lagana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Dillon; Ragusa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 DiMario; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Dimensions Medical Center v. Illinois Health Planning Bd. . . . . . 1169 Dime Savings Bank of N. Y.; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122,1225 Dinapoli; Cooke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Dingle v. Artuz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Director, Central Intelligence Agency; Stahl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Director, OWCP; Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Director, OWCP; Stevedoring Services of America v. . . . . . . 1155,1250 Director of penal or correctional institution. See name or title of director. DiSanto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Disney Co.; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189,1237 District Court. See U. S. District Court. District Judge. See U. S. District Judge. District of Columbia; Bonds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxvii Page District of Columbia; Milton S. Kronheim & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 District of Columbia; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 District of Columbia; Women Prisoners, D. C. Dept. of Corr. v. . . 1196 District of Columbia Dept. of Human Services; McKinley v. . . . . . 1108 District of Columbia Rental Housing Comm'n; Slaby v. . . . . . . . . 1190 Dittrich v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Divers; Louisiana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Dobos v. Civil Service Comm'n of Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . 1159 Dobyns v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Dockett v. Hofbauer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Dodd v. Oliver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125,1249 Dodson v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Doe; D'Amelia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Doe; Sikora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Doggins v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Doherty v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Dolan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Dolsky; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Dominguez v. Henry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Dominguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Donnellon, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Doody v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Dorf & Stanton Communications, Inc. v. Molson Breweries . . . . . 1275 Dorsey; Marquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Dorsey; Ontiveros v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Dortch v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Dostert v. Supreme Court of Appeals of W. Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Douglas; Coker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Douglas v. Sylvester . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Douglas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Douglass; Connell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Dow Chemical Co.; Belton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Downey v. Krempin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201,1284 Drake; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Drinkard v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Drobny v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Drug Enforcement Agency; Gant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178,1260 Drummond v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Dry Creek Rancheria v. Bridget and Lucy R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 DSM Copolymer, Inc.; Spears v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Duarte; Arizona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Dudley v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Duffey v. Hartman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Dunbar v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Duncan; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Duncan v. Baylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Duncan; Samuel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157,1283 Duncan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Dunlap v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Dunn; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259 Dupree; Mundy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Durant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Durbin; Mothershed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Durham; Glover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Durham v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Durham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213,1270 Durkin; Shea & Gould v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Durko; Glass Workers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Durko; OI­NEG TV Products, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Durst-Lee v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Du Vall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104,1193 Duy Nguyen v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Dye v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Dye; Ponder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Dyer v. Stevens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Easley Municipal Election Comm'n; Burgess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Easter v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Easterday v. Gilbert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Eastern Upper Peninsula Mental Health Center; Burnett v. . 1172,1283 Easterwood v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 East Lyme; Meehan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 East Stroudsburg Univ.; Bryan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Eaton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Ebenhart v. Howard Community Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Echols, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153,1262 Echols v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Eckerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Eddmonds v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Edelbacher v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Edmond v. Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Edmond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651 Edmonds v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Edmundson v. Keesler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Edwards v. Andrews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Edwards v. Balisok . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 641 Edwards; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxix Page Edwards v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170,1247 Eidson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259 Einaugler v. Supreme Court of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Elam v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 El-Badrawi v. Dickson Supply Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Eldredge; Carpenters Northern Cal. Jt. Apprenticeship Comm. v. 1187 Eldridge v. Quick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc. v. Purtle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 1133 Building Corp.; Baba v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Elison v. Bank of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Elkins; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Elliott v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Ellis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Ellis v. Pinkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Ellison v. Forrest City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 El Muhammad v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Embrey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Emerick v. United Technologies Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Emerson v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Emerson; Gilmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Emerson Electric Co.; Kahn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Emerson Electric Co. v. Karcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Emerson Electric Co.; Karcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Emery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Emhart Glass Machinery, Inc.; Schwartz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 England v. Stepanik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Englander v. Mills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 English v. Louisiana Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Entergy Operations, Inc.; Oubre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Environmental Technology Council; South Carolina v. . . . . . . . . . 1113 En Vogue; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n; Reed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Ernst & Young v. Simpson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Ernst & Young LLP v. McGann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Escobar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Escobar-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Escobar Velasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Espinoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176,1180 Essex County; Graham-Weber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164,1242 Estate. See name of estate. Etemad v. California Dept. of Water Resources Control Bd. . . . . 1255 Evans v. Avery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Evans; Baba v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Evans; Broussard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Evans v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Everhart v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Executive Office of President; Armstrong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Exxon Corp.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Ezeoke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Fadem; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Fairmont Hotel; Abellan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Falcon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Falconer v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Fanelli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Fankell; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Farcas, Stewart, Brownie, Handson & Bliss; Rivers v. . . . . . . . . . 1242 Farley v. Cessna Aircraft Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Farm Credit Services of Central Ark.; Arkansas v. . . . . . . . . . 821,1154 Farmer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Farmer v. McDaniel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Farmer v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Farmer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Farrell v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Farrow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Farrugia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Fashina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Fatta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Faunce; Risley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Faust v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Federal Bureau of Investigation; Bizberg-Gogol v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Federal Bureau of Investigation; Morales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Federal Bureau of Investigation; Zion v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 FCC; Ochoa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 FCC; Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Brandt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; First Security Bank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Federal Election Comm'n; Hagelin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 FERC; American Public Gas Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 FERC; Associated Gas Distributors v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 FERC; Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 FERC; Imparato v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 FERC; Indicated Expansion Shippers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 FERC; New York Public Service Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Federal Express Corp.; Trustees of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund of Philadelphia and Vicinity v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Federal Ins. Co.; Vemco, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxi Page Federal Republic of Germany; Wolf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Feichtinger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Felder v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Feldman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Feltner v. MCA Television, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Felton; Agostini v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141,1154 Felton; Chancellor, Bd. of Ed. of New York City v. . . . . . . . . 1142,1154 Feltrop v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Fennessey; Southwest Airlines Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Ferbar Corp. of Cal.; Bay Area Laundry Pension Trust v. . . . . . . 1209 Fernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Fernengel; Michigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Ferrell v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123,1173 Ferret-Castellanos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Festo Corp.; Shoketsu Kinzoku Kabushiki Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Festo Corp.; SMC Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Fett v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Fett v. Morris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Fidel v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Fink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Fidis v. Lakeside Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Fielder; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Fields; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Fields v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Fierro Ruiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Figueroa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Finalco, Inc. v. Roosevelt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Finberg v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. of Pa. . . . . . . . . 1123 Fink; Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Finks v. Ames Department Stores, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Finnerty; Paladin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Fiore, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 First Bancorp of La., Inc.; Silmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 First Federal Savings Bank; Hualde-Redin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 First Gibraltar Bank, FSB; Bradley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 First National Bank of Boston; Azubuko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1205 First National Bank of Centre Hall; Huff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 First Security Bank v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 First Union Corp.; Brandt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 First Union National Bank of Fla.; Staup v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Fischer; Brancato v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Fischer v. Philadelphia Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Fisher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Fitzgerald v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145,1214 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Fitzgerald v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Fitzpatrick v. Boyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Fjetland v. Lone Star Northwest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Fleet National Bank; H & D Entertainment, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Fleming v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151,1169 Fleming Corp.; Nagi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Fletcher v. Harrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Fletcher v. Schindler Elevator Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174,1260 Fletcher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Fletcher Pacific Construction Co.; Milnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Flint v. Middleton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Flores v. FMC Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1225 Florida; Al-Hakim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Florida; Branch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Florida; Cummings-El v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Florida; Ferrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123,1173 Florida; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Florida; Lark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Florida; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Florida; Medina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Florida; Mundy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Florida; Olsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Florida; O'Neill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Florida; Sims v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Florida; Vidal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Florida; Wilkinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Florida; Williamson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Florida Bar; Glant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Florida Bar; Nunes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Florida Power & Light Co.; Hover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Florio v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Flowers v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Floyd Auten Electric, Inc. v. Berry Construction, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 1265 FMC Corp.; Flores v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1225 Fogie; THORN Americas, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Foltice v. Guardsman Products, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Forbes; Arkansas Ed. Television Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Ford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Ford v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Fordice; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 Ford Motor Co.; Delk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Forest, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Forest Industries Ins. Exchange; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Formica v. Huntington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxiii Page Forrest City; Ellison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Forsman v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Fort v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Fort Stewart Assn. of Educators v. Weston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Foster v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Foster v. Giant Food, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Foster v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Foster v. Old Town Trolley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Foster v. Southfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Foster v. U. S. Marshals Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Foster v. Wolf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Fountain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Fowler; South Carolina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Fox v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Fox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Frank; Yount v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Franklin v. Hiser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Franklin v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Franklin Homes, Inc.; Hines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Franks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179,1249 Frederick v. Columbia Correctional Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Freeman; West American Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Freeman v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Freestone; Blessing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329 Freestyle U. S. A. v. Cyrk Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Freisinger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 French v. Pepe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Fresh Fields Market, Inc.; Levy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Friedman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141,1207 Frieze, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Frost v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Frye, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184,1272 Fuch; Oliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Fu Chen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Fuentes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Fugett; Antonelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Fulbright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Fulfree v. Manchester . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Fullwood v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Furukawa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Fuszek; Royal King Fisheries v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Futo; Missouri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Futterman v. Nasset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Gaither v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Gale; Trowery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Gales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Gallagher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Gallardo, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Gallares v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Gallego; Madril v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Gallego v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Galvan v. Hurley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Gammon; Bowman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Gammon; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202,1284 Gangel-Jacob; McReynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173,1260 Gangi v. Baybank, FSB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Gant v. Drug Enforcement Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178,1260 Garcia v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Garcia v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Garin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Garner v. Pennington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Garner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Garner v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Garner Food Services, Inc.; Wood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Garrett v. Moore McCormack Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Gary v. Turpin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Garza v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Garza-Nevarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Gates; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243,1278 Gates v. San Luis Obispo County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Gates v. Shinn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Gates v. Trevino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Gates; Trevino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Gauthier v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Gay; Wafer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Gelb, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Gelis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Gelman; Buell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 General Accounting Office; Singh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 General American Transportation Corp.; Cryo-Trans, Inc. v. . . . . 1155 General Electric Co. v. Joiner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 General Motors Corp.; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 General Motors Corp.; Kearns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Genins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 George; Baldwin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 George v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Georgetown Univ.; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxv Page Georgia; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Georgia; Posey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Gerald v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Germany; Wolf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Geske & Sons, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Gethers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Giacomel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Giant Food, Inc.; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Gibbons; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Gibbs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Gibson; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Giebel v. Montana System of Higher Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Gilbert; Easterday v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Gilbert v. Homar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,1102,1113 Gill v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Gillespie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Gilliam v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Gillis; Spruill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Gilmore; Adkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Gilmore v. Emerson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Gilmore; Emerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Giorgio v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Girard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Giseburt v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Giuliani; Marisol A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Givner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Glant v. Florida Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Glasberg; Bast v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Glass Workers v. Durko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Glaze; Grooms v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Glendora v. Cablevision Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Glendora v. Hostetter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Glenn v. Bartlett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Glickman; Worthington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Global Marine Drilling Co.; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Glock v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Glover v. Durham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Glover v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Godwin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Goehring v. Del Junco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Goff; Ohio Assn. of Independent Schools v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Goff v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Goggins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Goins v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Goins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Golden v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Golden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Goldy v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Gomes v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Gomez; Ali v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Gomez; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Gomez; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Gomez; Nettles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Gomez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Gomez; Wells v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Gonzales v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Gonzales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Gonzales; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Gonzalez v. Kuhlmann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Gonzalez-Quezada v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Goodroad v. Delano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.; Tumlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Goonewardena v. University of Minn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Goord; Le Grand v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Goord; Levine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Goosbly; Hopper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Gorczyk; Berard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Gorham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Gotcher; Wood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Gould; Jensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Goulding v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Governing Bd. of Marin Community College Dist.; Jordan v. . . . . 1143 Government of Virgin Islands; Hollar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Governor of Cal.; Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Governor of Cal. v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Governor of Colo.; Pastorius v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Governor of Fla.; Basic Energy Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Governor of Ga.; Chandler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 Governor of La. v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Governor of N. J.; Presbytery of N. J. Orthodox Church v. . . . . . . 1155 Governor of N. Y.; Nicholas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Governor of N. Y.; Volberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Governor of S. C.; Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Comm. v. 1166 Governor of Utah v. Jane L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Grace v. Burrill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Grade v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Graham; Pandey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Graham-Weber v. Essex County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164,1242 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxvii Page Gramley; Bracy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Gramley; McCain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Grant v. McCoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Grant v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Grant v. Rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Grant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Grant Medical Center; Leak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Grassia v. Luongo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Gravely v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Graves v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Gray v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Gray v. Nielson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Gray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129,1145,1203,1246 Gray v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Green v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Green; Collagen Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Green v. Dolsky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Green v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Green v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Green v. Umana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Green v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180,1203,1253 Gregory, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Gregory v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Greschner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Gresham v. Transportation Communications Union . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Griffes; Christensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Griffin; McVicar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Griffin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180,1222 Grijalva v. Department of Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Grooms v. Glaze . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Groose; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179,1283 Groose; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202,1216 Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Building Authority . . . 1230 Growney, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152,1262 Grubbs, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 GS Roofing Products Co.; Spinden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Guam; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Guaranty Bank & Trust Co.; Baheth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117,1224 Guardsman Products, Inc.; Foltice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Gucci Design Studio, Ltd. v. Sinatra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Guerriero v. Lufthansa German Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114,1198 Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Guilbeau v. W. W. Henry Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Guinn v. Kopf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Gulch; Ruthers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc. v. Hilton Inns, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Guzman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Hacklander-Ready v. Wisconsin ex rel. Sprague . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 H. A. DeHart & Son, Inc.; Totoro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Hadley v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 H & D Entertainment, Inc. v. Fleet National Bank . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Hagelin v. Federal Election Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Haile; Clorox Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Hai Vominh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Hale v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Hall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Halpin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Hamilton, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153,1164,1195 Hamilton v. Koons Sterling Ford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Hamilton v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Hamm v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Hammond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Hampton v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Hampton v. Killinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Hampton v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Hanks; Hogan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Han Kuk Chun; Wong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Hannigan; Nickel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Hanover Ins. Co.; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104,1182 Hansen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Hansen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131,1222,1235 Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 548 Harden v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Hardison; Bridgewater v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Hardison; Joseph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Hardy v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Hargrove v. Colony of Stone Mountain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190,1283 Harmon v. Sikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Harper; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Harper v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Supreme Court of Ohio 1274 Harper; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 Harrington v. Attorney General of N. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Harrington v. California Committee of Bar Examiners . . . . . . . . 1106 Harris v. Chapman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Harris v. Cuyahoga County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Harris v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Harris v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1260 Harris v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218,1257 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxix Page Harris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Harrison v. Barbour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Harrison; Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564 Harrison; Fletcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Hart v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Hart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231,1270 Hart/Cross v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Hartman; Duffey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Hartman v. Health Services Management, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Hartman v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Hartman v. Northern Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Hartnett v. Stein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Hartnett v. Western Construction Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Hartsville; Dickey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Harvard; Kent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Harvey v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Harvey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179,1242 Hashemi v. American Express Travel Related Services Co. . . . . . 1230 Hatch; Mustang Fuel Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Hawaii; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1249 Hawaii; Kealoha v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Hawaii; Radcliffe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Hawkins v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Hawkins v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Hawkins v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Hawkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Hawkins v. Uzzell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Haycock v. Hughes Aircraft Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Hayes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Haynes v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Hays v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Hays v. Urbana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Hayward v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Healow v. Anesthesia Partners, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Health Services Management, Inc.; Hartman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. v. American National Red Cross . . . . 1264 HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. v. American Red Cross Blood Servs. 1264 Hearn v. Robertson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Hearn v. Veasy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Heatwole v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Hedgepeth; Jasper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Heimermann v. Vander Ark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Helton v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Henderson v. DeTella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xl TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Henderson v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Hendrickson v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Hendrickson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Hennessy Industries, Inc.; Peitzmeier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Henry, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Henry; Dominguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Henry v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Henry v. Williamson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Henry Co.; Guilbeau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Henson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Henton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Herman v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Herman v. Ratelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Herman v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Hermosa Beach; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Hernandez v. Santa Ana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Hernandez; Santa Ana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170,1234,1251 Hernando County; Wallis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Herron; Barlow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Heurtebise; Reliable Business Computers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Hewlett-Packard Co.; Orback v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Hibma; Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Hickmon v. Barnett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Hicks v. Prince Graves Homes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Hicks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193,1258 Higgason v. Swihart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Higgins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Hill, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Hill v. Acker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Hill v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Hill; Arteaga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Hill v. Beck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Hill v. CSC Credit Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Hill v. Gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243,1278 Hill v. Hopper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Hill v. Kemp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Hill v. McClure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Hill v. McKee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Hill v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Hill v. Raup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Hill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132,1203 Hilton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xli Page Hilton Davis Chemical Co.; Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. . . . . . . . . . 17,1153 Hilton Inns, Inc.; Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Hiltunen v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Hinchliffe v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Hinckley; Judy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Hines v. Franklin Homes, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Hiser; Franklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Hobauer; Dockett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Hoeflich; Martech USA, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Hoekstra v. Independent School Dist. No. 283 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Hoelzer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Hofbauer; Lyons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Hogan v. Hanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Holcomb v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Holifield; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Holihan; Lucky Stores, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Hollar v. Government of Virgin Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Holliday v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Holman v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Holman v. Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Holman v. U. S. Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Holt v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Holt v. JTM Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Holt v. KMI-Continental, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Holtzman v. Mullon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Homar; Gilbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,1102,1113 Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. Butler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Honeywell, Inc. v. Litton Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Honeywell, Inc.; PSI Repair Services, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Hood; Culp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Hooper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Hopkins; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Hopper v. Goosbly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Hopper; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Horgan; Velasco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Horn v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Horton v. Union Recovery Ltd. Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Horton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Hospital Authority of Valdosta and Lowndes County; Crosby v. . . . 1116 Hostetter; Glendora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Hough v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 House v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Houser v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xlii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page House the Homeless, Inc. v. Widnall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Houston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Hover v. Florida Power & Light Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Howard v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Howard v. Caspari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Howard; Cornforth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Howard v. Howard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Howard; Hutton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Howard; Shay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Howard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234,1235 Howard v. Walt Disney Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189,1237 Howard Community Services; Ebenhart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Howell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 How Investment Ltd. v. Nowak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Hualde-Redin v. First Federal Savings Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Hubbard v. Kentucky Ed. Professional Standards Bd. . . . . . . . . . 1240 Hubert's Estate; Commissioner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Huck v. Dawson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Hudgins; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Hudson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Huerta v. Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Huff v. Chapleau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Huff v. First National Bank of Centre Hall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Huff v. Northwest Savings Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Hughes Aircraft Co.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Hughes Aircraft Co.; United States ex rel. Haycock v. . . . . . . . . . 1211 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer . . . . . . . . . 939 Hughes Aircraft Co.; Yee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Huie v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Humphrey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Humphries v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Humphries v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Hunter; Iolab Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185,1260 Hunter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Huntington; Formica v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Huntsville Memorial Hospital; Cole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Hurford; Lovell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156,1249 Hurley; Galvan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Hussein v. Pierre Hotel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188,1283 Hutchinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Hutchinson; Vartinelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Hutton v. Howard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Hutton v. Three Rivers Area Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Hyde; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 670 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xliii Page Hyperion 1999 Term Trust, Inc.; Olkey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Ibida v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Idaho; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Idaho State Bar; Topp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Ijemba, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114,1249 Iko v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Ilic v. Liquid Air Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Illinois; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Illinois; Ashing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Illinois; Britz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Illinois; Clemons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Illinois; Falconer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Illinois; Gilliam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Illinois; Hadley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Illinois; Hampton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Illinois; Hardy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Illinois; Haynes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Illinois; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Illinois; Kidd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Illinois; Marshall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Illinois; Maxwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Illinois; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Illinois; Nevius v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Illinois v. Nitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Illinois; Shatner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Illinois; Trotter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Illinois; Watson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Illinois; Weekly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Illinois; Wiggins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Illinois; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Illinois; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Illinois Dept. of Professional Regulation; Pfluger v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Illinois Health Planning Bd.; Dimensions Medical Center v. . . . . . 1169 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Chamorro-Torres v. . . . 1103 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Salazar-Haro v. . . . . . . . 1239 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Suan See Chong v. . . . . 1119 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Uwagbale v. . . . . . . . . . 1157 Imparato v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 In re. See name of party. Independent School Dist. No. 283; Hoekstra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Indiana; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Indiana; Helton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Indiana; Lambert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Indiana; McCoy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xliv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Indiana; Platt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Indiana; Propes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Indiana; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Indianapolis-Marion County Building Authority; Grossbaum v. . . 1230 Indicated Expansion Shippers v. FERC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, OWCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Ingram v. Powell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Ingram v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Inland Healthcare Group v. Ardary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Insituform Technologies, Inc.; CAT Contracting, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 1198 Institute of Specialized Medicine; Leff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Inter-Modal Rail Employees Assn. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 510,1102 Internal Revenue Service; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Internal Revenue Service; Schroeder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 International. For labor union, see name of trade. International Business Machines Corp.; Muse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 International College of Surgeons; Chicago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Iolab Corp. v. Hunter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185,1260 Iowa; Dunbar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Iowa; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Iowa; Rieflin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Iowa; Trobaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Iowa; Wessels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Iowa District Court for Des Moines County; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . 1197 Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Pro. Ethics and Conduct; Ronwin v. 1241 Irons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Irvin; Cole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Irvin; Kroemer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Irvin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Isles v. Cosby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Isom v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Ivani Contracting Corp.; New York City v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Ivory v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Ivy v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Ivy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131,1249 Iyamu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Jackson v. Barry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Jackson v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Jackson v. Byrd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Jackson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Jackson v. Champion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Jackson v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Jackson v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Jackson v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlv Page Jackson v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Jackson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131,1178,1222,1236 Jacksonville; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175,1260 Jacobson v. Stevens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177,1260 Jacquot v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Jae v. Coyne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Jae v. Kessler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Jahannes v. Reid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142,1214 Jain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 James v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 James v. Court of Common Pleas for Sumter County, S. C. . . . . . 1245 James v. McClain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 James T. Strickland Youth Center; Buford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Jane L.; Leavitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Jane Phillips Episcopal Memorial Medical Center v. Rishell . . . . . 1152 Jaques, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Jarrett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Jasper v. Hedgepeth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 J. Baker, Inc.; Maxwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Jefferson v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Jefferson v. Tarrant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Jefferson County v. Acker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Jefferson Lighthouse School; Muller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Jenkins v. Oakley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200,1256 Jenkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Jenkins v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217,1252 Jensen v. Gould . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Jenson v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Jewitt v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Jimenez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 J. M. Martinac & Co. v. Saratoga Fishing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 J. M. Martinac & Co.; Saratoga Fishing Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Joe Conte Toyota, Inc.; Conte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 John Deere Co.; Midcon Equipment Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 John Deere Co.; Taylor Equipment, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Johnson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195,1209 Johnson; Alford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Johnson v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Johnson; Asonye v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Johnson; Baldree v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Johnson; Bardin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Johnson; Basey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Johnson; Behringer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260 Johnson; Bumpass v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xlvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Johnson; Carraway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Johnson; Carson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Johnson; Doggins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Johnson; Drinkard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Johnson; Dudley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Johnson; Elam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Johnson v. En Vogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Johnson v. Fankell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Johnson; Flowers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Johnson; Garza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Johnson v. Gibbons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Johnson v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Johnson; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1260 Johnson; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Johnson; Herman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Johnson; Houser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Johnson; Huie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Johnson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Johnson v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Johnson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Johnson; Klyng v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Johnson v. Lamont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Johnson; Losada v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Johnson v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Johnson; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Johnson; Mixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Johnson; Neese v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Johnson; Ornelas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Johnson; Reagans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Johnson; Reyna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Johnson; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Johnson; Rose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Johnson; Ruthruff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Johnson; Stoker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Johnson; Taplin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Johnson; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Johnson; Union Pacific R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Johnson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461, 1109, 1110, 1132, 1133, 1144, 1148, 1192, 1222, 1223, 1234, 1236, 1251,1253,1271,1281 Johnson; Vela v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Johnson; Wafer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Johnson; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Johnson; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlvii Page Johnson; Westley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Johnson; Wharton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Johnson; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Johnson; Wilkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Johnson; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Johnson; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Johnson-Bey v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Joiner; General Electric Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Joiner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Jones; Clinton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 681 Jones v. Forest Industries Ins. Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Jones v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179,1283 Jones v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Jones v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Jones v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Jones v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Jones v. Senkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Jones v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Jones v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Jones v. Toombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1194 Jones v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132,1149,1202,1203,1236,1282 Jones; Vickery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Jordan v. Governing Bd. of Marin Community College Dist. . . . . 1143 Jordan v. Kenton County Bd. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Jordan; McColm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176,1283 Jordan v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Joseph v. Hardison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Joseph v. Quaglino Tobacco & Candy Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Joyce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 JTM Industries, Inc.; Holt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Judd v. University of N. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Judge, Court of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Supreme Court of Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Judge, District Court of Ky., Kenton County; Thompson v. . . . . . 1125 Judge, District Court of Okla., Okla. County; Thomas v. . . . . . . . 1215 Judge, District Court of Tulsa County; Morrow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Judge, District of Columbia Superior Court; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . 1159 Judge, Municipal Court of N. J., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Judge, Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County; Zaragoza v. 1126 Judge, Superior Court of Ga., Fulton County; Thomas v. . . . . . . . 1147 Judge, Territorial Court of V. I. v. Government of V. I. . . . . . . . . . 1277 Judy v. Hinckley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xlviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Juneu; Mount Juneau Enterprises, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Justice, App. Div., N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1st Jud. Dept.; McReynolds v. 1173,1260 Justice, Family Court of N. Y.; McReynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Juvenile Male v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162,1219,1221,1223 J. W. v. Bryan Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Kabakow v. American Savings Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Kahn v. Emerson Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Kahn; State Oil Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Kahn; United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.; Blouin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Kaisserman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Kanahele v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Kansas; Peden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Kansas City Southern R. Co.; Daniels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Karafa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Karcher v. Emerson Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Karcher; Emerson Electric Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Karim-Panahi v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Kaufman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Kaufman; Tidik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Kaye; McReynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Kealoha v. Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Keane; Laureano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Keane; Yarborough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Kearns v. General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Keathley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Keaton v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Keesler; Edmundson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Kehm v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Keirsey v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Keisling; Oregon Taxpayers United PAC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Kelly; Cosentino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Kelly v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Kelly v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Kemna; Spencer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165,1227 Kemp; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Kenilworth; New Jersey Carpenters Apprentice Train. & Ed. Fd. v. 1241 Kennedy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Kent v. Harvard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Kenton County Bd. of Ed.; Jordan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Kentucky; Chandler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Kentucky; Vergara v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Kentucky Bar Assn.; Roe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlix Page Kentucky Dept. of Corrections; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Kentucky Ed. Professional Standards Bd.; Hubbard v. . . . . . . . . . 1240 Kentucky River Authority; Danville v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Kern v. Rochester . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Kernats; Smiths Industries Medical Systems, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Keshishian v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Kessler; Jae v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Keys v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Keys; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Khanna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Kidd v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Kierstead v. Suter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Killinger; Hampton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Kimball v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Kimble v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247,1282 Kincaid v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Kinder v. Potts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 King v. Fielder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 King v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Kingston Constructors v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. 1274 Kin-Hong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. . . . . . . 1113 Kirby, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Kirk, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262 Kirkland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Kiser v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142,1154 Klingensmith v. Roy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Klyng v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 KMI-Continental, Inc.; Holt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Knapp v. Northwestern Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Knight v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Knotts v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Kobayashi America, Inc.; Sprague v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Koch v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Koche; Maghe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Koger, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Koons Sterling Ford; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Kopf; Guinn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Korean Air Lines Co. v. Bickel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Kovacs v. Mental Health Services of Orange County . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Kraft v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Kraytsberg v. Kraytsberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Krempin; Downey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201,1284 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR l TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Krier v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Kristi Micander, P. C.; Carlson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Kroemer v. Irvin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Kronheim & Co. v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Kruger v. Sonic Restaurants, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Krygoski Construction Co., Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Kucej v. Connecticut Statewide Grievance Committee . . . . . . . . . 1276 Kuchinskas v. Broward County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Kuhlmann; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Kuhn v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Transportation, Driver Licensing 1118 Kuk Chun; Wong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Kumpan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Kutnyak v. Walters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Kuykendall; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1194 L. v. Board of Ed. of Downers Grove Grade School Dist. No. 58 . 1113,1198 L.; Leavitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 L.; Morgan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Labastida v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 LaBonte; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 751,1238 Labor and Industry Review Comm'n; Pioterek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Labor Union. See name of trade. Labour v. American States Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Lackey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Lackey v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Contra Costa County . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Lafever v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana v. Transaero, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Lagana v. Dillon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Lakeside Medical Center; Fidis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Lamb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Lambert v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Lambert v. Wicklund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 Lambrix v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518 Lamont; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Landan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262 Lane v. Ministry of Defense, State of Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Lane v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Lang; Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Lang v. Reynolds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Langdon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Lanier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Lanier; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 L'anza Research International; Quality King Distributors v. . . . . 1250 LaPlant v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED li Page LaPlante v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Lark v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Larson v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Lash, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262 LaShawn A.; Barry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Laureano v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Lawal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Lawanson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Law Offices of Herbert Hafif v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Law Offices of Linnie L. Darden, III; Tatum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Laws v. United Mo. Bank of Kansas City, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Lawuary v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Lazenby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651 Leahy v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Leak v. Grant Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Leal v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130,1225 Leaver v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651 Leavitt v. Jane L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Lebbos v. Massachusetts State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 LeBlanc-Sternberg; Airmont v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Leckie Smokeless Coal Co.; U. M. W. A. 1992 Benefit Plan v. . . . . 1118 LeCureux; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 LeCureux; Turnpaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Ledet v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Leding v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Leeper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Lee Rosenbaum & Associates, P. C.; Craig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Leff v. Institute of Specialized Medicine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Le Grand v. Goord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Leidner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Leija v. Canutillo Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Leiphardt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Lemons; Wootton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Leonard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651 Leppert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Lesley; Belcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Letsinger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Levesque v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Levine v. Goord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Levinson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Levy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112,1207 Levy v. Fresh Fields Market, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Lewis v. Alamance County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Lewis v. Iowa District Court for Des Moines County . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Lewis; Sacramento County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Lewis; Sidles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Lewis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177,1209,1226 Lewis Lang v. Reynolds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach . . . . . . . 1227 Liberty Mut. Ins. Group; Azubuko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Licciardi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Lichtman v. Lichtman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Lidman v. Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1283 Life College, Inc. v. Mangum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Life Ins. Co. of Va.; Barakat v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143,1225 Lightman v. Zenith Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Ligons v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Lindsey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Linnie L. Darden, III; Tatum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Linscomb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103,1193 Linville v. Linville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Linza v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Lippitt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Lippold; Blandino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Liquid Air Corp.; Ilic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Littlefield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Litton Systems, Inc.; Honeywell, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Livingstone; North Belle Vernon Borough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Livingston Union School Dist.; Takahashi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Loaisiga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Local. For labor union, see name of trade. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.; Pate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Logue; Altschul v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Lohse v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Lombard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Lone Star Northwest; Fjetland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Longois; Cornett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Lopez v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231,1282 Loral Corp.; Cvijanovic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Lords Landing Village Condo. Council v. Cont'l Ins. Co. . . . . . . . 893 Lorenz v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Lorenz v. Martin Marietta Corp., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Losada, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260 Losada v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Losada v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Los Angeles Cty.; Huerta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED liii Page Los Angeles Cty. Dept. of Children & Fam. Servs.; Raymond T. v. 1176 Los Angeles Cty. Dept. of Children's Services; Reynolds v. . . . . . 1234 Louisiana; Bethley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259 Louisiana v. Divers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Louisiana; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Louisiana; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Louisiana; Pizzo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Louisiana; Roy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Louisiana; Seals v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Louisiana Dept. of Corrections; English v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.; Verdin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Love; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Love; Fox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Love v. Rouse Co. of Mo. Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Love; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Lovell v. Hurford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156,1249 Lovett v. Minnesota Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Loving v. Pirelli Cable Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Lowe v. Boone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Lowe v. Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Lowe v. Gibson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Lowe v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Lowe v. Pogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Lowe v. Zimmerman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Lowell v. Prunty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Lucas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Luchkowec v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Luck v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Lucky Stores, Inc. v. Holihan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Lufkin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Lufthansa German Airlines, Inc.; Guerriero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114,1198 Lui Kin-Hong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Lundell Mfg. Co.; American Broadcasting Cos. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Lundquist v. Premier Financial Services-Texas, L. P. . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Lungren; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Lungren; Stevenson-Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Luongo; Grassia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Luongo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Lurie v. Caesar's Tahoe, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Lutalo v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Lux v. Spotsylvania County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Lynch v. Boone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Lynch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170,1180 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR liv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Lynn, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Lyons v. Hofbauer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Lyons; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Macalino v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Maccaferri Gabions, Inc. v. Wilkinson & Jenkins Construction Co. 1167 MacFarlane; California Franchise Tax Bd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Machinists; Nielsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Mack v. Caspari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 MacKenzie v. Creager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Mackey v. Stalder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Madanat v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Madden, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Madden v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Madrid v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Madril v. Gallego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Maghe v. Koch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Main v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Maine; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Maine Dept. of Env. Protection; SC Testing Technology v. . . . . . . 1264 Makowski; Welky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Malik v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Malkiewicz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Mallard v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Mallia v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Mallott & Peterson v. Stadtmiller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Malone; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Manchester; Fulfree v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Mangone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Mangrum v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Mangum; Life College, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Mans v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.; Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. . . . . . . 1113 Manussier v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Maravilla v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Marchman v. Cole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Mardula; Merchants Bank of Cal., N. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Maricopa County; Zankich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Marisol A. v. Giuliani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Mark; McReynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Marks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Markson v. A & W Investors Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Marmolejo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Maroney, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101,1207 Marozsan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lv Page Marquez v. Dorsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Marshall v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Marshall v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Marshall v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174,1279 Martech USA, Inc. v. Hoeflich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Martin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Martin; Edmond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Martin v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Martin v. Rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Martin; Schmidt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Martin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Martinac & Co. v. Saratoga Fishing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Martinac & Co.; Saratoga Fishing Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Martin County; Section 28 Partnership, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Martineau v. Cypress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Martinez-Cano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Martinez-Villareal v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Martinez-Villareal; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Martin Marietta Corp., Inc.; Lorenz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Martin-Marietta Technologies, Inc.; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Maryland; Cox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Maryland; Drummond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Maryland; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Maryland; Holman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Maryland; Keirsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Maryland; McNamara v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Maryland; Moschetti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Maryland; Perry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Maryland v. Stanberry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Maryland Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene; Raynor v. . . . . . . 1166 Mason v. Norwest Bank S. D., N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Mason v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Mason v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132,1202 Massachusetts; Arigoni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Massachusetts; Beldotti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Massachusetts; Gregory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Massachusetts; Vieux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Massachusetts Dept. of Correction; Wilder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Massachusetts State Bar; Lebbos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Massasoit Greyhound, Inc.; Pielech v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Mastaw v. Norfolk & Western R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Mathewson v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Mathis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Matthews v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Mattox v. Dallas Bd. of Adjustments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Maudal v. Texas Instruments Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Maxberry v. Paramount Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Maxwell v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Maxwell v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 May v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 May v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Mayor of Alton; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Mayor of Baltimore; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Mayor of Baltimore; Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. . . . . . 1204 Mayor of Baltimore; Sweeney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Mayor of D. C.; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Mayor of D. C. v. LaShawn A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Mayor of Jersey City v. American Civil Liberties Union of N. J. . 1265 Mayor of New York City; Marisol A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Mays v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Mazurek v. Armstrong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Mazurkiewicz; Crosby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Mazzei, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 McAffee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 MCA Television, Ltd.; Feltner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 McBride v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 McCain v. Gramley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 McCall, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 McCauley-Bey v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 McClain; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 McClain v. Rho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 McClain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 McClure; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 McColm v. Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176,1283 McColm v. Nelson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 McCormack Resources; Garrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 McCotter; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 McCotter; Werner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 McCoy; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 McCoy v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 McCoy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 McCrea v. Andrews Federal Credit Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 McCroy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 McCullah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 McDaniel; Farmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 McDonald, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 McDonald; Catz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lvii Page McDonald v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 McDonald v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 McDonnell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 McDougall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 McGann; Ernst & Young LLP v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 McGehee; United Companies Lending Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 McGillivray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 McGuire v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 McHan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 McKee; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 McKenzie v. Renberg's, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 McKinley v. District of Columbia Dept. of Human Services . . . . . 1108 McKinney v. Baldwin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 McKinney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110,1226 McKnight; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 McKoy v. Morris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 McLemore v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 McLeod v. News-Register Publishing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 McLeod v. Oregon Lithoprint, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 McMillian v. Monroe County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 781,1102 McMullen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 McMullin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 McNamara v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 McNeil v. Aguilos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 McNely; Ocala Star-Banner Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 McQueen v. Parker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 McQueen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 McQuilken v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 McRae v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 McReynolds v. Gangel-Jacob . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173,1260 McReynolds v. Kaye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 McReynolds v. Mark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 McReynolds v. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 McReynolds v. Venkataraghaven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 McTeer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 McVicar v. Griffin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Medina, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Medina v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Medina v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Medina v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Medley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Medrano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Meehan v. East Lyme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Melius v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Mendoza Duarte; Arizona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Mental Health Services of Orange County; Kovacs v. . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Merchants Bank of Cal., N. A. v. Mardula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Merchants Bank & Trust Co.; Butler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176,1283 Merit Contracting, Inc. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Dancer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Durst-Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Merritt v. Bureau of Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Metro-North Commuter R. Co. v. Padilla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Metro-North Commuter R. Co.; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.; Coulter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Meyer; Nesbitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Meyers v. Norfolk and Western R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Miami; Skinner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Micander, P. C.; Carlson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Michigan; Darwall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Michigan; Dye v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Michigan v. Fernengel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Michigan; Linza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Michigan Dept. of Corrections; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Michigan Document Services, Inc. v. Princeton Univ. Press . . . . . 1156 Mickens v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Micron Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Midcon Equipment Co. v. John Deere Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Middleton; Flint v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Midwest Investments v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n . . . . . 1165 Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach; Lexecon Inc. v. . . . . . . 1227 Miles v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Miles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Miller v. Albright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195,1208 Miller v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Miller; Chandler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 Miller v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Miller; Ivy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Miller; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Miller v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Miller v. Schoemehl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Miller v. State Industrial Ins. System of Nev. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Miller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Mills; Englander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Millus v. Newsday, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Milnes v. Fletcher Pacific Construction Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lix Page Miltland Raleigh-Durham; Mudie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Milton v. World Savings and Loan Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Milton S. Kronheim & Co. v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Minard; Startup v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Mincey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Mines v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Ministry of Defense, State of Israel; Lane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Minnesota; Hendrickson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Minnesota Bd. of Medical Practice; Tatreau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Minnesota Dept. of Corrections; Lovett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Minnesota Pollution Control Agency; Mmubango v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Minniecheske, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Mississippi; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Mississippi; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Mississippi; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Mississippi; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Mississippi; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Mississippi; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Mississippi; Saulsberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Mississippi; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145,1225 Mississippi Bar; Robb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Missouri v. Futo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Missouri; Jordan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Missouri; Rushing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Missouri; Smulls v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Harper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Missouri Parole Bd.; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Mitchell v. Albuquerque Bd. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Mitchell; Diaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Mitchell v. Parker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Mitchell v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Mitchell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1180,1280 Mixon v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Mmubango v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Mobley; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Moffitt v. Charlotte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Molina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Molina Lopez v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Mollenhour v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Molson Breweries; Dorf & Stanton Communications, Inc. v. . . . . . 1275 Monaco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Monroe v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Monroe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Monroe County; McMillian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 781,1102 Monroe Township; Zafiratos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Montana System of Higher Ed.; Giebel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Montez v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Montgomery; Azubuko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1225 Montgomery County Dept. of Social Services; Clemy P. v. . . . . . . 1267 Montoya, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1284 Moore; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Moore; Ligons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Moore v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Moore v. Perrin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Moore; Plyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Moore v. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Moore; Sheets v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Moore v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Moore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131,1282 Moore McCormack Resources; Garrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Morales v. Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Morales; Pugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Morales-Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Morath, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262 Mordan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, J/V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Moreno Ramos v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Moretz v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Morewitz v. Ashmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1225 Morgan v. Chris L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Morgan; Rhoden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Morgan v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Morgan v. Texas Utilities Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Moriel v. Prunty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Mormon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Morris; DeLone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Morris; Fett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Morris; McKoy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Morris v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Morris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Morris v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Morrison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131,1194 Morrow v. Winslow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Morton; Chalet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Morton; Gerald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Morton; Goldy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxi Page Mosby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Moschetti v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Mosley; David v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Mothershed v. Durbin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Mott v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Mount Juneau Enterprises, Inc. v. Juneau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Muchnick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Mudie v. Miltland Raleigh-Durham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Mueller; Cohea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Muhammad, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Muhaymin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Mullanix v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Mulligan v. Barnett Bank of Central Fla., N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1194 Mullinax v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Mullon; Holtzman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Multani v. Ross Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Multani v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Mundy v. Dupree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Mundy v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Mundy v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Murff; Professional Medical Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238,1273 Murphy; McReynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Murphy v. Perrill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Murphy v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Murray v. Babbitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187,1259 Murray; Hayward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Murry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Muse v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Muse v. International Business Machines Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Mussari v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Hatch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Myers v. Shumacher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Myers; Tolliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Myers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218,1223,1270 Myles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Nachman; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Nadal v. Yonkers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Nagi v. C. E. Fleming Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Nagle v. Bailey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Napoletano; CIGNA HealthCare of Conn., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Nassau County v. State Employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Nasset; Futterman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 National Credit Union Admin.; CEDC Federal Credit Union v. . . 1165 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page National Credit Union Admin.; Sadowski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 NLRB; Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 NLRB; Geske & Sons, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Van Holt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh; Fidel v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Neal; Tuller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Nebraska; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Neese v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Negrete-Diaz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Neiderlitz; Prestonwood Golf Club Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Neilsen; C. O. N. T. R. O. L. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Nelson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Nelson v. DeTella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Nelson v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Nelson; McColm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Nelson v. Strawn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Nelson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1122,1203 Nesbitt v. Meyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Nesson v. Nesson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Netherland; O'Dell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Nettles v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Neustrup; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Nevada; Atkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Nevada; Barrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Nevada; Bentsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Nevada; Bonta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Nevada; Cardwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Nevada; Daws v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Despain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Dortch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Nevada; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Nevada; Everhart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Nevada; Fitzgerald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145,1214 Nevada; Florio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Franklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Nevada; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Gauthier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Nevada; Giseburt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Gomes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Nevada; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Nevada; Hiltunen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Iko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Nevada; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Nevada; Jenson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxiii Page Nevada; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Nevada; Labastida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Nevada; Lafever v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Lane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Nevada; Macalino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Nevada; Mathewson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Nevada; May v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Nevada; Reeves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Singleton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Nevada; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Sparks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Spike v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Nevada; Tapia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Nevada; Trillo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Nevada; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Nevada; Wesley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Nevada; Wheeler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Nevada; Whiterock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Nevada; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Nevada; Witter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Nevada; Wood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Nevada; Zamora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Nevius v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Newberry; Todd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 New Hampshire; Veale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 New Jersey; Farmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 New Jersey; Medina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 New Jersey v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 New Jersey Carpenters Apprentice Train. & Ed. Fd. v. Kenilworth 1241 New Jersey ReIns. Co.; Tarapacki v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Newman v. Associated Press, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 New Mexico; Ogden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 New Mexico; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Newsday, Inc.; Millus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 News-Register Publishing Co.; McLeod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Newton v. Board of Fitness for Bar Applicants, Sup. Ct. of Ga. . . 1283 New Valley Corp.; Administracion Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (Antel) v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 New York; Arbeiter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 New York; Cliff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 New York; Harvey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 New York; Mallia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 New York; New Jersey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page New York v. Owens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 New York; Siddiqui v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 New York; Walsh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 New York; Woodard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 New York City v. Bery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 New York City v. Ivani Contracting Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 New York City Dept. of Housing Preserv. and Dev.; Abidekun v. 1241 New York Mercantile Exchange; Tavora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 New York Public Service Comm'n v. FERC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 New York State Dept. of Social Services; Nicolau v. . . . . . . . . . . 1127 New York State Unified Court System; Schulz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 New York Tax Appeals Tribunal; Lunding v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Ng v. Quiet Forest II Homeowners Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1193 Nguyen v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Nicholas v. Pataki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Nichols v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651 Nickel v. Hannigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Nicolau v. New York State Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Nicolaus v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Nicoletti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Niederlitz; Prestonwood Country Club v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Nielsen v. Machinists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Nielson; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Nikolits v. Parrish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Nitz; Illinois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Noe v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256,1267 Norbury v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Nordberg; Tanca v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Nordquest, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Norfolk and Western R. Co.; Meyers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Lang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Norfolk Southern R. Co.; Prickett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Norfolk Southern R. Co.; Trimiew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Norfolk & Western R. Co.; Mastaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Norris; Asam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Norris; Easter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Norris; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Norris; Tosh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 North Belle Vernon Borough v. Livingstone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 North Carolina; Ball v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 North Carolina; Elliott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 North Carolina; Fullwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 North Carolina; Harden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 North Carolina; Hartman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxv Page North Carolina; Heatwole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 North Carolina; Norwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 North Carolina; Penland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 North Carolina; Womble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 North Carolina; Wooten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 North Central Bronx Hospital; Philippeaux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Northern Services, Inc.; Hartman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Northrop Grumman Corp.; United States ex rel. Sylvester v. . . . 1119 Northwest Airlines, Inc.; Alessi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Northwestern Univ.; Knapp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Northwest Iowa Mental Health Center; Somers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Northwest Savings Bank; Huff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Norwest Bank S. D., N. A.; Mason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Norwood v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Novey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Novi; Paragon Properties Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Nowaczyk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Nowak; Tak How Investment Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Nowicki v. Bruff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Noyes; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Nunes v. Florida Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 NYSA­ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund; De Buono v. . . . 806 Oak Forest Police Pension Bd; Zielinski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Oakley; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200,1256 Oberuch v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Oboh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Ocala Star-Banner Corp. v. McNely . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 O'Callaghan; Republican Party of Alaska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Ochoa v. Federal Communications Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Ochoa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 O'Connell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 O'Connor; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 O'Dell v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Supreme Court of Ohio; Harper v. 1274 Office of Government Ethics; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Office of Personnel Management; Jefferson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Ogbuehi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Ogden v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Ogletree v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Ohio; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Ohio; Farrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Ohio; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Ohio; Keaton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Ohio; Swiger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ohio; Tolbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Lyons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Ohio Assn. of Independent Schools v. Goff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 OI­NEG TV Products, Inc. v. Durko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Oklahoma; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Oklahoma; Carey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Oklahoma; Charm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Oklahoma; Easterwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Oklahoma; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Oklahoma; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Oklahoma; Leding v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Oklahoma; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Oklahoma; Mallard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Oklahoma; Mason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Oklahoma; Norbury v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Oklahoma; Reid v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Oklahoma; Rhine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Oklahoma; Ridgeway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Oklahoma; Willoughby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Oklahoma; Wolfe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Okoli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Old Line Life Ins. Co. of America; Daniell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Old Town Trolley; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Oliver; Dodd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125,1249 Oliver v. Fuch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Oliver v. Rossen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Olkey v. Hyperion 1999 Term Trust, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Olk Long; Shepherd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Olsen v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Olson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Olsten Staffing Services; Crane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Omori v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 O'Neal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 O'Neill v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 1­95­CV­553­D1; 1­95­CV­553­P1 v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 1­95­CV­553­P1 v. 1­95­CV­553­D1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Ontiveros v. Dorsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Opuku-Boateng; California v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Orback v. Hewlett-Packard Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Oregon; Montez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Oregon Lithoprint, Inc.; McLeod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Oregon Secretary of State; Oregon Taxpayers United PAC v. . . . 1252 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxvii Page Oregon Taxpayers United PAC v. Keisling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Ornelas v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Orozco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Ortega Venegas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Ortiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Orton v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Oshkosh Truck Corp.; Oliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Osias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Osume v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Otis Elevator Co.; Tuerk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Outlaws Club v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Overfield v. Bonsignore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Overseas Bulktank Corp. v. Rose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Owens v. Department of Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Owens; New York v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Owens; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Owens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 OXY USA Inc.; Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 1241 P. v. Montgomery County Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Pacheco-Chong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Pacheco-Maldonado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Pacific Southwest Seed & Grain, Inc. v. Botelho Shipping Corp. . . . 1211 Paddock Publications, Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Padilla; Metro-North Commuter R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Pagan v. Warner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Page; Holman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Page v. Saunders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Painesville Township; Buss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Painter; Day v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107,1194 Paladin v. Finnerty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Pallan v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Pall Corp.; Micron Separations, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Palmer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Palomo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Panchal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Pandey v. Graham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Paolo Gucci Design Studio, Ltd. v. Sinatra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Papai; Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 548 Pappas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Paradies v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Paragon Properties Co. v. Novi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Paramount Communications; Maxberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Parker v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Parker; McQueen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Parker; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Parker v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Parker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Park Place Apartments; Struve v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Parrish; Nikolits v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Parrish; Willis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Parsley Dairy Farm v. Cargill, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Parsley Dairy Farm; Cargill, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Parsons v. BASF Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Parton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Passman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Pastorius v. Romer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Pataki; Nicholas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Pataki; Volberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Pate v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Patel v. Penman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Patrick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1170 Patterson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Patterson v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Patton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Paul v. Cribb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Paulus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Payne, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Payne v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Pease v. Yellowstone County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Peck v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Peden v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Peeler v. Spartan Radiocasting, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Pena-Castrejon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Penland v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Penman; Patel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Schmoke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Pennington; Garner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Pennsylvania; Abdul-Salaam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Pennsylvania; Ballod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Pennsylvania; Beasley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Pennsylvania; Burchill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Pennsylvania; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Pennsylvania; Hinchliffe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Pennsylvania; Miles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Pennsylvania; Mines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Pennsylvania; Reyes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxix Page Pennsylvania; Rios v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Pennsylvania; Rucci v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Pennsylvania; Showers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Pennsylvania; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Pennsylvania; Wooley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Pennsylvania Dept. of Transportation, Driver Licensing; Kuhn v. 1118 Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n v. Philadelphia . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Penny v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Pepe; French v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Perales-Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Perdue v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121,1175 Perrill; Murphy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Perrin; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Perry v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Perryman v. Prado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Persyn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Peters v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Peters; Vance v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Petersen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Peterson; Bouie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Peterson v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Peterson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Petrick v. Reynolds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Pettco Enterprises, Inc. v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Pfluger v. Illinois Dept. of Professional Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Phidd v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Philadelphia; Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Philadelphia Electric Co.; Fischer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Philippeaux v. North Central Bronx Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Philips v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Phillip; Rahman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Phillips v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Phillips v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Phillips Episcopal Memorial Medical Center v. Rishell . . . . . . . . . 1152 Pickens v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Pickett v. American Breeders Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Pick 'n Save; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Pidal; Williamson of Homestead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Pidal; W. W. W. Enterprises, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Pierpoint; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Pierre v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Pierre Hotel; Hussein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188,1283 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Pierson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Pierson v. Wilshire Terrace Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Pieschek; Casteel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Pigram v. Thymes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Pillette v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Pinkins; Ellis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Pino-Lara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Pioterek v. Labor and Industry Review Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Pirelli Cable Corp.; Loving v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Pitt, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Pizzo v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190,1260 Pizzo v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Platt v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Pledger v. Arkansas Regional Blood Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Plust, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Plyler v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Pogue; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Pollard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Ponce-Bran v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ. and Colleges . . . . . . . 1191 Ponder v. Dye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Porter v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Porter v. Senkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Porter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Porter v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129,1283 Portillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Posey v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Postmaster General; Dodson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Postmaster General; Gallares v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Postmaster General; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Postmaster General; Hale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Postmaster General; Hough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Postmaster General; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Postmaster General; Rowls v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Postmaster General; Skinner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Potomac Electric Power Co.; Willoughby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Potts; Kinder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Powell v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Powell; Ingram v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Powell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Powell; Vaden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Prado; Perryman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxi Page Premier Financial Services-Texas, L. P.; Lundquist v. . . . . . . . . . 1229 Presbytery of N. J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Whitman 1155 Prescott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 President of U. S.; Califorrniaa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 President of U. S.; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1283 President of U. S.; Tavakoli-Nouri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 President of U. S.; Vey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Presiding Justice, Sup. Ct. of N. Y., App. Div., 1st Jud. Dept.; McReynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Pressley v. Pressley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Prestonwood Country Club v. Niederlitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Prestonwood Golf Club Corp. v. Niederlitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Pretty v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Prewitt; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Price v. Bossier Parish School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471,1164 Price v. Charlotte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Price; Charlotte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Price; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Prickett v. Norfolk Southern R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Prince George's County v. Alexander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Prince Graves Homes; Hicks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Princeton Univ. Press; Michigan Document Services, Inc. v. . . . . 1156 Pringle v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Pritchard; Southern Co. Services, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Pritchard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Professional Medical Ins. Co. v. Murff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238,1273 Propes v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Prou v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Prudential Securities, Inc.; Detroit Pension Fund v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Prunty; Lowell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Prunty; Moriel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Prunty; Stephen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 PSI Repair Services, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Public Service Co. of Colo.; Amoco Production Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Pugh v. Morales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Pullock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Purtle; Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Quaglino Tobacco & Candy Co.; Joseph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Quality King Distributors v. L'anza Research International . . . . . 1250 Quick; Eldridge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Quiet Forest II Homeowners Assn.; Sing Cho Ng v. . . . . . . . . 1106,1193 R.; Dry Creek Rancheria v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Radcliffe v. Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Rafael Medrano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ragusa v. Dillon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Rahman v. Phillip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Railroad Retirement Bd.; Watts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Raines v. Byrd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Rambo; Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130,1220 Ramos v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Ramos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128,1131 Randall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Randolph; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Raney; Carr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Rash; Associates Commercial Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1141,1163 Ratelle; Herman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Raup; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Ray; Sharp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Raymond T. v. L. A. Cty. Dept. of Children & Family Services . . 1176 Raynor v. Maryland Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene . . . . . . 1166 Reagans v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Recession Hearing Official; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Red Rock Commodities, Ltd. v. ABN­AMRO Bank, N. A. . . . . . . 1166 Reed, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184,1272 Reed v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Reed v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Reese v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Reeves v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Regents of Univ. of Cal.; Genentech, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Regions Bank; Baheth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117,1224 Registrar of Motor Vehicles; Azubuko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157,1225 Rehnquist; Babigian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Reid; Jahannes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142,1214 Reid v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Reliable Business Computers v. Heurtebise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Remeta v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147,1225 Renberg's, Inc.; McKenzie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Renfroe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1113 Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471,1164 Reno; Gaither v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Reno; Spice Entertainment Cos. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Reno; Terry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Reprise Records; Spiegelman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Republican Party of Alaska v. O'Callaghan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Revenue Division, Dept. of Treasury of Mich.; Thiokol Corp. v. . . 1271 Reyes v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxiii Page Reyna v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Reynolds; Lewis Lang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Reynolds v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children's Services . . . 1234 Reynolds; Petrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Rheinstrom v. Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Rhine v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Rho; McClain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Rhoades v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Rhoden v. Morgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Rhodes v. Brigano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Riales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Ricardo Ruiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Richards, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262 Richards v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Richards v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385,1102,1154 Richardson v. Albertson's, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Richardson v. Bakery Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143,1225 Richardson v. McKnight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Richardson; Standifird v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Richcreek; Arizona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Richmond Heights Local School Dist.; Dawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Ricotta v. Ricotta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Riddick v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Ridgeway v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Rieflin v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Riggle; Burnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Rios v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Rishell; Jane Phillips Episcopal Memorial Medical Center v. . . . . 1152 Rishell; Wellshear v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Risley v. Faunce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Ritsema; Tidik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Rivas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Rivera Contreras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Rivers v. Farcas, Stewart, Brownie, Handson & Bliss . . . . . . . . . 1242 Rivers; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Rivers; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Roane v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Robb v. Mississippi Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Roberts; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Robertson; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Robertson; Hearn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Robertson v. Thornell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Robertson County; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Roberts & Schaefer Co.; Merit Contracting, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Robinson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Robinson v. Barbour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Robinson v. Cleveland Heights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Robinson v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1283 Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Robinson; Rheinstrom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Robinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Robokoff v. Women's Choice of Bergen County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Rochester; Kern v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Rocking Horse Ridge Estates Assn.; Cherry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Rodea v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Rodgers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Rodriguez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Rodriguez v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Rodriguez; Rosenstiel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Rodriguez-Meraz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Rodriguez Salinas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Roe v. Kentucky Bar Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Roe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Rogers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161,1178,1237,1239,1247 Rokosik; Seamon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Roman; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Romer; Pastorius v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Ronwin v. Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Pro. Ethics and Conduct 1241 Roosevelt; Finaloc, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Rosati v. Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Rose v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Rose; Overseas Bulktank Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Rose v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Rose v. Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Rosenbalm v. DeMorales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Rosenbaum & Associates, P. C.; Craig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Ross v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202,1216 Rossen; Oliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Ross Univ.; Multani v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Rothschild v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Rouse Co. of Mo. Inc.; Love v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Rowbal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Rowe v. Board of Ed. of Chattanooga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Rowls v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Roy; Klingensmith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxv Page Roy v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Royal King Fisheries v. Fuszek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Rucci v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Rudd, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Ruelas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Ruiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176,1191 Runnels v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Runyon; Dodson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Runyon; Gallares v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Runyon; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Runyon; Hale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Runyon; Hough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Runyon; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Runyon; Rowls v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Runyon; Skinner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Rushing v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Russell v. Bryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Russell v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Russell v. Robertson County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Ruthers v. Gulch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Ruthruff v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Ryan; Asam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Ryion v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Saba; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Sacerio v. School Bd. of Dade County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Sacramento County v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Saculla v. Wisconsin Medical Examining Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Sadowski v. National Credit Union Administration . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Saffle v. Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Safford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 St. Joseph v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 St. Paul-Ramsey Medical Center, Inc. v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 St. Petersburg v. Bowen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Saiyed v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Salazar-Haro v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . 1239 Salinas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Saltaris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Samuel v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157,1283 Sanchez; Colorado v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Sanchez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Sanders v. Arneson Products, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Sanders v. Edwards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Sandoval v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Sands, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153,1262 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page San Francisco v. Carpenter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Sanguandikul v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 San Luis Obispo County; Gates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Santa Ana v. Hernandez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Santa Ana; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Santiago v. Ware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Santos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J. M. Martinac & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Saratoga Fishing Co.; J. M. Martinac & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Sarpy County; Cohen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Saturn General Motors Corp.; Bowers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170,1283 Saulsberry v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Saulsgiver v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Saunders; Page v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Saunders v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212,1253 Sawyer; Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church v. . . . . . . 1117 Sawyers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Scanlin v. Cooper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Scheetz v. Seville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Scheffer; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Schindler Elevator Corp.; Fletcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174,1260 Schlottman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Schmidt v. Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Schmoke; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Schmoke; Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Schmoke; Sweeney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Schoemehl; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 School Bd. of Dade County; Sacerio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Schriro; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Schroeder v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Schroeder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Schroering v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co. . . . . . . . . . 1118 Schulz v. New York State Unified Court System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Schumer; Hughes Aircraft Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Schundler v. American Civil Liberties Union of N. J. . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Schwab & Co.; Guice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Schwartz, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184,1208,1272 Schwartz v. Emhart Glass Machinery, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Schwarz v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Schwarz v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Schwarz v. Commission on Civil Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Schwarz v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216,1283 Schwarz v. Office of Government Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Schwarz v. Woodruff, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxvii Page Schweihs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Scott v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Scott v. Dime Savings Bank of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122,1225 Scott v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Scott v. Nachman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Scott v. Recession Hearing Official . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Scott v. Sutor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Scott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Scott-Harris; Bogan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Scroger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Scruggs v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 SC Testing Technology, Inc. v. Maine Dept. of Env. Protection . . 1264 Seagram & Sons, Inc.; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Seals v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Seamon v. Rokosik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Sears, Roebuck & Co.; Caudle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Seattle Bldg. & Constr. Coun.; Constr. Ind. Train. Coun. of Wash. v. 1210 Secretary of Agriculture; Worthington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Secretary of Air Force; House the Homeless, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Secretary of Army; Boulineau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Secretary of Army; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129,1283 Secretary of Army; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148,1225 Secretary of Commerce; Alliance Against IFQs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Secretary of Defense; Selland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Secretary of HHS; Courtney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Secretary of HHS; St. Paul-Ramsey Medical Center, Inc. v. . . . . 1250 Secretary of Interior; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187,1259 Secretary of Labor; Joy Technologies, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Secretary of State; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195,1208 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Agcaoili v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159,1249 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; McRae v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Section 28 Partnership, Ltd. v. Martin County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Securities and Exchange Comm'n; Midwest Investments v. . . . . . 1165 Securities and Exchange Comm'n; Orton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 See Chong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . 1119 Seeger v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Seiler v. Thalacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Selland v. Cohen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Senkowski; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Senkowski; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Serra, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Service Employees; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119,1225 Severa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Seville; Scheetz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Seward v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Shaffer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Shaffett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Shalala; Courtney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Shalala; St. Paul-Ramsey Medical Center, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Shaller v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Shanks; Sinks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Shaper v. Tracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Sharp v. Allstate Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Sharp v. Ray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Shatner v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Shaw; Atlantic Coast Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Shay v. Howard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Shea & Gould v. Durkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Sheets v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Shell Oil Co.; Slagel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Shell Oil Co.; Van Scoy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168,1169 Shell Oil Station; Bunnell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Shelton v. Barnes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Shepherd v. Olk Long . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Sheppard v. Diaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Sheppard Air Force Base; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Shinn v. College Station Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Shinn; Gates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Shoketsu Kinzoku Kabushiki Co. v. Festo Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Shoobs v. Zaveletta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Shoppers Food Warehouse; D'Ambrosio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Short, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Short v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Showers v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Shumacher; Myers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Siddiqui v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Sidles v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Sidles v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Siegler; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Sikes; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Sikes; Harmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Sikora v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Silmon v. First Bancorp of La., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Silver v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Silverman; DelCourt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213,1283 Simmons v. Burns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Simms; Cannon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Simpson; Ernst & Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxix Page Simpson v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Sims v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Sims v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Sinatra; Paolo Gucci Design Studio, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Sindram v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Sing Cho Ng v. Quiet Forest II Homeowners Assn. . . . . . . . . 1106,1193 Singh v. General Accounting Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Singletary; Calamia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Singletary; Durham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Singletary; Glock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Singletary; Holliday v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Singletary; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Singletary; Lambrix v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518 Singletary; Marshall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174,1279 Singletary; Medina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Singletary; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Singletary; Morgan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Singletary; Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Singletary; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Singletary; Pickens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Singletary; Remeta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147,1225 Singletary; Watts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Singletary; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158,1283 Singleton v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Sinks v. Shanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Sirbaugh; CSX Transportation, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Sisco v. Ault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Sisk v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Sistrunk v. Strongsville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Six v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Skinner v. Miami . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Skinner v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Slaby v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Comm'n . . . . . . . . . 1190 Slagel v. Shell Oil Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Sloan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Sloboda, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Smallwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Smart v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Smart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 SMC Corp. v. Festo Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Smith v. Alabama Aviation and Technical College . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Smith v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Smith v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Smith v. Elkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Smith v. Metro-North Commuter R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Smith v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Smith v. Noyes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Smith v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Smith v. Pick 'n Save . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Smith v. Roman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya . . . . . . . . 1204,1259 Smith; Tremblay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Smith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . 1144,1160,1193,1203,1219,1225,1248 Smith v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Smith v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Smith Corp.; Klehr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142,1154 Smiths Industries Medical Systems, Inc. v. Kernats . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Smulls v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Snipe, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 So v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; Smith v. . . . . . . . 1204,1259 Solan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Solano County; White Wing Associates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Solano County; White Wing Development, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Somers v. Northwest Iowa Mental Health Center . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Somers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Song v. Countryman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Sonic Restaurants, Inc.; Kruger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Sonnenfeld; Denver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Soria v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Sotelo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Soto-Fong v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Southall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 South Carolina v. Environmental Technology Council . . . . . . . . . 1113 South Carolina v. Fowler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 South Carolina; George v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 South Carolina; Henry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 South Carolina; Humphries v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 South Carolina; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 South Carolina; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Southern v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Southern Co. Services, Inc. v. Pritchard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Southfield; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 South Ga. Medical Center; Crosby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Southwest Airlines Co. v. Fennessy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Sparks v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Spartan Radiocasting, Inc.; Peeler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxi Page Spear; Bennett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 Spear v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Spearman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Spears v. DSM Copolymer, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Spears v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Special Judge, District Court of Okla., Okla. County; Cornforth v. 1241 Speckard v. Ayala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Spence v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Spencer v. Kemna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165,1227 Spice Entertainment Cos. v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Spicer v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Spiegelman v. Reprise Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Spike v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Spinden v. GS Roofing Products Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Spotsylvania County; Lux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Spradling; Tulsa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Sprague; Hacklander-Ready v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Sprague v. Kobayashi America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Spruill v. Gillis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Spychala, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Stadtmiller; Mallott & Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Stage House Inn; Vrettos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Stahl v. Director, Central Intelligence Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Stalder; Mackey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Stanberry; Maryland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Standifird v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Stanescu v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Stanley v. Boles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Stapley v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Star Editorial, Inc.; Dangerfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Startup v. Minard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 State. See also name of State. State Bar of Cal.; Ainsworth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172,1271 State Bar of Cal.; Cohea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 State Bar of Cal.; Wolfgram v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1283 State Employees; Nassau County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 State Industrial Ins. System of Nev.; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 State Oil Co. v. Khan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 State Roads Comm'n of Md. Highway Admin.; WJM Realty v. . . 1212 Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee v. Beasley . . . . 1166 Staup v. First Union National Bank of Fla. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Steamship Mut. Underwriting Assn. (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Baris . . . 1168 Stearman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Steele v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Stein; Hartnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Stelmokas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Stelmokevicius v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Stepanik; England v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Stephen v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Stephen v. Prunty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Stevedoring Services of America v. Director, OWCP . . . . . . . 1155,1250 Steven L. v. Board of Ed. of Downers Grove School Dist. 58 . . . 1113,1198 Stevens; Dyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Stevens; Jacobson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177,1260 Stevenson-Bey v. Lungren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Stewart; Koch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Stewart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220,1236,1246 Stewart; Woratzeck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173,1260 Stine; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Stoker v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Stone, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Stone v. Byrd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P. C.; Devine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Stowe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Strate v. A­1 Contractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438 Straub; Atlas Turner, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Strawn; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Strickland Youth Center; Buford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Strongsville; Sistrunk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Struve v. Park Place Apartments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Sturgis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Suan See Chong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . 1119 Suffolk Parents of Handicapped Adults v. Wingate . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 725 Sullivan v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Sullivan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Sunburst Products, Inc. v. Cyrk Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.; Oncale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Sundwall v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Superintendent of penal or correctional institution. See name or title of superintendent. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . 1193 Superior Court of Cal., Santa Clara County; Arteaga v. . . . . . . . . 1233 Supreme Court of Appeals of W. Va.; Dostert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Supreme Court of N. Y.; Einaugler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Suter; Kierstead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxiii Page Sutor; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Sutton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Swaney v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Sweeney v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Sweeney v. Schmoke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Swiger v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Swigert; Abele v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Swihart; Higgason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Sylvester; Douglas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Sylvester v. Northrop Grumman Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Szmalec v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 T. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children and Family Services 1176 Tadros v. Brooklyn Developmental Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Tahoe Regional Planning Agency; Suitum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 725 Takacs, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Takahashi v. Livingston Union School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Tak How Investment Ltd. v. Nowak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Talamasey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Tanca v. Nordberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Tapia v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Taplin v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Tarapacki v. New Jersey ReIns. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Tarrant; Jefferson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Tarrant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Tatreau v. Minnesota Bd. of Medical Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Tatum v. Law Offices of Linnie L. Darden, III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Tauil-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Tavakoli-Nouri v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Tavares v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Tax Comm'r of Ohio; Shaper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Taylor v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Taylor v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Taylor; Mangrum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Taylor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103,1148,1161,1181,1223 Taylor Equipment, Inc. v. John Deere Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Tebbetts v. Whitson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Tee v. UAL Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Tei Fu Chen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Tennessee; Giorgio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Tennessee; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218,1257 Tennessee; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Territory. See name of Territory. Terry v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Texaco Inc.; Commissioner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Texas; Altschul v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177,1244,1245 Texas; Barnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Texas; Brewer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Texas; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Texas; Burks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Texas; Carman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Texas v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Texas; Cockrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Texas; Dickerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Texas; Goff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Texas; Golden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Texas; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Texas; Herman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Texas; Johnson-Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Texas; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Texas; Lackey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Texas; Losada v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Texas; Madden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Texas; Maxwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Texas; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Texas; Moreno Ramos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Texas; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Texas v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Texas; Runnels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Texas; Sisk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Texas; Soria v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Texas; Southern v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Texas; Spence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Texas; Szmalec v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Texas; Trevino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Texas; Villareal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Texas; Westley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Texas Instruments Corp.; Maudal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp. . . . . . . . 1228 Texas Utilities Electric Co.; Morgan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Thalacker; Seiler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Thanh Hai Vominh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Division, Dept. of Treasury of Mich. . . 1271 Thomas; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Thomas; Gonzales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Thomas v. McCotter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxv Page Thomas v. Owens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Thomas v. Tusan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Thomas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110,1221 Thomas v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148,1225 Thomas, Head & Greisen Employees Trust; Buster v. . . . . . . . . . 1116 Thompson v. Calderon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259 Thompson; Holcomb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Thompson; McBride v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Thompson v. True . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Thompson v. Trusty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Thompson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Thongvanh v. Ault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 THORN Americas, Inc. v. Fogie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Thornell; Robertson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Thornton v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Thornton v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Thornton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Three Rivers Area Hospital; Hutton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Thymes; Pigram v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. California Labor Comm'r . . . . 1248 Tidik v. Kaufman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Tidik v. Ritsema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Tidik v. Tidik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Tierney v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Tilley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Tillman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Timber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Timmons v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 Tin Yat Chin v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Tipton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Tobie v. Department of Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1237 Todd v. Newberry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Todd v. U. S. Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Tokars v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Tolbert v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Tolbert v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Tolliver v. Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Toombs; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1194 Topp v. Idaho State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Tosh v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Totoro v. H. A. DeHart & Son, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Tower Air, Inc.; Branch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Town. See name of town. Townsend; Carner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Towse; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Tracy; Shaper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Transaero, Inc.; La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Transportation Communications Union; Gresham v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Trans World Airlines; Colligan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Traylor Brothers, Inc.; DiGiovanni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Tremblay v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Trest v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Trevino v. Gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Trevino; Gates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Trevino v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Trevino-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Triem v. Alaska Bar Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Trillo v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Trimiew v. Norfolk Southern R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Tripati v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Triplett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236,1270 Tristan Montoya, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1284 Trobaugh v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Trotter v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Trowbridge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Trowery v. Gale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 True; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Trustees of Cal. State Univ. and Colleges; Ponce-Bran v. . . . . . . . 1191 Trustees of Teamsters Pension Trust of Phila. v. Federal Express 1151 Trusty; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Tucker v. Coggins/Continental Granite Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Tucker v. Department of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Tucker v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Tucker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178,1192,1222 Tucker Bey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Tuerk v. Otis Elevator Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Tuller v. Neal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Tulsa v. Spradling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Tumlin v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Turner; Bailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Turner v. Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Turner; Dever v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Turner v. Guam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Turner v. Kuykendall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1194 Turner; Timmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxvii Page Turnpaugh v. LeCureux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Turpin; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Turpin; Gary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Tusan; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Twin Cities Area New Party; Timmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 Tyler, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Tyler v. Schriro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Tyler v. Ulrich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Tyus; Urban Search Management v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 UAL Corp.; Tee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Ugwu v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Ukandu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Ulloa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Ulrich; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Umana; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Union. For labor union, see name of trade. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Comsource Independent Food Service Cos. 1229 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Union Recovery Ltd. Partnership; Horton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 United. For labor union, see name of trade. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Kahn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 United Companies Lending Corp. v. McGehee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 United Machine Specialties Corp.; Vrettos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 United Mine Workers 1992 Benefit Plan v. Leckie Smokeless Coal 1118 United Mo. Bank of Kansas City, N. A.; Laws v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 United States. See name of other party. U. S. Court of Appeals; Arteaga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 U. S. Court of Appeals; Bast v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 U. S. Court of Appeals; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 U. S. District Court; Bergne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 U. S. District Court; Cincinnati Enquirer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 U. S. District Court; Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 U. S. District Court; House v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 U. S. District Court; Ledet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 U. S. District Court; Nicolaus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 U. S. District Court; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 U. S. District Court; Sidles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 U. S. District Court; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 U. S. District Court; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 U. S. District Judge; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 U. S. District Judge; Perryman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 U. S. Information Agency; Weaver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 U. S. Marshals Service; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 U. S. Parole Comm'n; Holman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page U. S. Parole Comm'n; Todd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 U. S. Postal Service; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 U. S. Postal Service; Czerkies v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 U. S. Postal Service; Daniels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 U. S. Postal Service; Edmonds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 U. S. Postal Service; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217,1252 United Technologies Corp.; Emerick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Universal Computer Systems, Inc., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 University of Minn.; Goonewardena v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 University of N. M.; Judd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 University of Wash.; Denouden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Unknown; Brock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Upjohn Co. v. Ambrosini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Urbana; Hays v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Urban Search Management v. Tyus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Uwagbale v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . 1157 Uzzell; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Vaccaro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Vaden v. Powell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Valdez-Mejia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Vance v. Peters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Vander Ark; Heimermann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Van Harken v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Van Holt; National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Vann v. Darden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Van Scoy v. Shell Oil Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168,1169 Van Zant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Vartinelli v. Hutchinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Vasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Veale v. Citibank, F. S. B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114,1198 Veale v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Veasy; Hearn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Veatch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149,1280 Vega v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Vela v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Velasco v. Horgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Velasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Velazquez-Medina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Velazquez-Overa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Vemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Venable v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651 Venegas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Venkataraghaven; McReynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Verdin v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxix Page Vergara v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Vey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 Vey v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Via v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Vickery v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Vidal v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Vieux v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Village. See name of village. Villareal v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Vinci v. Waste Management, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Vines v. Buchler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Vines v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Virginia; Barnabei v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Virginia; Mickens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Virginia; Moretz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Virginia; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Virginia; Riddick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Virginia; Spicer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Virginia; Watkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Virgin Islands; Hollar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Visintine, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Visintine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150,1205 Viswanathan v. Board of Governors of Univ. of N. C. . . . . . . . 1115,1271 Volberg v. Pataki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Volkswagen of America, Inc.; Zimmerman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Volpe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Vominh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Von Grabe v. Ziff Davis Publishing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Von Hoff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Vrettos v. Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Vrettos v. Stage House Inn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Vrettos v. United Machine Specialties Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 W. v. Bryan Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Wafer v. Gay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Wafer v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Walker v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Walker v. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Walker; Lutalo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Walker; Shaller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Walker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191,1219 Walker v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Wall v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Wallis v. Hernando County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Walsh v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xc TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Walt Disney Co.; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189,1237 Walters; Algernon Blair, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Walters; Kutnyak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Wambach v. Creecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Ward; Bingman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Ward v. Georgetown Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Warden. See name of warden. Ware; Santiago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Ware v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Warner; Pagan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Warner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. . . . . . . . . . . 17,1153 Warren v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Warren v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Washington, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Washington; Caffrey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1194 Washington; Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Indian Reservation v. 1168 Washington; Eddmonds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Washington; Garner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Washington v. Jacksonville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175,1260 Washington v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Washington; Krier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Washington; Manussier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Washington v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Washington; Saiyed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Washington; Tierney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Washington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.; Kingston Constructors v. 1274 Waste Management, Inc.; Vinci v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Watkins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1272 Watkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Watkins v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Watson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Watts v. Railroad Retirement Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Watts v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Weaver v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Weaver v. U. S. Information Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Weaver v. Weaver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Webber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Weekly v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Weisman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Welborn; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1272 Welky v. Makowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Wells v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xci Page Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Wellshear v. Rishell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Werner v. McCotter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Wesley v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Wessels v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 West; Boulineau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 West v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 West; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129,1283 West; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148,1225 West v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 West American Ins. Co. v. Freeman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Western Construction Co.; Hartnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Westley v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Westley v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Weston; Fort Stewart Assn. of Educators v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Westwinds Apartments; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Wharton v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Wheeler v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 White, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 White v. Adams County Detention Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 White; Baticados v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 White; Cohea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199,1243 White; Horn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 White v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 White v. O'Connor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 White; Pettco Enterprises, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 White; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 White v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 White v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 White; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Whitecliff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Whitehead v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Whiterock v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 White Wing Associates v. Solano County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 White Wing Development, Inc. v. Solano County . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Whitman; Presbytery of N. J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. 1155 Whitson; Tebbetts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Wicklund; Lambert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 Widnall; House the Homeless, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Wiford v. Boone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Wiggins v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Wilder v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Wilkins v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Wilkinson; Block v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xcii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Wilkinson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Wilkinson & Jenkins Construction Co.; Maccaferri Gabions, Inc. v. 1167 Willette; Burnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1225 Williams, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1114,1208 Williams v. Avnet, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Williams v. Borg & Warner Auto Elec. & Mech. Systems Corp. . . 1153 Williams v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Williams v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Williams v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Williams v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145,1225 Williams v. Mobley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Williams v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Williams v. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Williams v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158,1283 Williams v. United States . 1129,1150,1183,1188,1192,1220,1222,1234,1235 Williams Natural Gas Co. v. Amoco Production Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Williamson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Williamson; Henry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Williamson of Homestead v. Pidal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Willis v. DeTella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202,1284 Willis v. Parrish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Willoughby v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Willoughby v. Potomac Electric Power Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Wilshire Terrace Corp.; Pierson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Wilson v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Wilson v. Brother Records, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Wilson; Chambers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Wilson v. Drake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Wilson; Ford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Wilson; Gallego v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Wilson v. Saba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Wilson; Scruggs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Wilson; Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Wilson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Wilson v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Wimbush v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Windom v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Windsor v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Wing; Bernys v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244,1268 Wingate; Suffolk Parents of Handicapped Adults v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Winslow; Morrow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Wisconsin; Hampton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Wisconsin; LaPlant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Wisconsin; Larson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xciii Page Wisconsin; Richards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385,1102,1154 Wisconsin ex rel. Sprague; Hacklander-Ready v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Wisconsin Medical Examining Bd.; Saculla v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Witchell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Withers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Witter v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 WJM Realty v. State Roads Comm'n of Md. Highway Admin. . . . 1212 Wolf v. Federal Republic of Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Wolf; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Wolfe v. DeBose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Wolfe v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Wolfgram v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1283 Womble v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Women Prisoners, D. C. Dept. of Corrections v. District of Columbia 1196 Women's Choice of Bergen County; Robokoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Wonderland Greyhound Park, Inc.; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Wong v. Han Kuk Chun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Wood; Bianchi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Wood v. Garner Food Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Wood v. Gotcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Wood; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Wood; Melius v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Wood v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Woodall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Woodard v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Wood-Ede v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Woodruff, Inc.; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Woods v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Woods v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Woods; Rose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Woolley v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Woolley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Wooten v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Wooten v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Wootton v. Lemons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Woratzeck v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173,1260 Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church v. Sawyer . . . . . . . 1117 Workman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. of Pa.; Finberg v. . . . . . . . 1123 World Savings and Loan Assn.; Milton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Worsham; Booker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Worthington v. Glickman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Wright, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Wright v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xciv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Wright; Mundy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Wright v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Wright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169,1187,1220,1226,1236 Wronke v. Canady . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 W. W. Henry Co.; Guilbeau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 W. W. W. Enterprises, Inc. v. Pidal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Wyatt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Yankton Sioux Tribe; South Dakota v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Yarborough v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Yat Chin v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Yee v. Hughes Aircraft Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Yellowstone County; Pease v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Yonkers; Nadal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Young v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Young v. Fordice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 Young; Freeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Young v. Harper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 Young v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Young; Murphy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Young v. Stine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Young v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131,1162,1181 Yount v. Frank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Yourdon, Inc. v. Bridges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Zackary v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Zafiratos v. Monroe Township . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Zamora v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Zankich v. Maricopa County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Zaragoza v. Cianchetti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Zarnes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1239 Zavaras; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Zaveletta; Shoobs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Zenith Ins. Co.; Lightman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Zielinski v. Oak Forest Police Pension Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Ziff Davis Publishing Co.; Von Grabe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Zimmerman; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Zindell; Brasten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Zion v. Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 UNITED STATES v. GONZALES et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit No. 95­1605. Argued December 11, 1996-Decided March 3, 1997 All three respondents were convicted in New Mexico courts and sentenced to prison terms on state charges arising from the use of guns by two of them to hold up undercover officers during a drug sting operation. After they began to serve their state sentences, respondents were con- victed on various drug and related federal charges connected to the sting operation, and of using firearms during those crimes in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c). In ordering their imprisonment, the District Court directed that the portion of their federal sentences attributable to the drug convictions run concurrently with their state sentences, with the remaining 60-month sentences required by § 924(c) to run consecutively to both. Among other rulings, the Tenth Circuit vacated the firearms sentences on the ground that they should have run concurrently with the state prison terms. The court found § 924(c)'s language to be am- biguous, resorted to the legislative history, and held that a § 924(c) sen- tence may run concurrently with a previously imposed, already opera- tional state sentence, but not with another federal sentence. Held: Section § 924(c)'s plain language-i. e., "the sentence . . . under this subsection [shall not] run concurrently with any other term of imprison- ment" (emphasis added)-forbids a federal district court to direct that the section's mandatory 5-year firearms sentence run concurrently with any other prison term, whether state or federal. Read naturally, the section's word "any" has an expansive meaning that is not limited to federal sentences, and so must be interpreted as referring to all "term[s] 1 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN 2 UNITED STATES v. GONZALES Opinion of the Court of imprisonment," including those imposed by state courts. Cf., e. g., United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 358. Unlike the Tenth Circuit, this Court sees nothing remarkable (much less ambiguous) about Congress' decision, in drafting § 924(c), to prohibit concurrent sentences instead of simply mandating consecutive ones. Moreover, given the straightforward statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 254. Indeed, the legislative history excerpt relied upon by the Tenth Circuit only muddies the waters. Contrary to that court's interpretation, § 924(c)'s prohibition applies only to the section's manda- tory firearms sentence, and does not limit a district court's normal authority under § 3584(a) to order that other federal sentences run con- currently with or consecutively to other state or federal prison terms. Pp. 4­11. 65 F. 3d 814, vacated and remanded. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined, post, p. 12. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 14. Miguel A. Estrada argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Del- linger, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, and Dep- uty Solicitor General Dreeben. Edward Bustamante, by appointment of the Court, 519 U. S. 804, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Angela Arellanes, by appointment of the Court, 519 U. S. 804, Roberto Albertorio, by appointment of the Court, 519 U. S. 962, and Carter G. Phillips.* Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. We are asked to decide whether a federal court may direct that a prison sentence under 18 U. S. C. § 924(c) run concur- rently with a state-imposed sentence, even though § 924(c) *Leah J. Prewitt, Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Placido G. Gomez, and Barbara Bergman filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 1 (1997) 3 Opinion of the Court provides that a sentence imposed under that statute "shall [not] . . . run concurrently with any other term of imprison- ment." We hold that it may not. I Respondents were arrested in a drug sting operation during which two of them pulled guns on undercover police officers. All three were convicted in New Mexico courts on charges arising from the holdup. The state courts sen- tenced them to prison terms ranging from 13 to 17 years. After they began to serve their state sentences, respondents were convicted in federal court of committing various drug offenses connected to the sting operation, and conspiring to do so, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§ 841 and 846. They were also convicted of using firearms during and in relation to those drug trafficking crimes, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c). Respondents received sentences ranging from 120 to 147 months in prison, of which 60 months reflected the mandatory sentence required for their firearms convictions. Pursuant to § 924(c), the District Court ordered that the por- tion of respondents' federal sentences attributable to the drug convictions run concurrently with their state sentences, with the remaining 60 months due to the firearms offenses to run consecutively to both. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated re- spondents' sentences for the firearms violations, on the ground that the § 924(c) sentences should have run concur- rently with the state prison terms. 65 F. 3d 814 (1995). (The court also vacated respondents' substantive drug con- victions and dealt with various other sentencing issues not before us.) Although the Court of Appeals recognized that other Circuits had uniformly "held that § 924(c)'s plain lan- guage prohibits sentences imposed under that statute from running concurrently with state sentences," it nevertheless thought that "a literal reading of the statutory language would produce an absurd result." Id., at 819. Feeling 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN 4 UNITED STATES v. GONZALES Opinion of the Court obliged to "venture into the thicket of legislative history," id., at 820 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), the court found a line in a Senate Committee Report indi- cating that " `the mandatory sentence under the revised sub- section 924(c) [should] be served prior to the start of the sentence for the underlying or any other offense,' " ibid. (quoting S. Rep. No. 98­225, pp. 313­314 (1983) (hereinafter S. Rep.)) (emphasis deleted). If this statement were applied literally, respondents would have to serve first their state sentences, then their 5-year federal firearms sentences, and finally the sentences for their narcotics convictions-even though the narcotics sentences normally would have run con- currently with the state sentences, since they all arose out of the same criminal activity. 65 F. 3d, at 821. To avoid this irrational result, the court held that "§ 924(c)'s manda- tory five-year sentence may run concurrently with a pre- viously imposed state sentence that a defendant has already begun to serve." Id., at 819. We granted certiorari, 518 U. S. 1003, and now vacate and remand. II Our analysis begins, as always, with the statutory text. Section 924(c)(1) provides: "Whoever, during and in relation to any . . . drug traf- ficking crime . . . for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime . . . , be sentenced to imprisonment for five years . . . . Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sen- tence of any person convicted of a violation of this sub- section, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the . . . drug trafficking crime in which the firearm was used or carried." 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1) (emphasis added). 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 1 (1997) 5 Opinion of the Court The question we face is whether the phrase "any other term of imprisonment" "means what it says, or whether it should be limited to some subset" of prison sentences, Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 4 (1980)-namely, only federal sen- tences. Read naturally, the word "any" has an expansive meaning, that is, "one or some indiscriminately of what- ever kind." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976). Congress did not add any language limiting the breadth of that word, and so we must read § 924(c) as referring to all "term[s] of imprisonment," including those imposed by state courts. Cf. United States v. Alvarez- Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 358 (1994) (noting that statute refer- ring to "any law enforcement officer" includes "federal, state, or local" officers); Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wall. 1, 15 (1871) (stating "it is quite clear" that a statute prohibiting the filing of suit "in any court" "includes the State courts as well as the Federal courts," because "there is not a word in the [statute] tending to show that the words `in any court' are not used in their ordinary sense"). There is no basis in the text for limiting § 924(c) to federal sentences. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens suggests that the word "any" as used in the first sentence of § 924(c) "un- questionably has the meaning `any federal.' " Post, at 14. In that first sentence, however, Congress explicitly limited the scope of the phrase "any crime of violence or drug traf- ficking crime" to those "for which [a defendant] may be pros- ecuted in a court of the United States." Given that Con- gress expressly limited the phrase "any crime" to only federal crimes, we find it significant that no similar restric- tion modifies the phrase "any other term of imprisonment," which appears only two sentences later and is at issue in this case. See Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (" `Where Congress includes particular language in one sec- tion of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intention- ally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion' "). 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN 6 UNITED STATES v. GONZALES Opinion of the Court The Court of Appeals also found ambiguity in Congress' decision, in drafting § 924(c), to prohibit concurrent sen- tences instead of simply mandating consecutive sentences. 65 F. 3d, at 820. Unlike the lower court, however, we see nothing remarkable (much less ambiguous) about Congress' choice of words. Because consecutive and concurrent sen- tences are exact opposites, Congress implicitly required one when it prohibited the other. This "ambiguity" is, in any event, beside the point because this phraseology has no bear- ing on whether Congress meant § 924(c) sentences to run con- secutively only to other federal terms of imprisonment. Given the straightforward statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 254 (1992). Indeed, far from clarifying the statute, the legislative history only mud- dies the waters. The excerpt from the Senate Report ac- companying the 1984 amendment to § 924(c), relied upon by the Court of Appeals, reads: "[T]he Committee intends that the mandatory sentence under the revised subsection 924(c) be served prior to the start of the sentence for the underlying or any other offense." S. Rep., at 313­314. This snippet of legislative history injects into § 924(c) an entirely new idea-that a defendant must serve the 5-year prison term for his firearms conviction before any other sen- tences. This added requirement, however, is "in no way an- chored in the text of the statute." Shannon v. United States, 512 U. S. 573, 583 (1994). The Court of Appeals was troubled that this rule might lead to irrational results. Normally, a district court has au- thority to decide whether federal prison terms should run concurrently with or consecutively to other prison sentences. 18 U. S. C. § 3584(a) (vesting power in district court to run most prison terms either concurrently or consecutively); United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 1 (1997) 7 Opinion of the Court § 5G1.3 (Nov. 1995) (USSG) (guiding court's discretion under § 3584(a)). If the prison terms for respondents' other fed- eral sentences could not begin until after their § 924(c) terms were completed, however, the District Court would effec- tively be stripped of its statutory power to decide whether the sentences for the underlying narcotics offenses should run concurrently with respondents' state terms of imprison- ment. 65 F. 3d, at 822. The court observed that such a rule could lead to dramatically higher sentences, particularly for the respondents in this case. Perez, for example, is already serving a 17-year state prison term for his role in the holdup. Normally, his 7.25-year federal sentence for narcotics posses- sion would run concurrently with that state term under USSG § 5G1.3(b); his 5-year firearm sentence under § 924(c) would follow both, for a total of 22 years in prison. If he must serve his federal narcotics sentence after his 5-year firearms sentence, however, he would face a total of 29.25 years in prison. 65 F. 3d, at 821. Seeking to avoid this conflict between § 924(c) (as reinter- preted in light of its legislative history) and § 3584(a), the Court of Appeals held that § 924(c) only prohibited running federal terms of imprisonment concurrently. Ibid. It also reasoned that such a narrow reading was necessary because "there is no way in which a later-sentencing federal court can cause the mandatory 5-year § 924(c) sentence to be served before a state sentence that is already being served." Ibid. We see three flaws in this reasoning. First, the statutory texts of §§ 924(c) and 3584(a), unvarnished by legislative history, are entirely consistent. Section 924(c) specifies only that a court must not run a firearms sentence concur- rently with other prison terms. It leaves plenty of room for a court to run other sentences-whether for state or fed- eral offenses-concurrently with one another pursuant to § 3584(a) and USSG § 5G1.3. The statutes clash only if we engraft onto § 924(c) a requirement found only in a single 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN 8 UNITED STATES v. GONZALES Opinion of the Court sentence buried in the legislative history: that the firearms sentence must run first. We therefore follow the text, rather than the legislative history, of § 924(c). By disregard- ing the suggestion that a district court must specify that a sentence for a firearms conviction be served before other sentences, we give full meaning to the texts of both §§ 924(c) and 3584(a). See United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95­96 (1820) (Marshall, C. J.) ("Where there is no ambigu- ity in the words, there is no room for construction. The case must be a strong one indeed, which would justify a court in departing from the plain meaning of words . . . in search of an intention which the words themselves did not suggest"). Second, even if we ignored the plain language of § 924(c) and required courts to list the order in which a defendant must serve the sentences for different convictions, we would thereby create a rule that is superfluous in light of § 3584(c). That statute instructs the Bureau of Prisons to treat multi- ple terms of imprisonment, whether imposed concurrently or consecutively, "for administrative purposes as a single, ag- gregate term of imprisonment." Ibid. As a practical mat- ter, then, it makes no difference whether a court specifies the sequence in which each portion of an aggregate sentence must be served. We will not impose on sentencing courts new duties that, in view of other statutory commands, will be effectively meaningless. Third, the Court of Appeals' solution-to allow § 924(c) prison terms to run concurrently with state sentences-does not eliminate any anomaly that arises when a firearms sen- tence must run "first." Although it is clear that a prison term under § 924(c) cannot possibly run before an earlier im- posed state prison term, the same holds true when a prisoner is already serving a federal sentence. See § 3585(a) (provid- ing that a federal prison term commences when the defend- ant is received into custody or voluntarily arrives to begin serving the sentence). Because it is impossible to start a 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 1 (1997) 9 Opinion of the Court § 924(c) sentence before any prison term that the prisoner is already serving, whether imposed by a state or federal court, limiting the phrase "any other term of imprisonment" to state sentences does not get rid of the problem. Thus, we think that the Court of Appeals both invented the problem and devised the wrong solution. Justice Breyer questions, in dissent, whether Congress wanted to impose a § 924(c) sentence on a defendant who is already serving a prison term pursuant to a virtually identi- cal state sentencing enhancement statute. Post, at 15. A federal court could not (for double jeopardy reasons) sen- tence a person to two consecutive federal prison terms for a single violation of a federal criminal statute, such as § 924(c). If Congress cannot impose two consecutive federal § 924(c) sentences, the dissent argues, it is unlikely that Congress would have wanted to stack a § 924(c) sentence onto a prison term under a virtually identical state firearms enhancement. Ibid. As we have already observed, however, the straight- forward language of § 924(c) leaves no room to speculate about congressional intent. See supra, at 4­5. The statute speaks of "any term of imprisonment" without limitation, and there is no intimation that Congress meant § 924(c) sentences to run consecutively only to certain types of prison terms. District courts have some discretion under the Sentencing Guidelines, of course, in cases where related offenses are prosecuted in multiple proceedings, to establish sentences "with an eye toward having such punishments ap- proximate the total penalty that would have been imposed had the sentences for the different offenses been imposed at the same time . . . ." Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389, 404 (1995) (discussing USSG § 5G1.3). See post, at 14­15 (Breyer, J., dissenting). When Congress enacted § 924(c)'s consecutive-sentencing provision, however, it cabined the sentencing discretion of district courts in a single circum- stance: When a defendant violates § 924(c), his sentencing en- 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN 10 UNITED STATES v. GONZALES Opinion of the Court hancement under that statute must run consecutively to all other prison terms. Given this clear legislative directive, it is not for the courts to carve out statutory exceptions based on judicial perceptions of good sentencing policy. Other language in § 924(c) reinforces our conclusion. In 1984, Congress amended § 924(c) so that its sentencing en- hancement would apply regardless of whether the underly- ing felony statute "provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device." Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98­473, § 1005(a), 98 Stat. 2138­2139. Congress thus repudi- ated the result we reached in Busic v. United States, 446 U. S. 398 (1980), in which we held that "prosecution and en- hanced sentencing under § 924(c) is simply not permissible where the predicate felony statute contains its own enhance- ment provision," irrespective of whether the Government had actually sought an enhancement under that predicate statute. Id., at 404; see also Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. 6, 15 (1978) (holding that a federal court may not im- pose sentences under both § 924(c) and the weapon enhance- ment under the armed bank robbery statute, 18 U. S. C. § 2113, based on a single criminal transaction). Our holdings in these cases were based on our conclusion that the un- amended text of § 924(c) left us with little "more than a guess" as to how Congress meant to mesh that statute with the sentencing enhancement provisions scattered throughout the federal criminal code. Simpson, supra, at 15; Busic, supra, at 405. The 1984 amendment, however, eliminated these ambiguities. At that point, Congress made clear its desire to run § 924(c) enhancements consecutively to all other prison terms, regardless of whether they were imposed under firearms enhancement statutes similar to § 924(c). We therefore cannot agree with Justice Breyer's contention that our interpretation of § 924(c) distinguishes between "those subject to undischarged state, and those subject to 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 1 (1997) 11 Opinion of the Court undischarged federal, sentences." Post, at 16. Both sorts of defendants face sentences for their other convictions that run concurrently with or consecutively to each other accord- ing to normal sentencing principles, plus an enhancement under § 924(c). In short, in light of the 1984 amendment, we think that Congress has foreclosed the dissent's argument that § 924(c) covers only federal sentences. Finally, we pause to comment on Justice Stevens' con- cern over how today's decision might affect other cases where "the state trial follows the federal trial and the state judge imposes a concurrent sentence" that might be viewed as inconsistent with § 924(c). Post, at 12. That, of course, was not the sequence in which the respondents were sen- tenced in this case, and so we have no occasion to decide whether a later sentencing state court is bound to order its sentence to run consecutively to the § 924(c) term of impris- onment. See ibid. All that is before us today is the author- ity of a later sentencing federal court to impose a consecutive sentence under § 924(c). We are hesitant to reach beyond the facts of this case to decide a question that is not squarely presented for our review. III In sum, we hold that the plain language of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c) forbids a federal district court to direct that a term of imprisonment under that statute run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment, whether state or federal. The statute does not, however, limit the court's authority to order that other federal sentences run concurrently with or consecutively to other prison terms-state or federal- under § 3584. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN 12 UNITED STATES v. GONZALES Stevens, J., dissenting Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Breyer joins, dissenting. This case arose out of a criminal enterprise that violated both New Mexico law and federal law and gave rise to both state and federal prosecutions. It raises a narrow but important question concerning the scope of the prohibition against concurrent sentences contained in 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1). As the Government reads that provision, it pro- hibits the § 924(c) sentence from running concurrently with a state sentence that has already been imposed, but permits concurrent state and federal sentences when the federal prosecution precedes the state prosecution.1 Thus, the length of the total term of imprisonment-including both the state sentence and the federal sentence-is determined, in part, by the happenstance of which case is tried first. Read literally, however, the text of § 924(c)(1) would avoid this anomalous result. Because the text broadly prohibits the § 924(c) sentence from running "concurrently with any other term of imprisonment" regardless of whether that other term is imposed before or after the federal sentence, if the statute is read literally, it would require state judges to make any state term of imprisonment run consecutively to the § 924(c) sentence. Alternatively, if the state trial fol- lows the federal trial and the state judge imposes a concur- rent sentence (because she does not read § 924(c) as having any applicability to state sentences), the literal text would require the federal authorities to suspend the § 924(c) sen- tence until the state sentence has been served. By relying so heavily on pure textual analysis, the Court's opinion would appear to dictate this result. Like the Gov- ernment, however, I do not think the statute can reasonably be interpreted as containing any command to state sentenc- ing judges or as requiring the suspension of any federal sen- tences when concurrent state sentences are later imposed. 1 Reply Brief for United States 10­11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6­10. 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 1 (1997) 13 Stevens, J., dissenting Thus, common sense requires us to reject a purely literal reading of the text. The question that then arises is which is the better of two plausible nonliteral readings. Should the term "any other term of imprisonment" be narrowed by reading it to cover only "any other term of imprisonment that has already been imposed," as the Government argues, or "any other federal term of imprisonment," as respond- ents contend? For three reasons, I think it more likely that Congress intended the latter interpretation. First, it borders on the irrational to assume that Congress would actually intend the severity of the defendant's punishment in a case of this kind to turn on the happenstance of whether the state or the fed- eral prosecution was concluded first. Respondents' reading of the statute avoids that anomaly. Second, when § 924(c) was amended in 1970 to prohibit concurrent sentences, see Title II, Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1889, this prohibition applied only to the federal sentence imposed for the underlying offense. When Congress amended the statute in 1984 to broaden the prohibition beyond the under- lying offense, it said nothing about state sentences; if Con- gress had intended the amendment to apply to state as well as federal sentences, I think there would have been some mention of this important change in the legislative history.2 Furthermore, the 1984 amendment was part of a general revision of sentencing laws that sought to achieve more uniformity and predictability in federal sentencing. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1987, 18 U. S. C. § 3551 et seq. The anomaly that the Government's read- ing of § 924(c) authorizes is inconsistent with the basic uni- formity theme of the 1984 legislation. Finally, the context 2 "In a case where the construction of legislative language such as this makes so sweeping and so relatively unorthodox a change as that made here, I think judges as well as detectives may take into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the night." Harrison v. PPG Indus- tries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN 14 UNITED STATES v. GONZALES Breyer, J., dissenting in which the relevant language appears is concerned entirely with federal sentencing. Indeed, the word "any" as used earlier in the section unquestionably has the meaning "any federal." 3 Given the Government's recognition of the fact that a com- pletely literal reading of § 924(c)(1) is untenable, and the further fact that the Court offers nothing more than the dic- tionary definition of the word "any" to support its result, I think the wiser course is to interpret that word in the prohi- bition against concurrent sentences as having the same meaning as when the same word is first used in the statute. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joins, dissenting. I believe that Justice Stevens is right. Section 924(c) concerns federal, not state, sentences. Hence Congress in- tended the words "other term of imprisonment" to refer to other federal, not other state, "terms." With respect to un- discharged state sentences, therefore, 18 U. S. C. § 924(c) is permissive, not mandatory. That is, it permits the federal sentencing judge to make a § 924(c) sentence and an undis- charged state sentence concurrent. Quite often, it will make little difference that, in this state/ federal circumstance, the consecutive/concurrent decision is permissive, not mandatory. That is because federal sentenc- ing judges, understanding that § 924 requires consecutive sentencing where undischarged federal sentences are at issue, would normally treat undischarged state sentences the same way. They would make the § 924(c) sentence consecu- 3 In the first sentence of § 924(c)(1) the word "any" is expressly confined to federal prosecutions. When the word is used a second time to describe "any other provision of law," it is again quite obvious that it embraces only other provisions of federal law even though that limitation is implicit rather than explicit. Nowhere in § 924(c) is there any explicit reference to state law or state sentences. 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 1 (1997) 15 Breyer, J., dissenting tive to undischarged state sentences (even though § 924(c) would not force that result) in order to avoid treating simi- larly situated offenders differently. United States Sen- tencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 5G1.3 (Nov. 1995). Ordinarily, the fact that the State, rather than the Federal Government, imposed an undischarged sentence is irrelevant in terms of any sentencing objective. In at least one circumstance, however, federal sentencing judges would probably not treat an undischarged state sen- tence as if it were federal. That is where the undischarged state sentence is a sentence under a state statute that itself simply mimics § 924(c). Such a situation cannot arise where the initial undischarged sentence is federal. Indeed, the Constitution would forbid any effort to apply § 924(c) twice to a single instance of gun possession. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161, 165 (1977). But a State might have its own version of § 924(c), and a federal § 924(c) offender could be subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment imposed under such a statute. To run a § 924(c) sentence consecu- tively in such an instance (even if constitutionally permissi- ble, cf. Abbate v. United States, 359 U. S. 187 (1959); Heath v. Alabama, 474 U. S. 82 (1985)) would treat the state offender differently, and far more harshly, than any possible federal counterpart. I am not inventing a purely hypothetical possibility. The State, in the very case before us, has punished respondents, in part, pursuant to a mandatory state sentence enhance- ment statute that has no counterpart in federal law but for § 924(c) itself, which the state statute, N. M. Stat. Ann. § 31­18­16(A) (Supp. 1994), very much resembles. But cf. Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389, 398­404 (1995). I un- derstand that Congress wanted to guarantee that § 924(c)'s sentence would amount to an additional sentence. But I do not see why Congress would have wanted to pile Pelion on Ossa in this way, adding the § 924(c) sentence to another sen- tence that does the identical thing. Nor do I believe that 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN 16 UNITED STATES v. GONZALES Breyer, J., dissenting Congress would have intended potentially to create this kind of harsh distinction between those subject to undischarged state, and those subject to undischarged federal, sentences- a likely practical result of the majority's holding. See id., at 404­406. This reason, along with those that Justice Stevens has discussed, makes me think that Congress did intend § 924(c) to refer to federal sentences alone, and lead me to dissent in this close case. 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 17 Syllabus WARNER-JENKINSON CO., INC. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the federal circuit No. 95­728. Argued October 15, 1996-Decided March 3, 1997 Petitioner and respondent both manufacture dyes from which impurities must be removed. Respondent's " '746 patent," which issued in 1985, discloses an improved purification process involving the "ultrafiltration" of dye through a porous membrane at pH levels between 6.0 and 9.0. The inventors so limited their claim's pH element during patent prosecu- tion after the patent examiner objected because of a perceived overlap with the earlier "Booth" patent, which disclosed an ultrafiltration proc- ess operating at a pH above 9.0. In 1986, petitioner developed its own ultrafiltration process, which operated at a pH level of 5.0. Respondent sued for infringement of the '746 patent, relying solely on the "doctrine of equivalents," under which a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is "equivalence" between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U. S. 605, 609. Over petitioner's objections that this is an equitable doctrine and is to be applied by the court, the equivalence issue was included among those sent to the jury, which found, inter alia, that petitioner infringed upon the '746 patent. The District Court, among its rulings, entered a permanent injunction against petitioner. The en banc Fed- eral Circuit affirmed, holding that the doctrine of equivalents continues to exist, that the question of equivalence is for the jury to decide, and that the jury had substantial evidence from which to conclude that peti- tioner's process was not substantially different from the process dis- closed in the '746 patent. Held:1. The Court adheres to the doctrine of equivalents. Pp. 24­30. (a) In Graver Tank, supra, at 609, the Court, inter alia, described some of the considerations that go into applying the doctrine, such as the patent's context, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case, including the purpose for which an ingredient is used in the patent, the qualities it has when combined with the other ingredients, the function it is intended to perform, and whether persons reasonably 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 18 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Syllabus skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was. Pp. 24­25. (b) This Court rejects petitioner's primary argument, that the doc- trine of equivalents, as set out in Graver Tank in 1950, is inconsistent with, and thus did not survive, particular aspects of Congress' 1952 revi- sion of the Patent Act, 35 U. S. C. § 100 et seq. Petitioner's first three arguments in this regard-that the doctrine (1) is inconsistent with § 112's requirement that a patentee specifically "claim" the covered in- vention, (2) circumvents the patent reissue process under §§ 251­252, and (3) is inconsistent with the primacy of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in setting a patent's scope-were made in Graver Tank, supra, at 613­615, and n. 3, in the context of the 1870 Patent Act, and failed to command a majority. The 1952 Act is not materially different from the 1870 Act with regard to these matters. Also unpersuasive is petitioner's fourth argument, that the doctrine of equivalents was im- plicitly rejected as a general matter by Congress' specific and limited inclusion of it in § 112, ¶ 6. This new provision was enacted as a tar- geted cure in response to Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U. S. 1, 8, and thereby to allow so-called "means" claims describing an element of an invention by the result accomplished or the function served. Moreover, the statutory reference to "equivalents" appears to be no more than a prophylactic against potential side effects of that cure, i. e., an attempt to limit the application of the broad literal language of "means" claims to those means that are "equivalent" to the actual means shown in the patent specification. Pp. 25­28. (c) The determination of equivalence should be applied as an objec- tive inquiry on an element-by-element basis. The Court is concerned that the doctrine, as it has come to be broadly applied since Graver Tank, conflicts with the Court's numerous holdings that a patent may not be enlarged beyond the scope of its claims. The way to reconcile the two lines of authority is to apply the doctrine to each of the individ- ual elements of a claim, rather than to the accused product or process as a whole. Doing so will preserve some meaning for each of a claim's elements, all of which are deemed material to defining the invention's scope. So long as the doctrine does not encroach beyond these limits, or beyond related limits discussed in the Court's opinion, infra, at 30­34, 39, n. 8, and 39­40, it will not vitiate the central functions of patent claims to define the invention and to notify the public of the patent's scope. Pp. 28­30. (d) Petitioner is correct that Graver Tank did not supersede the well-established limitation on the doctrine of equivalents known as "prosecution history estoppel," whereby a surrender of subject matter during patent prosecution may preclude recapturing any part of that 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 19 Syllabus subject matter, even if it is equivalent to the matter expressly claimed. But petitioner reaches too far in arguing that any such surrender estab- lishes a bright line beyond which no equivalents may be claimed, and that the reason for an amendment during patent prosecution is therefore irrelevant to any subsequent estoppel. There are a variety of reasons why the PTO may request a change in claim language, and if the patent holder demonstrates that an amendment had a purpose unrelated to patentability, a court must consider that purpose in order to decide whether an estoppel is precluded. Where the patent holder is unable to establish such a purpose, the court should presume that the purpose behind the required amendment is such that prosecution history estop- pel would apply. Here, it is undisputed that the upper limit of 9.0 pH was added to the '746 patent in order to distinguish the Booth patent, but the record before this Court does not reveal the reason for adding the lower 6.0 pH limit. It is therefore impossible to tell whether the latter reason could properly avoid an estoppel. Pp. 30­34. (e) The Court rejects petitioner's argument that Graver Tank re- quires judicial exploration of the intent of the alleged infringer or a case's other equities before allowing application of the doctrine of equiv- alents. Although Graver Tank certainly leaves room for the inclusion of intent-based elements in the doctrine, the Court does not read the case as requiring proof of intent. The better view, and the one consist- ent with Graver Tank's predecessors, see, e. g., Winans v. Denmead, 15 How. 330, 343, and the objective approach to infringement, is that intent plays no role in the doctrine's application. Pp. 34­36. (f) The Court also rejects petitioner's proposal that in order to min- imize conflict with the notice function of patent claims, the doctrine of equivalents should be limited to equivalents that are disclosed within the patent itself. Insofar as the question under the doctrine is whether an accused element is equivalent to a claimed element, the proper time for evaluating equivalency-and knowledge of interchangeability be- tween elements-is at the time of infringement, not at the time the patent was issued. P. 37. (g) The Court declines to consider whether application of the doc- trine of equivalents is a task for the judge or for the jury, since reso- lution of that question is not necessary to answer the question here presented. Pp. 37­39. (h) In the Court's view, the particular linguistic framework used to determine "equivalence," whether the so-called "triple identity" test or the "insubstantial differences" test, is less important than whether the test is probative of the essential inquiry: Does the accused product or process contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention? Different linguistic frameworks 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 20 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Syllabus may be more suitable to different cases, depending on their particular facts. The Court leaves it to the Federal Circuit's sound judgment in this area of its special expertise to refine the formulation of the test for equivalence in the orderly course of case-by-case determinations. Pp. 39­40. 2. Because the Federal Circuit did not consider all of the require- ments of the doctrine of equivalents as described by the Court in this case, particularly as related to prosecution history estoppel and the preservation of some meaning for each element in a claim, further pro- ceedings are necessary. Pp. 40­41. 62 F. 3d 1512, reversed and remanded. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Kennedy, J., joined, post, p. 41. Richard G. Taranto argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were H. Bartow Farr III and J. Robert Chambers. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Bingaman, Cornelia T. L. Pillard, Nancy J. Linck, and Albin F. Drost. David E. Schmit argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Gateway Technol- ogies, Inc., by Richard Grant Lyon; for GHZ Equipment Co. by Ronald D. Maines and Richard G. Wilkins; for the Information Technology Industry Council et al. by Joel M. Freed, Jerrold J. Ganzfried, John F. Cooney, and William D. Coston; for the Intellectual Property Owners by Carter G. Phillips, Mark E. Haddad, and Joseph R. Guerra; for MCI Telecommuni- cations Corp. by Paul M. Smith and Nory Miller; for Micron Separations, Inc., by Steven M. Bauer and John J. Cotter; and for Seagate Technology, Inc., et al. by Carrie L. Walthour, Karl A. Limbach, Deborah Bailey- Wells, and Edward P. Heller III. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Biotech- nology Industry Organization by Charles E. Ludlam; for Chiron Corp. by Donald S. Chisum; for the Dallas-Fort Worth Intellectual Property Law Association by Lawrence J. Bassuk; for Litton Systems, Inc., by Laurence 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 21 Opinion of the Court Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. Nearly 50 years ago, this Court in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U. S. 605 (1950), set out the modern contours of what is known in patent law as the "doctrine of equivalents." Under this doctrine, a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is "equivalence" between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention. Id., at 609. Petitioner, which was found to have infringed upon respondent's patent under the doctrine of equivalents, invites us to speak the death of that doctrine. We decline that invitation. The significant disagreement within the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concern- ing the application of Graver Tank suggests, however, that the doctrine is not free from confusion. We therefore will endeavor to clarify the proper scope of the doctrine. I The essential facts of this case are few. Petitioner Warner-Jenkinson Co. and respondent Hilton Davis Chemi- cal Co. manufacture dyes. Impurities in those dyes must be removed. Hilton Davis holds United States Patent No. 4,560,746 ('746 patent), which discloses an improved purifica- tion process involving "ultrafiltration." The '746 process filters impure dye through a porous membrane at certain H. Tribe and Jonathan S. Massey; and for the Ohio State Bar Association by Eugene P. Whetzel and Albert L. Bell. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Automobile Manufac- turers Association by D. Dennis Allegretti, Phillip D. Brady, and Andrew D. Koblenz; for the American Intellectual Property Law Association by Robert J. Baechtold, Stevan J. Bosses, Nicholas M. Cannella, Charles L. Gholz, and Roger W. Parkhurst; for the Chemical Manufacturers Associa- tion by Robert A. Armitage and Michael P. Walls; and for the Licensing Executive Society (U. S. A. and Canada), Inc., by Gayle Parker and James W. Gould. 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 22 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court pressures and pH levels,1 resulting in a high purity dye product. The '746 patent issued in 1985. As relevant to this case, the patent claims as its invention an improvement in the ul- trafiltration process as follows: "In a process for the purification of a dye . . . the im- provement which comprises: subjecting an aqueous solu- tion . . . to ultrafiltration through a membrane having a nominal pore diameter of 5­15 Angstroms under a hy- drostatic pressure of approximately 200 to 400 p.s.i.g., at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0, to thereby cause separation of said impurities from said dye . . . ." App. 36­37 (emphasis added). The inventors added the phrase "at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0" during patent prosecution. At a minimum, this phrase was added to distinguish a previous patent (the "Booth" patent) that disclosed an ultrafiltration process oper- ating at a pH above 9.0. The parties disagree as to why the low-end pH limit of 6.0 was included as part of the claim.2 1 The pH, or power (exponent) of Hydrogen, of a solution is a measure of its acidity or alkalinity. A pH of 7.0 is neutral; a pH below 7.0 is acidic; and a pH above 7.0 is alkaline. Although measurement of pH is on a logarithmic scale, with each whole number difference representing a ten- fold difference in acidity, the practical significance of any such difference will often depend on the context. Pure water, for example, has a neutral pH of 7.0, whereas carbonated water has an acidic pH of 3.0, and concen- trated hydrochloric acid has a pH approaching 0.0. On the other end of the scale, milk of magnesia has a pH of 10.0, whereas household ammonia has a pH of 11.9. 21 Encyclopedia Americana 844 (Int'l ed. 1990). 2 Petitioner contends that the lower limit was added because below a pH of 6.0 the patented process created "foaming" problems in the plant and because the process was not shown to work below that pH level. Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 5, 37, n. 28. Respondent counters that the process was successfully tested to pH levels as low as 2.2 with no effect on the process because of foaming, but offers no particular explanation as to why the lower level of 6.0 pH was selected. Brief for Respondent 34, n. 34. 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 23 Opinion of the Court In 1986, Warner-Jenkinson developed an ultrafiltration process that operated with membrane pore diameters as- sumed to be 5­15 Angstroms, at pressures of 200 to nearly 500 p. s. i. g., and at a pH of 5.0. Warner-Jenkinson did not learn of the '746 patent until after it had begun commercial use of its ultrafiltration process. Hilton Davis eventually learned of Warner-Jenkinson's use of ultrafiltration and, in 1991, sued Warner-Jenkinson for patent infringement. As trial approached, Hilton Davis conceded that there was no literal infringement, and relied solely on the doctrine of equivalents. Over Warner-Jenkinson's objection that the doctrine of equivalents was an equitable doctrine to be ap- plied by the court, the issue of equivalence was included among those sent to the jury. The jury found that the '746 patent was not invalid and that Warner-Jenkinson infringed upon the patent under the doctrine of equivalents. The jury also found, however, that Warner-Jenkinson had not inten- tionally infringed, and therefore awarded only 20% of the damages sought by Hilton Davis. The District Court denied Warner-Jenkinson's post-trial motions, and entered a perma- nent injunction prohibiting Warner-Jenkinson from practic- ing ultrafiltration below 500 p. s. i. g. and below 9.01 pH. A fractured en banc Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. 62 F. 3d 1512 (1995). The majority below held that the doctrine of equivalents continues to exist and that its touchstone is whether substan- tial differences exist between the accused process and the patented process. Id., at 1521­1522. The court also held that the question of equivalence is for the jury to decide and that the jury in this case had substantial evidence from which it could conclude that the Warner-Jenkinson process was not substantially different from the ultrafiltration proc- ess disclosed in the '746 patent. Id., at 1525. There were three separate dissents, commanding a total of 5 of 12 judges. Four of the five dissenting judges viewed the doctrine of equivalents as allowing an improper expan- 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 24 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court sion of claim scope, contrary to this Court's numerous hold- ings that it is the claim that defines the invention and gives notice to the public of the limits of the patent monopoly. Id., at 1537­1538 (opinion of Plager, J.). The fifth dissenter, the late Judge Nies, was able to reconcile the prohibition against enlarging the scope of claims and the doctrine of equivalents by applying the doctrine to each element of a claim, rather than to the accused product or process "overall." Id., at 1574. As she explained it: "The `scope' is not enlarged if courts do not go beyond the substitution of equivalent ele- ments." Ibid. All of the dissenters, however, would have found that a much narrowed doctrine of equivalents may be applied in whole or in part by the court. Id., at 1540­1542 (opinion of Plager, J.); id., at 1579 (opinion of Nies, J.). We granted certiorari, 516 U. S. 1145 (1996), and now reverse and remand. II In Graver Tank we considered the application of the doc- trine of equivalents to an accused chemical composition for use in welding that differed from the patented welding mate- rial by the substitution of one chemical element. 339 U. S., at 610. The substituted element did not fall within the lit- eral terms of the patent claim, but the Court nonetheless found that the "question which thus emerges is whether the substitution [of one element for the other] . . . is a change of such substance as to make the doctrine of equivalents inap- plicable; or conversely, whether under the circumstances the change was so insubstantial that the trial court's invocation of the doctrine of equivalents was justified." Ibid. The Court also described some of the considerations that go into applying the doctrine of equivalents: "What constitutes equivalency must be determined against the context of the patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case. Equivalence, in the patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and is 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 25 Opinion of the Court not an absolute to be considered in a vacuum. It does not require complete identity for every purpose and in every respect. In determining equivalents, things equal to the same thing may not be equal to each other and, by the same token, things for most purposes differ- ent may sometimes be equivalents. Consideration must be given to the purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it has when combined with the other ingredients, and the function which it is intended to perform. An important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was." Id., at 609. Considering those factors, the Court viewed the difference between the chemical element claimed in the patent and the substitute element to be "colorable only," and concluded that the trial court's judgment of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents was proper. Id., at 612. A Petitioner's primary argument in this Court is that the doctrine of equivalents, as set out in Graver Tank in 1950, did not survive the 1952 revision of the Patent Act, 35 U. S. C. § 100 et seq., because it is inconsistent with several aspects of that Act. In particular, petitioner argues: (1) The doctrine of equivalents is inconsistent with the statutory re- quirement that a patentee specifically "claim" the invention covered by a patent, § 112; (2) the doctrine circumvents the patent reissue process-designed to correct mistakes in draft- ing or the like-and avoids the express limitations on that process, §§ 251­252; (3) the doctrine is inconsistent with the primacy of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in setting the scope of a patent through the patent prosecution process; and (4) the doctrine was implicitly rejected as a general mat- ter by Congress' specific and limited inclusion of the doctrine 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 26 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court in one section regarding "means" claiming, § 112, ¶ 6. All but one of these arguments were made in Graver Tank in the context of the 1870 Patent Act, and failed to command a majority.3 The 1952 Patent Act is not materially different from the 1870 Act with regard to claiming, reissue, and the role of the PTO. Compare, e. g., 35 U. S. C. § 112 ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the ap- plicant regards as his invention") with the Consolidated Pat- ent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (the applicant "shall particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his inven- tion or discovery"). Such minor differences as exist be- tween those provisions in the 1870 and the 1952 Acts have no bearing on the result reached in Graver Tank, and thus provide no basis for our overruling it. In the context of in- fringement, we have already held that pre-1952 precedent survived the passage of the 1952 Act. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U. S. 336, 342 (1961) (new section defining infringement "left intact the entire 3 Graver Tank was decided over a vigorous dissent. In that dissent, Justice Black raised the first three of petitioner's four arguments against the doctrine of equivalents. See 339 U. S., at 613­614 (doctrine inconsist- ent with statutory requirement to "distinctly claim" the invention); id., at 614­615 (patent reissue process available to correct mistakes); id., at 615, n. 3 (duty lies with the Patent Office to examine claims and to conform them to the scope of the invention; inventors may appeal Patent Office determinations if they disagree with result). Indeed, petitioner's first argument was not new even in 1950. Nearly 100 years before Graver Tank, this Court approved of the doctrine of equivalents in Winans v. Denmead, 15 How. 330 (1854). The dissent in Winans unsuccessfully argued that the majority result was inconsistent with the requirement in the 1836 Patent Act that the applicant "particu- larly `specify and point' out what he claims as his invention," and that the patent protected nothing more. Id., at 347 (opinion of Campbell, J.). 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 27 Opinion of the Court body of case law on direct infringement"). We see no reason to reach a different result here.4 Petitioner's fourth argument for an implied congressional negation of the doctrine of equivalents turns on the reference to "equivalents" in the "means" claiming provision of the 1952 Act. Section 112, ¶ 6, a provision not contained in the 1870 Act, states: "An element in a claim for a combination may be ex- pressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be con- strued to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof." (Emphasis added.) Thus, under this new provision, an applicant can describe an element of his invention by the result accomplished or the function served, rather than describing the item or element to be used (e. g., "a means of connecting Part A to Part B," rather than "a two-penny nail"). Congress enacted § 112, ¶ 6, in response to Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U. S. 1 (1946), which rejected claims that "do not describe the invention but use `conveniently functional language at the exact point of novelty.' " Id., at 8 (citation 4 Petitioner argues that the evolution in patent practice from "central" claiming (describing the core principles of the invention) to "peripheral" claiming (describing the outer boundaries of the invention) requires that we treat Graver Tank as an aberration and abandon the doctrine of equiv- alents. Brief for Petitioner 43­45. We disagree. The suggested change in claiming practice predates Graver Tank, is not of statutory origin, and seems merely to reflect narrower inventions in more crowded arts. Also, judicial recognition of so-called "pioneer" patents suggests that the aban- donment of "central" claiming may be overstated. That a claim describ- ing a limited improvement in a crowded field will have a limited range of permissible equivalents does not negate the availability of the doctrine vel non. 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 28 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court omitted). See In re Donaldson Co., 16 F. 3d 1189, 1194 (CA Fed. 1994) (Congress enacted predecessor of § 112, ¶ 6, in re- sponse to Halliburton); In re Fuetterer, 319 F. 2d 259, 264, n. 11 (CCPA 1963) (same); see also 2 D. Chisum, Patents § 8.04[2], pp. 63­64 (1996) (discussing 1954 commentary of then-Chief Patent Examiner P. J. Federico). Section 112, ¶ 6, now expressly allows so-called "means" claims, with the proviso that application of the broad literal language of such claims must be limited to only those means that are "equiva- len[t]" to the actual means shown in the patent specification. This is an application of the doctrine of equivalents in a re- strictive role, narrowing the application of broad literal claim elements. We recognized this type of role for the doctrine of equivalents in Graver Tank itself. 339 U. S., at 608­609. The added provision, however, is silent on the doctrine of equivalents as applied where there is no literal infringement. Because § 112, ¶ 6, was enacted as a targeted cure to a specific problem, and because the reference in that provision to "equivalents" appears to be no more than a prophylactic against potential side effects of that cure, such limited con- gressional action should not be overread for negative impli- cations. Congress in 1952 could easily have responded to Graver Tank as it did to the Halliburton decision. But it did not. Absent something more compelling than the dubi- ous negative inference offered by petitioner, the lengthy his- tory of the doctrine of equivalents strongly supports adher- ence to our refusal in Graver Tank to find that the Patent Act conflicts with that doctrine. Congress can legislate the doctrine of equivalents out of existence any time it chooses. The various policy arguments now made by both sides are thus best addressed to Congress, not this Court. B We do, however, share the concern of the dissenters below that the doctrine of equivalents, as it has come to be applied since Graver Tank, has taken on a life of its own, unbounded 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 29 Opinion of the Court by the patent claims. There can be no denying that the doc- trine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement. Judge Nies identified one means of avoiding this conflict: "[A] distinction can be drawn that is not too esoteric between substitution of an equivalent for a component in an invention and enlarging the metes and bounds of the invention beyond what is claimed. . . . . . "Where a claim to an invention is expressed as a com- bination of elements, as here, `equivalents' in the sobri- quet `Doctrine of Equivalents' refers to the equivalency of an element or part of the invention with one that is substituted in the accused product or process. . . . . . "This view that the accused device or process must be more than `equivalent' overall reconciles the Supreme Court's position on infringement by equivalents with its concurrent statements that `the courts have no right to enlarge a patent beyond the scope of its claims as al- lowed by the Patent Office.' [Citations omitted.] The `scope' is not enlarged if courts do not go beyond the substitution of equivalent elements." 62 F. 3d, at 1573­ 1574 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original). We concur with this apt reconciliation of our two lines of precedent. Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented inven- tion, and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole. It is important to ensure that the application of the doctrine, even as to an individual element, is not allowed such broad play as to effectively eliminate that element in its entirety. So long as the doctrine of equivalents does not encroach beyond the limits just described, or beyond related 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 30 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court limits to be discussed infra this page and 31­34, 39, n. 8, and 39­40, we are confident that the doctrine will not vitiate the central functions of the patent claims themselves. III Understandably reluctant to assume this Court would overrule Graver Tank, petitioner has offered alternative ar- guments in favor of a more restricted doctrine of equivalents than it feels was applied in this case. We address each in turn. A Petitioner first argues that Graver Tank never purported to supersede a well-established limit on nonliteral infringe- ment, known variously as "prosecution history estoppel" and "file wrapper estoppel." See Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Duphar Int'l Research B. V., 738 F. 2d 1237, 1238 (CA Fed. 1984). According to petitioner, any surrender of subject matter during patent prosecution, regardless of the reason for such surrender, precludes recapturing any part of that subject matter, even if it is equivalent to the matter ex- pressly claimed. Because, during patent prosecution, re- spondent limited the pH element of its claim to pH levels between 6.0 and 9.0, petitioner would have those limits form bright lines beyond which no equivalents may be claimed. Any inquiry into the reasons for a surrender, petitioner claims, would undermine the public's right to clear notice of the scope of the patent as embodied in the patent file. We can readily agree with petitioner that Graver Tank did not dispose of prosecution history estoppel as a legal limita- tion on the doctrine of equivalents. But petitioner reaches too far in arguing that the reason for an amendment during patent prosecution is irrelevant to any subsequent estoppel. In each of our cases cited by petitioner and by the dissent below, prosecution history estoppel was tied to amendments made to avoid the prior art, or otherwise to address a specific concern-such as obviousness-that arguably would have 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 31 Opinion of the Court rendered the claimed subject matter unpatentable. Thus, in Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U. S. 126 (1942), Chief Justice Stone distinguished inclusion of a limiting phrase in an original patent claim from the "very different" situation in which "the applicant, in order to meet objections in the Patent Office, based on references to the prior art, adopted the phrase as a substitute for the broader one" pre- viously used. Id., at 136 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Keystone Driller Co. v. Northwest Engineering Corp., 294 U. S. 42 (1935), estoppel was applied where the initial claims were "rejected on the prior art," id., at 48, n. 6, and where the allegedly infringing equivalent element was outside of the revised claims and within the prior art that formed the basis for the rejection of the earlier claims, id., at 48.5 It is telling that in each case this Court probed the rea- soning behind the Patent Office's insistence upon a change in the claims. In each instance, a change was demanded because the claim as otherwise written was viewed as not describing a patentable invention at all-typically because what it described was encompassed within the prior art. But, as the United States informs us, there are a variety of other reasons why the PTO may request a change in claim language. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22­23 5 See also Smith v. Magic City Kennel Club, Inc., 282 U. S. 784, 788 (1931) (estoppel applied to amended claim where the original "claim was rejected on the prior patent to" another); Computing Scale Co. of America v. Automatic Scale Co., 204 U. S. 609, 618­620 (1907) (initial claims re- jected based on lack of invention over prior patents); Hubbell v. United States, 179 U. S. 77, 83 (1900) (patentee estopped from excluding a claim element where element was added to overcome objections based on lack of novelty over prior patents); Sutter v. Robinson, 119 U. S. 530, 541 (1886) (estoppel applied where, during patent prosecution, the applicant "was ex- pressly required to state that [the device's] structural plan was old and not of his invention"); cf. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U. S. 1, 33 (1966) (noting, in a validity determination, that "claims that have been narrowed in order to obtain the issuance of a patent by distin- guishing the prior art cannot be sustained to cover that which was pre- viously by limitation eliminated from the patent"). 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 32 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court (counsel for the PTO also appearing on the brief). And if the PTO has been requesting changes in claim language without the intent to limit equivalents or, indeed, with the expectation that language it required would in many cases allow for a range of equivalents, we should be extremely re- luctant to upset the basic assumptions of the PTO without substantial reason for doing so. Our prior cases have con- sistently applied prosecution history estoppel only where claims have been amended for a limited set of reasons, and we see no substantial cause for requiring a more rigid rule invoking an estoppel regardless of the reasons for a change.6 In this case, the patent examiner objected to the patent claim due to a perceived overlap with the Booth patent, which revealed an ultrafiltration process operating at a pH above 9.0. In response to this objection, the phrase "at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0" was added to the claim. While it is undisputed that the upper limit of 9.0 was added in order to distinguish the Booth patent, the reason for add- ing the lower limit of 6.0 is unclear. The lower limit cer- tainly did not serve to distinguish the Booth patent, which said nothing about pH levels below 6.0. Thus, while a lower limit of 6.0, by its mere inclusion, became a material element of the claim, that did not necessarily preclude the application of the doctrine of equivalents as to that element. See Hub- bell v. United States, 179 U. S. 77, 82 (1900) (" `[A]ll [specified elements] must be regarded as material,' " though it remains an open " `question whether an omitted part is supplied by an equivalent device or instrumentality' " (citation omitted)). 6 That petitioner's rule might provide a brighter line for determining whether a patentee is estopped under certain circumstances is not a suffi- cient reason for adopting such a rule. This is especially true where, as here, the PTO may have relied upon a flexible rule of estoppel when decid- ing whether to ask for a change in the first place. To change so substan- tially the rules of the game now could very well subvert the various bal- ances the PTO sought to strike when issuing the numerous patents which have not yet expired and which would be affected by our decision. 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 33 Opinion of the Court Where the reason for the change was not related to avoiding the prior art, the change may introduce a new element, but it does not necessarily preclude infringement by equivalents of that element.7 We are left with the problem, however, of what to do in a case like the one at bar, where the record seems not to reveal the reason for including the lower pH limit of 6.0. In our view, holding that certain reasons for a claim amendment may avoid the application of prosecution history estoppel is not tantamount to holding that the absence of a reason for an amendment may similarly avoid such an estoppel. Mind- ful that claims do indeed serve both a definitional and a no- tice function, we think the better rule is to place the burden on the patent holder to establish the reason for an amend- ment required during patent prosecution. The court then would decide whether that reason is sufficient to overcome prosecution history estoppel as a bar to application of the doctrine of equivalents to the element added by that amend- ment. Where no explanation is established, however, the court should presume that the patent applicant had a sub- stantial reason related to patentability for including the limiting element added by amendment. In those circum- stances, prosecution history estoppel would bar the applica- tion of the doctrine of equivalents as to that element. The presumption we have described, one subject to rebuttal if an appropriate reason for a required amendment is established, gives proper deference to the role of claims in defining an invention and providing public notice, and to the primacy of 7 We do not suggest that, where a change is made to overcome an objec- tion based on the prior art, a court is free to review the correctness of that objection when deciding whether to apply prosecution history estop- pel. As petitioner rightly notes, such concerns are properly addressed on direct appeal from the denial of a patent, and will not be revisited in an infringement action. Smith v. Magic City Kennel Club, Inc., supra, at 789­790. What is permissible for a court to explore is the reason (right or wrong) for the objection and the manner in which the amendment ad- dressed and avoided the objection. 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 34 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court the PTO in ensuring that the claims allowed cover only sub- ject matter that is properly patentable in a proffered patent application. Applied in this fashion, prosecution history estoppel places reasonable limits on the doctrine of equiva- lents, and further insulates the doctrine from any feared con- flict with the Patent Act. Because respondent has not proffered in this Court a rea- son for the addition of a lower pH limit, it is impossible to tell whether the reason for that addition could properly avoid an estoppel. Whether a reason in fact exists, but simply was not adequately developed, we cannot say. On remand, the Federal Circuit can consider whether reasons for that portion of the amendment were offered or not and whether further opportunity to establish such reasons would be proper. B Petitioner next argues that even if Graver Tank remains good law, the case held only that the absence of substantial differences was a necessary element for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, not that it was sufficient for such a result. Brief for Petitioner 32. Relying on Graver Tank's references to the problem of an "unscrupulous copy- ist" and "piracy," 339 U. S., at 607, petitioner would require judicial exploration of the equities of a case before allowing application of the doctrine of equivalents. To be sure, Graver Tank refers to the prevention of copying and piracy when describing the benefits of the doctrine of equivalents. That the doctrine produces such benefits, however, does not mean that its application is limited only to cases where those particular benefits are obtained. Elsewhere in Graver Tank the doctrine is described in more neutral terms. And the history of the doctrine as re- lied upon by Graver Tank reflects a basis for the doctrine not so limited as petitioner would have it. In Winans v. Denmead, 15 How. 330, 343 (1854), we described the doctrine 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 35 Opinion of the Court of equivalents as growing out of a legally implied term in each patent claim that "the claim extends to the thing pat- ented, however its form or proportions may be varied." Under that view, application of the doctrine of equivalents involves determining whether a particular accused product or process infringes upon the patent claim, where the claim takes the form-half express, half implied-of "X and its equivalents." Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U. S. 120, 125 (1878), on which Graver Tank also relied, offers a similarly intent-neutral view of the doctrine of equivalents: "[T]he substantial equivalent of a thing, in the sense of the patent law, is the same as the thing itself; so that if two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even though they differ in name, form, or shape." If the essential predicate of the doctrine of equivalents is the notion of identity between a patented invention and its equivalent, there is no basis for treating an infringing equiv- alent any differently from a device that infringes the express terms of the patent. Application of the doctrine of equiva- lents, therefore, is akin to determining literal infringement, and neither requires proof of intent. Petitioner also points to Graver Tank's seeming reliance on the absence of independent experimentation by the al- leged infringer as supporting an equitable defense to the doc- trine of equivalents. The Federal Circuit explained this fac- tor by suggesting that an alleged infringer's behavior, be it copying, designing around a patent, or independent experi- mentation, indirectly reflects the substantiality of the differ- ences between the patented invention and the accused device or process. According to the Federal Circuit, a person aim- ing to copy or aiming to avoid a patent is imagined to be at 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 36 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court least marginally skilled at copying or avoidance, and thus intentional copying raises an inference-rebuttable by proof of independent development-of having only insubstantial differences, and intentionally designing around a patent claim raises an inference of substantial differences. This ex- planation leaves much to be desired. At a minimum, one wonders how ever to distinguish between the intentional copyist making minor changes to lower the risk of legal ac- tion and the incremental innovator designing around the claims, yet seeking to capture as much as is permissible of the patented advance. But another explanation is available that does not require a divergence from generally objective principles of patent infringement. In both instances in Graver Tank where we referred to independent research or experiments, we were discussing the known interchangeability between the chemi- cal compound claimed in the patent and the compound sub- stituted by the alleged infringer. The need for independ- ent experimentation thus could reflect knowledge-or lack thereof-of interchangeability possessed by one presumably skilled in the art. The known interchangeability of substi- tutes for an element of a patent is one of the express objec- tive factors noted by Graver Tank as bearing upon whether the accused device is substantially the same as the patented invention. Independent experimentation by the alleged in- fringer would not always reflect upon the objective question whether a person skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability between two elements, but in many cases it would likely be probative of such knowledge. Although Graver Tank certainly leaves room for petition- er's suggested inclusion of intent-based elements in the doc- trine of equivalents, we do not read it as requiring them. The better view, and the one consistent with Graver Tank's predecessors and the objective approach to infringement, is that intent plays no role in the application of the doctrine of equivalents. 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 37 Opinion of the Court C Finally, petitioner proposes that in order to minimize con- flict with the notice function of patent claims, the doctrine of equivalents should be limited to equivalents that are dis- closed within the patent itself. A milder version of this ar- gument, which found favor with the dissenters below, is that the doctrine should be limited to equivalents that were known at the time the patent was issued, and should not extend to after-arising equivalents. As we have noted, supra, at 36, with regard to the objec- tive nature of the doctrine, a skilled practitioner's knowledge of the interchangeability between claimed and accused ele- ments is not relevant for its own sake, but rather for what it tells the factfinder about the similarities or differences be- tween those elements. Much as the perspective of the hypo- thetical "reasonable person" gives content to concepts such as "negligent" behavior, the perspective of a skilled prac- titioner provides content to, and limits on, the concept of "equivalence." Insofar as the question under the doctrine of equivalents is whether an accused element is equivalent to a claimed element, the proper time for evaluating equiva- lency-and thus knowledge of interchangeability between el- ements-is at the time of infringement, not at the time the patent was issued. And rejecting the milder version of peti- tioner's argument necessarily rejects the more severe propo- sition that equivalents must not only be known, but must also be actually disclosed in the patent in order for such equivalents to infringe upon the patent. IV The various opinions below, respondents, and amici devote considerable attention to whether application of the doctrine of equivalents is a task for the judge or for the jury. How- ever, despite petitioner's argument below that the doctrine should be applied by the judge, in this Court petitioner makes only passing reference to this issue. See Brief for 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 38 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court Petitioner 22, n. 15 ("If this Court were to hold in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., No. 95­26 (argued Jan. 8, 1996), that judges rather than juries are to construe patent claims, so as to provide a uniform definition of the scope of the legally protected monopoly, it would seem at cross- purposes to say that juries may nonetheless expand the claims by resort to a broad notion of `equivalents' "); Reply Brief for Petitioner 20 (whether judge or jury should apply the doctrine of equivalents depends on how the Court views the nature of the inquiry under the doctrine of equivalents). Petitioner's comments go more to the alleged inconsist- ency between the doctrine of equivalents and the claiming requirement than to the role of the jury in applying the doctrine as properly understood. Because resolution of whether, or how much of, the application of the doctrine of equivalents can be resolved by the court is not necessary for us to answer the question presented, we decline to take it up. The Federal Circuit held that it was for the jury to decide whether the accused process was equivalent to the claimed process. There was ample support in our prior cases for that holding. See, e. g., Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U. S., at 125 ("[I]n determining the question of infringement, the court or jury, as the case may be, . . . are to look at the machines or their several devices or elements in the light of what they do, or what office or function they perform, and how they perform it, and to find that one thing is substan- tially the same as another, if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result"); Winans v. Denmead, 15 How., at 344 ("[It] is a question for the jury" whether the accused device was "the same in kind, and effected by the employment of [the patent- ee's] mode of operation in substance"). Nothing in our re- cent decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U. S. 370 (1996), necessitates a different result than that reached by the Federal Circuit. Indeed, Markman cites with considerable favor, when discussing the role of judge 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 39 Opinion of the Court and jury, the seminal Winans decision. 517 U. S., at 384­ 385. Whether, if the issue were squarely presented to us, we would reach a different conclusion than did the Federal Circuit is not a question we need decide today.8 V All that remains is to address the debate regarding the linguistic framework under which "equivalence" is deter- mined. Both the parties and the Federal Circuit spend con- siderable time arguing whether the so-called "triple iden- tity" test-focusing on the function served by a particular claim element, the way that element serves that function, and the result thus obtained by that element-is a suitable method for determining equivalence, or whether an "insub- stantial differences" approach is better. There seems to be substantial agreement that, while the triple identity test may be suitable for analyzing mechanical devices, it often 8 With regard to the concern over unreviewability due to black-box jury verdicts, we offer only guidance, not a specific mandate. Where the evi- dence is such that no reasonable jury could determine two elements to be equivalent, district courts are obliged to grant partial or complete sum- mary judgment. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317, 322­323 (1986). If there has been a reluctance to do so by some courts due to unfamiliarity with the subject matter, we are confident that the Federal Circuit can remedy the problem. Of course, the various legal limitations on the application of the doctrine of equivalents are to be determined by the court, either on a pretrial motion for partial summary judgment or on a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the evidence and after the jury verdict. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 50. Thus, under the particular facts of a case, if prosecu- tion history estoppel would apply or if a theory of equivalence would en- tirely vitiate a particular claim element, partial or complete judgment should be rendered by the court, as there would be no further material issue for the jury to resolve. Finally, in cases that reach the jury, a spe- cial verdict and/or interrogatories on each claim element could be very useful in facilitating review, uniformity, and possibly postverdict judg- ments as a matter of law. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 49 and 50. We leave it to the Federal Circuit how best to implement procedural improvements to promote certainty, consistency, and reviewability to this area of the law. 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 40 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court provides a poor framework for analyzing other products or processes. On the other hand, the insubstantial differences test offers little additional guidance as to what might render any given difference "insubstantial." In our view, the particular linguistic framework used is less important than whether the test is probative of the es- sential inquiry: Does the accused product or process contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention? Different linguistic frameworks may be more suitable to different cases, depending on their particular facts. A focus on individual elements and a spe- cial vigilance against allowing the concept of equivalence to eliminate completely any such elements should reduce con- siderably the imprecision of whatever language is used. An analysis of the role played by each element in the context of the specific patent claim will thus inform the inquiry as to whether a substitute element matches the function, way, and result of the claimed element, or whether the substitute ele- ment plays a role substantially different from the claimed element. With these limiting principles as a backdrop, we see no purpose in going further and micromanaging the Fed- eral Circuit's particular word choice for analyzing equiva- lence. We expect that the Federal Circuit will refine the formulation of the test for equivalence in the orderly course of case-by-case determinations, and we leave such refine- ment to that court's sound judgment in this area of its spe- cial expertise. VI Today we adhere to the doctrine of equivalents. The de- termination of equivalence should be applied as an objec- tive inquiry on an element-by-element basis. Prosecution history estoppel continues to be available as a defense to infringement, but if the patent holder demonstrates that an amendment required during prosecution had a purpose unre- lated to patentability, a court must consider that purpose in 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 41 Ginsburg, J., concurring order to decide whether an estoppel is precluded. Where the patent holder is unable to establish such a purpose, a court should presume that the purpose behind the required amendment is such that prosecution history estoppel would apply. Because the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit did not consider all of the requirements as described by us today, particularly as related to prosecution history estoppel and the preservation of some meaning for each element in a claim, we reverse its judgment and remand the case for fur- ther proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Kennedy joins, concurring. I join the opinion of the Court and write separately to add a cautionary note on the rebuttable presumption the Court announces regarding prosecution history estoppel. I ad- dress in particular the application of the presumption in this case and others in which patent prosecution has already been completed. The new presumption, if applied woodenly, might in some instances unfairly discount the expectations of a patentee who had no notice at the time of patent prose- cution that such a presumption would apply. Such a pat- entee would have had little incentive to insist that the rea- sons for all modifications be memorialized in the file wrapper as they were made. Years after the fact, the patentee may find it difficult to establish an evidentiary basis that would overcome the new presumption. The Court's opinion is sen- sitive to this problem, noting that "the PTO may have relied upon a flexible rule of estoppel when deciding whether to ask for a change" during patent prosecution. Ante, at 32, n. 6. Because respondent has not presented to this Court any explanation for the addition of the lower pH limit, I concur in the decision to remand the matter to the Federal Circuit. 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 42 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Ginsburg, J., concurring On remand, that court can determine-bearing in mind the prior absence of clear rules of the game-whether suitable reasons for including the lower pH limit were earlier offered or, if not, whether they can now be established. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 43 Syllabus ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH et al. v. ARIZONA et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­974. Argued December 4, 1996-Decided March 3, 1997 Maria-Kelly F. Yniguez, an Arizona state employee at the time, sued the State and its Governor, Attorney General, and Director of the Depart- ment of Administration under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that State Constitution Article XXVIII-key provisions of which declare English "the official language of the State," require the State to "act in English and in no other language," and authorize state residents and businesses "to bring [state-court] suit[s] to enforce th[e] Article"-violated, inter alia, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Yniguez used both English and Spanish in her work and feared that Article XXVIII, if read broadly, would require her to face discharge or other discipline if she did not refrain from speaking Spanish while serving the State. She requested injunctive and declaratory relief, counsel fees, and "all other relief that the Court deems just and proper." During the early phases of the suit, the State Attorney General released an opinion ex- pressing his view that Article XXVIII is constitutional in that, although it requires the expression of "official acts" in English, it allows govern- ment employees to use other languages to facilitate the delivery of gov- ernmental services. The Federal District Court heard testimony and, among its rulings, determined that only the Governor, in her official capacity, was a proper defendant. The court, at the same time, dis- missed the State because of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, the State Attorney General because he had no authority to enforce Article XXVIII against state employees, and the Director because there was no showing that she had undertaken or threatened any action adverse to Yniguez; rejected the Attorney General's interpretation of the Article on the ground that it conflicted with the measure's plain language; de- clared the Article fatally overbroad after reading it to impose a sweep- ing ban on the use of any language other than English by all of Arizona officialdom; and declined to allow the Arizona courts the initial oppor- tunity to determine the scope of Article XXVIII. Following the Gov- ernor's announcement that she would not appeal, the District Court denied the State Attorney General's request to certify the pivotal state- law question-the Article's correct construction-to the Arizona Su- preme Court. The District Court also denied the State Attorney Gen- 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 44 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Syllabus eral's motion to intervene on behalf of the State, under 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b), to contest on appeal the court's holding that the Article is unconstitutional. In addition, the court denied the motion of newcom- ers Arizonans for Official English Committee (AOE) and its Chairman Park, sponsors of the ballot initiative that became Article XXVIII, to intervene to support the Article's constitutionality. The day after AOE, Park, and the State Attorney General filed their notices of appeal, Yniguez resigned from state employment to accept a job in the private sector. The Ninth Circuit then concluded that AOE and Park met standing requirements under Article III of the Federal Constitution and could proceed as party appellants, and that the Attorney General, hav- ing successfully obtained dismissal below, could not reenter as a party, but could present an argument, pursuant to § 2403(b), regarding the con- stitutionality of Article XXVIII. Thereafter, the State Attorney Gen- eral informed the Ninth Circuit of Yniguez's resignation and suggested that, for lack of a viable plaintiff, the case was moot. The court dis- agreed, holding that a plea for nominal damages could be read into the complaint's "all other relief" clause to save the case. The en banc Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the District Court's ruling that Article XXVIII was unconstitutional, and announced that Yniguez was entitled to nominal damages from the State. Finding the Article's "plain lan- guage" dispositive, and noting that the State Attorney General had never conceded that the Article would be unconstitutional if construed as Yniguez asserted it should be, the Court of Appeals also rejected the Attorney General's limiting construction of the Article and declined to certify the matter to the State Supreme Court. Finally, the Ninth Cir- cuit acknowledged a state-court challenge to Article XXVIII's constitu- tionality, Ruiz v. State, but found that litigation no cause to stay the federal proceedings. Held: Because the case was moot and should not have been retained for adjudication on the merits, the Court vacates the Ninth Circuit's judg- ment and remands the case with directions that the action be dismissed by the District Court. This Court expresses no view on the correct interpretation of Article XXVIII or on the measure's constitutionality. Pp. 64­80. (a) Grave doubts exist as to the standing of petitioners AOE and Park to pursue appellate review under Article III's case-or-controversy re- quirement. Standing to defend on appeal in the place of an original defendant demands that the litigant possess "a direct stake in the out- come." Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 62. Petitioners' primary argument-that, as initiative proponents, they have a quasi-legislative 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 45 Syllabus interest in defending the measure they successfully sponsored-is dubi- ous because they are not elected state legislators, authorized by state law to represent the State's interests, see Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72, 82. Furthermore, this Court has never identified initiative proponents as Article-III-qualified defenders. Cf. Don't Bankrupt Washington Committee v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 460 U. S. 1077. Their assertion of representational or associational stand- ing is also problematic, absent the concrete injury that would confer standing upon AOE members in their own right, see, e. g., Food and Commercial Workers v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U. S. 544, 551­553, and absent anything in Article XXVIII's state-court citizen-suit provision that could support standing for Arizona residents in general, or AOE in particular, to defend the Article's constitutionality in federal court. Nevertheless, this Court need not definitively resolve the standing of AOE and Park to proceed as they did, but assumes such standing argu- endo in order to analyze the question of mootness occasioned by origi- nating plaintiff Yniguez's departure from state employment. See, e. g., Burke v. Barnes, 479 U. S. 361, 363, 364, n. Pp. 64­67. (b) Because Yniguez no longer satisfies the case-or-controversy re- quirement, this case is moot. To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of re- view, not merely at the time the complaint is filed. E. g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401. Although Yniguez had a viable claim at the outset of this litigation, her resignation from public sector employ- ment to pursue work in the private sector, where her speech was not governed by Article XXVIII, mooted the case stated in her complaint. Cf. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U. S. 77, 78, 80­81. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's ruling, her implied plea for nominal damages, which the Ninth Circuit approved as against the State of Arizona, could not revive the case, as § 1983 actions do not lie against a State, Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 71; Arizona was permitted to participate in the appeal only as an intervenor, through its Attorney General, not as a party subject to an obligation to pay damages; and the State's coopera- tion with Yniguez in waiving Eleventh Amendment immunity did not recreate a live case or controversy fit for federal-court adjudication, cf., e. g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U. S. 302, 304. Pp. 67­71. (c) When a civil case becomes moot pending appellate adjudication, the established practice in the federal system is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39. This Court is not disarmed from that course by the State Attorney General's failure to petition for cer- tiorari. The Court has an obligation to inquire not only into its own 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 46 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Syllabus authority to decide the questions presented, but to consider also the authority of the lower courts to proceed, even though the parties are prepared to concede it. E. g., Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534, 541. Because the Ninth Circuit refused to stop the adjudication when it learned of the mooting event-Yniguez's departure from public employment-its unwarranted en banc judgment must be set aside. Nor is the District Court's judgment saved by its entry be- fore the occurrence of the mooting event or by the Governor's refusal to appeal from it. AOE and Park had an arguable basis for seeking appellate review; moreover, the State Attorney General's renewed certi- fication plea and his motion to intervene in this litigation demonstrate that he was pursuing his § 2403(b) right to defend Article XXVIII's con- stitutionality when the mooting event occurred. His disclosure of that event to the Ninth Circuit warranted a mootness disposition, which would have stopped his § 2403(b) endeavor and justified vacation of the District Court's judgment. The extraordinary course of this litigation and the federalism concern next considered lead to the conclusion that vacatur down the line is the equitable solution. Pp. 71­75. (d) Taking into account the novelty of the question of Article XXVIII's meaning, its potential importance to the conduct of Arizona's business, the State Attorney General's views on the subject, and the at-least-partial agreement with those views by the Article's sponsors, more respectful consideration should have been given to the Attorney General's requests to seek, through certification, an authoritative con- struction of the Article from the State Supreme Court. When anticipa- tory relief is sought in federal court against a state statute, respect for the place of the States in our federal system calls for close consideration of the question whether conflict is avoidable. Federal courts are not well equipped to rule on a state statute's constitutionality without a controlling interpretation of the statute's meaning and effect by the state courts. See, e. g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Certification saves time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism. See, e. g., Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U. S. 386, 391. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's suggestion, this Court's decisions do not require as a condition precedent to certifi- cation a concession by the Attorney General that Article XXVIII would be unconstitutional if construed as Yniguez contended it should be. Moreover, that court improperly blended abstention with certification when it found that "unique circumstances," rather than simply a novel or unsettled state-law question, are necessary before federal courts may employ certification. The Arizona Supreme Court has before it, in Ruiz v. State, the question: What does Article XXVIII mean? Once that court has spoken, adjudication of any remaining federal constitu- 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 47 Syllabus tional question may be "greatly simplifie[d]." See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 151. Pp. 75­80. 69 F. 3d 920, vacated and remanded. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Barnaby W. Zall argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Robert J. Pohlman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Yniguez was Brian A. Luscher. Stephen G. Montoya, Albert M. Flores, and George Robles Vice III filed a brief for respondents Arizo- nans Against Constitutional Tampering et al. Grant Woods, Attorney General, Rebecca White Berch, First Assistant At- torney General, C. Tim Delaney, Solicitor General, Paula S. Bickett, Assistant Attorney General, and Carter G. Phillips filed briefs for respondents State of Arizona et al.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the FLA­187 Committee et al. by Stanley W. Sokolowski; for the Pacific Legal Founda- tion by Sharon L. Browne; for U. S. English, Inc., by Leonard J. Henzke, Jr.; for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Richard K. Willard, Bennett Evan Cooper, Daniel J. Popeo, Richard A. Samp, and Don Sten- berg; and for Thurston Greene, pro se. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of New Mexico by Tom Udall, Attorney General, Manuel Tijerina, Deputy Attorney General, and Gerald T. E. Gonzalez, Tannis L. Fox, Laura Fash- ing, Elizabeth A. Glenn, and William S. Keller, Assistant Attorneys Gen- eral; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Edward M. Chen, Steven R. Shapiro, Marjorie Heins, and Robert L. Rusky; for the Hawaii Civil Rights Commission et al. by John H. Ishihara, Carl C. Christensen, and Eric K. Yamamoto; for Human Rights Watch by Allan Blumstein and Kenneth Roth; for the Linguistic Society of America et al. by Peter M. Tiersma; for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund by E. Richard Larson; for the National Council of La Raza et al. by Joseph N. Onek, William D. Wallace, and Javier M. Guzman; for the Navajo Nation by Thomas W. Christie; for the Puerto Rican Legal De- fense and Education Fund et al. by Kenneth Kimerling, Karen K. Nara- saki, and Richard Albores; and for Representative Nydia M. Velazquez et al. by Walter A. Smith, Jr., and Audrey J. Anderson. Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Hun- ger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen- 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 48 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. Federal courts lack competence to rule definitively on the meaning of state legislation, see, e. g., Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U. S. 82, 86­87 (1970), nor may they adjudicate challenges to state measures absent a showing of actual impact on the challenger, see, e. g., Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103, 110 (1969). The Ninth Circuit, in the case at hand, lost sight of these limitations. The initiating plaintiff, Maria-Kelly F. Yniguez, sought federal-court resolution of a novel question: the compatibility with the Federal Constitution of a 1988 amendment to Arizona's Constitution declaring English "the official language of the State of Arizona"-"the language of . . . all government functions and actions." Ariz. Const., Art. XXVIII, §§ 1(1), 1(2). Participants in the federal litiga- tion, proceeding without benefit of the views of the Arizona Supreme Court, expressed diverse opinions on the meaning of the amendment. Yniguez commenced and maintained her suit as an individ- ual, not as a class representative. A state employee at the time she filed her complaint, Yniguez voluntarily left the State's employ in 1990 and did not allege she would seek to return to a public post. Her departure for a position in the private sector made her claim for prospective relief moot. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held that a plea for nominal damages could be read into Yniguez's complaint to save the case, and therefore pressed on to an ultimate decision. A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals declared Article XXVIII unconstitutional in 1994, and a divided en banc court, in 1995, adhered to the panel's position. The Ninth Circuit had no warrant to proceed as it did. The case had lost the essential elements of a justiciable con- troversy and should not have been retained for adjudica- tion on the merits by the Court of Appeals. We therefore eral Preston, Irving L. Gornstein, and Anthony J. Steinmeyer filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 49 Opinion of the Court vacate the Ninth Circuit's judgment, and remand the case to that court with directions that the action be dismissed by the District Court. We express no view on the correct interpretation of Article XXVIII or on the measure's constitutionality. I A 1988 Arizona ballot initiative established English as the official language of the State. Passed on November 8, 1988, by a margin of one percentage point,1 the measure became effective on December 5 as Arizona State Constitution Arti- cle XXVIII. Among key provisions, the Article declares that, with specified exceptions, the State "shall act in Eng- lish and in no other language." Ariz. Const., Art. XXVIII, § 3(1)(a). The enumerated exceptions concern compliance with federal laws, participation in certain educational pro- grams, protection of the rights of criminal defendants and crime victims, and protection of public health or safety. Id., § 3(2). In a final provision, Article XXVIII grants standing to any person residing or doing business in the State "to bring suit to enforce th[e] Article" in state court, under such "reasonable limitations" as "[t]he Legislature may enact." Id., § 4.2 Federal-court litigation challenging the constitutionality of Article XXVIII commenced two days after the ballot initiative passed. On November 10, 1988, Maria-Kelly F. Yniguez, then an insurance claims manager in the Arizona Department of Administration's Risk Management Division, sued the State of Arizona in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. Yniguez invoked 42 U. S. C. 1 The measure, opposed by the Governor as "sadly misdirected," App. 38, drew the affirmative votes of 50.5% of Arizonans casting ballots in the election, see Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F. 3d 920, 924 (CA9 1995). 2 Article XXVIII, titled "English as the Official Language," is set out in full in an appendix to this opinion. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 50 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court § 1983 as the basis for her suit.3 Soon after the lawsuit com- menced, Yniguez added as defendants, in their individual and official capacities, Arizona Governor Rose Mofford, Arizona Attorney General Robert K. Corbin, and the Director of Arizona's Department of Administration, Catherine Eden. Yniguez brought suit as an individual and never sought des- ignation as a class representative. Fluent in English and Spanish, Yniguez was engaged pri- marily in handling medical malpractice claims against the State. In her daily service to the public, she spoke English to persons who spoke only that language, Spanish to persons who spoke only that language, and a combination of English and Spanish to persons able to communicate in both lan- guages. Record, Doc. No. 62, ¶¶ 8, 13 (Statement of Stipu- lated Facts, filed Feb. 9, 1989). Yniguez feared that Article XXVIII's instruction to "act in English," § 3(1)(a), if read broadly, would govern her job performance "every time she [did] something." See Record, Doc. No. 62, ¶ 10. She be- lieved she would lose her job or face other sanctions if she did not immediately refrain from speaking Spanish while serving the State. See App. 58, ¶ 19 (Second Amended Complaint). Yniguez asserted that Article XXVIII violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d. She requested injunctive and declaratory relief, counsel fees, and "all other relief that the 3 Derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides in relevant part: "Civil action for deprivation of rights. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 51 Opinion of the Court Court deems just and proper under the circumstances." App. 60. All defendants named in Yniguez's complaint moved to dismiss all claims asserted against them.4 The State of Arizona asserted immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The individual defendants asserted the ab- sence of a case or controversy because "none of [them] ha[d] threatened [Yniguez] concerning her use of Spanish in the performance of her job duties [or had] ever told her not to use Spanish [at work]." Record, Doc. No. 30, p. 1. The de- fendants further urged that novel state-law questions con- cerning the meaning and application of Article XXVIII should be tendered first to the state courts. See id., at 2.5 Trial on the merits of Yniguez's complaint, the parties agreed, would be combined with the hearing on her motion for a preliminary injunction.6 Before the trial occurred, the State Attorney General, on January 24, 1989, released an opinion, No. I89­009, construing Article XXVIII and ex- plaining why he found the measure constitutional. App. 61­76. 4 Under Arizona law, the State Attorney General represents the State in federal court. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41­193(A)(3) (1992). Throughout these proceedings, the State and all state officials have been represented by the State Attorney General, or law department members under his supervision. See § 41­192(A). 5 Arizona law permits the State's highest court to "answer questions of law certified to it by the supreme court of the United States, a court of appeals of the United States, a United States district court or a tribal court . . . if there are involved in any proceedings before the certifying court questions of [Arizona law] which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme court and the intermediate appellate courts of this state." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12­1861 (1994). 6 The District Court, on December 8, 1988, had denied Yniguez's applica- tion for a temporary restraining order, finding no "imminent danger of the imposition of sanctions" against her. Record, Doc. No. 23, p. 1. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 52 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court In Opinion No. I89­009, the Attorney General said it was his obligation to read Article XXVIII "as a whole," in line "with the other portions of the Arizona Constitution" and "with the United States Constitution and federal laws." App. 61. While Article XXVIII requires the performance of "official acts of government" in English, it was the Attor- ney General's view that government employees remained free to use other languages "to facilitate the delivery of gov- ernmental services." Id., at 62. Construction of the word "act," as used in Article XXVIII, to mean more than an "of- ficial ac[t] of government," the Attorney General asserted, "would raise serious questions" of compatibility with federal and state equal protection guarantees and federal civil rights legislation. Id., at 65­66.7 On February 9, 1989, two weeks after release of the Attor- ney General's opinion, the parties filed a statement of stipu- lated facts, which reported Governor Mofford's opposition to the ballot initiative, her intention nevertheless "to comply with Article XXVIII," and her expectation that "State serv- ice employees [would] comply" with the measure. See Rec- ord, Doc. No. 62, ¶¶ 35, 36, 39. The stipulation confirmed the view of all parties that "[t]he efficient operation [and ad- ministration] of the State is enhanced by permitting State service employees to communicate with citizens of the State in languages other than English where the citizens are not proficient in English." Id., ¶¶ 16, 17. In particular, the parties recognized that "Yniguez'[s] use of a language other 7 Specifically addressing "[t]he handling of customer inquiries or com- plaints involving state or local government services," the Attorney Gen- eral elaborated: "All official documents that are governmental acts must be in English, but translation services and accommodating communications are permissi- ble, and may be required if reasonably necessary to the fair and effective delivery of services, or required by specific federal regulation. Communi- cations between elected and other governmental employees with the pub- lic at large may be in a language other than English on the same princi- ples." App. 74. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 53 Opinion of the Court than English in the course of her performing government business contributes to the efficient operation . . . and . . . administration of the State." Id., ¶ 15. The stipulation re- ferred to the Attorney General's January 24, 1989, opinion, id., ¶ 46, and further recounted that since the passage of Ar- ticle XXVIII, "none of [Yniguez's] supervisors ha[d] ever told her to change or cease her prior use of Spanish in the per- formance of her duties," id., ¶ 48.8 The District Court heard testimony on two days in Febru- ary and April 1989, and disposed of the case in an opinion and judgment filed February 6, 1990. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309. Prior to that final decision, the court had dismissed the State of Arizona as a defendant, accepting the State's plea of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id., at 311. Yniguez's second amended complaint, filed February 23, 1989, accordingly named as defendants only the Gover- nor, the Attorney General, and the Director of the Depart- ment of Administration. See App. 55.9 The District Court determined first that, among the named defendants, only the Governor, in her official capacity, was a proper party. The Attorney General, the District Court found, had no authority under Arizona law to enforce provisions like Article XXVIII against state employees. 730 F. Supp., at 311­312. The Director and the Governor, 8 Supplementing their pleas to dismiss for want of a case or controversy, the defendants urged that Attorney General Opinion No. I89­009 "puts to rest any claim that [Yniguez] will be penalized by the State for using Spanish in her work." Record, Doc. No. 51, p. 4, n. 1. 9 The second amended complaint added another plaintiff, Arizona State Senator Jaime Gutierrez. Senator Gutierrez alleged that Article XXVIII interfered with his rights to communicate freely with persons, including residents of his Senate district, who spoke languages other than English. App. 58­59. The District Court dismissed Gutierrez's claim on the ground that the defendants, all executive branch officials, lacked authority to take enforcement action against elected legislative branch officials. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309, 311 (Ariz. 1990). Gutierrez is no longer a participant in these proceedings. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 54 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court on the other hand, did have authority to enforce state laws and rules against state service employees. Id., at 311. But nothing in the record, the District Court said, showed that the Director had undertaken or threatened to undertake any action adverse to Yniguez. Id., at 313. That left Gover- nor Mofford. The Attorney General "ha[d] formally interpreted Article XXVIII as not imposing any restrictions on Yniguez's con- tinued use of Spanish during the course of her official du- ties," id., at 312, and indeed all three named defendants- Mofford as well as Corbin and Eden, see supra, at 50-"ha[d] stated on the record that Yniguez may continue to speak Spanish without fear of official retribution." 730 F. Supp., at 312. Governor Mofford therefore reiterated that Yniguez faced no actual or threatened injury attributable to any Ari- zona executive branch officer, and hence presented no genu- ine case or controversy. See ibid. But the District Court singled out the stipulations that "Governor Mofford intends to comply with Article XXVIII," and "expects State service employees to comply with Article XXVIII." Record, Doc. No. 62, ¶¶ 35, 36; see 730 F. Supp., at 312. If Yniguez proved right and the Governor wrong about the breadth of Article XXVIII, the District Court concluded, then Yniguez would be vulnerable to the Governor's pledge to enforce compliance with the Article. See ibid. Proceeding to the merits, the District Court found Article XXVIII fatally overbroad. The measure, as the District Court read it, was not merely a direction that all official acts be in English, as the Attorney General's opinion maintained; instead, according to the District Court, Article XXVIII imposed a sweeping ban on the use of any language other than English by all of Arizona officialdom, with only limited exceptions. Id., at 314. The District Court adverted to the Attorney General's confining construction, but found it unpersuasive. Opinion No. I89­009, the District Court observed, is "merely . . . advisory," not binding on any 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 55 Opinion of the Court court. 730 F. Supp., at 315. "More importantly," the Dis- trict Court concluded, "the Attorney General's interpre- tation . . . is simply at odds with Article XXVIII's plain language." Ibid. The view that Article XXVIII's text left no room for a moderate and restrained interpretation led the District Court to decline "to allow the Arizona courts the initial op- portunity to determine the scope of Article XXVIII." Id., at 316. The District Court ultimately dismissed all parties save Yniguez and Governor Mofford in her official capacity, then declared Article XXVIII unconstitutional as violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but denied Yniguez's request for an injunction because "she ha[d] not established an enforcement threat sufficient to warrant [such] relief." Id., at 316­317. Postjudgment motions followed, sparked by Governor Mofford's announcement that she would not pursue an ap- peal. See App. 98. The Attorney General renewed his re- quest to certify the pivotal state-law question-the correct construction of Article XXVIII-to the Arizona Supreme Court. See Record, Doc. No. 82. He also moved to in- tervene on behalf of the State, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b),10 in order to contest on appeal the District Court's declaration that a provision of Arizona's Constitution vio- lated the Federal Constitution. Record, Doc. Nos. 92, 93. 10 Title 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b) provides: "In any action, suit, or proceeding in a court of the United States to which a State or any agency, officer, or employee thereof is not a party, wherein the constitutionality of any statute of that State affecting the public interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the attorney general of the State, and shall permit the State to intervene for presentation of evidence, if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on the question of constitutionality. The State shall, subject to the applicable provisions of law, have all the rights of a party and be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality." 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 56 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court Two newcomers also appeared in the District Court after judgment: the Arizonans for Official English Committee (AOE) and Robert D. Park, Chairman of AOE. Invoking Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, AOE and Park moved to intervene as defendants in order to urge on appeal the constitutionality of Article XXVIII. App. 94­ 102. AOE, an unincorporated association, was principal sponsor of the ballot initiative that became Article XXVIII. AOE and Park alleged in support of their intervention mo- tion the interest of AOE members in enforcement of Article XXVIII and Governor Mofford's unwillingness to defend the measure on appeal. Responding to the AOE/Park motion, Governor Mofford confirmed that she did not wish to appeal, but would have no objection to the Attorney General's inter- vention to pursue an appeal as the State's representative, or to the pursuit of an appeal by any other party. See Record, Doc. No. 94. Yniguez expressed reservations about proceeding further. "She ha[d] won [her] suit against her employer" and had "ob- tained her relief," her counsel noted. Record, Doc. No. 114, p. 18 (Tr. of Proceeding on Motion to Intervene and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, Mar. 26, 1990). If the litiga- tion "goes forward," Yniguez's counsel told the District Court, "I guess we do, too," but, counsel added, it might be in Yniguez's "best interest . . . if we stopped it right here." Ibid. The District Court agreed. In an opinion filed April 3, 1990, the District Court denied all three postjudgment motions. Yniguez v. Mofford, 130 F. R. D. 410. Certification was inappropriate, the District Court ruled, in light of the court's prior rejection of the At- torney General's narrow reading of Article XXVIII. See id., at 412. As to the Attorney General's intervention appli- cation, the District Court observed that § 2403(b) addresses only actions " `to which the State or any agency, officer, or employee thereof is not a party.' " See id., at 413 (quoting § 2403(b)). Yniguez's action did not fit the § 2403(b) de- 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 57 Opinion of the Court scription, the District Court said, because the State and its officers were the very defendants-the sole defendants- Yniguez's complaint named. Governor Mofford remained a party throughout the District Court proceedings. If the State lost the opportunity to defend the constitutionality of Article XXVIII on appeal, the District Court reasoned, it was "only because Governor Mofford determine[d] that the state's sovereign interests would be best served by foregoing an appeal." Ibid. Turning to the AOE/Park intervention motion, the Dis- trict Court observed first that the movants had failed to file a pleading "setting forth the[ir] claim or defense," as re- quired by Rule 24(c). Ibid. But that deficiency was not critical, the District Court said. Ibid. The insurmountable hurdle was Article III standing. The labor and resources AOE spent to promote the ballot initiative did not suffice to establish standing to sue or defend in a federal tribunal, the District Court held. Id., at 414­415. Nor did Park or any other AOE member qualify for party status, the District Court ruled, for the interests of voters who favored the ini- tiative were too general to meet traditional standing criteria. Id., at 415. In addition, the District Court was satisfied that AOE and Park could not tenably assert practical impairment of their interests stemming from the precedential force of the deci- sion. As nonparticipants in the federal litigation, they would face no issue preclusion. And a lower federal-court judgment is not binding on state courts, the District Court noted. Thus, AOE and Park would not be precluded by the federal declaration from pursuing "any future state court proceeding [based on] Article XXVIII." Id., at 415­416. II The Ninth Circuit viewed the matter of standing to appeal differently. In an opinion released July 19, 1991, Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F. 2d 727, the Court of Appeals reached these 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 58 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court conclusions: AOE and Park met Article III requirements and could proceed as appellants; Arizona's Attorney General, however, having successfully moved in the District Court for his dismissal as a defendant, could not reenter as a party, but would be permitted to present argument regarding the constitutionality of Article XXVIII. Id., at 738­740. The Ninth Circuit reported it would retain jurisdiction over the District Court's decision on the merits, id., at 740, but did not then address the question whether Article XXVIII's meaning should be certified for definitive resolution by the Arizona Supreme Court. Concerning AOE's standing, the Court of Appeals rea- soned that the Arizona Legislature would have standing to defend the constitutionality of a state statute; by analogy, the Ninth Circuit maintained, AOE, as principal sponsor of the ballot initiative, qualified to defend Article XXVIII on appeal. Id., at 732­733; see also id., at 734, n. 5 ("[W]e hold that AOE has standing in the same way that a legislature might."). AOE Chairman Park also had standing to appeal, according to the Ninth Circuit, because Yniguez "could have had a reasonable expectation that Park (and possibly AOE as well) would bring an enforcement action against her" under § 4 of Article XXVIII, which authorizes any person residing in Arizona to sue in state court to enforce the Arti- cle. Id., at 734, and n. 5.11 11 In a remarkable passage, the Ninth Circuit addressed Yniguez's argu- ment, opposing intervention by AOE and Park, that the District Court's judgment was no impediment to any state-court proceeding AOE and Park might wish to bring, because that judgment is not a binding prece- dent on Arizona's judiciary. See 939 F. 2d, at 735­736. The Court of Appeals questioned the wisdom of the view expressed "in the academic literature," "by some state courts," and by "several individual justices" that state courts are "coordinate and coequal with the lower federal courts on matters of federal law." Id., at 736 (footnote omitted). The Ninth Circuit acknowledged "there may be valid reasons not to bind the state courts to a decision of a single federal district judge-which is not even binding on the same judge in a subsequent action." Id., at 736­737. However, the appellate panel added, those reasons "are inapplicable to 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 59 Opinion of the Court Having allowed AOE and Park to serve as appellants, the Court of Appeals held Arizona's Attorney General "judi- cial[ly] estoppe[d]" from again appearing as a party. Id., at 738­739; see also id., at 740 ("[H]aving asked the district court to dismiss him as a party, [the Attorney General] can- not now become one again.").12 With Governor Mofford choosing not to seek Court of Appeals review, the appeal became one to which neither "[the] State [n]or any agency, officer, or employee thereof [was] a party," the Ninth Circuit observed, so the State's Attorney General could appear pur- suant to 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b). See 939 F. 2d, at 739.13 But, the Ninth Circuit added, § 2403(b) "confers only a limited right," a right pendent to the AOE/Park appeal, "to make an argument on the question of [Article XXVIII's] constitu- tionality." Id., at 739­740. Prior to the Ninth Circuit's July 1991 opinion, indeed the very day after AOE, Park, and the Arizona Attorney General filed their notices of appeal, a development of prime impor- tance occurred. On April 10, 1990, Yniguez resigned from state employment in order to accept another job. Her resig- decisions of the federal courts of appeals." Id., at 737. But cf. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 617 (1989) ("state courts . . . possess the authority, absent a provision for exclusive federal jurisdiction, to render binding judicial decisions that rest on their own interpretations of federal law"); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U. S. 364, 375­376 (1993) (Thomas, J., con- curring) (Supremacy Clause does not require state courts to follow rulings by federal courts of appeals on questions of federal law). 12 Because the Court of Appeals found AOE and Park to be proper appel- lants, that court did not "address the question whether the Attorney Gen- eral would have standing to appeal under Article III if no other party were willing and able to appeal." 939 F. 2d, at 738. The Court of Ap- peals assumed, however, that "whenever the constitutionality of a provi- sion of state law is called into question, the state government will have a sufficient interest [to satisfy] Article III." Id., at 733, n. 4. Cf. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 137 (1986) (intervening State had standing to appeal from judgment holding state law unconstitutional); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 62 (1986) ("a State has standing to defend the constitutionality of its statute"). 13 The full text of 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b) is set out supra, at 55, n. 10. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 60 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court nation apparently became effective on April 25, 1990. Ari- zona's Attorney General so informed the Ninth Circuit in September 1991, "suggest[ing] that this case may lack a via- ble plaintiff and, hence, may be moot." Suggestion of Moot- ness in Nos. 90­15546 and 90­15581 (CA9), Affidavit and Exh. A. One year later, on September 16, 1992, the Ninth Circuit rejected the mootness suggestion. Yniguez v. Arizona, 975 F. 2d 646. The court's ruling adopted in large part Yni- guez's argument opposing a mootness disposition. See App. 194­204 (Appellee Yniguez's Response Regarding Mootness Considerations). "[T]he plaintiff may no longer be affected by the English only provision," the Court of Appeals ac- knowledged. 975 F. 2d, at 647. Nevertheless, the court continued, "[her] constitutional claims may entitle her to an award of nominal damages." Ibid. Her complaint did "not expressly request nominal damages," the Ninth Circuit noted, but "it did request `all other relief that the Court deems just and proper under the circumstances.' " Id., at 647, n. 1; see supra, at 50­51. Thus, the Court of Appeals reasoned, one could regard the District Court's judgment as including an "implicit denial" of nominal damages. 975 F. 2d, at 647, n. 2. To permit Yniguez and AOE to clarify their positions, the Ninth Circuit determined to return the case to the District Court. There, with the Ninth Circuit's permission, AOE's Chairman Park could file a notice of appeal from the District Court's judgment, following up the Circuit's decision 14 months earlier allowing AOE and Park to intervene. Id., at 647.14 And next, Yniguez could cross-appeal to place before 14 In their original notice of appeal, filed April 9, 1990, AOE and Park targeted the District Court's denial of their motion to intervene. See App. 150­151. Once granted intervention, their original notice indicated, they would be positioned to file an appeal from the judgment declaring Article XXVIII unconstitutional. See id., at 150. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 61 Opinion of the Court the Ninth Circuit, explicitly, the issue of nominal damages. Id., at 647, and n. 2.15 In line with the Ninth Circuit's instructions, the case file was returned to the District Court on November 5, 1992; AOE and Park filed their second notice of appeal on Decem- ber 3, App. 206­208, and Yniguez cross-appealed on Decem- ber 15, App. 209.16 The Ninth Circuit heard argument on the merits on May 3, 1994. After argument, on June 21, 1994, the Ninth Circuit allowed Arizonans Against Constitu- tional Tampering (AACT) and Thomas Espinosa, Chairman of AACT, to intervene as plaintiffs-appellees. App. 14; Yniguez v. Arizona, 42 F. 3d 1217, 1223­1224 (1994) (amended Jan. 17, 1995). AACT was the principal opponent of the ballot initiative that became Article XXVIII. Id., at 1224. In permitting this late intervention, the Court of Ap- peals noted that "it d[id] not rely on [AACT's] standing as a party." Ibid. The standing of the preargument partici- pants, in the Ninth Circuit's view, sufficed to support a deter- mination on the merits. See ibid. In December 1994, the Ninth Circuit panel that had super- intended the case since 1990 affirmed the judgment declaring Article XXVIII unconstitutional and remanded the case, di- recting the District Court to award Yniguez nominal dam- 15 The Ninth Circuit made two further suggestions in the event that Yniguez failed to seek nominal damages: A new plaintiff "whose claim against the operation of the English only provision is not moot" might intervene; or Yniguez herself might have standing to remain a suitor if she could show that others had refrained from challenging the English-only provision in reliance on her suit. See 975 F. 2d, at 647­648. No state employee later intervened to substitute for Yniguez, nor did Yniguez en- deavor to show that others had not sued because they had relied on her suit. 16 On March 16, 1993, the District Court awarded Yniguez nearly $100,000 in attorney's fees. Record, Doc. No. 127. Governor Mofford and the State filed a notice of appeal from that award on April 8, 1993. Rec- ord, Doc. No. 128. Because the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the Dis- trict Court's judgment on the merits, the appeals court did not reach the state defendants' appeal from the award of fees. 69 F. 3d, at 924, n. 2, 927. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 62 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court ages. 42 F. 3d 1217 (amended Jan. 17, 1995). Despite the Court of Appeals' July 1991 denial of party status to Arizona, the Ninth Circuit apparently viewed the State as the defend- ant responsible for any damages, for it noted: "The State of Arizona expressly waived its right to assert the Eleventh Amendment as a defense to the award of nominal damages." Id., at 1243. The Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc, 53 F. 3d 1084 (1995), and in October 1995, by a 6-to-5 vote, the en banc court reinstated the panel opinion with minor alterations. 69 F. 3d 920. Adopting the District Court's construction of Article XXVIII, the en banc court read the provision to prohibit " `the use of any language other than English by all officers and employees of all political subdivisions in Arizona while performing their official duties, save to the extent that they may be allowed to use a foreign language by the limited exceptions contained in § 3(2) of Article XXVIII.' " 69 F. 3d, at 928 (quoting 730 F. Supp., at 314). Because the court found the "plain language" dispositive, 69 F. 3d, at 929, it rejected the State Attorney General's limit- ing construction and declined to certify the matter to the Arizona Supreme Court, id., at 929­931. As an additional reason for its refusal to grant the Attorney General's request for certification, the en banc court stated: "The Attorney General . . . never conceded that [Article XXVIII] would be unconstitutional if construed as Yniguez asserts it properly should be." Id., at 931, and n. 14.17 The Ninth Circuit also pointed to a state-court challenge to the constitutionality of 17 The Court of Appeals contrasted Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U. S. 383 (1988), in which this Court certified to the Vir- ginia Supreme Court questions concerning the proper interpretation of a state statute. In American Booksellers, the Ninth Circuit noted, "the State Attorney General conceded [the statute] would be unconstitutional if construed as the plaintiffs contended it should be." 69 F. 3d, at 930. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 63 Opinion of the Court Article XXVIII, Ruiz v. State, No. CV92­19603 (Sup. Ct. Maricopa County, Jan. 24, 1994). In Ruiz, the Ninth Circuit observed, the state court of first instance "dispos[ed] of [the] First Amendment challenge in three paragraphs" and "d[id] nothing to narrow [the provision]." 69 F. 3d, at 931.18 After construing Article XXVIII as sweeping in scope, the en banc Court of Appeals condemned the provision as mani- festly overbroad, trenching untenably on speech rights of Arizona officials and public employees. See id., at 931­948. For prevailing in the § 1983 action, the court ultimately an- nounced, Yniguez was "entitled to nominal damages." Id., at 949. On remand, the District Court followed the en banc Court of Appeals' order and, on November 3, 1995, awarded Yniguez $1 in damages. App. 211. AOE and Park petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to the Ninth Circuit.19 They raised two questions: (1) Does Article XXVIII violate the Free Speech Clause of the First 18 The Ruiz case included among its several plaintiffs four elected offi- cials and five state employees. After defeat in the court of first instance, the Ruiz plaintiffs prevailed in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Ruiz v. Symington, No. 1 CA­CV 94­0235, 1996 WL 309512 (Ariz. App., June 11, 1996). That court noted, with evident concern, that "the Ninth Circuit refused to abstain and certify the question of Article [XXVIII]'s proper interpretation to the Arizona Supreme Court, although the issue was pending in our state court system." Id., at *4. "Comity," the Arizona intermediate appellate court observed, "typically applies when a federal court finds that deference to a state court, on an issue of state law, is proper." Ibid. Nevertheless, in the interest of uniformity and to dis- courage forum shopping, the Arizona appeals court decided to defer to the federal litigation, forgoing independent analysis. Ibid. The Arizona Supreme Court granted review in Ruiz in November 1996, and stayed proceedings pending our decision in this case. App. to Supplemental Brief for Petitioners 1. 19 The State did not oppose the petition and, in its Appearance Form, filed in this Court on January 10, 1996, noted that "if the Court grants the Petition and reverses the lower court's decision . . . Arizona will seek reversal of award of attorney's fees against the State." See supra, at 61, n. 16. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 64 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court Amendment by "declaring English the official language of the State and requiring English to be used to perform official acts"?; (2) Do public employees have "a Free Speech right to disregard the [State's] official language" and perform official actions in a language other than English? This Court granted the petition and requested the parties to brief as threshold matters (1) the standing of AOE and Park to pro- ceed in this action as defending parties, and (2) Yniguez's continuing satisfaction of the case-or-controversy require- ment. 517 U. S. 1102 (1996). III Article III, § 2, of the Constitution confines federal courts to the decision of "Cases" or "Controversies." Standing to sue or defend is an aspect of the case-or-controversy require- ment. Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Con- tractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656, 663­664 (1993) (standing to sue); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 56 (1986) (standing to defend on appeal). To qualify as a party with standing to litigate, a person must show, first and foremost, "an invasion of a legally protected interest" that is "concrete and particularized" and " `actual or imminent.' " Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990)). An interest shared generally with the public at large in the proper application of the Constitution and laws will not do. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S., at 573­576. Standing to defend on appeal in the place of an original defendant, no less than standing to sue, demands that the litigant possess "a direct stake in the outcome." Diamond, 476 U. S., at 62 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740 (1972) (in- ternal quotation marks omitted)). The standing Article III requires must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first instance. Diamond, 476 U. S., at 62. The decision to seek review "is not to be placed in the 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 65 Opinion of the Court hands of `concerned bystanders,' " persons who would seize it "as a `vehicle for the vindication of value interests.' " Ibid. (citation omitted). An intervenor cannot step into the shoes of the original party unless the intervenor independently "fulfills the requirements of Article III." Id., at 68. In granting the petition for a writ of certiorari in this case, we called for briefing on the question whether AOE and Park have standing, consonant with Article III of the Federal Constitution, to defend in federal court the constitutionality of Arizona Constitution Article XXVIII. Petitioners argue primarily that, as initiative proponents, they have a quasi- legislative interest in defending the constitutionality of the measure they successfully sponsored. AOE and Park stress the funds and effort they expended to achieve adoption of Article XXVIII. We have recognized that state legislators have standing to contest a decision holding a state statute unconstitutional if state law authorizes legislators to repre- sent the State's interests. See Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72, 82 (1987).20 AOE and its members, however, are not elected representatives, and we are aware of no Arizona law ap- pointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Ari- zona to defend, in lieu of public officials, the constitutionality of initiatives made law of the State. Nor has this Court ever identified initiative proponents as Article-III-qualified de- fenders of the measures they advocated. Cf. Don't Bank- rupt Washington Committee v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 460 U. S. 1077 (1983) (summarily dis- missing, for lack of standing, appeal by an initiative propo- nent from a decision holding the initiative unconstitutional). AOE also asserts representational or associational stand- ing. An association has standing to sue or defend in such 20 Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 930, n. 5, 939­940 (1983) (Immigration and Naturalization Service appealed Court of Appeals ruling to this Court but declined to defend constitutionality of one-House veto provision; Court held Congress a proper party to defend measure's validity where both Houses, by resolution, had authorized intervention in the lawsuit). 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 66 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court capacity, however, only if its members would have standing in their own right. See Food and Commercial Workers v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U. S. 544, 551­553 (1996); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U. S. 333, 343 (1977). The requisite concrete injury to AOE members is not apparent. As nonparties in the District Court, AOE's members were not bound by the judgment for Yniguez. That judgment had slim precedential effect, see supra, at 58­59, n. 11,21 and it left AOE entirely free to invoke Article XXVIII, § 4, the citizen suit provision, in state court, where AOE could pursue whatever relief state law authorized. Nor do we discern anything flowing from Article XXVIII's citizen suit provision-which authorizes suits to enforce Ar- ticle XXVIII in state court-that could support standing for Arizona residents in general, or AOE in particular, to defend the Article's constitutionality in federal court. We thus have grave doubts whether AOE and Park have standing under Article III to pursue appellate review. Nevertheless, we need not definitively resolve the issue. Rather, we will follow a path we have taken before and in- quire, as a primary matter, whether originating plaintiff Yniguez still has a case to pursue. See Burke v. Barnes, 479 U. S. 361, 363, 364, n. (1987) (leaving unresolved question of congressional standing because Court determined case was moot). For purposes of that inquiry, we will assume, argu- endo, that AOE and Park had standing to place this case before an appellate tribunal. See id., at 366 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Court properly assumed standing, even though that matter raised a serious question, in order to analyze mootness issue). We may resolve the question whether 21 As the District Court observed, the stare decisis effect of that court's ruling was distinctly limited. The judgment was "not binding on the Ari- zona state courts [and did] not foreclose any rights of [AOE] or Park in any future state-court proceeding arising out of Article XXVIII." Yniguez v. Mofford, 130 F. R. D. 410, 416 (D. Ariz. 1990). 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 67 Opinion of the Court there remains a live case or controversy with respect to Yni- guez's claim without first determining whether AOE or Park has standing to appeal because the former question, like the latter, goes to the Article III jurisdiction of this Court and the courts below, not to the merits of the case. Cf. U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U. S. 18, 20­22 (1994). IV To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, "an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed." Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401 (1975) (quoting Steffel v. Thomp- son, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a state employee subject to Article XXVIII, Yniguez had a viable claim at the outset of the litigation in late 1988. We need not consider whether her case lost vital- ity in January 1989 when the Attorney General released Opinion No. I89­009. That opinion construed Article XXVIII to require the expression of "official acts" in Eng- lish, but to leave government employees free to use other languages "if reasonably necessary to the fair and effective delivery of services" to the public. See App. 71, 74; supra, at 52­53, 54; see also Marston's Inc. v. Roman Catholic Church of Phoenix, 132 Ariz. 90, 94, 644 P. 2d 244, 248 (1982) ("Attorney General opinions are advisory only and are not binding on the court. . . . This does not mean, however, that citizens may not rely in good faith on Attorney General opin- ions until the courts have spoken."). Yniguez left her state job in April 1990 to take up employment in the private sec- tor, where her speech was not governed by Article XXVIII. At that point, it became plain that she lacked a still vital claim for prospective relief. Cf. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U. S. 77, 78, 80­81 (1971) (prospective relief denied where plain- tiffs failed to show challenged measures adversely affected any plaintiff's primary conduct). 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 68 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court The Attorney General suggested mootness,22 but Yniguez resisted, and the Ninth Circuit adopted her proposed method of saving the case. See supra, at 60­61.23 It was not dis- positive, the court said, that Yniguez "may no longer be af- fected by the English only provision," 975 F. 2d, at 647, for Yniguez had raised in response to the mootness suggestion "[t]he possibility that [she] may seek nominal damages," ibid.; see App. 197­200 (Appellee Yniguez's Response Re- garding Mootness Considerations). At that stage of the liti- gation, however, Yniguez's plea for nominal damages was not the possibility the Ninth Circuit imagined. Yniguez's complaint rested on 42 U. S. C. § 1983. See supra, at 49­50, and n. 3. Although Governor Mofford in her official capacity was the sole defendant against whom the 22 Mootness has been described as " `the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the com- mencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its exist- ence (mootness).' " United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U. S. 388, 397 (1980) (quoting Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L. J. 1363, 1384 (1973)). 23 Yniguez's counsel did not inform the Court of Appeals of Yniguez's departure from government employment, a departure effective April 25, 1990, the day before the appeal was docketed. See App. 7. It was not until September 1991 that the State's Attorney General notified the Ninth Circuit of the plaintiff's changed circumstances. See id., at 187. Yni- guez's counsel offered a laconic explanation for this lapse: First, "legal research disclosed that this case was not moot"; second, counsel for the State of Arizona knew of the resignation and "agreed this appeal should proceed." App. 196, n. 2 (Appellee Yniguez's Response Regarding Moot- ness Considerations). The explanation was unsatisfactory. It is the duty of counsel to bring to the federal tribunal's attention, "without delay," facts that may raise a question of mootness. See Board of License Comm'rs of Tiverton v. Pastore, 469 U. S. 238, 240 (1985) (per curiam). Nor is a change in circumstances bearing on the vitality of a case a matter opposing counsel may withhold from a federal court based on counsels' agreement that the case should proceed to judgment and not be treated as moot. See United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920); R. Stern, E. Gressman, S. Shapiro, & K. Geller, Supreme Court Practice 721­722 (7th ed. 1993). 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 69 Opinion of the Court District Court's February 1990 declaratory judgment ran, see supra, at 55, the Ninth Circuit held the State answerable for the nominal damages Yniguez requested on appeal. See 69 F. 3d, at 948­949 (declaring Yniguez "entitled to nominal damages for prevailing in an action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983" and noting that "[t]he State of Arizona expressly waived its right to assert the Eleventh Amendment as a defense to the award of nominal damages"). We have held, however, that § 1983 actions do not lie against a State. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, the claim for relief the Ninth Circuit found sufficient to overcome mootness was nonexistent. The barrier was not, as the Ninth Circuit supposed, Eleventh Amendment immunity, which the State could waive. The stopper was that § 1983 creates no remedy against a State.24 Furthermore, under the Ninth Circuit's ruling on inter- vention, the State of Arizona was permitted to participate in the appeal, but not as a party. 939 F. 3d, at 738­740. The Court of Appeals never revised that ruling. To recapitulate, 24 State officers in their official capacities, like States themselves, are not amenable to suit for damages under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S., at 71, and n. 10. State officers are subject to § 1983 liability for damages in their personal capacities, however, even when the conduct in question relates to their official duties. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U. S. 21, 25­31 (1991). At no point after the nominal damages solution to mootness surfaced in this case did the Ninth Circuit identify Governor Mofford as a party whose conduct could be the predicate for retrospective relief. That is hardly surprising, for Mofford never partici- pated in any effort to enforce Article XXVIII against Yniguez. More- over, she opposed the ballot initiative that became Article XXVIII, see supra, at 49, n. 1, associated herself with the Attorney General's restrained interpretation of the provision, see supra, at 52­53, and was unwilling to appeal from the District Court's judgment declaring the Article unconsti- tutional, see supra, at 56. In this Court, Yniguez raised the possibility of Governor Mofford's individual liability under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). See Brief for Respondent Yniguez 21­22. That doctrine, however, permits only prospective relief, not retrospective monetary awards. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 664 (1974). 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 70 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court in July 1991, two months prior to the Attorney General's suggestion of mootness, the Court of Appeals rejected the Attorney General's plea for party status, as representative of the State. Ibid. The Ninth Circuit accorded the Attorney General the "right [under 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b)] to argue the constitutionality of Article XXVIII . . . contingent upon AOE and Park's bringing the appeal." Id., at 740; see supra, at 59. But see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 136­137 (1986) (State's § 2403(b) right to urge on appeal the constitutionality of its laws is not contingent on participation of other appel- lants). AOE and Park, however, were the sole participants recognized by the Ninth Circuit as defendants-appellants. The Attorney General "ha[d] asked the district court to dis- miss him as a party," the Court of Appeals noted, hence he "cannot now become one again." 939 F. 2d, at 740. While we do not rule on the propriety of the Ninth Circuit's exclu- sion of the State as a party, we note this lapse in that court's accounting for its decision: The Ninth Circuit did not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that an intervenor the court had designated a nonparty could be subject, nevertheless, to an obligation to pay damages. True, Yniguez and the Attorney General took the steps the Ninth Circuit prescribed: Yniguez filed a cross-appeal notice, see supra, at 61; the Attorney General waived the State's right to assert the Eleventh Amendment as a defense to an award of nominal damages, see 69 F. 3d, at 948­949. But the earlier, emphatic Court of Appeals ruling remained in place: The State's intervention, although proper under § 2403(b), the Ninth Circuit maintained, gave Arizona no sta- tus as a party in the lawsuit. See 939 F. 2d, at 738­740.25 25 Section 2403(b) by its terms subjects an intervenor "to all liabilities of a party as to court costs" required "for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality." 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b) (emphasis added). It does not subject an intervenor to liability for damages available against a party defendant. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 71 Opinion of the Court In advancing cooperation between Yniguez and the Attor- ney General regarding the request for and agreement to pay nominal damages, the Ninth Circuit did not home in on the federal courts' lack of authority to act in friendly or feigned proceedings. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 319 U. S. 302, 304 (1943) (per curiam) (absent "a genuine adversary issue between . . . parties," federal court "may not safely proceed to judgment"). It should have been clear to the Court of Appeals that a claim for nominal damages, extracted late in the day from Yniguez's general prayer for relief and asserted solely to avoid otherwise certain mootness, bore close inspec- tion. Cf. Fox v. Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y., 42 F. 3d 135, 141­142 (CA2 1994) (rejecting claim for nominal damages proffered to save case from mootness years after litigation began where defendants could have asserted quali- fied immunity had plaintiffs' complaint specifically requested monetary relief). On such inspection, the Ninth Circuit might have perceived that Yniguez's plea for nominal dam- ages could not genuinely revive the case.26 When a civil case becomes moot pending appellate adjudi- cation, "[t]he established practice . . . in the federal system . . . is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss." United States v. Munsing- wear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39 (1950). Vacatur "clears the path for future relitigation" by eliminating a judgment the loser was stopped from opposing on direct review. Id., at 40. Vacatur is in order when mootness occurs through happen- stance-circumstances not attributable to the parties-or, 26 Endeavoring to meet the live case requirement, petitioners AOE and Park posited in this Court several "controversies remaining between the parties." Reply Brief for Petitioners 18­19. Tellingly, none of the as- serted controversies involved Yniguez, sole plaintiff and prevailing party in the District Court. See ibid. (describing AOE and Park as adverse to intervenor Arizonans Against Constitution Tampering (AACT), see supra, at 61, AACT as adverse to the State, AOE and Park as adverse to the State). 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 72 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court relevant here, the "unilateral action of the party who pre- vailed in the lower court." U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co., 513 U. S., at 23; cf. id., at 29 ("mootness by reason of settlement [ordinarily] does not justify vacatur of a judgment under review"). As just explained, Yniguez's changed circumstances-her resignation from public sector employment to pursue work in the private sector-mooted the case stated in her com- plaint.27 We turn next to the effect of that development on the judgments below. Yniguez urges that vacatur ought not occur here. She maintains that the State acquiesced in the Ninth Circuit's judgment and that, in any event, the District Court judgment should not be upset because it was entered before the mooting event occurred and was not properly ap- pealed. See Brief for Respondent Yniguez 23­25. Concerning the Ninth Circuit's judgment, Yniguez argues that the State's Attorney General effectively acquiesced in that court's dispositions when he did not petition for this Court's review. See id., at 24­25; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10­11, and n. 4 (citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54 (1986)).28 We do not agree that this Court is disarmed in the manner suggested. 27 It bears repetition that Yniguez did not sue on behalf of a class. See supra, at 50; cf. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 404 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) (mootness determination unavoidable where plaintiff- respondent's case lost vitality and action was not filed on behalf of a class); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 397­403 (1975) (recognizing class action ex- ception to mootness doctrine). 28 Designated a respondent in this Court, the State was not required or specifically invited to file a brief answering the AOE/Park petition. In his appearance form, filed January 10, 1996, Arizona's Attorney General made this much plain: The State-aligned with petitioners AOE and Park in that Arizona defended Article XXVIII's constitutionality-did not op- pose certiorari; in the event Yniguez did not prevail here, Arizona would seek to recoup the attorney's fees the District Court had ordered the State to pay her. See supra, at 61, n. 16. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 73 Opinion of the Court We have taken up the case for consideration on the petition for certiorari filed by AOE and Park. Even if we were to rule definitively that AOE and Park lack standing, we would have an obligation essentially to search the pleadings on core matters of federal-court adjudicatory authority-to inquire not only into this Court's authority to decide the questions petitioners present, but to consider, also, the authority of the lower courts to proceed. As explained in Bender v. Wil- liamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534 (1986): "[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to `satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review,' even though the parties are prepared to concede it. Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U. S. 237, 244 (1934). See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327, 331­332 (1977) (standing). `And if the record discloses that the lower court was without jurisdiction this court will notice the defect, although the parties make no contention concerning it. [When the lower federal court] lack[s] jurisdiction, we have ju- risdiction on appeal, not of the merits but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit.' United States v. Corrick, 298 U. S. 435, 440 (1936) (footnotes omitted)." Id., at 541 (brackets in original). See also Iron Arrow Honor Soc. v. Heckler, 464 U. S. 67, 72­73 (1983) (per curiam) (vacating judgment below where Court of Appeals had ruled on the merits although case had become moot). In short, we have authority to "make such disposition of the whole case as justice may require." U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co., 513 U. S., at 21 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because the Ninth Circuit re- fused to stop the adjudication when Yniguez's departure from public employment came to its attention, we set aside the unwarranted en banc Court of Appeals judgment. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 74 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court As to the District Court's judgment, Yniguez stresses that the date of the mooting event-her resignation from state employment effective April 25, 1990-was some 21 2 months after the February 6, 1990, decision she seeks to preserve. Governor Mofford was the sole defendant bound by the Dis- trict Court judgment, and Mofford declined to appeal. Therefore, Yniguez contends, the District Court's judgment should remain untouched. But AOE and Park had an arguable basis for seeking ap- pellate review, and the Attorney General promptly made known his independent interest in defending Article XXVIII against the total demolition declared by the District Court. First, the Attorney General repeated his plea for certifica- tion of Article XXVIII to the Arizona Supreme Court. See Record, Doc. No. 82. And if that plea failed, he asked, in his motion to intervene, "to be joined as a defendant so that he may participate in all post-judgment proceedings." Record, Doc. No. 93, p. 2. Although denied party status, the Attor- ney General had, at a minimum, a right secured by Congress, a right to present argument on appeal "on the question of constitutionality." See 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b). He was in the process of pursuing that right when the mooting event occurred. We have already recounted the course of proceedings thereafter. First, Yniguez did not tell the Court of Appeals that she had left the State's employ. See supra, at 68, n. 23. When that fact was disclosed to the court by the Attorney General, a dismissal for mootness was suggested, and re- jected. A mootness disposition at that point was in order, we have just explained. Such a dismissal would have stopped in midstream the Attorney General's endeavor, premised on § 2403(b), to defend the State's law against a declaration of unconstitutionality, and so would have war- ranted a path-clearing vacatur decree. The State urges that its current plea for vacatur is compel- ling in view of the extraordinary course of this litigation. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 75 Opinion of the Court See Brief for Respondents State of Arizona et al. 34 ("It would certainly be a strange doctrine that would permit a plaintiff to obtain a favorable judgment, take voluntary action [that] moot[s] the dispute, and then retain the [benefit of the] judgment."). We agree. The "exceptional circum- stances" that abound in this case, see U. S. Bancorp Mort- gage Co., 513 U. S., at 29, and the federalism concern we next consider, lead us to conclude that vacatur down the line is the equitable solution. V In litigation generally, and in constitutional litigation most prominently, courts in the United States characteristically pause to ask: Is this conflict really necessary? 29 When an- ticipatory relief is sought in federal court against a state statute, respect for the place of the States in our federal system calls for close consideration of that core question. See, e. g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 526 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[N]ormally this Court ought not to consider the Constitutionality of a state statute in the absence of a controlling interpretation of its meaning and effect by the state courts."); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U. S. 549, 573­574 (1947); Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 543, 580­585 (1985). Arizona's Attorney General, in addition to releasing his own opinion on the meaning of Article XXVIII, see supra, at 52, asked both the District Court and the Court of Appeals to pause before proceeding to judgment; specifically, he asked both federal courts to seek, through the State's certi- fication process, an authoritative construction of the new measure from the Arizona Supreme Court. See supra, at 51, and n. 5, 55, 62­63, and nn. 17, 18. Certification today covers territory once dominated by a deferral device called "Pullman abstention," after the gen- 29 The phrasing is borrowed from Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Neces- sary?, 37 Texas L. Rev. 657 (1959). 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 76 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court erative case, Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941). Designed to avoid federal-court error in deciding state-law questions antecedent to federal constitu- tional issues, the Pullman mechanism remitted parties to the state courts for adjudication of the unsettled state-law issues. If settlement of the state-law question did not prove dispositive of the case, the parties could return to the federal court for decision of the federal issues. Attractive in theory because it placed state-law questions in courts equipped to rule authoritatively on them, Pullman abstention proved protracted and expensive in practice, for it entailed a full round of litigation in the state court system before any re- sumption of proceedings in federal court. See generally 17A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 4242, 4243 (2d ed. 1988 and Supp. 1996). Certification procedure, in contrast, allows a federal court faced with a novel state-law question to put the question directly to the State's highest court, reducing the delay, cut- ting the cost, and increasing the assurance of gaining an au- thoritative response. See Note, Federal Courts-Certifica- tion Before Facial Invalidation: A Return to Federalism, 12 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 217 (1990). Most States have adopted certification procedures. See generally 17A Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra, § 4248. Arizona's statute, set out supra, at 51, n. 5, permits the State's highest court to con- sider questions certified to it by federal district courts, as well as courts of appeals and this Court. Both lower federal courts in this case refused to invite the aid of the Arizona Supreme Court because they found the language of Article XXVIII "plain," and the Attorney Gen- eral's limiting construction unpersuasive. See 730 F. Supp., at 315­316; 69 F. 3d, at 928­931.30 Furthermore, the Ninth 30 But cf. Huggins v. Isenbarger, 798 F. 2d 203, 207­210 (CA7 1986) (East- erbrook, J., concurring) (reasoned opinion of State Attorney General should be accorded respectful consideration; federal courts should hesitate 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 77 Opinion of the Court Circuit suggested as a proper price for certification a conces- sion by the Attorney General that Article XXVIII "would be unconstitutional if construed as [plaintiff Yniguez] con- tended it should be." Id., at 930; see id., at 931, and n. 14. Finally, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the pendency of a case similar to Yniguez's in the Arizona court system, but found that litigation no cause for a stay of the federal-court proceedings. See id., at 931; supra, at 62­63, and n. 18 (de- scribing the Ruiz litigation). A more cautious approach was in order. Through certifi- cation of novel or unsettled questions of state law for author- itative answers by a State's highest court, a federal court may save "time, energy, and resources and hel[p] build a co- operative judicial federalism." Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U. S. 386, 391 (1974); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 148 (1976) (to warrant district court certification, "[i]t is sufficient that the statute is susceptible of . . . an interpreta- tion [that] would avoid or substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the statute"). It is true, as the Ninth Circuit observed, 69 F. 3d, at 930, that in our decision certifying questions in Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U. S. 383 (1988), we noted the State's con- cession that the statute there challenged would be uncon- stitutional if construed as plaintiffs contended it should be, id., at 393­396. But neither in that case nor in any other did we declare such a concession a condition precedent to certification. The District Court and the Court of Appeals ruled out certification primarily because they believed Article XXVIII was not fairly subject to a limiting construction. See 730 F. Supp., at 316 (citing Houston v. Hill, 482 U. S. 451, 467 (1987)); 69 F. 3d, at 930. The assurance with which the lower courts reached that judgment is all the more puzzling to conclude that "[a State's] Executive Branch does not understand state law"). 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 78 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court in view of the position the initiative sponsors advanced be- fore this Court on the meaning of Article XXVIII. At oral argument on December 4, 1996, counsel for peti- tioners AOE and Park informed the Court that, in petition- ers' view, the Attorney General's reading of the Article was "the correct interpretation." Tr. of Oral Arg. 6; see id., at 5 (in response to the Court's inquiry, counsel for petitioners stated: "[W]e agree with the Attorney General's opinion as to [the] construction of Article XXVIII on [constitutional] grounds."). The Ninth Circuit found AOE's "explanations as to the initiative's scope . . . confused and self- contradictory," 69 F. 3d, at 928, n. 12, and we agree that AOE wavered in its statements of position, see, e. g., Brief for Peti- tioners 15 (AOE may "protect its political and statutory rights against the State and government employees"), 32­39 (Article XXVIII regulates Yniguez's "language on the job"), 44 ("AOE might . . . sue the State for limiting Art. XXVIII"). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals understood that the bal- lot initiative proponents themselves at least "partially en- dorsed the Attorney General's reading." 69 F. 3d, at 928, n. 12. Given the novelty of the question and its potential importance to the conduct of Arizona's business, plus the views of the Attorney General and those of Article XXVIII's sponsors, the certification requests merited more respectful consideration than they received in the proceedings below. Federal courts, when confronting a challenge to the consti- tutionality of a federal statute, follow a "cardinal principle": They "will first ascertain whether a construction . . . is fairly possible" that will contain the statute within constitutional bounds. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U. S. 435, 444 (1984); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 692­693 (1979); Rescue Army, 331 U. S., at 568­569. State courts, when interpreting state statutes, are similarly equipped to apply that cardinal principle. See Knoell v. Cerkvenik- 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 79 Opinion of the Court Anderson Travel, Inc., 185 Ariz. 546, 548, 917 P. 2d 689, 691 (1996) (citing Ashwander). Warnings against premature adjudication of constitutional questions bear heightened attention when a federal court is asked to invalidate a State's law, for the federal tribunal risks friction-generating error when it endeavors to construe a novel state Act not yet reviewed by the State's highest court. See Rescue Army, 331 U. S., at 573­574. "Specula- tion by a federal court about the meaning of a state statute in the absence of prior state court adjudication is particularly gratuitous when . . . the state courts stand willing to address questions of state law on certification from a federal court." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 510 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Blending abstention with certification, the Ninth Circuit found "no unique circumstances in this case militating in favor of certification." 69 F. 3d, at 931. Novel, unsettled questions of state law, however, not "unique circumstances," are necessary before federal courts may avail themselves of state certification procedures.31 Those procedures do not entail the delays, expense, and procedural complexity that generally attend abstention decisions. See supra, at 76. Taking advantage of certification made available by a State may "greatly simplif[y]" an ultimate adjudication in federal court. See Bellotti, 428 U. S., at 151. The course of Yniguez's case was complex. The complex- ity might have been avoided had the District Court, more than eight years ago, accepted the certification suggestion made by Arizona's Attorney General. The Arizona Su- preme Court was not asked by the District Court or the Court of Appeals to say what Article XXVIII means. But the State's highest court has that very question before it in 31 Arizona itself requires no "unique circumstances." It permits certi- fication to the State's highest court of matters "which may be determina- tive of the cause," and as to which "no controlling precedent" is apparent to the certifying court. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12­1861 (1994). 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 80 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Appendix to opinion of the Court Ruiz v. Symington, see supra, at 62­63, and n. 18, the case the Ninth Circuit considered no cause for federal-court hesi- tation. In Ruiz, which has been stayed pending our decision in this case, see supra, at 63, n. 18, the Arizona Supreme Court may now rule definitively on the proper construction of Article XXVIII. Once that court has spoken, adjudica- tion of any remaining federal constitutional question may indeed become greatly simplified. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Ap- peals is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court with directions that the action be dismissed by the District Court. It is so ordered. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT ARTICLE XXVIII. ENGLISH AS THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE § 1. English as the official language; applicability Section 1. (1) The English language is the official lan- guage of the State of Arizona. (2) As the official language of this State, the English lan- guage is the language of the ballot, the public schools and all government functions and actions. (3)(a) This Article applies to: (i) the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government[,] (ii) all political subdivisions, departments, agencies, orga- nizations, and instrumentalities of this State, including local governments and municipalities, (iii) all statutes, ordinances, rules, orders, programs and policies[,] (iv) all government officials and employees during the performance of government business. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 81 Appendix to opinion of the Court (b) As used in this Article, the phrase "This State and all political subdivisions of this State" shall include every entity, person, action or item described in this Section, as appro- priate to the circumstances. § 2. Requiring this state to preserve, protect and enhance English Section 2. This State and all political subdivisions of this State shall take all reasonable steps to preserve, protect and enhance the role of the English language as the official lan- guage of the State of Arizona. § 3. Prohibiting this state from using or requiring the use of languages other than English; exceptions Section 3. (1) Except as provided in Subsection (2): (a) This State and all political subdivisions of this State shall act in English and in no other language. (b) No entity to which this Article applies shall make or enforce a law, order, decree or policy which requires the use of a language other than English. (c) No governmental document shall be valid, effective or enforceable unless it is in the English language. (2) This State and all political subdivisions of this State may act in a language other than English under any of the following circumstances: (a) to assist students who are not proficient in the English language, to the extent necessary to comply with federal law, by giving educational instruction in a language other than English to provide as rapid as possible a transition to English. (b) to comply with other federal laws. (c) to teach a student a foreign language as a part of a required or voluntary educational curriculum. (d) to protect public health or safety. (e) to protect the rights of criminal defendants or victims of crime. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 82 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Appendix to opinion of the Court § 4. Enforcement; standing Section 4. A person who resides in or does business in this State shall have standing to bring suit to enforce this Article in a court of record of the State. The Legislature may enact reasonable limitations on the time and manner of bringing suit under this subsection. 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 83 Syllabus ADAMS et al. v. ROBERTSON et al. certiorari to the supreme court of alabama No. 95­1873. Argued January 14, 1997-Decided March 3, 1997 Respondent Robertson filed a class action in Alabama, alleging that re- spondent Liberty National Life Insurance Company had fraudulently encouraged its customers to exchange existing health insurance policies for new ones with less coverage. The trial court made him class repre- sentative and certified the class under the Alabama Rules of Civil Proce- dure, which do not give class members the right to opt out of a class. It then approved a settlement that precluded class members from indi- vidually suing Liberty National for fraud based on its exchange pro- gram. Petitioners, who had objected to the settlement in the trial court, appealed, and the State Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion addressing only state-law issues. Certiorari was granted on the ques- tion whether the certification and settlement violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause because class members could not opt out of the class or settlement. Held: Since petitioners have failed to establish that they properly pre- sented the due process issue to the Alabama Supreme Court, this Court will not reach the question presented, and the writ is dismissed as im- providently granted. With rare exceptions, Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 533, this Court will not consider a petitioner's federal claim that was not addressed by, or properly presented to, the state court ren- dering the decision. The Alabama Supreme Court did not expressly address the claim raised here, and petitioners have not shown that it was properly presented to that court. When the highest state court is silent on the federal question before this Court, it is assumed that the issue was not properly presented; the aggrieved party bears the burden of defeating this assumption, Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Ro- tary Club of Duarte, 481 U. S. 537, 550, by demonstrating that the state court had a fair opportunity to address the issue, Webb v. Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 501. Petitioners have not met this burden. They have not demonstrated that they complied with the applicable state rules for rais- ing their federal claim before the State Supreme Court, see, e. g., Bank- ers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U. S. 71, 77­78, explained why the failure to comply with those rules would not be an adequate and independent ground for the state court to disregard that claim, see, e. g., Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U. S. 255, 262­265, or shown that their claim was presented with fair precision and in due time, see, e. g., New York 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 84 ADAMS v. ROBERTSON Syllabus ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 67. Even assuming that the rule that a claim be addressed or properly presented in state court is purely prudential, the circumstances here justify no exception. An interest in penalizing respondents for failing to raise a timely objection to petitioners' failure to comply with the rule does not outweigh the interest of comity the rule serves or the value to this Court of a fully developed record upon which to base its decisions. Certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted. Reported below: 676 So. 2d 1265. Norman E. Waldrop, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Stephen C. Olen, George M. Walker, M. Kathleen Miller, J. Gusty Yearout, M. Clay Ragsdale IV, John D. Richardson, David F. Daniell, and Roderick P. Stout. John G. Roberts, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Liberty National Life Insurance Company. With him on the brief were David G. Leitch, Gregory G. Garre, Michael R. Pennington, James W. Gewin, and Edgar M. Elliott III. Paul M. Smith, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Jere L. Beasley, Frank M. Wilson, James A. Main, and Walter R. Byars filed a brief for respondent Charlie Frank Robertson.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White and Howard F. Twiggs; and for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, P. C., by Leslie A. Brueckner and Arthur H. Bryant. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Alabama by Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, and William H. Pryor, Jr., Deputy Attorney General; for the American Council of Life Insurance by Evan M. Tager and Phillip E. Stano; for Continental Casualty Com- pany et al. by Herbert M. Wachtell, Meir Feder, Paul J. Bschorr, Stephen M. Snyder, Kelly C. Wooster, Elihu Inselbuch, Peter Van N. Lockwood, Joseph F. Rice, Joseph B. Cox, Jr., Rodney L. Eshelman, Donald T. Ram- sey, Stuart Philip Ross, Sean M. Hanifan, Merril Hirsh, Steven Kazan, and Harry F. Wartnick; for Exxon Corporation by Charles W. Bender and John F. Daum; and for the National Association of Manufacturers et al. by Alfred W. Cortese, Jr., Kathleen L. Blaner, James C. Wilson, Jan S. Amundson, Quentin Riegel, and D. Dudley Oldham. A brief of amici curiae was filed for the State of New York et al. by Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of New York, Barbara Gott Billet, 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 83 (1997) 85 Per Curiam Per Curiam. We granted a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama to decide whether the Alabama courts' approval of the class action and the settlement agreement in this case, without affording all class members the right to exclude themselves from the class or the agreement, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Ala- bama Supreme Court did not address this federal issue, and it is now apparent that petitioners have failed to establish that they properly presented the issue to that court. We therefore dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. I In 1992, respondent Charlie Frank Robertson filed a class- action suit in an Alabama trial court, alleging that Liberty National Life Insurance Company had fraudulently encour- aged its customers to exchange existing health insurance pol- icies for new policies that, according to Robertson, provided less coverage for cancer treatment. The trial court ap- pointed Robertson as class representative and certified the Solicitor General, and Shirley F. Sarna, Nancy A. Spiegel, and Joy Feigen- baum, Assistant Attorneys General, Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney Gen- eral of Vermont, and Elliot Burg, Assistant Attorney General, Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Con- necticut, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Alan G. Lance, Attorney General of Idaho, James E. Ryan, Attorney General of Illinois, Tom Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General of Kansas, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, Jeffrey R. Howard, Attorney General of New Hamp- shire, Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Heidi Heit- kamp, Attorney General of North Dakota, W. A. Drew Edmondson, Attor- ney General of Oklahoma, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Charles W. Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Charles F. C. Ruff, Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia. 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 86 ADAMS v. ROBERTSON Per Curiam class pursuant to provisions of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure that do not give class members the right to ex- clude themselves from a class. See 676 So. 2d 1265, 1268, 1270 (Ala. 1995); App. 90. The trial court then approved a settlement agreement that precluded class members from individually suing Liberty National for fraud based on its insurance policy exchange program. See 676 So. 2d, at 1270­1271; App. 158­159. Petitioners, who had objected to the settlement in the trial court, appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion addressing only state-law issues, see 676 So. 2d, at 1270­1274, and petitioners sought a writ of certiorari. We granted certiorari, 518 U. S. 1056 (1996), on the question whether the certification and settlement of this class-action suit (which petitioners characterize as primarily involving claims for monetary relief) violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the class members were not afforded the right to opt out of the class or the settlement. II With "very rare exceptions," Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 533 (1992), we have adhered to the rule in reviewing state-court judgments under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 that we will not consider a petitioner's federal claim unless it was either addressed by or properly presented to the state court that rendered the decision we have been asked to review. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U. S. 82, 87 (1985); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 217­219 (1983); McGoldrick v. Compagnie Gen- erale Transatlantique, 309 U. S. 430, 434 (1940). As peti- tioners concede here, the Alabama Supreme Court did not expressly address the question on which we granted certio- rari. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 2­3, n. 1. Nor have petitioners met their burden of showing that the issue was properly presented to that court. When the high- est state court is silent on a federal question before us, we assume that the issue was not properly presented, Board of 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 83 (1997) 87 Per Curiam Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U. S. 537, 550 (1987), and the aggrieved party bears the burden of defeating this assumption, ibid., by demonstrating that the state court had "a fair opportunity to address the federal question that is sought to be presented here," Webb v. Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 501 (1981). We have described in different ways how a petitioner may satisfy this requirement. See Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 583­585 (1969). In some cases, we have focused on the need for petitioners either to establish that the claim was raised " `at the time and in the manner required by the state law,' " Bankers Life & Cas- ualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U. S. 71, 77­78 (1988) (quoting Webb, supra, at 501), see, e. g., Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176, 181, n. 3 (1983); Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 549­554 (1962), or to persuade us that the state procedural requirements could not serve as an independent and ade- quate state-law ground for the state court's judgment, see, e. g., Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U. S. 255, 262­265 (1982). In other cases, we have described a petitioner's burden as in- volving the need to demonstrate that it presented the partic- ular claim at issue here with "fair precision and in due time," New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 67 (1928); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 85, n. 9 (1980). See generally 16B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4022, pp. 322­ 339 (1996). But however we phrase our requirements, petitioners here have failed to satisfy them. Petitioners have done nothing to demonstrate that they complied with the applicable state rules for raising their federal due process claim before the Alabama Supreme Court,1 or to explain why the failure to 1 Respondents have argued that because petitioners failed to list their federal claim in the "statement of issues" section of their appellate brief in accordance with Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(3), the Ala- bama Supreme Court would have properly disregarded the claim even if petitioners had presented it below. See Brief for Respondent Liberty 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 88 ADAMS v. ROBERTSON Per Curiam comply with those rules would not be an adequate and inde- pendent ground for the state court to disregard that claim. Neither have petitioners satisfied us that they presented their federal claim with "fair precision and in due time." They argue that they raised their federal due process claim in their initial brief before the Alabama Supreme Court, and point to two pages of that brief discussing Brown v. Ticor, 982 F. 2d 386 (CA9 1992), cert. dism'd as improvidently granted, 511 U. S. 117 (1994). Although Ticor is relevant to the federal claim they present here, see 982 F. 2d, at 392, they mentioned the case below in the context of an entirely different argument that the right to a jury trial under § 11 of the Alabama Constitution gives a plaintiff the right to opt out of a class-action settlement agreement. The discussion of "a federal case, in the midst of an unrelated argument, is insufficient to inform a state court that it has been presented with a claim." Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, supra, at 550, n. 9. Equally unavailing is petitioners' reliance on three other pages of their Alabama Supreme Court brief. Although that portion begins with a heading asserting that "[m]ini- mum due process requires that Class Members be given the right to opt out or exclude themselves from the class," see Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1931603 et al. (Sup. Ct. Ala.), p. 23, the discussion under that heading addresses only whether members of the class who were not Alabama resi- dents had been afforded due process under Phillips Petro- leum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797 (1985). We therefore think that a court may fairly have read this section as arguing, as had the petitioner in Shutts, id., at 802, that the state court lacked personal jurisdiction over out-of-state class members, not the different and broader question of whether, if a state National Life Insurance Company 4, n. 2 (citing Ala. Rule App. Proc. 28(a)(3)), and Eady v. Stewart Dredging & Construction Co., Inc., 463 So. 2d 156, 157 (Ala. 1985); Brief for Respondent Robertson 16, n. 12 (citing Eady). Petitioners have not even responded to that argument. 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 83 (1997) 89 Per Curiam court has jurisdiction over the plaintiffs, due process re- quires that all class members have the right to opt out of the class and settlement agreement. Nor are petitioners helped by the fact that respondents addressed the federal due process issue raised here in their briefs as appellees in the Alabama Supreme Court.2 Peti- tioners failed to address respondents' federal due process arguments in their reply brief in the State Supreme Court and, instead, described "[t]he pivotal issue in this case" as the right to a jury trial under the Alabama Constitution. Reply Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1931603 et al. (Sup. Ct. Ala.), pp. 1­5. In these circumstances, it would have been per- fectly reasonable for a state court to conclude that the broader federal claim was not before it.3 2 Respondent Robertson listed among issues presented for review: "Whether an opt-out provision is required by the due process [clause] and/ or trial by jury guarantees of the U. S. and Alabama Constitutions." Brief for Appellee Robertson in Nos. 1931603 et al. (Sup. Ct. Ala.), p. 11. 3 Petitioners also direct our attention to 80 pages of the Joint Appendix containing papers filed in the trial court, see Reply Brief for Petitioners 2­3, n. 1 (referring to App. 93­126, 190­245). This general citation fails to comply with our requirement that petitioners provide us with "specific reference to the places in the record where the matter appears," see this Court's Rule 14.1(g)(i) (emphasis added). Moreover, the passing invoca- tions of "due process" we found therein, see App. 196, 209, 226­227, fail to cite the Federal Constitution or any cases relying on the Fourteenth Amendment, but could have just as easily referred to the due process guarantee of the Alabama Constitution, see Ala. Const., § 13 (1901), and thus they did not meet our minimal requirement that it must be clear that a federal claim was presented, Webb v. Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 496­497, 501 (1981); see Bowe v. Scott, 233 U. S. 658, 664­665 (1914). Petitioners also note that they raised their federal due process claim in their petition for rehearing before the Alabama Supreme Court. While the claim presented there closely resembles the one they ask us to review, see Appellants' Application for Rehearing and Brief in Support of Applica- tion for Rehearing in Nos. 1931603 et al. (Sup. Ct. Ala.), pp. 7­12, we have generally refused to consider issues raised clearly for the first time in a petition for rehearing when the state court is silent on the question, see Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U. S. 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 90 ADAMS v. ROBERTSON Per Curiam III Petitioners having thus failed to carry their burden of showing that the claim they raise here was properly pre- sented to the Alabama Supreme Court, we will not reach the question presented. We need not decide in this case whether our requirement that a federal claim be addressed or properly presented in state court is jurisdictional or pru- dential, see Yee, 503 U. S., at 533; Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 486 U. S., at 79; Gates, 462 U. S., at 217­219, because even treating the rule as purely prudential, the circumstances here justify no exception. The rule serves an important interest of comity. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., supra, at 79. As we have explained, "it would be unseemly in our dual system of government" to disturb the finality of state judgments on a federal ground that the state court did not have occasion to consider. Webb, 451 U. S., at 500 (citations and internal quotation marks omit- ted). Thus, the rule affords state courts "an opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the actions of state officials, and, equally important, proposed changes" that could obvi- ate any challenges to state action in federal court. Gates, supra, at 221­222. Here, the Alabama Supreme Court has an undeniable interest in having the opportunity to deter- mine in the first instance whether its existing rules govern- ing class-action settlements satisfy the requirements of due process, and whether to exercise its power to amend those rules to avoid potential constitutional challenges, see Ala. Const., § 6.11; 1971 Ala. Acts No. 1311. Our traditional standard also reflects "practical considera- tions" relating to this Court's capacity to decide issues. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., supra, at 79. Requiring par- ties to raise issues below not only avoids unnecessary adjudi- cation in this Court by allowing state courts to resolve issues 537, 549­550 (1987); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 244, n. 4 (1958); Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 128 (1945). 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 83 (1997) 91 Per Curiam on state-law grounds, but also assists us in our deliberations by promoting the creation of an adequate factual and legal record. See Webb, supra, at 500. Here, even if the state court's construction of its class-action rules would not obvi- ate the due process challenge, it would undoubtedly aid our understanding of those rules as a predicate to our assess- ment of their constitutional adequacy. And not incidentally, the parties would enjoy the opportunity to test and refine their positions before reaching this Court. The only unusual consideration weighing in favor of reach- ing the question presented is that respondents failed to raise a timely objection to our granting the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the question presented in that petition had not been properly raised or addressed.4 This Court's Rule 15.2 "admonishe[s counsel] that they have an obligation to the Court to point out in the brief in opposition, and not later, any perceived misstatement" "of fact or law in the peti- tion that bears on what issues properly would be before the Court if certiorari were granted." Without minimizing this obligation,5 however, we find no interest here in penalizing 4 Respondent Robertson failed to raise the objection in his brief in oppo- sition to the certiorari petition; respondent Liberty National waived its right to submit a brief in opposition. 5 Respondents' obligation to object under Rule 15.2 was not diminished by the fact that their objection may have been based on this Court's juris- diction, see supra, at 90, and thus nonwaivable. Even if, contrary to the assumption underlying our discussion in the main text, the requirement that claims be raised in or addressed by the state court is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, counsel are obliged to this Court (not to mention their clients) to raise such threshold issues in their briefs in opposition. Nor is respondents' failure to object in accordance with Rule 15.2 ex- cused by petitioners' failure to comply with this Court's Rule 14.1(g)(i), which requires a petitioner seeking review of a state-court judgment to specify, among other things, "when the federal questions sought to be re- viewed were raised" in the state court system and "the method or manner of raising them and the way in which they were passed on by those courts, . . . so as to show that the federal question was timely and properly raised and that this Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment on a writ of 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 92 ADAMS v. ROBERTSON Per Curiam the failure of counsel to comply with Rule 15.2 that overrides the interest of comity or the value to this Court of a fully developed factual and legal record upon which to base decisions.6 Accordingly, we dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvi- dently granted. It is so ordered. certiorari." The obligations under Rules 14.1 and 15.2 are complemen- tary, but independent of each other. 6 We note, of course, that we dismissed a writ of certiorari regarding a similar question three Terms ago in Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U. S. 117 (1994) (per curiam). Our continuing interest in an issue, how- ever, does not affect the application of our Rules, because we recognize that by "adher[ing] scrupulously to the customary limitations on our dis- cretion" regardless of the significance of the underlying issue, "we `pro- mote respect . . . for the Court's adjudicatory process.' " Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 224 (1983) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 677 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 93 Syllabus COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ESTATE OF HUBERT, DECEASED, C & S SOVRAN TRUST CO. (GEORGIA) N. A., CO-EXECUTOR certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit No. 95­1402. Argued November 12, 1996-Decided March 18, 1997 The executors of decedent Hubert's substantial estate filed a federal estate tax return about a year after his death. Subsequently, petitioner Com- missioner of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency, claiming underreporting of federal estate tax liability caused by the estate's as- serted entitlement to marital and charitable deductions. While the es- tate's redetermination petition was pending in the Tax Court, interested parties settled much of the litigation surrounding the estate that had begun after Hubert's death. The agreement divided the estate's resi- due principal, assumed to be worth $26 million on the date of death, about equally between marital trusts and a charitable trust. It also provided that the estate would pay its administration expenses either from the principal or the income of the assets that would comprise the residue and the corpus of the trusts, preserving the executors' discre- tion to apportion such expenses. The estate paid about $500,000 of its nearly $2 million of administration expenses from principal and the rest from income. It then recalculated its tax liability, reducing the marital and charitable deductions by the amount of principal, but not the amount of income, used to pay the expenses. The Commissioner con- cluded that using income for expenses required a dollar-for-dollar reduc- tion of the deductions. The Tax Court disagreed, finding that no reduc- tion was required by reason of the executors' power, or the exercise of their power, to pay administration expenses from income. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: The judgment is affirmed. 63 F. 3d 1083, affirmed. Justice Kennedy, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Stevens, and Justice Ginsburg, concluded that a taxpayer does not have to reduce the estate tax deduction for marital or charitable bequests by the amount of the administration expenses that were paid from income generated during administration by assets allocated to those bequests. Pp. 99­111. 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 94 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Syllabus (a) Hubert's executors used the standard date-of-death valuation to determine the value of property included in the gross estate for estate tax purposes. The parties agree that, for purposes of the question pre- sented, the charitable, 26 U. S. C. § 2055, and marital, § 2056, deduction statutes should be read to require the same answer, notwithstanding differences in their language. Since the marital deduction statute and regulation speak in more specific terms on this question than the chari- table deduction statute, this plurality concentrates on the marital provi- sions, but the holding here applies to both deductions. Pp. 99­100. (b) The marital deduction statute allows deduction for qualifying property only to the extent of the property's "value." So when the executors use date-of-death valuation for gross estate purposes, the deduction's value will be limited by that value. Marital deduction "value" is "net value," determined by the same principles as if the be- quest were a gift to the spouse, 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a), i. e., present value as of the controlling valuation date, § 25.2523(a)­1(e); see also §§ 20.2056(b)­4(d), 20.2055­2(f)(1). Although the question presented is not controlled by these provisions' exact terms, it is natural to apply the present-value principle here. Thus, assuming it were necessary for valuation purposes to take into account that income, this would be done by subtracting from the value of the bequest, computed as if the income were not subject to administration expense charges, the present value (as of the controlling valuation date) of the income expected to be used to pay administration expenses. Cf. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151. There is no dispute the entire interests transferred in trust here qualify for the marital and charitable deductions; the ques- tion before the Court is one of valuation. Pp. 100­104. (c) Only material limitations on the right to receive income are taken into account when valuing the property interest passing to the surviving spouse. 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a). A provision requiring or allowing administration expenses to be paid from income "may" be deemed a "material limitation" on the spouse's right to income. For example, where the amount of the corpus, and the expected income from it, are small, the amount of the estate's anticipated administration expenses chargeable to income may be material as compared with the anticipated income used to determine the assets' date-of-death value. Whether a limitation is material will also depend in part on the nature of the spouse's interest in the assets generating income. An obligation to pay administration expenses from income is more likely to be material where the value of the trust to the spouse is derived solely from income, but is less likely to be material where, as here, the marital property is valued as being equivalent to a transfer of the fee. Pp. 104­107. 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 95 Syllabus (d) The Tax Court found that, on the facts presented, the trustee's discretion to pay administration expenses out of income was not a mate- rial limitation on the right to receive income. There is no reason to reverse for the Tax Court's failure to specify the facts it considered relevant to the materiality inquiry. The anticipated expenses could have been thought immaterial in light of the income the trust corpus could have been expected to generate. P. 107. (e) This approach to the valuation question is consistent with the lan- guage of 26 U. S. C. § 2056(b), as interpreted in United States v. Stapf, 375 U. S. 118, 126, in which the Court held that the marital deduction should not exceed the "net economic interest received by the surviving spouse." There is no basis here for the Commissioner's argument that the reduction she seeks is necessary to avoid a "double deduction" for administration expenses in violation of 26 U. S. C. § 642(g). Moreover, assuming that the marital deduction statute's legislative history would have relevance here, it does not support the Commissioner's position. Pp. 109­111. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Thomas, concluded that the relevant sources point to a test of quantitative mate- riality to determine whether allocation of administrative expenses to postmortem income reduces marital and charitable deductions, and that test is not met by the unusual factual record in this case. Pp. 111­122. (a) Neither the Tax Code itself nor its legislative history supplies guidance on the question whether allocation of administrative expenses to postmortem income reduces the marital deduction always, some- times, or not at all. However, the Commissioner's regulations and revenue rulings can be relied on to decide this issue. Title 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) directs the reader to ask whether the executor's right to allocate administrative expenses to the marital bequest's postmortem income is a "material limitation" upon the spouse's "right to income from the property," such that "account must be taken of its effect." Because the executor's power is undeniably a "limitation" on the spouse's right to income, the case hinges on whether that limitation is "material." In Revenue Ruling 93­48, the Commissioner ruled that § 20.2056(b)­4(a)'s marital deduction is not "ordinarily" reduced when an executor allocates interest payments on deferred federal estate taxes to the spousal be- quest's postmortem income. Such interest and the administrative ex- penses at issue here are so similar that they should be treated the same under § 20.2056(b)­4(a). The Commissioner's treatment of interest in the Revenue Ruling also indicates that some, but not all, financial obli- gations will reduce the marital deduction. Thus, by virtue of the Rul- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 96 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Syllabus ing, the Commissioner has created a quantitative materiality rule for § 20.2056(b)­4(a). This rule is consistent with the example set forth in § 20.2056(b)­4(a), and the Commissioner's expressed preference for such a construction is entitled to deference. Pp. 112­120. (b) The proper measure of materiality has yet to be decided by the Commissioner. In the absence of guidance from the Commissioner, the Tax Court's approach is as consistent with the Code as any other test, and provides no basis for reversal. Here, the Commissioner's litigation strategy effectively pre-empted the Tax Court from finding the $1.5 million diminution in postmortem income material under a quantitative materiality test, for she argued that any diversion of postmortem in- come was material and never presented any evidence or argued that this diminution was quantitatively material. Her failure to offer proof of materiality left the Tax Court with little choice but to reach its care- fully crafted conclusion that the amount was not quantitatively material on the facts before it. Pp. 120­122. Kennedy, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Souter and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 111. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined, post, p. 122. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 138. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Jonathan S. Cohen, and Joan I. Oppenheimer. David D. Aughtry argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Shelley Cashion.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel by Edward F. Koren and Alvin J. Golden; for the American Council on Education et al. by Matthew J. Zinn and Carol A. Rhees; for the Baptist Foundation of Texas et al. by Terry L. Simmons, pro se; and for the Tax Section of The Florida Bar by Jerald David August and James J. Freeland. 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 97 Opinion of Kennedy, J. Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Stevens, and Justice Ginsburg join. In consequence of life's two certainties a decedent's estate faced federal estate tax deficiencies, giving rise to this case. The issue is whether the amount of the estate tax deduction for marital or charitable bequests must be reduced to the extent administration expenses were paid from income gen- erated during administration by assets allocated to those bequests. I The estate of Otis C. Hubert was substantial, valued at more than $30 million when he died. Considerable probate and civil litigation ensued soon after his death. The parties to the various proceedings included his wife and children; his nephew; one of the estate's coexecutors, Citizens and South- ern Trust Company (Georgia), N. A., the predecessor of re- spondent C & S Sovran Trust Company (Georgia), N. A.; the district attorney for Cobb County, Georgia, on behalf of cer- tain charitable beneficiaries; and the Georgia State Revenue Commission. Hubert had made various wills and codicils, and the legal disputes for the most part concerned the distri- bution of estate assets; but they were not confined to this. In addition to will contests alleging fraud and undue influ- ence, there were satellite civil suits including claims of slan- der and abuse of process. The principal proceedings were in the Probate and the Superior Courts of Cobb County, Georgia. The estate attracted the attention of petitioner, the Com- missioner of Internal Revenue. The executors filed the fed- eral estate tax return in 1987, about a year after Hubert died. In 1990, the Commissioner issued a notice of defi- ciency, claiming underreporting of federal estate tax liability by some $14 million. The Commissioner's major challenge then was to the estate's claimed entitlement to two deduc- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 98 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Opinion of Kennedy, J. tions. One was the marital deduction, under 68A Stat. 392, as amended, 26 U. S. C. § 2056, for qualifying property pass- ing from a decedent to the surviving spouse. The other was the charitable deduction, under § 2055, for qualifying prop- erty passing from a decedent to a charity. The Commission- er's notice of deficiency asserted, for reasons not relevant here, that the property passing to Hubert's surviving wife and to charity did not qualify for the marital and charitable deductions. The estate petitioned the United States Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. Within days of the estate's petition in the Tax Court, much of the other litigation surrounding the estate settled. The settlement agreement divided the estate's residue principal between a marital and a charitable share, which we can as- sume for purposes of our discussion were worth a total of $26 million on the day Hubert died. The settlement agreement divided the $26 million principal about half to trusts for the surviving spouse and half to a trust for the charities. The Commissioner stipulated that the nature of the trusts did not prevent them from qualifying for the marital and charitable deductions. The stipulation streamlined the Tax Court liti- gation but did not resolve it. The settlement agreement provided that the estate would pay its administration expenses either from the principal or from the income of the assets that would comprise the resi- due and the corpus of the trusts, preserving the discretion Hubert's most recent will had given his executors to appor- tion administration expenses. The apportionment provi- sions of the agreement and the will were consistent for all relevant purposes with the law of Georgia, the State where the decedent resided. The estate's administration expenses, including attorney's fees, were on the order of $2 million. The estate paid about $500,000 in expenses from principal and the rest from income. The estate recalculated its estate tax liability based on the settlement agreement and the payments from principal. 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 99 Opinion of Kennedy, J. The estate did not include in its marital and charitable de- ductions the amount of residue principal used to pay admin- istration expenses. The parties here have agreed through- out that the marital or charitable deductions could not include those amounts. The estate, however, did not reduce its marital or charitable deductions by the amount of the income used to pay the balance of the administration ex- penses. The Commissioner disagreed and contended that use of income for this purpose required a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the amounts of the marital and charitable deductions. In a reviewed opinion, the Tax Court, with two judges concurring in part and dissenting in part, rejected the Com- missioner's position. 101 T. C. 314 (1993). The court noted it had resolved the same issue against the Commissioner in Estate of Street v. Commissioner, 56 TCM 774, 57 TCM 2851 (1988), ¶ 88,553 P­H Memo TC. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had reversed this aspect of Estate of Street, see 974 F. 2d 723, 727­729 (1992), but in the instant case the Tax Court adhered to its view and said, given all the cir- cumstances here, no reduction was required by reason of the executors' power, or the exercise of their power, to pay ad- ministration expenses from income. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, adopt- ing the latter's opinion and noting the resulting conflict with the Sixth Circuit's decision in Street and with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's decision in Burke v. United States, 994 F. 2d 1576, cert. denied, 510 U. S. 990 (1993). See 63 F. 3d 1083, 1084­1085 (CA11 1995). We granted certiorari, 517 U. S. 1166 (1996), and, in agreement with the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for the Elev- enth Circuit, we now affirm the judgment. II A necessary first step in calculating the taxable estate for federal estate tax purposes is to determine the property in- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 100 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Opinion of Kennedy, J. cluded in the gross estate, and its value. Though an alterna- tive valuation date is authorized, the executors of the Hubert estate used the standard date-of-death valuation. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 2031(a), 2051. A later step is to compute any claimed charitable or marital deductions. See §§ 2055 (char- itable), 2056 (marital). Our inquiry here involves the rela- tionship between valuation principles and those computa- tions. The language of the charitable and marital deduction sections differs. For instance, § 2056 requires consideration, in valuing a marital bequest, of obligations or encumbrances the decedent imposes on the bequest, "in the same manner as if the amount of a gift to such spouse of such interest were being determined." § 2056(b)(4). Section 2055 has no similar language. Treasury Reg. § 20.2056(b)­4(a), 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996), moreover, has amplified aspects of the marital deduction statute, as we discuss. There is no similar regulation for the charitable deduction statute. These differences notwithstanding, the Commissioner and respondent agree that, for purposes of the question pre- sented, the two deduction statutes should be read to require the same answer. We adopt this approach. For the issue we decide, the marital deduction statute and regulation speak in more specific terms than the charitable deduction statute, so we concentrate on the marital provisions. Our holding in the case applies to both deductions. We begin with the language of the marital deduction stat- ute. It allows an estate to deduct for federal estate tax purposes "an amount equal to the value of any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, but only to the extent that such interest is included in determining the value of the gross estate." 26 U. S. C. § 2056(a). The statute allows deduction for qualifying property only to the extent of the property's "value." So when the execu- tors value the property for gross estate purposes as of the date of death, the value of the marital deduction will be lim- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 101 Opinion of Kennedy, J. ited by its date-of-death value. This is directed by the stat- utory language capping the deduction at "the value of any interest . . . included in determining the value of the gross estate." It is made explicit by Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)­4(a), which says "value, for the purpose of the marital deduction . . . is to be determined as of the date of the decedent's death [unless the estate uses the alternative valuation date]." Section 20.2056(b)­4(a) provides that "value" for marital deduction purposes is "net value," determined by applying "the same principles . . . as if the amount of a gift to the spouse were being determined." Section 25.2523(a)­1, enti- tled "Gift to spouse; in general," includes a subsection (e), entitled "Valuation," which parallels § 20.2056(b)­4(d); see also § 20.2055­2(f)(1). Section 25.2523(a)­1(e) provides: "If the income from property is made payable to the donor or another individual for life or for a term of years, with remainder to the donor's spouse . . . the marital deduction is computed . . . with respect to the present value of the remainder, determined under [26 U. S. C. § ]7520. The present value of the remainder (that is, its value as of the date of gift) is to be deter- mined in accordance with the rules stated in § 25.2512­5 or, for certain prior periods, § 25.2512­5A." Section 7520, in turn, refers to present-value tables located in regulation § 20.2031­7. The question presented here, in- volving date-of-death valuation of property or a principal amount, some of the income from which may be used to pay administration expenses, is not controlled by the exact terms of these provisions. For that reason, we do not attempt to force it into their detailed mold. It is natural, however, to apply the present-value principle to the question at hand, as we are directed to do by § 20.2056(b)­4(a). In other words, assuming it were necessary for valuation purposes to take into account that income, see infra, at 106­107 (discussing materiality), this would be done by subtracting from the 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 102 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Opinion of Kennedy, J. value of the bequest, computed as if the income were not subject to administration expense charges, the present value (as of the controlling valuation date) of the income expected to be used to pay administration expenses. Our application of the present-value principle to the issue here is further supported by Justice Holmes' explanation of valuation theory in his opinion for the Court in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151 (1929). The decedent there bequeathed the residue of his estate in trust to charity, subject to a particular life interest in his wife. After hold- ing that the charitable bequest qualified for the charitable deduction under the law as it stood in 1929, the Court consid- ered how to value the bequest. The Government argued the value should be reduced to reflect the wife's probable life expectancy as of the date the decedent died. The estate ar- gued for a smaller reduction than the Government, because by the time of the litigation it was known that the wife had, in fact, lived for only six months after the decedent died. Justice Holmes wrote: "The first impression is that it is absurd to resort to statistical probabilities when you know the fact. But this is due to inaccurate thinking. . . . [Value] depends largely on more or less certain prophecies of the future; and the value is no less real at that time if later the prophecy turns out false than when it comes out true. . . . Tempting as it is to correct uncertain probabilities by the now certain fact, we are of opinion that it cannot be done. . . . Our opinion is not changed by the necessary exceptions to the general rule specifically made by the Act." Id., at 155. So the charitable deduction had to be valued based on the wife's probable life expectancy as of the date of death rather than the known fact that she died only six months after her husband. 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 103 Opinion of Kennedy, J. It is suggested that § 20.2056(b)­4(a)'s direction to value the marital deduction as a spousal gift refers to a gift tax qualification regulation, § 25.2523(e)­1(f), and a Revenue Rul- ing interpreting it, Rev. Rul. 69­56, 1969­1 Cum. Bull. 224. Post, at 116 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). The suggestion misunderstands the regulations and the Reve- nue Ruling. Section 20.2056(b)­4(a) concerns how to deter- mine the "value, for the purpose of the marital deduction, of any deductible interest." Before determining an interest's value under § 20.2056(b)­4(a), one must decide the extent to which the interest qualifies as deductible. There is a structural problem with interpreting § 20.2056(b)­4(a) as directing reference to § 25.2523(e)­1(f) for valuation purposes. Qualification and valuation are dif- ferent steps. Section 25.2523(e)­1(f) prescribes conditions under which an interest transferred in trust qualifies for a marital deduction under the gift tax. It tracks the language of § 20.2056(b)­5(f), which prescribes the same conditions for determining whether an interest transferred in trust quali- fies for a marital deduction under the estate tax. Any inter- est to which § 25.2523(e)­1(f) would apply, were its principles understood to be incorporated into § 20.2056(b)­4(a), would, of necessity, already have been analyzed under the same principles at the earlier, qualification stage of the estate-tax marital-deduction inquiry under § 20.2056(b)­5(f). So under the suggested interpretation, whether or not an interest passed the qualification test, there would never be a need to value it. If it failed, there would be nothing to value; if it passed, its value would never be reduced at the val- uation stage. The qualification step of the estate-tax marital-deduction inquiry would render the valuation step superfluous. We do not think the Commissioner adopted this view of the regulations in Revenue Ruling 69­56. The Revenue Ruling held that a trustee's power to: 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 104 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Opinion of Kennedy, J. "charge to income or principal, executor's or trustee's commissions, legal and accounting fees, custodian fees, and similar administration expenses . . . [does] not result . . . . . "[does] in the disallowance or diminution of the marital deduction for estate and gift tax purposes unless the execution of such directions would or the exercise of such powers could, cause the spouse to have less than substantially full beneficial enjoyment of the particular interest transferred." Rev. Rul. 69­56, 1969­1 Cum. Bull. 224. The Revenue Ruling cites for this proposition §§ 20.2056(b)­ 5(f)(1) and 25.2523(e)­1(f)(1), parts of the estate and gift tax qualification regulations discussed above. The qualifica- tion regulations provide that an interest may qualify as de- ductible only in part. Where that happens, the deduction need not be disallowed but it must be diminished. See, e. g., § 20.2056(b)­5(b); § 25.2523(e)­1(b); see also 26 U. S. C. §§ 2056(b)(5), 2523(e). It is in this qualification context that the Revenue Ruling speaks of "diminution" of the marital deduction. There is no dispute the entire interests trans- ferred in trust here qualify for the estate tax marital and charitable deductions, respectively. The question before us is one of valuation. Sections 25.2523(e)­1(f) and 20.2056(b)­ 5(f) and Revenue Ruling 69­56 do not bear on our inquiry. The parties here agree that the marital and charitable de- ductions had to be reduced by the amount of marital and charitable residue principal used to pay administration ex- penses. The Commissioner contends that the estate must reduce its marital and charitable deductions by the amount of administration expenses paid not only from principal but also, and in all events, from income and by a dollar-for-dollar amount. The Commissioner cites the controlling regulation in support of her position. The regulation says: 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 105 Opinion of Kennedy, J. "The value, for the purpose of the marital deduction, of any deductible interest which passed from the dece- dent to his surviving spouse is to be determined as of the date of the decedent's death [unless the estate uses the alternative valuation date]. The marital deduction may be taken only with respect to the net value of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, the same principles being applica- ble as if the amount of a gift to the spouse were being determined. In determining the value of the interest in property passing to the spouse account must be taken of the effect of any material limitations upon her right to income from the property. An example of a case in which this rule may be applied is a bequest of property in trust for the benefit of the decedent's spouse but the income from the property from the date of the dece- dent's death until distribution of the property to the trustee is to be used to pay expenses incurred in the administration of the estate." 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­ 4(a) (1996). The regulation does not help the Commissioner. It says a limitation providing that income "is to be used" throughout the administration period to pay administration expenses "may" be material in a given case and, if it is, account must be taken of it for valuation purposes as if it were a gift to the spouse, as we have discussed, see supra, at 101­102. The Tax Court was quite accurate in its description of the regulation when it said: "That section is merely a valuation provision which re- quires material limitations on the right to receive in- come to be taken into account when valuing the prop- erty interest passing to the surviving spouse. The fact that income from property is to be used to pay expenses during the administration of the estate is not necessarily 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 106 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Opinion of Kennedy, J. a material limitation on the right to receive income that would have a significant effect on the date-of-death value of the property of the estate." 101 T. C., at 324­325. There is no indication in the case before us that the execu- tor's power to charge administration expenses to income is equivalent to an express postponement of the spouse's right to income beyond a reasonable period of administration. Cf. 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­5(f)(9) (1996) (requiring valuation of ex- press postponements of the spouse's right to income beyond a reasonable period of administration). By contrast, we have no difficulty conceiving of situations where a provision requiring or allowing administration expenses to be paid from income could be deemed a "material limitation" on the spouse's right to income. Suppose the decedent's other be- quests account for most of the estate's property or that most of its assets are nonincome producing, so that the corpus of the surviving spouse's bequest, and the income she could expect to receive from it, would be quite small. In these circumstances, the amount of the estate's anticipated admin- istration expenses chargeable to income may be material as compared with the anticipated income used to determine the assets' date-of-death value. If so, a provision requiring or allowing administration expenses to be charged to income would be a material limitation on the spouse's right to in- come, reducing the marital bequest's date-of-death value and the allowable marital deduction. Whether a limitation is "material" will also depend in part on the nature of the spouse's interest in the assets generat- ing income. This analysis finds strong support in the text of § 20.2056(b)­4(a). The regulation gives an example of where a limitation on the right to income "may" be mate- rial-bequests "in trust" for the benefit of a decedent's spouse. The example suggests a significant difference be- tween a bequest of income and an outright gift of the fee interest in the income-producing property. A fee in the 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 107 Opinion of Kennedy, J. same interest will almost always be worth much more. Where the value of the trust to the beneficiaries is derived solely from income, an obligation to pay administration ex- penses from that income is more likely to be "material." In the case of a specific bequest of income, for example, valued only for its future income stream, a diversion of that income would be more significant. The marital property in this case, however, comprising trusts involving either a general power of appointment (the GPA trust) or an irrevocable elec- tion (the QTIP trust), was valued as being equivalent to a transfer of the fee. See Brief for Petitioner 8­9, n. 1 ("[T]he corpus of both trusts is includable in the estate of the sur- viving spouse"). As a result, the limitation on the right to income here is less likely to be material. The inquiry into the value of the estate's anticipated administration expenses should be just as administrable, if not more so, than valu- ing property interests like going-concern businesses, see, e. g., § 20.2031­3, involving much greater complexity and uncertainty. The Tax Court concluded here: "On the facts before us, we find that the trustee's discretion to pay administration expenses out of income is not a material limitation on the right to receive income." 101 T. C., at 325. The Tax Court did not specify the facts it considered relevant to the materi- ality inquiry. As we have explained, however, the Commis- sioner does not contend the estate failed to give adequate consideration to expected future administration expenses as of the date of death in determining the amount of the marital deduction. We have no basis to reverse for the Tax Court's failure to elaborate. Here, given the size and complexity of the estate, one might have expected it to incur substantial litigation costs. But the anticipated expenses could none- theless have been thought immaterial in light of the income the trust corpus could have been expected to generate. The major disagreement in principle between the Tax Court majority and dissenters involved the distinction be- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 108 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Opinion of Kennedy, J. tween expected and actual income and expenses. Judge Halpern's opinion, joined by Judge Beghe, explained: "I believe the majority is undone by its view that income earned on estate property is not included in the gross estate. Once it is accepted that income earned on es- tate property (as anticipated at the appropriate valua- tion date) is included in the gross estate, the next ques- tion is whether, but for the use of such income to pay administration expenses, it would be received by the surviving spouse or charitable beneficiary. If the an- swer is yes, then it follows easily that, when such income is used for administration expenses, rather than re- ceived by the surviving spouse or charitable beneficiary, the value of the interest passing from the decedent to the surviving spouse or charitable beneficiary is de- creased." Id., at 342­343 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Tax Court dissenters recognized that only anticipated, not actual, income is included in the gross estate, as the gross estate is based on date-of-death value. See also id., at 342, n. 5 (opinion of Halpern, J.) ("It is true, of course, that income actually earned on . . . property [included in valuing the gross estate] during the period of estate administration is not included in the gross estate. The gross estate, however, does include the discounted value of post mortem income ex- pected to be earned during estate administration" (emphasis deleted)). The dissenters failed to recognize that following their own logic, as a general rule, assuming compliance with § 20.2056(b)­4(a)'s limitation to relevant facts on the control- ling valuation date, only anticipated administration expenses payable from income, not the actual ones, affect the date-of- death value of the marital or charitable bequests. The dis- senters were, in a sense, a step closer to § 25.2523(a)­1(e)'s present-value approach than the Commissioner, for they would have required the estate to reduce the marital or char- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 109 Opinion of Kennedy, J. itable deduction by only the discounted value of the actual administration expenses, whereas the Commissioner insists on a dollar-for-dollar reduction. The dissenters' wait-and- see approach to the valuation inquiry, however, is still at odds with the valuation inquiry required by the regulations: What is the net value of the marital or charitable bequest on the controlling valuation date, determined as if it were a gift to the spouse? The Commissioner directs us to the language of § 2056(b)(4), which says: "In determining . . . the value of any interest in prop- erty passing to the surviving spouse for which a deduc- tion is allowed by this section- . . . . . "(B) where such interest or property is encumbered in any manner, or where the surviving spouse incurs any obligation imposed by the decedent with respect to the passing of such interest, such encumbrance or obligation shall be taken into account in the same manner as if the amount of a gift to such spouse of such interest were being determined." We interpreted this language in United States v. Stapf, 375 U. S. 118 (1963). The husband's will there gave property to his wife, conditioned on her relinquishing other property she owned to the couple's children. We held that the husband's estate was entitled to a marital deduction only to the extent the value of the property the husband gave his wife ex- ceeded the value of the property she relinquished to receive it. The marital deduction, we explained, should not exceed the "net economic interest received by the surviving spouse." Id., at 126. The statutory language, as we inter- preted it in Stapf, is consistent with our analysis here. Where the will requires or allows the estate to pay adminis- tration expenses from income that would otherwise go to the surviving spouse, our analysis requires that the marital 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 110 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Opinion of Kennedy, J. deduction reflect the date-of-death value of the expected fu- ture administration expenses chargeable to income if they are material as compared with the date-of-death value of the expected future income. Using this approach to valuation, the estate will arrive at the "net economic interest received by the surviving spouse." Ibid. For the first time at oral argument, the Commissioner sug- gested that the reduction she seeks is necessary to avoid a "double deduction" in violation of 26 U. S. C. § 642(g). Under § 642(g), an estate may take an estate tax deduction for administration expenses under § 2053(a)(2), or it may take them, if deductible, off its taxable income, but it may not do both. The so-called double deduction argument is rhetori- cal, not statutory. As our colleagues in dissent recognize, "nothing in § 642(g) compels the conclusion that the marital (or charitable) deduction must be reduced whenever an es- tate elects to deduct expenses from income." Post, at 137 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The Commis- sioner nevertheless suggests that, unless we reduce the estate's marital deduction by the amount of administration expenses paid from income and deducted on its income tax, the estate will receive a deduction for them on its income tax as well as a deduction for them on its estate tax in the form of inflated marital and charitable deductions. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 12, 15. The marital and charitable estate tax deductions do not include income, however. When income is used, consistent with state law and the will, to pay admin- istration expenses, this does not require that the estate tax deductions be diminished. The deductions include asset val- ues determined with reference to expected income, but under our analysis the values must also be reduced to reflect material expected administration expense charges to which that income may be subjected. As noted above, the Com- missioner has not contended the estate's marital and charita- ble deductions fail to reflect such expected payments. So 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 111 O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment there is no basis for the double deduction argument. Our analysis is consistent with the design of the statute. The Commissioner also invites our attention to the legisla- tive history of the marital deduction statute. Assuming for the sake of argument it would have relevance here, it does not support her position. The Senate Report accompanying the statute says: "The interest passing to the surviving spouse from the decedent is only such interest as the decedent can give. If the decedent by his will leaves the residue of his estate to the surviving spouse and she pays, or if the estate income is used to pay, claims against the estate so as to increase the residue, such increase in the residue is acquired by purchase and not by bequest. Accord- ingly, the value of any additional part of the residue passing to the surviving spouse cannot be included in the amount of the marital deduction." S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 6 (1948). The Report supports our analysis. It underscores that valu- ation for marital deduction purposes occurs on the date of death. The Commissioner's position is inconsistent with the con- trolling regulations. The Tax Court and the Court of Ap- peals were correct in finding for the taxpayer on these facts, and we affirm the judgment. It is so ordered. Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Souter and Justice Thomas join, concurring in the judgment. "Logic and taxation are not always the best of friends." Sonneborn Brothers v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506, 522 (1923) (McReynolds, J., concurring). In cases like the one before us today, they can be complete strangers. That our tax laws can at times be in such disarray is a discomforting thought. I can understand why the plurality attempts to extrapolate 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 112 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment a generalized estate tax valuation theory from one regula- tion and then to apply that theory to resolve this case, per- haps with the hope of making sense out of the applicable law. But where the applicability-not to mention the validity-of that theory is far from clear, the temptation to make order out of chaos at any cost should be resisted, especially when the question presented can be resolved-albeit imperfectly- by reference to more directly applicable sources. While Justice Scalia, Justice Breyer, and I agree on this point, we disagree on the result ultimately dictated by these sources. I therefore write separately to explain why in my view the plurality's result, though not its reasoning, is correct. I When a citizen or resident of the United States dies, the Federal Government imposes a tax on "all [of his] property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated." 26 U. S. C. §§ 2001(a), 2031(a). Specifically excluded from taxation, however, is certain property devised to the dece- dent's spouse or to charity. Such testamentary gifts may qualify for the marital deduction, § 2056(a), or the charitable deduction, § 2055(a). If they do, they are removed from the decedent's "gross estate" and exempted from the estate tax. § 2051. Calculating the estate tax, however, takes time, as does marshaling the decedent's property and distributing it to the ultimate beneficiaries. During this process, the assets in the estate often earn income and the estate itself incurs administrative expenses. To deal with this eventual- ity, the Tax Code permits an estate administrator to choose between allocating these expenses to the assets in the estate at the time of death (the estate principal), or to the postmor- tem income earned by those assets. § 642(g). Everyone agrees that when these expenses are charged against a por- tion of the estate's principal devised to the spouse or charity, that portion of the principal is diverted from the spouse or charity and the marital and charitable deductions are accord- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 113 O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment ingly "reduced" by the actual amount of expenses incurred. See ante, at 104 (plurality opinion); post, at 123 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Brief for Petitioner 19; Brief for Respondent 6. The question presented here is what becomes of these deduc- tions when the estate chooses the second option under § 642(g) and allocates administrative expenses to the post- mortem income generated by the property in the spousal or charitable devise. The Tax Code itself supplies no guidance. Accord, post, at 127 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The statute most relevant to this case, 26 U. S. C. § 2056(b)(4)(B), provides: "[W]here [any interest in property otherwise qualifying for the marital deduction] is encumbered in any manner, or where the surviving spouse incurs any obligation im- posed by the decedent with respect to the passing of such interest, such encumbrance or obligation shall be taken into account in the same manner as if the amount of a gift to such spouse of such interest were being determined." Although an executor's power to burden the postmortem in- come of the marital bequest with the estate's administrative expenses is arguably an "encumbrance" or an "obligation im- posed by the decedent with respect to the passing of such interest," the statute itself says only that the "encumbrance or obligation shall be taken into account." It does not ex- plain how this should be done, however. In my view, it is not possible to tell from § 2056(b)(4)(B) whether allocation of administrative expenses to postmortem income reduces the marital deduction always, sometimes, or not at all. Nor does the Code's legislative history give shape to its otherwise ambiguous language. The discussion in the Sen- ate Report of § 2056(b)(4)(B)'s predecessor statute reads: "The interest passing to the surviving spouse from the decedent is only such interest as the decedent can give. If the decedent by his will leaves the residue of his es- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 114 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment tate to the surviving spouse and she pays, or if the estate income is used to pay, claims against the estate so as to increase the residue, such increase in the residue is acquired by purchase and not by bequest. Accordingly, the value of any such additional part of the residue passing to the surviving spouse cannot be included in the amount of the marital deduction." S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 6 (1948) (emphasis added). This italicized passage might be helpful if it explicitly referred to "administrative expenses" instead of "claims against the estate." But it is not at all clear from the Senate Report whether the latter term includes the former: The Report nowhere defines the term "claims against the es- tate," and the immediately preceding paragraph discusses § 2056(b)(4)(B)'s language with reference to mortgages. Ibid. Because mortgages differ from administrative ex- penses in many ways (e. g., mortgages pre-exist the dece- dent's death and are fixed in amount at that time), there is a reasonable argument that administrative expenses are not "claims against the estate." In sum, the Code's legisla- tive history is not illuminating. II All that remains in this statutory vacuum are the Commis- sioner's regulations and Revenue Rulings, and it is on these sources that I would decide this issue. The key regulation is 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996): "The value, for the purpose of the marital deduction, of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse is to be determined as of the date of the decedent's death . . . . The marital deduction may be taken only with respect to the net value of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, the same principles being applica- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 115 O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment ble as if the amount of a gift to the spouse were being determined. In determining the value of the interest in property passing to the spouse account must be taken of the effect of any material limitations upon her right to income from the property." The text of the regulation leaves no doubt that only the "net value" of the spousal gift may be deducted. Moreover, there is little doubt that, in assessing this "net value," one should examine how the spousal devise would have been treated if it were instead an inter vivos gift. See 26 U. S. C. § 2056(b)(4)(A) (also referring to treatment of gifts). The plurality latches onto 26 CFR § 25.2523(a)­1(e) (1996), and to the statutes and regulations to which it refers. Ante, at 101­102 (referring to 26 U. S. C. § 7520; 26 CFR § 20.2031­7 (1996)). In the plurality's view, these regulations define how to "tak[e] [account] of the effect of any material limitations upon [a spouse's] right to income from the property." 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996). The plurality frankly admits that these regulations do not speak directly to the anteced- ent inquiry-when an executor's right to allocate administra- tive expenses to income constitutes a "material limitation." Ante, at 106. The plurality nevertheless believes that these regulations bear indirectly on this inquiry by imply- ing an underlying estate tax valuation theory that, in the plurality's view, dovetails nicely with our decision in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151 (1929). Ante, at 102. It is on the basis of this valuation theory that the plu- rality is able to conclude that the Tax Court's analysis was wrong because that analysis did not, consistent with the plu- rality's theory, focus solely on anticipated administrative ex- penses and anticipated income. Ante, at 107­109. But, as Justice Scalia points out, the plurality's valuation theory is not universally applicable and, in fact, conflicts with the Commissioner's treatment of some other expenses. See 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(c) (1996); post, at 133­136. Because § 25.2523(a)­1(e) and its accompanying provisions do no more 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 116 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment than suggest an estate tax valuation theory that itself has questionable value in this context, these provisions do not in my view provide any meaningful guidance in this case. The Tax Court, on the other hand, zeroed in on 26 CFR §§ 25.2523(e)­1(f)(3) and (4) (1996), the gift tax regulations which, read together, provide that a trustee's power to allo- cate the "trustees' commissions . . . and other charges" to the trust's income will not disqualify the trust from the gift tax spousal deduction as long as the donee spouse receives "substantial beneficial enjoyment" of the trust property. 101 T. C. 314, 325 (1993); see also 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­5(f) (1996) (tracking language of § 25.2523(e)­1(f)). The Commis- sioner interpreted this language in Revenue Ruling 69­56, and held that a trustee's power to "charge to income or principal, executor's or trustee's commissions, legal and accounting fees, custodian fees, and similar administration expenses . . . . . . . . "[does] not result in the disallowance or diminution of the marital deduction for estate and gift tax purposes unless the execution of such directions would or the ex- ercise of such powers could, cause the spouse to have less than substantially full beneficial enjoyment of the particular interest transferred." Rev. Rul. 69­56, 1969­1 Cum. Bull. 224 (emphasis added). Both the plurality and Justice Scalia argue that these gift regulations and rulings are inapposite because they address how the power to allocate expenses affects a trust's qualifi- cation for the marital deduction, and not how it affects the trust's value. Ante, at 103­104; post, at 125­126, 131­132. They further contend that the "material limitation" language in 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996) would be rendered super- fluous if a "material limitation" on the spouse's right to receive income existed only when that spouse lacked "sub- stantial beneficial enjoyment" of the income. 101 T. C., 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 117 O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment at 325­326 (adopting this argument). Under this reading, there could be no such thing as a trust that qualified for the marital deduction but imposed a material limitation on the right to income because any trust failing the "substantial beneficial enjoyment" test would not qualify for the deduc- tion at all. Ante, at 103; post, at 132. These are potent criticisms. But no matter how poorly drafted or ill con- ceived the Revenue Ruling might be, the fact remains that the Commissioner issued it and its plain language is hard to ignore. In the end, the conclusion one draws regarding how the marital and charitable trusts would be treated if they were inter vivos gifts depends on whether one takes the Commissioner at her word: If one does, the gift tax pro- visions, Revenue Ruling 69­56 in particular, favor respond- ent's position; if one does not, one is left with no guidance at all. Neither result is wholly satisfying. Fortunately, § 20.2056(b)­4(a) further directs the reader to consider a second method of determining the amount of the marital deduction: "In determining the value of the interest in property passing to the spouse account must be taken of the effect of any material limitations upon her right to income from the property." From this we ask whether the executor's right to allocate administrative expenses to the postmortem income of the marital bequest is a material limitation upon the spouse's "right to income from the property," such that "account must be taken of the effect." Because the executor's power is undeniably a "limitation" on the spouse's right to income, the case hinges on whether that limitation is "material." Accord, post, at 128 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The beginning of analysis . . . is to determine what, in the context of § 20.2056(b)­4(a), the word `material' means"). We can quibble over which definition of "material"-"sub- stantial" or "relevant"-precedes the other in the dictionary, 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 118 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment see ibid.; American Heritage Dictionary 772 (2d ed. 1985) ("substantial" precedes "relevant"), but this debate is beside the point. The Commissioner has already interpreted the language in § 20.2056(b)­4(a). In Revenue Ruling 93­48, the Commissioner ruled that the marital deduction is not "ordi- narily" reduced when an executor allocates interest pay- ments on deferred federal estate taxes to the postmortem income of the spousal bequest. Rev. Rul. 93­48, 1993­2 Cum. Bull. 271 ("[T]he value of a residuary charitable [or marital] bequest is [not] reduced by the amount of [interest] expenses payable from the income of the residuary prop- erty"). Justice Scalia contends that Revenue Ruling 93­48 should be disregarded because it was promulgated by the Commissioner only after her attempts to prevail on the contrary position in federal court repeatedly failed. Post, at 129­130. To be sure, the Commissioner may not have whole-heartedly embraced Revenue Ruling 93­48, but the Ruling nevertheless issued and we may not totally ig- nore the plain language of a regulation or ruling because the entity promulgating it did not really want to have to adopt it. See Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253­254 (1992) ("We have stated time and time again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there"); West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83, 98 (1991) (rejecting argument that "the congressional purpose in enacting [a statute] must prevail over the ordinary mean- ing of statutory terms"). It is, as an initial matter, difficult to reconcile the Commis- sioner's treatment of interest under Revenue Ruling 93­48 with her position in this case. For all intents and purposes, interest accruing on estate taxes is functionally indistin- guishable from the administrative expenses at issue here. By definition, neither of these expenses can exist prior to the decedent's death; before that time, there is no estate to administer and no estate tax liability to defer. Yet both 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 119 O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment types of expenses are inevitable once the estate is open be- cause it is virtually impossible to close an estate in a day so as to avoid the deferral of estate tax payments or the incur- sion of some administration expenses. Although both can theoretically be avoided if an executor donates his time or pays up front what he estimates the estate tax to be, this will not often occur. Both types of expenses are, moreover, of uncertain amount on the date of death. Because these two types of expenses are so similar in relevant ways, in my view they should be treated the same under § 20.2056(b)­4(a) and Ruling 93­48, despite the Commissioner's limitation on the applicability of Revenue Ruling 93­48 to interest on deferred estate taxes. But more important, the Commissioner's treatment of interest on deferred estate taxes in Revenue Ruling 93­48 indicates her rejection of the notion that every financial bur- den on a marital bequest's postmortem income is a material limitation warranting a reduction in the marital deduction. That the Ruling purports to apply not only to income but also to principal, and may therefore deviate from the ac- cepted rule regarding payment of expenses from principal, see supra, at 112­113, does not undercut the relevance of the Ruling's implications as to income. Post, at 130 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, some financial burdens on the spouse's right to postmortem income will reduce the marital deduc- tion; others will not. The line between the two does not, as Justice Scalia contends, depend upon the relevance of the limitation on the spouse's right to income to the value of the marital bequest, post, at 128­129, since interest on deferred estate taxes surely reduces, and is therefore relevant to, "the value of what passes," post, at 128 (emphasis deleted). By virtue of Revenue Ruling 93­48, the Commissioner has instead created a quantitative rule for § 20.2056(b)­4(a). That a limitation affects the marital deduction only upon reaching a certain quantum of substantiality is not a concept alien to the law of taxation; such rules are quite common. 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 120 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment See, e. g., Rev. Rul. 75­298, 1975­2 Cum. Bull. 290 (exempting from income tax the income of qualifying banks owned by foreign governments, as long as their participation in domes- tic commercial activity is de minimis); Rev. Rul. 90­60, 1990­2 Cum. Bull. 3 (establishing de minimis rule so that taxpayers who give up less than 33.3% of their partnership interest need not post a bond to enable them to defer pay- ment of credit recapture taxes for low-income housing). The Commissioner's quantitative materiality rule is con- sistent with the example set forth in 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­ 4(a) (1996): "An example of a case in which [the material limitation] rule may be applied is a bequest of property in trust for the benefit of the decedent's spouse but the income from the property from the date of the decedent's death until distribution of the property to the trustee is to be used to pay expenses incurred in the administration of the estate." Even assuming that Justice Scalia is correct that the word "may" connotes "possibility rather than permissibility," post, at 131, the example still does not specify whether it applies when all the income, some of the income, or any of the income "from the property . . . is to be used to pay expenses incurred in the administration of the estate." Any of these construc- tions of the example's language is plausible, and the Commis- sioner's expressed preference for the second one is worthy of deference. National Muffler Dealers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 440 U. S. 472, 476 (1979). That said, the proper measure of materiality has yet to be decided by the Commissioner. The Tax Court below com- pared the actual amount spent on administration expenses to its estimate of the income to be generated by the marital bequest during the spouse's lifetime. 101 T. C., at 325. One amicus suggests a comparison of the discounted present value of the projected income stream from the marital be- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 121 O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment quest when the actual administrative expenses are allocated to income with the projected income stream when the ex- penses are allocated to principal. App. to Brief for Ameri- can College of Trust and Estate Counsel as Amicus Curiae 1­2. The plurality, drawing upon its valuation theory, supra, at 115, looks to whether the "date-of-death value of the expected future administration expenses chargeable to income . . . [is] material as compared with the date-of-death value of the expected future income." Ante, at 110. None of these tests specifies with any particularity when the threshold of materiality is crossed. Cf. 26 U. S. C. § 2503(b) (setting $10,000 annual minimum before gift tax liability at- taches). The proliferation of possible tests only underscores the need for the Commissioner's guidance. In its absence, the Tax Court's approach is as consistent with the Code as any of the others, and provides no basis for reversal. I share Justice Scalia's reluctance to find a $1.5 million diminution in postmortem income immaterial under any standard. Post, at 128­129. Were this Court considering the question of quantitative materiality in the first instance, I would be hard pressed not to find this amount "material" given the size of Mr. Hubert's estate. But the Tax Court in this case was effectively pre-empted from making such a finding by the Commissioner's litigation strategy. It ap- pears from the record that the Commissioner elected to marshal all her resources behind the proposition that any diversion of postmortem income was material, and never presented any evidence or argued that $1.5 million was quan- titatively material. See App. 58 (Stipulation of Agreed Issues) (setting forth Commissioner's argument); Brief for Respondent 47. Because she bore the burden of proving materiality (since her challenge to administrative expenses was omitted from the original notice of deficiency), Tax Court Rule 142(a), her failure of proof left the Tax Court with little choice but to reach its carefully crafted conclusion that $1.5 million was not quantitatively material on "the 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 122 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Scalia, J., dissenting facts before [it]." 101 T. C., at 325. I would resist the temptation to correct the seemingly counterintuitive result in this case by protecting the Commissioner from her own litigation strategy, especially when she continues to adhere to that strategy and does not, even now, ask us to reconsider the Tax Court's finding on this issue. This complex case has spawned four separate opinions from this Court. The question presented is simple and its answer should have been equally straightforward. Yet we are confronted with a maze of regulations and rulings that lead at times in opposite directions. There is no reason why this labyrinth should exist, especially when the Commis- sioner is empowered to promulgate new regulations and make the answer clear. Indeed, nothing prevents the Com- missioner from announcing by regulation the very position she advances in this litigation. Until that time, however, the relevant sources point to a test of quantitative material- ity, one that is not met by the unusual factual record in this case. I would, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Tax Court. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Breyer joins, dissenting. The statute and regulation most applicable to the question presented in this case are discussed in today's opinion almost as an afterthought. Instead of relying on the text of 26 U. S. C. § 2056(b)(4)(B) and its interpretive Treasury Regula- tion, 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996), the plurality hinges its analysis on general principles of valuation which it mistak- enly believes to inhere in the estate tax. It thereby creates a tax boondoggle never contemplated by Congress, and an- nounces a test of deductibility virtually impossible for tax- payers and the Internal Revenue Service to apply. In my view, § 2056(b)(4)(B) and § 20.2056(b)­4(a) provide a straight- forward disposition, namely, that the marital (and charitable) deductions must be reduced whenever income from property 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 123 Scalia, J., dissenting comprising the residuary bequest to the spouse (or charity) is used to satisfy administration expenses. I therefore re- spectfully dissent. I Section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for a deduction from gross estate for marital be- quests.1 The Code places two limitations on the marital de- duction which are relevant to this case. First, as would be expected, the marital deduction is limited to "an amount equal to the value of any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, but only to the extent that such interest is included in determin- ing the value of the gross estate." 26 U. S. C. § 2056(a). Thus, as the plurality correctly recognizes, and as both par- ties agree, if any portion of marital bequest principal is used to pay estate administration expenses, then the marital de- duction must be reduced commensurately. Second, and more to the point, "where such interest or property [be- queathed to the spouse] is encumbered in any manner, or where the surviving spouse incurs any obligation imposed by the decedent with respect to the passing of such interest, such encumbrance or obligation shall be taken into account in the same manner as if the amount of a gift to such spouse of such interest were being determined." § 2056(b)(4)(B). Section 2056(b)(4)(B) controls this case and leads to the conclusion that the marital deduction must be reduced when estate income which would otherwise pass to the spouse is used to pay administration expenses of the estate. A As the plurality implicitly recognizes, Mrs. Hubert's inter- est in the estate was burdened with the obligation of paying 1 This case involves both the marital and the charitable deductions. I agree with the plurality's determination that the provisions governing the two should be read in pari materia, ante, at 100, and, like the plurality, I focus my attention on the marital deduction. 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 124 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Scalia, J., dissenting administration expenses. The settlement agreement resolv- ing the will contest, like Mr. Hubert's most recent will, pro- vided that the estate's administration expenses would be paid from the residuary trusts, with the discretion given to the executor to apportion expenses between the income and principal of the residue. The marital bequest, which makes up some 52% of the residue, was thus plainly burdened with the obligation of paying 52% of the administration expenses of the estate. (The charitable bequest accounted for the remaining 48% of the residue.) Our task under § 2056(b)(4)(B) is to determine how this obligation would affect the value of the marital bequest were the bequest an inter vivos gift. This seemingly rudimen- tary question proves difficult to answer. Both parties point to various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury Regulations, but these concern the quite differ- ent question whether a gift qualifies for the gift tax mari- tal deduction; none discusses how the actual payment of administration expenses from income will affect the value of the gift tax marital deduction. See, e. g., Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2523(e)­1(f)(3) and (4), 26 CFR §§ 25.2523(e)­1(f)(3) and (4) (1996) (inclusion of the power to a trustee to allocate ex- penses of a trust between income and corpus will not dis- qualify the gift from the marital deduction so long as the spouse maintains substantial beneficial enjoyment of the in- come). The plurality seeks to derive some support from § 25.2523(a)­1(e), see ante, at 101­102, though it must ac- knowledge that "[t]he question presented here . . . is not con- trolled by the exact terms of [that regulation or the provi- sions to which it refers]," ante, at 101. Even going beyond its "exact terms," however, the regulation has no relevance. Like its counterparts in the estate tax provisions, see §§ 20.2031­1(b), 20.2031­7, it simply provides instruction on how to value the assets comprising the gift. It says nothing about how to take account of administration expenses. In- deed, the gross estate does not include anticipated adminis- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 125 Scalia, J., dissenting tration expenses. As I discuss below, infra, at 134­135, the estate tax provisions provide for a deduction from the gross estate for administration expenses actually incurred. See 26 U. S. C. § 2053(a)(2) and 26 CFR § 20.2053­3(a) (1996). Were expected administration expenses taken into account in valuing the assets of the gross estate, as the plurality in- correctly suggests, then the estate tax deduction for actual administration expenses would in effect be a second deduc- tion for the same charge. Respondent's strongest argument is based on Rev. Rul. 69­56, 1969­1 Cum. Bull. 224, which held that inclusion in a marital trust of the power to charge administration expenses to either income or principal does not run afoul of that provi- sion of the regulations which requires, in order for a life- estate trust to qualify for the gift and estate tax marital deductions, that the settlor intend the spouse to enjoy "sub- stantially that degree of beneficial enjoyment of the trust property during her life which the principles of the law of trust accord to a person who is unqualifiedly designated as the life beneficiary of a trust." 26 CFR §§ 2523(e)­1(f)(1), 2056(b)­5(f)(1) (1996). Although the Revenue Ruling was an interpretation of qualification regulations, it also pur- ported to "h[o]ld" that inclusion of the "power" to allocate expenses between income and principal "does not result in the disallowance or diminution of the marital deduction," Rev. Rul. 69­56, 1969­1 Cum. Bull. 224, 225 (emphasis added). I agree with the Commissioner that this Revenue Ruling is inapposite because it deals with the effect of the mere existence of the power to allocate expenses against in- come; it speaks not at all to the question of how the actual exercise of that power will affect the valuation of the estate tax marital deduction. If the Ruling is construed to mean that exercise of the power does not reduce the marital deduc- tion, then actually using principal to pay the expenses should not reduce the marital deduction, a result which everyone agrees is incorrect, see, e. g., ante, at 104 (plurality opinion); 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 126 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Scalia, J., dissenting ante, at 112­113 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); supra, at 123, and which plainly conflicts with § 2056(a). It seems to me obvious that the Commissioner was simply not addressing the issue before us today when she issued Reve- nue Ruling 69­56, a conclusion confirmed by the fact that the Commissioner's longstanding view-which antedates Reve- nue Ruling 69­56-is that use of marital bequest income to pay administration expenses requires that the marital deduc- tion be reduced, see, e. g., Brief for Government Appellee in Ballantine v. Tomlinson, No. 18,736 (CA5 1961), p. 18; Brief for Government Appellee in Alston v. United States, No. 21,402 (CA5 1965), p. 15. B The Commissioner contends that Treas. Reg. § 20.2056 (b)­4(a), 26 CFR § 2056(b)­4(a) (1996), which interprets § 2056(b)­(4)(B), mandates the conclusion that payment of ad- ministration expenses from marital bequest income reduces the marital deduction. Section 20.2056(b)­4(a) provides: "The value, for the purpose of the marital deduction, of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse is to be determined as of the date of the decedent's death, [unless the executor elects the alternate valuation date]. The marital deduction may be taken only with respect to the net value of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, the same principles being applica- ble as if the amount of a gift to the spouse were being determined. In determining the value of the interest in property passing to the spouse account must be taken of the effect of any material limitations upon her right to income from the property. An example of a case in which this rule may be applied is a bequest of property in trust for the benefit of the decedent's spouse but the income from the property from the date of decedent's death until distribution of the property to the trustee is 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 127 Scalia, J., dissenting to be used to pay expenses incurred in the administra- tion of the estate." (Emphasis added.) This text was issued pursuant to explicit authority given the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate the rules and regu- lations necessary to enforce the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U. S. C. § 7805(a). As this Court has repeatedly ac- knowledged, judicial deference to the Secretary's handiwork "helps guarantee that the rules will be written by `masters of the subject.' " National Muffler Dealers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 440 U. S. 472, 477 (1979), quoting United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 763 (1878). Thus, when a pro- vision of the Internal Revenue Code is ambiguous, as § 2056(b)(4)(B) plainly is, this Court has consistently deferred to the Treasury Department's interpretive regulations so long as they " ` "implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner." ' " National Muffler Dealers Assn., Inc., supra, at 476, quoting United States v. Cart- wright, 411 U. S. 546, 550 (1973), in turn quoting United States v. Correll, 389 U. S. 299, 307 (1967). See also Cottage Savings Assn. v. Commissioner, 499 U. S. 554, 560­561 (1991). As the courts below recognized, the crucial term of the regulation for present purposes is "material limitations." Curiously enough, however, neither the Commissioner nor respondent comes forward with a definition of this term, the former simply contending that "it is the burden of paying administration expenses itself that constitutes the `material' limitation," Brief for Petitioner 31, and the latter simply con- tending that that burden is for various reasons not substan- tial enough to qualify. Today's plurality opinion also takes the latter approach, never defining the term but displaying by its examples that "material" must mean "relatively sub- stantial." If, it says, a spouse's bequest represents a small portion of the overall estate and could be expected to gen- erate little income, the estate's anticipated administration expenses " `may' be material" when compared to the antici- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 128 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Scalia, J., dissenting pated income. Ante, at 106. But, it says, the mere fact that an estate incurs (or as I discuss below, under the plurality's approach, expects to incur) "substantial litigation costs" is insufficient to make a limitation material. Ante, at 107. The beginning of analysis, it seems to me, is to determine what, in the context of § 20.2056(b)­4(a), the word "material" means. In common parlance, the word sometimes bears the meaning evidently assumed by respondent: "substantial," or "serious," or "important." See 1 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1714 (1993) (def. 3); Webster's New Inter- national Dictionary 1514 (2d ed. 1950) (def. 2a). It would surely bear that meaning in a regulation that referred to a "material diminution of the value of the spouse's estate." Relatively small diminutions would not count. But where, as here, the regulation refers to "material limitations upon [the spouse's] right to receive income," it seems to me that the more expansive meaning of "material" is naturally sug- gested-the meaning that lawyers use when they move that testimony be excluded as "immaterial": Not "insubstantial" or "unimportant," but "irrelevant" or "inconsequential." See American Heritage Dictionary 1109 (3d ed. 1992) (def. 4: defining "material" as "[b]eing both relevant and consequen- tial," and listing "relevant" as a synonym). In the context of § 20.2056(b)­4(a), which deals, as its first sentence recites, with "[t]he value, for the purpose of the marital deduction, of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse" (emphasis added), a "material limita- tion" is a limitation that is relevant or consequential to the value of what passes. Many limitations are not-for exam- ple, a requirement that the spouse not spend the income for five years, or that the spouse be present at the reading of the will, or that the spouse reconcile with an alienated relative. That this is the more natural reading of the provision is amply demonstrated by the consequences of the alternative reading, which would leave it to the taxpayer, the Commis- sioner, and ultimately the courts, to guess whether a particu- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 129 Scalia, J., dissenting lar decrease in value is "material" enough to qualify-with- out any hint as to what might be a "ballpark" figure, or indeed any hint as to whether there is such a thing as "abso- lute materiality" (the $2 million at issue here, for instance), or whether it is all relative to the size of the estate. One should not needlessly impute such a confusing meaning to a regulation which readily bears another interpretation that is more precise. Moreover, the Commissioner's interpretation of her own regulation, so long as it is consistent with the text, is entitled to considerable deference, see National Muf- fler Dealers Assn., Inc., supra, at 488­489; Cottage Savings Assn., supra, at 560­561. The concurrence contends that the other (more unnatural) reading of "material" must be adopted-and that no defer- ence is to be accorded the Commissioner's longstanding ap- proach of reducing the marital deduction for any payment of administrative expenses out of marital-bequest income- because of a recent Revenue Ruling in which the Commis- sioner acquiesced in lower court holdings that the marital deduction is not reduced by the payment from the marital bequest of interest on deferred estate taxes. Ante, at 118­ 120 (discussing Rev. Rul. 93­48). The concurrence asserts that interest accruing on estate taxes "is functionally indis- tinguishable" from administrative expenses, so that Revenue Ruling 93­48 "created a quantitative rule" shielding some financial burdens from affecting the calculation of the marital deduction. Ante, at 118, 119. I think not. The Commis- sioner issued Revenue Ruling 93­48 only after her conten- tion, that § 20.2056(b)­4(a) required the marital deduction to be reduced by payment of estate tax interest from the mari- tal bequest, was repeatedly rejected by the Tax Court and the Courts of Appeals. See, e. g., Estate of Street v. Com- missioner, 974 F. 2d 723 (CA6 1992); Estate of Whittle v. Commissioner, 994 F. 2d 379 (CA7 1993); Estate of Richard- son v. Commissioner, 89 T. C. 1193 (1987). Rather than con- tinuing to expend resources in litigation that seemed likely 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 130 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Scalia, J., dissenting to bring little or no income to the Treasury, the Commis- sioner chose, in Revenue Ruling 93­48, to "adopt the result" of then-recent court decisions regarding interest on taxes. It is impossible to think that this suggested her view on the proper treatment of administrative expenses had changed. Indeed, the Ruling itself expressly indicates continued ad- herence to the Commissioner's longstanding position by reaf- firming Revenue Ruling 73­98, which held that the charita- ble deduction must be reduced by the amount of charitable bequest income and principal consumed to pay administra- tive expenses, modifying it only insofar as it applies to pay- ment of interest on taxes. Moreover, the Courts of Appeals whose results the Commissioner adopted themselves distin- guished administrative expenses. In Estate of Street, for example, the court reasoned that while administrative ex- penses accrue at death interest on taxes accrues after death, and noted that the example in Treas. Reg. § 2056(b)­4(a) spe- cifically required a reduction of the marital deduction for payment of administrative expenses, but was silent as to in- terest on taxes. 974 F. 2d, at 727, 729. While the concur- rence may be correct that the distinctions advanced by the Courts of Appeals are not wholly persuasive (the Commis- sioner herself argued that to no avail), I hardly think they are so irrational that it was arbitrary or capricious for the Commissioner to maintain her longstanding prior position on administrative expenses once Revenue Ruling 93­48 was issued; and it is utterly impossible to think that Revenue Ruling 93­48 was, or was understood to be, an indication that the Commissioner had changed her prior position on administrative expenses. That eliminates the only two grounds on which Revenue Ruling 93­48 could be relevant. The concurrence's reading of Revenue Ruling 93­48 suf- fers from an additional flaw. Revenue Ruling 93­48 is not limited to payment from marital bequest income, but rather extends to payment from marital bequest principal as well. Thus, under the concurrence's view of that Ruling, even sub- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 131 Scalia, J., dissenting stantial administrative expenses paid out of marital bequest principal may not require a reduction of the marital deduc- tion. This result is, of course, inconsistent with the statute, see 26 U. S. C. § 2056(a), and with what appears to be (as I noted earlier, supra, at 125­126) the concurrence's view, ante, at 112­113. Respondent asserts that some inquiry into "substantiality" is necessarily implied by the fact that the last sentence of the regulation describes an income-to-pay-administration- expenses limitation as "[a]n example of a case in which this rule [of taking account of material limitations] may be applied," 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996) (emphasis added). The word "may" implies, the argument goes, that in some circumstances under those same facts the rule would not be applied-namely (the argument posits), when the adminis- tration expenses are not "substantial." But the latter is not the only explanation for the "may." Assuming it connotes possibility rather than permissibility (as in, "My boss said that I may go to New York"), the contingency referred to could simply be the contingency that there be some income which is used to pay administration expenses. The Tax Court (in analysis adopted verbatim by the Elev- enth Circuit and seemingly adopted by the concurrence, ante, at 120­121) took yet a third approach to "material limita- tion," which I must pause to consider. The Tax Court relied on 26 CFR § 25.2523(e)­1(f)(3) (1996), which, it stated, pro- vides that so long as the spouse has substantial beneficial enjoyment of the income of a trust, the bequest will not be disqualified from the marital gift deduction by virtue of a provision allowing the trustee to allocate expenses to in- come, and the spouse will be deemed to have received all the income from the trust. The Tax Court concluded: "If Mrs. Hubert is treated as having received all of the income from the trust, there can be no material limitation on her right to receive income." 101 T. C. 314, 325­326 (1993). This rea- soning fails for a number of reasons. First, § 25.2523(e)­ 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 132 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Scalia, J., dissenting 1(f)(3) is a qualification provision; it does not purport to instruct on how to value the bequest. Second, and more fundamentally, the Tax Court's approach renders the "ma- terial limitation" phrase in § 20.2056(b)­4(a) superfluous. Under that view, a limitation is material only if it deprives the spouse of substantial beneficial enjoyment of the income. However, if the spouse does not have substantial beneficial enjoyment of the income, the trust does not qualify for the marital deduction and whether the limitation is material is irrelevant. That "material limitation" is not synonymous with "substantial beneficial enjoyment" is further suggested by the regulations governing the qualification of trusts for the marital estate tax deduction, which are virtually identi- cal to the gift tax provisions relied upon by the Tax Court. See 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­5(f) (1996). Section 20.2056(b)­ 5(f)(9) provides that a spouse will not be deemed to lack sub- stantial beneficial enjoyment of the income merely because the spouse is not entitled to the income from the estate assets for the period reasonably required for administration of the estate. However, that section expressly provides: "As to the valuation of the property interest passing to the spouse in trust where the right to income is expressly post- poned, see § 20.2056(b)­4." Ibid. (emphasis added). C My understanding of § 20.2056(b)­4(a) is the only approach consistent with the statutory requirement that the marital deduction be limited to the value of property which passes to the spouse. See 26 U. S. C. § 2056(a). As the plurality and the concurrence acknowledge, one component of an asset's value is its discounted future income. See, e. g., Maass v. Higgins, 312 U. S. 443, 448 (1941); 26 CFR § 20.2031­1(b) (1996). (This explains why postmortem in- come earned by the estate is not added to the date-of-death value in computing the gross estate: projected income was already included in the date-of-death value.) The plurality 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 133 Scalia, J., dissenting and the concurrence also properly acknowledge that if resid- uary principal is used to pay administration expenses, then the marital deduction must be reduced commensurately be- cause the property does not pass to the spouse. See ante, at 104 (plurality opinion); ante, at 112­113 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); 26 U. S. C. § 2056(a). The plurality and the concurrence decline, however, to follow this reason- ing to its logical conclusion. Since the future stream of income is one part of the value of the assets at the date of death, use of the income to pay administration expenses (which were not included in calculating the assets' values) in effect reduces the value of the interest that passes to the spouse. As succinctly explained by a respected tax commentator: "Beneficiaries are compensated for the delay in receiv- ing possession by giving them the right to the income that is earned during administration. . . . [I]t is only the combination of the two rights-that to the income and that to possess the property in the future-that gives the beneficiary rights at death that are equal to value of the property at death. If the beneficiary does not get the income, what the beneficiary gets is less than the deathtime value of the property." Davenport, A Street Through Hubert's Fog, 73 Tax Notes 1107, 1110 (1996). If the beneficiary does not receive the income generated by the marital bequest principal, she in effect receives at the date of death less than the value of the property in the es- tate, in much the same way as she receives less than the value of the property in the estate when principal is used to pay expenses. II Besides giving the word "material" the erroneous meaning of something in excess of "substantial," the plurality's opin- ion adopts a unique methodology for determining material- ity. Consistent with its apparent view that the estate tax provisions prohibit examination of any events following the 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 134 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Scalia, J., dissenting date of death, the plurality concludes that whether a limita- tion is material, and the extent of any reduction in the mari- tal deduction, are determined solely on the basis of the infor- mation available at the date of death-a position espoused by neither litigant, none of the amici, and none of the courts to have considered this issue since it arose some 35 years ago. The plurality appears to have been misled by its view that the estate tax demands symmetry: Since only antici- pated income is included in the gross estate, only anticipated administration expenses can reduce the marital deduction. See ante, at 102, 106­109. The provisions of the estate tax clearly reject such a notion of symmetry and do not sharply discriminate between date-of-death and postmortem events insofar as the allowance of deductions for claims against and obligations of the estate are concerned. In this very case, for example, in calculating the taxable estate the executors deducted $506,989 of actual administration expenses pur- suant to 26 U. S. C. § 2053(a)(2). App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a. The regulations governing such deductions provide that "[t]he amounts deductible . . . as `administration expenses' . . . are limited to such expenses as are actually and nec- essarily, incurred in the administration of the decedent's es- tate," 26 CFR § 20.2053­3(a) (1996) (emphasis added), and expressly prohibit taking a deduction "upon the basis of a vague or uncertain estimate," § 20.2053­1(b)(3). Since such common administration expenses as litigation costs will be impossible to ascertain with any exactitude as of the date of death, the plurality's approach flatly contradicts the provi- sions of these regulations.2 The marital deduction itself is calculated on the basis of actual, rather than anticipated, expenditures from the mari- tal bequest. The regulations governing 26 U. S. C. § 2056(b) 2 The plurality's reference to Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151 (1929), is unhelpful. That case holds that date-of-death valuation is applicable to bequeathed assets, not that it is applicable to claims and obligations that are to be satisfied out of those assets. 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 135 Scalia, J., dissenting (4)(A), the provision requiring the marital deduction to be reduced to take account of the effect of estate and inheri- tance taxes, make it clear that the actual amounts of those taxes control. See 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(c) (1996). (With respect to the charitable deduction, the requirement that ac- tual amounts be used is apparent on the face of the statute itself, see 26 U. S. C. § 2055(c).) Moreover, the language of § 2056(b)(4)(A) is quite similar to the language of the regulation at issue here, § 20.2056(b)­4(a), suggesting that the latter, like the former, should be interpreted to require consideration of actual, rather than merely expected, ad- ministration expenses. Compare 26 U. S. C. § 2056(b)(4)(A) ("[T]here shall be taken into account the effect which the tax imposed by section 2001, or any estate [tax], has on the net value to the surviving spouse of such interest" (emphasis added)) with 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996) ("The marital deduction may be taken only with respect to the net value of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse . . . . In determining the value of the interest in property passing to the spouse account must be taken of the effect of any material limitations upon [the spouse's] right to income" (emphasis added)). In short, the plurality's general theory concerning valu- ation is contradicted by provisions of both the Code and regulations. It is also plagued by a number of practical problems. Most prominently, the plurality's rule is simply unadministrable. It requires the Internal Revenue Service and courts to engage in a peculiar, nunc pro tunc, three- stage investigation into what would have been believed on the date of death of the decedent. This highly speculative inquiry begins, I presume, with an examination of the vari- ous possible administration expenditures multiplied by the likelihood that they would actually come into being (for example, estimating the chances that a will contest would develop). Next, one must calculate the expected future income from the bequest. Finally, one must determine if, 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 136 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Scalia, J., dissenting in light of the expected income, the anticipated expenses are such that a willing buyer would deem them to be a "ma- terial [i. e., substantial] limitation" on the right to receive income. Just how a court, presiding over a tax controversy many years after the decedent's death, is supposed to blind itself to later developed facts, and gauge the expected administration expenses and anticipated income just as they would have been gauged on the date of death, is a mystery to me. In most cases, it is nearly impossible to estimate administration expenses as of the date of death; much less is it feasible to reconstruct such an estimation five or six years later. The plurality's test creates tremendous uncertainty and will un- doubtedly produce extensive litigation. We should be very reluctant to attribute to the Code or the Secretary's regula- tions the intention to require this sort of inherently difficult inquiry, especially when the key regulation is best read to require that account be taken of actual expenses. The plurality's test also leads to rather peculiar results. One example should suffice: Assume a decedent leaves his entire $30 million estate in trust to his wife and that as of the date of death a hypothetical buyer estimates that the estate will generate administration expenses on the order of $5 million because the decedent's estranged son has publicly stated that he is going to wage a fight over the will. Fur- ther, assume that the will provides that either income or principal may be used to satisfy the estate's expenses. Fi- nally, assume that a week after the decedent's death, mother and son put aside their differences and that the money passes to the spouse almost immediately with virtually no adminis- tration expenses. Under the plurality's test, since "only an- ticipated administration expenses payable from income, not the actual ones, affect the date-of-death value of the marital or charitable bequests," ante, at 108, the marital deduction will be limited to approximately $25 million, and, despite generating almost no income and having very few adminis- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 137 Scalia, J., dissenting tration expenses, the estate will be required to pay an estate tax on some $5 million even though the entire estate passed to the spouse. The plurality's test creates taxable estates where none exist. The proper result under § 2056(b)(4)(B) and § 20.2056(b)­4(a) is that the marital deduction is $30 million and the estate pays no estate tax. I have one final concern with the plurality's approach: It effectively permits an estate to obtain a double deduction from tax for administration expenses, a tax windfall which Congress could never have intended. Title 26 U. S. C. § 642(g) provides that administration expenses, which are al- lowed as a deduction in computing the taxable estate of a decedent, see § 2053, may be deducted from income (provided they fall within an income tax deduction) if the estate files a statement with the Commissioner stating that such amounts have not been taken as deductions from the gross estate. Here, respondent elected to deduct some $1.5 million of its administration expenses on its fiduciary income tax returns and was prohibited from taking these expenses as a deduc- tion from the gross estate. Notwithstanding § 642(g), how- ever, the plurality's holding effectively permits respondent to deduct the $1.5 million of administration expenses on the estate tax return under the guise of a marital or charitable deduction. Of course, the estate could have avoided the es- tate tax by electing to deduct its administration expenses on its estate tax return, but then it would have had no income tax deduction; Congress gave estates a choice, not a road map to a double deduction. I recognize that nothing in § 642(g) compels the conclusion that the marital (or charita- ble) deduction must be reduced whenever an estate elects to deduct expenses from income. However, by enacting § 642 to prohibit a double deduction, Congress seemingly antici- pated that if an estate elected to deduct administration ex- penses against income, its potential estate tax liability would increase commensurately. The plurality's holding today defeats this expectation. 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 138 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Breyer, J., dissenting III The plurality today virtually ignores the controlling au- thority and instead decides this case based on a novel vision of the estate tax system. Because 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996), which is a reasonable interpretation of 26 U. S. C. § 2056(b)(4)(B), squarely controls this case and requires that the marital (and charitable) deductions be reduced whenever marital (or charitable) bequest income is used to pay admin- istration expenses, I would reverse the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. There is some dispute as to how exactly to calculate the reduction in the marital and charitable de- ductions. The dissenting judges in the Tax Court, on the one hand, contended that the marital and charitable deduc- tions should be reduced by the date-of-death value of an an- nuity charged against the residuary interest that would be sufficient to pay the actual administration expenses charged to income. See 101 T. C., at 348­349 (Beghe, J., dissenting). The Commissioner, on the other hand, contends that the mar- ital and charitable deductions must be reduced on a dollar- for-dollar basis, reasoning that this is the same way that all claims and obligations of the estate are treated. Since this dispute was not adequately briefed by the parties, nor passed upon by the Eleventh Circuit or the majority of judges in the Tax Court, I would remand the case to allow the lower courts to consider this issue in the first instance. Justice Breyer, dissenting. I join Justice Scalia's dissent. This case turns on whether a payment of administration expenses out of income generated by estate assets constitutes a "material limitation" on the right to receive income from those assets. 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996). The Commissioner has long, and consistently, argued that such a payment does reduce the value of the marital deduction. See, e. g., Ballantine v. Tomlinson, 293 F. 2d 311 (CA5 1961); Alston v. United States, 349 F. 2d 87 (CA5 1965); Estate of Street v. Commis- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 139 Breyer, J., dissenting sioner, 974 F. 2d 723 (CA6 1992); Estate of Roney, 33 T. C. 801 (1960), aff'd per curiam, 294 F. 2d 774 (CA5 1961); Reply Brief for Petitioner 15. Justice Scalia explains why the Commissioner's interpretation is consistent with the regula- tion's language and the statute it interprets. I add a brief explanation as to why I believe that it is consistent with basic statutory and regulatory tax law objectives as well. The regulation, which speaks of the "net value" of what passes to the spouse, requires a realistic valuation of the in- terest left to the spouse as of the date of the decedent's death. Assume, for example, that a decedent leaves his en- tire estate to his wife in trust, with the proviso that the administrator pay 25% of the income earned by the estate assets during the period of administration to the decedent's son. Assume that the period of administration lasts several years and that the estate generates several million dollars in income during that time. On these assumptions, the son will have received an important asset (included in the es- tate's date-of-death value) that the surviving spouse did not receive, namely, the right to a portion of the estate's income over a period of several years. Were estate tax law to fail to take account of this fact (that the son, not the wife, re- ceived that asset), it would permit a valuable asset (the right to that income) to pass to the son without estate tax. But estate tax law does seem realistically to appraise the "net value" of what passes to the wife in such circumstances. See 26 CFR §§ 20.2056(b)­5(f)(9), 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996); 4 A. Casner, Estate Planning § 13.11, pp. 138­139, and § 13.14.6, n. 18 (5th ed. 1988); cf. Estate of Friedberg, 63 TCM 3080 (1992), ¶ 92,310 P­H Memo TC (delay in payment of a specific bequest to a surviving spouse reduces its marital deduction value). And that being so, why would it not take account of the similar limitation on the right to income at issue here? The fact that the administrator uses estate income to pay administration expenses, rather than to make a bequest to the son, makes no difference from a marital deduction 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 140 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Breyer, J., dissenting perspective, for, as the regulations state, the marital deduc- tion focuses upon the "net value" of the "interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse." 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996); see United States v. Stapf, 375 U. S. 118, 125 (1963). The Commissioner's position also treats economic equals as equal. The time when the administrator writes the rele- vant checks, and not the account to which he debits them, determines economic impact. Thus $100,000 in administra- tion expenses incurred by a $1 million estate open for one year, paid by check on the year's last day will (assuming 10% simple interest and assuming away here-irrelevant complexi- ties) leave $1 million for the spouse at year's end, whether the administrator pays the expenses out of estate principal or from income. On these same assumptions, a commitment to pay, say, $100,000 in administration expenses out of income will reduce the value of principal by an amount identical to the reduction in value that would flow from a commitment to pay a similar amount out of principal. This economic similarity argues for similar estate tax treatment. I recognize that the statute permits estates to deduct ad- ministration and certain other expenses either from the es- tate tax or from the estate's income tax. 26 U. S. C. § 642(g); cf. ante, at 112­113 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). But I do not read that statute as allowing a spouse to escape payment both of the estate tax (through a greater marital deduction) and also of income tax (through the deduction of the administration expenses from income). One can easily read the provision's language as simply granting the estate the advantage of whichever of the two tax rates is the more favorable, while continuing to require the estate to pay at least one of the two potential taxes. To read the "election" provision in this way makes of it a less dramatic departure from a Tax Code that otherwise sees what passes to heirs not as the full value of what the testator left, but, rather, as 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 141 Breyer, J., dissenting that value minus a set of permitted deductions. 26 U. S. C. § 2053(a) (specifying deductions). Although respondent argues that the Commissioner's in- terpretation will sometimes produce an unjustified "shrink- ing" of the marital deduction, I do not see how that is so. I concede that unfairness could occur were the Commissioner to readjust the marital deduction every time the adminis- trator deducted from the estate's income tax every expense necessary to produce that income. But regulations guard against her doing so. Those regulations distinguish be- tween (a) "expenditures . . . essential to the proper settle- ment of the estate," and (b) expenses "incurred for the indi- vidual benefit of the heirs, legatees, or devisees." 26 CFR § 20.2053­3(a) (1996). The former are "administration ex- penses"; the latter are not. Deducting expenses in the lat- ter category from the estate's income tax should not affect the marital deduction; and, as long as that is so, the Commis- sioner's interpretation will simply permit estates to use their administration expense deductions to the best tax advantage. It will not lead to a marital deduction that to the spouse's overall disadvantage somehow shrinks, or disappears. The Commissioner's insistence upon reducing the date-of- death value of the trust dollar for dollar poses a more serious problem. Payment of $100,000 in administration expenses from future income should reduce the date-of-death value of assets left to a wife in trust not by $100,000, but by $100,000 discounted to reflect the fact that the $100,000 will be paid in the future, earning interest in the meantime. (Assuming a 10% interest rate and payment one year after death, the reduction in value would be about $91,000, not $100,000.) Nonetheless, the Commissioner's practice of reducing the marital deduction dollar for dollar might reflect the simplify- ing assumption that discount calculations do not make a suf- ficiently large difference sufficiently often to warrant the ad- ministrative burden of authorizing them. Or it might reflect 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 142 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Breyer, J., dissenting the fact that when administration expenses are taken as a deduction against the estate tax, their value is not dis- counted. Were the Commissioner to defend the dollar-for- dollar position in some such way, her approach might prove reasonable. And this Court will defer to longstanding inter- pretations of the Code and Treasury Regulations, see supra, at 138­139, that reasonably "implement the congressional mandate." United States v. Correll, 389 U. S. 299, 307 (1967); see National Muffler Dealers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 440 U. S. 472, 488 (1979). Regardless, I would not decide this matter now, for it has not been argued to us. Finally, although I agree with much that Justice O'Con- nor has written, I cannot agree that the amount at issue- almost $1.5 million of administration expenses deducted from income-is insignificant hence immaterial; and I can find no concession to that effect in the courts below. For these reasons and those set forth by Justice Scalia, I would reverse the Court of Appeals. 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 143 Syllabus YOUNG et al. v. HARPER certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit No. 95­1598. Argued December 9, 1996-Decided March 18, 1997 Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Supervision Program (preparole or Pro- gram) took effect whenever the state prisons became overcrowded and authorized the conditional release of prisoners before their sentences expired. The Pardon and Parole Board (Board) determined who could participate in it, and an inmate could be placed on preparole after serv- ing 15% of his sentence. An inmate was eligible for parole only after one-third of his sentence had elapsed, and the Governor, based on the Board's recommendation, decided to grant parole. Program partici- pants and parolees were released subject to similar constraints. Upon reviewing respondent's criminal record and prison conduct, the Board simultaneously recommended him for parole and released him under the Program. At that time, he had served 15 years of a life sentence. After he spent five apparently uneventful months outside the peniten- tiary, the Governor denied him parole, whereupon he was ordered to, and did, report back to prison. Despite his claim that his summary reincarceration deprived him of liberty without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, he was denied habeas relief by, succes- sively, the state trial court, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Federal District Court. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that preparole was sufficiently like parole that a Program participant was entitled to the procedural protections set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471. Held: The Program, as it existed when respondent was released, was equivalent to parole as understood in Morrissey. Morrissey's descrip- tion of the "nature of the interest of the parolee in his continued liberty" could just as easily have applied to respondent while he was on prepa- role. In compliance with state procedures, he was released from prison before the expiration of his sentence. See 408 U. S., at 477. He kept his own residence; he sought, obtained, and maintained a job; and he lived a life generally free of the incidents of imprisonment. See id., at 481­482. Although he was not permitted to use alcohol, to incur other than educational debt, or to travel outside the county without permis- sion, and he was required to report regularly to a parole officer, similar limits on a parolee's liberty did not in Morrissey render such liberty beyond procedural protection. Id., at 478. Some of the factors as- 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 144 YOUNG v. HARPER Opinion of the Court serted by petitioners to differentiate the Program from parole under Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215, 228-that preparole had the purpose of reducing prison overcrowding, and that a preparolee continued to serve his sentence and receive earned credits, remained within the cus- tody of the Department of Corrections, and was aware that he could have been transferred to a higher security level if the Governor denied parole-do not, in fact, appear to distinguish the two programs at all. Other differences identified by petitioners-that participation in the Program was ordered by the Board, while the Governor conferred pa- role; that escaped preparolees could be prosecuted as though they had escaped from prison, while escaped parolees were subject only to parole revocation, and that a preparolee could not leave Oklahoma under any circumstances, while a parolee could leave the State with his parole officer's permission-serve only to set preparole apart from the specific terms of parole as it existed in Oklahoma, but not from the more general class of parole identified in Morrissey. The Program appears to have differed from parole in name alone. Pp. 147­153. 64 F. 3d 563, affirmed. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Sandra D. Howard, Assistant Attorney General of Okla- homa, argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were W. A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General, and Jennifer B. Miller, Assistant Attorney General. Margaret Winter, by appointment of the Court, 518 U. S. 1015, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Marjorie Rifkin, Elizabeth Alexander, Micheal Salem, and Steven R. Shapiro.* Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the narrow question whether a program employed by the State of Oklahoma to reduce the overcrowd- *A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of Ne- vada et al. by Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, and Anne Cathcart, Senior Deputy Attorney General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Daniel E. Lungren of Cali- fornia, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, and Dennis C. Vacco of New York. 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 143 (1997) 145 Opinion of the Court ing of its prisons was sufficiently like parole that a person in the program was entitled to the procedural protections set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), before he could be removed from it. We hold that the program, as it appears to have been structured at the time respondent was placed on it, differed from parole in name alone, and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. I As pertinent to this case, Oklahoma operated two pro- grams under which inmates were conditionally released from prison before the expiration of their sentences. One was pa- role, the other was the Preparole Conditional Supervision Program (preparole or Program). The Program was in ef- fect whenever the population of the prison system exceeded 95% of its capacity. Okla. Stat., Tit. 57, § 365(A) (Supp. 1990). An inmate could be placed on preparole after serving 15% of his sentence, § 365(A)(2), and he was eligible for pa- role when one-third of his sentence had elapsed, § 332.7(A). The Pardon and Parole Board (Board) had a role in the place- ment of both parolees and preparolees. The Board itself de- termined who could participate in the Program, while the Governor, based on the Board's recommendation, decided whether a prisoner would be paroled. As we describe fur- ther in Part II, infra, participants in the Program were released subject to constraints similar to those imposed on parolees. In October 1990, after reviewing respondent Ernest Eu- gene Harper's criminal record and conduct while incar- cerated, the Pardon and Parole Board simultaneously rec- ommended him for parole and released him under the Program. At that time, respondent had served 15 years of a life sentence for two murders. Before his release, re- spondent underwent orientation, during which he reviewed the "Rules and Conditions of Pre-Parole Conditional Super- vision," see App. 7, and after which he executed a document 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 146 YOUNG v. HARPER Opinion of the Court indicating that he "underst[ood] that being classified to com- munity level depend[ed] upon [his] compliance with each of these expectations," id., at 6. He spent five apparently un- eventful months outside the penitentiary. Nonetheless, the Governor of Oklahoma denied respondent parole. On March 14, 1991, respondent was telephoned by his parole officer, informed of the Governor's decision, and told to report back to prison, which he did later that day. Respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in state court complaining that his summary return to prison had deprived him of liberty without due process. The state trial court denied relief and the Oklahoma Court of Crimi- nal Appeals affirmed. 852 P. 2d 164 (1993). The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that respondent's removal from the Program impinged only upon an interest in his "degree of confinement," an interest to which the procedural protec- tions set out in Morrissey did not attach. 852 P. 2d, at 165. The court found "[d]ispositive of the issue" the fact that re- spondent "was not granted parole by the Governor of Okla- homa." Ibid. The court noted that the Board had adopted a procedure under which preparolees subsequently denied parole remained on the Program, and had their cases re- viewed within 90 days of the denial for a determination whether they should continue on preparole. According to the court, "such a procedure gives an inmate sufficient notice when he is placed in the program that he may be removed from it when the governor exercises his discretion and de- clines to grant parole." Ibid. Respondent fared no better in District Court on his peti- tion for relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2254. But the Tenth Cir- cuit reversed. 64 F. 3d 563 (1995). It determined that pre- parole "more closely resembles parole or probation than even the more permissive forms of institutional confinement" and that "[d]ue process therefore mandates that program partici- pants receive at least the procedural protections described in Morrissey." Id., at 566­567. Petitioners sought certio- 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 143 (1997) 147 Opinion of the Court rari on the limited question whether preparole "is more simi- lar to parole or minimum security imprisonment; and, thus, whether continued participation in such program is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Pet. for Cert. i. We granted certiorari, 517 U. S. 1219 (1996), and, because we find that preparole as it existed at the time of respondent's release was equivalent to parole as under- stood in Morrissey, we affirm.1 II "The essence of parole is release from prison, before the completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of the sentence." Morrissey, 408 U. S., at 477. In Morrissey, we described the "nature of the interest of the parolee in his continued liberty": "[H]e can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring at- tachments of normal life. Though the State properly subjects him to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his condition is very different from that of con- finement in a prison. . . . The parolee has relied on at 1 Respondent contends that the petition for certiorari was filed out of time, and that we are thus without jurisdiction. We disagree. A timely filed petition for rehearing will toll the running of the 90-day period for filing a petition for certiorari until disposition of the rehearing petition. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U. S. 33, 46 (1990). The petition for certiorari was filed within 90 days of the denial of rehearing. Although the petition for rehearing was filed two days late, the Tenth Circuit granted petitioners "leave to file a late petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc," as it had authority to do. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 40(a). More- over, after granting petitioners leave to file the petition for rehearing, the Tenth Circuit treated it as timely and no mandate issued until after the petition was denied. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 41(a). In these circum- stances, we are satisfied that both the petition for rehearing and the subse- quent petition for certiorari were timely filed. 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 148 YOUNG v. HARPER Opinion of the Court least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions." Id., at 482. This passage could just as easily have applied to respondent while he was on preparole. In compliance with state proce- dures, he was released from prison before the expiration of his sentence. He kept his own residence; he sought, ob- tained, and maintained a job; and he lived a life generally free of the incidents of imprisonment. To be sure, respond- ent's liberty was not unlimited. He was not permitted to use alcohol, to incur other than educational debt, or to travel outside the county without permission. App. 7­8. And he was required to report regularly to a parole officer. Id., at 7. The liberty of a parolee is similarly limited, but that did not in Morrissey, 408 U. S., at 478, render such liberty be- yond procedural protection. Petitioners do not ask us to revisit Morrissey; they merely dispute that preparole falls within its compass. Our inquiry, they argue, should be controlled instead by Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976). There, we determined that the interest of a prisoner in avoiding an intrastate prison trans- fer was "too ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger proce- dural due process protections as long as prison officials have discretion to transfer him for whatever reason or for no rea- son at all." Id., at 228; see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U. S. 472, 487 (1995). Petitioners contend that reincarceration of a preparolee was nothing more than a "transfe[r] to a higher degree of confinement" or a "classification to a more super- vised prison environment," Brief for Petitioners 18, which, like transfers within the prison setting, involved no liberty interest. In support of their argument that preparole was merely a lower security classification and not parole, petitioners iden- tify several aspects of the Program said to render it different from parole. Some of these do not, in fact, appear to distin- guish the two programs. Others serve only to set preparole 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 143 (1997) 149 Opinion of the Court apart from the specific terms of parole as it existed in Okla- homa, but not from the more general class of parole identified in Morrissey. None of the differences-real or imagined- supports a view of the Program as having been anything other than parole as described in Morrissey. We first take up the phantom differences. We are told at the outset that the purposes of preparole and parole were different. Preparole was intended "to reduce prison over- crowding," while parole was designed "to help reintegrate the inmate into society." Reply Brief for Petitioners 10. This alleged difference is less than it seems. Parole could also be employed to reduce prison overcrowding, see Okla. Stat., Tit. 57, § 332.7(B) (Supp. 1990). And the Program's requirement that its participants work or attend school be- lies the notion that preparole was concerned only with mov- ing bodies outside of teeming prison yards. In fact, in their brief below, petitioners described the Program as one in which the Department of Corrections "places eligible in- mates into a community for the purpose of reintegration into society." Brief for Appellees in No. 95­5026 (CA10), p. 7, n. 2. We are also told that "an inmate on the Program continues to serve his sentence and receives earned credits . . . , whereas a parolee is not serving his sentence and, if parole is revoked, the parolee is not entitled to deduct from his sen- tence time spent on parole." Reply Brief for Petitioners 11. Our review of the statute in effect when respondent was re- leased, however, reveals that a parolee was "entitled to a deduction from his sentence for all time during which he has been or may be on parole" and that, even when parole was revoked, the Board had the discretion to credit time spent on parole against the sentence. Okla. Stat., Tit. 57, § 350 (Supp. 1990). Petitioners next argue that preparolees, unlike parolees, remained within the custody of the Department of Correc- tions. This is said to be evidenced by respondent's having 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 150 YOUNG v. HARPER Opinion of the Court had to report to his parole officer weekly and to provide the officer with a weekly itinerary. Reply Brief for Petitioners 13. We are at a loss to explain why respondent's regular visits to his parole officer rendered him more "in custody" than a parolee, who was required to make similar visits. See App. to Brief for Respondent 28a. Likewise, the provi- sion that preparolees "be subject to disciplinary proceedings as established by the Department of Corrections" in the event that they "violate any rule or condition during the pe- riod of community supervision," Okla. Stat., Tit. 57, § 365(E) (Supp. 1990), did not distinguish their "custodial" status from that of parolees, who were also subject to the department's custody in the event of a parole violation. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 13. Petitioners, for their final nonexistent distinction, argue that, because a preparolee "is aware that he may be trans- ferred to a higher security level if the Governor, through his discretionary power, denies parole," he does not enjoy the same liberty interest as a parolee. Brief for Petitioners 20. Preparole, contend petitioners, was thus akin to a furlough program, in which liberty was not conditioned on the partici- pant's behavior but on extrinsic events. By this reasoning, respondent would have lacked the "implicit promise" that his liberty would continue so long as he complied with the condi- tions of his release, Morrissey, 408 U. S., at 482. Respond- ent concedes the reasoning of petitioners' argument as it relates to furloughs, but challenges the premise that his par- ticipation in the Program was conditioned on the Governor's decision regarding parole. In support of their assertion that a preparolee knew that a denial of parole could result in reincarceration, petitioners rely-as they have throughout this litigation-on a proce- dure promulgated in August 1991, nearly five months after respondent was returned to prison. See Pardon and Parole Board Procedure No. 004­011 (1991), App. to Pet. for Cert. 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 143 (1997) 151 Opinion of the Court 56a.2 The Court of Criminal Appeals also relied on this pro- vision, but because it was not in effect when respondent was released, it has little relevance to this case. Nor have we been presented with any other evidence to substantiate this asserted limitation on respondent's release. The closest petitioners come is to direct us to the orientation form reviewed with respondent upon his release. Item 9 of that orientation form says: "Reviewed options available in the event of parole denial." App. 5. Mindful of Procedure No. 004­011, as amended after respondent was reincarcer- ated, it is possible to read this item as indicating that re- spondent was told his participation in the Program could be terminated if parole were denied. But the mere possibility of respondent's having been so informed is insufficient to overcome his showing of the facially complete, written "Rules and Conditions of Pre-Parole Conditional Super- vision," App. 7­9, which said nothing about the effect of a parole denial. Counsel for the State also claims that at the time respond- ent was participating in the Program, preparolees were al- ways reincarcerated if the Governor denied them parole. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. In the absence of evidence to this ef- fect-and the State points to none-this assertion is insuffi- cient to rebut the seemingly complete rules and conditions of respondent's release. On the record before us, therefore, the premise of petitioners' argument-that respondent's con- tinued participation was conditioned on extrinsic events-is illusory, and the analogy to furlough inapposite.3 2 The version of Procedure No. 004­011 in effect when respondent was placed on the Program was silent as to a parole denial's effect. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a­52a. The procedure was amended again in 1994, and now provides that "[i]nmates denied parole by the Governor while on [preparole] will remain on the program, unless returned to higher security by due process." App. to Brief for Respondent 38a. 3 Equally illusory is the argument, which petitioners made for the first time in this Court, that the Board had authority to reimprison a prepa- rolee for any reason or for no reason. The written rules and conditions 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 152 YOUNG v. HARPER Opinion of the Court Petitioners do identify some actual differences between preparole and Oklahoma's version of parole, but these do no better at convincing us that preparole was different from parole as we understood it in Morrissey. As petitioners point out, participation in the Program was ordered by the Board, while the Governor conferred parole. In this regard, preparole was different from parole in Oklahoma; but it was no different from parole as we described it in Morrissey. See 408 U. S., at 477­478. In addition, preparolees who "es- cape[d]" from the Program could be prosecuted as though they had escaped from prison, see Okla. Stat., Tit. 57, § 365(F) (Supp. 1990), while it appears that parolees who "es- caped" from parole were subject not to further prosecution, but to revocation of parole, see Reply Brief for Petitioners 11. That the punishment for failure to abide by one of the conditions of his liberty was potentially greater for a prepa- rolee than for a parolee did not itself diminish that liberty. Petitioners also note that a preparolee could not leave Okla- homa under any circumstances, App. 7, while a parolee could leave Oklahoma with his parole officer's permission, App. to Brief for Respondent 27a. This minor difference in a re- leased prisoner's ability to travel did not, we think, alter the fundamentally parole-like nature of the Program.4 III We conclude that the Program, as it existed when respond- ent was released, was a kind of parole as we understood pa- of respondent's release identify no such absolute discretion, and petitioners point to nothing to support their contention. 4 A comparison of the conditions of preparole of which respondent was informed, App. 7­9, and those of which a roughly contemporary parolee would have been informed, App. to Brief for Respondent 27a­30a, reveals that-except for the travel and "escape" provisions-the two sets of condi- tions were essentially identical. 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 143 (1997) 153 Opinion of the Court role in Morrissey.5 The judgment of the Tenth Circuit is therefore affirmed. It is so ordered. 5 The Program appears to be different now. We have no occasion to pass on whether the State's amendments to the Program, adopted since respondent was reincarcerated, render the liberty interest of a present- day preparolee different in kind from that of a parolee. 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 154 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus BENNETT et al. v. SPEAR et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­813. Argued November 13, 1996-Decided March 19, 1997 The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) requires the Secretary of the Interior to specify animal species that are "threatened" or "endangered" and designate their "critical habitat," 16 U. S. C. § 1533, and requires federal agencies to ensure that any action they authorize, fund, or carry out is not likely to jeopardize a listed species or adversely modify its critical habitat, § 1536(a)(2). If an agency determines that a proposed action may adversely affect such a species, it must formally consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service, which must provide it with a written statement (the Biological Opinion) explaining how the proposed action will affect the species or its habitat. § 1536(b)(3)(A). If the Service concludes that such action will result in jeopardy or adverse habitat modification, § 1536(a)(2), the Biological Opinion must outline any "rea- sonable and prudent alternatives" that the Service believes will avoid that consequence, § 1536(b)(3)(A). If the Biological Opinion concludes that no jeopardy or adverse habitat modification will result, or if it offers reasonable and prudent alternatives, the Service must issue a written statement (known as the Incidental Take Statement) specifying the terms and conditions under which an agency may take the species. § 1536(b)(4). After the Bureau of Reclamation notified the Service that the operation of the Klamath Irrigation Project might affect two endan- gered species of fish, the Service issued a Biological Opinion, concluding that the proposed long-term operation of the project was likely to jeop- ardize the species and identifying as a reasonable and prudent alterna- tive the maintenance of minimum water levels on certain reservoirs. The Bureau notified the Service that it would operate the project in compliance with the Biological Opinion. Petitioners, irrigation districts receiving project water and operators of ranches in those districts, filed this action against respondents, the Service's director and regional di- rectors and the Secretary, claiming that the jeopardy determination and imposition of minimum water levels violated § 1536, and constituted an implicit critical habitat determination for the species in violation of § 1533(b)(2)'s requirement that the designation's economic impact be con- sidered. They also claimed that the actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which prohibits agency actions that are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 155 Syllabus law. 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). The District Court dismissed the com- plaint, concluding that petitioners lacked standing because they asserted "recreational, aesthetic, and commercial interests" that did not fall within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the ESA. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the "zone of interests" test- which requires that a plaintiff's grievance arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision or consti- tutional guarantee invoked in the suit-limits the class of persons who may obtain judicial review not only under the APA, but also under the ESA's citizen-suit provision, 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g); and that only plaintiffs alleging an interest in the preservation of endangered species fall within the zone of interests protected by the ESA. Held: Petitioners have standing to seek judicial review of the Biological Opinion. Pp. 161­179. (a) The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that petitioners lacked standing under the zone-of-interests test to bring their claims under the ESA's citizen-suit provision. The test is a prudential standing require- ment of general application, see, e. g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751, that applies unless expressly negated by Congress. By providing that "any person may commence a civil suit," § 1540(g)(1) negates the test. The quoted phrase is an authorization of remarkable breadth when compared with the language Congress ordinarily uses. The Court's readiness to take the term "any person" at face value is greatly aug- mented by the interrelated considerations that the legislation's overall subject matter is the environment and that § 1540(g)'s obvious purpose is to encourage enforcement by so-called "private attorneys general." See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205, 210­211. The "any person" formulation applies to all § 1540(g) causes of action, including actions against the Secretary asserting overenforcement of § 1533; there is no textual basis for saying that the formulation's expansion of standing requirements applies to environmentalists alone. Pp. 161­166. (b) Three alternative grounds advanced by the Government-(1) that petitioners fail to meet Article III standing requirements; (2) that § 1540(g) does not authorize judicial review of the types of claims peti- tioners advanced; and (3) that judicial review is unavailable under the APA-do not support affirmance. Petitioners' complaint alleges an in- jury in fact that is fairly traceable to the Biological Opinion and redress- able by a favorable judicial ruling and, thus, meets Article III standing requirements at this stage of the litigation. Their § 1533 claim is clearly reviewable under § 1540(g)(1)(C), which authorizes suit against the Sec- retary for an alleged failure to perform any nondiscretionary act or duty 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 156 BENNETT v. SPEAR Syllabus under § 1533. Their § 1536 claims are obviously not reviewable under subsection (C), however. Nor are they reviewable under subsection (A), which authorizes injunctive actions against any person "who is al- leged to be in violation" of the ESA or its regulations. Viewed in the context of the entire statute, subsection (A)'s reference to any ESA "violation" cannot be interpreted to include the Secretary's maladminis- tration of the Act. The § 1536 claims are nonetheless reviewable under the APA. The ESA does not preclude such review, and the claim that petitioners will suffer economic harm because of an erroneous jeopardy determination is plainly within the zone of interests protected by § 1536, the statutory provision whose violation forms the basis for the com- plaint, see Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871. In addition, the Biological Opinion constitutes final agency action for APA purposes. It marks the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process, Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 113. It is also an action from which "legal consequences will flow," Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U. S. 62, 71, because the Biological Opinion and ac- companying Incidental Take Statement alter the legal regime to which the Bureau is subject, authorizing it to take the endangered species if (but only if) it complies with the prescribed conditions. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788, and Dalton v. Specter, 511 U. S. 462, distin- guished. Pp. 166­179. 63 F. 3d 915, reversed and remanded. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Gregory K. Wilkinson argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was William F. Schroeder. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Malcolm L. Stewart, Anne S. Almy, Robert L. Klarquist, and Evelyn S. Ying.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Cali- fornia et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Rod- erick E. Walston, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles W. Getz IV, Assistant Attorney General, and Linus Masouredis, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Margery S. Bronster of 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 157 Opinion of the Court Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a challenge to a biological opinion issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service in accordance with the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 87 Stat. 884, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 1531 et seq., concerning the operation of the Kla- math Irrigation Project by the Bureau of Reclamation, and the project's impact on two varieties of endangered fish. The question for decision is whether the petitioners, who have competing economic and other interests in Klamath Project water, have standing to seek judicial review of the biological opinion under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA, § 1540(g)(1), and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 80 Stat. 392, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 701 et seq. I The ESA requires the Secretary of the Interior to promul- gate regulations listing those species of animals that are "threatened" or "endangered" under specified criteria, and Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Jeremiah W. Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Ne- braska, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, Jan Graham of Utah, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; for the State of Texas by Dan Morales, Attorney General, Jorge Vega, First Assistant Attorney General, and Ja- vier P. Guajardo and Sam Goodhope, Special Assistant Attorneys Gen- eral; for the American Farm Bureau Federation et al. by Timothy S. Bishop, Michael F. Rosenblum, John J. Rademacher, Richard L. Krause, and Nancy N. McDonough; for the American Forest & Paper Association et al. by Steven P. Quarles, Clifton S. Elgarten, Thomas R. Lundquist, and William R. Murray; for the American Homeowners Foundation et al. by Nancie G. Marzulla; for the Association of California Water Agencies et al. by Thomas W. Birmingham, Clifford W. Schulz, Janet K. Goldsmith, and William T. Chisum; for the National Association of Home Builders of the United States et al. by Glen Franklin Koontz, Thomas C. Jackson, and Nick Cammarota; for the Nationwide Public Projects Coalition et al. by Lawrence R. Liebesman and Kenneth S. Kamlet; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by Robin L. Rivett and M. Reed Hopper; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, and Craig S. Harrison. 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 158 BENNETT v. SPEAR Opinion of the Court to designate their "critical habitat." 16 U. S. C. § 1533. The ESA further requires each federal agency to "insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary . . . to be criti- cal." § 1536(a)(2). If an agency determines that action it proposes to take may adversely affect a listed species, it must engage in formal consultation with the Fish and Wild- life Service, as delegate of the Secretary, ibid.; 50 CFR § 402.14 (1995), after which the Service must provide the agency with a written statement (the Biological Opinion) ex- plaining how the proposed action will affect the species or its habitat, 16 U. S. C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). If the Service con- cludes that the proposed action will "jeopardize the contin- ued existence of any [listed] species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical habitat]," § 1536(a)(2), the Biological Opinion must outline any "reasonable and prudent alternatives" that the Service believes will avoid that consequence, § 1536(b)(3)(A). Addi- tionally, if the Biological Opinion concludes that the agency action will not result in jeopardy or adverse habitat modifi- cation, or if it offers reasonable and prudent alternatives to avoid that consequence, the Service must provide the agency with a written statement (known as the Incidental Take Statement) specifying the "impact of such incidental taking on the species," any "reasonable and prudent measures that the [Service] considers necessary or appropriate to minimize such impact," and setting forth "the terms and conditions . . . that must be complied with by the Federal agency . . . to implement [those measures]." § 1536(b)(4). The Klamath Project, one of the oldest federal reclamation schemes, is a series of lakes, rivers, dams, and irrigation canals in northern California and southern Oregon. The project was undertaken by the Secretary of the Interior 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 159 Opinion of the Court pursuant to the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 388, as amended, 43 U. S. C. § 371 et seq., and the Act of Feb. 9, 1905, 33 Stat. 714, and is administered by the Bureau of Reclama- tion, which is under the Secretary's jurisdiction. In 1992, the Bureau notified the Service that operation of the project might affect the Lost River Sucker (Deltistes luxatus) and Shortnose Sucker (Chasmistes brevirostris), species of fish that were listed as endangered in 1988, see 53 Fed. Reg. 27130­27133 (1988). After formal consultation with the Bu- reau in accordance with 50 CFR § 402.14 (1995), the Service issued a Biological Opinion which concluded that the " `long- term operation of the Klamath Project was likely to jeopar- dize the continued existence of the Lost River and shortnose suckers.' " App. to Pet. for Cert. 3. The Biological Opinion identified "reasonable and prudent alternatives" the Service believed would avoid jeopardy, which included the mainte- nance of minimum water levels on Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs. The Bureau later notified the Service that it intended to operate the project in compliance with the Bio- logical Opinion. Petitioners, two Oregon irrigation districts that receive Klamath Project water and the operators of two ranches within those districts, filed the present action against the director and regional director of the Service and the Secre- tary of the Interior. Neither the Bureau nor any of its offi- cials is named as defendant. The complaint asserts that the Bureau "has been following essentially the same procedures for storing and releasing water from Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs throughout the twentieth century," id., at 36; that "[t]here is no scientifically or commercially available evidence indicating that the populations of endangered suckers in Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs have declined, are declin- ing, or will decline as a result" of the Bureau's operation of the Klamath Project, id., at 37; that "[t]here is no commer- cially or scientifically available evidence indicating that the restrictions on lake levels imposed in the Biological Opinion 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 160 BENNETT v. SPEAR Opinion of the Court will have any beneficial effect on the . . . populations of suck- ers in Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs," id., at 39; and that the Bureau nonetheless "will abide by the restrictions im- posed by the Biological Opinion," id., at 32. Petitioners' complaint included three claims for relief that are relevant here. The first and second claims allege that the Service's jeopardy determination with respect to Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs, and the ensuing imposition of minimum water levels, violated § 7 of the ESA, 16 U. S. C. § 1536. The third claim is that the imposition of minimum water elevations constituted an implicit determination of critical habitat for the suckers, which violated § 4 of the ESA, 16 U. S. C. § 1533(b)(2), because it failed to take into consideration the designation's economic impact.1 Each of the claims also states that the relevant action violated the APA's prohibition of agency action that is "arbitrary, capri- cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). The complaint asserts that petitioners' use of the reser- voirs and related waterways for "recreational, aesthetic and commercial purposes, as well as for their primary sources of irrigation water," will be "irreparably damaged" by the ac- tions complained of, App. to Pet. for Cert. 34, and that the restrictions on water delivery "recommended" by the Biolog- ical Opinion "adversely affect plaintiffs by substantially re- ducing the quantity of available irrigation water," id., at 40. In essence, petitioners claim a competing interest in the water the Biological Opinion declares necessary for the pres- ervation of the suckers. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It concluded that petitioners did not have 1 Petitioners also raised a fourth claim: that the de facto designation of critical habitat violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 853, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 4332(2)(C), because it was not preceded by preparation of an environmental assessment. The Court of Appeals' dismissal of that claim has not been challenged. 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 161 Opinion of the Court standing because their "recreational, aesthetic, and commer- cial interests . . . do not fall within the zone of interests sought to be protected by ESA." Id., at 28. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F. 3d 915 (1995). It held that the "zone of interests" test limits the class of persons who may obtain judicial review not only under the APA, but also under the citizen-suit provi- sion of the ESA, 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g), and that "only plaintiffs who allege an interest in the preservation of endangered species fall within the zone of interests protected by the ESA," 63 F. 3d, at 919 (emphasis in original). We granted certiorari. 517 U. S. 1102 (1996). In this Court, petitioners raise two questions: first, whether the prudential standing rule known as the "zone of interests" test applies to claims brought under the citizen- suit provision of the ESA; and second, if so, whether petition- ers have standing under that test notwithstanding that the interests they seek to vindicate are economic rather than environmental. In this Court, the Government has made no effort to defend the reasoning of the Court of Appeals. In- stead, it advances three alternative grounds for affirmance: (1) that petitioners fail to meet the standing requirements imposed by Article III of the Constitution; (2) that the ESA's citizen-suit provision does not authorize judicial review of the types of claims advanced by petitioners; and (3) that judi- cial review is unavailable under the APA because the Biolog- ical Opinion does not constitute final agency action. II We first turn to the question the Court of Appeals found dispositive: whether petitioners lack standing by virtue of the zone-of-interests test. Although petitioners contend that their claims lie both under the ESA and the APA, we look first at the ESA because it may permit petitioners to recover their litigation costs, see 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g)(4), and because the APA by its terms independently authorizes re- 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 162 BENNETT v. SPEAR Opinion of the Court view only when "there is no other adequate remedy in a court," 5 U. S. C. § 704. The question of standing "involves both constitutional lim- itations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limita- tions on its exercise." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975) (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953)). To satisfy the "case" or "controversy" requirement of Article III, which is the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing, a plaintiff must, generally speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered "injury in fact," that the injury is "fairly traceable" to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560­561 (1992); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separa- tion of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 471­472 (1982). In addition to the immutable requirements of Article III, "the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of standing." Id., at 474­475. Like their constitutional counterparts, these "ju- dicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdic- tion," Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984), are "founded in concern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society," Warth, supra, at 498; but unlike their constitutional counterparts, they can be modified or abrogated by Congress, see 422 U. S., at 501. Numbered among these prudential requirements is the doctrine of par- ticular concern in this case: that a plaintiff's grievance must arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or regu- lated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee invoked in the suit. See Allen, supra, at 751; Valley Forge, supra, at 474­475. The "zone of interests" formulation was first employed in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970). There, certain data proces- sors sought to invalidate a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency authorizing national banks to sell data processing 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 163 Opinion of the Court services on the ground that it violated, inter alia, § 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 1132, which prohibited bank service corporations from engaging in "any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks." The Court of Appeals had held that the banks' data-processing competitors were without standing to chal- lenge the alleged violation of § 4. In reversing, we stated the applicable prudential standing requirement to be "whether the interest sought to be protected by the com- plainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be pro- tected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guar- antee in question." Data Processing, supra, at 153. Data Processing, and its companion case, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U. S. 159 (1970), applied the zone-of-interests test to suits under the APA, but later cases have applied it also in suits not involving review of federal administrative action, see Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U. S. 439, 449 (1991); Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U. S. 318, 320­321, n. 3 (1977); see also Note, A Defense of the "Zone of Interests" Standing Test, 1983 Duke L. J. 447, 455­456, and nn. 40­49 (1983) (cataloging lower court decisions), and have specifi- cally listed it among other prudential standing requirements of general application, see, e. g., Allen, supra, at 751; Valley Forge, supra, at 474­475. We have made clear, however, that the breadth of the zone of interests varies according to the provisions of law at issue, so that what comes within the zone of interests of a statute for purposes of obtaining judicial review of administrative action under the " `generous review provisions' " of the APA may not do so for other pur- poses, Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388, 400, n. 16 (1987) (quoting Data Processing, supra, at 156). Congress legislates against the background of our pruden- tial standing doctrine, which applies unless it is expressly negated. See Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 345­348 (1984). Cf. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519, 532­533, and n. 28 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 164 BENNETT v. SPEAR Opinion of the Court (1983). The first question in the present case is whether the ESA's citizen-suit provision, set forth in pertinent part in the margin,2 negates the zone-of-interests test (or, perhaps more accurately, expands the zone of interests). We think it does. The first operative portion of the provision says that "any person may commence a civil suit"-an authorization of re- markable breadth when compared with the language Con- 2 "(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf- "(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority thereof; or . . . . . "(C) against the Secretary where there is alleged a failure of the Secre- tary to perform any act or duty under section 1533 of this title which is not discretionary with the Secretary. "The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce any such provi- sion or regulation, or to order the Secretary to perform such act or duty, as the case may be. . . . "(2)(A) No action may be commenced under subparagraph (1)(A) of this section- "(i) prior to sixty days after written notice of the violation has been given to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of any such provision or regulation; "(ii) if the Secretary has commenced action to impose a penalty pursu- ant to subsection (a) of this section; or "(iii) if the United States has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a criminal action . . . to redress a violation of any such provision or regulation. . . . . . "(3)(B) In any such suit under this subsection in which the United States is not a party, the Attorney General, at the request of the Secre- tary, may intervene on behalf of the United States as a matter of right. "(4) The court, in issuing any final order in any suit brought pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate." 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g). 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 165 Opinion of the Court gress ordinarily uses. Even in some other environmental statutes, Congress has used more restrictive formulations, such as "[any person] having an interest which is or may be adversely affected," 33 U. S. C. § 1365(g) (Clean Water Act); see also 30 U. S. C. § 1270(a) (Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act) (same); "[a]ny person suffering legal wrong," 15 U. S. C. § 797(b)(5) (Energy Supply and Environ- mental Coordination Act); or "any person having a valid legal interest which is or may be adversely affected . . . whenever such action constitutes a case or controversy," 42 U. S. C. § 9124(a) (Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act). And in contexts other than the environment, Congress has often been even more restrictive. In statutes concerning unfair trade practices and other commercial matters, for example, it has authorized suit only by "[a]ny person injured in his business or property," 7 U. S. C. § 2305(c); see also 15 U. S. C. § 72 (same), or only by "competitors, customers, or subse- quent purchasers," § 298(b). Our readiness to take the term "any person" at face value is greatly augmented by two interrelated considerations: that the overall subject matter of this legislation is the envi- ronment (a matter in which it is common to think all persons have an interest) and that the obvious purpose of the par- ticular provision in question is to encourage enforcement by so-called "private attorneys general"-evidenced by its elim- ination of the usual amount-in-controversy and diversity-of- citizenship requirements, its provision for recovery of the costs of litigation (including even expert witness fees), and its reservation to the Government of a right of first refusal to pursue the action initially and a right to intervene later. Given these factors, we think the conclusion of expanded standing follows a fortiori from our decision in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205 (1972), which held that standing was expanded to the full extent permitted under Article III by § 810(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 85, 42 U. S. C. § 3610(a) (1986 ed.), that authorized 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 166 BENNETT v. SPEAR Opinion of the Court "[a]ny person who claims to have been injured by a discrimi- natory housing practice" to sue for violations of the Act. There also we relied on textual evidence of a statutory scheme to rely on private litigation to ensure compliance with the Act. See 409 U. S., at 210­211. The statutory lan- guage here is even clearer, and the subject of the legislation makes the intent to permit enforcement by everyman even more plausible. It is true that the plaintiffs here are seeking to prevent application of environmental restrictions rather than to im- plement them. But the "any person" formulation applies to all the causes of action authorized by § 1540(g)-not only to actions against private violators of environmental restric- tions, and not only to actions against the Secretary asserting underenforcment under § 1533, but also to actions against the Secretary asserting overenforcement under § 1533. As we shall discuss below, the citizen-suit provision does favor envi- ronmentalists in that it covers all private violations of the ESA but not all failures of the Secretary to meet his admin- istrative responsibilities; but there is no textual basis for saying that its expansion of standing requirements applies to environmentalists alone. The Court of Appeals therefore erred in concluding that petitioners lacked standing under the zone-of-interests test to bring their claims under the ESA's citizen-suit provision. III The Government advances several alternative grounds upon which it contends we may affirm the dismissal of peti- tioners' suit. Because the District Court and the Court of Appeals found the zone-of-interests ground to be dispositive, these alternative grounds were not reached below. A re- spondent is entitled, however, to defend the judgment on any ground supported by the record, see Ponte v. Real, 471 U. S. 491, 500 (1985); Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U. S. 367, 379, n. 5 (1996). The asserted grounds were 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 167 Opinion of the Court raised below, and have been fully briefed and argued here; we deem it an appropriate exercise of our discretion to con- sider them now rather than leave them for disposition on remand. A The Government's first contention is that petitioners' com- plaint fails to satisfy the standing requirements imposed by the "case" or "controversy" provision of Article III. This "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing requires: (1) that the plaintiff have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is (a) con- crete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not con- jectural or hypothetical; (2) that there be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the in- jury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court; and (3) that it be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Defenders of Wild- life, 504 U. S., at 560­561. Petitioners allege, among other things, that they currently receive irrigation water from Clear Lake, that the Bureau "will abide by the restrictions imposed by the Biological Opinion," App. to Pet. for Cert. 32, and that "[t]he restric- tions on lake levels imposed in the Biological Opinion ad- versely affect [petitioners] by substantially reducing the quantity of available irrigation water," id., at 40. The Gov- ernment contends, first, that these allegations fail to satisfy the "injury in fact" element of Article III standing because they demonstrate only a diminution in the aggregate amount of available water, and do not necessarily establish (absent information concerning the Bureau's water allocation prac- tices) that petitioners will receive less water. This conten- tion overlooks, however, the proposition that each element of Article III standing "must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 168 BENNETT v. SPEAR Opinion of the Court of proof, i. e., with the manner and degree of evidence re- quired at the successive stages of the litigation." Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 561. Thus, while a plaintiff must "set forth" by affidavit or other evidence "specific facts" to sur- vive a motion for summary judgment, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), and must ultimately support any contested facts with evidence adduced at trial, "[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we `presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.' " Defenders of Wild- life, supra, at 561 (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed- eration, 497 U. S. 871, 889 (1990)). Given petitioners' allega- tion that the amount of available water will be reduced and that they will be adversely affected thereby, it is easy to presume specific facts under which petitioners will be in- jured-for example, the Bureau's distribution of the reduc- tion pro rata among its customers. The complaint alleges the requisite injury in fact. The Government also contests compliance with the second and third Article III standing requirements, contending that any injury suffered by petitioners is neither "fairly trace- able" to the Service's Biological Opinion, nor "redressable" by a favorable judicial ruling, because the "action agency" (the Bureau) retains ultimate responsibility for determining whether and how a proposed action shall go forward. See 50 CFR § 402.15(a) (1995) ("Following the issuance of a bio- logical opinion, the Federal agency shall determine whether and in what manner to proceed with the action in light of its section 7 obligations and the Service's biological opinion"). "If petitioners have suffered injury," the Government con- tends, "the proximate cause of their harm is an (as yet un- identified) decision by the Bureau regarding the volume of water allocated to petitioners, not the biological opinion itself." Brief for Respondents 22. This wrongly equates injury "fairly traceable" to the defendant with injury as to 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 169 Opinion of the Court which the defendant's actions are the very last step in the chain of causation. While, as we have said, it does not suf- fice if the injury complained of is " `th[e] result [of] the inde- pendent action of some third party not before the court,' " Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 560­561 (emphasis added) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41­42 (1976)), that does not exclude injury produced by determinative or coercive effect upon the action of someone else. By the Government's own account, while the Service's Bio- logical Opinion theoretically serves an "advisory function," 51 Fed. Reg. 19928 (1986), in reality it has a powerful coer- cive effect on the action agency: "The statutory scheme . . . presupposes that the biologi- cal opinion will play a central role in the action agency's decisionmaking process, and that it will typically be based on an administrative record that is fully adequate for the action agency's decision insofar as ESA issues are concerned. . . . [A] federal agency that chooses to deviate from the recommendations contained in a biolog- ical opinion bears the burden of `articulat[ing] in its ad- ministrative record its reasons for disagreeing with the conclusions of a biological opinion.' 51 Fed. Reg. 19,956 (1986). In the government's experience, action agencies very rarely choose to engage in conduct that the Service has concluded is likely to jeopardize the continued exist- ence of a listed species." Brief for Respondents 20­21. What this concession omits to say, moreover, is that the ac- tion agency must not only articulate its reasons for disagree- ment (which ordinarily requires species and habitat investi- gations that are not within the action agency's expertise), but that it runs a substantial risk if its (inexpert) reasons turn out to be wrong. A Biological Opinion of the sort ren- dered here alters the legal regime to which the action agency is subject. When it "offers reasonable and prudent alterna- 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 170 BENNETT v. SPEAR Opinion of the Court tives" to the proposed action, a Biological Opinion must in- clude a so-called "Incidental Take Statement"-a written statement specifying, among other things, those "measures that the [Service] considers necessary or appropriate to mini- mize [the action's impact on the affected species]" and the "terms and conditions . . . that must be complied with by the Federal agency . . . to implement [such] measures." 16 U. S. C. § 1536(b)(4). Any taking that is in compliance with these terms and conditions "shall not be considered to be a prohibited taking of the species concerned." § 1536(o)(2). Thus, the Biological Opinion's Incidental Take Statement constitutes a permit authorizing the action agency to "take" the endangered or threatened species so long as it respects the Service's "terms and conditions." The action agency is technically free to disregard the Biological Opinion and pro- ceed with its proposed action, but it does so at its own peril (and that of its employees), for "any person" who knowingly "takes" an endangered or threatened species is subject to substantial civil and criminal penalties, including imprison- ment. See §§ 1540(a) and (b) (authorizing civil fines of up to $25,000 per violation and criminal penalties of up to $50,000 and imprisonment for one year); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687, 708 (1995) (upholding interpretation of the term "take" to include significant habitat degradation). The Service itself is, to put it mildly, keenly aware of the virtually determinative effect of its biological opinions. The Incidental Take Statement at issue in the present case be- gins by instructing the reader that any taking of a listed species is prohibited unless "such taking is in compliance with this incidental take statement," and warning that "[t]he measures described below are nondiscretionary, and must be taken by [the Bureau]." App. 92­93. Given all of this, and given petitioners' allegation that the Bureau had, until issu- ance of the Biological Opinion, operated the Klamath Project in the same manner throughout the 20th century, it is not 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 171 Opinion of the Court difficult to conclude that petitioners have met their burden- which is relatively modest at this stage of the litigation-of alleging that their injury is "fairly traceable" to the Service's Biological Opinion and that it will "likely" be redressed- i. e., the Bureau will not impose such water level restric- tions-if the Biological Opinion is set aside. B Next, the Government contends that the ESA's citizen-suit provision does not authorize judicial review of petitioners' claims. The relevant portions of that provision provide that "any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf- "(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority thereof; or . . . . . "(C) against the Secretary [of Commerce or the Inte- rior] where there is alleged a failure of the Secretary to perform any act or duty under section 1533 of this title which is not discretionary with the Secretary." 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g)(1). The Government argues that judicial review is not available under subsection (A) because the Secretary is not "in viola- tion" of the ESA, and under subsection (C) because the Sec- retary has not failed to perform any nondiscretionary duty under § 1533. 1 Turning first to subsection (C): that it covers only viola- tions of § 1533 is clear and unambiguous. Petitioners' first and second claims, which assert that the Secretary has vio- lated § 1536, are obviously not reviewable under this provi- sion. However, as described above, the third claim alleges 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 172 BENNETT v. SPEAR Opinion of the Court that the Biological Opinion implicitly determines critical habitat without complying with the mandate of § 1533(b)(2) that the Secretary "tak[e] into consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat." This claim does come within subsection (C). The Government seeks to avoid this result by appealing to the limitation in subsection (C) that the duty sought to be enforced not be "discretionary with the Secretary." But the terms of § 1533(b)(2) are plainly those of obligation rather than discretion: "The Secretary shall designate critical habi- tat, and make revisions thereto, . . . on the basis of the best scientific data available and after taking into consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of speci- fying any particular area as critical habitat." (Emphasis added.) It is true that this is followed by the statement that, except where extinction of the species is at issue, "[t]he Secretary may exclude any area from critical habitat if he determines that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area as part of the critical habi- tat." Ibid. (emphasis added). However, the fact that the Secretary's ultimate decision is reviewable only for abuse of discretion does not alter the categorical requirement that, in arriving at his decision, he "tak[e] into consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant impact," and use "the best scientific data available." Ibid. It is rudimen- tary administrative law that discretion as to the substance of the ultimate decision does not confer discretion to ig- nore the required procedures of decisionmaking. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 94­95 (1943). Since it is the omission of these required procedures that petition- ers complain of, their § 1533 claim is reviewable under § 1540(g)(1)(C). 2 Having concluded that petitioners' § 1536 claims are not reviewable under subsection (C), we are left with the ques- 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 173 Opinion of the Court tion whether they are reviewable under subsection (A), which authorizes injunctive actions against any person "who is alleged to be in violation" of the ESA or its implementing regulations. The Government contends that the Secretary's conduct in implementing or enforcing the ESA is not a "vio- lation" of the ESA within the meaning of this provision. In its view, § 1540(g)(1)(A) is a means by which private parties may enforce the substantive provisions of the ESA against regulated parties-both private entities and Government agencies-but is not an alternative avenue for judicial review of the Secretary's implementation of the statute. We agree. The opposite contention is simply incompatible with the existence of § 1540(g)(1)(C), which expressly authorizes suit against the Secretary, but only to compel him to perform a nondiscretionary duty under § 1533. That provision would be superfluous-and, worse still, its careful limitation to § 1533 would be nullified-if § 1540(g)(1)(A) permitted suit against the Secretary for any "violation" of the ESA. It is the " `cardinal principle of statutory construction' . . . [that] [i]t is our duty `to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute' . . . rather than to emasculate an entire section." United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538 (1955) (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 30 (1937), and Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152 (1883)). Application of that principle here clearly re- quires us to conclude that the term "violation" does not in- clude the Secretary's failure to perform his duties as admin- istrator of the ESA. Moreover, the ESA uses the term "violation" elsewhere in contexts in which it is most unlikely to refer to failure by the Secretary or other federal officers and employees to perform their duties in administering the ESA. Section 1540(a), for example, authorizes the Secretary to impose substantial civil penalties on "[a]ny person who knowingly violates . . . any provision of [the ESA]," and entrusts the Secretary with the power to "remi[t] or mitigat[e]" any such penalty. We know 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 174 BENNETT v. SPEAR Opinion of the Court of no precedent for applying such a provision against those who administer (as opposed to those who are regulated by) a substantive law. Nor do we think it likely that the statute meant to subject the Secretary and his officers and employ- ees to criminal liability under § 1540(b), which makes it a crime for "[a]ny person [to] knowingly violat[e] any provision of [the ESA]," or that § 1540(e)(3), which authorizes law en- forcement personnel to "make arrests without a warrant for any violation of [the ESA]," was intended to authorize war- rantless arrest of the Secretary or his delegates for "know- ingly" failing to use the best scientific data available. Finally, interpreting the term "violation" to include any errors on the part of the Secretary in administering the ESA would effect a wholesale abrogation of the APA's "final agency action" requirement. Any procedural default, even one that had not yet resulted in a final disposition of the matter at issue, would form the basis for a lawsuit. We are loathe to produce such an extraordinary regime without the clearest of statutory direction, which is hardly present here. Viewed in the context of the entire statute, § 1540(g) (1)(A)'s reference to any "violation" of the ESA cannot be interpreted to include the Secretary's maladministration of the ESA. Petitioners' claims are not subject to judicial re- view under § 1540(g)(1)(A). IV The foregoing analysis establishes that the principal stat- ute invoked by petitioners, the ESA, does authorize review of their § 1533 claim, but does not support their claims based upon the Secretary's alleged failure to comply with § 1536. To complete our task, we must therefore inquire whether these § 1536 claims may nonetheless be brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, which authorizes a court to "set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other- wise not in accordance with law," 5 U. S. C. § 706. 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 175 Opinion of the Court A No one contends (and it would not be maintainable) that the causes of action against the Secretary set forth in the ESA's citizen-suit provision are exclusive, supplanting those provided by the APA. The APA, by its terms, provides a right to judicial review of all "final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court," § 704, and applies universally "except to the extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law," § 701(a). Nothing in the ESA's citizen-suit provision expressly precludes review under the APA, nor do we detect anything in the statutory scheme suggesting a purpose to do so. And any contention that the relevant provision of 16 U. S. C. § 1536(a)(2) is discretion- ary would fly in the face of its text, which uses the impera- tive "shall." In determining whether the petitioners have standing under the zone-of-interests test to bring their APA claims, we look not to the terms of the ESA's citizen-suit provision, but to the substantive provisions of the ESA, the alleged violations of which serve as the gravamen of the complaint. See National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S., at 886. The classic formulation of the zone-of-interests test is set forth in Data Processing, 397 U. S., at 153: "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." The Court of Appeals concluded that this test was not met here, since petitioners are neither directly regulated by the ESA nor seek to vindicate its overarching purpose of species preser- vation. That conclusion was error. Whether a plaintiff's interest is "arguably . . . protected . . . by the statute" within the meaning of the zone-of- interests test is to be determined not by reference to the overall purpose of the Act in question (here, species preser- vation), but by reference to the particular provision of law 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 176 BENNETT v. SPEAR Opinion of the Court upon which the plaintiff relies. It is difficult to understand how the Ninth Circuit could have failed to see this from our cases. In Data Processing itself, for example, we did not require that the plaintiffs' suit vindicate the overall purpose of the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, but found it sufficient that their commercial interest was sought to be protected by the anticompetition limitation contained in § 4 of the Act-the specific provision which they alleged had been violated. See Data Processing, supra, at 155­156. As we said with the utmost clarity in National Wildlife Federa- tion, "the plaintiff must establish that the injury he com- plains of . . . falls within the `zone of interests' sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint." 497 U. S., at 883 (em- phasis added). See also Air Courier Conference v. Postal Workers, 498 U. S. 517, 523­524 (1991) (same). In the claims that we have found not to be covered by the ESA's citizen-suit provision, petitioners allege a violation of § 7 of the ESA, 16 U. S. C. § 1536, which requires, inter alia, that each agency "use the best scientific and commercial data available," § 1536(a)(2). Petitioners contend that the avail- able scientific and commercial data show that the continued operation of the Klamath Project will not have a detrimental impact on the endangered suckers, that the imposition of minimum lake levels is not necessary to protect the fish, and that by issuing a Biological Opinion which makes unsubstan- tiated findings to the contrary the defendants have acted arbitrarily and in violation of § 1536(a)(2). The obvious pur- pose of the requirement that each agency "use the best scien- tific and commercial data available" is to ensure that the ESA not be implemented haphazardly, on the basis of specu- lation or surmise. While this no doubt serves to advance the ESA's overall goal of species preservation, we think it readily apparent that another objective (if not indeed the primary one) is to avoid needless economic dislocation 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 177 Opinion of the Court produced by agency officials zealously but unintelligently pursuing their environmental objectives. That economic consequences are an explicit concern of the ESA is evidenced by § 1536(h), which provides exemption from § 1536(a)(2)'s no-jeopardy mandate where there are no reasonable and pru- dent alternatives to the agency action and the benefits of the agency action clearly outweigh the benefits of any alterna- tives. We believe the "best scientific and commercial data" provision is similarly intended, at least in part, to prevent uneconomic (because erroneous) jeopardy determinations. Petitioners' claim that they are victims of such a mistake is plainly within the zone of interests that the provision protects. B The Government contends that petitioners may not obtain judicial review under the APA on the theory that the Biolog- ical Opinion does not constitute "final agency action," 5 U. S. C. § 704, because it does not conclusively determine the manner in which Klamath Project water will be allocated: "Whatever the practical likelihood that the [Bureau] would adopt the reasonable and prudent alternatives (including the higher lake levels) identified by the Serv- ice, the Bureau was not legally obligated to do so. Even if the Bureau decided to adopt the higher lake levels, moreover, nothing in the biological opinion would con- strain the [Bureau's] discretion as to how the available water should be allocated among potential users." Brief for Respondents 33. This confuses the question whether the Secretary's action is final with the separate question whether petitioners' harm is "fairly traceable" to the Secretary's action (a question we have already resolved against the Government, see Part III­A, supra). As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied for agency action to be "final": First, the action must 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 178 BENNETT v. SPEAR Opinion of the Court mark the "consummation" of the agency's decisionmaking process, Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 113 (1948)-it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by which "rights or obligations have been determined," or from which "legal consequences will flow," Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebola- get Transatlantic, 400 U. S. 62, 71 (1970). It is uncontested that the first requirement is met here; and the second is met because, as we have discussed above, the Biological Opinion and accompanying Incidental Take Statement alter the legal regime to which the action agency is subject, authorizing it to take the endangered species if (but only if) it complies with the prescribed conditions. In this crucial respect the present case is different from the cases upon which the Gov- ernment relies, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788 (1992), and Dalton v. Specter, 511 U. S. 462 (1994). In the former case, the agency action in question was the Secretary of Commerce's presentation to the President of a report tab- ulating the results of the decennial census; our holding that this did not constitute "final agency action" was premised on the observation that the report carried "no direct conse- quences" and served "more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination." 505 U. S., at 798. And in the latter case, the agency action in question was submission to the President of base closure recommendations by the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission; our holding that this was not "final agency action" followed from the fact that the recom- mendations were in no way binding on the President, who had absolute discretion to accept or reject them. 511 U. S., at 469­471. Unlike the reports in Franklin and Dalton, which were purely advisory and in no way affected the legal rights of the relevant actors, the Biological Opinion at issue here has direct and appreciable legal consequences. * * * 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 179 Opinion of the Court The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's dismissal of petitioners' claims for lack of jurisdic- tion. Petitioners' complaint alleges facts sufficient to meet the requirements of Article III standing, and none of their ESA claims is precluded by the zone-of-interests test. Peti- tioners' § 1533 claim is reviewable under the ESA's citizen- suit provision, and petitioners' remaining claims are review- able under the APA. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 180 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., et al. v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION et al. appeal from the united states district court for the district of columbia No. 95­992. Argued October 7, 1996-Decided March 31, 1997 Sections 4 and 5 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Compe- tition Act of 1992 (Cable Act) require cable television systems to dedi- cate some of their channels to local broadcast television stations. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622 (Turner), this Court held these so-called "must-carry" provisions to be subject to in- termediate First Amendment scrutiny under United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377, whereby a content-neutral regulation will be sus- tained if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests. However, because a plurality considered the record as then developed insufficient to deter- mine whether the provisions would in fact alleviate real harms in a direct and material way and would not burden substantially more speech than necessary, the Court remanded the case. After 18 months of additional factfinding, the District Court granted summary judgment for the Government and other appellees, concluding that the expanded record contained substantial evidence supporting Congress' predictive judgment that the must-carry provisions further important governmen- tal interests in preserving cable carriage of local broadcast stations, and that the provisions are narrowly tailored to promote those interests. This direct appeal followed. Held: The judgment is affirmed. 910 F. Supp. 734, affirmed. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to all but a portion of Part II­A­1, concluding that the must-carry provi- sions are consistent with the First Amendment: 1. The record as it now stands supports Congress' predictive judg- ment that the must-carry provisions further important governmental interests. Pp. 189­196, 208­213. (a) This Court decided in Turner, 512 U. S., at 662, and now re- affirms, that must-carry was designed to serve three interrelated, im- portant governmental interests: (1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the widespread 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 181 Syllabus dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) pro- moting fair competition in the television programming market. Pro- tecting noncable households from loss of regular broadcasting service due to competition from cable systems is important because 40 percent of American households still rely on over-the-air signals for television programming. See, e. g., id., at 663. Moreover, there is a correspond- ing governmental purpose of the highest order in ensuring public access to a multiplicity of information sources, ibid., and the Government has an interest in eliminating restraints on fair competition even when the regulated parties are engaged in protected expressive activity, ibid. The parties' attempts to recast these interests in forms more readily proved-i. e., the Government's claim that the loss of even a few broad- cast stations is critically important and appellants' assertions that Con- gress' interest in preserving broadcasting is not implicated absent a showing that the entire industry would fail, and that its interest in assuring a multiplicity of information sources extends only as far as preserving a minimum amount of broadcast service-are inconsistent with Congress' stated interests in enacting must-carry. Pp. 189­194. (b) Even in the realm of First Amendment questions where Con- gress must base its conclusions upon substantial evidence, courts must accord deference to its findings as to the harm to be avoided and to the remedial measures adopted for that end, lest the traditional legislative authority to make predictive judgments when enacting nationwide reg- ulatory policy be infringed. See, e. g., Turner, 512 U. S., at 665 (plural- ity opinion). The courts' sole obligation is to assure that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on sub- stantial evidence. Id., at 666. Pp. 195­196. (c) The must-carry provisions serve important governmental inter- ests "in a direct and effective way." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 800. Congress could reasonably conclude from the sub- stantial body of evidence before it that attaining cable carriage would be of increasing importance to ensuring broadcasters' economic viability, and that, absent legislative action, the free local off-air broadcast system was endangered. Such evidence amply indicated that: a broadcast sta- tion's viability depends to a material extent on its ability to secure cable carriage and thereby to increase its audience size and revenues; broad- cast stations had fallen into bankruptcy, curtailed their operations, and suffered serious reductions in operating revenues as a result of adverse carriage decisions by cable systems; stations without carriage encoun- tered severe difficulties obtaining financing for operations; and the po- tentially adverse impact of losing carriage was increasing as the growth of "clustering"-i. e., the acquisition of as many cable systems in a given 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 182 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Syllabus market as possible-gave multiple system operators centralized control over more local markets. The reasonableness of the congressional judgment is confirmed by evidence assembled on remand that clearly establishes the importance of cable to broadcast stations and suggests that expansion in the cable industry was harming broadcasting. Al- though the record also contains evidence to support a contrary con- clusion, the question is not whether Congress was correct as an ob- jective matter, but whether the legislative conclusion was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. Turner, supra, at 665­666. Where, as here, that standard is satisfied, summary judgment is ap- propriate regardless of whether the evidence is in conflict. Cf., e. g., American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U. S. 490, 523. Pp. 208­213. 2. The must-carry provisions do not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the governmental interests they promote. See, e. g., Turner, supra, at 662. Appellants say must-carry's burden is great, but significant evidence adduced on remand indicates the vast majority of cable operators have not been affected in a significant man- ner. This includes evidence that: such operators have satisfied their must-carry obligations 87 percent of the time using previously unused channel capacity; 94.5 percent of the cable systems nationwide have not had to drop any programming; the remaining 5.5 percent have had to drop an average of only 1.22 services from their programming; operators nationwide carry 99.8 percent of the programming they carried before must-carry; and broadcast stations gained carriage on only 5,880 cable channels as a result of must-carry. The burden imposed by must-carry is congruent to the benefits it affords because, as appellants concede, most of those 5,880 stations would be dropped in its absence. Must- carry therefore is narrowly tailored to preserve a multiplicity of broad- cast stations for the 40 percent of American households without cable. Cf., e. g., Ward, supra, at 799, n. 7. The possibilities that must-carry will prohibit dropping a broadcaster even if the cable operator has no anticompetitive motives or if the broadcaster would survive with- out cable access are not so prevalent that they render must-carry sub- stantially overbroad. This Court's precedents establish that it will not invalidate the preferred remedial scheme merely because some al- ternative solution is marginally less intrusive on a speaker's First Amendment interests. In any event, a careful examination of each of appellants' suggestions-a more limited set of must-carry obligations modeled on those earlier used by the Federal Communications Commis- sion; use of so-called A/B switches, giving consumers a choice of both cable and broadcast signals; a leased-access regime requiring cable oper- 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 183 Syllabus ators to set aside channels for both broadcasters and cable programmers to use at a regulated price; subsidies for broadcasters; and a system of antitrust enforcement or an administrative complaint procedure-re- veals that none of them is an adequate alternative to must-carry for achieving the Government's aims. Because it has received only the most glancing attention from the District Court and the parties, pru- dence dictates that this Court not reach appellants' challenge to the Cable Act provision requiring carriage of low power stations in certain circumstances. Pp. 213­225. Justice Kennedy, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Stevens, and Justice Souter, and by Justice Breyer in part, concluded in Part II­A­1 that the expanded record contains substantial evidence to support Congress' conclusion that enactment of must-carry was justified by a real threat to local broadcasting's economic health. The harm Congress feared was that broadcast stations dropped or denied cable carriage would be at a serious risk of financial difficulty, see Turner, 512 U. S., at 667, and would deteriorate to a substantial degree or fail altogether, id., at 666. The evidence before Congress, as supplemented on remand, indicated, inter alia, that: cable operators had considerable and growing market power over local video programming markets in 1992; the industry's expanding horizontal and vertical integration would give cable operators increasing ability and incentive to drop, or reposi- tion to less-viewed channels, independent local broadcast stations, which competed with the operators for audiences and advertisers; significant numbers of local broadcasters had already been dropped; and, absent must-carry, additional stations would be deleted, repositioned, or not carried in an attempt to capture their local advertising revenues to off- set waning cable subscription growth. The reasonableness of Congress' predictive judgment is also supported by additional evidence, developed on remand, indicating that the percentage of local broadcasters not car- ried on the typical cable system is increasing, and that the growth of cable systems' market power has proceeded apace, better enabling them to sell their own reach to potential advertisers, and to deny broadcast competitors access to all or substantially all the cable homes in a market area. Pp. 196­208. Justice Breyer, although agreeing that the statute satisfies the in- termediate scrutiny standard set forth in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377, rested his conclusion not upon the principal opinion's anal- ysis of the statute's efforts to promote fair competition, but rather upon its discussion of the statute's other two objectives. He therefore joined the opinion of the Court except insofar as Part II­A­1 relies on an anticompetitive rationale. Pp. 225­229. 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 184 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Syllabus Kennedy, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to a portion of Part II­A­1. Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens and Souter, JJ., joined that opinion in full, and Breyer, J., joined except insofar as Part II­A­1 relied on an anticompeti- tive rationale. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 225. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, post, p. 225. O'Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 229. H. Bartow Farr III argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs for appellant National Cable Televi- sion Association, Inc., were Richard G. Taranto, Daniel L. Brenner, Neal M. Goldberg, and Diane B. Burstein. Bruce D. Sokler, Christopher A. Holt, Bertram W. Carp, Bruce D. Collins, Neal S. Grabell, and James H. Johnson filed a brief for appellants Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., et al. Al- bert G. Lauber, Jr., Peter Van N. Lockwood, Judith A. McHale, and Diane L. Hofbauer filed a brief for appellants Discovery Communications, Inc., et al. Robert D. Joffe, Stu- art W. Gold, Rowan D. Wilson, Brian Conboy, and Theodore Case Whitehouse filed a brief for appellant Time Warner Entertainment Co. Acting Solicitor General Dellinger argued the cause for appellees. With him on the briefs for the federal appellees were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Paul R. Q. Wolf- son, Douglas N. Letter, Bruce G. Forrest, William E. Ken- nard, and Christopher J. Wright. Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees National As- sociation of Broadcasters et al. With him on the brief were Kit A. Pierson, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Thomas J. Perrelli, Jack N. Goodman, Benjamin F. P. Ivins, Kathleen M. Sulli- van, and James J. Popham. Carolyn F. Corwin, Mark H. Lynch, Marilyn Mohrman-Gillis, and Paula A. Jameson filed a brief for appellees Association of America's Public Television Stations et al. Andrew Jay Schwartzman, Gigi B. Sohn, and Elliot M. Mincberg filed a brief for appellees Consumer Federation of America et al. 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 185 Opinion of the Court Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to a portion of Part II­A­1. Sections 4 and 5 of the Cable Television Consumer Protec- tion and Competition Act of 1992 require cable television sys- tems to dedicate some of their channels to local broadcast television stations. Earlier in this case, we held the so- called "must-carry" provisions to be content-neutral restric- tions on speech, subject to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny under United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968). A plurality of the Court considered the record as then developed insufficient to determine whether the provi- sions were narrowly tailored to further important govern- mental interests, and we remanded the case to the District Court for the District of Columbia for additional factfinding. On appeal from the District Court's grant of summary judgment for appellees, the case now presents the two ques- tions left open during the first appeal: First, whether the record as it now stands supports Congress' predictive judg- ment that the must-carry provisions further important gov- ernmental interests; and second, whether the provisions do not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests. We answer both questions in the affirmative, and conclude the must-carry provisions are consistent with the First Amendment. I An outline of the Cable Act, Congress' purposes in adopt- ing it, and the facts of the case are set out in detail in our first opinion, see Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622 (1994) (Turner), and a more abbreviated sum- mary will suffice here. Soon after Congress enacted the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (Cable Act), Pub. L. 102­385, 106 Stat. 1460, appel- lants brought suit against the United States and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (both referred to here as the Government) in the United States District Court for 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 186 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of the Court the District of Columbia, challenging the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions under the First Amendment. The three-judge District Court, in a divided opinion, granted summary judgment for the Government and intervenor- defendants. A majority of the court sustained the must- carry provisions under the intermediate standard of scru- tiny set forth in United States v. O'Brien, supra, concluding the must-carry provisions were content-neutral "industry- specific antitrust and fair trade" legislation narrowly tailored to preserve local broadcasting beset by monopoly power in most cable systems, growing concentration in the cable in- dustry, and concomitant risks of programming decisions driven by anticompetitive policies. 819 F. Supp. 32, 40, 45­47 (1993). On appeal, we agreed with the District Court that must- carry does not "distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed," 512 U. S., at 643, but is a content-neutral regulation designed "to prevent cable operators from exploiting their economic power to the detriment of broadcasters," and "to ensure that all Americans, especially those unable to subscribe to cable, have access to free television programming-whatever its content." Id., at 649. We held that, under the intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral regulations, must-carry would be sustained if it were shown to further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech, provided the incidental restrictions did not " `burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further' " those interests. Id., at 662 (quot- ing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 799 (1989)). Although we "ha[d] no difficulty concluding" the interests must-carry was designed to serve were important in the ab- stract, 512 U. S., at 663, a four-Justice plurality concluded genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether "the economic health of local broadcasting is in genuine jeop- ardy and in need of the protections afforded by must-carry," 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 187 Opinion of the Court and whether must-carry " `burden[s] substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legiti- mate interests.' " Id., at 665 (quoting Ward, supra, at 799). Justice Stevens would have found the statute valid on the record then before us; he agreed to remand the case to en- sure a judgment of the Court, and the case was returned to the District Court for further proceedings. 512 U. S., at 673­674 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judg- ment); id., at 667­668. The District Court oversaw another 18 months of fac- tual development on remand "yielding a record of tens of thousands of pages" of evidence, Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 910 F. Supp. 734, 755 (1995), comprised of materials ac- quired during Congress' three years of pre-enactment hear- ings, see Turner, supra, at 632­634, as well as additional expert submissions, sworn declarations and testimony, and industry documents obtained on remand. Upon consider- ation of the expanded record, a divided panel of the District Court again granted summary judgment to appellees. 910 F. Supp., at 751. The majority determined "Congress drew reasonable inferences" from substantial evidence before it to conclude that "in the absence of must-carry rules, `signifi- cant' numbers of broadcast stations would be refused car- riage." Id., at 742. The court found Congress drew on studies and anecdotal evidence indicating "cable operators had already dropped, refused to carry, or adversely reposi- tioned significant numbers of local broadcasters," and sug- gesting that in the vast majority of cases the broadcasters were not restored to carriage in their prior position. Ibid. Noting evidence in the record before Congress and the testi- mony of experts on remand, id., at 743, the court decided the noncarriage problem would grow worse without must-carry because cable operators had refrained from dropping broad- cast stations during Congress' investigation and the pend- ency of this litigation, id., at 742­743, and possessed increas- ing incentives to use their growing economic power to 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 188 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of the Court capture broadcasters' advertising revenues and promote af- filiated cable programmers, ibid. The court concluded "sub- stantial evidence before Congress" supported the predictive judgment that a local broadcaster denied carriage "would suffer financial harm and possible ruin." Id., at 743­744. It cited evidence that adverse carriage actions decrease broad- casters' revenues by reducing audience levels, id., at 744­745, and evidence that the invalidation of the FCC's prior must- carry regulations had contributed to declining growth in the broadcast industry, id., at 744, and n. 34. The court held must-carry to be narrowly tailored to pro- mote the Government's legitimate interests. It found the effects of must-carry on cable operators to be minimal, not- ing evidence that: most cable systems had not been required to add any broadcast stations since the rules were adopted; only 1.2 percent of all cable channels had been devoted to broadcast stations added because of must-carry; and the bur- den was likely to diminish as channel capacity expanded in the future. Id., at 746­747. The court proceeded to con- sider a number of alternatives to must-carry that appellants had proposed, including: a leased-access regime, under which cable operators would be required to set aside channels for both broadcasters and cable programmers to use at a regu- lated price; use of so-called A/B switches, giving consumers a choice of both cable and broadcast signals; a more limited set of must-carry obligations modeled on those earlier used by the FCC; and subsidies for broadcasters. The court re- jected each in turn, concluding that "even assuming that [the alternatives] would be less burdensome" on cable operators' First Amendment interests, they "are not in any respect as effective in achieving the government's [interests]." Id., at 747. Judge Jackson would have preferred a trial to sum- mary judgment, but concurred in the judgment of the court. Id., at 751­754. Judge Williams dissented. His review of the record, and particularly evidence concerning growth in the number of 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 189 Opinion of the Court broadcasters, industry advertising revenues, and per-station profits during the period without must-carry, led him to con- clude the broadcast industry as a whole would not be " `seri- ously jeopardized' " in the absence of must-carry. Id., at 759­767. Judge Williams acknowledged the Government had a legitimate interest in preventing anticompetitive be- havior, and accepted that cable operators have incentives to discriminate against broadcasters in favor of their own verti- cally integrated cable programming. Id., at 772, 775, 779. He would have granted summary judgment for appellants nonetheless on the ground must-carry is not narrowly tai- lored. In his view, must-carry constitutes a significant (though "diminish[ing]," id., at 782) burden on cable opera- tors' and programmers' rights, ibid., and the Cable Act's must-carry provisions suppress more speech than necessary because "less-restrictive" alternatives exist to accomplish the Government's legitimate objectives, id., at 782­789. This direct appeal followed. See 47 U. S. C. § 555(c)(1); 28 U. S. C. § 1253. We noted probable jurisdiction, 516 U. S. 1110 (1996), and we now affirm. II We begin where the plurality ended in Turner, applying the standards for intermediate scrutiny enunciated in O'Brien. A content-neutral regulation will be sustained under the First Amendment if it advances important govern- mental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than neces- sary to further those interests. O'Brien, 391 U. S., at 377. As noted in Turner, must-carry was designed to serve "three interrelated interests: (1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for television programming." 512 U. S., at 662. We decided then, and now reaffirm, that each of those is an important 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 190 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of the Court governmental interest. We have been most explicit in hold- ing that " `protecting noncable households from loss of regu- lar television broadcasting service due to competition from cable systems' is an important federal interest." Id., at 663 (quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S. 691, 714 (1984)). Forty percent of American households continue to rely on over-the-air signals for television programming. Despite the growing importance of cable television and alter- native technologies, " `broadcasting is demonstrably a princi- pal source of information and entertainment for a great part of the Nation's population.' " Turner, supra, at 663 (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U. S. 157, 177 (1968)). We have identified a corresponding "governmental purpose of the highest order" in ensuring public access to "a multiplicity of information sources," 512 U. S., at 663. And it is undisputed the Government has an interest in "eliminat- ing restraints on fair competition . . . , even when the individ- uals or entities subject to particular regulations are engaged in expressive activity protected by the First Amendment." Id., at 664. On remand, and again before this Court, both sides have advanced new interpretations of these interests in an at- tempt to recast them in forms "more readily proven." 910 F. Supp., at 759 (Williams, J., dissenting). The Government downplays the importance of showing a risk to the broadcast industry as a whole and suggests the loss of even a few broadcast stations "is a matter of critical importance." Tr. of Oral Arg. 23. Taking the opposite approach, appellants argue Congress' interest in preserving broadcasting is not implicated unless it is shown the industry as a whole would fail without must-carry, Brief for Appellant National Cable Television Association, Inc. 18­23 (NCTA Brief); Brief for Appellant Time Warner Entertainment Co., L. P. 8­10 (Time Warner Brief), and suggest Congress' legitimate interest in "assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of infor- mation sources," Turner, supra, at 663, extends only as far 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 191 Opinion of the Court as preserving "a minimum amount of television broadcast service," Time Warner Brief 28; NCTA Brief 40; Reply Brief for Appellant NCTA 12. These alternative formulations are inconsistent with Con- gress' stated interests in enacting must-carry. The congres- sional findings do not reflect concern that, absent must-carry, "a few voices," Tr. of Oral Arg. 23, would be lost from the television marketplace. In explicit factual findings, Con- gress expressed clear concern that the "marked shift in mar- ket share from broadcast television to cable television serv- ices," Cable Act § 2(a)(13), note following 47 U. S. C. § 521, resulting from increasing market penetration by cable serv- ices, as well as the expanding horizontal concentration and vertical integration of cable operators, combined to give cable systems the incentive and ability to delete, reposition, or decline carriage to local broadcasters in an attempt to favor affiliated cable programmers. §§ 2a(2)­(5), (15). Con- gress predicted that "absent the reimposition of [must-carry], additional local broadcast signals will be deleted, reposi- tioned, or not carried," § 2(a)(15); see also § 2(a)(8)(D), with the end result that "the economic viability of free local broadcast television and its ability to originate quality local programming will be seriously jeopardized," § 2(a)(16). At the same time, Congress was under no illusion that there would be a complete disappearance of broadcast televi- sion nationwide in the absence of must-carry. Congress rec- ognized broadcast programming (and network programming in particular) "remains the most popular programming on cable systems," § 2(a)(19). Indeed, reflecting the popularity and strength of some broadcasters, Congress included in the Cable Act a provision permitting broadcasters to charge cable systems for carriage of the broadcasters' signals. See § 6, codified at 47 U. S. C. § 325. Congress was concerned not that broadcast television would disappear in its entirety without must-carry, but that without it, "significant numbers of broadcast stations will be refused carriage on cable sys- 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 192 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of the Court tems," and those "broadcast stations denied carriage will either deteriorate to a substantial degree or fail altogether." 512 U. S., at 666. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 102­628, p. 51 (1992) (House Report) (the absence of must-carry "will result in a weakening of the over-the-air television industry and a reduction in competition"); id., at 64 ("The Committee wishes to make clear that its concerns are not limited to a situation where stations are dropped wholesale by large numbers of cable systems"); S. Rep. No. 102­92, p. 62 (1991) (Senate Re- port) ("Without congressional action, . . . the role of local television broadcasting in our system of communications will steadily decline . . ."); see also Brief for Federal Appellees in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, No. 93­44, p. 32, n. 22 (the question is not whether "the evidence shows that broadcast television is likely to be totally eliminated" but "whether the broadcast services available to viewers [with- out cable] are likely to be reduced to a significant extent, because of either loss of some stations altogether or curtail- ment of services by others"). Nor do the congressional findings support appellants' sug- gestion that legitimate legislative goals would be satisfied by the preservation of a rump broadcasting industry providing a minimum of broadcast service to Americans without cable. We have noted that " `it has long been a basic tenet of na- tional communications policy that "the widest possible dis- semination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public." ' " Turner, 512 U. S., at 663­664 (quoting United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U. S. 649, 668, n. 27 (1972) (plurality opin- ion), in turn quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 20 (1945)); see also FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U. S. 582, 594 (1981). " `[I]ncreasing the number of out- lets for community self-expression' " represents a " `long- established regulatory goa[l] in the field of television broad- casting.' " United States v. Midwest Video Corp., supra, at 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 193 Opinion of the Court 667­668 (plurality opinion). Consistent with this objective, the Cable Act's findings reflect a concern that congressional action was necessary to prevent "a reduction in the number of media voices available to consumers." § 2(a)(4). Con- gress identified a specific interest in "ensuring [the] continua- tion" of "the local origination of [broadcast] programming," § 2(a)(10), an interest consistent with its larger purpose of promoting multiple types of media, § 2(a)(6), and found must-carry necessary "to serve the goals" of the original Communications Act of 1934 of "providing a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of broadcast services," § 2(a)(9). In short, Congress enacted must-carry to "preserve the ex- isting structure of the Nation's broadcast television medium while permitting the concomitant expansion and develop- ment of cable television." 512 U. S., at 652. Although Congress set no definite number of broadcast stations sufficient for these purposes, the Cable Act's re- quirement that all cable operators with more than 12 chan- nels set aside one-third of their channel capacity for local broadcasters, § 4, 47 U. S. C. § 534(b)(1)(B), refutes the notion that Congress contemplated preserving only a bare minimum of stations. Congress' evident interest in "preserv[ing] the existing structure," 512 U. S., at 652, of the broadcast indus- try discloses a purpose to prevent any significant reduction in the multiplicity of broadcast programming sources avail- able to noncable households. To the extent the appellants question the substantiality of the Government's interest in preserving something more than a minimum number of sta- tions in each community, their position is meritless. It is for Congress to decide how much local broadcast television should be preserved for noncable households, and the valid- ity of its determination " `does not turn on a judge's agree- ment with the responsible decisionmaker concerning' . . . the degree to which [the Government's] interests should be pro- moted." Ward, 491 U. S., at 800 (quoting United States v. 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 194 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of the Court Albertini, 472 U. S. 675, 689 (1985)); accord, Clark v. Com- munity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 299 (1984) ("We do not believe . . . [that] United States v. O'Brien . . . endow[s] the judiciary with the competence to judge how much protection of park lands is wise"). The dissent proceeds on the assumption that must-carry is designed solely to be (and can only be justified as) a measure to protect broadcasters from cable operators' anticompetitive behavior. See post, at 251, 253, 258. Federal policy, how- ever, has long favored preserving a multiplicity of broadcast outlets regardless of whether the conduct that threatens it is motivated by anticompetitive animus or rises to the level of an antitrust violation. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S., at 714; United States v. Midwest Video Corp., supra, at 665 (plurality opinion) (FCC regulations "were . . . avowedly designed to guard broadcast services from being undermined by unregulated [cable] growth"); Na- tional Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 223­ 224 (1943) (" `While many of the network practices raise seri- ous questions under the antitrust laws, . . . [i]t is not [the FCC's] function to apply the antitrust laws as such' " (quoting FCC Report on Chain Broadcasting Regulations (1941))). Broadcast television is an important source of information to many Americans. Though it is but one of many means for communication, by tradition and use for decades now it has been an essential part of the national discourse on subjects across the whole broad spectrum of speech, thought, and ex- pression. See Turner, supra, at 663; FCC v. National Citi- zens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U. S. 775, 783 (1978) (re- ferring to studies "showing the dominant role of television stations . . . as sources of local news and other information"). Congress has an independent interest in preserving a multi- plicity of broadcasters to ensure that all households have ac- cess to information and entertainment on an equal footing with those who subscribe to cable. 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 195 Opinion of the Court A On our earlier review, we were constrained by the state of the record to assessing the importance of the Government's asserted interests when "viewed in the abstract," Turner, 512 U. S., at 663. The expanded record now permits us to consider whether the must-carry provisions were designed to address a real harm, and whether those provisions will alleviate it in a material way. Id., at 663­664. We turn first to the harm or risk which prompted Congress to act. The Government's assertion that "the economic health of local broadcasting is in genuine jeopardy and in need of the protections afforded by must-carry," id., at 664­665, rests on two component propositions: First, "significant numbers of broadcast stations will be refused carriage on cable systems" absent must-carry, id., at 666. Second, "the broadcast sta- tions denied carriage will either deteriorate to a substantial degree or fail altogether." Ibid. In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, "courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive judg- ments of Congress." Id., at 665. Our sole obligation is "to assure that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence." Id., at 666. As noted in the first appeal, substantiality is to be measured in this context by a standard more deferential than we accord to judgments of an administrative agency. See id., at 666­667; id., at 670, n. 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). We owe Congress' findings deference in part because the institution "is far bet- ter equipped than the judiciary to `amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data' bearing upon" legislative questions. Turner, supra, at 665­666 (plurality opinion) (quoting Wal- ters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U. S. 305, 331, n. 12 (1985)); Ward, supra, at 800; Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S. 57, 83 (1981) (courts must perform "appropriately deferential examination of Congress' evaluation of th[e] evi- 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 196 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of Kennedy, J. dence"); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 103 (1973). This princi- ple has special significance in cases, like this one, involving congressional judgments concerning regulatory schemes of inherent complexity and assessments about the likely inter- action of industries undergoing rapid economic and techno- logical change. Though different in degree, the deference to Congress is in one respect akin to deference owed to admin- istrative agencies because of their expertise. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, supra, at 814 ("[C]omplete factual support in the record for the [FCC's] judgment or prediction is not possible or required; `a forecast of the direction in which future public interest lies necessar- ily involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency' "); United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U. S., at 674 (it was "beyond the competence of the Court of Ap- peals itself to assess the relative risks and benefits" of FCC policy, so long as that policy was based on findings supported by evidence). This is not the sum of the matter, however. We owe Congress' findings an additional measure of defer- ence out of respect for its authority to exercise the legisla- tive power. Even in the realm of First Amendment ques- tions where Congress must base its conclusions upon substantial evidence, deference must be accorded to its find- ings as to the harm to be avoided and to the remedial meas- ures adopted for that end, lest we infringe on traditional legislative authority to make predictive judgments when enacting nationwide regulatory policy. 1 We have no difficulty in finding a substantial basis to sup- port Congress' conclusion that a real threat justified enact- ment of the must-carry provisions. We examine first the evidence before Congress and then the further evidence pre- sented to the District Court on remand to supplement the congressional determination. 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 197 Opinion of Kennedy, J. As to the evidence before Congress, there was specific sup- port for its conclusion that cable operators had considerable and growing market power over local video programming markets. Cable served at least 60 percent of American households in 1992, see Cable Act § 2(a)(3), and evidence indi- cated cable market penetration was projected to grow be- yond 70 percent. See Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Hearing on S. 12 before the Subcommittee on Com- munications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 259 (1991) (state- ment of Edward O. Fritts) (App. 1253); see also Defendants' Joint Statement of Evidence Before Congress ¶¶ 9, 10 (JSCR) (App. 1252­1253). As Congress noted, § 2(a)(2), cable operators possess a local monopoly over cable house- holds. Only one percent of communities are served by more than one cable system, JSCR ¶¶ 31­40 (App. 1262­1266). Even in communities with two or more cable systems, in the typical case each system has a local monopoly over its sub- scribers. See Comments of NAB before the FCC on MM Docket No. 85­349, ¶ 47 (Apr. 25, 1986) (App. 26). Cable operators thus exercise "control over most (if not all) of the television programming that is channeled into the sub- scriber's home [and] can thus silence the voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch." Turner, 512 U. S., at 656. Evidence indicated the structure of the cable industry would give cable operators increasing ability and incentive to drop local broadcast stations from their systems, or repo- sition them to a less-viewed channel. Horizontal concentra- tion was increasing as a small number of multiple system operators (MSO's) acquired large numbers of cable systems nationwide. § 2(a)(4). The trend was accelerating, giving the MSO's increasing market power. In 1985, the 10 largest MSO's controlled cable systems serving slightly less than 42 percent of all cable subscribers; by 1989, the figure was nearly 54 percent. JSCR ¶ 77 (App. 1282); Competitive 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 198 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of Kennedy, J. Problems in the Cable Television Industry, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 74 (1990) (Hearing on Competitive Problems in the Cable Television Industry) (statement of Gene Kim- melman and Dr. Mark N. Cooper). Vertical integration in the industry also was increasing. As Congress was aware, many MSO's owned or had affilia- tion agreements with cable programmers. § 2(a)(5); Senate Report, at 24­29. Evidence indicated that before 1984 cable operators had equity interests in 38 percent of cable pro- gramming networks. In the late 1980's, 64 percent of new cable programmers were held in vertical ownership. JSCR ¶ 197 (App. 1332­1333). Congress concluded that "vertical integration gives cable operators the incentive and ability to favor their affiliated programming services," § 2(a)(5); Senate Report, at 25, a conclusion that even Judge Williams' dissent conceded to be reasonable. See 910 F. Supp., at 775. Ex- tensive testimony indicated that cable operators would have an incentive to drop local broadcasters and to favor affiliated programmers. See, e. g., Competitive Issues in the Cable Television Industry: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 546 (1988) (Hearing on Competitive Issues) (statement of Milton Maltz); Cable Television Regulation: Hearings on H. R. 1303 and H. R. 2546 before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Com- merce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 869­870, 878­879 (1992) (Hear- ings on Cable Television Regulation) (statement of James B. Hedlund); id., at 752 (statement of Edward O. Fritts); id., at 699 (statement of Gene Kimmelman); Cable Television Regu- lation (Part 2): Hearings before the Subcommittee on Tele- communications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 261 (1990) (Hearings on Cable Television Regulation (Part 2)) (state- 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 199 Opinion of Kennedy, J. ment of Robert G. Picard) (App. 1339­1341); see also JSCR ¶¶ 168­170, 278­280 (App. 1320­1321, 1370­1371). Though the dissent criticizes our reliance on evidence pro- vided to Congress by parties that are private appellees here, post, at 237­238, that argument displays a lack of regard for Congress' factfinding function. It is the nature of the legis- lative process to consider the submissions of the parties most affected by legislation. Appellants, too, sent representa- tives before Congress to try to persuade them of their side of the debate. See, e. g., Hearing on Competitive Problems in the Cable Television Industry, at 228­241 (statement of James P. Mooney, president and CEO of appellant NCTA); Hearings on Cable Television Regulation, at 575­582 (state- ment of Decker S. Anstrom, executive vice president of ap- pellant NCTA); Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Hearing on S. 12 before the Subcommittee on Communica- tions of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 173­180 (1991) (state- ment of Ted Turner, president of appellant Turner Broad- casting System). After hearing years of testimony, and reviewing volumes of documentary evidence and studies of- fered by both sides, Congress concluded that the cable indus- try posed a threat to broadcast television. The Constitution gives to Congress the role of weighing conflicting evidence in the legislative process. Even when the resulting regulation touches on First Amendment concerns, we must give consid- erable deference, in examining the evidence, to Congress' findings and conclusions, including its findings and conclu- sions with respect to conflicting economic predictions. See supra, at 195­196. Furthermore, much of the testimony, though offered by interested parties, was supported by veri- fiable information and citation to independent sources. See, e. g., Hearings on Cable Television Regulation, at 869­870, 878­879 (statement of James B. Hedlund); id., at 705, 707­ 708, 712 (statement of Gene Kimmelman). 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 200 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of Kennedy, J. The reasonableness of Congress' conclusion was borne out by the evidence on remand, which also reflected cable indus- try favoritism for integrated programmers. See, e. g., Rec- ord, Defendants' Additional Evidence, Vol. VII.H, Exh. 170, p. 1749 (DAE) (cable industry memo stating: "All [of an MSO's] systems must launch Starz [an integrated program- mer] 2/94. Word from corporate: if you don't have free chan- nels . . . make one free"); Third Declaration of Tom Meek ¶ 44 (Third Meek Declaration) (App. 2071­2072); see also Declara- tion of Roger G. Noll ¶¶ 18­22 (Noll Declaration) (App. 1009­ 1013); Declaration of James Dertouzos ¶ 6a (Dertouzos Decla- ration) (App. 959). In addition, evidence before Congress, supplemented on remand, indicated that cable systems would have incentives to drop local broadcasters in favor of other programmers less likely to compete with them for audience and advertisers. Independent local broadcasters tend to be the closest substi- tutes for cable programs, because their programming tends to be similar, see JSCR ¶¶ 269, 274, 276 (App. 1367, 1368­ 1370), and because both primarily target the same type of advertiser: those interested in cheaper (and more frequent) ad spots than are typically available on network affiliates. Second Declaration of Tom Meek ¶ 32 (Second Meek Declara- tion) (App. 1866); Reply Declaration of James N. Dertouzos ¶ 26 (App. 2023); Carriage of Television Broadcast Signals by Cable Television Systems, Reply Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics and the San Francisco Regional Office of the Federal Trade Commission, p. 19 (Nov. 26, 1991) (Reply Comment of FTC) (App. 176). The ability of broad- cast stations to compete for advertising is greatly increased by cable carriage, which increases viewership substantially. See Second Meek Declaration ¶ 34 (App. 1866­1867). With expanded viewership, broadcast presents a more competitive medium for television advertising. Empirical studies indi- cate that cable-carried broadcasters so enhance competition for advertising that even modest increases in the numbers of 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 201 Opinion of Kennedy, J. broadcast stations carried on cable are correlated with sig- nificant decreases in advertising revenue to cable systems. Dertouzos Declaration ¶¶ 20, 25­28 (App. 966, 969­971); see also Reply Comment of FTC, at 18 (App. 175). Empirical evidence also indicates that demand for premium cable serv- ices (such as pay-per-view) is reduced when a cable system carries more independent broadcasters. Hearing on Com- petitive Problems in the Cable Television Industry, at 323 (statement of Michael O. Wirth). Thus, operators stand to benefit by dropping broadcast stations. Dertouzos Declara- tion ¶ 6b (App. 959). Cable systems also have more systemic reasons for seek- ing to disadvantage broadcast stations: Simply stated, cable has little interest in assisting, through carriage, a competing medium of communication. As one cable-industry executive put it, " `our job is to promote cable television, not broadcast television.' " Hearing on Competitive Issues, at 658 (quot- ing Multichannel News, Channel Realignments: United Cable Eyes Plan to Bump Network Affils to Upper Channels, Nov. 3, 1986, p. 39); see also Hearing on Competitive Issues, at 661 (" `Shouldn't we give more . . . shelf space to cable? Why have people trained to view UHF?' ") (vice president of operations at Comcast, an MSO, quoted in Multichannel News, Cable Operators begin to Shuffle Channel Lineups, Sept. 8, 1986, p. 38). The incentive to subscribe to cable is lower in markets with many over-the-air viewing options. See JSCR ¶ 275 (App. 1369); Dertouzos Declaration ¶¶ 27, 32 (App. 970, 972). Evidence adduced on remand indicated cable systems have little incentive to carry, and a significant incentive to drop, broadcast stations that will only be strengthened by access to the 60 percent of the television market that cable typically controls. Dertouzos Declaration ¶¶ 29, 35 (App. 971, 973); Noll Declaration ¶ 43 (App. 1029). Congress could therefore reasonably conclude that cable sys- tems would drop broadcasters in favor of programmers- even unaffiliated ones-less likely to compete with them for 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 202 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of Kennedy, J. audience and advertisers. The cap on carriage of affiliates included in the Cable Act, 47 U. S. C. § 533(f)(1)(B); 47 CFR § 76.504 (1995), and relied on by the dissent, post, at 238, 252, is of limited utility in protecting broadcasters. The dissent contends Congress could not reasonably con- clude cable systems would engage in such predation because cable operators, whose primary source of revenue is sub- scriptions, would not risk dropping a widely viewed broad- cast station in order to capture advertising revenues. Post, at 239. However, if viewers are faced with the choice of sacrificing a handful of broadcast stations to gain access to dozens of cable channels (plus network affiliates), it is likely they would still subscribe to cable even if they would prefer the dropped television stations to the cable programming that replaced them. Substantial evidence introduced on re- mand bears this out: With the exception of a handful of very popular broadcast stations (typically network affiliates), a cable system's choice between carrying a cable programmer or broadcast station has little or no effect on cable subscrip- tions, and subscribership thus typically does not bear on car- riage decisions. Noll Declaration ¶ 29 (App. 1018­1019); Re- buttal Declaration of Roger G. Noll ¶ 20 (App. 1798); Reply Declaration of Roger G. Noll ¶¶ 3­4, and n. 3 (App. 2003­ 2004); see also Declaration of John R. Haring ¶ 37 (Haring Declaration) (App. 1106). It was more than a theoretical possibility in 1992 that cable operators would take actions adverse to local broadcasters; indeed, significant numbers of broadcasters had already been dropped. The record before Congress contained extensive anecdotal evidence about scores of adverse carriage decisions against broadcast stations. See JSCR ¶¶ 291­467, 664 (App. 1376­1489, 1579). Congress considered an FCC-sponsored study detailing cable system carriage practices in the wake of decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit striking down prior must-carry regulations. See Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F. 2d 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 203 Opinion of Kennedy, J. 1434 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U. S. 1169 (1986); Century Com- munications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F. 2d 292 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U. S. 1032 (1988). It indicated that in 1988, 280 out of 912 responding broadcast stations had been dropped or de- nied carriage in 1,533 instances. App. 47. Even assuming that every station dropped or denied coverage responded to the survey, it would indicate that nearly a quarter (21 per- cent) of the approximately 1,356 broadcast stations then in existence, id., at 40, had been denied carriage. The same study reported 869 of 4,303 reporting cable systems had de- nied carriage to 704 broadcast stations in 1,820 instances, id., at 48, and 279 of those stations had qualified for carriage under the prior must-carry rules, id., at 49. A contempo- raneous study of public television stations indicated that in the vast majority of cases, dropped stations were not re- stored to the cable service. Record, CR Vol. I.Z, Exh. 140, pp. CR 15297­15298, 15306­15307. Substantial evidence demonstrated that absent must-carry the already "serious," Senate Report, at 43, problem of non- carriage would grow worse because "additional local broad- cast signals will be deleted, repositioned, or not carried," § 2(a)(15). The record included anecdotal evidence showing the cable industry was acting with restraint in dropping broadcast stations in an effort to discourage reregulation. See Hearings on Cable Television Regulation, at 900, n. 81 (statement of James B. Hedlund); Hearings on Cable Televi- sion Regulation (Part 2), at 242­243 (statement of James P. Mooney) (App. 1519); JSCR ¶¶ 524­534 (App. 1515­1519). There was also substantial evidence that advertising revenue would be of increasing importance to cable operators as sub- scribership growth began to flatten, providing a steady, in- creasing incentive to deny carriage to local broadcasters in an effort to capture their advertising revenue. Id., ¶¶ 124­ 142, 154­166 (App. 1301­1308, 1313­1319). A contemporane- ous FCC report noted that "[c]able operators' incentive to deny carriage . . . appears to be particularly great as against 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 204 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of Kennedy, J. local broadcasters." Id., ¶ 155 (App. 1313). FCC Commis- sioner James Quello warned Congress that the carriage problems "occurring today are just the `tip of the iceberg.' These activities come at a time when the cable industry is just beginning to recognize the importance of local advertis- ing." Cable Television, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 322 (1988) (App. 1515). Quello continued: "As [cable] systems mature and penetration levels off, systems will turn increasingly to advertising for revenues. The incentive to deny carriage to local stations is a logical, rational and, without must carry, a legal business strategy." App. A to Testimony of James B. Hedlund before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy & Com- merce 18 (1990) (statement of James H. Quello) (App. 1315). The FCC advised Congress the "diversity in broadcast tele- vision service . . . will be jeopardized if this situation contin- ues unredressed." In re Competition, Rate Regulation, and Provision of Cable Television Service, 5 FCC Rcd 4962, 5040, ¶ 149 (1990). Additional evidence developed on remand supports the reasonableness of Congress' predictive judgment. Approxi- mately 11 percent of local broadcasters were not carried on the typical cable system in 1989. See Reply Comment of FTC, at 9­10 (App. 168­169). The figure had grown to even more significant proportions by 1992. According to one of appellants' own experts, between 19 and 31 percent of all local broadcast stations, including network affiliates, were not carried by the typical cable system. See Declaration of Stanley Besen, Exhs. C­2, C­3 (App. 907­908). Based on the same data, another expert concluded that 47 percent of local independent commercial stations, and 36 percent of non- commercial stations, were not carried by the typical cable system. The rate of noncarriage was even higher for new stations. Third Meek Declaration ¶ 4 (App. 2054). Appel- 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 205 Opinion of Kennedy, J. lees introduced evidence drawn from an empirical study con- cluding the 1988 FCC survey substantially underestimated the actual number of drops (Declaration of Tom Meek ¶¶ 5, 25, 36 (Meek Declaration) (App. 619, 625, 626)), and the non- carriage problem grew steadily worse during the period without must-carry. By the time the Cable Act was passed, 1,261 broadcast stations had been dropped for at least one year, in a total of 7,945 incidents. Id., ¶¶ 12, 15 (App. 621, 622). The dissent cites evidence indicating that many dropped broadcasters were stations few viewers watch, post, at 242, and it suggests that must-carry thwarts noncable viewers' preferences, ibid. Undoubtedly, viewers without cable-the immediate, though not sole, beneficiaries of efforts to pre- serve broadcast television-would have a strong preference for carriage of any broadcast program over any cable pro- gram, for the simple reason that it helps to preserve a me- dium to which they have access. The methodological flaws in the cited evidence are of concern. See post, at 243. Even aside from that, the evidence overlooks that the broadcasters added by must-carry had ratings greater than or equal to the cable programs they replaced. Second Meek Declaration ¶ 23 (App. 1863) (ratings of broadcasters added by must- carry "are generally higher than that achieved . . . by their equivalent cable counterparts"); Meek Declaration ¶ 21, at 11­12 (Record, DAE Vol. II.A, Exh. 2); see also Hearings on Cable Television Regulation, at 880 (statement of James Hedlund) ("[I]n virtually every instance, the local [broadcast] stations shifted are more popular . . . than the cable program services that replace them"); JSCR ¶¶ 497­510 (App. 1505­ 1509) (stations dropped before must-carry generally more popular than cable services that replaced them). (Indeed, in the vast majority of cases, cable systems were able to fulfill their must-carry obligations using spare channels, and did not displace cable programmers. See Report to Counsel for National Cable Television Association Carriage of Must- 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 206 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of Kennedy, J. Carry TV Broadcast Stations, Table II­4 (Apr. 1995) (App. 678).) On average, even the lowest rated station added pur- suant to must-carry had ratings better than or equal to at least nine basic cable program services carried on the sys- tem. Third Meek Declaration ¶ 20, and n. 5 (App. 2061). If cable systems refused to carry certain local broadcast sta- tions because of their subscribers' preferences for the cable services carried in their place, one would expect that all cable programming services would have ratings exceeding those of broadcasters not carried. That is simply not the case. The evidence on remand also indicated that the growth of cable systems' market power proceeded apace. The trend toward greater horizontal concentration continued, driven by "[e]nhanced growth prospects for advertising sales." Paul Kagan Assocs., Inc., Cable TV Advertising 1 (Sept. 30, 1994) (App. 301). By 1994, the 10 largest MSO's controlled 63 percent of cable systems, Notice of Inquiry, In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for Delivery of Video Programming, 10 FCC Rcd 7805, 7819­ 7820, ¶ 79 (1995), a figure projected to have risen to 85 per- cent by the end of 1996. DAE Vol. VII.D, Exh. 80, at 1 (Turner Broadcasting memo); Noll Declaration ¶ 26 (App. 1017). MSO's began to gain control of as many cable sys- tems in a given market as they could, in a trend known as "clustering." JSCR ¶¶ 150­153 (App. 1311­1313). Cable systems looked increasingly to advertising (and especially local advertising) for revenue growth, see, e. g., Paul Kagan Associates, Inc., Cable TV Advertising 1 (July 28, 1993) (App. 251); 1 R. Bilotti, D. Hansen, & R. MacDonald, The Cable Television Industry 94­97 (Mar. 8, 1993) (DAE Vol. VII.K, Exh. 232, at 94­97) ("Local advertising revenue is an exceptional incremental revenue opportunity for the cable television industry"); Memo from Arts & Entertainment Network, dated Oct. 26, 1992, p. 2 (DAE Vol. VII.K, Exh. 235) (discussing "huge growth on the horizon" for spot adver- 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 207 Opinion of Kennedy, J. tising revenue), and cable systems had increasing incentives to drop local broadcasters in favor of cable programmers (whether affiliated or not). See Noll Declaration ¶¶ 29­31 (App. 1018­1020). The vertical integration of the cable in- dustry also continued, so by 1994, MSO's serving about 70 percent of the Nation's cable subscribers held equity inter- ests in cable programmers. See In re Implementation of Section 19 of Cable Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992, First Report, 9 FCC Rcd 7442, 7526, ¶ 167, and nn. 455, 457 (1994); id., App. G, Tables 9­10; Top 100 MSO's as of October 1, 1994 (DAE Vol. VII.K, Exh. 266); see also JSCR ¶¶ 199, 204 (App. 1334, 1336). The FTC study the dis- sent cites, post, at 242, takes a skeptical view of the potential for cable systems to engage in anticompetitive behavior, but concedes the risk of anticompetitive carriage denials is "most plausible" when "the cable system's franchise area is large relative to the local area served by the affected broadcast station," Reply Comment of FTC, at 20 (App. 177), and when "a system's penetration rate is both high and relatively unre- sponsive to the system's carriage decisions," id., at 18 (App. 175). That describes "precisely what is happening" as large cable operators expand their control over individual markets through clustering. Second Meek Declaration ¶ 35 (App. 1867). As they do so, they are better able to sell their own reach to potential advertisers, and to limit the access of broadcast competitors by denying them access to all or sub- stantially all the cable homes in the market area. Ibid.; ac- cord, Noll Declaration ¶ 24 (App. 1015). This is not a case in which we are called upon to give our best judgment as to the likely economic consequences of certain financial arrangements or business structures, or to assess competing economic theories and predictive judg- ments, as we would in a case arising, say, under the antitrust laws. "Statutes frequently require courts to make policy judgments. The Sherman Act, for example, requires courts to delve deeply into the theory of economic organization." 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 208 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of the Court See Holder v. Hall, 512 U. S. 874, 966 (1994) (separate opinion of Stevens, J.). The issue before us is whether, given con- flicting views of the probable development of the television industry, Congress had substantial evidence for making the judgment that it did. We need not put our imprimatur on Congress' economic theory in order to validate the rea- sonableness of its judgment. 2 The harm Congress feared was that stations dropped or denied carriage would be at a "serious risk of financial dif- ficulty," 512 U. S., at 667, and would "deteriorate to a sub- stantial degree or fail altogether," id., at 666. Congress had before it substantial evidence to support its conclusion. Congress was advised the viability of a broadcast station depends to a material extent on its ability to secure cable carriage. JSCR ¶¶ 597­617, 667­670, 673 (App. 1544­1553, 1580­1581, 1582­1583). One broadcast industry executive explained it this way: "Simply put, a television station's audience size directly translates into revenue-large audiences attract larger revenues, through the sale of advertising time. If a sta- tion is not carried on cable, and thereby loses a substan- tial portion of its audience, it will lose revenue. With less revenue, the station can not serve its community as well. The station will have less money to invest in equipment and programming. The attractiveness of its programming will lessen, as will its audience. Reve- nues will continue to decline, and the cycle will repeat." Hearing on Competitive Issues, at 526­527 (statement of Gary Chapman) (App. 1600). See also JSCR ¶¶ 589­591 (App. 1542­1543); id., ¶¶ 625­633, 636, 638­640 (App. 1555­1563) (repositioning). Empirical research in the record before Congress confirmed the " `di- rect correlation [between] size in audience and station [ad- 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 209 Opinion of the Court vertising] revenues,' " id., ¶ 591 (App. 1543), and that viewer- ship was in turn heavily dependent on cable carriage, see id., ¶¶ 589­596 (App. 1542­1544). Considerable evidence, consisting of statements compiled from dozens of broadcasters who testified before Congress and the FCC, confirmed that broadcast stations had fallen into bankruptcy, see id., ¶¶ 659, 661, 669, 671­672, 676, 681 (App. 1576, 1578, 1581­1582, 1584, 1587), curtailed their broadcast operations, see id., ¶¶ 589, 692, 695, 697, 703­704 (App. 1542, 1591­1600), and suffered serious reductions in operating revenues as a result of adverse carriage decisions by cable systems, see id., ¶¶ 618­620, 622­623 (App. 1553­ 1555). The record also reflected substantial evidence that stations without cable carriage encountered severe difficul- ties obtaining financing for operations, reflecting the finan- cial markets' judgment that the prospects are poor for broad- casters unable to secure carriage. See, e. g., id., ¶¶ 302, 304, 581, 643­658 (App. 1382­1383, 1538­1539, 1564­1576); see also Declaration of David Schutz ¶¶ 6, 15­16, 18, 43 (App. 640­641, 644­646, 654); Noll Declaration ¶¶ 36­42 (App. 1024­1029); Haring Declaration ¶¶ 21­26 (App. 1099­1102); Second Meek Declaration ¶ 11 (App. 1858); Declaration of Jef- frey Rohlfs ¶ 6 (App. 1157­1158). Evidence before Congress suggested the potential adverse impact of losing carriage was increasing as the growth of clustering gave MSO's cen- tralized control over more local markets. See JSCR ¶¶ 150­ 153 (App. 1311­1313). Congress thus had ample basis to conclude that attaining cable carriage would be of increasing importance to ensuring a station's viability. We hold Con- gress could conclude from the substantial body of evidence before it that "absent legislative action, the free local off-air broadcast system is endangered." Senate Report, at 42. The evidence assembled on remand confirms the rea- sonableness of the congressional judgment. Documents produced on remand reflect that internal cable industry studies 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 210 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of the Court "clearly establis[h] the importance of cable television to broadcast television stations. Because viewership equates to ratings and in turn ratings equate to reve- nues, it is unlikely that broadcast stations could afford to be off the cable system's line-up for any extended pe- riod of time." Memorandum from F. Lopez to T. Baxter re: Adlink's Presentations on Retransmission Consent, dated June 14, 1993 (App. 2118). Another study prepared by a large MSO in 1993 concluded that "[w]ith cable penetration now exceeding 70% in many markets, the ability of a broadcast television station to easily reach its audience through cable television is crucial." Exh. B to Haring Declaration, DAE Vol. II.A (App. 2147). The study acknowledged that even in a market with significantly below-average cable penetration, "[t]he loss of cable carriage could cause a significant decrease in a station's ratings and a resulting loss in advertising revenues." Ibid. (App. 2147). For an average market "the impact would be even greater." Ibid. (App. 2149). The study determined that for a popu- lar station in a major television market, even modest reduc- tions in carriage could result in sizeable reductions in reve- nue. A 5 percent reduction in cable viewers, for example, would result in a $1.48 million reduction in gross revenue for the station. (App. 2156.) To be sure, the record also contains evidence to support a contrary conclusion. Appellants (and the dissent in the District Court) make much of the fact that the number of broadcast stations and their advertising revenue continued to grow during the period without must-carry, albeit at a diminished rate. Evidence introduced on remand indicated that only 31 broadcast stations actually went dark during the period without must-carry (one of which failed after a tor- nado destroyed its transmitter), and during the same period some 263 new stations signed on the air. Meek Declaration ¶¶ 76­77 (App. 627­628). New evidence appellants pro- duced on remand indicates the average cable system volun- 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 211 Opinion of the Court tarily carried local broadcast stations accounting for about 97 percent of television ratings in noncable households. Declaration of Stanley Besen, Part III­D (App. 808). Ap- pellants, as well as the dissent in the District Court, contend that in light of such evidence, it is clear "the must-carry law is not necessary to assure the economic viability of the broad- cast system as a whole." NCTA Brief 18. This assertion misapprehends the relevant inquiry. The question is not whether Congress, as an objective matter, was correct to determine must-carry is necessary to pre- vent a substantial number of broadcast stations from losing cable carriage and suffering significant financial hardship. Rather, the question is whether the legislative conclusion was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the record before Congress. Turner, 512 U. S., at 665­666. In making that determination, we are not to "reweigh the evi- dence de novo, or to replace Congress' factual predictions with our own." Id., at 666. Rather, we are simply to de- termine if the standard is satisfied. If it is, summary judg- ment for defendants-appellees is appropriate regardless of whether the evidence is in conflict. We have noted in an- other context, involving less deferential review than is at issue here, that " `the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent . . . [a] finding from being supported by substantial evidence.' " American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U. S. 490, 523 (1981) (citation omitted) (quoting Consolo v. Federal Mari- time Comm'n, 383 U. S. 607, 620 (1966)). Although evidence of continuing growth in broadcast could have supported the opposite conclusion, a reasonable inter- pretation is that expansion in the cable industry was causing harm to broadcasting. Growth continued, but the rate of growth fell to a considerable extent during the period with- out must-carry (from 4.5 percent in 1986 to 1.7 percent by 1992), and appeared to be tapering off further. JSCR ¶¶ 577­584 (App. 1537­1540); Meek Declaration ¶¶ 74­82 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 212 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of the Court (App. 626­631); 910 F. Supp., at 790, App. 2. At the same time, "in an almost unprecedented development," 5 FCC Rcd, at 5041, ¶¶ 153­154, stations began to fail in increasing numbers. Meek Declaration ¶ 78 (App. 628) ("[T]he number of stations going dark began to escalate" after 1988) (empha- sis deleted); JSCR ¶¶ 659, 661, 669, 671­672, 676, 681 (App. 1576, 1581­1582, 1584, 1587). Broadcast advertising reve- nues declined in real terms by 11 percent between 1986 and 1991, during a period in which cable's real advertising reve- nues nearly doubled. See 910 F. Supp., at 790, App. 1. While these phenomena could be thought to stem from fac- tors quite separate from the increasing market power of cable (for example, a recession in 1990­1992), it was for Con- gress to determine the better explanation. We are not at liberty to substitute our judgment for the reasonable conclu- sion of a legislative body. See Turner, supra, at 665­666. It is true the number of bankruptcies among local broadcast- ers was small; but Congress could forecast continuance of the "unprecedented" 5-year downward trend and conclude the station failures of 1985­1992 were, as Commissioner Quello warned, the tip of the iceberg. A fundamental princi- ple of legislation is that Congress is under no obligation to wait until the entire harm occurs but may act to prevent it. "An industry need not be in its death throes before Congress may act to protect it from economic harm threatened by a monopoly." Turner, supra, at 672 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). As a Senate Commit- tee noted in a Report on the Cable Act: "[W]e need not wait until widespread further harm has occurred to the system of local broadcasting or to competition in the video market be- fore taking action to forestall such consequences. Congress is allowed to make a rational predication of the consequences of inaction and of the effects of regulation in furthering gov- ernmental interests." Senate Report, at 60. Despite the considerable evidence before Congress and ad- duced on remand indicating that the significant numbers of 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 213 Opinion of the Court broadcast stations are at risk, the dissent believes yet more is required before Congress could act. It demands more in- formation about which of the dropped broadcast stations still qualify for mandatory carriage, post, at 241; about the broad- cast markets in which adverse decisions take place, ibid.; and about the features of the markets in which bankrupt broad- cast stations were located prior to their demise, post, at 246. The level of detail in factfinding required by the dissent would be an improper burden for courts to impose on the Legislative Branch. That amount of detail is as unreason- able in the legislative context as it is constitutionally unwar- ranted. "Congress is not obligated, when enacting its stat- utes, to make a record of the type that an administrative agency or court does to accommodate judicial review." Turner, supra, at 666 (plurality opinion). We think it apparent must-carry serves the Government's interests "in a direct and effective way." Ward, 491 U. S., at 800. Must-carry ensures that a number of local broad- casters retain cable carriage, with the concomitant audience access and advertising revenues needed to support a multi- plicity of stations. Appellants contend that even were this so, must-carry is broader than necessary to accomplish its goals. We turn to this question. B The second portion of the O'Brien inquiry concerns the fit between the asserted interests and the means chosen to advance them. Content-neutral regulations do not pose the same "inherent dangers to free expression," Turner, supra, at 661, that content-based regulations do, and thus are sub- ject to a less rigorous analysis, which affords the Govern- ment latitude in designing a regulatory solution. See, e. g., Ward, supra, at 798­799, n. 6. Under intermediate scrutiny, the Government may employ the means of its choosing " `so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial governmen- tal interest that would be achieved less effectively absent 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 214 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of the Court the regulation,' " and does not " `burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further' " that interest. Turner, 512 U. S., at 662 (quoting Ward, supra, at 799). The must-carry provisions have the potential to interfere with protected speech in two ways. First, the provisions restrain cable operators' editorial discretion in creating pro- gramming packages by "reduc[ing] the number of channels over which [they] exercise unfettered control." Turner, 512 U. S., at 637. Second, the rules "render it more difficult for cable programmers to compete for carriage on the limited channels remaining." Ibid. Appellants say the burden of must-carry is great, but the evidence adduced on remand indicates the actual effects are modest. Significant evidence indicates the vast majority of cable operators have not been affected in a significant man- ner by must-carry. Cable operators have been able to sat- isfy their must-carry obligations 87 percent of the time using previously unused channel capacity, Declaration of Harry Shooshan III, ¶ 14 (App. 692); 94.5 percent of the 11,628 cable systems nationwide have not had to drop any programming in order to fulfill their must-carry obligations; the remaining 5.5 percent have had to drop an average of only 1.22 services from their programming, id., ¶ 15 (App. 692); and cable oper- ators nationwide carry 99.8 percent of the programming they carried before enactment of must-carry, id., ¶ 21 (App. 694­ 695). Appellees note that only 1.18 percent of the approxi- mately 500,000 cable channels nationwide is devoted to chan- nels added because of must-carry, see id., ¶ 11(b) (App. 688­689); weighted for subscribership, the figure is 2.4 per- cent, 910 F. Supp., at 780 (Williams, J., dissenting). Appel- lees contend the burdens of must-carry will soon diminish as cable channel capacity increases, as is occurring nationwide. NAB Brief 45; see also 910 F. Supp., at 746­747. We do not understand appellants to dispute in any funda- mental way the accuracy of those figures, only their signifi- cance. See NCTA Brief 46; id., at 44­49; Time Warner Brief 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 215 Opinion of the Court 38­45; Turner Brief 33­42. They note national averages fail to account for greater crowding on certain (especially urban) cable systems, see Time Warner Brief 41, 43; Turner Brief 41, and contend that half of all cable systems, serving two- thirds of all cable subscribers, have no available capacity, NCTA Brief 45; Turner Brief 34; Time Warner Brief 42, n. 58. Appellants argue that the rate of growth in cable programming outstrips cable operators' creation of new channel space, that the rate of cable growth is lower than claimed, Turner Brief 39, and that must-carry infringes First Amendment rights now irrespective of future growth, Turner Brief 40; Reply Brief for Appellants Turner Broad- casting System, Inc., et al. 12­13. Finally, they say that re- gardless of the percentage of channels occupied, must-carry still represents "thousands of real and individual infringe- ments of speech." Time Warner Brief 44. While the parties' evidence is susceptible of varying inter- pretations, a few definite conclusions can be drawn about the burdens of must-carry. It is undisputed that broadcast sta- tions gained carriage on 5,880 channels as a result of must- carry. While broadcast stations occupy another 30,006 cable channels nationwide, this carriage does not represent a sig- nificant First Amendment harm to either system operators or cable programmers because those stations were carried voluntarily before 1992, and even appellants represent, Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, that the vast majority of those channels would continue to be carried in the absence of any legal obligation to do so. See Turner, supra, at 673, n. 6 (Stevens, J., con- curring in part and concurring in judgment). The 5,880 channels occupied by added broadcasters represent the ac- tual burden of the regulatory scheme. Appellants concede most of those stations would be dropped in the absence of must-carry, Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, so the figure approximates the benefits of must-carry as well. Because the burden imposed by must-carry is congruent to the benefits it affords, we conclude must-carry is narrowly 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 216 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of the Court tailored to preserve a multiplicity of broadcast stations for the 40 percent of American households without cable. Cf. Ward, 491 U. S., at 799, n. 7 ("[T]he essence of narrow tailor- ing" is "focus[ing] on the source of the evils the [Govern- ment] seeks to eliminate [without] significantly restricting a substantial quantity of speech that does not create the same evils"); Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S., at 297 ("None of [the regulation's] provisions appears unrelated to the ends that it was designed to serve"). Congress took steps to confine the breadth and burden of the regulatory scheme. For example, the more popular stations (which ap- pellants concede would be carried anyway) will likely opt to be paid for cable carriage under the "retransmission consent" provision of the Cable Act; those stations will nonetheless be counted toward systems' must-carry obligations. Congress exempted systems of 12 or fewer channels, and limited the must-carry obligation of larger systems to one-third of capac- ity, 47 U. S. C. § 534(b)(1); see also §§ 535(b)(2)­(3); allowed cable operators discretion in choosing which competing and qualified signals would be carried, § 534(b)(2); and permitted operators to carry public stations on unused public, educa- tional, and governmental channels in some circumstances, § 535(d). Appellants say the must-carry provisions are overbroad because they require carriage in some instances when the Government's interests are not implicated: The must-carry rules prohibit a cable system operator from dropping a broadcaster "even if the operator has no anticompetitive mo- tives, and even if the broadcaster that would have to be dropped . . . would survive without cable access." 512 U. S., at 683 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also NCTA Brief 25­ 26. We are not persuaded that either possibility is so preva- lent that must-carry is substantially overbroad. As dis- cussed supra, at 201­202, cable systems serving 70 percent of subscribers are vertically integrated with cable program- mers, so anticompetitive motives may be implicated in a 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 217 Opinion of the Court majority of systems' decisions not to carry broadcasters. Some broadcasters will opt for must-carry although they would not suffer serious financial harm in its absence. See Time Warner Brief 35­36, and n. 49. Broadcasters with stronger finances tend, however, to be popular ones that or- dinarily seek payment from cable systems for transmission, so their reliance on must-carry should be minimal. It ap- pears, for example, that no more than a few hundred of the 500,000 cable channels nationwide are occupied by network affiliates opting for must-carry, see Time Warner Brief 35­ 36, and n. 49, a number insufficient to render must-carry "substantially broader than necessary to achieve the govern- ment's interest," Ward, supra, at 800. Even on the doubtful assumption that a narrower but still practicable must-carry rule could be drafted to exclude all instances in which the Government's interests are not implicated, our cases estab- lish that content-neutral regulations are not "invalid simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech." Albertini, 472 U. S., at 689; accord, Ward, supra, at 797; Community for Creative Non- Violence, supra, at 299. Appellants posit a number of alternatives in an effort to demonstrate a less restrictive means to achieve the Govern- ment's aims. They ask us, in effect, to "sif[t] through all the available or imagined alternative means of regulating [cable television] in order to determine whether the [Government's] solution was `the least intrusive means' of achieving the desired end," an approach we rejected in Ward, 491 U. S., at 797. This " `less-restrictive-alternative analysis . . . has never been a part of the inquiry into the validity' " of content-neutral regulations on speech. Ibid. (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U. S. 641, 657 (1984) (plurality opinion) (ellipses in original)). Our precedents establish that when evaluating a content-neutral regulation which incidentally burdens speech, we will not invalidate the preferred reme- dial scheme because some alternative solution is marginally 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 218 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of the Court less intrusive on a speaker's First Amendment interests. "So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest, . . . the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court con- cludes that the government's interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative." Ward, 491 U. S., at 800. See generally ibid. (holding regulation valid although Court of Appeals had identified less restric- tive "alternative regulatory methods" of controlling volume at concerts); Albertini, supra, at 689 (upholding validity of order barring a person from a military base, although exclud- ing barred person was not "essential" to preserving security and there were less speech-restrictive means of attaining that end); Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 299 (overnight camping ban upheld although "there [were] less speech-restrictive alternatives" of satisfying interest in preserving park lands); Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 815­817 (1984) (stating that although making exceptions to ban on posting signs on public property "would have had a less severe effect on expressive activity," they were not "consti- tutionally mandated"). It is well established a regulation's validity "does not turn on a judge's agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant government interests." Albertini, supra, at 689. In any event, after careful examination of each of the alter- natives suggested by appellants, we cannot conclude that any of them is an adequate alternative to must-carry for promot- ing the Government's legitimate interests. First among ap- pellants' suggested alternatives is a proposal to revive a more limited set of must-carry rules, known as the "Century rules" after the 1987 court decision striking them down, see Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F. 2d 292 (CADC). Those rules included a minimum viewership standard for eligibility and limited the must-carry obligation 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 219 Opinion of the Court to 25 percent of channel capacity. The parties agree only 14 percent of broadcasters added to cable systems under the Cable Act would be eligible for carriage under the Century rules. See Turner Brief 45; Brief for Federal Appellees 45; NAB Brief 49; see also Declaration of Gregory Klein ¶¶ 21­25 (App. 1141­1143). The Century rules, for the most part, would require carriage of the same stations a system would carry without statutory compulsion. While we ac- knowledge appellants' criticism of any rationale that more is better, the scheme in question does not place limitless must- carry obligations on cable system operators. In the final analysis this alternative represents nothing more than appel- lants' " `[dis]agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning' . . . the degree to which [the Government's] in- terests should be promoted." Ward, supra, at 800 (quot- ing Albertini, supra, at 689); Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S., at 299. Congress legislated in the shadow of Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F. 2d 1434 (CADC 1985), and Century Communications. Its delibera- tions reflect awareness of the must-carry rules at issue in those cases, Senate Report, at 39­41, 62; indeed, in drafting the must-carry provisions of the Cable Act, Congress made specific comparisons to the rules struck down in Quincy, supra. See House Report, at 65­66; Senate Report, at 61. The record reflects a deliberate congressional choice to adopt the present levels of protection, to which this Court must defer. The second alternative appellants urge is the use of input selector or "A/B" switches, which, in combination with an- tennas, would permit viewers to switch between cable and broadcast input, allowing cable subscribers to watch broad- cast programs not carried on cable. Congress examined the use of A/B switches as an alternative to must-carry and con- cluded it was "not an enduring or feasible method of distribu- tion and . . . not in the public interest." § 2(a)(18). The data showed that: many households lacked adequate antennas to 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 220 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of the Court receive broadcast signals, JSCR ¶¶ 724, 725, 768 (App. 1609­ 1610, 1634); A/B switches suffered from technical flaws, id., ¶¶ 718, 721, 738­739, 751­755, 761 (App. 1606, 1608, 1617­ 1618, 1624­1626, 1630); viewers might be required to reset channel settings repeatedly in order to view both UHF and cable channels, House Report, at 54; and installation and use of the switch with other common video equipment (such as videocassette recorders) could be "cumbersome or impos- sible," Senate Report, at 45, and nn. 115­116; House Re- port, at 54, and nn. 60­61; see also JSCR ¶¶ 746, 750, 758­ 767 (App. 1622, 1623, 1629­1634). Even the cable industry trade association (one of appellants here) determined that "the A/B switch is not a workable solution to the carriage problem." Senate Report, at 45; House Report, at 54. The group's engineering committee likewise concluded the switches suffered from technical problems and that no solu- tion "appear[ed] imminent." Joint Petition for Reconsidera- tion in MM Docket No. 85­349, pp. 6­8 (Dec. 17, 1986) (App. 1606­1607); see also Senate Report, at 45, and n. 115; House Report, at 54, and n. 60; Must Carry, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 80 (1989) (statement of Preston Padden) (App. 1608); Hearings on Cable Television Regulation, at 901, n. 84 (state- ment of James B. Hedlund) (App. 1608). Congress also had before it "considerable evidence," in- cluding two empirical studies, that "it is rare for [cable sub- scribers] ever to switch to receive an over-the-air signal," Senate Report, at 45; House Report, at 54, and n. 62. A 1991 study demonstrated that even "after several years of a government mandated program of providing A­B switches [to] consumers and a simultaneous education program on their use," NAB, A­B Switch Availability and Use (Sept. 23, 1991) (App. 132), and after FCC-mandated technical im- provements to the switch, App. 129, only 11.7 percent of all cable-connected television sets were attached to an antenna 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 221 Opinion of the Court and had an A/B switch, id., at 131. Of the small number of households possessing the switch, an even smaller num- ber (only 38 percent) had ever used it. Ibid. See House Report, at 54, and nn. 62­63. Congress' decision that use of A/B switches was not a real alternative to must-carry was a reasonable one based on substantial evidence of technical shortcomings and lack of consumer acceptance. The rea- sonableness of its judgment was confirmed by additional evidence on remand that A/B switches can create signal in- terference and add complexity to video systems, factors discouraging their use. See Declaration of Eldon Haakinson ¶¶ 45­54 (App. 602­609); Supplemental Declaration of Eldon Haakinson ¶¶ 8­10 (App. 2025­2026); Memorandum from W. Cicora to L. Yaeger et al., dated June 25, 1993, p. 5 (channels may have to be reset every time A/B switch is used) (App. 246). Appellants also suggest a leased-access regime, under which both broadcasters and cable programmers would have equal access to cable channels at regulated rates. Turner Brief 46­47. Appellants do not specify what kind of regime they would propose, or how it would operate, making this alternative difficult to compare to the must-carry rules. Whatever virtues the proposal might otherwise have, it would reduce the number of cable channels under cable sys- tems' control in the same manner as must-carry. Because this alternative is aimed solely at addressing the bottleneck control of cable operators, it would not be as effective in achieving Congress' further goal of ensuring that significant programming remains available for the 40 percent of Ameri- can households without cable. Indeed, unless the number of channels set aside for local broadcast stations were to de- crease (sacrificing Congress' interest in preserving a multi- plicity of broadcasters), additional channels would have to be set aside for cable programmers, further reducing the chan- nels under the systems' control. Furthermore, Congress was specific in noting that requiring payment for cable car- 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 222 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of the Court riage was inimical to the interests it was pursuing, because of the burden it would impose on small broadcasters. See House Report, at 51; Senate Report, at 43, 45. Congress specifically prohibited such payments under the Cable Act. 47 U. S. C. §§ 534(b)(10), 535(i). Appellants next suggest a system of subsidies for finan- cially weak stations. Appellants have not proposed any par- ticular subsidy scheme, so it is difficult to determine whether this option presents a feasible means of achieving the Gov- ernment's interests, let alone one preferable to must-carry under the First Amendment. To begin with, a system of subsidies would serve a very different purpose than must- carry. Must-carry is intended not to guarantee the financial health of all broadcasters, but to ensure a base number of broadcasters survive to provide service to noncable house- holds. Must-carry is simpler to administer and less likely to involve the Government in making content-based determina- tions about programming. The must-carry rules distinguish between categories of speakers based solely on the tech- nology used to communicate. The rules acknowledge cable systems' expertise by according them discretion to deter- mine which broadcasters to carry on reserved channels, and (within the Cable Act's strictures) allow them to choose broadcasters with a view to offering program choices appeal- ing to local subscribers. Appellants' proposal would require the Government to develop other criteria for giving subsidies and to establish a potentially elaborate administrative struc- ture to make subsidy determinations. Appellants also suggest a system of antitrust enforcement or an administrative complaint procedure to protect broad- casters from cable operators' anticompetitive conduct. See Turner Brief 47­48. Congress could conclude, however, that the considerable expense and delay inherent in antitrust liti- gation, and the great disparities in wealth and sophistication between the average independent broadcast station and av- erage cable system operator, would make these remedies in- 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 223 Opinion of the Court adequate substitutes for guaranteed carriage. The record suggests independent broadcasters simply are not in a posi- tion to engage in complex antitrust litigation, which involves extensive discovery, significant motions practice, appeals, and the payment of high legal fees throughout. See JSCR ¶¶ 556­576 (App. 1528­1537); Meek Declaration ¶ 58 (Record, Defendants' Joint Submission of Expert Affidavits and Re- ports in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Vol. II.A, Exh. 2). An administrative complaint procedure, al- though less burdensome, would still require stations to incur considerable expense and delay before enforcing their rights. As it is, some public stations have been forced by limited resources to forgo pursuing administrative complaints under the Cable Act to obtain carriage. See Declaration of Car- olyn Lewis ¶ 13 (App. 548­549); Declaration of John Beabout ¶ 11 (App. 526­527). Those problems would be compounded if instead of proving entitlement under must-carry, the sta- tion had to prove facts establishing an antitrust violation. There is a final argument made by appellants that we do not reach. Appellant Time Warner Entertainment raises in its brief a separate First Amendment challenge to a subsec- tion of the Cable Act, 47 U. S. C. § 534(c), that requires car- riage on unfilled must-carry channels of low power broadcast stations if the FCC determines that the station's program- ming "would address local news and informational needs which are not being adequately served by full power televi- sion broadcast stations because of the geographic distance of such full power stations from the low power station's commu- nity of license." § 534(h)(2)(B). We earlier reserved this question and invited the District Court to address it on re- mand. See Turner, 512 U. S., at 643­644, n. 6. Because this question has received "only the most glancing" atten- tion, ibid., from the District Court and the parties, we have no more information about "the operation of, and justifica- tions for, the low-power broadcast provisions," ibid., on which to base an informed determination than we did on the 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 224 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Opinion of the Court earlier appeal. The District Court's primary opinion dis- posed of the question in a perfunctory discussion, 910 F. Supp., at 750­751; and the dissent explicitly declined to reach the question, id., at 789. The issue has received even less attention from the parties. It was not addressed in the jurisdictional statement, the motions to affirm, or the appel- lants' oppositions to the motions to affirm. In over 400 pages of merits briefs, the parties devoted a total of four paragraphs (two of which were relegated to footnotes) to conclusory argumentation on this subject, largely concerning not the merits of the question but whether it was even prop- erly before us. On this state of the record we have insuffi- cient basis to make an informed judgment on this discrete issue. Even if the issue is "fairly included" in the broadly worded question presented, it is tangential to the main issue, and prudence dictates that we not decide this question based on such scant argumentation. See Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U. S. 583, 588­589, n. 2 (1972); Teamsters v. Denver Milk Producers, Inc., 334 U. S. 809 (1948) (per cu- riam); see also Carducci v. Regan, 714 F. 2d 171, 177 (CADC 1983) (Scalia, J.). III Judgments about how competing economic interests are to be reconciled in the complex and fast-changing field of televi- sion are for Congress to make. Those judgments "cannot be ignored or undervalued simply because [appellants] cas[t] [their] claims under the umbrella of the First Amendment." Columbia Broadcasting v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S., at 103. Appellants' challenges to must-carry re- flect little more than disagreement over the level of protec- tion broadcast stations are to be afforded and how protection is to be attained. We cannot displace Congress' judgment respecting content-neutral regulations with our own, so long as its policy is grounded on reasonable factual findings sup- ported by evidence that is substantial for a legislative deter- mination. Those requirements were met in this case, and in 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 225 Breyer, J., concurring in part these circumstances the First Amendment requires nothing more. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, concurring. As Justice Kennedy clearly explains, the policy judg- ments made by Congress in the enactment of legislation that is intended to forestall the abuse of monopoly power are en- titled to substantial deference. Ante, at 195­196, 224 and this page. That is true even when the attempt to protect an economic market imposes burdens on communication. Cf. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U. S. 334 (1959); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 493 U. S. 411, 428, n. 12 (1990) (" `This Court has recognized the strong governmental interest in certain forms of economic regulation, even though such regulation may have an inci- dental effect on rights of speech and association' " (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 912 (1982))). If this statute regulated the content of speech rather than the structure of the market, our task would be quite different. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 669, n. 2 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Cf. Sable Communi- cations of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 129 (1989); Land- mark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 829, 843 (1978). Though I write to emphasize this important point, I fully concur in the Court's thorough opinion. Justice Breyer, concurring in part. I join the opinion of the Court except insofar as Part II­ A­1 relies on an anticompetitive rationale. I agree with the majority that the statute must be "sustained under the First Amendment if it advances important governmental inter- ests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to fur- ther those interests." Ante, at 189 (citing United States v. 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN 226 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Breyer, J., concurring in part O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968)). I also agree that the statute satisfies this standard. My conclusion rests, how- ever, not upon the principal opinion's analysis of the statute's efforts to "promot[e] fair competition," see post, at 230­232, 237­240, but rather upon its discussion of the statute's other objectives, namely, " `(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television,' " and " `(2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a multi- plicity of sources,' " ante, at 189 (quoting Turner Broadcast- ing System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 662 (1994) (Turner)). Whether or not the statute does or does not sensibly compen- sate for some significant market defect, it undoubtedly seeks to provide over-the-air viewers who lack cable with a rich mix of over-the-air programming by guaranteeing the over- the-air stations that provide such programming with the extra dollars that an additional cable audience will generate. I believe that this purpose-to assure the over-the-air public "access to a multiplicity of information sources," id., at 663-provides sufficient basis for rejecting appellants' First Amendment claim. I do not deny that the compulsory carriage that creates the "guarantee" extracts a serious First Amendment price. It interferes with the protected interests of the cable opera- tors to choose their own programming; it prevents displaced cable program providers from obtaining an audience; and it will sometimes prevent some cable viewers from watching what, in its absence, would have been their preferred set of programs. Ante, at 214; post, at 250. This "price" amounts to a "suppression of speech." But there are important First Amendment interests on the other side as well. The statute's basic noneconomic pur- pose is to prevent too precipitous a decline in the quality and quantity of programming choice for an ever-shrinking non-cable-subscribing segment of the public. Ante, at 190, 191­194. This purpose reflects what "has long been a basic tenet of national communications policy," namely, that "the 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:41:59] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 227 Breyer, J., concurring in part widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public." Turner, supra, at 663 (quoting United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U. S. 649, 668, n. 27 (1972) (plural- ity opinion) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 20 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U. S. 582, 594 (1981). That policy, in turn, seeks to facilitate the public discussion and informed deliberation, which, as Justice Bran- deis pointed out many years ago, democratic government presupposes and the First Amendment seeks to achieve. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375­376 (1927) (con- curring opinion). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 390 (1969); Associated Press v. United States, supra, at 20. Indeed, Turner rested in part upon the propo- sition that "assuring that the public has access to a multiplic- ity of information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment." 512 U. S., at 663. With important First Amendment interests on both sides of the equation, the key question becomes one of proper fit. That question, in my view, requires a reviewing court to de- termine both whether there are significantly less restrictive ways to achieve Congress' over-the-air programming objec- tives, and also to decide whether the statute, in its effort to achieve those objectives, strikes a reasonable balance be- tween potentially speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 799­800 (1989); ante, at 217­218. The majority's opinion analyzes and evaluates those consequences, and I agree with its conclusions in respect to both of these matters. Ante, at 213­224. In particular, I note (and agree) that a cable system, physi- cally dependent upon the availability of space along city streets, at present (perhaps less in the future) typically faces little competition, that it therefore constitutes a kind of bot- 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 228 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC Breyer, J., concurring in part tleneck that controls the range of viewer choice (whether or not it uses any consequent economic power for economi- cally predatory purposes), and that some degree-at least a limited degree-of governmental intervention and control through regulation can prove appropriate when justified under O'Brien (at least when not "content based"). Ante, at 197, 208­213; see also Defendants' Joint Statement of Evi- dence before Congress ¶¶ 12­21, 31­59 (App. 1254­1258, 1262­1274) (JSCR); Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, § 2(a)(2), P. L. 102­385, 106 Stat. 1460. Cf. Red Lion, supra, at 377­378, 387­401; 47 CFR §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (1969) (Federal Com- munications Commission regulations upheld in Red Lion); United Broadcasting Co., 10 F. C. C. 515 (1945); New Broad- casting Co., 6 P & F Radio Reg. 258 (1950). I also agree that, without the statute, cable systems would likely carry significantly fewer over-the-air stations, ante, at 191, 202­ 205, that station revenues would therefore decline, ante, at 208­213, and that the quality of over-the-air programming on such stations would almost inevitably suffer, e. g., JSCR ¶¶ 596, 704­706 (App. 1544, 1600­1601); Rebuttal Declaration of Roger G. Noll ¶¶ 5, 11, 34, 38 (App. 1790, 1793, 1804­1805, 1806). I agree further that the burden the statute imposes upon the cable system, potential cable programmers, and cable viewers is limited and will diminish as typical cable system capacity grows over time. Finally, I believe that Congress could reasonably conclude that the statute will help the typical over-the-air viewer (by maintaining an expanded range of choice) more than it will hurt the typical cable subscriber (by restricting cable slots otherwise available for preferred programming). The lat- ter's cable choices are many and varied, and the range of choice is rapidly increasing. The former's over-the-air choice is more restricted; and, as cable becomes more popu- lar, it may well become still more restricted insofar as the over-the-air market shrinks and thereby, by itself, becomes 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 229 O'Connor, J., dissenting less profitable. In these circumstances, I do not believe the First Amendment dictates a result that favors the cable viewers' interests. These and other similar factors discussed by the majority lead me to agree that the statute survives "intermediate scrutiny," whether or not the statute is properly tailored to Congress' purely economic objectives. Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting. In sustaining the must-carry provisions of the Cable Tele- vision Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (Cable Act), Pub. L. 102­385, §§ 4­5, 106 Stat. 1460, against a First Amendment challenge by cable system operators and cable programmers, the Court errs in two crucial respects. First, the Court disregards one of the principal defenses of the statute urged by appellees on remand: that it serves a sub- stantial interest in preserving "diverse," "quality" program- ming that is "responsive" to the needs of the local commu- nity. The course of this litigation on remand and the proffered defense strongly reinforce my view that the Court adopted the wrong analytic framework in the prior phase of this case. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 643­651 (1994) (Turner); id., at 675­680 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Second, the Court misapplies the "intermediate scrutiny" framework it adopts. Although we owe deference to Con- gress' predictive judgments and its evaluation of complex economic questions, we have an independent duty to identify with care the Government interests supporting the scheme, to inquire into the reasonableness of congressional findings regarding its necessity, and to examine the fit between its goals and its consequences. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U. S. 761, 770­771 (1993); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 129 (1989); Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U. S. 488, 496 (1986); Landmark 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 230 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC O'Connor, J., dissenting Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 829, 843 (1978). The Court fails to discharge its duty here. I I did not join those portions of the principal opinion in Turner holding that the must-carry provisions of the Cable Act are content neutral and therefore subject to intermedi- ate First Amendment scrutiny. 512 U. S., at 643­651. The Court there referred to the "unusually detailed statutory findings" accompanying the Cable Act, in which Congress recognized the importance of preserving sources of local news, public affairs, and educational programming. Id., at 646; see id., at 632­634, 648. Nevertheless, the Court mini- mized the significance of these findings, suggesting that they merely reflected Congress' view of the "intrinsic value" of broadcast programming generally, rather than a congres- sional preference for programming with local, educational, or informational content. Id., at 648. In Turner, the Court drew upon Senate and House Re- ports to identify three "interests" that the must-carry provi- sions were designed to serve: "(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a multi- plicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for television programming." Id., at 662 (citing S. Rep. No. 102­92, p. 58 (1991); H. R. Rep. No. 102­628, p. 63 (1992)). The Court reiterates these interests here, ante, at 189­190, but neither the principal opinion nor the partial concurrence ever explains the relationship between them with any clarity. Much of the principal opinion treats the must-carry provi- sions as a species of antitrust regulation enacted by Con- gress in response to a perceived threat that cable system operators would otherwise engage in various forms of anti- competitive conduct resulting in harm to broadcasters. E. g., ante, at 191, 196­208. The Court recognizes that ap- 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 231 O'Connor, J., dissenting pellees cannot show an anticompetitive threat to broadcast television simply by demonstrating that "a few" broadcast stations would be forced off the air in the absence of must- carry. Ante, at 191; see Brief for Federal Appellees 14, 17, 18. No party has ever questioned that adverse carriage de- cisions by cable operators will threaten some broadcasters in some markets. The notion that Congress premised the must-carry provisions upon a far graver threat to the struc- ture of the local broadcast system than the loss of "a few" stations runs through virtually every passage in the princi- pal Turner opinion that discusses the Government interests the provisions were designed to serve. See, e. g., 512 U. S., at 647 (recognizing substantiality of interest in " `protecting noncable households from loss of regular television broad- casting service due to competition from cable systems' " (quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S. 691, 714 (1984) (emphasis added))); 512 U. S., at 652 ("Congress sought to preserve the existing structure of the Nation's broadcast television medium, . . . and, in particular, to en- sure that broadcast television remains available as a source of video programming for those without cable" (emphasis added)); id., at 663 (recognizing interest in "maintaining the local broadcasting structure"); id., at 664­665 (plurality opin- ion) (characterizing inquiry as whether Government "has ad- equately shown that the economic health of local broadcast- ing is in genuine jeopardy" (emphasis added)); id., at 665 (noting Government's reliance on Congress' finding that "ab- sent mandatory carriage rules, the continued viability of local broadcast television would be `seriously jeopardized' " (quoting Cable Act, § 2(a)(16) (emphasis added))); id., at 666 (recognizing Government's assertion that "the must-carry rules are necessary to protect the viability of broadcast tele- vision" (emphasis added)). Ostensibly adopting this frame- work, the Court now asks whether Congress could reason- ably have thought the must-carry regime necessary to prevent a "significant reduction in the multiplicity of broad- 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 232 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC O'Connor, J., dissenting cast programming sources available to noncable households." Ante, at 193 (emphasis added). I fully agree that promoting fair competition is a legiti- mate and substantial Government goal. But the Court no- where examines whether the breadth of the must-carry pro- visions comports with a goal of preventing anticompetitive harms. Instead, in the course of its inquiry into whether the must-carry provisions are "narrowly tailored," the principal opinion simply assumes that most adverse carriage decisions are anticompetitively motivated, and that must-carry is therefore a measured response to a problem of anticom- petitive behavior. Ante, at 216­217. We ordinarily do not substitute unstated and untested assumptions for our independent evaluation of the facts bearing upon an issue of constitutional law. See Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 636 (1980). Perhaps because of the difficulty of defending the must- carry provisions as a measured response to anticompetitive behavior, the Court asserts an "independent" interest in pre- serving a "multiplicity" of broadcast programming sources. Ante, at 194; ante, at 226­227 (Breyer, J., concurring in part). In doing so, the Court posits existence of "conduct that threatens" the availability of broadcast television out- lets, quite apart from anticompetitive conduct. Ante, at 194. We are left to wonder what precisely that conduct might be. Moreover, when separated from anticompetitive conduct, this interest in preserving a "multiplicity of broadcast pro- gramming sources" becomes poorly defined. Neither the principal opinion nor the partial concurrence offers any guid- ance on what might constitute a "significant reduction" in the availability of broadcast programming. The proper analysis, in my view, necessarily turns on the present dis- tribution of broadcast stations among the local broadcast markets that make up the national broadcast "system." Whether cable poses a "significant" threat to a local broad- cast market depends first on how many broadcast stations in 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 233 O'Connor, J., dissenting that market will, in the absence of must-carry, remain avail- able to viewers in noncable households. It also depends on whether viewers actually watch the stations that are dropped or denied carriage. The Court provides some raw data on adverse carriage decisions, but it never connects those data to markets and viewership. Instead, the Court proceeds from the assumptions that adverse carriage deci- sions nationwide will affect broadcast markets in proportion to their size; and that all broadcast programming is watched by viewers. Neither assumption is logical or has any factual basis in the record. Appellees bear the burden of demonstrating that the pro- visions of the Cable Act restricting expressive activity sur- vive constitutional scrutiny. See Turner, supra, at 664. As discussed below, the must-carry provisions cannot be justi- fied as a narrowly tailored means of addressing anticompeti- tive behavior. See infra, at 235­257; ante, at 225, 226, 227­ 228 (Breyer, J., concurring in part). As a result, the Court's inquiry into whether must-carry would prevent a "significant reduction in the multiplicity of broadcast pro- gramming sources" collapses into an analysis of an ill-defined and generalized interest in maintaining broadcast stations, wherever they might be threatened and whatever their viewership. Neither the principal opinion nor the partial concurrence ever explains what kind of conduct, apart from anticompetitive conduct, threatens the "multiplicity" of broadcast programming sources. Indeed, the only justifica- tion advanced by the parties for furthering this interest is heavily content based. It is undisputed that the broadcast stations protected by must-carry are the "marginal" stations within a given market, see infra, at 244; the record on re- mand reveals that any broader threat to the broadcast sys- tem was entirely mythical. Pressed to explain the impor- tance of preserving noncable viewers' access to "vulnerable" broadcast stations, appellees emphasize that the must-carry rules are necessary to ensure that broadcast stations main- 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 234 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC O'Connor, J., dissenting tain "diverse," "quality" programming that is "responsive" to the needs of the local community. Brief for Federal Ap- pellees 13, 30; see Brief for Appellees National Association of Broadcasters et al. 36­37 (NAB Brief); Tr. of Oral Arg. 29, 42; see also ante, at 226 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (justifying must-carry as a means of preventing a decline in "quality and quantity of programming choice"). Must-carry is thus justified as a way of preserving viewers' access to a Spanish or Chinese language station or of preventing an independent station from adopting a home-shopping format. NAB Brief 28, 33; Brief for Federal Appellees 31; Tr. of Oral Arg. 32­33. Undoubtedly, such goals are reasonable and im- portant, and the stations in question may well be worthwhile targets of Government subsidies. But appellees' character- ization of must-carry as a means of protecting these stations, like the Court's explicit concern for promoting " `community self-expression' " and the " `local origination of broadcast pro- gramming,' " ante, at 192, 193 (brackets omitted), reveals a content-based preference for broadcast programming. This justification of the regulatory scheme is, in my view, wholly at odds with the Turner Court's premise that must-carry is a means of preserving "access to free television program- ming-whatever its content," 512 U. S., at 649 (emphasis added). I do not read Justice Breyer's opinion-which analyzes the must-carry rules in part as a "speech-enhancing" meas- ure designed to ensure a "rich mix" of over-the-air program- ming, see ante, at 226, 227-to treat the content of over-the- air programming as irrelevant to whether the Government's interest in promoting it is an important one. The net result appears to be that five Justices of this Court do not view must-carry as a narrowly tailored means of serving a sub- stantial governmental interest in preventing anticompetitive behavior; and that five Justices of this Court do see the significance of the content of over-the-air programming to the Government's and appellees' efforts to defend the law. 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 235 O'Connor, J., dissenting Under these circumstances, the must-carry provisions should be subject to strict scrutiny, which they surely fail. II The principal opinion goes to great lengths to avoid ac- knowledging that preferences for "quality," "diverse," and "responsive" local programming underlie the must-carry scheme, although the partial concurrence's reliance on such preferences is explicit. See ante, at 226 (opinion of Breyer, J.). I take the principal opinion at its word and evaluate the claim that the threat of anticompetitive behavior by cable operators supplies a content-neutral basis for sustaining the statute. It does not. The Turner Court remanded the case for a determination whether the must-carry provisions satisfy intermediate scru- tiny under United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968). Under that standard, appellees must demonstrate that the must-carry provisions (1) "furthe[r] an important or substan- tial government interest"; and (2) burden speech no more "than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id., at 377; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 799 (1989). The Turner plurality found that genuine issues of material fact remained as to both parts of the O'Brien analysis. On whether must-carry furthers a substantial governmental interest, the Turner Court remanded the case to test two essential and unproven propositions: "(1) that un- less cable operators are compelled to carry broadcast sta- tions, significant numbers of broadcast stations will be re- fused carriage on cable systems; and (2) that the broadcast stations denied carriage will either deteriorate to a substan- tial degree or fail altogether." 512 U. S., at 666 (emphasis added). As for whether must-carry restricts no more speech than essential to further Congress' asserted purpose, the Turner plurality found evidence lacking on the extent of the burden that the must-carry provisions would place on cable operators and cable programmers. Id., at 667­668. 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 236 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC O'Connor, J., dissenting The District Court resolved this case on cross-motions for summary judgment. As the Court recognizes, ante, at 211, the fact that the evidence before Congress might have been in conflict will not necessarily preclude summary judgment upholding the must-carry scheme. The question, rather, is what the undisputed facts show about the reasonableness of Congress' conclusions. We are not, however, at liberty to substitute speculation for evidence or to ignore factual dis- putes that call the reasonableness of Congress' findings into question. The evidence on remand demonstrates that appel- lants, not appellees, are entitled to summary judgment. A The principal opinion devotes substantial discussion to the structure of the cable industry, see ante, at 197, 206­207, a matter that was uncontroversial in Turner. See, e. g., 512 U. S., at 627­628, 632­633, 639­640; id., at 684 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As of 1992, cable already served 60 percent of American households. I agree with the observation that Congress could reasonably predict an increase in cable penetration of the local video programming market. Ante, at 197. Local franchising re- quirements and the expense of constructing a cable system to serve a particular area make it possible for cable fran- chisees to exercise a monopoly over cable service. 512 U. S., at 633. Nor was it ever disputed that some cable system operators own large numbers of systems nationwide, or that some cable systems are affiliated with cable programmers. Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 39­40 (DC 1993) (opinion of Jackson, J.); id., at 57 (Williams, J., dissent- ing); Plaintiffs' Response to NAB's Statement of Material Facts ¶ 4 (Feb. 12, 1993) (App. in Turner, O. T. 1993, No. 93­44, p. 186); Plaintiff Time Warner's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Is No Genuine Issue ¶¶ 5, 12 (App. in Turner, O. T. 1993, supra, at 198, 199). 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 237 O'Connor, J., dissenting What was not resolved in Turner was whether "reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence," 512 U. S., at 666 (plurality opinion), supported Congress' judgment that the must-carry provisions were necessary "to prevent cable op- erators from exploiting their economic power to the det- riment of broadcasters," id., at 649. Because I remain convinced that the statute is not a measured response to congressional concerns about monopoly power, see infra, at 249­256, in my view the principal opinion's discussion on this point is irrelevant. But even if it were relevant, it is incorrect. 1 The Turner plurality recognized that Congress' interest in curtailing anticompetitive behavior is substantial "in the abstract." 512 U. S., at 664. The principal opinion now concludes that substantial evidence supports the congres- sional judgment that cable operators have incentives to en- gage in significant anticompetitive behavior. It appears to accept two related arguments on this point: first, that ver- tically integrated cable operators prefer programming produced by their affiliated cable programming networks to broadcast programming, ante, at 198­199, 200; and second, that potential advertising revenues supply cable system op- erators, whether affiliated with programmers or not, with incentives to prefer cable programming to broadcast pro- gramming, ante, at 200­202. To support the first proposition, the principal opinion states that "[e]xtensive testimony" before Congress showed that in fact operators do have incentives to favor vertically integrated programmers. Ante, at 198. This testimony, noteworthy as it may be, is primarily that of persons appear- ing before Congress on behalf of the private appellees in this case. Compare ante, at 198­199, with Competitive Issues in the Cable Television Industry: Hearing before the Subcom- mittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 238 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC O'Connor, J., dissenting 543 (1988) (Hearing on Competitive Issues) (statement of Milton Maltz, representative of Association of Independent Television Stations, Inc. (INTV), now appellee Association of Local Television Stations, Inc.) (Record, Defendants' Joint Submission of Congressional Record (CR) Vol. I.C, Exh. 8, p. CR 01882); Cable Television Regulation: Hearings on H. R. 1303 and H. R. 2546 before the Subcommittee on Telecommu- nications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 858 (1992) (statement of James B. Hedlund, president of INTV) (CR Vol. I.J, Exh. 18, at CR 07862); id., at 752 (statement of Edward O. Fritts, president of appellee NAB) (CR Vol. I.J, Exh. 18, at CR 07756); id., at 701 (statement of Gene Kimmelman, legislative director of appellee Consumer Federation of America) (CR Vol. I.J, Exh. 18, at CR 07706). It is appropriate to regard the testimony of interested persons with a degree of skepti- cism when our task is to engage in " `independent judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law.' " Turner, supra, at 666 (plurality opinion) (quoting Sable Com- munications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S., at 129). More- over, even accepting as reasonable Congress' conclusion that cable operators have incentives to favor affiliated program- mers, Congress has already limited the number of channels on a cable system that can be occupied by affiliated program- mers. 47 U. S. C. § 533(f)(1)(B); 47 CFR § 76.504 (1995). Once a cable system operator reaches that cap, it can no longer bump a broadcaster in favor of an affiliated program- mer. If Congress were concerned that broadcasters favored too many affiliated programmers, it could simply adjust the cap. Must-carry simply cannot be justified as a response to the allegedly "substantial" problem of vertical integration. The second argument, that the quest for advertising reve- nue will supply cable operators with incentives to drop local broadcasters, takes two forms. First, some cable program- mers offer blank slots within a program into which a cable operator can insert advertisements; appellees argue that 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 239 O'Connor, J., dissenting "[t]he opportunity to sell such advertising gives cable pro- grammers an additional value to operators above broadcast stations . . . ." Brief for Federal Appellees 24. But that "additional value" arises only because the must-carry provi- sions require cable operators to carry broadcast signals with- out alteration. 47 U. S. C. § 534(b)(3). Judge Williams was correct in noting that the Government cannot have "a `sub- stantial interest' in remedying a competitive distortion that arises entirely out of a detail in its own purportedly remedial legislation." 910 F. Supp. 734, 777 (DC 1995) (dissenting opinion). Second, appellees claim that since cable operators compete directly with broadcasters for some advertising rev- enue, operators will profit if they can drive broadcasters out of the market and capture their advertising revenue. Even if the record before Congress included substantial evidence that "advertising revenue would be of increasing importance to cable operators as subscribership growth began to flat- ten," ante, at 203, it does not necessarily follow that Con- gress could reasonably find that the quest for advertising revenues supplies cable operators with incentives to engage in predatory behavior, or that must-carry is a reasonable re- sponse to such incentives. There is no dispute that a cable system depends primarily upon its subscriber base for reve- nue. A cable operator is therefore unlikely to drop a widely viewed station in order to capture advertising revenues- which, according to the figures of appellees' expert, account for between one and five percent of the total revenues of most large cable systems. Declaration of James N. Der- touzos ¶ 22 (App. 967). In doing so, it would risk losing sub- scribers. Nevertheless, appellees contend that cable opera- tors will drop some broadcast stations in spite of, and not because of, viewer preferences. The principal opinion sug- gests that viewers are likely to subscribe to cable even though they prefer certain over-the-air programming to cable programming, because they would be willing to trade access to their preferred channel for access to dozens of cable 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 240 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC O'Connor, J., dissenting channels. Ante, at 202. Even assuming that, at the mar- gin, advertising revenues would drive cable systems to drop some stations-invariably described as "vulnerable" or "smaller" independents, see NAB Brief 22; Brief for Federal Appellees 25, and n. 14-the strategy's success would depend upon the additional untested premise that the advertising revenues freed by dropping a broadcast station will flow to cable operators rather than to other broadcasters. 2 Under the standard articulated by the Turner plurality, the conclusion that must-carry serves a substantial govern- mental interest depends upon the "essential propositio[n]" that, without must-carry, "significant numbers of broadcast stations will be refused carriage on cable systems." 512 U. S., at 666. In analyzing whether this undefined standard is satisfied, the Court focuses almost exclusively on raw num- bers of stations denied carriage or "repositioned"-that is, shifted out of their traditional channel positions. The Court begins its discussion of evidence of adverse car- riage decisions with the 1988 study sponsored by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Ante, at 202­203; see Cable System Broadcast Signal Carriage Survey, Staff Re- port by the Policy and Rules Division, Mass Media Bureau (Sept. 1, 1988) (App. 37). But in Turner, the plurality criti- cized this very study, noting that it did not indicate the time- frame within which carriage denials occurred or whether the stations were later restored to their positions. 512 U. S., at 667. As for the evidence in the record before Congress, these gaps persist; the Court relies on a study of public tele- vision stations to support the proposition that "in the vast majority of cases, dropped stations were not restored to the cable service." Ante, at 203. In canvassing the additional evidence offered on remand, the Court focuses on the suggestion of one of appellees' ex- perts that the 1988 FCC survey underestimated the number 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 241 O'Connor, J., dissenting of drops of broadcast stations in the non-must-carry era. The data do not indicate which of these stations would now qualify for mandatory carriage. Appellees' expert frames the relevant drop statistic as "subscriber instances"-that is, the number of drop instances multiplied by the number of cable subscribers affected. Declaration of Tom Meek ¶ 17 (Meek Declaration) (App. 623). Two-thirds of the "sub- scriber instances" of drops existing as of mid-1992 remained uncured as of mid-1994, fully 19 months after the present must-carry rules went into effect. Meek Declaration, At- tachment C (Record, Defendants' Joint Submission of Expert Affidavits and Reports in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Vol. II.A, Exh. 2). The Court discounts the im- portance of whether dropped stations now qualify for manda- tory carriage, on the ground that requiring any such showing places an "improper burden" on the Legislative Branch. Ante, at 213. It seems obvious, however, that if the must- carry rules will not reverse those adverse carriage decisions on which appellees rely to illustrate the Government "inter- est" supporting the rules, then a significant question remains as to whether the rules in fact serve the articulated interest. Without some further analysis, I do not see how the Court can, in the course of its independent scrutiny on a question of constitutional law, deem Congress' judgment "reasonable." In any event, the larger problem with the Court's approach is that neither the FCC study nor the additional evidence on remand canvassed by the Court, ante, at 204­207, says any- thing about the broadcast markets in which adverse carriage decisions take place. The Court accepts Congress' stated concern about preserving the availability of a "multiplicity" of broadcast stations, but apparently thinks it sufficient to evaluate that concern in the abstract, without considering how much local service is already available in a given broad- cast market. Ante, at 212­213; see also ante, at 226­227 (Breyer, J., concurring in part). I address this gap in the Court's discussion at greater length below, infra, at 247­250, 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 242 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC O'Connor, J., dissenting by examining the reasonableness of Congress' prediction that adverse carriage decisions will inflict severe harm on broadcast stations. Nor can we evaluate whether must-carry is necessary to serve an interest in preserving broadcast stations without examining the value of the stations protected by the must- carry scheme to viewers in noncable households. By disre- garding the distribution and viewership of stations not car- ried on cable, the Court upholds the must-carry provisions without addressing the interests of the over-the-air televi- sion viewers that Congress purportedly seeks to protect. See Turner, 512 U. S., at 647 (describing interest in "protect- ing noncable households from loss of regular television broadcasting service" (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)); id., at 652 (describing interest in ensur- ing that broadcast television remains available as a source of video programming for those without cable); ante, at 193 (describing interest in preventing "any significant reduction in the multiplicity of broadcast programming sources avail- able to noncable households" (emphasis added)). The Court relies on analyses suggesting that, as of 1992, the typical independent commercial broadcaster was being denied car- riage on cable systems serving 47 percent of subscribers in its local market, and the typical noncommercial station was denied carriage on cable systems serving 36 percent of sub- scribers in its local market. Ante, at 204. The only analy- sis in the record of the relationship between carriage and noncable viewership favors the appellants. A 1991 study by Federal Trade Commission staff concluded that most cable systems voluntarily carried broadcast stations with any reportable ratings in noncable households and that most instances of noncarriage involved "relatively remote (and duplicated) network stations, or local stations that few viewers watch." Carriage of Television Broadcast Signals by Cable Television Systems, Reply Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics and the San Francisco Re- 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 243 O'Connor, J., dissenting gional Office of the Federal Trade Commission, p. 3 (Nov. 26, 1991) (App. 163); see also Declaration of Stanley M. Besen (Besen Declaration) (App. 808, 818); Second Declaration of Stanley M. Besen (App. 1812) (presenting data that (1) the typical cable subscriber was served by a cable system carry- ing local broadcast stations accounting for 97 percent of viewing in noncable households; and (2) the typical cable sub- scriber was served by a cable system carrying 90 percent of all local broadcast stations with any reportable ratings and 30 percent of all local broadcast stations with no reportable ratings). Appellees claim there are various methodological flaws in each study, including appellants' expert's reliance on Nielsen data to measure viewership shares. A protective order en- tered by the District Court in this case prevents the parties from contesting the accuracy of such data. App. 321. But appellees-who bear the burden of proof in this case-offer no alternative measure of the viewership in noncable house- holds of stations dropped or denied carriage. Instead, ap- pellees and their experts repeatedly emphasize the impor- tance of preserving "vulnerable" or "marginal" independent stations serving "relatively small" audiences. Brief for Fed- eral Appellees 14, 17, 25, n. 14; NAB Brief 31; see also Deposition of James N. Dertouzos (App. 381) (describing broadcast stations affected by carriage denials as "[s]tations on the margin of cable operator decisionmaking now and in the future"); Deposition of Roger G. Noll (App. 446) (cable operators' advertising incentives will operate "at the mar- gin" and affect "weaker stations, UHF independent sta- tions"); id., at 450 (stations dropped will be "[t]hose that have the lowest audience ratings combined with the absence of a specific target audience"); Deposition of Harry Shooshan III (App. 477) (must-carry has benefited "stations that were not as strong, that were marginal"); Reply Declaration of Roger G. Noll ¶ 19 (App. 2009) ("While frequently . . . the stations not carried by cable systems have low ratings, the point is 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 244 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC O'Connor, J., dissenting this: even the lowest rated commercial stations attract view- ers, and the lowest rated noncommercial stations attract members"). The Court suggests that it is appropriate to disregard the low noncable viewership of stations denied car- riage, because in some instances cable viewers preferred the dropped broadcast channels to the cable channels that re- placed them. Ante, at 206. The viewership statistics in question, as well as their significance, are sharply disputed, but they are also irrelevant. The issue is whether the Gov- ernment can demonstrate a substantial interest in forced car- riage of certain broadcast stations, for the benefit of viewers who lack access to cable. That inquiry is not advanced by an analysis of relative cable household viewership of broad- cast and cable programming. When appellees are pressed to explain the Government's "substantial interest" in pre- serving noncable viewers' access to "vulnerable" or "mar- ginal" stations with "relatively small" audiences, it becomes evident that the interest has nothing to do with anticompeti- tive behavior, but has everything to do with content-pre- serving "quality" local programming that is "responsive" to community needs. Brief for Federal Appellees 13, 30. In- deed, Justice Breyer expressly declines to accept the anti- competitive rationale for the must-carry rules embraced by the principal opinion, and instead explicitly relies on a need to preserve a "rich mix" of "quality" programming. Ante, at 226 (opinion concurring in part). 3 I turn now to the evidence of harm to broadcasters denied carriage or repositioned. The Court remanded for a deter- mination whether broadcast stations denied carriage would be at " `serious risk of financial difficulty' " and would " `dete- riorate to a substantial degree or fail altogether.' " Ante, at 208 (quoting Turner, 512 U. S., at 667, 666). The Turner plurality noted that there was no evidence that "local broad- cast stations have fallen into bankruptcy, turned in their 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 245 O'Connor, J., dissenting broadcast licenses, curtailed their broadcast operations, or suffered a serious reduction in operating revenues" because of adverse carriage decisions. Id., at 667. The record on remand does not permit the conclusion, at the summary judg- ment stage, that Congress could reasonably have predicted serious harm to a significant number of stations in the ab- sence of must-carry. The purported link between an adverse carriage decision and severe harm to a station depends on yet another un- tested premise. Even accepting the conclusion that a cable system operator has a monopoly over cable services to the home, supra, at 237, it does not necessarily follow that the operator also has a monopoly over all video services to cabled households. Cable subscribers using an input selector switch and an antenna can receive broadcast signals. Wide- spread use of such switches would completely eliminate any cable system "monopoly" over sources of video input. See 910 F. Supp., at 786 (Williams, J., dissenting). Growing use of direct-broadcast satellite television also tends to undercut the notion that cable operators have an inevitable monopoly over video services entering cable households. See, e. g., Farhi, Dishing Out the Competition to Cable TV, Washington Post, Oct. 12, 1996, at H1, col. 3. In the Cable Act, Congress rejected the wisdom of any "substantial societal investment" in developing input selector switch technology. § 2(a)(18). In defending this choice, the Court purports to identify "substantial evidence of techno- logical shortcomings" that prevent widespread, efficient use of such devices. But nearly all of the "data" in question are drawn from sources predating the enactment of must-carry by roughly six years. Compare ante, at 219­220, with De- fendants' Joint Statement of Evidence Before Congress ¶ 725 (JSCR) (citing ELRA Group, Inc., Outdoor Antennas, Recep- tion of Local Television Signals and Cable Television i­ii (Jan. 28, 1986), App. H to NAB Testimony in Cable Legisla- tion before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 246 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC O'Connor, J., dissenting Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (May 16, 1990)) (CR Vol. I.L, Exh. 22, at CR 08828); JSCR ¶¶ 759­760 (App. 1629­1630) (citing Comments of INTV in MM Docket No. 85­349, at 73 (Jan. 29, 1986)) (CR Vol. I.BB, Exh. 162, at CR 15901­15902); JSCR ¶ 758 (App. 1628) (citing Comments of NAB in MM Docket No. 85­349, at 23­24 (Jan. 29, 1986)) (CR Vol. I.BB, Exh. 165, at CR 16183­16184); JSCR ¶¶ 718, 724, 751­752, 754­755, 761­762 (App. 1605­1607, 1609­1610, 1624­1627, 1630­1631) (citing Joint Petition for Reconsideration in MM Docket No. 85­349 (Dec. 17, 1986)) (CR Vol. I.DD, Exh. 183, at CR 16726­16839); JSCR ¶¶ 738­739, 764, 767 (App. 1617­1618, 1632­1634) (citing Petition for Reconsideration by Adelphia Communications Corp. et al. in MM Docket No. 85­349, at 27­32 (Jan. 12, 1987)) (CR Vol. I.DD, Exh. 184, at CR 16892­ 16897). The Court notes the importance of deferring to con- gressional judgments about the "interaction of industries un- dergoing rapid economic and technological change." Ante, at 196. But this principle does not require wholesale defer- ence to judgments about rapidly changing technologies that are based on unquestionably outdated information. The Court concludes that the evidence on remand meets the threshold of harm established in Turner. The Court be- gins with the "[c]onsiderable evidence" that broadcast sta- tions denied carriage have fallen into bankruptcy. Ante, at 209. The analysis, however, does not focus on features of the market in which these stations were located or on the size of the audience they commanded. The "considerable evidence" relied on by the Court consists of repeated ref- erences to the bankruptcies of the same 23 commercial in- dependent stations-apparently, new stations. See JSCR ¶¶ 659, 671­672, 676, 681 (App. 1576, 1581­1582, 1584, 1587); Hearing on Competitive Issues, at 548 (statement of Milton Maltz) (CR Vol. I.C, Exh. 8, at CR 01887). Because the must-carry provisions have never been justified as a means of enhancing broadcast television, I do not understand the 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 247 O'Connor, J., dissenting relevance of this evidence, or of the evidence concerning the difficulties encountered by new stations seeking financing. See ante, at 209 (citing JSCR ¶¶ 643­658 (App. 1564­1576)). The Court also claims that the record on remand reflects "considerable evidence" of stations curtailing their broadcast operations or suffering reductions in operating revenues. Ante, at 209. Most of the anecdotal accounts of harm on which the Court relies are sharply disputed. Compare JSCR ¶¶ 618, 619, 622, 623, 692 (App. 1553­1555, 1591), with Time Warner Entertainment Company, L. P.'s Broadcast Station Rebuttal ¶ 8 (App. 2299) (ABC affiliate claiming harm from denial of carriage experienced $3.8 million net revenue increase between 1986 and 1992); id., ¶ 111 (App. 2403) (Home Shopping Network affiliate did not report to Congress that it was harmed by cable operator conduct be- tween 1986 and 1992); id., ¶ 83 (App. 2372­2373) (station al- leged to have lost half of its cable carriage in fact obtained carriage on systems serving 80 percent of total cable sub- scribers within area of dominant influence); id., ¶ 94 (App. 2385) (station claiming harm from denial of carriage experi- enced a $1.13 million net revenue increase between 1986 and 1993); id., ¶ 30 (App. 2318) (some systems on which station claimed anticompetitive carriage denials were precluded from carrying station due to signal strength and quality problems). Congress' reasonable conclusions are entitled to deference, and for that reason the fact that the evidence is in conflict will not necessarily preclude summary judgment in appellees' favor. Nevertheless, in the course of our inde- pendent review, we cannot ignore sharp conflicts in the rec- ord that call into question the reasonableness of Congress' findings. Moreover, unlike other aspects of the record on remand, the station-specific accounts cited by the Court do permit an evaluation of trends in the various broadcast markets, or "areas of dominant influence," in which carriage denials al- legedly caused harm. The Court does not conduct this sort 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 248 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC O'Connor, J., dissenting of analysis. Were it to do so, the Court would have to recog- nize that all but one of the commercial broadcast stations cited as claiming a curtailment in operations or a decline in revenue was broadcasting within an area of dominant influ- ence that experienced net growth, or at least no net reduc- tion, in the number of commercial broadcast stations operat- ing during the non-must-carry era. See Besen Declaration, Exh. 11 (App. 861­869); cf. JSCR ¶ 618 (App. 1553) (station claiming harm within Cedar Rapids market, with four com- mercial broadcast stations in 1987 and five in 1992); id., ¶ 620 (App. 1554) (station claiming harm within Tulsa market, with seven commercial broadcast stations in 1987 and 1992); id., ¶ 623 (App. 1554) (station claiming harm within New York City market, with 14 commercial broadcast stations in 1987 and 1992); id., ¶ 692 (App. 1591) (station claiming harm within Salt Lake City market, with five commercial broad- cast stations in 1987 and eight in 1992); id., ¶ 695 (App. 1593­ 1594) (station claiming harm within Honolulu market, with seven commercial broadcast stations in 1987 and nine in 1992); id., ¶ 703 (App. 1599) (station claiming harm within Grand Rapids market, with seven commercial broadcast stations in 1987 and 1992). Indeed, in 499 of 504 areas of dominant influence nationwide, the number of commercial broadcast stations operating in 1992 equaled or exceeded the number operating in 1987. Besen Declaration, Exh. 11 (App. 861­869). Only two areas of dominant influence expe- rienced a reduction in the number of noncommercial broad- cast stations operating between 1987 and 1992. Ibid. (App. 871­880). In sum, appellees are not entitled to summary judgment on whether Congress could conclude, based on reasonable inferences drawn from substantial evidence, that " `absent legislative action, the free local off-air broadcast system is endangered.' " Ante, at 209 (quoting S. Rep. No. 102­92, at 42). The Court acknowledges that the record contains much evidence of the health of the broadcast industry, including 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 249 O'Connor, J., dissenting evidence that 263 new broadcast stations signed on the air in the period without must-carry rules, evidence of growth in stations' advertising revenue, and evidence of voluntary carriage of broadcast stations accounting for virtually all measurable viewership in noncable households. Ante, at 210­211. But the Court dismisses such evidence, emphasiz- ing that the question is not whether Congress correctly de- termined that must-carry is necessary to prevent significant financial hardship to a substantial number of stations, but whether "the legislative conclusion was reasonable and sup- ported by substantial evidence in the record before Con- gress." Ante, at 211. Even accepting the Court's articula- tion of the relevant standard, it is not properly applied here. The principal opinion disavows a need to closely scrutinize the logic of the regulatory scheme at issue on the ground that it "need not put [its] imprimatur on Congress' economic theory in order to validate the reasonableness of its judg- ment." Ante, at 208. That approach trivializes the First Amendment issue at stake in this case. A highly dubious economic theory has been advanced as the "substantial inter- est" supporting a First Amendment burden on cable opera- tors and cable programmers. In finding that must-carry serves a substantial interest, the principal opinion necessar- ily accepts that theory. The partial concurrence does not, but neither does it articulate what threat to the availability of a "multiplicity" of broadcast stations would exist in a per- fectly competitive market. B I turn now to the second portion of the O'Brien inquiry, which concerns the fit between the Government's asserted interests and the means chosen to advance them. The Court observes that "broadcast stations gained carriage on 5,880 channels as a result of must-carry," and recognizes that this forced carriage imposes a burden on cable system opera- tors and cable programmers. Ante, at 215. But the Court also concludes that the other 30,006 cable channels occupied 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 250 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC O'Connor, J., dissenting by broadcast stations are irrelevant to measuring the burden of the must-carry scheme. The must-carry rules prevent operators from dropping these broadcast stations should other more desirable cable programming become available, even though operators have carried these stations voluntar- ily in the past. The must-carry requirements thus burden an operator's First Amendment freedom to exercise unfet- tered control over a number of channels in its system, whether or not the operator's present choice is aligned with that of the Government. Even assuming that the Court is correct that the 5,880 channels occupied by added broadcasters "represent the ac- tual burden of the regulatory scheme," ibid., the Court's leap to the conclusion that must-carry "is narrowly tailored to preserve a multiplicity of broadcast stations," ante, at 215­ 216, is nothing short of astounding. The Court's logic is cir- cular. Surmising that most of the 5,880 channels added by the regulatory scheme would be dropped in its absence, the Court concludes that the figure also approximates the "bene- fit" of must-carry. Finding the scheme's burden "congru- ent" to the benefit it affords, the Court declares the statute narrowly tailored. The Court achieves this result, however, only by equating the effect of the statute-requiring cable operators to add 5,880 stations-with the governmental in- terest sought to be served. The Court's citation of Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781 (1989), reveals the true nature of the interest at stake. The "evi[l] the Government seeks to eliminate," id., at 799, n. 7, is not the failure of cable operators to carry these 5,880 stations. Rather, to read the first half of the principal opinion, the "evil" is anticompeti- tive behavior by cable operators. As a factual matter, we do not know whether these stations were not carried because of anticompetitive impulses. Positing the effect of a statute as the governmental interest "can sidestep judicial review of almost any statute, because it makes all statutes look narrowly tailored." Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 251 O'Connor, J., dissenting N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 120 (1991). Without a sense whether most adverse carriage decisions are anticompetitively motivated, it is improper to conclude that the statute is narrowly tailored simply because it prevents some adverse carriage decisions. See Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 480 (1989) (scope of law must be "in proportion to the interest served") (internal quotation marks omitted). In my view, the statute is not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial interest in preventing anticompetitive conduct. I do not understand Justice Breyer to disagree with this conclusion. Ante, at 227 (examining fit between "speech- restricting and speech-enhancing consequences" of must- carry). Congress has commandeered up to one-third of each cable system's channel capacity for the benefit of local broad- casters, without any regard for whether doing so advances the statute's alleged goals. To the extent that Congress was concerned that anticompetitive impulses would lead verti- cally integrated operators to prefer those programmers in which the operators have an ownership stake, the Cable Act is overbroad, since it does not impose its requirements solely on such operators. An integrated cable operator cannot sat- isfy its must-carry obligations by allocating a channel to an unaffiliated cable programmer. And must-carry blocks an operator's access to up to one-third of the channels on the system, even if its affiliated programmer provides program- ming for only a single channel. The Court rejects this logic, finding the possibility that the must-carry regime would re- quire reversal of a benign carriage decision not "so prevalent that must-carry is substantially overbroad." Ante, at 216. The principal opinion reasons that "cable systems serving 70 percent of subscribers are vertically integrated with cable programmers, so anticompetitive motives may be impli- cated in a majority of systems' decisions not to carry broad- casters." Ante, at 216­217 (emphasis added). It is unclear whether the principal opinion means that anticompetitive 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 252 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC O'Connor, J., dissenting motives may be implicated in a majority of decisions, or in decisions by a majority of systems. In either case, the prin- cipal opinion's conclusion is wholly speculative. We do not know which of these vertically integrated systems are affili- ated with one cable programmer and which are affiliated with five cable programmers. Moreover, Congress has placed limits upon the number of channels that can be used for affiliated programming. 47 U. S. C. § 533(f)(1)(B). The principal opinion does not suggest why these limits are inad- equate or explain why, once a system reaches the limit, its remaining carriage decisions would also be anticompetitively motivated. Even if the channel limits are insufficient, the principal opinion does not explain why requiring carriage of broadcast stations on one-third of the system's channels is a measured response to the problem. Finally, I note my disagreement with the Court's sugges- tion that the availability of less-speech-restrictive alterna- tives is never relevant to O'Brien's narrow tailoring inquiry. Ante, at 217­218. The Turner Court remanded this case in part because a plurality concluded that "judicial findings concerning the availability and efficacy of constitutionally acceptable less restrictive means of achieving the Govern- ment's asserted interests" were lacking in the original rec- ord. 512 U. S., at 668 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court's present position on this issue is puzzling. Our cases suggest only that we have not interpreted the narrow tailoring inquiry to "require elimination of all less restrictive alternatives." Fox, supra, at 478. Put another way, we have refrained from imposing a least-restrictive- means requirement in cases involving intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. Ward, supra, at 798 (time, place, and manner restriction); Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984) (same); Fox, supra, at 478 (commercial speech). It is one thing to say that a regulation need not be the least-speech-restrictive means of serving an important governmental objective. It is quite another to 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 253 O'Connor, J., dissenting suggest, as I read the majority to do here, that the availabil- ity of less-speech-restrictive alternatives cannot establish or confirm that a regulation is substantially broader than neces- sary to achieve the Government's goals. While the validity of a Government regulation subject to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny does not turn on our "agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appro- priate method for promoting significant government inter- ests," United States v. Albertini, 472 U. S. 675, 689 (1985), the availability of less intrusive approaches to a problem serves as a benchmark for assessing the reasonableness of the fit between Congress' articulated goals and the means chosen to pursue them, Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U. S. 476, 490­491 (1995). As shown supra, at 251­252 and this page, in this case it is plain without reference to any alternatives that the must- carry scheme is "substantially broader than necessary," Ward, 491 U. S., at 800, to serve the only governmental inter- est that the principal opinion fully explains-preventing un- fair competition. If Congress truly sought to address anti- competitive behavior by cable system operators, it passed the wrong law. See Turner, supra, at 682 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("That some speech within a broad category causes harm . . . does not justify restricting the whole category"). Nevertheless, the availability of less restrictive alternatives-a leased access regime and subsidies-reinforces my conclusion that the must-carry provisions are overbroad. Consider first appellants' proposed leased access scheme, under which a cable system operator would be required to make a specified proportion of the system's channels avail- able to broadcasters and independent cable programmers alike at regulated rates. Leased access would directly ad- dress both vertical integration and predatory behavior, by placing broadcasters and cable programmers on a level play- ing field for access to cable. The principal opinion never ex- 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 254 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC O'Connor, J., dissenting plicitly identifies any threat to the availability of broadcast television to noncable households other than anticompetitive conduct, nor does Justice Breyer's partial concurrence. Accordingly, to the extent that leased access would address problems of anticompetitive behavior, I fail to understand why it would not achieve the goal of "ensuring that signifi- cant programming remains available" for noncable house- holds. Ante, at 221. The Court observes that a leased ac- cess regime would, like must-carry, "reduce the number of cable channels under cable systems' control in the same man- ner as must-carry." Ibid. No leased access scheme is cur- rently before the Court, and I intimate no view on whether leased access, like must-carry, imposes unacceptable burdens on cable operators' free speech interests. It is important to note, however, that the Court's observation that a leased ac- cess scheme may, like must-carry, impose First Amendment burdens does not dispose of the narrow tailoring inquiry in this case. As noted, a leased access regime would respond directly to problems of vertical integration and problems of predatory behavior. Must-carry quite clearly does not re- spond to the problem of vertical integration. Supra, at 251­ 253. In addition, the must-carry scheme burdens the rights of cable programmers and cable operators; there is no sug- gestion here that leased access would burden cable program- mers in the same way as must-carry does. In both of these respects, leased access is a more narrowly tailored guard against anticompetitive behavior. Finally, if, as the Court suggests, Congress were concerned that a leased access scheme would impose a burden on "small broadcasters" forced to pay for access, subsidies would eliminate the problem. Subsidies would not, of course, eliminate anticompetitive behavior by cable system operators-a problem that Con- gress could address directly or through a leased-access scheme. Appellees defend the must-carry provisions, how- ever, not only as a means of preventing anticompetitive 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 255 O'Connor, J., dissenting behavior, but also as a means of protecting "marginal" or "vulnerable" stations, even if they are not threatened by anticompetitive behavior. The principal opinion chooses not to acknowledge this interest explicitly, although Justice Breyer does. Even if this interest were content neutral- which it is not-subsidies would address it directly. The Court adopts appellees' position that subsidies would serve a "very different purpose than must-carry. Must-carry is intended not to guarantee the financial health of all broad- casters, but to ensure a base number of broadcasters survive to provide service to noncable households." Ante, at 222; see Brief for Federal Appellees 47. To the extent that Justice Breyer sees must-carry as a "speech-enhancing" measure designed to guarantee over-the-air broadcasters "extra dollars," ante, at 226, it is unclear why subsidies would not fully serve that interest. In any event, I take appellees' concern to be that subsidies, unlike must-carry, would save some broadcasters that would not survive even with cable carriage. There is a straightforward solution to this problem. If the Government is indeed worried that im- precision in allocation of subsidies would prop up stations that would not survive even with cable carriage, then it could tie subsidies to a percentage of stations' advertising reve- nues (or, for public stations, member contributions), deter- mined by stations' access to viewers. For example, in a broadcast market where 50 percent of television-viewing households subscribe to cable, a broadcaster has access to all households without cable as well as to those households served by cable systems on which the broadcaster has se- cured carriage. If a broadcaster is carried on cable systems serving only 20 percent of cable households (i. e., 10 percent of all television-viewing households in the broadcast market), the broadcaster has access to 60 percent of the television- viewing households. If the Government provided a subsidy to compensate for the loss in advertising revenue or member contributions that a station would sustain by virtue of its 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 256 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC O'Connor, J., dissenting failure to reach 40 percent of its potential audience, it could ensure that its allocation would do no more than protect those broadcasters that would survive with full access to television-viewing households. In sum, the alleged barrier to a precise allocation of subsidies is not insurmountable. The Court also suggests that a subsidy scheme would "in- volve the Government in making content-based determina- tions about programming." Ante, at 222. Even if that is so, it does not distinguish subsidies from the must-carry provisions. In light of the principal opinion's steadfast ad- herence to the position that a preference for "diverse" or local-content broadcasting is not a content-based preference, the argument is ironic indeed. III Finally, I note my disagreement with the Court's decision to sidestep a question reserved in Turner, see 512 U. S., at 643­644, n. 6; addressed by the District Court below, 910 F. Supp., at 750 (Sporkin, J.); fairly included within the ques- tion presented here; and argued by one of the appellants: whether the must-carry rules requiring carriage of low power stations, 47 U. S. C. § 534(c), survive constitutional scrutiny. A low power station qualifies for carriage only if the FCC determines that the station's programming "would address local news and informational needs which are not being adequately served by full power television broadcast stations because of the geographic distance of such full power stations from the low power station's community of license." § 534(h)(2)(B). As the Turner Court noted, "this aspect of § 4 appears to single out certain low-power broad- casters for special benefits on the basis of content." 512 U. S., at 644, n. 6. Because I believe that the must-carry provisions fail even intermediate scrutiny, it is clear that they would fail scrutiny under a stricter content-based standard. In declining to address the rules requiring carriage of low power stations, the Court appears to question whether the 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997) 257 O'Connor, J., dissenting issue was fairly included within the question presented or properly preserved by the parties. Ante, at 224. This posi- tion is somewhat perplexing. The Court in Turner appar- ently found the issue both fairly included within the strik- ingly similar question presented there, compare Brief for Federal Appellees in Turner, O. T. 1993, No. 93­44, p. I, with Brief for Federal Appellees I, and properly preserved de- spite the lack of specific argumentation devoted to this subsection of the challenged statute in the jurisdictional statement there, see Juris. Statement in Turner, O. T. 1993, No. 93­44, pp. 11­28. The Court's focus on the quantity of briefing devoted to the subject, ante, at 224, ignores the fact that there are two groups of appellants challenging the judg- ment below-cable operators and cable programmers-and that the issue is of more interest to the former than to the latter. It also seems to suggest that a party defending a judgment can defeat this Court's review of a question simply by ignoring its adversary's position on the merits. In any event, the Court lets stand the District Court's se- riously flawed legal reasoning on the point. The District Court concluded that the provisions "are very close to content-based legislation triggering strict scrutiny," but held that they do not "cross the line." 910 F. Supp., at 750. That conclusion appears to have been based on the fact that the low power provisions are viewpoint neutral. Ibid. Whether a provision is viewpoint neutral is irrelevant to the question whether it is also content neutral. See R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 430 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Turner, supra, at 685 (Ginsburg, J., concur- ring in part and dissenting in part). IV In sustaining the must-carry provisions of the Cable Act, the Court ignores the main justification of the statute urged by appellees and subjects restrictions on expressive activity to an inappropriately lenient level of scrutiny. The principal 520US1 Unit: $U38 [09-13-99 10:42:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 258 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC O'Connor, J., dissenting opinion then misapplies the analytic framework it chooses, exhibiting an extraordinary and unwarranted deference for congressional judgments, a profound fear of delving into complex economic matters, and a willingness to substitute untested assumptions for evidence. In light of gaps in logic and evidence, it is improper to conclude, at the summary judgment stage, that the must-carry scheme serves a sig- nificant governmental interest "in a direct and effective way." Ward, 491 U. S., at 800. Moreover, because the un- disputed facts demonstrate that the must-carry scheme is plainly not narrowly tailored to serving the only govern- mental interest the principal opinion fully explains and embraces-preventing anticompetitive behavior-appellants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor. Justice Breyer disavows the principal opinion's posi- tion on anticompetitive behavior, and instead treats the must-carry rules as a "speech-enhancing" measure designed to ensure access to "quality" programming for noncable households. Neither the principal opinion nor the partial concurrence explains the nature of the alleged threat to the availability of a "multiplicity of broadcast programming sources," if that threat does not arise from cable operators' anticompetitive conduct. Such an approach makes it impos- sible to discern whether Congress was addressing a problem that is "real, not merely conjectural," and whether must- carry addresses the problem in a "direct and material way." Turner, supra, at 664 (plurality opinion). I therefore respectfully dissent, and would reverse the judgment below. 520US1 Unit: $U39 [09-10-99 17:14:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 259 Syllabus UNITED STATES v. LANIER certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit No. 95­1717. Argued January 7, 1997-Decided March 31, 1997 Respondent Lanier was convicted under 18 U. S. C. § 242 of criminally vio- lating the constitutional rights of five women by assaulting them sexu- ally while he served as a state judge. The jury had been instructed, inter alia, that the Government had to prove as an element of the of- fense that Lanier had deprived the victims of their Fourteenth Amend- ment due process right to liberty, which included the right to be free from sexually motivated physical assaults and coerced sexual battery. The en banc Sixth Circuit set aside the convictions for lack of any notice to the public that § 242 covers simple or sexual assault crimes. Invok- ing general interpretive canons and Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (plurality opinion), the court held that § 242 criminal liability may be imposed only if the constitutional right said to have been violated is first identified in a decision of this Court, and only when the right has been held to apply in a factual situation "fundamentally similar" to the one at bar. The court regarded these combined requirements as substantially higher than the "clearly established" standard used to judge qualified immunity in civil cases under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Held: The Sixth Circuit employed the wrong standard for determining whether particular conduct falls within the range of criminal liability under § 242. Section 242's general language prohibiting "the depriva- tion of any rights . . . secured . . . by the Constitution" does not describe the specific conduct it forbids, but-like its companion conspiracy stat- ute, 18 U. S. C. § 241-incorporates constitutional law by reference. Be- fore criminal liability may be imposed for violation of any penal law, due process requires "fair warning . . . of what the law intends." McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27. The touchstone is whether the stat- ute, either standing alone or as construed by the courts, made it reason- ably clear at the time of the charged conduct that the conduct was crimi- nal. Section 242 was construed in light of this due process requirement in Screws, supra. The Sixth Circuit erred in adding as a gloss to this standard the requirement that a prior decision of this Court have de- clared the constitutional right at issue in a factual situation "fundamen- tally similar" to the one at bar. The Screws plurality referred in gen- eral terms to rights made specific by "decisions interpreting" the Constitution, see 325 U. S., at 104; no subsequent case has confined the 520US1 Unit: $U39 [09-10-99 17:14:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN 260 UNITED STATES v. LANIER Syllabus universe of relevant decisions to the Court's opinions; and the Court has specifically referred to Court of Appeals decisions in defining the established scope of a constitutional right under § 241, see Anderson v. United States, 417 U. S. 211, 223­227, and in enquiring whether a right was "clearly established" when applying the qualified immunity rule under § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, see, e. g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 533. Nor has this Court demanded precedents applying the right at issue to a "fundamen- tally similar" factual situation at the level of specificity meant by the Sixth Circuit. Rather, the Court has upheld convictions under § 241 or § 242 despite notable factual distinctions between prior cases and the later case, so long as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct at issue violated constitutional rights. See, e. g., United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 759, n. 17. The Sixth Circuit's view that due process under § 242 demands more than the "clearly established" qualified immunity test under § 1983 or Bivens is error. In effect that test is simply the adaptation of the fair warning standard to give offi- cials (and, ultimately, governments) the same protection from civil liabil- ity and its consequences that individuals have traditionally possessed in the face of vague criminal statutes. As with official conduct under § 1983 or Bivens, liability may be imposed under § 242 if, but only if, in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness of the defendant's conduct is apparent. Pp. 264­272. 73 F. 3d 1380, vacated and remanded. Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Deputy Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for the United States. On the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Patrick, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Jessica Dunsay Silver, and Thomas E. Chandler. Alfred H. Knight, by appointment of the Court, 519 U. S. 804, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Marjorie Heins and Steven R. Shapiro; for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by Lynn Hecht Schafran and Martha F. Davis; for the Southern Poverty Law Center et al. by Mary-Christine Sungaila, Gregory R. Smith, J. Richard Cohen, and Brian Levin; and for Vivian Forsythe-Archie et al. by Catharine A. MacKinnon. 520US1 Unit: $U39 [09-10-99 17:14:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 259 (1997) 261 Opinion of the Court Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent David Lanier was convicted under 18 U. S. C. § 242 of criminally violating the constitutional rights of five women by assaulting them sexually while Lanier served as a state judge. The Sixth Circuit reversed his convictions on the ground that the constitutional right in issue had not previously been identified by this Court in a case with funda- mentally similar facts. The question is whether this stand- ard of notice is higher than the Constitution requires, and we hold that it is. I David Lanier was formerly the sole state Chancery Court judge for two rural counties in western Tennessee. The trial record, read most favorably to the jury's verdict, shows that from 1989 to 1991, while Lanier was in office, he sexually assaulted several women in his judicial chambers. The two most serious assaults were against a woman whose divorce proceedings had come before Lanier and whose daughter's custody remained subject to his jurisdiction. When the woman applied for a secretarial job at Lanier's courthouse, Lanier interviewed her and suggested that he might have to reexamine the daughter's custody. When the woman got up to leave, Lanier grabbed her, sexually assaulted her, and fi- nally committed oral rape. A few weeks later, Lanier invei- gled the woman into returning to the courthouse again to get information about another job opportunity, and again sexually assaulted and orally raped her. App. 44­67. On five other occasions Lanier sexually assaulted four other women: two of his secretaries, a Youth Services Officer of the juvenile court over which Lanier presided, and a local coordinator for a federal program who was in Lanier's cham- bers to discuss a matter affecting the same court. Id., at 13­43, 67­109. Ultimately, Lanier was charged with 11 violations of § 242, each count of the indictment alleging that, acting willfully and under color of Tennessee law, he had deprived the victim 520US1 Unit: $U39 [09-10-99 17:14:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN 262 UNITED STATES v. LANIER Opinion of the Court of "rights and privileges which are secured and protected by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, namely the right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law, including the right to be free from wilful sexual as- sault." Id., at 5­12. Before trial, Lanier moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that § 242 is void for vagueness. The District Court denied the motion. The trial judge instructed the jury on the Government's burden to prove as an element of the offense that the defend- ant deprived the victim of rights secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States: "Included in the liberty protected by the [Due Process Clause of the] Fourteenth Amendment is the concept of personal bodily integrity and the right to be free of un- authorized and unlawful physical abuse by state intru- sion. Thus, this protected right of liberty provides that no person shall be subject to physical or bodily abuse without lawful justification by a state official acting or claiming to act under the color of the laws of any state of the United States when that official's conduct is so demeaning and harmful under all the circumstances as to shock one's consci[ence]. Freedom from such physi- cal abuse includes the right to be free from certain sexu- ally motivated physical assaults and coerced sexual bat- tery. It is not, however, every unjustified touching or grabbing by a state official that constitutes a violation of a person's constitutional rights. The physical abuse must be of a serious substantial nature that involves physical force, mental coercion, bodily injury or emo- tional damage which is shocking to one's consci[ence]." Id., at 186­187. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on seven counts, and not guilty on three (one count having been dismissed at the close of the Government's evidence). It also found that the two oral rapes resulted in "bodily injury," for which Lanier was 520US1 Unit: $U39 [09-10-99 17:14:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 259 (1997) 263 Opinion of the Court subject to 10-year terms of imprisonment on each count, in addition to 1-year terms under the other five counts of con- viction, see § 242. He was sentenced to consecutive maxi- mum terms totaling 25 years. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit af- firmed the convictions and sentence, 33 F. 3d 639 (1994), but the full court vacated that decision and granted rehearing en banc, 43 F. 3d 1033 (1995). On rehearing, the court set aside Lanier's convictions for "lack of any notice to the public that this ambiguous criminal statute [i. e., § 242] includes simple or sexual assault crimes within its coverage." 73 F. 3d 1380, 1384 (1996). Invoking general canons for interpreting crimi- nal statutes, as well as this Court's plurality opinion in Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945), the Sixth Circuit held that criminal liability may be imposed under § 242 only if the constitutional right said to have been violated is first identified in a decision of this Court (not any other federal, or state, court), and only when the right has been held to apply in "a factual situation fundamentally similar to the one at bar." 73 F. 3d, at 1393. The Court of Appeals regarded these combined requirements as "substantially higher than the `clearly established' standard used to judge qualified im- munity" in civil cases under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. 73 F. 3d, at 1393. Finding no decision of this Court applying a right to be free from unjustified assault or in- vasions of bodily integrity in a situation "fundamentally similar" to those charged, the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment of conviction with instructions to dismiss the in- dictment. Two judges would not have dismissed the felony counts charging the oral rapes but concurred in dismissing the misdemeanor counts, while three members of the court dissented as to all dismissals. We granted certiorari to review the standard for deter- mining whether particular conduct falls within the range of criminal liability under § 242. 518 U. S. 1004 (1996). We now vacate and remand. 520US1 Unit: $U39 [09-10-99 17:14:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN 264 UNITED STATES v. LANIER Opinion of the Court II Section 242 is a Reconstruction Era civil rights statute making it criminal to act (1) "willfully" and (2) under color of law (3) to deprive a person of rights protected by the Con- stitution or laws of the United States.1 18 U. S. C. § 242; Screws v. United States, supra. The en banc decision of the Sixth Circuit dealt only with the last of these elements, and it is with that element alone that we are concerned here.2 The general language of § 242,3 referring to "the depriva- tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or pro- 1 The present § 242 has its roots in portions of three Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Acts, whose substantive criminal provisions were consoli- dated in a single section in 1874. See 2 Cong. Rec. 827­828 (1874) (de- scribing derivation of consolidated criminal civil rights law from §§ 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27; §§ 16 and 17 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 144; and § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13). Although those statutory forebears created criminal sanctions only for violations of some enumerated rights and privileges, the consoli- dated statute of 1874 expanded the law's scope to apply to deprivations of all constitutional rights, despite the "customary stout assertions of the codifiers that they had merely clarified and reorganized without changing substance." United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 803 (1966). Since the 1874 recodification, Congress has revisited § 242 on several occasions, with- out contracting its substantive scope. See 35 Stat. 1092 (1909) (adding willfulness requirement); 82 Stat. 75 (1968) (enhancing penalties for some violations); 102 Stat. 4396 (1988) (same); 108 Stat. 1970, 2109, 2113, 2147 (1994) (same). 2 Thus, we do not address the argument, pressed by respondent, that the actions for which he was convicted were not taken under color of law. The Sixth Circuit discussed that issue only in the original panel opinion, subsequently vacated, but did not reach the question in the en banc deci- sion under review here. To the extent the issue remains open, we leave its consideration in the first instance to the Court of Appeals on remand. 3 "Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or pro- tected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens," shall be subject to specified criminal penalties. 520US1 Unit: $U39 [09-10-99 17:14:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 259 (1997) 265 Opinion of the Court tected by the Constitution or laws of the United States," is matched by the breadth of its companion conspiracy statute, § 241,4 which speaks of conspiracies to prevent "the free ex- ercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to [any person] by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Thus, in lieu of describing the specific conduct it forbids, each statute's general terms incorporate constitutional law by ref- erence, see United States v. Kozminski, 487 U. S. 931, 941 (1988); United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 797, 805 (1966), and many of the incorporated constitutional guarantees are, of course, themselves stated with some catholicity of phras- ing. The result is that neither the statutes nor a good many of their constitutional referents delineate the range of forbid- den conduct with particularity. The right to due process enforced by § 242 and said to have been violated by Lanier presents a case in point, with the irony that a prosecution to enforce one application of its spa- cious protection of liberty can threaten the accused with dep- rivation of another: what Justice Holmes spoke of as "fair warning . . . in language that the common world will under- stand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear." McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931). " `The . . . principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably under- stand to be proscribed.' " Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347, 351 (1964) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617 (1954)).5 4 Insofar as pertinent: "If two or more persons conspire to injure, op- press, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, or Dis- trict in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same," they shall be subject to specified criminal penalties. 5 The fair warning requirement also reflects the deference due to the legislature, which possesses the power to define crimes and their punish- ment. See United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820); United 520US1 Unit: $U39 [09-10-99 17:14:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN 266 UNITED STATES v. LANIER Opinion of the Court There are three related manifestations of the fair warning requirement. First, the vagueness doctrine bars enforce- ment of "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926); accord, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 357 (1983); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939). Second, as a sort of "junior version of the vagueness doc- trine," H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 95 (1968), the canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning by so resolving ambi- guity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered. See, e. g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 419, 427 (1985); United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347­348 (1971); McBoyle, supra, at 27. Third, although clar- ity at the requisite level may be supplied by judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute, see, e. g., Bouie, supra, at 357­359; Kolender, supra, at 355­356; Lanzetta, supra, at 455­457; Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189, 207 (1985), due process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judi- cial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope, see, e. g., Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188, 191­192 (1977); Rabe v. Washington, 405 U. S. 313 (1972) (per curiam); Bouie, supra, at 353­354; cf. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id., § 10, cl. 1; Bouie, supra, at 353­354 (Ex Post Facto States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 600 (1995). See generally H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 79­96 (1968) (discussing "principle of legality," "that conduct may not be treated as criminal unless it has been so defined by [a competent] authority . . . before it has taken place," as implementing separation of powers, providing notice, and preventing abuses of official discretion) (quotation at 80); Jeffries, Legality, Vague- ness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189 (1985). 520US1 Unit: $U39 [09-10-99 17:14:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 259 (1997) 267 Opinion of the Court Clauses bar legislatures from making substantive criminal offenses retroactive). In each of these guises, the touch- stone is whether the statute, either standing alone or as con- strued, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defendant's conduct was criminal. We applied this standard in Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945), which recognized that the expansive lan- guage of due process that provides a basis for judicial review is, when incorporated by reference into § 242, generally ill suited to the far different task of giving fair warning about the scope of criminal liability. The Screws plurality identi- fied the affront to the warning requirement posed by employ- ing § 242 to place "the accused . . . on trial for an offense, the nature of which the statute does not define and hence of which it gives no warning." Id., at 101. At the same time, the same Justices recognized that this constitutional diffi- culty does not arise when the accused is charged with violat- ing a "right which has been made specific either by the ex- press terms of the Constitution or laws of the United States or by decisions interpreting them." Id., at 104. When broad constitutional requirements have been "made specific" by the text or settled interpretations, willful violators "cer- tainly are in no position to say that they had no adequate advance notice that they would be visited with pun- ishment. . . . [T]hey are not punished for violating an un- knowable something." Id., at 105. Accordingly, Screws limited the statute's coverage to rights fairly warned of, hav- ing been "made specific" by the time of the charged conduct. See also Kozminski, supra, at 941 (parallel construction of § 241).6 6 This process of "making specific" does not, as the Sixth Circuit be- lieved, qualify Screws as "the only Supreme Court case in our legal history in which a majority of the Court seems [to have been] willing to create a common law crime." 73 F. 3d 1380, 1391 (1996). Federal crimes are de- fined by Congress, not the courts, Kozminski, 487 U. S., at 939; United States v. Wiltberger, supra, at 95, and Screws did not "create a common 520US1 Unit: $U39 [09-10-99 17:14:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN 268 UNITED STATES v. LANIER Opinion of the Court The Sixth Circuit, in this case, added two glosses to the made-specific standard of fair warning. In its view, a gener- ally phrased constitutional right has been made specific within the meaning of Screws only if a prior decision of this Court has declared the right, and then only when this Court has applied its ruling in a case with facts "fundamentally similar" to the case being prosecuted. 73 F. 3d, at 1393. None of the considerations advanced in this case, however, persuade us that either a decision of this Court or the ex- treme level of factual specificity envisioned by the Court of Appeals is necessary in every instance to give fair warning. First, contrary to the Court of Appeals, see ibid., we think it unsound to read Screws as reasoning that only this Court's decisions could provide the required warning. Although the Screws plurality gave two examples involving decisions of the Court, their opinion referred in general terms to rights made specific by "decisions interpreting" the Constitution, see 325 U. S., at 104 (plurality opinion), and no subsequent case has held that the universe of relevant interpretive deci- sions is confined to our opinions. While United States v. Kozminski, 487 U. S. 931 (1988), a case under § 241 for violat- law crime"; it narrowly construed a broadly worded Act of Congress, and the policies favoring strict construction of criminal statutes oblige us to carry out congressional intent as far as the Constitution will admit, see Kozminski, supra, at 939; Huddleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 814, 831 (1974); United States v. Morris, 14 Pet. 464, 475 (1840). Nor is § 242's pedigree as an Act of Congress tainted by its birth at the hands of codifiers who arguably made substantive changes in the pre-existing law, see n. 1, supra, as the Sixth Circuit concluded from the statutory history, 73 F. 3d, at 1384­1387. The legislative intent of Congress is to be derived from the language and structure of the statute itself, if possible, not from the assertions of codifiers directly at odds with clear statutory language. See, e. g., United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 496­497 (1997). Further, the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that Congress never intended § 242 to extend to "newly-created constitutional rights," 73 F. 3d, at 1387, is belied by the fact that Congress has increased the penalties for the section's violation several times since Screws was decided, without contracting its substan- tive scope, see n. 1, supra. 520US1 Unit: $U39 [09-10-99 17:14:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 259 (1997) 269 Opinion of the Court ing Thirteenth Amendment rights, did characterize our task as ascertaining the crime charged "by looking to the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition . . . specified in our prior decisions," id., at 941, in at least one other case we have specifically referred to a decision of a Court of Appeals in defining the established scope of a constitutional right for purposes of § 241 liability, see Anderson v. United States, 417 U. S. 211, 223­227 (1974). It is also to the point, as we ex- plain below, that in applying the rule of qualified immunity under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), we have referred to decisions of the Courts of Appeals when enquiring whether a right was "clearly established." See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 533 (1985); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183, 191­ 192 (1984); see also id., at 203­205 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Elder v. Holloway, 510 U. S. 510, 516 (1994) (treating Court of Appeals decision as "rele- vant authority" that must be considered as part of qualified immunity enquiry). Although the Sixth Circuit was con- cerned, and rightly so, that disparate decisions in various Circuits might leave the law insufficiently certain even on a point widely considered, such a circumstance may be taken into account in deciding whether the warning is fair enough, without any need for a categorical rule that decisions of the Courts of Appeals and other courts are inadequate as a mat- ter of law to provide it. Nor have our decisions demanded precedents that applied the right at issue to a factual situation that is "fundamentally similar" at the level of specificity meant by the Sixth Circuit in using that phrase. To the contrary, we have upheld con- victions under § 241 or § 242 despite notable factual distinc- tions between the precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so long as the prior decisions gave reason- able warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitu- tional rights. See United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 759, n. 17 (1966) (prior cases established right of interstate travel, 520US1 Unit: $U39 [09-10-99 17:14:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN 270 UNITED STATES v. LANIER Opinion of the Court but later case was the first to address the deprivation of this right by private persons); United States v. Saylor, 322 U. S. 385 (1944) (pre-Screws; prior cases established right to have legitimate vote counted, whereas later case involved dilution of legitimate votes through casting of fraudulent ballots); United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 321­324 (1941) (pre- Screws; prior cases established right to have vote counted in general election, whereas later case involved primary elec- tion); see also Screws, 325 U. S., at 106 (stating that Classic met the test being announced). But even putting these examples aside, we think that the Sixth Circuit's "fundamentally similar" standard would lead trial judges to demand a degree of certainty at once unneces- sarily high and likely to beget much wrangling. This dan- ger flows from the Court of Appeals' stated view, 73 F. 3d, at 1393, that due process under § 242 demands more than the "clearly established" law required for a public officer to be held civilly liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983 or Bivens, see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635 (1987) (Bivens action); Davis v. Scherer, supra (§ 1983 action). This, we think, is error. In the civil sphere, we have explained that qualified immu- nity seeks to ensure that defendants "reasonably can antici- pate when their conduct may give rise to liability," id., at 195, by attaching liability only if "[t]he contours of the right [violated are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right," Anderson, supra, at 640. So conceived, the object of the "clearly established" immunity standard is not different from that of "fair warning" as it relates to law "made specific" for the purpose of validly applying § 242. The fact that one has a civil and the other a criminal law role is of no signifi- cance; both serve the same objective, and in effect the quali- fied immunity test is simply the adaptation of the fair warn- ing standard to give officials (and, ultimately, governments) the same protection from civil liability and its consequences 520US1 Unit: $U39 [09-10-99 17:14:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 259 (1997) 271 Opinion of the Court that individuals have traditionally possessed in the face of vague criminal statutes. To require something clearer than "clearly established" would, then, call for something beyond "fair warning." This is not to say, of course, that the single warning stand- ard points to a single level of specificity sufficient in every instance. In some circumstances, as when an earlier case expressly leaves open whether a general rule applies to the particular type of conduct at issue, a very high degree of prior factual particularity may be necessary. See, e. g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, supra, at 530­535, and n. 12. But gen- eral statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning, and in other instances a gen- eral constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though "the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful," Anderson, supra, at 640. As Judge Daughtrey noted in her dissenting opinion in this case: " `The easiest cases don't even arise. There has never been . . . a section 1983 case accusing welfare officials of sell- ing foster children into slavery; it does not follow that if such a case arose, the officials would be immune from damages [or criminal] liability.' " 73 F. 3d, at 1410 (quoting K. H. Through Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F. 2d 846, 851 (CA7 1990)); see also Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104, 110 (1972) (due process requirements are not "designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited"); Williams v. United States, 341 U. S. 97, 101 (1951) (holding that beating to obtain a confession plainly violates § 242). In sum, as with civil liability under § 1983 or Bivens, all that can usefully be said about criminal liability under § 242 is that it may be imposed for deprivation of a constitutional right if, but only if, "in the light of pre-existing law the un- 520US1 Unit: $U39 [09-10-99 17:14:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN 272 UNITED STATES v. LANIER Opinion of the Court lawfulness [under the Constitution is] apparent," Anderson, supra, at 640. Where it is, the constitutional requirement of fair warning is satisfied. Because the Court of Appeals used the wrong gauge in deciding whether prior judicial decisions gave fair warning that respondent's actions violated constitutional rights, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for application of the proper standard.7 It is so ordered. 7 We also leave consideration of other issues that may remain open to the Court of Appeals on remand. Several of the arguments tendered by respondent here are, however, plainly without merit and need not be left open. First, Lanier's contention that Screws excluded rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from the ambit of § 242 is contradicted by the language of Screws itself as well as later cases. See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 100, 106 (1945); United States v. Price, 383 U. S., at 789, and n. 2, 793 (§ 242 is enforcement legisla- tion enacted under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and encompasses violations of rights guaranteed under the Due Process Clause). Second, although DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U. S. 189 (1989), generally limits the constitutional duty of officials to protect against assault by private parties to cases where the victim is in custody, DeShaney does not hold, as respondent maintains, that there is no consti- tutional right to be free from assault committed by state officials them- selves outside of a custodial setting. Third, contrary to respondent's claim, Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 394 (1989), does not hold that all constitutional claims relating to physically abusive government conduct must arise under either the Fourth or Eighth Amendments; rather, Gra- ham simply requires that if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process. 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 273 Syllabus YOUNG et al. v. FORDICE et al. appeal from the united states district court for the southern district of mississippi No. 95­2031. Argued January 6, 1997-Decided March 31, 1997 The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) requires States to provide simplified systems for registering to vote in federal elections, including a system for voter registration on a driver's license applica- tion. Beginning on January 1, 1995, Mississippi attempted to comply with the NVRA, attempting to replace its "Old System" of registration with a "Provisional Plan" that simplified registration procedures for both federal and state elections. The United States Attorney General precleared the Provisional Plan under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), which prohibits States with a specified history of voting discrimination from making changes in voting "practices or procedures" that have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. However, a week before the plan was precleared, the state legislature tabled legislation needed to make the changes effective for state elections. On February 10, 1995, the State abandoned the Provisional Plan in favor of a "New System," which uses the Provisional Plan for federal election registration only and the Old System for both state and federal election registration. The State made no further preclearance submissions. In this suit, appellants claim that the State and its officials violated § 5 by implementing changes in its registration system without preclearance. A three-judge District Court granted the State summary judgment, holding that the differences in the New System and Provisional Plan were attributable to the State's attempt to correct a misapplication of state law, and, thus, were not changes subject to preclearance; and that the State had pre- cleared all the changes that the New System made in the Old when the Attorney General precleared the changes needed to implement the NVRA. Held: Mississippi has not precleared, and must preclear, the "practices and procedures" that it sought to administer on and after February 10, 1995. Pp. 281­291. (a) Several circumstances, taken together, lead to the conclusion that the Provisional Plan, although precleared by the Attorney General, was not "in force or effect" under § 5 and, hence, did not become part of the baseline against which to judge whether future change occurred. Those seeking to administer the plan did not intend to administer an 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN 274 YOUNG v. FORDICE Syllabus unlawful plan, and they abandoned the plan as soon as it became clear that the legislature would not pass the laws needed to make it lawful. Moreover, all these events took place within a few weeks: The plan was used for only 41 days and by only a third of the State's voter registration officials, and the State held no elections prior to its abandonment of the plan, nor were any elections imminent. Pp. 282­283. (b) Nonetheless, the New System included changes that must be pre- cleared because it contains "practices and procedures" that are signifi- cantly different from the Old System. Minor changes, as well as major, require preclearance. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 566­569. This is true even where, as here, the changes are made in an effort to comply with federal law, so long as those changes reflect policy choices made by state or local officials. Id., at 565, n. 29. The NVRA does not preclude application of the VRA's requirements. Change in- vokes the preclearance process whether that change works in favor of, works against, or is neutral in its impact on minorities because the pre- clearance process is aimed at preserving the status quo until the Attor- ney General or the courts have an opportunity to evaluate a proposed change. Although the NVRA imposed mandates on the States, Mis- sissippi's changes to the New System are discretionary and nonminis- terial, reflecting the exercise of policy choice and discretion by state officials. Thus, they are appropriate matters for § 5 preclearance re- view. Pp. 283­286. (c) Mississippi's arguments in favor of its position that the Attorney General has already precleared its efforts to comply with the NVRA are rejected. Mississippi correctly argues that the decisions to adopt the NVRA federal registration system and to retain a prior state regis- tration system, by themselves, are not changes for § 5 purposes. How- ever, preclearance requires examination of the federal system's discre- tionary elements in a context that includes history, purpose, and practical effect. The argument on the merits is whether these changes could have the purpose and effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. Preclearance is necessary to evaluate this argument. Pp. 286­291. Reversed and remanded. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Brenda Wright argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Hender- son, Samuel L. Walters, A. Spencer Gilbert III, Laughlin McDonald, and Neil Bradley. 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 273 (1997) 275 Opinion of the Court Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant At- torney General Patrick, Deputy Solicitor General Waxman, and Steven H. Rosenbaum. Robert E. Sanders, Assistant Attorney General of Missis- sippi, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Mike Moore, Attorney General.* Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. The question before us is whether § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (§ 5), requires preclearance of certain changes that Mississippi made in its voter registration procedures-changes that Mis- sissippi made in order to comply with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. We hold that § 5 does require preclearance. I A The National Voter Registration Act Congress enacted the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), 107 Stat. 77, 42 U. S. C. § 1973gg et seq., to take effect for States like Mississippi on January 1, 1995. The NVRA requires States to provide simplified systems for registering to vote in federal elections, i. e., elections for fed- eral officials, such as the President, congressional Repre- sentatives, and United States Senators. The States must provide a system for voter registration by mail, § 1973gg­4, a system for voter registration at various state offices (in- cluding those that provide "public assistance" and those that provide services to people with disabilities), § 1973gg­5, and, particularly important, a system for voter registration on a driver's license application, § 1973gg­3. The NVRA speci- *Juan Cartagena filed a brief for the Community Service Society of New York et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN 276 YOUNG v. FORDICE Opinion of the Court fies various details about how these systems must work, including, for example, the type of information that States can require on a voter registration form. §§ 1973gg­3(c)(2), 1973gg­7(b). It also imposes requirements about just when, and how, States may remove people from the federal voter rolls. §§ 1973gg­6(a)(3), (4). The NVRA adds that it does not "supersede, restrict or limit the application of the Voting Rights Act of 1965," and that it does not "authoriz[e] or re- quir[e] conduct that is prohibited by the Voting Rights Act of 1965." § 1973gg­9(d). The Voting Rights Act Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), among other things, prohibits a State with a specified history of voting discrimination, such as Mississippi, from "enact[ing] or seek[ing] to administer any . . . practic[e], or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964," unless and until the State obtains preclearance from the United States Attorney General (At- torney General) or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. § 1973c. Preclearance is, in effect, a determination that the change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." Ibid. In the language of § 5 jurisprudence, this determination involves a determi- nation that the change is not retrogressive. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976); 28 CFR § 51.54(a) (1996). B The case before us concerns three different Mississippi voting registration systems: The first system, which we shall call the "Old System," is that used by Mississippi before it tried to comply with the NVRA. The second system, the "Provisional Plan," is a system aimed at NVRA compliance, which Mississippi tried to implement for about six weeks be- tween January 1, 1995, and February 10, 1995. The third 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 273 (1997) 277 Opinion of the Court system, the "New System," is the system that Mississippi put into place after February 10, 1995, in a further effort to comply with the NVRA. We shall briefly explain the rele- vant features of each system. The Old System. Before 1995, Mississippi administered a voting registration system, which, like the systems of most States, provided for a single registration that allowed the registrant to vote in both federal elections and state elec- tions (i. e., elections for state and local offices). Under Mis- sissippi law, a citizen could register to vote either by appear- ing personally at a county or municipal clerk's office or at other locations (such as polling places) that the clerk or his deputy visited to register people to vote. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 23­15­35, 23­15­37, 23­15­39(6) (1990). Mississippi citi- zens could also register by obtaining a mail-in registration form available at driver's license agencies, public schools, and public libraries, among other places, and mailing it back to the clerk. Miss. Code Ann. § 23­15­47(2)(a) (Supp. 1996). The law set forth various details, requiring, for example, that a mail-in application contain the name and address of the voter and that it be attested to by a witness, ibid. (although there is some dispute between the parties about whether an application could be rejected for failing to have the witness' signature). State law also allowed county registration offi- cials to purge voters from the rolls if they had not voted in four years. Miss. Code Ann. § 23­15­159 (1990). The Provisional Plan. In late 1994, the Mississippi sec- retary of state, with the help of an NVRA implementation committee, prepared a series of voter registration changes designed to ensure compliance with the NVRA. The new voter registration application that was incorporated into the driver's license form, for example, did not require that the registrant repeat his or her address, nor did it require an attesting witness. The secretary of state provided informa- tion and instructions about those changes to voter registra- tion officials and state agency personnel throughout the 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN 278 YOUNG v. FORDICE Opinion of the Court State. The secretary of state and the implementing com- mittee assumed-and recommended-that the Mississippi Legislature would change state law insofar as that law might prevent a valid registration under the NVRA's provisions from counting as a valid registration for a state or local elec- tion. And, on that assumption, at least one official in the secretary of state's office told state election officials to place the name of any new valid applicant under the NVRA on a list that would permit him or her to vote in state, as well as in federal, elections. Using this Provisional Plan, at least some Mississippi offi- cials registered as many as 4,000 voters between January 1, 1995, and February 10, 1995. On January 25, however, the state legislature tabled a bill that would have made NVRA registrations valid for all elections in Mississippi (by, for ex- ample, allowing applicants at driver's license and other agen- cies to register on the spot, without having to mail in the application themselves, App. 86, by eliminating the attesting witness signature on the mail-in application, compare id., at 96, 101, with Miss. Code Ann. § 23­15­47(3) (Supp. 1996), and by eliminating the optional 4-year purge of nonvoting regis- trants, replacing it with other methods for maintaining up- to-date voter rolls, App. 87­92, 103). Because of the legisla- ture's failure to change the Old System's requirements for state election registration, the state attorney general con- cluded that Provisional Plan registrations that did not meet Old System requirements would not work, under state law, as registration for state elections. State officials notified voter registration officials throughout the State; and they, in turn, were asked to help notify the 4,000 registrants that they were not registered to vote in state or local elections. The New System. On February 10, 1995, Mississippi began to use what we shall call the New System. That sys- tem consists of the changes that its Provisional Plan set forth-but as applied only to registration for federal elec- tions. Mississippi maintains the Old System as the only 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 273 (1997) 279 Opinion of the Court method for registration for state elections, and as one set of methods to register for federal elections. See App. to Juris. Statement 21a. All other States, we are told, have modified their voter registration rules so that NVRA registration registers voters for both federal and state elections. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4. C This case arises out of efforts by Mississippi to preclear, under § 5 of the VRA, changes that it made to comply with the NVRA. In December 1994, Mississippi submitted to the United States Attorney General a list of NVRA- implementing changes that it then intended to make. That submission essentially described what we have called the Provisional Plan. The submission contained numerous ad- ministrative changes described in two booklets called The National Voter Registration Act, App. 26­43, and the Missis- sippi Agency Voter Registration Procedures Manual, id., at 51­60. It also included the proposed state legislation neces- sary to make the Provisional Plan work for state elections as well. Id., at 86­104. Mississippi requested preclearance. Id., at 109­110. On February 1, 1995, the Department of Justice wrote to Mississippi that the Attorney General did "not interpose any objection to the specified changes"- thereby preclearing Mississippi's submitted changes. App. to Juris. Statement 17a. As we pointed out above, however, on January 25, about one week before the Attorney General precleared the pro- posed changes, the state legislature had tabled the proposed legislation needed to make those changes effective for state elections. On February 10, 10 days after the Department precleared the proposed changes, Mississippi officials wrote to voter registration officials around the State, telling them that it "appears unlikely that the Legislature will" revive the tabled bill; that the Provisional Plan's registration would therefore not work for state elections; that they should 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN 280 YOUNG v. FORDICE Opinion of the Court write-or help the secretary of state write-to tell those who had registered under that system that they were not registered to vote in state elections; that they should make certain future registrants understand that they would need to register separately to be eligible to vote in state, as well as federal, elections; and that they should develop a system for distinguishing between NVRA and other voters. Id., at 20a­23a. On February 16, about two weeks after the Department of Justice sent its preclearance letter, the Department wrote another letter to Mississippi, which made clear that the De- partment did not believe its earlier preclearance had pre- cleared what it now saw as a new plan. The Department asked the State to submit what it called this new "dual regis- tration and voter purge system" for preclearance. Id., at 24a. The Department added: "In this regard, we note that while, on February 1, 1995, the Attorney General granted Section 5 preclearance to procedures instituted by the state to implement the NVRA, that submission did not seek preclearance for a dual registration and purge system and, indeed, we understand that the decision to institute such a system was not made until after February 1." Id., at 24a­25a. Mississippi, perhaps believing that the February 1 preclear- ance sufficed, made no further preclearance submissions. D On April 20, 1995, four private citizens (appellants) brought this lawsuit before a three-judge District Court. They claimed that Mississippi and its officials had imple- mented changes in its registration system without preclear- ance in violation of § 5. The United States, which is an ami- cus curiae here, brought a similar lawsuit, and the two actions were consolidated. The three-judge District Court granted Mississippi's mo- tion for summary judgment. It considered the plaintiffs' 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 273 (1997) 281 Opinion of the Court basic claim, namely, that the differences between the Provi- sional Plan and the New System amounted to a change in the administration of Mississippi's voting registration prac- tice, which change had not been precleared. The court re- jected this argument on the ground that the Provisional Plan was a misapplication of state law, never ratified by the State. Since the differences between the New System and the Pro- visional Plan were attributable to the State's attempt to cor- rect this misapplication of state law, the court held, those differences were not changes subject to preclearance. The court also considered a different question, namely, whether the New System differed from the Old System; and whether Mississippi had precleared all the changes that the New System made in the Old. The court held that the De- partment had (on February 1) precleared the administrative changes needed to implement the NVRA. The court also held that Mississippi did not need to preclear its failure to pass a law that would have permitted NVRA registration to count for state, as well as for federal, elections, as the dis- tinction between state and federal elections was due to the NVRA's own provisions, not to the State's changes in vot- ing practices. The private plaintiffs appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 518 U. S. 1055 (1996). We now reverse. II Section 5 of the VRA requires Mississippi to preclear "any . . . practic[e] or procedure with respect to voting differ- ent from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964." 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. The statute's date of November 1, 1964, often, as here, is not directly relevant, for differences once precleared normally need not be cleared again. They be- come part of the baseline standard for purposes of determin- ing whether a State has "enact[ed]" or is "seek[ing] to admin- ister" a "practice or procedure" that is "different" enough itself to require preclearance. Presley v. Etowah County 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN 282 YOUNG v. FORDICE Opinion of the Court Comm'n, 502 U. S. 491, 495 (1992) ("To determine whether there have been changes with respect to voting, we must compare the challenged practices with those in existence before they were adopted. Absent relevant intervening changes, the Act requires us to use practices in existence on November 1, 1964, as our standard of comparison"). Re- gardless, none of the parties asks us to look further back in time than 1994, when the Old System was last in effect. The appellants ask us to consider whether Mississippi's New Sys- tem amounts to a forbidden effort to implement unprecleared changes either (a) because the New System is "different from" the post-1994 Provisional Plan or (b) because it is "dif- ferent from" the 1994 Old System. We shall consider each of these claims in turn. A First, the appellants and the Government argue that the Provisional Plan, because it was precleared by the Attorney General, became part of the baseline against which to judge whether a future change must be precleared. They add that the New System differs significantly from the Provisional Plan, particularly in its effect on registration for state elec- tions. They conclude that Mississippi had to preclear the New System insofar as it differed from the Provisional Plan. The District Court rejected this argument on the ground that the Provisional Plan practices and procedures never be- came part of Mississippi's voting-related practices or proce- dures, but instead simply amounted to a temporary misappli- cation of state law. We, too, believe that the Provisional Plan, in the statute's words, was never "in force or effect." 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. The District Court rested its conclusion upon the fact that Mississippi did not change its state law so as to make the Provisional Plan's "unitary" registration system lawful and that neither the Governor nor the legislature nor the state attorney general ratified the Provisional Plan. The appel- 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 273 (1997) 283 Opinion of the Court lants argue that the simple fact that a voting practice is un- lawful under state law does not show, entirely by itself, that the practice was never "in force or effect." We agree. A State, after all, might maintain in effect for many years a plan that technically, or in one respect or another, violated some provision of state law. Cf. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 394­395 (1971) (deeming ward system "in fact `in force or effect' " and requiring change from wards to at-large elections to be precleared even though ward system was ille- gal and at-large elections were required under state law (em- phasis in original)); City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U. S. 125, 132­133 (1983) (numbered-post election system was "in effect" although it may have been unauthorized by state law). But that is not the situation here. In this case, those seeking to administer the Provisional Plan did not intend to administer an unlawful plan. They expected it to become lawful. They abandoned the Provi- sional Plan as soon as its unlawfulness became apparent, i. e., as soon as it became clear that the legislature would not pass the laws needed to make it lawful. Moreover, all these events took place within the space of a few weeks. The plan was used to register voters for only 41 days, and only about a third of the State's voter registration officials had begun to use it. Further, the State held no elections prior to its abandonment of the Provisional Plan, nor were any elections imminent. These circumstances taken together lead us to conclude that the Provisional Plan was not "in force or ef- fect"; hence it did not become part of the baseline against which we are to judge whether future change occurred. B We nonetheless agree with the appellants and the Govern- ment that the New System included changes that must be, but have not been, precleared. That is because the New System contains "practices and procedures" that are signifi- cantly "different from" the Old System-the system that was 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN 284 YOUNG v. FORDICE Opinion of the Court in effect in 1994. And the State has not precleared those differences. This Court has made clear that minor, as well as major, changes require preclearance. Allen v. State Bd. of Elec- tions, 393 U. S. 544, 566­569 (1969) (discussing minor changes, including a change from paper ballots to voting ma- chines); NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U. S. 166, 175­177 (1985) (election date relative to filing dead- line); Perkins, supra, at 387 (location of polling places). See also 28 CFR § 51.12 (1996) (requiring preclearance of "[a]ny change affecting voting, even though it appears to be minor or indirect . . ."). This is true even where, as here, the changes are made in an effort to comply with federal law, so long as those changes reflect policy choices made by state or local officials. Allen, supra, at 565, n. 29 (requiring State to preclear changes made in an effort to comply with § 2 of the VRA, 42 U. S. C. § 1973); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U. S. 130, 153 (1981) (requiring preclearance of voting changes submit- ted to a federal court because the VRA "requires that when- ever a covered jurisdiction submits a proposal reflecting the policy choices of the elected representatives of the people- no matter what constraints have limited the choices available to them-the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act is applicable"); Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U. S. 9, 22 (1996) (quoting McDaniel and emphasizing the need to preclear changes reflecting policy choices); Hampton County Election Comm'n, supra, at 179­180 (requiring preclearance of change in election date although change was made in an effort to comply with § 5). Moreover, the NVRA does not forbid application of the VRA's requirements. To the con- trary, it says "[n]othing in this subchapter authorizes or re- quires conduct that is prohibited by the" VRA. 42 U. S. C. § 1973gg­9(d)(2). And it adds that "neither the rights and remedies established by this section nor any other provision of this subchapter shall supersede, restrict, or limit the appli- cation of the" VRA. § 1973gg­9(d)(1). 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 273 (1997) 285 Opinion of the Court Nor does it matter for the preclearance requirement whether the change works in favor of, works against, or is neutral in its impact upon the ability of minorities to vote. See generally City of Lockhart v. United States, supra (re- quiring preclearance of a change but finding the change non- retrogressive). It is change that invokes the preclearance process; evaluation of that change concerns the merits of whether the change should in fact be precleared. See Lopez, supra, at 22­25; Allen, supra, at 555, n. 19, 558­559. That is so because preclearance is a process aimed at pre- serving the status quo until the Attorney General or the courts have an opportunity to evaluate a proposed change. See McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U. S. 236, 243­244 (1984) (With- out § 5, even successful antidiscrimination lawsuits might "merely resul[t] in a change in methods of discrimination"); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 335 (1966) (same); id., at 328 (explaining how the VRA could attack the problems of States going from one discriminatory system to another, by shifting "the advantage of time and inertia" to the potential victims of that discrimination). In this case, the New System contains numerous examples of new, significantly different administrative practices-prac- tices that are not purely ministerial, but reflect the exercise of policy choice and discretion by Mississippi officials. The system, for example, involves newly revised written materi- als containing significant, and significantly different, regis- tration instructions; new reporting requirements for local elections officials; new and detailed instructions about what kind of assistance state agency personnel should offer poten- tial NVRA registrants, which state agencies will be NVRA registration agencies, and how and in what form registration material is to be forwarded to those who maintain the voting rolls; and other similar matters. Insofar as they embody discretionary decisions that have a potential for discrimina- tory impact, they are appropriate matters for review under § 5's preclearance process. 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN 286 YOUNG v. FORDICE Opinion of the Court In saying this, we recognize that the NVRA imposes cer- tain mandates on States, describing those mandates in detail. The NVRA says, for example, that the state driver's license applications must also serve as voter registration applica- tions and that a decision not to register will remain con- fidential. 42 U. S. C. §§ 1973gg­3(a)(1), (c)(2)(D)(ii). It says that States cannot force driver's license applications to sub- mit the same information twice (on license applications and again on registration forms). § 1973gg­3(c)(2)(A). None- theless, implementation of the NVRA is not purely ministe- rial. The NVRA still leaves room for policy choice. The NVRA does not list, for example, all the other information the State may-or may not-provide or request. And a de- cision about that other information-say, whether or not to tell the applicant that registration counts only for federal elections-makes Mississippi's changes to the New System the kind of discretionary, nonministerial changes that call for federal VRA review. Hence, Mississippi must preclear those changes. C We shall consider Mississippi's two important arguments to the contrary. 1 The first set of arguments concerns the effect of the Attor- ney General's preclearance letter. Mississippi points out that the Department of Justice wrote to the State on Febru- ary 1, 1995, that the Attorney General did "not interpose any objection" to its NVRA changes. App. to Juris. Statement 17a. Hence, says Mississippi, the Attorney General has al- ready precleared its efforts to comply. The submission that the Attorney General approved, how- ever, assumed that Mississippi's administrative changes would permit NVRA registrants to vote in both state and federal elections. The submission included a pamphlet enti- tled The National Voter Registration Act, App. 26­43, which 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 273 (1997) 287 Opinion of the Court set forth what Mississippi's submission letter called the State's "plan to administratively implement NVRA on Janu- ary 1, 1995," id., at 110. The submission included legislative changes; indeed, Mississippi enclosed in the packet the pro- posed legislation that would have made a single NVRA reg- istration valid for both federal and state elections. Id., at 86­104. The submission also included forms to be provided NVRA registrants, forms that, by their lack of specificity, probably would have led those voters-and the Attorney General-to believe that NVRA registration permitted them to vote in all elections. Id., at 44­50. These forms-per- fectly understandable on the "single registration" assump- tion-might well mislead if they cannot in fact be used to register for state elections. Cf. City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U. S., at 131­132 (requiring city to submit "entire system" because "[t]he possible discriminatory purpose or effect of the [changes], admittedly subject to § 5, cannot be determined in isolation from the `pre-existing' elements"). Furthermore, the submission included no instructions to voter registration officials about treating NVRA registrants differently from other voters and provided for no notice to NVRA registrants that they could not vote in state elections. Mississippi replies that, as a matter of logic, one could read its submission, with its explicit indication that the state leg- islation was proposed, but not yet enacted, as a request for approval of the administrative changes whether or not the state legislature passed the bill. It tries to derive further support for its claim by pointing to Department of Justice regulations that say that the Attorney General will not pre- clear unenacted legislation. 28 CFR §§ 51.22, 51.35 (1996). As a matter of pure logic, Mississippi is correct. One could logically understand the preclearance in the way the State suggests. But still, that is not the only way to understand it. At a minimum, its submission was ambiguous as to whether (1) it sought approval on the assumption that the 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN 288 YOUNG v. FORDICE Opinion of the Court state legislature would enact the bill, or (2) it sought ap- proval whether or not the state legislature would enact the bill. Although there is one reference to the possibility of a "dual registration system" in the absence of legislation, App. 72, the submission simply did not specify what would happen if the legislature did not pass the bill, and it thereby created ambiguity about whether the practices and procedures de- scribed in the submission would be implemented regardless of what the legislature did. The VRA permits the Attorney General to resolve such ambiguities against the submitting State. McCain, 465 U. S., at 249, 255­257 (burden is on the State to submit a complete and unambiguous description of proposed changes); Clark v. Roemer, 500 U. S. 646, 658­659 (1991) (relying on "presumption that any ambiguity in the scope of the preclearance request must be construed against the [State]" (internal quotation marks and citations omit- ted)). See also 28 CFR §§ 51.26(d), 51.27(c) (1996) (requiring preclearance submissions to explain changes clearly and in detail). Hence, the Attorney General could read her ap- proval of the submitted plan as an approval of a plan that rested on the assumption that the proposed changes would be valid for all elections, not a plan in which NVRA registra- tion does not qualify the registrant to vote in state elections. We find nothing in the Attorney General's regulations that forces a contrary conclusion. Mississippi adds that the Attorney General-if faced with an ambiguity-could have sought more information to clarify the situation, to determine what would happen if the legisla- ture failed to pass the bill, for example. And the Attorney General could then have withheld her approval once she found out what would likely occur. Again, Mississippi is right as to what the Attorney General might have done. See § 51.37(a) (Attorney General may request more informa- tion about submissions). Indeed, the United States "ac- knowledge[s]" that with "the benefit of hindsight, . . . such a request might have been preferable" to preclearing the sub- 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 273 (1997) 289 Opinion of the Court mission. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27, n. 14. Still, the law does not require the Attorney General, in these circumstances, to obtain more information. Clark, supra, at 658­659 (The Attorney General is under no duty to investigate voting changes). See also McCain, supra, at 247 (Congress " `acknowledged and anticipated [the] inability of the Justice Department-given limited resources-to in- vestigate independently all changes . . .' " (quoting Perkins, 400 U. S., at 392, n. 10)). And the issue, of course, is not whether she should or should not have issued a preclearance letter on February 1, 1995, but rather what it was that she precleared. Her failure to seek added information makes it more likely, not less likely, that she intended to preclear what she took to be the natural import of the earlier submission, namely, a proposal for a single state/federal registration system. Finally, Mississippi argues that the Attorney General in fact knew, on February 1, 1995, when she issued the preclear- ance letter that the state legislature would not enact the pro- posed bill. And it adds that the Attorney General nonethe- less approved the submission in order to have in place a precleared unitary system that would serve as a benchmark for measuring whether subsequent changes are retrogres- sive, thereby permitting the Attorney General to argue that § 5 prohibited as retrogressive the dual system which she knew would likely emerge because the legislation failed. In fact, the record is not clear about just what the Department of Justice did or did not know (e. g., whether tabling the bill meant killing it; whether state election law definitely had to be changed). But in any event, the short answer to the argument is that Mississippi's description of the Depart- ment's motive, if true, would refute its claim that the Attor- ney General intended to preclear a dual system. Indeed, only two weeks after the February 1 preclearance, the At- torney General wrote to Mississippi stating explicitly her view that its submission had not sought "preclearance for a 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN 290 YOUNG v. FORDICE Opinion of the Court dual registration and purge system." App. to Juris. State- ment 25a. See McCain, supra, at 255­256 (relying on "such after-the-fact Justice Department statements . . . in determining whether a particular change was actually precleared"). Regardless, the law ordinarily permits the Attorney Gen- eral to rest a decision to preclear or not to preclear upon the submission itself. Clark, supra, at 658­659; United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U. S. 110, 136­138 (1978). Tying preclearance to a particular set of written documents themselves helps to avoid the kinds of arguments about meaning and intent that Mississippi raises here-arguments that, were they frequently to arise, could delay expeditious decisionmaking as to the many thousands of requests for clearance that the Department of Justice receives each year. See Clark, supra, at 658­659. In sum, we conclude that the Department of Justice, on February 1, did not preclear the New System. 2 Finally, Mississippi argues that the NVRA, because it spe- cifically applies only to registration for federal elections, 42 U. S. C. § 1973gg­2(a), automatically authorizes it to maintain separate voting procedures; hence § 5 cannot be used to force it to implement the NVRA for all elections. If Mississippi means that the NVRA does not forbid two systems and that § 5 of the VRA does not categorically-without more-forbid a State to maintain a dual system, we agree. The decision to adopt the NVRA federal registration system is not, by itself, a change for the purposes of § 5, for the State has no choice but to do so. And of course, a State's retention of a prior system for state elections, by itself, is not a change. It is the discretionary elements of the new federal system that the State must preclear. The problem for Mississippi is that preclearance typically requires examination of dis- cretionary changes in context-a context that includes his- tory, purpose, and practical effect. See City of Lockhart v. 520US1 Unit: $U40 [09-10-99 17:19:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 273 (1997) 291 Opinion of the Court United States, 460 U. S., at 131 ("The possible discriminatory purpose or effect of the [changes], admittedly subject to § 5, cannot be determined in isolation from the `pre-existing' ele- ments of the council"). The appellants and the Government argue that in context and in light of their practical effects, the particular changes and the way in which Mississippi ad- ministers them could have the "purpose [or] effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color . . . ." 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. We cannot say whether or not that is so, for that is an argument about the merits. The question here is "preclearance," and preclearance is neces- sary so that the appellants and the Government will have the opportunity to find out if it is true. III We hold that Mississippi has not precleared, and must pre- clear, the "practices and procedures" that it sought to admin- ister on and after February 10, 1995. The decision of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions for the District Court to enter an order enjoin- ing further use of Mississippi's unprecleared changes as ap- propriate. Any further questions about the remedy for Mis- sissippi's use of an unprecleared plan are for the District Court to address in the first instance. Clark, 500 U. S., at 659­660. It is so ordered. 520us1$41Z 05-14-98 09:56:54 PAGES OPINPGT 292 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus LAMBERT, GALLATIN COUNTY ATTORNEY v. WICKLUND et al. on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 96­858. Decided March 31, 1997 Montana's Parental Notice of Abortion Act permits a court to waive the requirement that one parent be notified before a minor has an abortion if, inter alia, notification is not in the minor's best interests. The Fed- eral District Court declared the Act unconstitutional because the judi- cial bypass mechanism does not authorize waiver of the notice require- ment whenever the abortion itself is in the minor's best interest. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, basing its conclusion entirely on its earlier deci- sion that Nevada's identical bypass requirement was inconsistent with Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, and Ohio v. Akron Center for Repro- ductive Health, 497 U. S. 502. Held: The Act's judicial bypass provision sufficiently protects a minor's right to an abortion. The Ninth Circuit's holding to the contrary is in direct conflict with this Court's precedents. The principal opinion in Bellotti explained the four criteria that a parental consent statute by- pass provision must meet to be constitutional, and this Court explicitly held that the Ohio statute at issue in Akron met the second Bellotti requirement: that the minor be allowed to show that the desired abor- tion would be in her best interests. The Ohio statute was indistin- guishable in any relevant way from the statute at issue here, and, thus, the Montana law also meets the second Bellotti requirement. Akron's context, the Ohio statute's language, and Akron's concurring opinion all make clear that requiring a minor to show that parental notification is not in her best interests is equivalent to requiring her to show that abortion without notification is in her best interests. Contrary to re- spondents' argument, the Montana statute does not draw a distinction between requiring a minor to show that parental notification is not in her best interests and requiring her to show that an abortion (without notification) is in her best interests, and respondents cite no Montana state-court decision suggesting that the statute permits a court to sepa- rate these questions. Certiorari granted; 93 F. 3d 567, reversed. 520us1$41H 05-14-98 09:56:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 292 (1997) 293 Per Curiam Per Curiam. Before a minor has an abortion in Montana, one of her parents must be notified. A waiver, or "judicial bypass," of the notification requirement is allowed if the minor can con- vince a court that notification would not be in her best inter- ests. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down Montana's parental notification law as unconstitutional, holding that the judicial bypass did not sufficiently protect the right of minors to have an abortion. Because the Ninth Circuit's holding is in direct conflict with our precedents, we grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse. In 1995, Montana enacted the Parental Notice of Abortion Act. The Act prohibits a physician from performing an abortion on a minor unless the physician has notified one of the minor's parents or the minor's legal guardian 48 hours in advance. Mont. Code Ann. § 50­20­204 (1995).1 However, an "unemancipated" minor 2 may petition the state youth court to waive the notification requirement, pursuant to the statute's "judicial bypass" provision. § 50­20­212 (quoted in full in an appendix to this opinion). The provision gives the minor a right to court-appointed counsel, and guarantees ex- peditious handling of the minor's petition (since the petition is automatically granted if the youth court fails to rule on 1 Section 50­20­204 provides in relevant part: "A physician may not per- form an abortion upon a minor or an incompetent person unless the physi- cian has given at least 48 hours' actual notice to one parent or to the legal guardian of the pregnant minor or incompetent person of the physician's intention to perform the abortion. . . . If actual notice is not possible after a reasonable effort, the physician or the physician's agent shall give alter- nate notice as provided in 50­20­205." Section 50­20­205 provides for notice by certified mail. The notice requirement does not apply if "a med- ical emergency exists and there is insufficient time to provide notice." § 50­20­208(1). 2 " `Emancipated minor' means a person under 18 years of age who is or has been married or who has been granted an order of limited emancipa- tion by a court . . . ." § 50­20­203(3). 520us1$41H 05-14-98 09:56:54 PAGES OPINPGT 294 LAMBERT v. WICKLUND Per Curiam the petition within 48 hours from the time it is filed). §§ 50­ 20­212(2)(a), (3). The minor's identity remains anonymous, and the proceedings and related documents are kept con- fidential. § 50­20­212(3). If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that any of the following three conditions are met, it must grant the petition and waive the notice requirement: (i) the minor is "sufficiently mature to decide whether to have an abor- tion"; (ii) "there is evidence of a pattern of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse" of the minor by one of her parents, a guardian, or a custodian; or (iii) "the notification of a parent or guardian is not in the best interests of the [minor]." §§ 50­20­212(4), (5) (emphasis added). It is this third condi- tion which is at issue here. Before the Act's effective date, respondents-several phy- sicians who perform abortions, and other medical person- nel-filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Act was unconstitutional and an order enjoining its enforcement. The District Court for the District of Montana, addressing only one of respondents' arguments, held that the Act was unconstitutional because the third condition set out above was too narrow. According to the District Court, our prece- dents require that judicial bypass mechanisms authorize waiver of the notice requirement whenever "the abortion would be in [the minor's] best interests," not just when "noti- fication would not be in the minor's best interests." App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a (emphasis in original) (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 640­642 (1979) (plurality opinion)). Three days before the Act was to go into effect, the District Court enjoined its enforcement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that it was bound by its prior decision in Glick v. McKay, 937 F. 2d 434 (CA9 1991). See Wicklund v. Salvagni, 93 F. 3d 567, 571­572 (CA9 1996). Glick struck down Nevada's parental notifica- tion statute which, like Montana's statute here, allowed a minor to bypass the notification requirement if a court deter- 520us1$41H 05-14-98 09:56:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 292 (1997) 295 Per Curiam mined that the notification would not be in the minor's best interests. The court's conclusion was based on its analysis of our decisions in Bellotti v. Baird, supra, and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S. 502 (1990). In Bellotti, we struck down a statute requiring a minor to obtain the consent of both parents before having an abortion, subject to a judicial bypass provision, because the judicial bypass provision was too restrictive, unconstitutionally bur- dening a minor's right to an abortion. 443 U. S., at 647 (plu- rality opinion); id., at 655­656 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). The Court's principal opinion explained that a constitutional parental consent statute must contain a by- pass provision that meets four criteria: (i) allow the minor to bypass the consent requirement if she establishes that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make the abor- tion decision independently; (ii) allow the minor to bypass the consent requirement if she establishes that the abortion would be in her best interests; (iii) ensure the minor's ano- nymity; and (iv) provide for expeditious bypass procedures. Id., at 643­644 (plurality opinion). See also Akron, 497 U. S., at 511­513 (restating the four requirements). In Akron, we upheld a statute requiring a minor to notify one parent before having an abortion, subject to a judicial bypass provision. We declined to decide whether a parental notification statute must include some sort of bypass provi- sion to be constitutional. Id., at 510. Instead, we held that this bypass provision satisfied the four Bellotti criteria re- quired for bypass provisions in parental consent statutes, and that a fortiori it satisfied any criteria that might be re- quired for bypass provisions in parental notification statutes. Critically for the case now before us, the judicial bypass pro- vision we examined in Akron was substantively indistin- guishable from both the Montana judicial bypass provision at issue here and the Nevada provision at issue in Glick. See 497 U. S., at 508 (summarizing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.85 (1995)). The judicial bypass provision in Akron al- 520us1$41H 05-14-98 09:56:54 PAGES OPINPGT 296 LAMBERT v. WICKLUND Per Curiam lowed a court to waive the notification requirement if it de- termined by clear and convincing evidence "that notice is not in [the minor's] best interests" (not that an abortion is in her best interests). 497 U. S., at 508 (emphasis added) (citing § 2151.85(A)(4)). And we explicitly held that this provision satisfied the second Bellotti requirement, that "the proce- dure must allow the minor to show that, even if she cannot make the abortion decision by herself, `the desired abortion would be in her best interests.' " 497 U. S., at 511 (quoting Bellotti, supra, at 644). Despite the fact that Akron involved a parental notifica- tion statute, and Bellotti involved a parental consent stat- ute; 3 despite the fact that Akron involved a statute virtually identical to the Nevada statute at issue in Glick; and despite the fact that Akron explicitly held that the statute met all of the Bellotti requirements, the Ninth Circuit in Glick struck down Nevada's parental notification statute as incon- sistent with Bellotti: "Rather than requiring the reviewing court to consider the minor's `best interests' generally, the Nevada statute requires the consideration of "best interests" only with respect to the possible consequences of parental notifi- cation. The best interests of a minor female in obtain- ing an abortion may encompass far more than her inter- ests in not notifying a parent of the abortion decision. Furthermore, in Bellotti, the court expressly stated, `[i]f, all things considered, the court determines that an abortion is in the minor's best interests, she is entitled to court authorization without any parental involve- ment.' Bellotti, 443 U. S. at 648 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Nevada statute impermissibly narrows 3 See Bellotti, 443 U. S., at 654, n. 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in judg- ment) ("[T]his case [does not] determin[e] the constitutionality of a statute which does no more than require notice to the parents, without affording them or any other third party an absolute veto"). 520us1$41H 05-14-98 09:56:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 292 (1997) 297 Per Curiam the Bellotti `best interests' criterion, and is unconstitu- tional." 937 F. 2d, at 439. Based entirely on Glick, the Ninth Circuit in this case af- firmed the District Court's ruling that the Montana statute is unconstitutional, since the statute allows waiver of the no- tification requirement only if the youth court determines that notification-not the abortion itself-is not in the mi- nor's best interests. 93 F. 3d, at 572. As should be evident from the foregoing, this decision sim- ply cannot be squared with our decision in Akron. The Ohio parental notification statute at issue there was indistinguish- able in any relevant way from the Montana statute at issue here. Both allow for judicial bypass if the minor shows that parental notification is not in her best interests. We asked in Akron whether this met the Bellotti requirement that the minor be allowed to show that "the desired abortion would be in her best interests." We explicitly held that it did. 497 U. S., at 511. Thus, the Montana statute meets this re- quirement, too. In concluding otherwise, the Ninth Circuit was mistaken. Respondents (as did the Ninth Circuit in Glick) place great emphasis on our statement in Akron, that "[t]he statute re- quires the juvenile court to authorize the minor's consent where the court determines that the abortion is in the mi- nor's best interest." 497 U. S., at 511 (emphasis added) (cit- ing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.85(C)(2) (Supp. 1988)). But since we had clearly stated that the statute actually required such authorization only when the court determined that noti- fication would not be in the minor's best interests, it is wrong to take our statement to imply that the statute said otherwise. Rather, underlying our statement was an as- sumption that a judicial bypass procedure requiring a minor to show that parental notification is not in her best interests is equivalent to a judicial bypass procedure requiring a minor to show that abortion without notification is in her best in- 520us1$41H 05-14-98 09:56:54 PAGES OPINPGT 298 LAMBERT v. WICKLUND Per Curiam terests, as the context of the opinion, the statutory language, and the concurring opinion all make clear.4 Respondents, echoing the Ninth Circuit in Glick, claim that there is a constitutionally significant distinction be- tween requiring a minor to show that parental notification is not in her best interests, and requiring a minor to show that an abortion (without such notification) is in her best inter- ests. See Brief in Opposition 12­13; 937 F. 2d, at 438­439. But the Montana statute draws no such distinction, and re- spondents cite no Montana state-court decision suggesting that the statute permits a court to separate the question whether parental notification is not in a minor's best interest from an inquiry into whether abortion (without notification) is in the minor's best interest. As with the Ohio statute in Akron, the challenge to the Montana statute here is a facial one. Under these circumstances, the Ninth Circuit was in- correct to assume that Montana's statute "narrow[ed]" the Bellotti test, 937 F. 2d, at 439, as interpreted in Akron. 4 See 497 U. S., at 517 ("if she can demonstrate that her maturity or best interests favor abortion without notifying one of her parents"); id., at 522 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("Although it need not take the form of a judicial bypass, the State must provide an adequate mechanism for cases in which the minor is mature or notice would not be in her best interests" (emphasis added)); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.85(C)(2) (1994) ("[I]f the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, . . . that the notification of the parents, guardian, or custodian of the [minor] otherwise is not in the best interest of [the minor], the court shall issue an order authorizing the [minor] to consent to the performance or inducement of an abortion without the notification of her parents, guardian, or custodian"). See also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U. S. 417, 497 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (interpreting Minnesota judicial bypass procedure which requires minor to show that "an abortion . . . without notification of her parents, guardian, or conservator would be in her best interests," Minn. Stat. § 144.343(6) (1988) (emphasis added), as authorizing exemption from stric- tures of parental notification scheme in "those cases in which . . . notifica- tion of the minor's parents is not in the minor's best interests" (empha- sis added)). 520us1$41H 05-14-98 09:56:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 292 (1997) 299 Appendix to Per Curiam opinion Because the reasons given by the District Court and the Ninth Circuit for striking down the Act are inconsistent with our precedents, we grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. It is so ordered. APPENDIX TO PER CURIAM OPINION Mont. Code Ann. § 50­20­212 (1995): "(1) The requirements and procedures under this section are available to minors and incompetent persons whether or not they are residents of this state. "(2) (a) The minor or incompetent person may petition the youth court for a waiver of the notice requirement and may participate in the proceedings on the person's own behalf. The petition must include a statement that the petitioner is pregnant and is not emancipated. The court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the petitioner. A guardian ad litem is required to maintain the confidentiality of the proceedings. The youth court shall advise the petitioner of the right to court-appointed counsel and shall provide the petitioner with counsel upon request. "(b) If the petition filed under subsection (2)(a) alleges abuse as a basis for waiver of notice, the youth court shall treat the petition as a report under 41­3­202. The provi- sions of Title 41, chapter 3, part 2, apply to an investigation conducted pursuant to this subsection. "(3) Proceedings under this section are confidential and must ensure the anonymity of the petitioner. All proceed- ings under this section must be sealed. The petitioner may file the petition using a pseudonym or using the petitioner's initials. All documents related to the petition are confiden- tial and are not available to the public. The proceedings on the petition must be given preference over other pending 520us1$41H 05-14-98 09:56:54 PAGES OPINPGT 300 LAMBERT v. WICKLUND Appendix to Per Curiam opinion matters to the extent necessary to ensure that the court reaches a prompt decision. The court shall issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law and rule within 48 hours of the time that the petition is filed unless the time is extended at the request of the petitioner. If the court fails to rule within 48 hours and the time is not extended, the petition is granted and the notice requirement is waived. "(4) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is sufficiently mature to decide whether to have an abortion, the court shall issue an order authoriz- ing the minor to consent to the performance or inducement of an abortion without the notification of a parent or guardian. "(5) The court shall issue an order authorizing the peti- tioner to consent to an abortion without the notification of a parent or guardian if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that: "(a) there is evidence of a pattern of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse of the petitioner by one or both parents, a guardian, or a custodian; or "(b) the notification of a parent or guardian is not in the best interests of the petitioner. "(6) If the court does not make a finding specified in sub- section (4) or (5), the court shall dismiss the petition. "(7) A court that conducts proceedings under this section shall issue written and specific findings of fact and conclu- sions of law supporting its decision and shall order that a confidential record of the evidence, findings, and conclusions be maintained. "(8) The supreme court may adopt rules providing an ex- pedited confidential appeal by a petitioner if the youth court denies a petition. An order authorizing an abortion without notice is not subject to appeal. "(9) Filing fees may not be required of a pregnant minor who petitions a court for a waiver of parental notification or appeals a denial of a petition." 520us1$41I 05-14-98 09:56:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 292 (1997) 301 Stevens, J., concurring in judgment Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join, concurring in the judgment. We assumed in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S. 502 (1990) (Akron II), that a young woman's demonstration that an abortion would be in her best interest was sufficient to meet the requirements of the Ohio statute's judicial bypass provision. In my view, that case requires us to make the same assumption here. Whether that is a necessary showing is a question we need not reach. In Akron II, we upheld a statute authorizing a judicial bypass of a parental notice requirement on the understand- ing that Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.85(C)(2) (1995) required the juvenile court to authorize the procedure whenever it determined that "the abortion is in the minor's best inter- est," 497 U. S., at 511. Given the fact that the relevant text of the Montana statute at issue in this case, Mont. Code Ann. § 50­20­212(5)(b) (1995), is essentially identical to the Ohio provision, coupled with the fact that the Montana Attorney General has advised us that "the best interests standard in § 50­20­212(5)(b) [is] either identical to or substantively in- distinguishable from the best interests" provision construed in Akron II, Pet. for Cert. 7, it is surely appropriate to as- sume that the Montana provision also requires the court to authorize the minor's consent whenever the abortion is in her best interests. So understood, the Montana statute is plainly constitutional under our ruling in Akron II. Be- cause the Court of Appeals erroneously construed the stat- ute in a manner that caused that court to hold the statute unconstitutional, I agree with the majority that the judg- ment below should be reversed.* *Our reading of the statute in Akron II appropriately recognized that the two inquiries at issue here-whether an abortion is in a young wom- an's best interest, and whether notifying a minor's parents of her desire to obtain an abortion is in her best interest-are sometimes linked. For example, if a judge finds after careful assessment of all the circumstances 520us1$41I 05-14-98 09:56:54 PAGES OPINPGT 302 LAMBERT v. WICKLUND Stevens, J., concurring in judgment While a showing that an abortion is in a young woman's best interest is therefore sufficient to satisfy the Montana judicial bypass provision as we understood an analogous statute in Akron II, I do not think the Court need address whether the Montana statute can be properly understood to make such a demonstration a necessary requirement. My colleagues suggest that the statute requires a minor "to show that abortion without notification is in her best inter- ests," ante, at 297­298 (emphasis deleted). To the extent this language indicates that a young woman must demon- strate both that abortion is in her best interest and that noti- fication is not, I think that question is best left for another day. I note, however, that the plain language of the statute makes passably clear that a showing that notification is not in the minor's best interest is alone sufficient. See Mont. Code Ann. § 50­20­212(5)(b) (1995) ("The court shall issue an order authorizing the petitioner to consent to an abortion without the notification of a parent . . . if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that . . . the notification of a parent . . . is not in the best interests of the petitioner"). Although I therefore do not agree with all of the Court's reasoning, I concur in the majority's view that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. that the abortion a young woman seeks would be in her best interest, and determines that notifying her parents is both opposed by the young woman and would likely cause her to be deterred from pursuing the treatment decision that would serve her best, then parental notification is assuredly not in her best interest. Under such circumstances, the proper course for the trial judge would be to permit the abortion with- out notification. 520US1 Unit: $U42 [09-17-99 06:54:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 303 Per Curiam IN RE VEY on motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis No. 96­8005. Decided April 14, 1997 Pro se petitioner seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis and requests this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus vacating her 13-year-old convictions. In the past 6 1 2 years, she has filed 11 petitions for certio- rari, 12 petitions for extraordinary relief, and 2 applications for bail, all of which have been denied. While her first 14 motions to proceed in forma pauperis were granted, she has since been denied leave to pro- ceed in forma pauperis five times under this Court's Rule 39.8. Held: Petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is denied. For the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Ap- peals, 506 U. S. 1 (per curiam), she is barred from filing any further petitions for extraordinary writs unless she first pays the docketing fee and submits her petition in compliance with Rule 33. Motion denied. Per Curiam. Pro se petitioner Eileen Vey seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis and requests this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus vacating her 13-year-old convictions. This is not Vey's first filing in this Court. In the past 61 2 years, she has filed 11 petitions for certiorari, 12 petitions for extraordinary relief, and 2 applications for bail. All of these have been denied. For the first 14 of those submis- sions, we granted her motions to proceed in forma pauperis. Since then, we have five times denied her leave to proceed in forma pauperis under this Court's Rule 39.8.* We again deny petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Her various allegations are supported by nothing other than her own conclusory statements that they are true. *Rule 39.8 provides: "If satisfied that a petition for a writ of certiorari, jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ is frivolous or malicious, the Court may deny a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis." 520US1 Unit: $U42 [09-17-99 06:54:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 304 IN RE VEY Stevens, J., dissenting Petitioner is allowed until May 5, 1997, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit her petition in compliance with Rule 33.1. In light of her his- tory of frivolous, repetitive filings, we direct the Clerk of the Court not to accept any further petitions for extraordinary writs from petitioner unless she first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits her petition in compliance with Rule 33. We enter the order barring future in forma pauperis filings for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, dissenting. For reasons previously stated, see Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting), and cases cited, I respectfully dissent. 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 305 Syllabus CHANDLER et al. v. MILLER, GOVERNOR OF GEORGIA, et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit No. 96­126. Argued January 14, 1997-Decided April 15, 1997 A Georgia statute requires candidates for designated state offices to cer- tify that they have taken a urinalysis drug test within 30 days prior to qualifying for nomination or election and that the test result was nega- tive. Petitioners, Libertarian Party nominees for state offices subject to the statute's requirements, filed this action in the District Court about one month before the deadline for submission of the certificates. Naming as defendants the Governor and two officials involved in the statute's administration, petitioners asserted, inter alia, that the drug tests violated their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The District Court denied petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction and later entered final judgment for respondents. Relying on this Court's precedents sustaining drug-testing programs for student athletes, Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 650, 665­666, Customs Service employ- ees, Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U. S. 656, 659, and railway employees, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 608­613, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court accepted as settled law that the tests were searches, but reasoned that, as was true of the drug-testing programs at issue in Skinner and Von Raab, the statute served "special needs," interests other than the ordinary needs of law enforcement. Balancing the individual's privacy expectations against the State's interest in the drug-testing program, the court held the stat- ute, as applied to petitioners, not inconsistent with the Fourth and Four- teenth Amendments. Held: Georgia's requirement that candidates for state office pass a drug test does not fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches. Pp. 313­323. (a) It is uncontested that Georgia's drug-testing requirement, im- posed by law and enforced by state officials, effects a search within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The pivotal question here is whether the searches are reasonable. To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. See Vernonia, 515 U. S., at 652­653. But particularized exceptions to the main rule are sometimes 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN 306 CHANDLER v. MILLER Syllabus warranted based on "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement." See Skinner, 489 U. S., at 619. When such "special needs" are alleged, courts must undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing private and public interests advanced by the parties. See Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 665­666. In evaluating Georgia's ballot-access, drug-testing statute-a measure plainly not tied to individualized suspicion-the Eleventh Circuit sought to balance the competing interests in line with this Court's precedents most immedi- ately in point: Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia. Pp. 313­317. (b) These precedents remain the guides for assessing the validity of the Georgia statute despite respondents' invitation to apply a frame- work extraordinarily deferential to state measures setting conditions of candidacy for state office. No precedent suggests that a State's sov- ereign power to establish qualifications for state offices diminishes the constraints on state action imposed by the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 317­318. (c) Georgia's testing method is relatively noninvasive; therefore, if the "special need" showing had been made, the State could not be faulted for excessive intrusion. However, Georgia has failed to show a special need that is substantial-important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspi- cion. Respondents contend that unlawful drug use is incompatible with holding high state office because such drug use draws into question an official's judgment and integrity; jeopardizes the discharge of public functions, including antidrug law enforcement efforts; and undermines public confidence and trust in elected officials. Notably lacking in re- spondents' presentation is any indication of a concrete danger demand- ing departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule. The statute was not enacted, as respondents concede, in response to any fear or suspicion of drug use by state officials. A demonstrated problem of drug abuse, while not in all cases necessary to the validity of a testing regime, see Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 673­675, would shore up an assertion of special need for a suspicionless general search program, see Skinner, 489 U. S., at 606­608; Vernonia, 515 U. S., at 662­663. In contrast to the effective testing regimes upheld in Skinner, Von Raab, and Ver- nonia, Georgia's certification requirement is not well designed to iden- tify candidates who violate antidrug laws and is not a credible means to deter illicit drug users from seeking state office. The test date is se- lected by the candidate, and thus all but the prohibitively addicted could abstain for a pretest period sufficient to avoid detection. Respondents' reliance on this Court's decision in Von Raab, which sustained a drug- 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 305 (1997) 307 Syllabus testing program for Customs Service officers prior to promotion or transfer to certain high-risk positions, despite the absence of any docu- mented drug abuse problem among Service employees, 489 U. S., at 660, is misplaced. Hardly a decision opening broad vistas for suspicionless searches, Von Raab must be read in its unique context. Drug interdic- tion had become the agency's primary enforcement mission. The cov- ered posts directly involved drug interdiction or otherwise required Customs officers to carry firearms, the employees would have access to vast sources of valuable contraband, and officers had been targets of and some had succumbed to bribery by drug smugglers. Moreover, it was not feasible to subject the Customs Service employees to the kind of day-to-day scrutiny that is the norm in more traditional office environ- ments. In telling contrast, the day-to-day conduct of candidates for public office attracts attention notably beyond the norm in ordinary work environments. What is left, after close review of Georgia's scheme, is that the State seeks to display its commitment to the struggle against drug abuse. But Georgia asserts no evidence of a drug problem among the State's elected officials, those officials typically do not per- form high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks, and the required certification im- mediately aids no interdiction effort. The need revealed is symbolic, not "special." The Fourth Amendment shields society from state action that diminishes personal privacy for a symbol's sake. Pp. 318­322. (d) The Court expresses no opinion on medical examinations designed to provide certification of a candidate's general health or on finan- cial disclosure requirements, and it does not speak to drug testing in the private sector, a domain unguarded by Fourth Amendment con- straints. P. 323. 73 F. 3d 1543, reversed. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 323. Walker L. Chandler, petitioner, argued the cause and filed a brief pro se. With him on the briefs for petitioners was Robert E. Turner. Patricia Guilday, Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Michael E. 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN 308 CHANDLER v. MILLER Opinion of the Court Hobbs, Deputy Attorney General, and Dennis D. Dunn, Senior Assistant Attorney General.* Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. The Fourth Amendment requires government to respect "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures." This restraint on government conduct generally bars officials from under- taking a search or seizure absent individualized suspicion. Searches conducted without grounds for suspicion of particu- lar individuals have been upheld, however, in "certain limited circumstances." See Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U. S. 656, 668 (1989). These circumstances include brief stops for questioning or observation at a fixed Border Patrol checkpoint, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 545­550, 566­567 (1976), or at a sobriety checkpoint, Michi- gan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U. S. 444, 447, 455 (1990), and administrative inspections in "closely regulated" businesses, New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691, 703­704 (1987). Georgia requires candidates for designated state offices to certify that they have taken a drug test and that the test result was negative. Ga. Code Ann. § 21­2­140 (1993) (here- inafter § 21­2­140). We confront in this case the question whether that requirement ranks among the limited cir- cumstances in which suspicionless searches are warranted. Relying on this Court's precedents sustaining drug-testing *Stephen H. Sachs, Steven R. Shapiro, Gerald R. Weber, Arthur B. Spitzer, and Barbara E. Bergman filed a brief for the American Civil Lib- erties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Richard K. Willard, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Hun- ger, Deputy Solicitor General Waxman, James A. Feldman, Leonard Schaitman, and Edward Himmelfarb filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae. 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 305 (1997) 309 Opinion of the Court programs for student athletes, customs employees, and rail- way employees, see Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 650, 665­666 (1995) (random drug testing of stu- dents who participate in interscholastic sports); Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 659 (drug tests for United States Customs Serv- ice employees who seek transfer or promotion to certain po- sitions); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 608­613 (1989) (drug and alcohol tests for railway employees involved in train accidents and for those who vio- late particular safety rules), the United States Court of Ap- peals for the Eleventh Circuit judged Georgia's law constitu- tional. We reverse that judgment. Georgia's requirement that candidates for state office pass a drug test, we hold, does not fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches. I The prescription at issue, approved by the Georgia Legis- lature in 1990, orders that "[e]ach candidate seeking to qual- ify for nomination or election to a state office shall as a condi- tion of such qualification be required to certify that such candidate has tested negative for illegal drugs." § 21­2­ 140(b). Georgia was the first, and apparently remains the only, State to condition candidacy for state office on a drug test. Under the Georgia statute, to qualify for a place on the ballot, a candidate must present a certificate from a state- approved laboratory, in a form approved by the Secretary of State, reporting that the candidate submitted to a urinalysis drug test within 30 days prior to qualifying for nomination or election and that the results were negative. § 21­2­ 140(c). The statute lists as "[i]llegal drug[s]": marijuana, cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, and phencyclidines. § 21­2­ 140(a)(3). The designated state offices are: "the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, State School Superintendent, Commissioner of Insurance, 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN 310 CHANDLER v. MILLER Opinion of the Court Commissioner of Agriculture, Commissioner of Labor, Jus- tices of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the superior courts, district attorneys, members of the General Assembly, and members of the Public Service Commission." § 21­2­140(a)(4). Candidate drug tests are to be administered in a manner consistent with the United States Department of Health and Human Services Guidelines, 53 Fed. Reg. 11979­11989 (1988), or other professionally valid procedures approved by Georgia's Commissioner of Human Resources. See § 21­2­ 140(a)(2). A candidate may provide the test specimen at a laboratory approved by the State, or at the office of the can- didate's personal physician, see App. 4­5 (Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts). Once a urine sample is obtained, an approved laboratory determines whether any of the five specified illegal drugs are present, id., at 5; § 21­2­140(c), and prepares a certificate reporting the test results to the candidate. Petitioners were Libertarian Party nominees in 1994 for state offices subject to the requirements of § 21­2­140. The Party nominated Walker L. Chandler for the office of Lieu- tenant Governor, Sharon T. Harris for the office of Commis- sioner of Agriculture, and James D. Walker for the office of member of the General Assembly. In May 1994, about one month before the deadline for submission of the certificates required by § 21­2­140, petitioners Chandler, Harris, and Walker filed this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. They asserted, inter alia, that the drug tests required by § 21­2­140 violated their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amend- ments to the United States Constitution. Naming as de- fendants Governor Zell D. Miller and two other state officials involved in the administration of § 21­2­140, petitioners re- quested declaratory and injunctive relief barring enforce- ment of the statute. 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 305 (1997) 311 Opinion of the Court In June 1994, the District Court denied petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction. Stressing the importance of the state offices sought and the relative unintrusiveness of the testing procedure, the court found it unlikely that peti- tioners would prevail on the merits of their claims. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5B. Petitioners apparently submitted to the drug tests, obtained the certificates required by § 21­2­140, and appeared on the ballot. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. After the 1994 election, the parties jointly moved for the entry of final judgment on stipulated facts. In January 1995, the District Court entered final judgment for respondents. A divided Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed. 73 F. 3d 1543 (1996). It is settled law, the court accepted, that the drug tests required by the statute rank as searches. But, as was true of the drug-testing programs at issue in Skinner and Von Raab, the court reasoned, § 21­2­140 serves "special needs," interests other than the ordinary needs of law en- forcement. The court therefore endeavored to " `balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it [was] impractical to re- quire a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context.' " 73 F. 3d, at 1545 (quoting Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 665­666). Examining the state interests involved, the court acknowl- edged the absence of any record of drug abuse by elected officials in Georgia. Nonetheless, the court observed, "[t]he people of Georgia place in the trust of their elected officials . . . their liberty, their safety, their economic well-being, [and] ultimate responsibility for law enforcement." 73 F. 3d, at 1546. Consequently, "those vested with the highest execu- tive authority to make public policy in general and fre- quently to supervise Georgia's drug interdiction efforts in particular must be persons appreciative of the perils of drug use." Ibid. The court further noted that "[t]he nature of high public office in itself demands the highest levels of honesty, clear-sightedness, and clear-thinking." Ibid. Re- 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN 312 CHANDLER v. MILLER Opinion of the Court citing responsibilities of the offices petitioners sought, the Court of Appeals perceived those "positions [as] particularly susceptible to the `risks of bribery and blackmail against which the Government is entitled to guard.' " Ibid. (quoting Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 674). Turning to petitioners' privacy interests, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that the tests could be conducted in the office of the candidate's private physician, making the "intru- sion here . . . even less than that approved in Von Raab." 73 F. 3d, at 1547. The court also noted the statute's refer- ence to federally approved drug-testing guidelines. Ibid. The drug test itself would reveal only the presence or ab- sence of indicia of the use of particular drugs, and not any other information about the health of the candidate. Fur- thermore, the candidate would control release of the test results: Should the candidate test positive, he or she could forfeit the opportunity to run for office, and in that event, nothing would be divulged to law enforcement officials. Ibid. Another consideration, the court said, is the reality that "candidates for high office must expect the voters to demand some disclosures about their physical, emotional, and mental fitness for the position." Ibid. Concluding that the State's interests outweighed the privacy intrusion caused by the required certification, the court held the statute, as ap- plied to petitioners, not inconsistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Ibid.1 Judge Barkett dissented. In her view, a balance of the State's and candidates' interests was not appropriate, for the State had failed to establish a special governmental need for the regime. "There is nothing so special or immediate about the generalized governmental interests involved here," she observed, "as to warrant suspension of the Fourth 1 The court also rejected equal protection and free speech pleas made by petitioners. 73 F. 3d, at 1547­1549. We hold § 21­2­140 incompatible with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and do not reach petition- ers' further pleas. 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 305 (1997) 313 Opinion of the Court Amendment's requirement of individualized suspicion for searches and seizures." Id., at 1551. We granted the petition for certiorari, 518 U. S. 1057 (1996), and now reverse.2 II We begin our discussion of this case with an uncontested point: Georgia's drug-testing requirement, imposed by law and enforced by state officials, effects a search within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Skinner, 489 U. S., at 617; Tr. of Oral Arg. 36; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10 (collection and testing of urine to meet Georgia's certification statute "constitutes a search subject to the demands of the Fourth Amendment" (internal quotation marks omitted)). As explained in Skin- ner, government-ordered "collection and testing of urine in- trudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable." 489 U. S., at 617. Because "these intrusions [are] searches under the Fourth Amend- ment," ibid., we focus on the question: Are the searches reasonable? To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. See Vernonia, 515 U. S., at 652­653. But particularized exceptions to the main rule are sometimes warranted based on "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement." Skinner, 489 U. S., at 619 (internal 2 The United States, as amicus curiae in support of respondents, sug- gests that this case may have become moot because there is no continuing controversy regarding the now-completed 1994 election, and petitioners, who did not sue on behalf of a class, failed to assert in the courts below that they intended to run for a covered state office in a future election. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9­10, n. 4. We reject the suggestion of mootness. Petitioner Chandler represented, as an officer of this Court, that he plans to run again, and counsel for the State does not contest that representation. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4­6, 27; see also 28 U. S. C. § 1653 (defective allegations of jurisdiction curable by amendment at trial or in appellate stages). 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN 314 CHANDLER v. MILLER Opinion of the Court quotation marks omitted). When such "special needs"- concerns other than crime detection-are alleged in justifi- cation of a Fourth Amendment intrusion, courts must under- take a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the compet- ing private and public interests advanced by the parties. See Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 665­666; see also id., at 668. As Skinner stated: "In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individual- ized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the ab- sence of such suspicion." 489 U. S., at 624. In evaluating Georgia's ballot-access, drug-testing stat- ute-a measure plainly not tied to individualized suspicion- the Eleventh Circuit sought to " `balance the individual's pri- vacy expectations against the [State's] interests,' " 73 F. 3d, at 1545 (quoting Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 665), in line with our precedents most immediately in point: Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia. We review those decisions before inspecting Georgia's law. A Skinner concerned Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) regulations that required blood and urine tests of rail employees involved in train accidents; the regulations also authorized railroads to administer breath and urine tests to employees who violated certain safety rules. 489 U. S., at 608­612. The FRA adopted the drug-testing program in re- sponse to evidence of drug and alcohol abuse by some rail- road employees, the obvious safety hazards posed by such abuse, and the documented link between drug- and alcohol- impaired employees and the incidence of train accidents. Id., at 607­608. Recognizing that the urinalysis tests, most conspicuously, raised evident privacy concerns, the Court noted two offsetting considerations: First, the regulations re- duced the intrusiveness of the collection process, id., at 626; 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 305 (1997) 315 Opinion of the Court and, more important, railway employees, "by reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety," had diminished expectations of privacy, id., at 627. "[S]urpassing safety interests," the Court concluded, war- ranted the FRA testing program. Id., at 634. The drug tests could deter illegal drug use by railroad employees, workers positioned to "cause great human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors." Id., at 628. The program also helped railroads to obtain invalu- able information about the causes of major train accidents. See id., at 630. Testing without a showing of individualized suspicion was essential, the Court explained, if these vital interests were to be served. See id., at 628. Employees could not forecast the timing of an accident or a safety viola- tion, events that would trigger testing. The employee's in- ability to avoid detection simply by staying drug free at a prescribed test time significantly enhanced the deterrent ef- fect of the program. See ibid. Furthermore, imposing an individualized suspicion requirement for a drug test in the chaotic aftermath of a train accident would seriously impede an employer's ability to discern the cause of the accident; indeed, waiting until suspect individuals could be identified "likely would result in the loss or deterioration of the evi- dence furnished by the tests." Id., at 631. In Von Raab, the Court sustained a United States Cus- toms Service program that made drug tests a condition of promotion or transfer to positions directly involving drug in- terdiction or requiring the employee to carry a firearm. 489 U. S., at 660­661, 667­677.3 While the Service's regime was 3 The Service's program also required tests for individuals promoted or transferred to positions in which they would handle "classified" material. 489 U. S., at 661. The Court agreed that the Government "ha[d] a compel- ling interest in protecting truly sensitive information." Id., at 677. However, we did not rule on this aspect of the program, see id., at 677­678, 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN 316 CHANDLER v. MILLER Opinion of the Court not prompted by a demonstrated drug abuse problem, id., at 660, it was developed for an agency with an "almost unique mission," id., at 674, as the "first line of defense" against the smuggling of illicit drugs into the United States, id., at 668. Work directly involving drug interdiction and posts that re- quire the employee to carry a firearm pose grave safety threats to employees who hold those positions, and also ex- pose them to large amounts of illegal narcotics and to persons engaged in crime; illicit drug users in such high-risk po- sitions might be unsympathetic to the Service's mission, tempted by bribes, or even threatened with blackmail. See id., at 668­671. The Court held that the Government had a "compelling" interest in assuring that employees placed in these positions would not include drug users. See id., at 670­671. Individualized suspicion would not work in this setting, the Court determined, because it was "not feasible to subject [these] employees and their work product to the kind of day-to-day scrutiny that is the norm in more tradi- tional office environments." Id., at 674. Finally, in Vernonia, the Court sustained a random drug- testing program for high school students engaged in inter- scholastic athletic competitions. The program's context was critical, for a local government bears large "responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of chil- dren entrusted to its care." 515 U. S., at 665. An "immedi- ate crisis," id., at 663, caused by "a sharp increase in drug use" in the school district, id., at 648, sparked installation of the program. District Court findings established that stu- dent athletes were not only "among the drug users," they were "leaders of the drug culture." Id., at 649. Our deci- sion noted that " `students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population generally.' " Id., at 657 (quoting New Jersey v. because the record did not clarify "whether the category defined by the [regulation] encompas[sed] only those Customs employees likely to gain access to sensitive information," id., at 678. 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 305 (1997) 317 Opinion of the Court T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)). We emphasized the importance of deterring drug use by schoolchildren and the risk of injury a drug-using student athlete cast on himself and those engaged with him on the playing field. See Vernonia, 515 U. S., at 662. B Respondents urge that the precedents just examined are not the sole guides for assessing the constitutional validity of the Georgia statute. The "special needs" analysis, they contend, must be viewed through a different lens because § 21­2­140 implicates Georgia's sovereign power, reserved to it under the Tenth Amendment, to establish qualifications for those who seek state office. Respondents rely on Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452 (1991), which upheld against federal statutory and Equal Protection Clause challenges Missouri's mandatory retirement age of 70 for state judges. The Court found this age classification reasonable and not barred by the federal legislation. See id., at 473. States, Gregory reaf- firmed, enjoy wide latitude to establish conditions of candi- dacy for state office, but in setting such conditions, they may not disregard basic constitutional protections. See id., at 463; McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618 (1978) (invalidating state provision prohibiting members of clergy from serving as delegates to state constitutional convention); Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 414 U. S. 441 (1974) (voiding loy- alty oath as a condition of ballot access); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116 (1966) (Georgia Legislature could not exclude elected representative on ground that his antiwar state- ments cast doubt on his ability to take an oath). We are aware of no precedent suggesting that a State's power to establish qualifications for state offices-any more than its sovereign power to prosecute crime-diminishes the con- straints on state action imposed by the Fourth Amendment. We therefore reject respondents' invitation to apply in this case a framework extraordinarily deferential to state meas- 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN 318 CHANDLER v. MILLER Opinion of the Court ures setting conditions of candidacy for state office. Our guides remain Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia. Turning to those guides, we note, first, that the testing method the Georgia statute describes is relatively noninva- sive; therefore, if the "special needs" showing had been made, the State could not be faulted for excessive intrusion. Georgia's statute invokes the drug-testing guidelines appli- cable to the federal programs upheld in Skinner and Von Raab. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20­21; Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 661­662, n. 1. The State per- mits a candidate to provide the urine specimen in the office of his or her private physician; and the results of the test are given first to the candidate, who controls further dissemina- tion of the report. Because the State has effectively limited the invasiveness of the testing procedure, we concentrate on the core issue: Is the certification requirement warranted by a special need? Our precedents establish that the proffered special need for drug testing must be substantial-important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest, suf- ficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion. See supra, at 313­ 317 and this page. Georgia has failed to show, in justifica- tion of § 21­2­140, a special need of that kind. Respondents' defense of the statute rests primarily on the incompatibility of unlawful drug use with holding high state office. The statute is justified, respondents contend, be- cause the use of illegal drugs draws into question an official's judgment and integrity; jeopardizes the discharge of public functions, including antidrug law enforcement efforts; and undermines public confidence and trust in elected officials. Brief for Respondents 11­18. The statute, according to re- spondents, serves to deter unlawful drug users from becom- ing candidates and thus stops them from attaining high state office. Id., at 17­18. Notably lacking in respondents' pres- 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 305 (1997) 319 Opinion of the Court entation is any indication of a concrete danger demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule. Nothing in the record hints that the hazards respond- ents broadly describe are real and not simply hypothetical for Georgia's polity. The statute was not enacted, as coun- sel for respondents readily acknowledged at oral argument, in response to any fear or suspicion of drug use by state officials: "QUESTION: Is there any indication anywhere in this record that Georgia has a particular problem here with State officeholders being drug abusers? "[COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS]: No, there is no such evidence, [and] to be frank, there is no such prob- lem as we sit here today." Tr. of Oral Arg. 32. See also id., at 31 (counsel for respondents affirms absence of evidence that state officeholders in Georgia have drug problems). A demonstrated problem of drug abuse, while not in all cases necessary to the validity of a testing regime, see Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 673­675, would shore up an asser- tion of special need for a suspicionless general search pro- gram. Proof of unlawful drug use may help to clarify-and to substantiate-the precise hazards posed by such use. Thus, the evidence of drug and alcohol use by railway em- ployees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks in Skinner, see 489 U. S., at 606­608, and the immediate crisis prompted by a sharp rise in students' use of unlawful drugs in Vernonia, see 515 U. S., at 662­663, bolstered the Government's and school officials' arguments that drug-testing programs were warranted and appropriate. In contrast to the effective testing regimes upheld in Skin- ner, Von Raab, and Vernonia, Georgia's certification require- ment is not well designed to identify candidates who violate antidrug laws. Nor is the scheme a credible means to deter illicit drug users from seeking election to state office. The test date-to be scheduled by the candidate anytime within 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN 320 CHANDLER v. MILLER Opinion of the Court 30 days prior to qualifying for a place on the ballot-is no secret. As counsel for respondents acknowledged at oral ar- gument, users of illegal drugs, save for those prohibitively addicted, could abstain for a pretest period sufficient to avoid detection. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 44­46.4 Even if we in- dulged respondents' argument that one purpose of § 21­2­ 140 might be to detect those unable so to abstain, see id., at 46, respondents have not shown or argued that such persons are likely to be candidates for public office in Georgia. Moreover, respondents have offered no reason why ordinary law enforcement methods would not suffice to apprehend such addicted individuals, should they appear in the limelight of a public stage. Section 21­2­140, in short, is not needed and cannot work to ferret out lawbreakers, and respondents barely attempt to support the statute on that ground. Respondents and the United States as amicus curiae rely most heavily on our decision in Von Raab, which sustained a drug-testing program for Customs Service officers prior to promotion or transfer to certain high-risk positions, despite the absence of any documented drug abuse problem among Service employees. 489 U. S., at 660; see Brief for Respond- ents 12­14; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18; see also 73 F. 3d, at 1546. The posts in question in Von Raab directly involved drug interdiction or otherwise required the Service member to carry a firearm. See 489 U. S., at 670 ("Government has a compelling interest in ensuring that front-line interdiction personnel are physically fit, and have unimpeachable integrity and judgment."); id., at 670­671 ("[T]he public should not bear the risk that employees who may suffer from impaired perception and judgment will be promoted to positions where they may need to employ deadly force."). 4 In Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U. S. 656 (1989), the applicant for promotion or transfer could not know precisely when action would be taken on the application. In contrast, the potential candidate knows from the start the timing of all relevant events. 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 305 (1997) 321 Opinion of the Court Hardly a decision opening broad vistas for suspicionless searches, Von Raab must be read in its unique context. As the Customs Service reported in announcing the testing pro- gram: "Customs employees, more than any other Federal workers, are routinely exposed to the vast network of orga- nized crime that is inextricably tied to illegal drug use." National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F. 2d 170, 173 (CA5 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 489 U. S. 656 (1989). We stressed that "[d]rug interdiction ha[d] become the agency's primary enforcement mission," id., at 660, and that the employees in question would have "access to vast sources of valuable contraband," id., at 669. Furthermore, Customs officers "ha[d] been the targets of bribery by drug smugglers on nu- merous occasions," and several had succumbed to the temp- tation. Ibid. Respondents overlook a telling difference between Von Raab and Georgia's candidate drug-testing program. In Von Raab it was "not feasible to subject employees [required to carry firearms or concerned with interdiction of controlled substances] and their work product to the kind of day-to-day scrutiny that is the norm in more traditional office envi- ronments." Id., at 674. Candidates for public office, in contrast, are subject to relentless scrutiny-by their peers, the public, and the press. Their day-to-day conduct at- tracts attention notably beyond the norm in ordinary work environments. What is left, after close review of Georgia's scheme, is the image the State seeks to project. By requiring candidates for public office to submit to drug testing, Georgia displays its commitment to the struggle against drug abuse. The suspicionless tests, according to respondents, signify that candidates, if elected, will be fit to serve their constituents free from the influence of illegal drugs. But Georgia asserts no evidence of a drug problem among the State's elected officials, those officials typically do not perform high-risk, 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN 322 CHANDLER v. MILLER Opinion of the Court safety-sensitive tasks, and the required certification immedi- ately aids no interdiction effort. The need revealed, in short, is symbolic, not "special," as that term draws meaning from our case law. In Von Raab, the Customs Service had defended its officer drug-testing program in part as a way to demonstrate the agency's commitment to enforcement of the law. See Brief for United States in Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, O. T. 1988, No. 86­1879, pp. 35­36. The Von Raab Court, how- ever, did not rely on that justification. Indeed, if a need of the "set a good example" genre were sufficient to overwhelm a Fourth Amendment objection, then the care this Court took to explain why the needs in Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia ranked as "special" wasted many words in entirely unnecessary, perhaps even misleading, elaborations. In a pathmarking dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis rec- ognized the importance of teaching by example: "Our Gov- ernment is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example." Olm- stead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 485 (1928). Justice Brandeis explained in Olmstead why the Government set a bad example when it introduced in a criminal proceeding evi- dence obtained through an unlawful Government wiretap: "[I]t is . . . immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law enforcement. Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Govern- ment's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well- meaning but without understanding." Id., at 479. However well meant, the candidate drug test Georgia has devised diminishes personal privacy for a symbol's sake. The Fourth Amendment shields society against that state action. 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 305 (1997) 323 Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting III We note, finally, matters this opinion does not treat. Georgia's singular drug test for candidates is not part of a medical examination designed to provide certification of a candidate's general health, and we express no opinion on such examinations. Nor do we touch on financial disclosure requirements, which implicate different concerns and proce- dures. See, e. g., Barry v. City of New York, 712 F. 2d 1554 (CA2 1983) (upholding city's financial disclosure law for elected and appointed officials, candidates for city office, and certain city employees); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F. 2d 1119 (CA5 1978) (upholding Florida's financial disclosure require- ments for certain public officers, candidates, and employees). And we do not speak to drug testing in the private sector, a domain unguarded by Fourth Amendment constraints. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109, 113 (1984). We reiterate, too, that where the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches cali- brated to the risk may rank as "reasonable"-for example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and other official buildings. See Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 674­676, and n. 3. But where, as in this case, public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment pre- cludes the suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently arranged. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is Reversed. Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting. I fear that the novelty of this Georgia law has led the Court to distort Fourth Amendment doctrine in order to strike it down. The Court notes, impliedly turning up its nose, that "Georgia was the first, and apparently remains the only, State to condition candidacy for state office on a drug 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN 324 CHANDLER v. MILLER Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting test." Ante, at 309. But if we are to heed the oft-quoted words of Justice Brandeis in his dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932)-"[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single coura- geous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country"-novelty itself is not a vice. These novel experiments, of course, must comply with the United States Constitution; but their mere novelty should not be a strike against them. Few would doubt that the use of illegal drugs and abuse of legal drugs is one of the major problems of our society. Cases before this Court involving drug use extend to numer- ous occupations-railway employees, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U. S. 602 (1989), Border Patrol officers, Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U. S. 656 (1989), high school students, Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646 (1995), and machine operators, Paper- workers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U. S. 29 (1987). It would take a bolder person than I to say that such widespread drug usage could never extend to candidates for public office such as Governor of Georgia. The Court says that "[n]othing in the record hints that the hazards respondents broadly describe are real and not simply hypothetical for Georgia's polity." Ante, at 319. But surely the State need not wait for a drug addict, or one inclined to use drugs illegally, to run for or actually become Governor before it installs a prophylactic mechanism. We held as much in Von Raab: "First, petitioners argue that the program is unjustified because it is not based on a belief that testing will reveal any drug use by covered employees. In pressing this argument, petitioners point out that the Service's test- ing scheme was not implemented in response to any per- ceived drug problem among Customs employees . . . . "Petitioners' first contention evinces an unduly nar- row view of the context in which the Service's testing 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 305 (1997) 325 Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting program was implemented. Petitioners do not dispute, nor can there be doubt, that drug abuse is one of the most serious problems confronting our society today. There is little reason to believe that American work- places are immune from this pervasive social problem . . . ." 489 U. S., at 673­674. The test under the Fourth Amendment, as these cases have held, is whether the search required by the Georgia statute is "reasonable." Today's opinion speaks of a "closely guarded" class of permissible suspicionless searches which must be justified by a "special need." But this term, as used in Skinner and Von Raab and on which the Court now relies, was used in a quite different sense than it is used by the Court today. In Skinner and Von Raab it was used to de- scribe a basis for a search apart from the regular needs of law enforcement, Skinner, supra, at 620; Von Raab, supra, at 669. The "special needs" inquiry as delineated there has not required especially great "importan[ce]," ante, at 318, un- less one considers "the supervision of probationers," or the "operation of a government office," Skinner, supra, at 620, to be especially "important." Under our precedents, if there was a proper governmental purpose other than law enforcement, there was a "special need," and the Fourth Amendment then required the familiar balancing between that interest and the individual's privacy interest. Under normal Fourth Amendment analysis, the individu- al's expectation of privacy is an important factor in the equa- tion. But here, the Court perversely relies on the fact that a candidate for office gives up so much privacy-"[c]andi- dates for public office . . . are subject to relentless scrutiny- by their peers, the public, and the press," ante, at 321-as a reason for sustaining a Fourth Amendment claim. The Court says, in effect, that the kind of drug test for candidates required by the Georgia law is unnecessary, because the scrutiny to which they are already subjected by reason of their candidacy will enable people to detect any drug use on 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN 326 CHANDLER v. MILLER Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting their part. But this is a strange holding, indeed. One might just as easily say that the railroad employees in Skin- ner, or the Customs officials in Von Raab, would be subjected to the same sort of scrutiny from their fellow employees and their supervisors. But the clear teaching of those cases is that the government is not required to settle for that sort of a vague and uncanalized scrutiny; if in fact preventing per- sons who use illegal drugs from concealing that fact from the public is a legitimate government interest, these cases indicate that the government may require a drug test. The privacy concerns ordinarily implicated by urinalysis drug testing are "negligible," Vernonia, supra, at 658, when the procedures used in collecting and analyzing the urine samples are set up "to reduce the intrusiveness" of the proc- ess, Skinner, supra, at 626. Under the Georgia law, the can- didate may produce the test specimen at his own doctor's office, which must be one of the least intrusive types of urinalysis drug tests conceivable. But although the Court concedes this, it nonetheless manages to count this factor against the State, because with this kind of test the person tested will have advance notice of its being given, and will therefore be able to abstain from drug use during the neces- sary period of time. But one may be sure that if the test were random-and therefore apt to ensnare more users-the Court would then fault it for its intrusiveness. Cf. Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 676, and n. 4. In Von Raab, we described as "compelling" the Govern- ment interest "in ensuring that many of these covered em- ployees do not use drugs even off duty, for such use creates risks of bribery and blackmail against which the Government is entitled to guard." Id., at 674 (emphasis added). The risks of bribery and blackmail for high-level officials of state government using illegal drugs would seem to be at least as significant as those for off-duty Customs officials. Even more important, however, is our treatment of the third class of tested employees in Von Raab, those who "handle[d] `clas- 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 305 (1997) 327 Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting sified' materials." The Court relegates this discussion to a footnote, ante, at 315, n. 3, and all but dismisses it. Al- though the lack of factual development of the record in Von Raab prevented us from determining who "handle[d] `classi- fied' material," we did consider the weight of the proffered governmental interest: "We readily agree that the Government has a compelling interest in protecting truly sensitive information from those who, `under compulsion of circumstances or for other reasons, . . . might compromise [such] information.' Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U. S. 518, 528 (1988). . . . We also agree that employees who seek promotions to positions where they would handle sensitive informa- tion can be required to submit to a urine test under the Service's screening program, especially if the positions covered under this category require background investi- gations, medical examinations, or other intrusions that may be expected to diminish their expectations of pri- vacy in respect of a urinalysis test." 489 U. S., at 677. Although petitioners might raise questions as to some of the other positions covered by the Georgia statute, there is no question that, at least for positions like Governor and Lieutenant Governor, identical concerns are implicated. In short, when measured through the correct lens of our prece- dents in this area, the Georgia urinalysis test is a "reason- able" search; it is only by distorting these precedents that the Court is able to reach the result it does. Lest readers expect the holding of this case to be extended to any other case, the Court notes that the drug test here is not a part of a medical examination designed to provide certification of a candidate's general health. Ante, at 323. It is all but inconceivable that a case involving that sort of requirement could be decided differently than the present case; the same sort of urinalysis would be involved. The only possible basis for distinction is to say that the State has 520US1 Unit: $U43 [09-10-99 17:24:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN 328 CHANDLER v. MILLER Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting a far greater interest in the candidate's "general health" than it does with respect to his propensity to use illegal drugs. But this is the sort of policy judgment that surely must be left to legislatures, rather than being announced from on high by the Federal Judiciary. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment or in any other part of the Constitution prevents a State from enacting a statute whose principal vice is that it may seem misguided or even silly to the Members of this Court. I would affirm the judg- ment of the Court of Appeals. 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 329 Syllabus BLESSING, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY v. FREESTONE et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­1441. Argued January 6, 1997-Decided April 21, 1997 Respondents, five Arizona mothers whose children are eligible for state child support services under Title IV­D of the Social Security Act, filed this 42 U. S. C. § 1983 suit against petitioner, the director of the state child support agency, claiming, among other things, that they properly applied for child support services; that, despite their good faith efforts to cooperate, the agency never took adequate steps to obtain child support payments for them; that these omissions were largely attributable to staff shortages and other structural defects in the State's program; and that these systemic failures violated their individual rights under Title IV­D to have all mandated services delivered in substantial compliance with the title and its implementing regulations. They requested broad relief, including a declaratory judgment that the Arizona program's op- eration violates Title IV­D provisions creating rights in them that are enforceable through a § 1983 action, and an injunction requiring the di- rector to achieve substantial compliance with Title IV­D throughout all programmatic operations. The District Court granted summary judg- ment for petitioner, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. Without distin- guishing among the numerous provisions of the complex Title IV­D program or the many rights those provisions might have created, the latter court held that respondents had an enforceable individual right to have the State achieve "substantial compliance" with Title IV­D. It also disagreed with the District Court's conclusion that Congress had foreclosed private Title IV­D enforcement actions by authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) to audit and cut off funds to States whose programs do not substantially comply with Title IV­D's requirements. Held: Title IV­D does not give individuals a federal right to force a state agency to substantially comply with Title IV­D. Pp. 340­349. (a) A plaintiff seeking § 1983 redress must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely of federal law. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U. S. 103, 106. Three principal factors determine whether a statutory provision creates a privately enforceable right: (1) whether the plaintiff is an intended beneficiary of the statute; (2) whether the plaintiff's asserted interests are not so vague and amor- 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 330 BLESSING v. FREESTONE Syllabus phous as to be beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce; and (3) whether the statute imposes a binding obligation on the State. See, e. g., Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U. S. 498, 509. Even if a plaintiff demonstrates such a right, however, there is only a rebuttable presumption that it is enforceable under § 1983. Dismissal is proper if Congress specifically foreclosed a § 1983 remedy, Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, 1005, n. 9, 1003, either expressly, by forbidding recourse to § 1983 in the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual § 1983 enforce- ment, Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U. S. 107, 133. Pp. 340­341. (b) Respondents have not established that Title IV­D gives them in- dividually enforceable federal rights. In prior cases, the Court has been able to determine whether or not a statute created such rights because the plaintiffs articulated, and lower courts evaluated, well- defined claims. See, e. g., Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U. S. 418, 430. Here, respondents have not identified with particularity the rights they claim, and the Ninth Circuit has not engaged in the requisite methodical inquiry. That court erred in apparently holding that individuals have an enforceable right to "sub- stantial compliance" with Title IV­D in all respects. The statutory "substantial compliance" requirement, see, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 609(a)(8) (1994 ed., Supp. II), does not give rise to individual rights; it was not intended to benefit individual children and custodial parents, but is sim- ply a yardstick for the Secretary to measure the systemwide perform- ance of a State's Title IV­D program, allowing her to increase the fre- quency of audits and reduce the State's federal grant upon a finding of substantial noncompliance. The Court of Appeals also erred in taking a blanket approach to determining whether Title IV­D creates rights: It is readily apparent that many of the provisions of that multifaceted statutory scheme, including its "substantial compliance" standard and data processing, staffing, and organizational requirements, do not fit any of the traditional criteria for identifying statutory rights. Although this Court does not foreclose the possibility that some Title IV­D provi- sions give rise to individual rights, the Ninth Circuit did not separate out the particular rights it believed arise from the statutory scheme, the complaint is less than clear in this regard, and it is not certain whether respondents sought any relief more specific than a declaration that their "rights" were being violated and an injunction forcing petitioner to "substantially comply" with all of Title IV­D's provisions. This defect is best addressed by sending the case back for the District Court to construe the complaint in the first instance, in order to determine ex- actly what rights, considered in their most concrete, specific form, re- spondents are asserting. Only by manageably breaking down the 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 329 (1997) 331 Syllabus complaint into specific allegations can the District Court proceed to determine whether any specific claim asserts an individual federal right. Pp. 341­346. (c) Petitioner's argument that Title IV­D's remedial scheme is suffi- ciently comprehensive to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude § 1983 suits is rejected. Petitioner does not claim that any Title IV­D provision expressly curtails § 1983 actions, and she has failed to make the difficult showing that allowing such actions to go forward in these circumstances would be inconsistent with Congress' carefully tailored scheme. That scheme is far more limited than those at issue in Middle- sex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, and Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, the only cases in which the Court has found preclusion; in particular, Title IV­D contains no private remedy-either judicial or administrative-through which ag- grieved persons can seek redress. The only way that Title IV­D as- sures that States live up to their child support plans is through the Secretary's oversight, but the Secretary's limited powers to audit and cut federal funding are not comprehensive enough to foreclose § 1983 liability. Pp. 346­348. 68 F. 3d 1141, vacated and remanded. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Kennedy, J., joined, post, p. 349. C. Tim Delaney, Solicitor General of Arizona, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Grant Woods, Attorney General, Carter G. Phillips, Richard D. Bernstein, and Adam D. Hirsh. Marsha S. Berzon argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attor- ney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, William Kanter, and Alfred Mollin.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Illinois et al. by James E. Ryan, Attorney General of Illinois, Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and James C. O'Connell, Barbara L. Green- span, and James C. Stevens, Special Assistant Attorneys General, and Charles F. C. Ruff, Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, and 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 332 BLESSING v. FREESTONE Opinion of the Court Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns a lawsuit brought by five mothers in Arizona whose children are eligible to receive child support services from the State pursuant to Title IV­D of the Social Security Act, as added, 88 Stat. 2351, and as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 651­669b (1994 ed. and Supp. II). These custodial parents sued the director of Arizona's child support agency by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Jeff Sessions of Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecti- cut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Mi- chael J. Bowers of Georgia, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Pamela S. Carter of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger of Massachu- setts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Peter Verniero of New Jersey, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Caro- lina, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Theodore R. Kulongoski of Ore- gon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Is- land, Charles Molony Condon of South Carolina, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Charles W. Burson of Tennessee, Dan Morales of Texas, Jan Gra- ham of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, William U. Hill of Wyo- ming, Malaetasi M. Togafau of American Samoa, Calvin E. Holloway, Sr., of Guam, and Julio A. Brady of the Virgin Islands; for the American Public Welfare Association et al. by Diana L. Fogle; for the Council of State Governments et al. by Richard Ruda and Charles Rothfeld; and for the National District Attorneys Association et al. by John D. Krisor, Jr., John Kaye, Michael R. Capizi, John Ladenburg, and Michael McCormick. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Christopher A. Hansen, Steven R. Shapiro, and Erwin Chemerinsky; for the Anti-Poverty Project of the Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic of the University of Chicago Law School by Gary H. Palm; for the National Center for Youth Law et al. by Leora Gershen- zon, Martha Matthews, and Brian Paddock; and for the National Women's Law Center et al. by Regina G. Maloney, Nancy Duff Campbell, Elisabeth Hirschhorn Donahue, and Martha F. Davis. 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 329 (1997) 333 Opinion of the Court under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, claiming that they had an enforceable individual right to have the State's pro- gram achieve "substantial compliance" with the require- ments of Title IV­D. Without distinguishing among the nu- merous provisions of this complex program, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that respondents had such a right. We disagree that the statutory scheme can be ana- lyzed so generally, and hold that Title IV­D does not give individuals a federal right to force a state agency to substan- tially comply with Title IV­D. Accordingly, we vacate and remand with instructions to remand to the District Court. I This controversy concerns an interlocking set of coopera- tive federal-state welfare programs. Arizona participates in the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which provides subsistence welfare bene- fits to needy families. Social Security Act, Title IV­A, 42 U. S. C. §§ 601­617. To qualify for federal AFDC funds, the State must certify that it will operate a child support enforcement program that conforms with the numerous requirements set forth in Title IV­D of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 651­669b (1994 ed. and Supp. II),1 and will do so pursuant to a detailed plan that has been approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary). § 602(a)(2); see also § 652(a)(3). The Federal Government underwrites roughly two-thirds of the cost of the State's child support efforts. § 655(a). But the State must do more than simply collect overdue support payments; it must also establish a comprehensive system to establish paternity, 1 After the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, Congress amended Title IV­D in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcil- iation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104­193, 110 Stat. 2105. Except where other- wise noted, we refer to the amended version of Title IV­D throughout this opinion. 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 334 BLESSING v. FREESTONE Opinion of the Court locate absent parents, and help families obtain support or- ders. §§ 651, 654. A State must provide these services free of charge to AFDC recipients and, when requested, for a nominal fee to children and custodial parents who are not receiving AFDC payments. §§ 651, 654(4). AFDC recipients must assign their child support rights to the State and fully cooperate with the State's efforts to establish paternity and obtain sup- port payments. Although the State may keep most of the support payments that it collects on behalf of AFDC families in order to offset the costs of providing welfare benefits, until recently it only had to distribute the first $50 of each pay- ment to the family. 42 U. S. C. § 657(b)(1). The amended version of Title IV­D replaces this $50 pass-through with more generous distributions to families once they leave welfare. 42 U. S. C. § 657(a)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. II). Non- AFDC recipients who request the State's aid are entitled to have all collected funds passed through. § 657(a)(3). In all cases, the State must distribute the family's share of collected support payments within two business days after receipt. § 654b(c)(1). The structure of each State's Title IV­D agency, like the services it provides, must conform to federal guide- lines. For example, States must create separate units to ad- minister the plan, § 654(3), and to disburse collected funds, § 654(27), each of which must be staffed at levels set by the Secretary, 45 CFR § 303.20 (1995). If a State delegates its disbursement function to local governments, it must reward the most efficient local agencies with a share of federal incentive payments. 42 U. S. C. § 654(22). To maintain de- tailed records of all pending cases, as well as to generate the various reports required by federal authorities, States must set up computer systems that meet numerous fed- eral specifications. § 654a. Finally, in addition to set- ting up this administrative framework, each participating 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 329 (1997) 335 Opinion of the Court State must enact laws designed to streamline paternity and child support actions. §§ 654(20), 666. To oversee this complex federal-state enterprise, Congress created the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). This agency is charged with auditing the States' compliance with their federally approved plans. Audits must occur at least once every three years, or more often if a State's performance falls below certain standards. § 652(a)(4). If a State does not "substantially comply" with the requirements of Title IV­D, the Secretary is authorized to penalize the State by reducing its AFDC grant by up to five percent. § 609(a)(8). The Secretary has interpreted "substantial compliance" as: (a) full compliance with require- ments that services be offered statewide and that certain recipients be notified monthly of the support collected, as well as with reporting, recordkeeping, and accounting rules; (b) 90 percent compliance with case opening and case closure criteria; and (c) 75 percent compliance with most remaining program requirements. 45 CFR § 305.20 (1995). The Sec- retary may suspend a penalty if the State implements an adequate corrective action plan, and if the program achieves "substantial compliance," she may rescind the penalty en- tirely. 42 U. S. C. § 609(c) (1994 ed., Supp. II). II Arizona's record of enforcing child support obligations is less than stellar, particularly compared with those of other States. In a 1992 report, Arizona's Auditor General chroni- cled many of the State's problems. In the 1989­1990 fiscal year, Arizona failed to collect enough child support payments and federal incentives to cover the administrative costs of its Title IV­D program-1 of only 10 States to fall below that target. Arizona Auditor General, A Performance Audit of the Arizona Department of Economic Security 2 (1992). The Auditor General also pointed out that the cost effectiveness 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 336 BLESSING v. FREESTONE Opinion of the Court of Arizona's support enforcement efforts had been "mini- mal." For every dollar spent on enforcement, the State collected barely two dollars-almost half the nationwide average. Ibid. In 1992, nearly three-quarters of Arizona's 275,000 child support cases were still in the earliest stages of the enforcement process. In 42 percent of all cases, pa- ternity had yet to be established. In a further 29 percent, the absent parent had been identified but his or her where- abouts were unknown. Id., at 12. Overall, the Auditor General found that Arizona "obtains regular child support payments for fewer than five percent of the parents it serves." Id., at 9. Federal audits by OCSE have also identified shortcomings in Arizona's child support system. In several reviews of the State's performance from 1984 to 1989, the Secretary found that Arizona had not substantially complied with significant program requirements, and she repeatedly penalized the State one percent of its AFDC grant. The State developed a corrective action plan after each failed audit, which prompted the Secretary to suspend and-in every instance but one-waive the one-percent reduction in Arizona's AFDC funding.2 2 For the deficiencies in Arizona's child support enforcement system, see principally OCSE, Audit Division Report No. AZ­85­PR, Program Re- sults Audit of the State of Arizona Child Support Enforcement Program, October 1, 1984­September 30, 1985 (June 25, 1987); OCSE, Audit Division Report No. AZ­86­PR/PM, Program Results/Performance Measurements Audit, State of Arizona, Child Support Enforcement Program, October 1, 1985­September 30, 1986 (June 9, 1989); OCSE, Audit Division Report No. AZ­90­AA, Comprehensive Annual Audit, State of Arizona (Sept. 30, 1991) (covering calendar year 1989). Arizona eventually achieved sub- stantial compliance in each category found deficient in these audits, al- though not always in a timely manner. See, e. g., Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, Dept. of HHS, to Linda Moore-Cannon, Director, Arizona Dept. of Economic Security (Mar. 2, 1992) (reducing Arizona's AFDC funding by one percent for the period between July 1, 1988, and December 31, 1988, due to the State's failure to implement its Parent Locator Service in conformity with its corrective action plan). 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 329 (1997) 337 Opinion of the Court Respondents are five Arizona mothers (some of whom re- ceive AFDC benefits) whose children are eligible for Title IV­D child support services. They filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the Director of the Arizona Department of Economic Security, the state agency charged with providing child sup- port services under Title IV­D. In a lengthy complaint, re- spondents claimed that they had properly applied for child support services but that, despite their good faith efforts to cooperate, the agency never took adequate steps to obtain child support payments from the fathers of their children. These omissions, respondents contended, were largely attrib- utable to structural defects in the State's child support ef- forts: staff shortages, high caseloads, unmanageable back- logs, and deficiencies in the State's accounting methods and recordkeeping. App. 11, 14­16. Respondents sought to represent a class of all children and custodial parents resid- ing in Arizona who are or will be entitled to Title IV­D services. Respondents claimed that the State's systemic failures vio- lated their federal rights under Title IV­D. Invoking 42 U. S. C. § 1983, they asked the District Court to grant them the following broad relief: "Enter a declaratory judgment determining that opera- tion of the Arizona Title IV­D program violates control- ling, substantive provisions of federal law creating rights in plaintiffs and the class enforceable through an action permitted by 42 U. S. C. § 1983. "Grant permanent (and as necessary and appropriate, interlocutory) injunctions prohibiting continued adher- ence to the aforesaid pattern and practices and requiring affirmative measures sufficient to achieve as well as sus- tain substantial compliance with federal law, throughout all programmatic operations at issue." App. 42. The Director immediately moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, arguing primarily that Title IV­D cre- 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 338 BLESSING v. FREESTONE Opinion of the Court ates no individual rights enforceable under § 1983. The Dis- trict Court treated this motion as one for summary judgment and ruled in favor of the Director. Relying primarily on a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Carelli v. Howser, 923 F. 2d 1208 (1991), the District Court held that Congress had foreclosed private actions to enforce Title IV­D by authorizing the Secretary to audit and cut off funds to States with programs that do not substantially comply with Title IV­D's requirements. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir- cuit reversed. 68 F. 3d 1141 (1995). The majority identified the three principal factors this Court has used to determine whether a statute creates a privately enforceable right: whether the plaintiff is one of the "intended beneficiaries of the statute," whether the plaintiffs' asserted interests are not so " `vague and amorphous' as to be `beyond the compe- tence of the judiciary to enforce,' " and whether the statute imposes a binding obligation on the State. Id., at 1147 (quoting Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U. S. 498, 509 (1990)). Title IV­D, the Court of Appeals held, satisfied each of these criteria. First, "needy families with children" were the intended beneficiaries of Title IV­D. 68 F. 3d, at 1150. Second, the majority held that the "plaintiffs' asserted interest is not vague or amorphous, and it is sufficiently concrete to be judicially enforceable" because whether a State delivers the services required by Title IV­D "to the degree required by law is judicially ascertainable." Id., at 1149­1150. Finally, the Court of Appeals stated that the statute imposes binding obligations because a State must satisfy each of the requirements spelled out in Title IV­D in order to receive AFDC funding. Although the majority acknowledged that the requirement that a State remain in "substantial compliance" with its plan might seem ambiguous when divorced from context, the majority believed that the "highly detailed requirements" of the statute and its imple- 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 329 (1997) 339 Opinion of the Court menting regulations adequately notified the State of the ex- tent of its duties. Id., at 1148. Moreover, the Court of Ap- peals noted that "the statute . . . sets forth detailed criteria for measuring compliance with the statute," for example, generally requiring States to establish paternity in a given percentage of all cases. Id., at 1149 (citing 42 U. S. C. § 652(g)). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that respondents could sue petitioner under § 1983 to bring Ari- zona's child support enforcement program into substantial compliance with federal law. 68 F. 3d, at 1150. The Court of Appeals also disagreed with the District Court's conclusion that Congress had implicitly foreclosed an individual remedy under § 1983 for violations of Title IV­D. The majority noted that Title IV­D includes no provisions for judicial enforcement that might supplant the § 1983 rem- edy. Id., at 1153. Instead, the law simply gave the Secre- tary administrative oversight powers that were virtually in- discernible from those we had found insufficient to displace § 1983 liability in Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U. S. 418 (1987). The majority expressed no opinion as to the appropriateness of either in- junctive or declaratory relief, and left that question for the District Court to answer in the first instance. 68 F. 3d, at 1156. Judge Kleinfeld dissented, arguing that Congress placed the power to enforce Title IV­D exclusively in the hands of the Secretary. He contended that the " `substantial compli- ance' standard does not `unambiguously confer' enforceable rights on any individual." Id., at 1157. At most, Title IV­D called upon States "to try pretty hard, and do a pretty good job, of enforcing child support, and come up with a plan to try harder if the Secretary thinks they have not been try- ing hard enough." Ibid. We granted certiorari to resolve disagreement among the Courts of Appeals as to whether individuals may sue state 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 340 BLESSING v. FREESTONE Opinion of the Court officials under § 1983 for violations of Title IV­D.3 517 U. S. 1186 (1996). III Section 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, under color of state law, deprives a person "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." We have held that this provision safeguards certain rights conferred by federal statutes. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980). In order to seek redress through § 1983, however, a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U. S. 103, 106 (1989). We have traditionally looked at three factors when determining whether a particu- lar statutory provision gives rise to a federal right. First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. Wright, 479 U. S., at 430. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly pro- tected by the statute is not so "vague and amorphous" that 3 Compare Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F. 2d 1558 (CA11 1989) (holding that Title IV­D was not enacted for the especial benefit of AFDC families, and so it does not create enforceable rights under § 1983), cert. denied, 494 U. S. 1027 (1990), with Carelli v. Howser, 923 F. 2d 1208 (CA6 1991) (hold- ing that Title IV­D creates rights that are enforceable under § 1983, but that the Secretary's oversight power forecloses a § 1983 remedy), with Al- biston v. Maine Comm'r of Human Servs., 7 F. 3d 258 (CA1 1993) (holding that AFDC recipients have an enforceable right to prompt disbursement of their child support payments under Title IV­D), and with Howe v. Ellenbecker, 8 F. 3d 1258 (CA8 1993) (holding that Title IV­D creates rights that are enforceable under § 1983), cert. denied, 511 U. S. 1005 (1994). Petitioner makes two further arguments in her briefs on the merits. She first contends that the Eleventh Amendment strips federal courts of jurisdiction over a § 1983 cause of action against state officials to enforce Title IV­D. Next, she asks us to overrule Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980), where we held that § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal statutes. We decline to address these questions which were nei- ther raised nor decided below, and were not presented in the petition for certiorari. This Court's Rule 14.1(a). 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 329 (1997) 341 Opinion of the Court its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Id., at 431­432. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. In other words, the provi- sion giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms. Wilder, supra, at 510­511; see also Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981) (discussing whether Con- gress created obligations giving rise to an implied cause of action). Even if a plaintiff demonstrates that a federal statute cre- ates an individual right, there is only a rebuttable presump- tion that the right is enforceable under § 1983. Because our inquiry focuses on congressional intent, dismissal is proper if Congress "specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983." Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, 1005, n. 9 (1984). Con- gress may do so expressly, by forbidding recourse to § 1983 in the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual en- forcement under § 1983. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U. S. 107, 133 (1994). A With these principles in mind, we turn first to the question whether respondents have established that Title IV­D gives them federal rights. In their complaint, respondents argued that federal law granted them "individual rights to all mandated services de- livered in substantial compliance with Title IV­D and its im- plementing regulations." App. 41. They sought a broad in- junction requiring the Director of Arizona's child support agency to achieve "substantial compliance . . . throughout all programmatic operations." Id., at 42. Attributing the deficiencies in the State's program primarily to staff short- ages and other structural defects, respondents essentially in- vited the District Court to oversee every aspect of Arizona's Title IV­D program. 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 342 BLESSING v. FREESTONE Opinion of the Court Without distinguishing among the numerous rights that might have been created by this federally funded welfare program, the Court of Appeals agreed in sweeping terms that "Title IV­D creates enforceable rights in families in need of Title IV­D services." 68 F. 3d, at 1150. The Court of Appeals did not specify exactly which "rights" it was pur- porting to recognize, but it apparently believed that federal law gave respondents the right to have the State substan- tially comply with Title IV­D in all respects. We disagree. As an initial matter, the lower court's holding that Title IV­D "creates enforceable rights" paints with too broad a brush. It was incumbent upon respondents to identify with particularity the rights they claimed, since it is impossible to determine whether Title IV­D, as an undifferentiated whole, gives rise to undefined "rights." Only when the complaint is broken down into manageable analytic bites can a court ascertain whether each separate claim satisfies the various criteria we have set forth for determining whether a federal statute creates rights. See, e. g., Golden State, supra, at 106 (asking whether the "provision in question" was designed to benefit the plaintiff). In prior cases, we have been able to determine whether or not a statute created a given right because the plaintiffs articulated, and lower courts evaluated, well-defined claims. In Wright, for example, we held that tenants of public hous- ing projects had a right to have their utility costs included within a rental payment that did not exceed 30 percent of their income. We did not ask whether the federal housing legislation generally gave rise to rights; rather, we focused our analysis on a specific statutory provision limiting "rent" to 30 percent of a tenant's income. 479 U. S., at 430. Simi- larly, in Wilder, we held that health care providers had an enforceable right to reimbursement at "reasonable and ade- quate rates" as required by a particular provision in the Medicaid statute. 496 U. S., at 511­512. And in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U. S. 347 (1992), where we held that Title 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 329 (1997) 343 Opinion of the Court IV­E of the Social Security Act did not give the plaintiffs the right that they asserted, we again analyzed the claim in very specific terms: whether children had a right to have state authorities undertake "reasonable efforts to prevent removal of children from their homes and to facilitate reuni- fication of families where removal had occurred." Id., at 352 (footnote omitted). Finally, in Livadas, supra, at 134, we discerned in the structure of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) the very specific right of employees "to com- plete the collective-bargaining process and agree to an arbi- tration clause." See 512 U. S., at 133, n. 27 (explaining that whether a claim founded on the NLRA is cognizable under § 1983 may depend on whether the claim stems from abridg- ment of a "protected individual interest"). We did not sim- ply ask whether the NLRA created unspecified "rights." The Court of Appeals did not engage in such a methodical inquiry. As best we can tell, the Court of Appeals seemed to think that respondents had a right to require the Director of Arizona's child support agency to bring the State's pro- gram into substantial compliance with Title IV­D. But the requirement that a State operate its child support program in "substantial compliance" with Title IV­D was not in- tended to benefit individual children and custodial parents, and therefore it does not constitute a federal right. Far from creating an individual entitlement to services, the standard is simply a yardstick for the Secretary to measure the systemwide performance of a State's Title IV­D pro- gram. Thus, the Secretary must look to the aggregate serv- ices provided by the State, not to whether the needs of any particular person have been satisfied. A State substantially complies with Title IV­D when it provides most mandated services (such as enforcement of support obligations) in only 75 percent of the cases reviewed during the federal audit period. 45 CFR § 305.20(a)(3)(iii) (1995). States must aim to establish paternity in 90 percent of all eligible cases, but may satisfy considerably lower targets so long as their 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 344 BLESSING v. FREESTONE Opinion of the Court efforts are steadily improving. 42 U. S. C. § 652(g). It is clear, then, that even when a State is in "substantial compli- ance" with Title IV­D, any individual plaintiff might still be among the 10 or 25 percent of persons whose needs ulti- mately go unmet. Moreover, even upon a finding of substan- tial noncompliance, the Secretary can merely reduce the State's AFDC grant by up to five percent; she cannot, by force of her own authority, command the State to take any particular action or to provide any services to certain indi- viduals. In short, the substantial compliance standard is de- signed simply to trigger penalty provisions that increase the frequency of audits and reduce the State's AFDC grant by a maximum of five percent. As such, it does not give rise to individual rights. The Court of Appeals erred not only in finding that indi- viduals have an enforceable right to substantial compliance, but also in taking a blanket approach to determining whether Title IV­D creates rights. It is readily apparent that many other provisions of that multifaceted statutory scheme do not fit our traditional three criteria for identifying statutory rights. To begin with, many provisions, like the "substantial compliance" standard, are designed only to guide the State in structuring its systemwide efforts at en- forcing support obligations. These provisions may ulti- mately benefit individuals who are eligible for Title IV­D services, but only indirectly. For example, Title IV­D lays out detailed requirements for the State's data processing system. Among other things, this system must sort infor- mation into standardized data elements specified by the Sec- retary; transmit information electronically to the State's AFDC system to monitor family eligibility for financial as- sistance; maintain the data necessary to meet federal report- ing requirements; and provide for the electronic transfer of funds for purposes of income withholding and interstate col- lections. 42 U. S. C. § 654a (1994 ed., Supp. II); 45 CFR § 307.10 (1995). Obviously, these complex standards do not 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 329 (1997) 345 Opinion of the Court give rise to individualized rights to computer services. They are simply intended to improve the overall efficiency of the States' child support enforcement scheme. The same reasoning applies to the staffing levels of the state agency, which respondents seem to claim are inade- quate. App. 11 (Complaint ¶ 39) (alleging that delays in case processing are attributable to "extraordinary staff short- ages, inordinately high caseloads and unmanageable back- logs"). Title IV­D generally requires each participating State to establish a separate child support enforcement unit "which meets such staffing and organizational requirements as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe." 42 U. S. C. § 654(3). The regulations, in turn, simply provide that each level of the State's organization must have "sufficient staff" to fulfill specified functions. These mandates do not, how- ever, give rise to federal rights. For one thing, the link be- tween increased staffing and the services provided to any particular individual is far too tenuous to support the notion that Congress meant to give each and every Arizonan who is eligible for Title IV­D the right to have the State Depart- ment of Economic Security staffed at a "sufficient" level. Furthermore, neither the statute nor the regulation gives any guidance as to how large a staff would be "sufficient." Cf. Suter, 503 U. S., at 360 (finding requirement of "reason- able efforts" unenforceable where there was "[n]o further statutory guidance . . . as to how `reasonable efforts' are to be measured"). Enforcement of such an undefined standard would certainly "strain judicial competence." Livadas, 512 U. S., at 132. We do not foreclose the possibility that some provisions of Title IV­D give rise to individual rights. The lower court did not separate out the particular rights it believed arise from the statutory scheme, and we think the complaint is less than clear in this regard. For example, respondent Madrid alleged that the state agency managed to collect some sup- port payments from her ex-husband but failed to pass 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 346 BLESSING v. FREESTONE Opinion of the Court through the first $50 of each payment, to which she was pur- portedly entitled under the pre-1996 version of § 657(b)(1). App. 13 (Complaint ¶ 48). Although § 657 may give her a federal right to receive a specified portion of the money col- lected on her behalf by Arizona, she did not explicitly re- quest such relief in the complaint. In any event, it is not at all apparent that respondents sought any relief more specific than a declaration that their "rights" were being violated and an injunction forcing Arizo- na's child support agency to "substantially comply" with all of the provisions of Title IV­D. We think that this defect is best addressed by sending the case back for the District Court to construe the complaint in the first instance, in order to determine exactly what rights, considered in their most concrete, specific form, respondents are asserting. Only by manageably breaking down the complaint into specific alle- gations can the District Court proceed to determine whether any specific claim asserts an individual federal right. B Because we leave open the possibility that Title IV­D may give rise to some individually enforceable rights, we pause to consider petitioner's final argument that no remand is warranted because the statute contains "a remedial scheme that is `sufficiently comprehensive . . . to demonstrate con- gressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.' " Wilder, 496 U. S., at 521 (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 20 (1981)). Because petitioner does not claim that any provision of Title IV­D expressly curtails § 1983 actions, she must make the difficult showing that allowing § 1983 actions to go forward in these circumstances "would be inconsistent with Congress' carefully tailored scheme." Golden State, 493 U. S., at 107 (citation and inter- nal quotation marks omitted). 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 329 (1997) 347 Opinion of the Court Only twice have we found a remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to supplant § 1983: in Sea Clammers, supra, and Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992 (1984). In Sea Clam- mers, we focused on the "unusually elaborate enforcement provisions" of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which placed at the disposal of the Environmental Protection Agency a panoply of enforcement options, including noncom- pliance orders, civil suits, and criminal penalties. 453 U. S., at 13. We emphasized that several provisions of the Act au- thorized private persons to initiate enforcement actions. Id., at 14, 20. We found it "hard to believe that Congress intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action when it cre- ated so many specific statutory remedies, including the two citizen-suit provisions." Id., at 20. Likewise, in Smith, the review scheme in the Education of the Handicapped Act per- mitted aggrieved individuals to invoke "carefully tailored" local administrative procedures followed by federal judicial review. 468 U. S., at 1009. We reasoned that Congress could not possibly have wanted parents to skip these pro- cedures and go straight to court by way of § 1983, since that would have "render[ed] superfluous most of the detailed procedural protections outlined in the statute." Id., at 1011. We have also stressed that a plaintiff's ability to invoke § 1983 cannot be defeated simply by "[t]he availability of ad- ministrative mechanisms to protect the plaintiff's interests." Golden State, supra, at 106. Thus, in Wright, we rejected the argument that the Secretary of Housing and Urban De- velopment's "generalized powers" to audit local public hous- ing authorities, to enforce annual contributions contracts, and to cut off federal funding demonstrated a congressional intention to prevent public housing tenants from using § 1983 to enforce their rights under the federal Housing Act. 479 U. S., at 428. We reached much the same conclusion in Wilder, where the Secretary of Health and Human Services 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 348 BLESSING v. FREESTONE Opinion of the Court had power to reject state Medicaid plans or to withhold fed- eral funding to States whose plans did not comply with fed- eral law. 496 U. S., at 521. Even though in both cases these oversight powers were accompanied by limited state griev- ance procedures for individuals, we found that § 1983 was still available. Wright, supra, at 427­428; Wilder, supra, at 523. The enforcement scheme that Congress created in Title IV­D is far more limited than those in Sea Clammers and Smith. Unlike the federal programs at issue in those cases, Title IV­D contains no private remedy-either judicial or administrative-through which aggrieved persons can seek redress. The only way that Title IV­D assures that States live up to their child support plans is through the Secretary's oversight. The Secretary can audit only for "substantial compliance" on a programmatic basis. Furthermore, up to 25 percent of eligible children and custodial parents can go without most of the services enumerated in Title IV­D be- fore the Secretary can trim a State's AFDC grant. These limited powers to audit and cut federal funding closely re- semble those powers at issue in Wilder and Wright. Al- though counsel for the Secretary suggested at oral argument that the Secretary "has the same right under a contract as any other party to seek specific performance," Tr. of Oral Arg. 49, this possibility was not developed in the briefs. Even assuming the Secretary's authority to sue for specific performance, Title IV­D's administrative enforcement arse- nal would not compare to those in Sea Clammers and Smith, especially if, as the Government further contended, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 49­50, no private actor would have standing to force the Secretary to bring suit for specific performance. To the extent that Title IV­D may give rise to individual rights, therefore, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Secretary's oversight powers are not comprehensive enough to close the door on § 1983 liability. 68 F. 3d, at 1151­1156. 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 329 (1997) 349 Scalia, J., concurring IV The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Kennedy joins, concurring. I agree with the Court that under the test set forth in Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U. S. 418, 423 (1987), and Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U. S. 498, 509 (1990), 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not permit individual beneficiaries of Title IV­D of the Social Security Act, as added, 88 Stat. 2351, and as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 651­669b (1994 ed., Supp. II), to bring suit chal- lenging a State's failure to achieve "substantial compliance" with the requirements of Title IV­D. That conclusion makes it unnecessary to reach the question whether § 1983 ever authorizes the beneficiaries of a federal-state funding and spending agreement-such as Title IV­D-to bring suit. As we explained in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), such an agreement is "in the nature of a contract," id., at 17: The State promises to provide certain services to private individuals, in exchange for which the Federal Government promises to give the State funds. In contract law, when such an arrangement is made (A promises to pay B money, in exchange for which B promises to provide services to C), the person who receives the benefit of the exchange of promises between the two oth- ers (C) is called a third-party beneficiary. Until relatively recent times, the third-party beneficiary was generally re- garded as a stranger to the contract, and could not sue upon it; that is to say, if, in the example given above, B broke his promise and did not provide services to C, the only person who could enforce the promise in court was the other party 520US2 Unit: $U44 [09-10-99 20:00:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN 350 BLESSING v. FREESTONE Scalia, J., concurring to the contract, A. See 1 W. Story, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts 549­550 (4th ed. 1856). This appears to have been the law at the time § 1983 was enacted. See Brief for Council of State Governments et al. as Amici Curiae 10­11, and n. 6 (citing sources). If so, the ability of persons in re- spondents' situation to compel a State to make good on its promise to the Federal Government was not a "righ[t] . . . secured by the . . . laws" under § 1983. While it is of course true that newly enacted laws are automatically embraced within § 1983, it does not follow that the question of what rights those new laws (or, for that matter, old laws) secure is to be determined according to modern notions rather than according to the understanding of § 1983 when it was en- acted. Allowing third-party beneficiaries of commitments to the Federal Government to sue is certainly a vast expansion. It must be acknowledged that Wright and Wilder permit- ted beneficiaries of federal-state contracts to sue under § 1983, but the argument set forth above was not raised. I am not prepared without further consideration to reject the possibility that third-party-beneficiary suits simply do not lie. I join the Court's opinion because, in ruling against re- spondents under the Wright/Wilder test, it leaves that possi- bility open. 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 351 Syllabus TIMMONS, ACTING DIRECTOR, RAMSEY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PROPERTY RECORDS AND REVENUE, et al. v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit No. 95­1608. Argued December 4, 1996-Decided April 28, 1997 Most States ban multiple-party, or "fusion," candidacies for elected office. Minnesota's laws prohibit an individual from appearing on the ballot as the candidate of more than one party. When respondent, a chapter of the national New Party, chose as its candidate for state representative an individual who was already the candidate of another political party, local election officials refused to accept the New Party's nominating petition. The party filed suit against petitioners, Minnesota election officials, contending that the State's antifusion laws violated its asso- ciational rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Dis- trict Court granted petitioners summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the fusion ban was unconstitutional be- cause it severely burdened the party's associational rights and was not narrowly tailored to advance Minnesota's valid interests in avoiding intraparty discord and party splintering, maintaining a stable political system, and avoiding voter confusion. Held: Minnesota's fusion ban does not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 356­370. (a) While the First Amendment protects the right of citizens to asso- ciate and to form political parties for the advancement of common politi- cal goals and ideas, Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U. S. 604, 616, States may enact reason- able regulations of parties, elections, and ballots to reduce election- and campaign-related disorder, Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428, 433. When deciding whether a state election law violates First and Four- teenth Amendment associational rights, this Court must weigh the char- acter and magnitude of the burden the State's rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State contends justify that burden, and consider the extent to which the State's concerns make the burden necessary. Id., at 434. Regulations imposing severe burdens must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest. Lesser burdens, however, trigger less exacting review, and a State's important regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable, non- discriminatory restrictions. Ibid. No bright line separates permis- 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 352 TIMMONS v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY Syllabus sible election-related regulation from unconstitutional infringements on First Amendment freedoms. Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 730. Pp. 356­359. (b) Minnesota's fusion ban does not severely burden the New Party's associational rights. The State's laws do not restrict the ability of the party and its members to endorse, support, or vote for anyone they like or directly limit the party's access to the ballot. The party's preferred candidate will still appear on the ballot, although as another party's candidate. The laws are also silent on parties' internal structure, gov- ernance, and policymaking. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214, and Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U. S. 208, distinguished. Instead, these provisions reduce the universe of potential candidates who may appear on the ballot as the party's nominee and limit, slightly, the party's ability to send a par- ticularized message, to its candidate and to the voters, about the nature of its support for the candidate. However, ballots are designed primar- ily to elect candidates, not to serve as forums for political expression. See Burdick, supra, at 438. Pp. 359­363. (c) Because Minnesota's fusion ban does not impose a severe burden on the New Party's rights, the State is required to show, not that the ban was narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, but that the State's asserted regulatory interests are "sufficiently weighty to jus- tify the limitation" on the party's rights. Norman v. Reed, 502 U. S. 279, 288­289. Elaborate, empirical verification of weightiness is not re- quired. See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U. S. 189, 195­196. Here, the burden is justified by "correspondingly weighty" valid state interests in ballot integrity and political stability. States certainly have an interest in protecting the integrity, fairness, and efficiency of their ballots and election processes as means for electing public officials. E. g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 145. Minnesota fears that a candidate or party could easily exploit fusion as a way of associating his or its name with popular slogans and catchphrases, transforming the ballot from a means of choosing candidates to a billboard for political ad- vertising. It is also concerned that fusion might enable minor par- ties, by nominating a major party's candidate, to bootstrap their way to major-party status in the next election and circumvent the State's nominating-petition requirement for minor parties, which is designed to ensure that only bona fide minor and third parties are granted access to the ballot. The State's strong interest in the stability of its political systems, see, e. g., Eu, supra, at 226, does not permit it to completely insulate the two-party system from minor parties' or independent candi- dates' competition and influence, e. g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 802, and is not a paternalistic license for States to protect political 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 351 (1997) 353 Opinion of the Court parties from the consequences of their own internal disagreements, e. g., Eu, supra, at 227. However, it does permit the State to enact reason- able election regulations that may, in practice, favor the traditional two- party system. Minnesota's fusion ban is far less burdensome than a California law, upheld in Storer, 415 U. S., at 728, that denied ballot positions to any independent candidate affiliated with a party at any time during the year preceding the primary election, and it is justified by similarly weighty state interests. The Court expresses no view on the party's policy-based arguments concerning the wisdom of fusion. Pp. 363­370. 73 F. 3d 196, reversed. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Con- nor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, and in Parts I and II of which Souter, J., joined, post, p. 370. Souter, J., filed a dissent- ing opinion, post, p. 382. Richard S. Slowes, Assistant Solicitor General of Minne- sota, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, and Peter M. Ackerberg, Assistant Attorney General. Laurence H. Tribe argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Joel Rogers, Sarah E. Siskind, Cornish F. Hitchcock, and David C. Vladeck.* Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Most States prohibit multiple-party, or "fusion," candida- cies for elected office.1 The Minnesota laws challenged in *Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Burt Neuborne, Steven R. Shapiro, Elliot M. Mincberg, and Lawrence S. Ottinger; for the Conservative Party of New York et al. by Rory O. Millson; for the Reform Party et al. by J. Gregory Taylor; for the Republican National Committee by Jan Witold Baran and Thomas J. Josefiak; and for Twelve University Professors et al. by David Halperin. 1 "Fusion," also called "cross-filing" or "multiple-party nomination," is "the electoral support of a single set of candidates by two or more parties." Argersinger, "A Place on the Ballot": Fusion Politics and Anti- 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 354 TIMMONS v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY Opinion of the Court this case prohibit a candidate from appearing on the ballot as the candidate of more than one party. Minn. Stat. §§ 204B.06, subd. 1(b), and 204B.04, subd. 2 (1994). We hold that such a prohibition does not violate the First and Four- teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Respondent is a chartered chapter of the national New Party. Petitioners are Minnesota election officials. In April 1994, Minnesota State Representative Andy Dawkins was running unopposed in the Minnesota Democratic- Farmer-Labor Party's (DFL) primary.2 That same month, New Party members chose Dawkins as their candidate for the same office in the November 1994 general election. Nei- ther Dawkins nor the DFL objected, and Dawkins signed the required affidavit of candidacy for the New Party. Minn. Stat. § 204B.06 (1994). Minnesota, however, prohibits fusion candidacies.3 Because Dawkins had already filed as a candidate for the DFL's nomination, local election officials refused to accept the New Party's nominating petition.4 fusion Laws, 85 Am. Hist. Rev. 287, 288 (1980); see also Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F. 3d 196, 197­198 (CA8 1996) (Fusion is "the nomination by more than one political party of the same candidate for the same office in the same general election"). 2 The DFL is the product of a 1944 merger between Minnesota's Farmer-Labor Party and the Democratic Party, and is a "major party" under Minnesota law. Minn. Stat. § 200.02, subd. 7(a) (1994) (major parties are parties that have won five percent of a statewide vote and therefore participate in the state primary elections). 3 State law provides: "No individual who seeks nomination for any parti- san or nonpartisan office at a primary shall be nominated for the same office by nominating petition . . . ." § 204B.04, subd. 2. Minnesota law further requires that "[a]n affidavit of candidacy shall state the name of the office sought and shall state that the candidate: . . . (b) Has no other affidavit on file as a candidate for any office at the same primary or next ensuing general election." § 204B.06, subd. 1(b). 4 Because the New Party is a "minor party" under Minnesota law, it does not hold a primary election but must instead file a nominating peti- tion with the signatures of 500 eligible voters, or 10 percent of the total 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 351 (1997) 355 Opinion of the Court The New Party filed suit in United States District Court, contending that Minnesota's antifusion laws violated the par- ty's associational rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court granted summary judg- ment for the state defendants, concluding that Minnesota's fusion ban was "a valid and non-discriminatory regulation of the election process," and noting that "issues concerning the mechanics of choosing candidates . . . are, in large part, matters of policy best left to the deliberative bodies them- selves." Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 863 F. Supp. 988, 994 (D. Minn. 1994). The Court of Appeals reversed. Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F. 3d 196, 198 (CA8 1996). First, the court determined that Minnesota's fusion ban "unquestion- ably" and "severe[ly]" burdened the New Party's "freedom to select a standard bearer who best represents the party's ideologies and preferences" and its right to "broaden the base of public participation in and support for [its] activi- ties." Ibid. (citations and internal quotation marks omit- ted). The court then decided that Minnesota's absolute ban on multiple-party nominations was "broader than necessary to serve the State's asserted interests" in avoiding intra- party discord and party splintering, maintaining a stable po- litical system, and avoiding voter confusion, and that the State's remaining concerns about multiple-party nomination were "simply unjustified in this case." Id., at 199­200. The court noted, however, that the Court of Appeals for the Sev- enth Circuit had upheld Wisconsin's similar fusion ban in Swamp v. Kennedy, 950 F. 2d 383, 386 (1991) (fusion ban did not burden associational rights and, even if it did, the State's interests justified the burden), cert. denied, 505 U. S. 1204 (1992). Nonetheless, the court concluded that Minnesota's fusion-ban provisions, Minn. Stat. §§ 204B.06, subd. 1(b), and number of voters in the preceding state or county general election, which- ever is less. §§ 204B.03, 204B.07­204B.08. 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 356 TIMMONS v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY Opinion of the Court 204B.04, subd. 2 (1994), were unconstitutional because they severely burdened the New Party's associational rights and were not narrowly tailored to advance Minnesota's valid in- terests. We granted certiorari, 517 U. S. 1219 (1996), and now reverse. Fusion was a regular feature of Gilded Age American politics. Particularly in the West and Midwest, candidates of issue-oriented parties like the Grangers, Independents, Greenbackers, and Populists often succeeded through fusion with the Democrats, and vice versa. Republicans, for their part, sometimes arranged fusion candidacies in the South, as part of a general strategy of encouraging and exploiting divisions within the dominant Democratic Party. See gen- erally Argersinger, "A Place on the Ballot": Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws, 85 Am. Hist. Rev. 287, 288­290 (1980). Fusion was common in part because political parties, rather than local or state governments, printed and distrib- uted their own ballots. These ballots contained only the names of a particular party's candidates, and so a voter could drop his party's ticket in the ballot box without even know- ing that his party's candidates were supported by other par- ties as well. But after the 1888 presidential election, which was widely regarded as having been plagued by fraud, many States moved to the "Australian ballot system." Under that system, an official ballot, containing the names of all the can- didates legally nominated by all the parties, was printed at public expense and distributed by public officials at polling places. Id., at 290­292; Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428, 446­447 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (States' move to the Australian ballot system was a "progressive reform to reduce fraudulent election practices"). By 1896, use of the Australian ballot was widespread. During the same period, many States enacted other election-related reforms, includ- ing bans on fusion candidacies. See Argersinger, supra, at 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 351 (1997) 357 Opinion of the Court 288, 295­298. Minnesota banned fusion in 1901.5 This trend has continued and, in this century, fusion has become the exception, not the rule. Today, multiple-party candi- dacies are permitted in just a few States,6 and fusion plays a significant role only in New York.7 The First Amendment protects the right of citizens to associate and to form political parties for the advancement of common political goals and ideas. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U. S. 604, 616 (1996) ("The independent expression of a politi- cal party's views is `core' First Amendment activity no less than is the independent expression of individuals, candidates, or other political committees"); Norman v. Reed, 502 U. S. 279, 288 (1992) ("constitutional right of citizens to create and develop new political parties . . . advances the constitutional interest of like-minded voters to gather in pursuit of common political ends"); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 5 See Act of Apr. 13, 1901, ch. 312, 1902 Minn. Laws 524. The Minnesota Supreme Court struck down the ban in In re Day, 93 Minn. 178, 182, 102 N. W. 209, 211 (1904), because the title of the enacting bill did not reflect the bill's content. The ban was reenacted in 1905. 1905 Minn. Rev. Laws, ch. 6, § 176, pp. 27, 31. Minnesota enacted a revised election code, which includes the fusion-related provisions involved in this case, in 1981. Act of Apr. 14, 1981, ch. 29, Art. 4, § 6, 1981 Minn. Laws 73. 6 Burnham Declaration, App. 15 ("Practice of [multiple-party nomina- tion] in the 20th century has, of course, been much more limited. This owes chiefly to the fact that most state legislatures . . . outlawed the practice"); McKenna, 73 F. 3d, at 198 ("[M]ultiple party nomination is pro- hibited today, either directly or indirectly, in about forty states and the District of Columbia . . ."); S. Cobble & S. Siskind, Fusion: Multiple Party Nomination in the United States 8 (1993) (summarizing States' fusion laws). 7 See N. Y. Elec. Law §§ 6­120, 6­146(1) (McKinney 1978 and Supp. 1996). Since 1936, when fusion was last relegalized in New York, several minor parties, including the Liberal, Conservative, American Labor, and Right to Life Parties, have been active and influential in New York politics. See Burnham Declaration, App. 15­16; Cobble & Siskind, supra n. 6, at 3­4. 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 358 TIMMONS v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY Opinion of the Court U. S. 208, 214 (1986). As a result, political parties' govern- ment, structure, and activities enjoy constitutional protec- tion. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214, 230 (1989) (noting political party's "dis- cretion in how to organize itself, conduct its affairs, and se- lect its leaders"); Tashjian, supra, at 224 (Constitution pro- tects a party's "determination . . . of the structure which best allows it to pursue its political goals"). On the other hand, it is also clear that States may, and inevitably must, enact reasonable regulations of parties, elections, and ballots to reduce election- and campaign- related disorder. Burdick, supra, at 433 (" `[A]s a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process' ") (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 730 (1974)); Tash- jian, supra, at 217 (The Constitution grants States "broad power to prescribe the `Time, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,' Art. I, § 4, cl. 1, which power is matched by state control over the election process for state offices"). When deciding whether a state election law violates First and Fourteenth Amendment associational rights, we weigh the " `character and magnitude' " of the burden the State's rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State contends justify that burden, and consider the extent to which the State's concerns make the burden necessary. Burdick, supra, at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 789 (1983)). Regulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs' rights must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest. Lesser burdens, however, trigger less exacting review, and a State's " `important regulatory interests' " will usually be enough to justify " `reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.' " Burdick, supra, at 434 (quoting Anderson, supra, at 788); Norman, supra, at 288­ 289 (requiring "corresponding interest sufficiently weighty 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 351 (1997) 359 Opinion of the Court to justify the limitation"). No bright line separates permis- sible election-related regulation from unconstitutional in- fringements on First Amendment freedoms. Storer, supra, at 730 ("[N]o litmus-paper test . . . separat[es] those restric- tions that are valid from those that are invidious . . . . The rule is not self-executing and is no substitute for the hard judgments that must be made"). The New Party's claim that it has a right to select its own candidate is uncontroversial, so far as it goes. See, e. g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477 (1975) (party, not State, has right to decide who will be State's delegates at party convention). That is, the New Party, and not someone else, has the right to select the New Party's "standard bearer." It does not follow, though, that a party is absolutely entitled to have its nominee appear on the ballot as that party's can- didate. A particular candidate might be ineligible for office,8 unwilling to serve, or, as here, another party's candidate. That a particular individual may not appear on the ballot as a particular party's candidate does not severely burden that party's associational rights. See Burdick, 504 U. S., at 440, n. 10 ("It seems to us that limiting the choice of candidates to those who have complied with state election law require- ments is the prototypical example of a regulation that, while it affects the right to vote, is eminently reasonable"); Ander- son, 460 U. S., at 792, n. 12 ("Although a disaffiliation provi- sion may preclude . . . voters from supporting a particular ineligible candidate, they remain free to support and pro- mote other candidates who satisfy the State's disaffiliation requirements"); id., at 793, n. 15. The New Party relies on Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., supra, and Tashjian v. Republi- can Party of Conn., supra. In Eu, we struck down Califor- 8 See, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 204B.06, subd. 1(c) (1994) (candidates must be 21 years of age or more upon assuming office and must have maintained residence in the district from which they seek election for 30 days before the general election). 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 360 TIMMONS v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY Opinion of the Court nia election provisions that prohibited political parties from endorsing candidates in party primaries and regulated par- ties' internal affairs and structure. And in Tashjian, we held that Connecticut's closed-primary statute, which re- quired voters in a party primary to be registered party members, interfered with a party's associational rights by limiting "the group of registered voters whom the Party may invite to participate in the basic function of selecting the Par- ty's candidates." 479 U. S., at 215­216 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But while Tashjian and Eu involved regulation of political parties' internal affairs and core associational activities, Minnesota's fusion ban does not. The ban, which applies to major and minor parties alike, sim- ply precludes one party's candidate from appearing on the ballot, as that party's candidate, if already nominated by an- other party. Respondent is free to try to convince Repre- sentative Dawkins to be the New Party's, not the DFL's, candidate. See Swamp, 950 F. 2d, at 385 ("[A] party may nominate any candidate that the party can convince to be its candidate"). Whether the party still wants to endorse a candidate who, because of the fusion ban, will not appear on the ballot as the party's candidate, is up to the party. The Court of Appeals also held that Minnesota's laws "keep the New Party from developing consensual political alliances and thus broadening the base of public participation in and support for its activities." McKenna, 73 F. 3d, at 199. The burden on the party was, the court held, severe because "[h]istory shows that minor parties have played a significant role in the electoral system where multiple party nomination is legal, but have no meaningful influence where multiple party nomination is banned." Ibid. In the view of the Court of Appeals, Minnesota's fusion ban forces mem- bers of the New Party to make a "no-win choice" between voting for "candidates with no realistic chance of winning, defect[ing] from their party and vot[ing] for a major party candidate who does, or declin[ing] to vote at all." Ibid. 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 351 (1997) 361 Opinion of the Court But Minnesota has not directly precluded minor political parties from developing and organizing. Cf. Norman, 502 U. S., at 289 (statute "foreclose[d] the development of any political party lacking the resources to run a statewide cam- paign"). Nor has Minnesota excluded a particular group of citizens, or a political party, from participation in the election process. Cf. Anderson, supra, at 792­793 (filing deadline "places a particular burden on an identifiable segment of Ohio's independent-minded voters"); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) (striking down Texas statute requiring can- didates to pay filing fees as a condition to having their names placed on primary-election ballots). The New Party re- mains free to endorse whom it likes, to ally itself with others, to nominate candidates for office, and to spread its message to all who will listen. Cf. Eu, 489 U. S., at 223 (California law curtailed right to "[f]ree discussion about candidates for public office"); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm'n, 518 U. S., at 615 (restrictions on party's spending impair its ability to "engage in direct political advocacy"). The Court of Appeals emphasized its belief that, without fusion-based alliances, minor parties cannot thrive. This is a predictive judgment which is by no means self-evident.9 9 Between the First and Second World Wars, for example, various radi- cal, agrarian, and labor-oriented parties thrived, without fusion, in the Midwest. See generally R. Valelly, Radicalism in the States (1989). One of these parties, Minnesota's Farmer-Labor Party, displaced the Demo- cratic Party as the Republicans' primary opponent in Minnesota during the 1930's. As one historian has noted: "The Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party elected its candidates to the governorship on four occasions, to the U. S. Senate in five elections, and to the U. S. House in twenty-five cam- paigns . . . . Never less than Minnesota's second strongest party, in 1936 Farmer-Laborites dominated state politics. . . . The Farmer-Labor Party was a success despite its independence of America's two dominant national parties and despite the sometimes bold anticapitalist rhetoric of its plat- forms." J. Haynes, Dubious Alliance 9 (1984). It appears that factional- ism within the Farmer-Labor Party, the popular successes of New Deal programs and ideology, and the gradual movement of political power from the States to the National Government contributed to the party's de- 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 362 TIMMONS v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY Opinion of the Court But, more importantly, the supposed benefits of fusion to minor parties do not require that Minnesota permit it. See Tashjian, supra, at 222 (refusing to weigh merits of closed and open primaries). Many features of our political sys- tem-e. g., single-member districts, "first past the post" elec- tions, and the high costs of campaigning-make it difficult for third parties to succeed in American politics. Burnham Declaration, App. 12­13. But the Constitution does not re- quire States to permit fusion any more than it requires them to move to proportional-representation elections or public financing of campaigns. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 75 (1980) (plurality opinion) ("Whatever appeal the dissent- ing opinion's view may have as a matter of political theory, it is not the law"). The New Party contends that the fusion ban burdens its "right . . . to communicate its choice of nominees on the ballot on terms equal to those offered other parties, and the right of the party's supporters and other voters to receive that information," and insists that communication on the ballot of a party's candidate choice is a "critical source of information for the great majority of voters . . . who . . . rely upon party `labels' as a voting guide." Brief for Respondent 22­23. It is true that Minnesota's fusion ban prevents the New Party from using the ballot to communicate to the public that it supports a particular candidate who is already another party's candidate. In addition, the ban shuts off one possible avenue a party might use to send a message to its preferred candidate because, with fusion, a candidate who wins an election on the basis of two parties' votes will likely know more-if the parties' votes are counted separately-about the particular wishes and ideals of his constituency. We are cline. See generally Haynes, supra; Valelly, supra; M. Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism: The Third-Party Alternative (1979). Eventually, a much-weakened Farmer-Labor Party merged with the Democrats, form- ing what is now Minnesota's Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, in 1944. Valelly, supra, at 156. 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 351 (1997) 363 Opinion of the Court unpersuaded, however, by the party's contention that it has a right to use the ballot itself to send a particularized mes- sage, to its candidate and to the voters, about the nature of its support for the candidate. Ballots serve primarily to elect candidates, not as forums for political expression. See Burdick, 504 U. S., at 438; id., at 445 (Kennedy, J., dissent- ing). Like all parties in Minnesota, the New Party is able to use the ballot to communicate information about itself and its candidate to the voters, so long as that candidate is not already someone else's candidate. The party retains great latitude in its ability to communicate ideas to voters and can- didates through its participation in the campaign, and party members may campaign for, endorse, and vote for their pre- ferred candidate even if he is listed on the ballot as another party's candidate. See Anderson, 460 U. S., at 788 ("[A]n election campaign is an effective platform for the expression of views on the issues of the day"); Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173, 186 (1979) ("[A]n election campaign is a means of disseminating ideas"). In sum, Minnesota's laws do not restrict the ability of the New Party and its members to endorse, support, or vote for anyone they like. The laws do not directly limit the party's access to the ballot. They are silent on parties' internal structure, governance, and policymaking. Instead, these provisions reduce the universe of potential candidates who may appear on the ballot as the party's nominee only by ruling out those few individuals who both have already agreed to be another party's candidate and also, if forced to choose, themselves prefer that other party. They also limit, slightly, the party's ability to send a message to the voters and to its preferred candidates. We conclude that the bur- dens Minnesota imposes on the party's First and Fourteenth Amendment associational rights-though not trivial-are not severe. The Court of Appeals determined that Minnesota's fusion ban imposed "severe" burdens on the New Party's associa- 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 364 TIMMONS v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY Opinion of the Court tional rights, and so it required the State to show that the ban was narrowly tailored to serve compelling state inter- ests. McKenna, 73 F. 3d, at 198. We disagree; given the burdens imposed, the bar is not so high. Instead, the State's asserted regulatory interests need only be "sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation" imposed on the party's rights. Norman, 502 U. S., at 288­289; Burdick, supra, at 434 (quoting Anderson, supra, at 788). Nor do we require elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State's asserted justifications. See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U. S. 189, 195­196 (1986) ("Legislatures . . . should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in the electoral process with foresight rather than reactively, provided that the response is reasonable and does not sig- nificantly impinge on constitutionally protected rights"). The Court of Appeals acknowledged Minnesota's interests in avoiding voter confusion and overcrowded ballots, pre- venting party splintering and disruptions of the two-party system, and being able to clearly identify the election win- ner. McKenna, supra, at 199­200. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in Swamp, noted Wisconsin's "compelling" interests in avoiding voter confusion, preserving the integrity of the election process, and maintaining a stable political system. 950 F. 2d, at 386; cf. id., at 387­388 (Fairchild, J., concurring) (State has a compelling interest in "maintaining the distinct identity of parties"). Minnesota argues here that its fusion ban is justified by its interests in avoiding voter confusion, promoting candidate competition (by reserving limited ballot space for opposing candidates), preventing electoral distor- tions and ballot manipulations, and discouraging party splin- tering and "unrestrained factionalism." Brief for Petition- ers 41­50. States certainly have an interest in protecting the integ- rity, fairness, and efficiency of their ballots and election proc- esses as means for electing public officials. Bullock, 405 U. S., at 145 (State may prevent "frivolous or fraudulent 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 351 (1997) 365 Opinion of the Court candidacies") (citing Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U. S. 431, 442 (1971)); Eu, 489 U. S., at 231; Norman, supra, at 290 (States have an interest in preventing "misrepresentation"); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752, 761 (1973). Petitioners contend that a candidate or party could easily exploit fusion as a way of associating his or its name with popular slogans and catch- phrases. For example, members of a major party could de- cide that a powerful way of "sending a message" via the bal- lot would be for various factions of that party to nominate the major party's candidate as the candidate for the newly formed "No New Taxes," "Conserve Our Environment," and "Stop Crime Now" parties. In response, an opposing major party would likely instruct its factions to nominate that party's candidate as the "Fiscal Responsibility," "Healthy Planet," and "Safe Streets" parties' candidate. Whether or not the putative "fusion" candidates' names appeared on one or four ballot lines, such maneuvering would undermine the ballot's purpose by transforming it from a means of choosing candidates to a billboard for political ad- vertising. The New Party responds to this concern, ironi- cally enough, by insisting that the State could avoid such manipulation by adopting more demanding ballot-access standards rather than prohibiting multiple-party nomination. Brief for Respondent 38. However, as we stated above, be- cause the burdens the fusion ban imposes on the party's asso- ciational rights are not severe, the State need not narrowly tailor the means it chooses to promote ballot integrity. The Constitution does not require that Minnesota compromise the policy choices embodied in its ballot-access requirements to accommodate the New Party's fusion strategy. See Minn. Stat. § 204B.08, subd. 3 (1994) (signature requirements for nominating petitions); Rosario, supra, at 761­762 (New York's time limitation for enrollment in a political party was part of an overall scheme aimed at the preservation of the integrity of the State's electoral process). 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 366 TIMMONS v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY Opinion of the Court Relatedly, petitioners urge that permitting fusion would undercut Minnesota's ballot-access regime by allowing minor parties to capitalize on the popularity of another party's can- didate, rather than on their own appeal to the voters, in order to secure access to the ballot. Brief for Petitioners 45­46. That is, voters who might not sign a minor party's nominating petition based on the party's own views and can- didates might do so if they viewed the minor party as just another way of nominating the same person nominated by one of the major parties. Thus, Minnesota fears that fusion would enable minor parties, by nominating a major party's candidate, to bootstrap their way to major-party status in the next election and circumvent the State's nominating- petition requirement for minor parties. See Minn. Stat. §§ 200.02, subd. 7 (defining "major party"), and 204D.13 (1994) (describing ballot order for major and other parties). The State surely has a valid interest in making sure that minor and third parties who are granted access to the ballot are bona fide and actually supported, on their own merits, by those who have provided the statutorily required petition or ballot support. Anderson, 460 U. S., at 788, n. 9; Storer, 415 U. S., at 733, 746. States also have a strong interest in the stability of their political systems.10 Eu, supra, at 226; Storer, supra, at 736. 10 The dissents state that we may not consider "what appears to be the true basis for [our] holding-the interest in preserving the two-party sys- tem," post, at 377 (opinion of Stevens, J.), because Minnesota did not defend this interest in its briefs and "expressly rejected" it at oral argu- ment, post, at 378; see also post, at 382­383 (opinion of Souter, J.). In fact, at oral argument, the State contended that it has an interest in the stability of its political system and that, even if certain election-related regulations, such as those requiring single-member districts, tend to work to the advantage of the traditional two-party system, the "States do have a permissible choice . . . there, as long as they don't go so far as to close the door to minor part[ies]." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27; see also Brief for Peti- tioners 46­47 (discussing State's interest in avoiding " `splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism' ") (quoting Storer, 415 U. S., at 736). We agree. 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 351 (1997) 367 Opinion of the Court This interest does not permit a State to completely insulate the two-party system from minor parties' or independent candidates' competition and influence, Anderson, supra, at 802; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968), nor is it a pater- nalistic license for States to protect political parties from the consequences of their own internal disagreements. Eu, supra, at 227; Tashjian, 479 U. S., at 224. That said, the States' interest permits them to enact reasonable election regulations that may, in practice, favor the traditional two- party system, see Burnham Declaration, App. 12 (American politics has been, for the most part, organized around two parties since the time of Andrew Jackson), and that temper the destabilizing effects of party splintering and excessive factionalism. The Constitution permits the Minnesota Leg- islature to decide that political stability is best served through a healthy two-party system. See Rutan v. Repub- lican Party of Ill., 497 U. S. 62, 107 (1990) (Scalia, J., dis- senting) ("The stabilizing effects of such a [two-party] sys- tem are obvious"); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109, 144­145 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable two-party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and ef- fective government"); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 507, 532 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Broad-based political parties supply an essential coherence and flexibility to the American political scene"). And while an interest in securing the perceived benefits of a stable two-party system will not justify unreasonably exclusionary restrictions, see Williams, supra, at 31­32, States need not remove all of the many hurdles third parties face in the American political arena today. In Storer, we upheld a California statute that denied ballot positions to independent candidates who had voted in the immediately preceding primary elections or had a registered party affiliation at any time during the year before the same 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 368 TIMMONS v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY Opinion of the Court primary elections. 415 U. S., at 728.11 After surveying the relevant case law, we "ha[d] no hesitation in sustaining" the party-disaffiliation provisions. Id., at 733. We recognized that the provisions were part of a "general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of . . . the ballot," and noted that the provision did not discriminate against independent candidates. Ibid. We concluded that while a "State need not take the course California has, . . . California appar- ently believes with the Founding Fathers that splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant damage to the fabric of government. See The Federalist No. 10 (Madison). It appears obvious to us that the one-year disaffiliation provision furthers the State's interest in the stability of its political system." 415 U. S., at 736; see also Lippitt v. Cipollone, 404 U. S. 1032 (1972) (affirming, without opinion, district-court decision upholding statute banning party-primary candidacies of those who had voted in another party's primary within last four years).12 11 A similar provision applied to party candidates, and imposed a "flat disqualification upon any candidate seeking to run in a party primary if he has been `registered as affiliated with a political party other than that political party the nomination of which he seeks within 12 months immedi- ately prior to the filing of the declaration.' " Another provision stated that "no person may file nomination papers for a party nomination and an independent nomination for the same office . . . ." Storer, 415 U. S., at 733. 12 Justice Stevens insists that New York's experience with fusion poli- tics undermines Minnesota's contention that its fusion ban promotes politi- cal stability. Post, at 376, n. 4, 381, n. 12 (dissenting opinion). Califor- nia's experiment with cross-filing, on the other hand, provides some justification for Minnesota's concerns. In 1946, for example, Earl Warren was the nominee of both major parties, and was therefore able to run unopposed in California's general election. It appears to be widely ac- cepted that California's cross-filing system stifled electoral competition and undermined the role of distinctive political parties. See B. Hyink, S. Brown, & D. Provost, Politics and Government in California 76 (12th ed. 1989) (California's cross-filing law "undermined party responsibility and cohesiveness"); D. Mazmanian, Third Parties in Presidential Elections 134 (1974) (cross-filing "diminish[ed] the role of political parties and 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 351 (1997) 369 Opinion of the Court Our decision in Burdick v. Takushi, supra, is also relevant. There, we upheld Hawaii's ban on write-in voting against a claim that the ban unreasonably infringed on citizens' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In so holding, we re- jected the petitioner's argument that the ban "deprive[d] him of the opportunity to cast a meaningful ballot," empha- sizing that the function of elections is to elect candidates and that "we have repeatedly upheld reasonable, politically neu- tral regulations that have the effect of channeling expressive activit[ies] at the polls." 504 U. S., at 437­438. Minnesota's fusion ban is far less burdensome than the dis- affiliation rule upheld in Storer, and is justified by similarly weighty state interests. By reading Storer as dealing only with "sore-loser candidates," Justice Stevens, in our view, fails to appreciate the case's teaching. Post, at 377 (dissent- ing opinion). Under the California disaffiliation statute at issue in Storer, any person affiliated with a party at any time during the year leading up to the primary election was absolutely precluded from appearing on the ballot as an inde- pendent or as the candidate of another party. Minnesota's fusion ban is not nearly so restrictive; the challenged provi- sions say nothing about the previous party affiliation of would-be candidates but only require that, in order to appear on the ballot, a candidate not be the nominee of more than one party. California's disaffiliation rule limited the field of candidates by thousands; Minnesota's precludes only a hand- ful who freely choose to be so limited. It is also worth not- ing that while California's disaffiliation statute absolutely banned many candidacies, Minnesota's fusion ban only pro- hibits a candidate from being named twice. We conclude that the burdens Minnesota's fusion ban im- poses on the New Party's associational rights are justified by "correspondingly weighty" valid state interests in ballot work[ed] against the efforts of minority factions to gain recognition and a hearing in the electoral arena"). 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 370 TIMMONS v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY Stevens, J., dissenting integrity and political stability.13 In deciding that Minneso- ta's fusion ban does not unconstitutionally burden the New Party's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, we express no views on the New Party's policy-based arguments con- cerning the wisdom of fusion. It may well be that, as sup- port for new political parties increases, these arguments will carry the day in some States' legislatures. But the Consti- tution does not require Minnesota, and the approximately 40 other States that do not permit fusion, to allow it. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, and with whom Justice Souter joins as to Parts I and II, dissenting. In Minnesota, the Twin Cities Area New Party (Party) is a recognized minor political party entitled by state law to have the names of its candidates for public office appear on the state ballots. In April 1994, Andy Dawkins was quali- fied to be a candidate for election to the Minnesota Legisla- ture as the representative of House District 65A. With Dawkins' consent, the Party nominated him as its candidate for that office. In my opinion the Party and its members had a constitutional right to have their candidate's name ap- pear on the ballot despite the fact that he was also the nomi- nee of another party. The Court's conclusion that the Minnesota statute prohib- iting multiple-party candidacies is constitutional rests on three dubious premises: (1) that the statute imposes only a 13 Justice Stevens rejects the argument that Minnesota's fusion ban serves its alleged paternalistic interest in "avoiding voter confusion." Post, at 374, 375­376 (dissenting opinion) ("[T]his concern is meritless and severely underestimates the intelligence of the typical voter"). Although this supposed interest was discussed below, 73 F. 3d, at 199­200, and in the parties' briefs before this Court, Brief for Petitioners 41­44; Brief for Respondent 34­39, it plays no part in our analysis today. 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 351 (1997) 371 Stevens, J., dissenting minor burden on the Party's right to choose and to support the candidate of its choice; (2) that the statute significantly serves the State's asserted interests in avoiding ballot ma- nipulation and factionalism; and (3) that, in any event, the interest in preserving the two-party system justifies the im- position of the burden at issue in this case. I disagree with each of these premises. I The members of a recognized political party unquestion- ably have a constitutional right to select their nominees for public office and to communicate the identity of their nomi- nees to the voting public. Both the right to choose and the right to advise voters of that choice are entitled to the high- est respect. The Minnesota statutes place a significant burden on both of those rights. The Court's recital of burdens that the stat- ute does not inflict on the Party, ante, at 363, does nothing to minimize the severity of the burdens that it does impose. The fact that the Party may nominate its second choice surely does not diminish the significance of a restriction that denies it the right to have the name of its first choice appear on the ballot. Nor does the point that it may use some of its limited resources to publicize the fact that its first choice is the nominee of some other party provide an adequate sub- stitute for the message that is conveyed to every person who actually votes when a party's nominees appear on the ballot. As to the first point, the State contends that the fusion ban in fact limits by only a few candidates the range of indi- viduals a party may nominate, and that the burden is there- fore quite small. But the number of candidates removed from the Party's reach cannot be the determinative factor. The ban leaves the Party free to nominate any eligible candi- date except the particular " `standard bearer who best repre- sents the party's ideologies and preferences.' " Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214, 224 (1989). 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 372 TIMMONS v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY Stevens, J., dissenting The Party could perhaps choose to expend its resources supporting a candidate who was not in fact the best repre- sentative of its members' views. But a party's choice of a candidate is the most effective way in which that party can communicate to the voters what the party represents and, thereby, attract voter interest and support.1 Political par- ties "exist to advance their members' shared political be- liefs," and "in the context of particular elections, candidates are necessary to make the party's message known and effec- tive, and vice versa." Colorado Republican Federal Cam- paign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U. S. 604, 629 (1996) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 821 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissent- ing) ("Political parties have, or at least hope to have, a continuing existence, representing particular philosophies. Each party has an interest in finding the best candidate to advance its philosophy in each election"). The State next argues that-instead of nominating a second-choice candidate-the Party could remove itself from 1 The burden on the Party's right to nominate its first-choice candidate, by limiting the Party's ability to convey through its nominee what the Party represents, risks impinging on another core element of any political party's associational rights-the right to "broaden the base of public par- ticipation in and support for its activities." Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U. S. 208, 214 (1986). The Court of Appeals relied substantially on this right in concluding that the fusion ban impermissibly burdened the New Party, but its focus was somewhat different. See Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F. 3d 196, 199 (CA8 1996). A fusion ban burdens the right of a minor party to broaden its base of sup- port because of the political reality that the dominance of the major parties frequently makes a vote for a minor party or independent candidate a "wasted" vote. When minor parties can nominate a candidate also nomi- nated by a major party, they are able to present their members with an opportunity to cast a vote for a candidate who will actually be elected. Although this aspect of a party's effort to broaden support is distinct from the ability to nominate the candidate who best represents the party's views, it is important to note that the party's right to broaden the base of its support is burdened in both ways by the fusion ban. 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 351 (1997) 373 Stevens, J., dissenting the ballot altogether, and publicly endorse the candidate of another party. But the right to be on the election ballot is precisely what separates a political party from any other interest group.2 The Court relies on the fact that the Party remains free "to spread its message to all who will listen," ante, at 361, through forums other than the ballot. Given the limited resources available to most minor parties, and the less-than-universal interest in the messages of third par- ties, it is apparent that the Party's message will, in this man- ner, reach a much smaller audience than that composed of all voters who can read the ballot in the polling booth. The majority rejects as unimportant the limits that the fusion ban may impose on the Party's ability to express its political views, ante, at 362­363, relying on our decision in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428, 445 (1992), in which we noted that "the purpose of casting, counting, and recording votes is to elect public officials, not to serve as a general forum for political expression." But in Burdick we con- cluded simply that an individual voter's interest in express- ing his disapproval of the single candidate running for office in a particular election did not require the State to finance and provide a mechanism for tabulating write-in votes. Our conclusion that the ballot is not principally a forum for the individual expression of political sentiment through the cast- ing of a vote does not justify the conclusion that the ballot serves no expressive purpose for the parties who place candi- dates on the ballot. Indeed, the long-recognized right to choose a " `standard bearer who best represents the party's ideologies and preferences,' " Eu, 489 U. S., at 224, is inescap- ably an expressive right. "To the extent that party labels 2 We have recognized that "[t]here is no evidence that an endorsement issued by an official party organization carries more weight than one is- sued by a newspaper or a labor union." Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214, 228, n. 18 (1989). Given this reality, I cannot agree with the majority's implicit equation of the right to endorse with the right to nominate. 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 374 TIMMONS v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY Stevens, J., dissenting provide a shorthand designation of the views of party candi- dates on matters of public concern, the identification of candi- dates with particular parties plays a role in the process by which voters inform themselves for the exercise of the fran- chise." Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U. S. 208, 220 (1986). In this case, and presumably in most cases, the burden of a statute of this kind is imposed upon the members of a minor party, but its potential impact is much broader. Popular candidates like Andy Dawkins sometimes receive nationwide recognition. Fiorello LaGuardia, Earl Warren, Ronald Reagan, and Franklin D. Roosevelt are names that come readily to mind as candidates whose reputations and political careers were enhanced because they appeared on election ballots as fusion candidates. See Note, Fusion and the Associational Rights of Minor Political Parties, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 683 (1995). A statute that denied a political party the right to nominate any of those individuals for high office simply because he had already been nominated by another party would, in my opinion, place an intolerable burden on political expression and association. II Minnesota argues that the statutory restriction on the Party's right to nominate the candidate of its choice is justi- fied by the State's interests in avoiding voter confusion, pre- venting ballot clutter and manipulation, encouraging candi- date competition, and minimizing intraparty factionalism. None of these rationales can support the fusion ban because the State has failed to explain how the ban actually serves the asserted interests. I believe that the law significantly abridges First Amend- ment freedoms and that the State therefore must shoulder a correspondingly heavy burden of justification if the law is to survive judicial scrutiny. But even accepting the majority's view that the burdens imposed by the law are not weighty, 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 351 (1997) 375 Stevens, J., dissenting the State's asserted interests must at least bear some plausi- ble relationship to the burdens it places on political parties. See Anderson, 460 U. S., at 789. Although the Court today suggests that the State does not have to support its asserted justifications for the fusion ban with evidence that they have any empirical validity, ante, at 364, we have previously required more than a bare assertion that some particular state interest is served by a burdensome election require- ment. See, e. g., Eu, 489 U. S., at 226 (rejecting California's argument that the State's endorsement ban protected politi- cal stability because the State "never adequately explain[ed] how banning parties from endorsing or opposing primary candidates advances that interest"); Anderson, 460 U. S., at 789 (evaluating a State's interests, we examine "the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights"); Norman v. Reed, 502 U. S. 279, 288­ 289 (1992) ("corresponding interest" must be "sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation").3 While the State describes some imaginative theoretical sources of voter confusion that could result from fusion candidacies, in my judgment the argument that the burden on First Amendment interests is justified by this concern is meritless and severely underestimates the intelligence of the 3 In any event, the parade of horribles that the majority appears to be- lieve might visit Minnesota should fusion candidacies be allowed is fantas- tical, given the evidence from New York's experience with fusion. See Brief for Conservative Party of New York et al. as Amici Curiae 20­25. Thus, the evidence that actually is available diminishes, rather than strengthens, Minnesota's claims. The majority asserts, ante, at 368­369, n. 12, that California's cross-filing system, in place during the first half of this century, provides a compelling counterexample. But cross-filing, which "allowed candidates to file in the primary of any or all parties with- out specifying party affiliation," D. Mazmanian, Third Parties in Presiden- tial Elections 132­133 (1974) (hereinafter Mazmanian), is simply not the same as fusion politics, and the problems suffered in California do not provide empirical support for Minnesota's position. 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN 376 TIMMONS v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY Stevens, J., dissenting typical voter.4 We have noted more than once that "[a] State's claim that it is enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions by restricting the flow of information to them must be viewed with some skepticism." Eu, 489 U. S., at 228; Tashjian, 479 U. S., at 221; Anderson, 460 U. S., at 798. The State's concern about ballot manipulation, readily ac- cepted by the majority, is similarly farfetched. The possibil- ity that members of the major parties will begin to create dozens of minor parties with detailed, issue-oriented titles for the sole purpose of nominating candidates under those titles, see ante, at 365, is entirely hypothetical. The major- ity dismisses out-of-hand the Party's argument that the risk of this type of ballot manipulation and crowding is more eas- ily averted by maintaining reasonably stringent require- ments for the creation of minor parties. Ibid. In fact, though, the Party's point merely illustrates the idea that a State can place some kinds-but not every kind-of limita- tion on the abilities of small parties to thrive. If the State wants to make it more difficult for any group to achieve the legal status of being a political party, it can do so within reason and still not run up against the First Amendment. "The State has the undoubted right to require candidates to make a preliminary showing of substantial support in order to qualify for a place on the ballot, because it is both wasteful and confusing to encumber the ballot with the names of friv- olous candidates." Anderson, 460 U. S., at 788­789, n. 9. See also Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U. S. 431, 442 (1971). But once the State has established a standard for achieving party status, forbidding an acknowledged party to put on the bal- lot its chosen candidate clearly frustrates core associational rights.5 4 See Brief for Petitioners 41­43; see also ante, at 365. 5 A second "ballot manipulation" argument accepted by the majority is that minor parties will attempt to "capitalize on the popularity of another party's candidate, rather than on their own appeal to the voters, in order 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 351 (1997) 377 Stevens, J., dissenting The State argues that the fusion ban promotes political stability by preventing intraparty factionalism and party raiding. States do certainly have an interest in maintaining a stable political system. Eu, 489 U. S., at 226. But the State has not convincingly articulated how the fusion ban will prevent the factionalism it fears. Unlike the law at issue in Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724 (1974), for example, this law would not prevent sore-loser candidates from defect- ing with a disaffected segment of a major party and running as an opposition candidate for a newly formed minor party. Nor does this law, like those aimed at requiring parties to show a modicum of support in order to secure a place on the election ballot, prevent the formation of numerous small parties. Indeed, the activity banned by Minnesota's law is the formation of coalitions, not the division and dissension of "splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism." Id., at 736. As for the State's argument that the fusion ban encourages candidate competition, this claim treats "candidates" as fun- gible goods, ignoring entirely each party's interest in nomi- nating not just any candidate, but the candidate who best represents the party's views. Minnesota's fusion ban simply cannot be justified with reference to this or any of the above-mentioned rationales. I turn, therefore, to what ap- pears to be the true basis for the Court's holding-the inter- est in preserving the two-party system. III Before addressing the merits of preserving the two-party system as a justification for Minnesota's fusion ban, I should note that, in my view, it is impermissible for the Court to consider this rationale. Minnesota did not argue in its to secure access to the ballot." Ante, at 366. What the majority appears unwilling to accept is that Andy Dawkins was the Party's chosen candi- date. The Party was not trying to capitalize on his status as someone else's candidate, but to identify him as their own choice. 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN 378 TIMMONS v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY Stevens, J., dissenting briefs that the preservation of the two-party system sup- ported the fusion ban, and indeed, when pressed at oral argu- ment on the matter, the State expressly rejected this ration- ale. Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. Our opinions have been explicit in their willingness to consider only the particular interests put forward by a State to support laws that impose any sort of burden on First Amendment rights. See Anderson, 460 U. S., at 789 (the Court will "identify and evaluate the pre- cise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule"); id., at 817 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (state laws that burden First Amendment rights are upheld when they are " `tied to a particularized legiti- mate purpose' ") (quoting Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752, 762 (1973)); Burdick, 504 U. S., at 434. Even if the State had put forward this interest to support its laws, it would not be sufficient to justify the fusion ban. In most States, perhaps in all, there are two and only two major political parties. It is not surprising, therefore, that most States have enacted election laws that impose burdens on the development and growth of third parties. The law at issue in this case is undeniably such a law. The fact that the law was both intended to disadvantage minor parties and has had that effect is a matter that should weigh against, rather than in favor of, its constitutionality.6 6 Indeed, "[a] burden that falls unequally on new or small political parties or on independent candidates impinges, by its very nature, on asso- ciational choices protected by the First Amendment." Anderson v. Cele- brezze, 460 U. S. 780, 793­794 (1983). I do not think it is irrelevant that when antifusion laws were passed by States all over the Nation in the latter part of the 1800's, these laws, characterized by the majority as "reforms," ante, at 356, were passed by "the parties in power in state legislatures . . . to squelch the threat posed by the opposition's combined voting force." McKenna, 73 F. 3d, at 198. See Argersinger, "A Place on the Ballot": Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws, 85 Am. Hist. Rev. 287, 302­306 (1980). Although the State is not required now to justify its laws with exclusive reference to the original purpose behind their passage, 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 351 (1997) 379 Stevens, J., dissenting Our jurisprudence in this area reflects a certain tension: On the one hand, we have been clear that political stability is an important state interest and that incidental burdens on the formation of minor parties are reasonable to protect that interest, see Storer, 415 U. S., at 736; on the other, we have struck down state elections laws specifically because they give "the two old, established parties a decided advantage over any new parties struggling for existence," Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 31 (1968).7 Between these boundaries, we have acknowledged that there is "no litmus-paper test for separating those restrictions that are valid from those that are invidious . . . . The rule is not self-executing and is no substitute for the hard judgments that must be made." Storer, 415 U. S., at 730. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the States from maintaining single-member districts with winner-take-all voting arrangements. And these elements of an election system do make it significantly more difficult for third par- ties to thrive. But these laws are different in two respects from the fusion bans at issue here. First, the method by which they hamper third-party development is not one that impinges on the associational rights of those third parties; minor parties remain free to nominate candidates of their choice, and to rally support for those candidates. The small parties' relatively limited likelihood of ultimate success on election day does not deprive them of the right to try. Sec- ond, the establishment of single-member districts correlates Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 70­71 (1983), this history does provide some indication of the kind of burden the States themselves believed they were imposing on the smaller parties' effective association. 7 In Anderson, the State argued that its interest in political stability justified the early filing deadline for Presidential candidates at issue in the case. We recognized that the "asserted interest in political stability amounts to a desire to protect existing political parties from competition," and rejected that interest. 460 U. S., at 801­802. 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN 380 TIMMONS v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY Stevens, J., dissenting directly with the States' interests in political stability. Sys- tems of proportional representation, for example, may tend toward factionalism and fragile coalitions that diminish legis- lative effectiveness. In the context of fusion candidacies, the risks to political stability are extremely attenuated.8 Of course, the reason minor parties so ardently support fusion politics is because it allows the parties to build up a greater base of support, as potential minor party members realize that a vote for the smaller party candidate is not necessarily a "wasted" vote. Eventually, a minor party might gather sufficient strength that-were its members so inclined-it could successfully run a candidate not endorsed by any major party, and legislative coalition building will be made more difficult by the presence of third-party legislators. But the risks to political stability in that scenario are speculative at best.9 In some respects, the fusion candidacy is the best marriage of the virtues of the minor party challenge to entrenched viewpoints 10 and the political stability that the two-party 8 Even in a system that allows fusion, a candidate for election must as- semble majority support, so the State's concern cannot logically be about risks to political stability in the particular election in which the fusion candidate is running. 9 In fact, Minnesota's expressed concern that fusion candidacies would stifle political diversity because minor parties would not put additional names on the ballot seems directly contradictory to the majority's imposed interest in the stable two-party system. The tension between the Court's rationale for its decision and the State's actually articulated interests is one of the reasons I do not believe the Court can legitimately consider interests not relied on by the State, especially in a context where the burden imposed and the interest justifying it must have some relationship. 10 "[A]s an outlet for frustration, often as a creative force and a sort of conscience, as an ideological governor to keep major parties from speed- ing off into an abyss of mindlessness, and even just as a technique for strengthening a group's bargaining position for the future, the minor party would have to be invented if it did not come into existence reg- ularly enough." A. Bickel, Reform and Continuity 80 (1971); see also 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 351 (1997) 381 Stevens, J., dissenting system provides. The fusion candidacy does not threaten to divide the legislature and create significant risks of factional- ism, which is the principal risk proponents of the two-party system point to. But it does provide a means by which vot- ers with viewpoints not adequately represented by the plat- forms of the two major parties can indicate to a particular candidate that-in addition to his support for the major party views-he should be responsive to the views of the minor party whose support for him was demonstrated where political parties demonstrate support-on the ballot. The strength of the two-party system-and of each of its major components-is the product of the power of the ideas, the traditions, the candidates, and the voters that constitute the parties.11 It demeans the strength of the two-party sys- tem to assume that the major parties need to rely on laws that discriminate against independent voters and minor par- ties in order to preserve their positions of power.12 Indeed, S. Rosenstone, R. Behr, & E. Lazarus, Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure 4­9 (1984). 11 The Court of Appeals recognized that fusion politics could have an important role in preserving this value when it struck down the fusion ban. "[R]ather than jeopardizing the integrity of the election system, consensual multiple party nomination may invigorate it by fostering more competition, participation, and representation in American politics." Mc- Kenna, 73 F. 3d, at 199. 12 The experience in New York with fusion politics provides considerable evidence that neither political stability nor the ultimate strength of the two major parties is truly risked by the existence of successful minor parties. More generally, "the presence of one or even two significant third parties has not led to a proliferation of parties, nor to the destruction of basic democratic institutions." Mazmanian 69; see also The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Independent Candidates and Minority Parties, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 162 (1983) ("American political stability does not depend on a two-party oligopoly. . . . [H]istorical experience in this country demon- strate[s] that minor parties and independent candidacies are compatible with long-term political stability. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that eliminating restrictions on political minorities would change the basic structure of the two-party system in this country"). 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN 382 TIMMONS v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY Souter, J., dissenting it is a central theme of our jurisprudence that the entire electorate, which necessarily includes the members of the major parties, will benefit from robust competition in ideas and governmental policies that " `is at the core of our elec- toral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.' " An- derson, 460 U. S., at 802, quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., at 32. In my opinion legislation that would otherwise be uncon- stitutional because it burdens First Amendment interests and discriminates against minor political parties cannot sur- vive simply because it benefits the two major parties. Ac- cordingly, I respectfully dissent. Justice Souter, dissenting. I join Parts I and II of Justice Stevens's dissent, agree- ing as I do that none of the concerns advanced by the State suffices to justify the burden of the challenged statutes on respondent's First Amendment interests. I also agree with Justice Stevens's view, set out in the first paragraph of Part III, that the State does not assert the interest in pre- serving "the traditional two-party system" upon which the majority repeatedly relies in upholding Minnesota's statutes, see, e. g., ante, at 367 ("The Constitution permits the Minne- sota Legislature to decide that political stability is best served through a healthy two-party system"). Actually, Minnesota's statement of the "important regulatory concerns advanced by the State's ban on ballot fusion," Brief for Peti- tioners 40, contains no reference whatsoever to the "two- party system," nor even any explicit reference to "political stability" generally. See id., at 40­50. To be sure, the State does assert its intention to prevent "party splintering," id., at 46­50, which may not be separa- ble in the abstract from a desire to preserve political stabil- 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 351 (1997) 383 Souter, J., dissenting ity.1 But in fact the State has less comprehensive concerns; the primary dangers posed by what it calls "major-party splintering and factionalism," id., at 47, are said to be those of "turn[ing] the general election ballot into a forum for venting intraparty squabbles," ibid., and reducing elections to "a thinly disguised ballot-issue campaign," id., at 49. No- where does the State even intimate that the splintering it wishes to avert might cause or hasten the demise of the two- party system. In these circumstances, neither the State's point about "splintering," nor its tentative reference to "po- litical stability" at oral argument, n. 1, infra, may fairly be assimilated to the interest posited by the Court of preserv- ing the "two-party system." Accordingly, because I agree with Justice Stevens, ante, at 378, that our election cases restrict our consideration to "the precise interests put for- ward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule," Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 789 (1983),2 I would judge the challenged statutes only on the interests the State has raised in their defense and would hold them unconstitutional. I am, however, unwilling to go the further distance of considering and rejecting the majority's "preservation of the two-party system" rationale. For while Minnesota has made no such argument before us, I cannot discount the pos- sibility of a forceful one. There is considerable consensus that party loyalty among American voters has declined significantly in the past four decades, see, e. g., W. Crotty, American Parties in Decline 26­34 (2d ed. 1984); Jensen, 1 Indeed, at oral argument, the State did hesitantly suggest that it "does have an interest, a generalized interest in preserving, in a sense, political stability . . . ." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. 2 See also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U. S. 761, 768 (1993) (explaining that the midlevel scrutiny that applies in commercial speech cases, which is similar to what we apply here, "[u]nlike rational-basis review . . . does not permit us to supplant the precise interests put forward by the State with other suppositions"). 520US2 Unit: $U45 [09-17-99 06:55:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN 384 TIMMONS v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY Souter, J., dissenting The Last Party System: Decay of Consensus, 1932­1980, in The Evolution of American Electoral Systems 219­225, (P. Kleppner et al. eds. 1981), and that the overall influence of the parties in the political process has decreased consider- ably, see, e. g., Cutler, Party Government Under the Ameri- can Constitution, 134 U. Penn. L. Rev. 25 (1987); Sundquist, Party Decay and the Capacity to Govern, in The Future of American Political Parties: The Challenge of Governance 42­69 (J. Fleishman ed. 1982). In the wake of such studies, it may not be unreasonable to infer that the two-party sys- tem is in some jeopardy. See, e. g., Lowi, N. Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1992, Magazine, p. 28 ("[H]istorians will undoubtably focus on 1992 as the beginning of the end of America's two- party system"). Surely the majority is right that States "have a strong interest in the stability of their political systems," ante, at 366, that is, in preserving a political system capable of gov- erning effectively. If it could be shown that the disappear- ance of the two-party system would undermine that interest, and that permitting fusion candidacies poses a substantial threat to the two-party scheme, there might well be a suffi- cient predicate for recognizing the constitutionality of the state action presented by this case. Right now, however, no State has attempted even to make this argument, and I would therefore leave its consideration for another day. 520US2 Unit: $U46 [09-10-99 18:36:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 385 Syllabus RICHARDS v. WISCONSIN certiorari to the supreme court of wisconsin No. 96­5955. Argued March 24, 1997-Decided April 28, 1997 In Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927, this Court held that the Fourth Amendment incorporates the common-law requirement that police knock on a dwelling's door and announce their identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry, recognized that the flexible reasonable- ness requirement should not be read to mandate a rigid announcement rule that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests, id., at 934, and left it to the lower courts to determine the circumstances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable. Id., at 936. Officers in Madison, Wisconsin, obtained a warrant to search petitioner Richards' motel room for drugs and related paraphernalia, but the Magistrate re- fused to give advance authorization for a "no-knock" entry. The officer who knocked on Richards' door was dressed, and identified himself, as a maintenance man. Upon opening the door, Richards also saw a uni- formed officer and quickly closed the door. The officers kicked down the door, caught Richards trying to escape, and found cash and cocaine in the bathroom. In denying Richards' motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the officers did not knock and announce their pres- ence before forcing entry, the trial court found that they could gather from Richards' strange behavior that he might try to destroy evidence or escape and that the drugs' disposable nature further justified their decision not to knock and announce. The State Supreme Court af- firmed, concluding that Wilson did not preclude the court's pre-Wilson per se rule that police officers are never required to knock and announce when executing a search warrant in a felony drug investigation because of the special circumstances of today's drug culture. Held:1. The Fourth Amendment does not permit a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations. While the requirement can give way under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence or where officers believe that evidence would be destroyed if advance notice were given, 514 U. S., at 936, the fact that felony drug investigations may frequently present such circumstances cannot remove from the neutral scrutiny of a reviewing court the rea- sonableness of the police decision not to knock and announce in a par- ticular case. Creating exceptions to the requirement based on the cul- ture surrounding a general category of criminal behavior presents at 520US2 Unit: $U46 [09-10-99 18:36:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN 386 RICHARDS v. WISCONSIN Syllabus least two serious concerns. First, the exception contains considerable overgeneralization that would impermissibly insulate from judicial re- view cases in which a drug investigation does not pose special risks. Second, creating an exception in one category can, relatively easily, be applied to others. If a per se exception were allowed for each criminal activity category that included a considerable risk of danger to officers or destruction of evidence, the knock-and-announce requirement would be meaningless. The court confronted with the question in each case has a duty to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the requirement. A "no- knock" entry is justified when the police have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular cir- cumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime. This standard strikes the appro- priate balance between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy interests affected by no-knock entries. Cf. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U. S. 325, 337. Pp. 391­395. 2. Because the evidence in this case establishes that the decision not to knock and announce was a reasonable one under the circumstances, the officers' entry into the motel room did not violate the Fourth Amendment. That the Magistrate had originally refused to issue a no- knock warrant means only that at the time the warrant was requested there was insufficient evidence for a no-knock entry. However, the of- ficers' decision to enter the room must be evaluated as of the time of entry. Pp. 395­396. 201 Wis. 2d 845, 549 N. W. 2d 218, affirmed. Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. David R. Karpe, by appointment of the Court, 519 U. S. 1106, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were John Wesley Hall, Jr., Henry R. Schultz, and Jack E. Schairer. James E. Doyle, Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Ste- phen W. Kleinmaier, Assistant Attorney General. Miguel A. Estrada argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. On the brief were Act- ing Solicitor General Dellinger, Acting Assistant Attorney 520US2 Unit: $U46 [09-10-99 18:36:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 385 (1997) 387 Opinion of the Court General Richard, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, James A. Feldman, and Deborah Watson.* Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. In Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927 (1995), we held that the Fourth Amendment incorporates the common-law re- quirement that police officers entering a dwelling must knock on the door and announce their identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry. At the same time, we recognized that the "flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests," id., at 934, and left "to the lower courts the task of determining the circum- stances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment," id., at 936. In this case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that police officers are never required to knock and announce their presence when executing a search warrant in a felony *Tracey Maclin, Steven R. Shapiro, and Lisa B. Kemler filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Ohio et al. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Jeffrey S. Sut- ton, State Solicitor, Simon B. Karas, and Diane R. Richards, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Gus F. Diaz of Guam, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, A. B. Chandler III of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Steven M. Houran of New Hampshire, Peter Verniero of New Jersey, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Jose Fuentes Agostini of Puerto Rico, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Charles Molony Condon of South Carolina, Mark W. Barnett of South Dakota, Jan Graham of Utah, and James Gilmore III of Virginia; and for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. by Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, Richard M. Weintraub, and Bernard J. Farber. 520US2 Unit: $U46 [09-10-99 18:36:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN 388 RICHARDS v. WISCONSIN Opinion of the Court drug investigation. In so doing, it reaffirmed a pre-Wilson holding and concluded that Wilson did not preclude this per se rule. We disagree with the court's conclusion that the Fourth Amendment permits a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for this entire category of criminal activity. But because the evidence presented to support the officers' actions in this case establishes that the decision not to knock and announce was a reasonable one under the circumstances, we affirm the judgment of the Wis- consin court. I On December 31, 1991, police officers in Madison, Wiscon- sin, obtained a warrant to search Steiney Richards' motel room for drugs and related paraphernalia. The search war- rant was the culmination of an investigation that had uncov- ered substantial evidence that Richards was one of several individuals dealing drugs out of hotel rooms in Madison. The police requested a warrant that would have given ad- vance authorization for a "no-knock" entry into the motel room, but the Magistrate explicitly deleted those portions of the warrant. App. 7, 9. The officers arrived at the motel room at 3:40 a.m. Officer Pharo, dressed as a maintenance man, led the team. With him were several plainclothes officers and at least one man in uniform. Officer Pharo knocked on Richards' door and, responding to the query from inside the room, stated that he was a maintenance man. With the chain still on the door, Richards cracked it open. Although there is some dispute as to what occurred next, Richards acknowledges that when he opened the door he saw the man in uniform standing behind Officer Pharo. Brief for Petitioner 6. He quickly slammed the door closed and, after waiting two or three sec- onds, the officers began kicking and ramming the door to gain entry to the locked room. At trial, the officers testified that they identified themselves as police while they were kicking the door in. App. 40. When they finally did break 520US2 Unit: $U46 [09-10-99 18:36:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 385 (1997) 389 Opinion of the Court into the room, the officers caught Richards trying to escape through the window. They also found cash and cocaine hid- den in plastic bags above the bathroom ceiling tiles. Richards sought to have the evidence from his motel room suppressed on the ground that the officers had failed to knock and announce their presence prior to forcing entry into the room. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the officers could gather from Richards' strange behav- ior when they first sought entry that he knew they were police officers and that he might try to destroy evidence or to escape. Id., at 54. The judge emphasized that the easily disposable nature of the drugs the police were searching for further justified their decision to identify themselves as they crossed the threshold instead of announcing their presence before seeking entry. Id., at 55. Richards appealed the decision to the Wisconsin Supreme Court and that court affirmed. 201 Wis. 2d 845, 549 N. W. 2d 218 (1996). The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not delve into the events underlying Richards' arrest in any detail, but ac- cepted the following facts: "[O]n December 31, 1991, police executed a search warrant for the motel room of the defend- ant seeking evidence of the felonious crime of Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance in violation of Wis. Stat. § 161.41(1m) (1991­92). They did not knock and announce prior to their entry. Drugs were seized." Id., at 849, 549 N. W. 2d, at 220. Assuming these facts, the court proceeded to consider whether our decision in Wilson required the court to aban- don its decision in State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 511 N. W. 2d 591 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U. S. 1102 (1995), which held that "when the police have a search warrant, supported by probable cause, to search a residence for evidence of delivery of drugs or evidence of possession with intent to deliver drugs, they necessarily have reasonable cause to believe exi- gent circumstances exist" to justify a no-knock entry. 201 Wis. 2d, at 852, 549 N. W. 2d, at 221. The court concluded 520US2 Unit: $U46 [09-10-99 18:36:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN 390 RICHARDS v. WISCONSIN Opinion of the Court that nothing in Wilson's acknowledgment that the knock- and-announce rule was an element of the Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" requirement would prohibit application of a per se exception to that rule in a category of cases. 201 Wis. 2d, at 854­855, 549 N. W. 2d, at 220. In reaching this conclusion, the Wisconsin court found it reasonable-after considering criminal conduct surveys, newspaper articles, and other judicial opinions-to assume that all felony drug crimes will involve "an extremely high risk of serious if not deadly injury to the police as well as the potential for the disposal of drugs by the occupants prior to entry by the police." Id., at 847­848, 549 N. W. 2d, at 219. Notwithstanding its acknowledgment that in "some cases, police officers will undoubtedly decide that their safety, the safety of others, and the effective execution of the warrant dictate that they knock and announce," id., at 863, 549 N. W. 2d, at 225, the court concluded that exigent circumstances justifying a no-knock entry are always present in felony drug cases. Further, the court reasoned that the violation of pri- vacy that occurs when officers who have a search warrant forcibly enter a residence without first announcing their presence is minimal, given that the residents would ulti- mately be without authority to refuse the police entry. The principal intrusion on individual privacy interests in such a situation, the court concluded, comes from the issuance of the search warrant, not the manner in which it is executed. Id., at 864­865, 549 N. W. 2d, at 226. Accordingly, the court de- termined that police in Wisconsin do not need specific infor- mation about dangerousness, or the possible destruction of drugs in a particular case, in order to dispense with the knock-and-announce requirement in felony drug cases.1 1 Several other state courts-in cases that predate our decision in Wil- son-have adopted similar rules, concluding that simple probable cause to search a home for narcotics always allows the police to forgo the knock- and-announce requirement. See, e. g., People v. Lujan, 484 P. 2d 1238, 1241 (Colo. 1971) (en banc); Henson v. State, 236 Md. 519, 523­524, 204 A. 520US2 Unit: $U46 [09-10-99 18:36:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 385 (1997) 391 Opinion of the Court Justice Abrahamson concurred in the judgment because, in her view, the facts found by the trial judge justified a no-knock entry. Id., at 866­868, 549 N. W. 2d, at 227. Spe- cifically, she noted that Richards' actions in slamming the door when he saw the uniformed man standing behind Offi- cer Pharo indicated that he already knew that the people knocking on his door were police officers. Under these cir- cumstances, any further announcement of their presence would have been a useless gesture. Id., at 868­869, n. 3, 549 N. W. 2d, at 228, n. 3. While agreeing with the outcome, Justice Abrahamson took issue with her colleagues' affirma- tion of the blanket exception to the knock-and-announce re- quirement in drug felony cases. She observed that the con- stitutional reasonableness of a search has generally been a matter left to the court, rather than to the officers who con- ducted the search, and she objected to the creation of a blan- ket rule that insulated searches in a particular category of crime from the neutral oversight of a reviewing judge. Id., at 868­875, 549 N. W. 2d, at 228­230. II We recognized in Wilson that the knock-and-announce re- quirement could give way "under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence," or "where police officers have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given." 514 U. S., at 936. It is indis- putable that felony drug investigations may frequently in- volve both of these circumstances.2 The question we must 2d 516, 519­520 (1964); State v. Loucks, 209 N. W. 2d 772, 777­778 (N. D. 1973). Cf. People v. De Lago, 16 N. Y. 2d 289, 292, 213 N. E. 2d 659, 661 (1965) (similar rule for searches related to gambling operations), cert. de- nied, 383 U. S. 963 (1966). 2 This Court has encountered before the links between drugs and vio- lence, see, e. g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 702 (1981), and the likelihood that drug dealers will attempt to dispose of drugs before police seize them, see, e. g., Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 28, n. 3 (1963). 520US2 Unit: $U46 [09-10-99 18:36:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN 392 RICHARDS v. WISCONSIN Opinion of the Court resolve is whether this fact justifies dispensing with case- by-case evaluation of the manner in which a search was executed.3 The Wisconsin court explained its blanket exception as ne- cessitated by the special circumstances of today's drug cul- ture, 201 Wis. 2d, at 863­866, 549 N. W. 2d, at 226­227, and the State asserted at oral argument that the blanket excep- tion was reasonable in "felony drug cases because of the con- vergence in a violent and dangerous form of commerce of weapons and the destruction of drugs." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. But creating exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule based on the "culture" surrounding a general category of criminal behavior presents at least two serious concerns.4 3 Although our decision in Wilson did not address this issue directly, it is instructive that in that case-which involved a felony drug investiga- tion-we remanded to the state court for further factual development to determine whether the no-knock entry was reasonable under the circum- stances of the case. Two amicus briefs in Wilson suggested that we adopt just the sort of per se rule the Wisconsin court propounded here. Brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 10­11, Brief for Wayne County, Michigan, as Amicus Curiae 39­ 46, in Wilson v. Arkansas, O. T. 1994, No. 5707. Although the respondent did not argue for a categorical rule, the petitioner, in her reply brief, did address the arguments put forward by the amicus briefs, Reply Brief for Petitioner in Wilson v. Arkansas, O. T. 1994, No. 5707, p. 11, and amici supporting the petitioner also presented arguments against a categorical rule. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae in Wilson v. Arkansas, O. T. 1994, No. 5707, p. 29, n. 44. Thus, while the prospect of a categorical rule was one to which we were alerted in Wilson, we did not choose to adopt such a rule at that time. 4 It is always somewhat dangerous to ground exceptions to constitutional protections in the social norms of a given historical moment. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonableness "is to preserve that degree of respect for the privacy of persons and the inviolability of their property that existed when the provision was adopted-even if a later, less virtuous age should become accustomed to considering all sorts of intrusion `reasonable.' " Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U. S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 520US2 Unit: $U46 [09-10-99 18:36:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 385 (1997) 393 Opinion of the Court First, the exception contains considerable overgeneraliza- tion. For example, while drug investigation frequently does pose special risks to officer safety and the preservation of evidence, not every drug investigation will pose these risks to a substantial degree. For example, a search could be con- ducted at a time when the only individuals present in a resi- dence have no connection with the drug activity and thus will be unlikely to threaten officers or destroy evidence. Or the police could know that the drugs being searched for were of a type or in a location that made them impossible to de- stroy quickly. In those situations, the asserted governmen- tal interests in preserving evidence and maintaining safety may not outweigh the individual privacy interests intruded upon by a no-knock entry.5 Wisconsin's blanket rule imper- missibly insulates these cases from judicial review. A second difficulty with permitting a criminal-category ex- ception to the knock-and-announce requirement is that the 5 The State asserts that the intrusion on individual interests effectuated by a no-knock entry is minimal because the execution of the warrant itself constitutes the primary intrusion on individual privacy and that the indi- vidual privacy interest cannot outweigh the generalized governmental in- terest in effective and safe law enforcement. Brief for Respondent 21­24. See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16 ("occupants' privacy interest is necessarily limited to the brief interval between the officers' announcement and their entry"). While it is true that a no-knock entry is less intrusive than, for example, a warrantless search, the individual interests implicated by an unannounced, forcible entry should not be un- duly minimized. As we observed in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927, 930­932 (1995), the common law recognized that individuals should be provided the opportunity to comply with the law and to avoid the destruc- tion of property occasioned by a forcible entry. These interests are not inconsequential. Additionally, when police enter a residence without announcing their presence, the residents are not given any opportunity to prepare them- selves for such an entry. The State pointed out at oral argument that, in Wisconsin, most search warrants are executed during the late night and early morning hours. Tr. of Oral Arg. 24. The brief interlude between announcement and entry with a warrant may be the opportunity that an individual has to pull on clothes or get out of bed. 520US2 Unit: $U46 [09-10-99 18:36:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN 394 RICHARDS v. WISCONSIN Opinion of the Court reasons for creating an exception in one category can, relatively easily, be applied to others. Armed bank robbers, for example, are, by definition, likely to have weapons, and the fruits of their crime may be destroyed without too much difficulty. If a per se exception were allowed for each category of criminal investigation that included a consider- able-albeit hypothetical-risk of danger to officers or de- struction of evidence, the knock-and-announce element of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement would be meaningless. Thus, the fact that felony drug investigations may fre- quently present circumstances warranting a no-knock entry cannot remove from the neutral scrutiny of a reviewing court the reasonableness of the police decision not to knock and announce in a particular case. Instead, in each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to deter- mine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement. In order to justify a "no-knock" entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dan- gerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investi- gation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence. This standard-as opposed to a probable-cause requirement-strikes the appropriate balance between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execu- tion of search warrants and the individual privacy interests affected by no-knock entries. Cf. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U. S. 325, 337 (1990) (allowing a protective sweep of a house during an arrest where the officers have "a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 30 (1968) (requiring a reasonable and articulable suspicion of danger to justify a patdown search). This showing is not high, but the police 520US2 Unit: $U46 [09-10-99 18:36:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 385 (1997) 395 Opinion of the Court should be required to make it whenever the reasonableness of a no-knock entry is challenged. III Although we reject the Wisconsin court's blanket excep- tion to the knock-and-announce requirement, we conclude that the officers' no-knock entry into Richards' motel room did not violate the Fourth Amendment. We agree with the trial court, and with Justice Abrahamson, that the circum- stances in this case show that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that Richards might destroy evidence if given fur- ther opportunity to do so.6 The judge who heard testimony at Richards' suppression hearing concluded that it was reasonable for the officers exe- cuting the warrant to believe that Richards knew, after open- ing the door to his motel room the first time, that the men seeking entry to his room were the police. App. 54. Once the officers reasonably believed that Richards knew who they were, the court concluded, it was reasonable for them to force entry immediately given the disposable nature of the drugs. Id., at 55. In arguing that the officers' entry was unreasonable, Rich- ards places great emphasis on the fact that the Magistrate who signed the search warrant for his motel room deleted the portions of the proposed warrant that would have given the officers permission to execute a no-knock entry. But this fact does not alter the reasonableness of the officers' deci- sion, which must be evaluated as of the time they entered the motel room. At the time the officers obtained the war- rant, they did not have evidence sufficient, in the judgment of the Magistrate, to justify a no-knock warrant. Of course, 6 We note that the attorneys general of 26 States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Territory of Guam filed an amicus brief taking the position that the officers' decision was reasonable under the specific facts of this case, but rejecting Wisconsin's per se rule. See Brief for Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae. 520US2 Unit: $U46 [09-10-99 18:36:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN 396 RICHARDS v. WISCONSIN Opinion of the Court the Magistrate could not have anticipated in every particu- lar the circumstances that would confront the officers when they arrived at Richards' motel room.7 These actual cir- cumstances-petitioner's apparent recognition of the officers combined with the easily disposable nature of the drugs- justified the officers' ultimate decision to enter without first announcing their presence and authority. Accordingly, although we reject the blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investi- gations, the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is affirmed. It is so ordered. 7 A number of States give magistrate judges the authority to issue "no- knock" warrants if the officers demonstrate ahead of time a reasonable suspicion that entry without prior announcement will be appropriate in a particular context. See, e. g., 725 Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, § 5/108­8 (1992); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29­411 (1995); Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, § 1228 (Supp. 1997); S. D. Codified Laws § 23A­35­9 (1988); Utah Code Ann. § 77­23­210 (1995). But see State v. Arce, 83 Ore. App. 185, 730 P. 2d 1260 (1986) (magistrate has no authority to abrogate knock-and-announce requirement); State v. Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1994) (same). The practice of allowing magistrates to issue no-knock warrants seems entirely reasonable when sufficient cause to do so can be demonstrated ahead of time. But, as the facts of this case demonstrate, a magistrate's decision not to authorize a no-knock entry should not be interpreted to remove the officers' authority to exercise independent judgment concern- ing the wisdom of a no-knock entry at the time the warrant is being executed. 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 397 Syllabus BOARD OF THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BRYAN COUNTY, OKLAHOMA v. BROWN et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit No. 95­1100. Argued November 5, 1996-Decided April 28, 1997 Jill Brown (hereinafter respondent) brought this 42 U. S. C. § 1983 dam- ages action against petitioner county, alleging, among other things, that its Deputy Burns had arrested her with excessive force, and that it was liable for her injuries because its Sheriff Moore had hired Burns without adequately reviewing his background. Burns had pleaded guilty to various driving infractions and other misdemeanors, including assault and battery. Moore, whom the county stipulated was its Sheriff's De- partment policymaker, testified that he had obtained Burns' driving and criminal records, but had not closely reviewed either before hiring Burns. The District Court denied the county's motions for judgment as a matter of law, which asserted that a policymaker's single hiring decision could not give rise to § 1983 municipal liability. Respondent prevailed following a jury trial, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the county was properly found liable based on Moore's decision to hire Burns. Held: The county is not liable for Sheriff Moore's isolated decision to hire Burns without adequate screening, because respondent has not demon- strated that the decision reflected a conscious disregard for a high risk that Burns would use excessive force in violation of respondent's feder- ally protected right. Pp. 402­416. (a) A municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor, see, e. g., Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 692. Instead, the plaintiff must identify a municipal "policy" or "custom" that caused the injury. See, e. g., Pem- baur v. Cincinnati, 475 U. S. 469, 480­481. Contrary to respondent's contention, a "policy" giving rise to liability cannot be established merely by identifying a policymaker's conduct that is properly attribut- able to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the "moving force" behind the injury alleged. See Monell, supra, at 694. That is, a plain- tiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights. Pp. 402­404. 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 398 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Syllabus (b) Respondent's claim that a policymaker's single facially lawful hir- ing decision can trigger municipal liability presents difficult problems of proof. This Court has recognized a § 1983 cause of action based on a single decision attributable to a municipality only where the evidence that the municipality had acted and that the plaintiff had suffered a deprivation of federal rights also proved fault and causation. See, e. g., Pembaur, supra, at 481. In relying heavily on Pembaur, respondent blurs the distinction between § 1983 cases that present no difficult fault and causation questions and those that do. Claims such as the present, which do not involve an allegation that the municipal action itself vio- lated federal law or directed or authorized the deprivation of federal rights, require application of rigorous culpability and causation stand- ards in order to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for its employees' actions. In Canton v. Harris, 489 U. S. 378, for example, the Court held that a plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability on the theory that a facially lawful municipal action-there, an allegedly inadequate training program-has led an employee to violate a plain- tiff's rights must demonstrate that the municipal action was not simply negligent, but was taken with "deliberate indifference" as to its known or obvious consequences. Id., at 388. Respondent's reliance on Can- ton for an analogy between failure-to-train cases and inadequate screen- ing cases is not persuasive. In leaving open the possibility that munici- pal liability could be triggered by evidence of a single violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that the municipality has failed to train its employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation, id., at 390, and n. 10, the Can- ton Court simply hypothesized that, in this narrow range of circum- stances, the violation may be a highly predictable consequence of the failure to train and thereby justify a finding of "deliberate indifference" by policymakers. Predicting the consequence of a single hiring deci- sion, even one based on an inadequate assessment of a record, is far more difficult. Only where adequate scrutiny of the applicant's back- ground would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would be the deprivation of a third party's federally protected right can the official's failure to adequately scrutinize the applicant's background constitute "deliberate indifference." Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals directly tested whether Burns' background made his use of excessive force in making an arrest a plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision. Pp. 404­412. (c) Even assuming without deciding that proof of a single instance of inadequate screening could ever trigger municipal liability, Moore's fail- ure to scrutinize Burns' record cannot constitute "deliberate indiffer- 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 399 Opinion of the Court ence" to respondent's federally protected right to be free from the use of excessive force. To test the link between Moore's action and re- spondent's injury, it must be asked whether a full review of Burns' rec- ord reveals that Moore should have concluded that Burns' use of exces- sive force would be a plainly obvious consequence of his decision to hire Burns. Respondent's showing on this point was inadequate because the primary infractions on which she relies to prove Burns' propensity for violence arose from a single college fight. A full review of Burns' rec- ord might well have led Moore to conclude that Burns was an extremely poor deputy candidate, but he would not necessarily have reached that decision because Burns' use of excessive force would have been a plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire him. The District Court therefore erred in submitting the inadequate screening theory to the jury. Pp. 412­415. 67 F. 3d 1174, vacated and remanded. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 416. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 430. Wallace B. Jefferson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Sharon E. Callaway. Bryan J. Serr argued the cause for respondent Brown. With him on the brief were J. Kermit Hill and Duke Walker.* Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent Jill Brown brought a claim for damages against petitioner Bryan County under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. She alleged that a county police officer used *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the City of New York by Paul A. Crotty, Leonard J. Koerner, and John Hogrogian; for the National Association of Counties et al. by Richard Ruda, James I. Crow- ley, and Donald B. Ayer; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp. Ogden N. Lewis, James D. Liss, Vincent T. Chang, Michele S. Warman, and Martha Davis filed a brief for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 400 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Opinion of the Court excessive force in arresting her, and that the county itself was liable for her injuries based on its sheriff's hiring and training decisions. She prevailed on her claims against the county following a jury trial, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment against the county on the basis of the hiring claim alone. 67 F. 3d 1174 (1995). We granted certiorari. We conclude that the Court of Ap- peals' decision cannot be squared with our recognition that, in enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to impose liability on a municipality unless deliberate action attributable to the municipality itself is the "moving force" behind the plaintiff's deprivation of federal rights. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 694 (1978). I In the early morning hours of May 12, 1991, Jill Brown (hereinafter respondent) and her husband were driving from Grayson County, Texas, to their home in Bryan County, Okla- homa. After crossing into Oklahoma, they approached a police checkpoint. Mr. Brown, who was driving, decided to avoid the checkpoint and return to Texas. After seeing the Browns' truck turn away from the checkpoint, Bryan County Deputy Sheriff Robert Morrison and Reserve Deputy Stacy Burns pursued the vehicle. Although the parties' versions of events differ, at trial both deputies claimed that their patrol car reached speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour. Mr. Brown testified that he was unaware of the deputies' attempts to overtake him. The chase finally ended four miles south of the police checkpoint. After he got out of the squad car, Deputy Sheriff Morrison pointed his gun toward the Browns' vehicle and ordered the Browns to raise their hands. Reserve Deputy Burns, who was unarmed, rounded the corner of the vehicle on the pas- senger's side. Burns twice ordered respondent from the ve- hicle. When she did not exit, he used an "arm bar" tech- nique, grabbing respondent's arm at the wrist and elbow, 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 401 Opinion of the Court pulling her from the vehicle, and spinning her to the ground. Respondent's knees were severely injured, and she later underwent corrective surgery. Ultimately, she may need knee replacements. Respondent sought compensation for her injuries under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and state law from Burns, Bryan County Sher- iff B. J. Moore, and the county itself. Respondent claimed, among other things, that Bryan County was liable for Burns' alleged use of excessive force based on Sheriff Moore's deci- sion to hire Burns, the son of his nephew. Specifically, re- spondent claimed that Sheriff Moore had failed to adequately review Burns' background. Burns had a record of driving infractions and had pleaded guilty to various driving-related and other misdemeanors, including assault and battery, re- sisting arrest, and public drunkenness. Oklahoma law does not preclude the hiring of an individual who has committed a misdemeanor to serve as a peace officer. See Okla. Stat., Tit. 70, § 3311(D)(2)(a) (1991) (requiring that the hiring agency certify that the prospective officer's records do not reflect a felony conviction). At trial, Sheriff Moore testified that he had obtained Burns' driving record and a report on Burns from the National Crime Information Center, but had not closely reviewed either. Sheriff Moore authorized Burns to make arrests, but not to carry a weapon or to oper- ate a patrol car. In a ruling not at issue here, the District Court dismissed respondent's § 1983 claim against Sheriff Moore prior to trial. App. 28. Counsel for Bryan County stipulated that Sheriff Moore "was the policy maker for Bryan County regarding the Sheriff's Department." Id., at 30. At the close of re- spondent's case and again at the close of all of the evidence, Bryan County moved for judgment as a matter of law. As to respondent's claim that Sheriff Moore's decision to hire Burns triggered municipal liability, the county argued that a single hiring decision by a municipal policymaker could not give rise to municipal liability under § 1983. Id., at 59­60. 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 402 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Opinion of the Court The District Court denied the county's motions. The court also overruled the county's objections to jury instructions on the § 1983 claim against the county. Id., at 125­126, 132. To resolve respondent's claims, the jury was asked to answer several interrogatories. The jury concluded that Stacy Burns had arrested respondent without probable cause and had used excessive force, and therefore found him liable for respondent's injuries. It also found that the "hiring pol- icy" and the "training policy" of Bryan County "in the case of Stacy Burns as instituted by its policymaker, B. J. Moore," were each "so inadequate as to amount to deliberate indiffer- ence to the constitutional needs of the Plaintiff." Id., at 135. The District Court entered judgment for respondent on the issue of Bryan County's § 1983 liability. The county ap- pealed on several grounds, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 67 F. 3d 1174 (1995). The court held, among other things, that Bryan County was properly found liable under § 1983 based on Sheriff Moore's decision to hire Burns. Id., at 1185. The court addressed only those points that it thought merited review; it did not address the jury's determination of county liability based on inadequate training of Burns, id., at 1178, nor do we. We granted cer- tiorari, 517 U. S. 1154 (1996), to decide whether the county was properly held liable for respondent's injuries based on Sheriff Moore's single decision to hire Burns. We now reverse. II Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides in relevant part: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi- nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Ter- ritory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party in- 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 403 Opinion of the Court jured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." We held in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S., at 689, that municipalities and other local govern- mental bodies are "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. We also recognized that a municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. Our conclusion rested partly on the language of § 1983 itself. In light of the statute's imposition of liability on one who "sub- jects [a person], or causes [that person] to be subjected," to a deprivation of federal rights, we concluded that it "cannot be easily read to impose liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an employer- employee relationship with a tortfeasor." Id., at 692. Our conclusion also rested upon the statute's legislative history. As stated in Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U. S. 469, 479 (1986), "while Congress never questioned its power to im- pose civil liability on municipalities for their own illegal acts, Congress did doubt its constitutional power to impose such liability in order to oblige municipalities to control the con- duct of others" (citing Monell, supra, at 665­683). We have consistently refused to hold municipalities liable under a the- ory of respondeat superior. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808, 818 (1985) (plurality opinion); id., at 828 (opin- ion of Brennan, J.); Pembaur, supra, at 478­479; St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U. S. 112, 122 (1988) (plurality opinion); id., at 137 (opinion of Brennan, J.); Canton v. Harris, 489 U. S. 378, 392 (1989). Instead, in Monell and subsequent cases, we have required a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 to identify a municipal "policy" or "custom" that caused the plaintiff's injury. See Monell, supra, at 694; Pembaur, supra, at 480­481; Canton, supra, at 389. Locat- ing a "policy" ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 404 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Opinion of the Court may fairly be said to be those of the municipality. Monell, supra, at 694. Similarly, an act performed pursuant to a "custom" that has not been formally approved by an appro- priate decisionmaker may fairly subject a municipality to lia- bility on the theory that the relevant practice is so wide- spread as to have the force of law. 436 U. S., at 690­691 (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 167­168 (1970)). The parties join issue on whether, under Monell and sub- sequent cases, a single hiring decision by a county sheriff can be a "policy" that triggers municipal liability. Relying on our decision in Pembaur, respondent claims that a single act by a decisionmaker with final authority in the relevant area constitutes a "policy" attributable to the municipality itself. So long as a § 1983 plaintiff identifies a decision prop- erly attributable to the municipality, respondent argues, there is no risk of imposing respondeat superior liability. Whether that decision was intended to govern only the situa- tion at hand or to serve as a rule to be applied over time is immaterial. Rather, under respondent's theory, identifica- tion of an act of a proper municipal decisionmaker is all that is required to ensure that the municipality is held liable only for its own conduct. The Court of Appeals accepted re- spondent's approach. As our § 1983 municipal liability jurisprudence illustrates, however, it is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to iden- tify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the "moving force" behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the mu- nicipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpa- bility and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights. Where a plaintiff claims that a particular municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to do so, resolving these issues of fault and causation is straightfor- 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 405 Opinion of the Court ward. Section 1983 itself "contains no state-of-mind re- quirement independent of that necessary to state a violation" of the underlying federal right. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 330 (1986). In any § 1983 suit, however, the plain- tiff must establish the state of mind required to prove the underlying violation. Accordingly, proof that a municipali- ty's legislative body or authorized decisionmaker has inten- tionally deprived a plaintiff of a federally protected right necessarily establishes that the municipality acted culpably. Similarly, the conclusion that the action taken or directed by the municipality or its authorized decisionmaker itself vio- lates federal law will also determine that the municipal ac- tion was the moving force behind the injury of which the plaintiff complains. Sheriff Moore's hiring decision was itself legal, and Sheriff Moore did not authorize Burns to use excessive force. Re- spondent's claim, rather, is that a single facially lawful hiring decision can launch a series of events that ultimately cause a violation of federal rights. Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but none- theless has caused an employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee. See Canton, supra, at 391­392; Tuttle, supra, at 824 (plurality opinion). See also Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U. S. 257, 270­271 (1987) (per curiam) (dissent from dis- missal of writ as improvidently granted). In relying heavily on Pembaur, respondent blurs the dis- tinction between § 1983 cases that present no difficult ques- tions of fault and causation and those that do. To the extent that we have recognized a cause of action under § 1983 based on a single decision attributable to a municipality, we have done so only where the evidence that the municipality had acted and that the plaintiff had suffered a deprivation of fed- eral rights also proved fault and causation. For example, Owen v. Independence, 445 U. S. 622 (1980), and Newport v. 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 406 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Opinion of the Court Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247 (1981), involved formal de- cisions of municipal legislative bodies. In Owen, the city council allegedly censured and discharged an employee with- out a hearing. 445 U. S., at 627­629, 633, and n. 13. In Fact Concerts, the city council canceled a license permitting a con- cert following a dispute over the performance's content. 453 U. S., at 252. Neither decision reflected implementation of a generally applicable rule. But we did not question that each decision, duly promulgated by city lawmakers, could trigger municipal liability if the decision itself were found to be unconstitutional. Because fault and causation were obvi- ous in each case, proof that the municipality's decision was unconstitutional would suffice to establish that the munici- pality itself was liable for the plaintiff's constitutional injury. Similarly, Pembaur v. Cincinnati concerned a decision by a county prosecutor, acting as the county's final decision- maker, 475 U. S., at 485, to direct county deputies to forcibly enter petitioner's place of business to serve capiases upon third parties. Relying on Owen and Newport, we concluded that a final decisionmaker's adoption of a course of action "tailored to a particular situation and not intended to control decisions in later situations" may, in some circumstances, give rise to municipal liability under § 1983. 475 U. S., at 481. In Pembaur, it was not disputed that the prosecutor had specifically directed the action resulting in the depriva- tion of petitioner's rights. The conclusion that the decision was that of a final municipal decisionmaker and was there- fore properly attributable to the municipality established municipal liability. No questions of fault or causation arose. Claims not involving an allegation that the municipal ac- tion itself violated federal law, or directed or authorized the deprivation of federal rights, present much more difficult problems of proof. That a plaintiff has suffered a depriva- tion of federal rights at the hands of a municipal employee will not alone permit an inference of municipal culpability and causation; the plaintiff will simply have shown that the 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 407 Opinion of the Court employee acted culpably. We recognized these difficulties in Canton v. Harris, where we considered a claim that inade- quate training of shift supervisors at a city jail led to a depri- vation of a detainee's constitutional rights. We held that, quite apart from the state of mind required to establish the underlying constitutional violation-in that case, a violation of due process, 489 U. S., at 388­389, n. 8-a plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability on the theory that a facially lawful municipal action has led an employee to violate a plaintiff's rights must demonstrate that the municipal action was taken with "deliberate indifference" as to its known or obvious consequences. Id., at 388. A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice. We concluded in Canton that an "inadequate training" claim could be the basis for § 1983 liability in "limited circum- stances." Id., at 387. We spoke, however, of a deficient training "program," necessarily intended to apply over time to multiple employees. Id., at 390. Existence of a "pro- gram" makes proof of fault and causation at least possible in an inadequate training case. If a program does not pre- vent constitutional violations, municipal decisionmakers may eventually be put on notice that a new program is called for. Their continued adherence to an approach that they know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by em- ployees may establish the conscious disregard for the conse- quences of their action-the "deliberate indifference"-nec- essary to trigger municipal liability. Id., at 390, n. 10 ("It could . . . be that the police, in exercising their discretion, so often violate constitutional rights that the need for further training must have been plainly obvious to the city policy- makers, who, nevertheless, are `deliberately indifferent' to the need"); id., at 397 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[M]unicipal liability for failure to train may be proper where it can be shown that policymakers were aware of, and acquiesced in, a pattern of constitutional violations . . ."). In addition, the existence of a pattern of 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 408 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Opinion of the Court tortious conduct by inadequately trained employees may tend to show that the lack of proper training, rather than a one-time negligent administration of the program or factors peculiar to the officer involved in a particular incident, is the "moving force" behind the plaintiff's injury. See id., at 390­391. Before trial, counsel for Bryan County stipulated that Sheriff Moore "was the policy maker for Bryan County re- garding the Sheriff's Department." App. 30. Indeed, the county sought to avoid liability by claiming that its Board of Commissioners participated in no policy decisions regarding the conduct and operation of the office of the Bryan County Sheriff. Id., at 32. Accepting the county's representations below, then, this case presents no difficult questions concern- ing whether Sheriff Moore has final authority to act for the municipality in hiring matters. Cf. Jett v. Dallas Independ- ent School Dist., 491 U. S. 701 (1989); St. Louis v. Praprot- nik, 485 U. S. 112 (1988). Respondent does not claim that she can identify any pattern of injuries linked to Sheriff Moore's hiring practices. Indeed, respondent does not con- tend that Sheriff Moore's hiring practices are generally de- fective. The only evidence on this point at trial suggested that Sheriff Moore had adequately screened the backgrounds of all prior deputies he hired. App. 106­110. Respondent instead seeks to trace liability to what can only be described as a deviation from Sheriff Moore's ordinary hiring practices. Where a claim of municipal liability rests on a single decision, not itself representing a violation of federal law and not di- recting such a violation, the danger that a municipality will be held liable without fault is high. Because the decision necessarily governs a single case, there can be no notice to the municipal decisionmaker, based on previous violations of federally protected rights, that his approach is inadequate. Nor will it be readily apparent that the municipality's action caused the injury in question, because the plaintiff can point to no other incident tending to make it more likely that the 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 409 Opinion of the Court plaintiff's own injury flows from the municipality's action, rather than from some other intervening cause. In Canton, we did not foreclose the possibility that evi- dence of a single violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that a municipality has failed to train its employ- ees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious po- tential for such a violation, could trigger municipal liability. 489 U. S., at 390, and n. 10 ("[I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious . . . that the poli- cymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need"). Respondent purports to rely on Canton, arguing that Burns' use of excessive force was the plainly obvious consequence of Sheriff Moore's fail- ure to screen Burns' record. In essence, respondent claims that this showing of "obviousness" would demonstrate both that Sheriff Moore acted with conscious disregard for the consequences of his action and that the Sheriff's action di- rectly caused her injuries, and would thus substitute for the pattern of injuries ordinarily necessary to establish munici- pal culpability and causation. The proffered analogy between failure-to-train cases and inadequate screening cases is not persuasive. In leaving open in Canton the possibility that a plaintiff might succeed in carrying a failure-to-train claim without showing a pattern of constitutional violations, we simply hypothesized that, in a narrow range of circumstances, a violation of federal rights may be a highly predictable consequence of a failure to equip law enforcement officers with specific tools to handle recur- ring situations. The likelihood that the situation will recur and the predictability that an officer lacking specific tools to handle that situation will violate citizens' rights could justify a finding that policymakers' decision not to train the officer reflected "deliberate indifference" to the obvious conse- quence of the policymakers' choice-namely, a violation of a specific constitutional or statutory right. The high degree 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 410 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Opinion of the Court of predictability may also support an inference of causation- that the municipality's indifference led directly to the very consequence that was so predictable. Where a plaintiff presents a § 1983 claim premised upon the inadequacy of an official's review of a prospective appli- cant's record, however, there is a particular danger that a municipality will be held liable for an injury not directly caused by a deliberate action attributable to the municipality itself. Every injury suffered at the hands of a municipal em- ployee can be traced to a hiring decision in a "but-for" sense: But for the municipality's decision to hire the employee, the plaintiff would not have suffered the injury. To prevent mu- nicipal liability for a hiring decision from collapsing into re- spondeat superior liability, a court must carefully test the link between the policymaker's inadequate decision and the particular injury alleged. In attempting to import the reasoning of Canton into the hiring context, respondent ignores the fact that predicting the consequence of a single hiring decision, even one based on an inadequate assessment of a record, is far more difficult than predicting what might flow from the failure to train a single law enforcement officer as to a specific skill necessary to the discharge of his duties. As our decision in Canton makes clear, "deliberate indifference" is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action. Unlike the risk from a particular glaring omission in a training regimen, the risk from a single instance of inadequate screening of an ap- plicant's background is not "obvious" in the abstract; rather, it depends upon the background of the applicant. A lack of scrutiny may increase the likelihood that an unfit officer will be hired, and that the unfit officer will, when placed in a particular position to affect the rights of citizens, act improp- erly. But that is only a generalized showing of risk. The fact that inadequate scrutiny of an applicant's background would make a violation of rights more likely cannot alone 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 411 Opinion of the Court give rise to an inference that a policymaker's failure to scru- tinize the record of a particular applicant produced a specific constitutional violation. After all, a full screening of an ap- plicant's background might reveal no cause for concern at all; if so, a hiring official who failed to scrutinize the applicant's background cannot be said to have consciously disregarded an obvious risk that the officer would subsequently inflict a particular constitutional injury. We assume that a jury could properly find in this case that Sheriff Moore's assessment of Burns' background was inade- quate. Sheriff Moore's own testimony indicated that he did not inquire into the underlying conduct or the disposition of any of the misdemeanor charges reflected on Burns' record before hiring him. But this showing of an instance of inade- quate screening is not enough to establish "deliberate indif- ference." In layman's terms, inadequate screening of an ap- plicant's record may reflect "indifference" to the applicant's background. For purposes of a legal inquiry into municipal liability under § 1983, however, that is not the relevant "in- difference." A plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal decision reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a vio- lation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will follow the decision. Only where adequate scrutiny of an ap- plicant's background would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would be the deprivation of a third par- ty's federally protected right can the official's failure to ade- quately scrutinize the applicant's background constitute "de- liberate indifference." Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals di- rectly tested the link between Burns' actual background and the risk that, if hired, he would use excessive force. The District Court instructed the jury on a theory analogous to that reserved in Canton. The court required respondent to prove that Sheriff Moore's inadequate screening of Burns' background was "so likely to result in violations of constitu- 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 412 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Opinion of the Court tional rights" that the Sheriff could "reasonably [be] said to have been deliberately indifferent to the constitutional needs of the Plaintiff." App. 123 (emphasis added). The court also instructed the jury, without elaboration, that re- spondent was required to prove that the "inadequate hiring . . . policy directly caused the Plaintiff's injury." Ibid. As discussed above, a finding of culpability simply cannot depend on the mere probability that any officer inadequately screened will inflict any constitutional injury. Rather, it must depend on a finding that this officer was highly likely to inflict the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff. The connection between the background of the particular appli- cant and the specific constitutional violation alleged must be strong. What the District Court's instructions on culpabil- ity, and therefore the jury's finding of municipal liability, failed to capture is whether Burns' background made his use of excessive force in making an arrest a plainly obvious con- sequence of the hiring decision. The Court of Appeals' af- firmance of the jury's finding of municipal liability depended on its view that the jury could have found that "inadequate screening of a deputy could likely result in the violation of citizens' constitutional rights." 67 F. 3d, at 1185 (emphasis added). Beyond relying on a risk of violations of unspecified constitutional rights, the Court of Appeals also posited that Sheriff Moore's decision reflected indifference to "the pub- lic's welfare." Id., at 1184. Even assuming without deciding that proof of a single in- stance of inadequate screening could ever trigger municipal liability, the evidence in this case was insufficient to support a finding that, in hiring Burns, Sheriff Moore disregarded a known or obvious risk of injury. To test the link between Sheriff Moore's hiring decision and respondent's injury, we must ask whether a full review of Burns' record reveals that Sheriff Moore should have concluded that Burns' use of ex- cessive force would be a plainly obvious consequence of the 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 413 Opinion of the Court hiring decision.1 On this point, respondent's showing was inadequate. To be sure, Burns' record reflected various misdemeanor infractions. Respondent claims that the rec- ord demonstrated such a strong propensity for violence that Burns' application of excessive force was highly likely. The primary charges on which respondent relies, however, are those arising from a fight on a college campus where Burns was a student. In connection with this single incident, Burns was charged with assault and battery, resisting arrest, and public drunkenness.2 In January 1990, when he pleaded 1 In suggesting that our decision complicates this Court's § 1983 munici- pal liability jurisprudence by altering the understanding of culpability, Justice Souter and Justice Breyer misunderstand our approach. Post, at 422; post, at 430, 433­434. We do not suggest that a plaintiff in an inadequate screening case must show a higher degree of culpability than the "deliberate indifference" required in Canton v. Harris, 489 U. S. 378 (1989); we need not do so, because, as discussed below, respondent has not made a showing of deliberate indifference here. See infra this page and 414. Furthermore, in assessing the risks of a decision to hire a partic- ular individual, we draw no distinction between what is "so obvious" or "so likely to occur" and what is "plainly obvious." The difficulty with the lower courts' approach is that it fails to connect the background of the particular officer hired in this case to the particular constitutional violation the respondent suffered. Supra, at 412. Ensuring that lower courts link the background of the officer to the constitutional violation alleged does not complicate our municipal liability jurisprudence with degrees of "ob- viousness," but seeks to ensure that a plaintiff in an inadequate screening case establishes a policymaker's deliberate indifference-that is, conscious disregard for the known and obvious consequences of his actions. 2 Justice Souter implies that Burns' record reflected assault and bat- tery charges arising from more than one incident. Post, at 428. There has never been a serious dispute that a single misdemeanor assault and battery conviction arose out of a single campus fight. Nor did petitioner's expert testify that the record reflected any assault charge without a dispo- sition, see 9 Record 535­536, although Justice Souter appears to sug- gest otherwise, post, at 428­429, n. 6. In fact, respondent's own expert witness testified that Burns' record reflected a single assault conviction. 7 Record 318; see also id., at 320. Petitioner has repeatedly so claimed. See, e. g., Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc in No. 93­5376 (CA5), p. 12 ("Burns had one misdemeanor assault 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 414 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Opinion of the Court guilty to those charges, Burns also pleaded guilty to various driving-related offenses, including nine moving violations and a charge of driving with a suspended license. In addi- tion, Burns had previously pleaded guilty to being in actual physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated. The fact that Burns had pleaded guilty to traffic offenses and other misdemeanors may well have made him an ex- tremely poor candidate for reserve deputy. Had Sheriff Moore fully reviewed Burns' record, he might have come to precisely that conclusion. But unless he would necessarily have reached that decision because Burns' use of excessive force would have been a plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision, Sheriff Moore's inadequate scrutiny of Burns' record cannot constitute "deliberate indifference" to respondent's federally protected right to be free from a use of excessive force. Justice Souter's reading of the case is that the jury be- lieved that Sheriff Moore in fact read Burns' entire record. Post, at 426­427. That is plausible, but it is also irrelevant. It is not sufficient for respondent to show that Sheriff Moore read Burns' record and therefore hired Burns with knowl- edge of his background. Such a decision may reflect indif- conviction stemming from a campus fight"); Pet. for Rehearing of Substi- tuted Opinion in No. 93­5376 (CA5), p. 11 (same); 3 Record 927 (Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 10); Pet. for Cert. 16 ("Burns pled guilty to assault and battery" as a result of "one campus fight"). Respondent has not once contested this characterization. See, e. g., 3 Record 961 (Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Jury Verdict 4); Brief for Appellee/ Cross-Appellant Brown et al. in No. 93­5376 (CA5), pp. 3­4; Brief in Oppo- sition 1. Indeed, since the characterization is reflected in the county's petition for certiorari, under this Court's Rule 15(2) respondent would have had an obligation in her brief in opposition to correct "any perceived misstatement" in the petition. She did not. Involvement in a single fra- ternity fracas does not demonstrate "a proclivity to violence against the person." Post, at 429, n. 6. 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 415 Opinion of the Court ference to Burns' record, but what is required is deliberate indifference to a plaintiff's constitutional right. That is, whether Sheriff Moore failed to examine Burns' record, par- tially examined it, or fully examined it, Sheriff Moore's hir- ing decision could not have been "deliberately indifferent" unless in light of that record Burns' use of excessive force would have been a plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision. Because there was insufficient evidence on which a jury could base a finding that Sheriff Moore's decision to hire Burns reflected conscious disregard of an obvious risk that a use of excessive force would follow, the District Court erred in submitting respondent's inadequate screening claim to the jury. III Cases involving constitutional injuries allegedly traceable to an ill-considered hiring decision pose the greatest risk that a municipality will be held liable for an injury that it did not cause. In the broadest sense, every injury is trace- able to a hiring decision. Where a court fails to adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and causation, municipal liability collapses into respondeat superior liability. As we recognized in Monell and have repeatedly reaffirmed, Con- gress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless deliberate action attributable to the municipality directly caused a deprivation of federal rights. A failure to apply stringent culpability and causation requirements raises seri- ous federalism concerns, in that it risks constitutionalizing particular hiring requirements that States have themselves elected not to impose. Cf. Canton v. Harris, 489 U. S., at 392. Bryan County is not liable for Sheriff Moore's isolated decision to hire Burns without adequate screening, because respondent has not demonstrated that his decision reflected a conscious disregard for a high risk that Burns would use excessive force in violation of respondent's federally pro- 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 416 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Souter, J., dissenting tected right. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for further proceed- ings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer join, dissenting. In Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U. S. 469, 480 (1986), we held a municipality liable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for harm caused by the single act of a policymaking officer in a matter within his authority but not covered by a policy previously identified. The central question presented here is whether that rule applies to a single act that itself neither violates nor commands a violation of federal law. The answer is yes if the single act amounts to deliberate indifference to a sub- stantial risk that a violation of federal law will result. With significant qualifications, the Court assumes so, too, in the- ory, but it raises such skeptical hurdles to reaching any such conclusion in practice that it virtually guarantees its disposi- tion of this case: it holds as a matter of law that the sheriff's act could not be thought to reflect deliberate indifference to the risk that his subordinate would violate the Constitution by using excessive force. I respectfully dissent as much from the level of the Court's skepticism as from its reversal of the judgment. I Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658 (1978), overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), insofar as Monroe had held § 1983 inapplicable to govern- ments beneath the state level ("municipal," for short). Mo- nell, supra, at 663. At the same time that we decided Con- gress meant municipalities to be persons subject to § 1983, however, we also concluded that municipal liability under the statute could not be based on the traditional theory of respondeat superior. 436 U. S., at 691. We said that for 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 417 Souter, J., dissenting purposes of § 1983 an act could not be attributed to a munici- pality merely because it was an act of a municipal agent per- formed in the course of exercising a power delegated to the municipality by local law, and we reasoned instead that "it is [only] when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983." Id., at 694; see Pembaur, supra, at 480. In assigning municipal liability under Monell, we accord- ingly distinguish an act of a municipal agent without inde- pendent authority to establish policy from the act of one authorized to set policy under local law, and we likewise distinguish the acts of lower level employees depending on whether they do or do not implement or manifest a policy set by those with the authority to set it. The act of the municipality is the act only of an authorized policymaker or of an employee following the policymaker's lead. "The `offi- cial policy' requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible." Pembaur, supra, at 479­480. While this overview indicates that the policy requirement may be satisfied in more than one way, there are in fact three alternatives discernible in our prior cases. It is certainly met when the appropriate officer or entity promulgates a generally applicable statement of policy and the subsequent act complained of is simply an implementation of that policy. Monell exemplified these circumstances, where city agencies had issued a rule requiring pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before any medical need arose. Monell, supra, at 660­661. We have also held the policy requirement satisfied where no rule has been announced as "policy" but federal law has 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 418 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Souter, J., dissenting been violated by an act of the policymaker itself. In this situation, the choice of policy and its implementation are one, and the first or only action will suffice to ground municipal liability simply because it is the very policymaker who is acting. See Pembaur, supra, at 480­481; cf. Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 250­252 (1981) (implicitly as- suming that a policymaker's single act can sustain § 1983 ac- tion); Owen v. Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 625­630 (1980) (same). It does not matter that the policymaker may have chosen "a course of action tailored [only] to a particular sit- uation and not intended to control decisions in later situa- tions," Pembaur, 475 U. S., at 481; if the decision to adopt that particular course of action is intentionally made by the authorized policymaker, "it surely represents an act of offi- cial government `policy' " and "the municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly," ibid. We have, finally, identified a municipal policy in a third situation, even where the policymaker has failed to act af- firmatively at all, so long as the need to take some action to control the agents of the government "is so obvious, and the inadequacy [of existing practice] so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymake[r] . . . can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need." Canton v. Harris, 489 U. S. 378, 390 (1989). Where, in the most obvious example, the policymaker sits on his hands after repeated, unlawful acts of subordinate offi- cers and that failure "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of [the municipality's] inhabitants," id., at 389, the policymaker's toleration of the subordinates' behavior es- tablishes a policy-in-practice just as readily attributable to the municipality as the one-act policy-in-practice described above. Such a policy choice may be inferred even without a pattern of acts by subordinate officers, so long as the need for action by the policymaker is so obvious that the failure to act rises to deliberate indifference. Id., at 390, n. 10. 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 419 Souter, J., dissenting Deliberate indifference is thus treated, as it is elsewhere in the law,1 as tantamount to intent, so that inaction by a policymaker deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm is equivalent to the intentional action that setting pol- icy presupposes. Compare Pembaur, supra, at 483 (plural- ity opinion of Brennan, J.) ("deliberate choice" by policy- maker), and Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808, 823 (1985) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (" `policy' gener- ally implies a course of action consciously chosen"), with Canton, supra, at 389 ("Only where a municipality's failure to train its employees . . . evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants can . . . a shortcoming be . . . city `policy or custom' . . . actionable under § 1983"). Under this prior law, Sheriff Moore's failure to screen out his 21-year-old great-nephew Burns on the basis of his crimi- nal record, and the decision instead to authorize Burns to act as a deputy sheriff, constitutes a policy choice attributable to Bryan County under § 1983. There is no serious dispute that Sheriff Moore is the designated policymaker for imple- menting the sheriff's law enforcement powers and recruiting officers to exercise them, or that he "has final authority to act for the municipality in hiring matters." Ante, at 408. As the authorized policymaker, Sheriff Moore is the county 1 See, e. g., American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c) (1985) ("A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct"); J. I. Case Credit Corp. v. First Nat. Bank of Madison Cty., 991 F. 2d 1272, 1278 (CA7 1993) ("To consciously ignore or to deliberately close one's eyes to a manifest danger is recklessness, a mental state that the law commonly substitutes for intent or actual knowledge"). Cf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 105­106 (1976) (deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment); United States v. Giovan- netti, 919 F. 2d 1223, 1228 (CA7 1990) (a "deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge is all the guilty knowledge the law requires"); United States v. Jewell, 532 F. 2d 697, 700 (CA9), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 951 (1976) ("[D]elib- erate ignorance and positive knowledge are equally culpable"). 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 420 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Souter, J., dissenting for purposes of § 1983 municipal liability arising from the sheriff's department's exercise of law enforcement authority. As I explain in greater detail below, it was open to the jury to find that the sheriff knew of the record of his nephew's violent propensity, but hired him in deliberate indifference to the risk that he would use excessive force on the job, as in fact he later did. That the sheriff's act did not itself com- mand or require commission of a constitutional violation (like the order to perform an unlawful entry and search in Pem- baur) is not dispositive under § 1983, for we have expressly rejected the contention that "only unconstitutional policies are actionable" under § 1983, Canton, supra, at 387, and have never suggested that liability under the statute is otherwise limited to policies that facially violate other federal law. The sheriff's policy choice creating a substantial risk of a constitutional violation therefore could subject the county to liability under existing precedent.2 II At the level of theory, at least, the Court does not disagree, and it assumes for the sake of deciding the case that a single, facially neutral act of deliberate indifference by a policy- maker could be a predicate to municipal liability if it led to an unconstitutional injury inflicted by subordinate officers. See ante, at 412. At the level of practice, however, the tenor of the Court's opinion is decidedly different: it suggests that 2 Given the sheriff's position as law enforcement policymaker, it is sim- ply off the point to suggest, as the Court does, that there is some signifi- cance in either the fact that Sheriff Moore's failure to screen may have been a "deviation" from his ordinary hiring practices or that a pattern of injuries resulting from his past practices is absent. See ante, at 408. Pembaur made clear that a single act by a designated policymaker is suf- ficient to establish a municipal policy, see Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U. S. 469, 480­481 (1986), and Canton explained, as the Court recognizes, see ante, at 409, that evidence of a single violation of federal rights can trigger municipal liability under § 1983, see Canton v. Harris, 489 U. S. 378, 390, n. 10 (1989). See Part II­B, infra. 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 421 Souter, J., dissenting the trial court insufficiently appreciated the specificity of the risk to which such indifference must be deliberate in order to be actionable; it expresses deep skepticism that such ap- preciation of risk could ever reasonably be attributed to the policymaker who has performed only a single unsatisfactory, but not facially unconstitutional, act; and it finds the record insufficient to make any such showing in this case. The Court is serially mistaken. This case presents no occasion to correct or refine the District Court's jury instructions on the degree of risk required for deliberate indifference; the Court's skepticism converts a newly demanding formulation of the standard of fault into a virtually categorical impossi- bility of showing it in a case like this; and the record in this case is perfectly sufficient to support the jury's verdict even on the Court's formulation of the high degree of risk that must be shown. A The Court is certainly correct in emphasizing the need to show more than mere negligence on the part of the policy- maker, for at the least the element of deliberateness requires both subjective appreciation of a risk of unconstitutional harm, and a risk substantial enough to justify the heightened responsibility that deliberate indifference generally entails. The Court goes a step further, however, in requiring that the "particular" harmful consequence be "plainly obvious" to the policymaker, ante, at 411, a characterization of deliberate indifference adapted from dicta set forth in a footnote in Canton, see 489 U. S., at 390, n. 10. Canton, as mentioned above, held that a municipal policy giving rise to liability under § 1983 may be inferred even when the policymaker has failed to act affirmatively at all, so long as a need to control the agents of the government "is so obvious, and the inade- quacy [of existing practice] so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymake[r] . . . can reason- ably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need." Id., at 390. While we speculated in Canton that 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 422 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Souter, J., dissenting "[i]t could . . . be that the police, in exercising their discre- tion, so often violate constitutional rights that the need for further training must have been plainly obvious to the city policymakers, who, nevertheless, are `deliberately indiffer- ent' to the need," see id., at 390, n. 10, we did not purport to be defining the fault of deliberate indifference universally as the failure to act in relation to a "plainly obvious conse- quence" of harm. Nor did we, in addressing the requisite risk that constitutional violations will occur, suggest that the deliberate indifference necessary to establish municipal lia- bility must be, as the Court says today, indifference to the particular constitutional violation that in fact occurred. The Court's formulation that deliberate indifference exists only when the risk of the subsequent, particular constitu- tional violation is a plainly obvious consequence of the hir- ing decision, see ante, at 411, while derived from Canton, is thus without doubt a new standard. See post, at 433­434 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As to the "particular" violation, the Court alters the understanding of deliberate indifference as set forth in Canton, where we spoke of constitutional vio- lations generally.3 As to "plainly obvious consequence," the Court's standard appears to be somewhat higher, for exam- ple, than the standard for "reckless" fault in the criminal law, where the requisite indifference to risk is defined as that which "consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result . . . [and] involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situa- tion." See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c) (1985). 3 The Court's embellishment on the deliberate indifference standard is, in any case, no help in resolving this case because there has never been any suggestion that Deputy Burns's criminal background, including charges of assault and battery, indicated that he would commit a constitu- tional violation different from the one he in fact committed. 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 423 Souter, J., dissenting That said, it is just possible that our prior understanding of the requisite degree of fault and the standard as the Court now states it may in practice turn out to amount to much the same thing, but I would have preferred an argument addressing the point before ruling on it. There was, how- ever, no such argument here for the simple reason that peti- tioner never asked that deliberate indifference be defined to occur only when the particular constitutional injury was the plainly obvious consequence of the policymaker's act. Peti- tioner merely asked the District Court to instruct the jury to determine whether Sheriff Moore acted with "conscious indifference," see 2 Record 342, and made no objection to the District Court's charge that "Sheriff B. J. Moore would have acted with deliberate indifference in adopting an otherwise constitutional hiring policy for a deputy sheriff if the need for closer scrutiny of Stacy Burns' background was so ob- vious and the inadequacy of the scrutiny given so likely to result in violations of constitutional rights, that Sheriff B. J. Moore can be reasonably said to have been deliberately indifferent to the constitutional needs of the Plaintiff." 10 Record 800­801. If, as it appears, today's standard does raise the threshold of municipal liability, it does so quite in- dependently of any issue posed or decided in the trial court. B The Court's skepticism that the modified standard of fault can ever be met in a single-act case of inadequate screening without a patently unconstitutional policy, ante, at 412­414, both reveals the true value of the assumption that in theory there might be municipal liability in such a case, and dictates the result of the Court's review of the record in the case before us. It is skepticism gone too far. It is plain enough that a facially unconstitutional policy is likely to produce unconstitutional injury, see, e. g., Pembaur, 475 U. S., at 480­481; Monell, 436 U. S., at 660­661, and obvi- ous, too, that many facially neutral policy decisions evince 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 424 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Souter, J., dissenting no such clear portents. Written standards for hiring law enforcement personnel might be silent on the significance of a prior criminal record without justifying much worry about employing axe murderers (who are unlikely to apply) or sub- jecting the public to attacks by someone with a 30-year-old assault conviction (who has probably grown up). But a poli- cymaker need not mandate injury to be indifferent to its risk when obvious, and, because a particular hiring decision may raise a very high probability of harm down the line, it simply ignores the issue before us to lump together in one presump- tively benign category every singular administrative act of a policymaker that does not expressly command or constitute unconstitutional behavior. Thus, a decision to give law en- forcement authority to a scofflaw who had recently engaged in criminal violence presents a very different risk from hir- ing someone who once drove an overweight truck. While the decision to hire the violent scofflaw may not entail harm to others as unquestionably as an order to "go out and rough-up some suspects," it is a long way from neutral in the risk it creates. While the Court should rightly be skeptical about predi- cating municipal or individual liability merely on a failure to adopt a crime-free personnel policy or on a particular deci- sion to hire a guilty trucker, why does it extend that valid skepticism to the quite unsound point of doubting liability for hiring the violent scofflaw? The Court says it fears that the latter sort of case raises a danger of liability without fault, ante, at 408. But if the Court means fault generally (as distinct from the blame imputed on classic respondeat superior doctrine), it need only recall that whether a particu- lar violent scofflaw is violent enough or scoffing enough to implicate deliberate indifference will depend on applying the highly demanding standard the Court announces: plainly obvious consequence of particular injury. It is the high threshold of deliberate indifference that will ensure that municipalities be held liable only for considered acts with 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 425 Souter, J., dissenting substantial risks. That standard will distinguish single-act cases with only a mild portent of injury from single-act cases with a plainly obvious portent, and from cases in which the harm is only the latest in a series of injuries known to have followed from the policymaker's action. The Court has fenced off the slippery slope. A second stated reason of the skeptical majority is that, because municipal liability under Monell cannot rest on re- spondeat superior, ante, at 410, 415, "a court must carefully test the link between the policymaker's inadequate decision and the particular injury alleged," ante, at 410. But that is simply to say that the tortious act must be proximately caused by the policymaker. The policy requirement is the restriction that bars straightforward respondeat superior li- ability, and the need to "test the link" is merely the need to apply the law that defines what a cognizable link is. The restriction on imputed fault that saves municipalities from liability has no need of categorical immunization in single- act cases. In short, the Court's skepticism is excessive in ignoring the fact that some acts of a policymaker present substantial risks of unconstitutional harm even though the acts are not unconstitutional per se. And the Court's purported justifi- cations for its extreme skepticism are washed out by the very standards employed to limit liability. C For demonstrating the extreme degree of the Court's in- hospitality to single-act municipal liability, this is a case on point, for even under the "plainly obvious consequence" rule the evidence here would support the verdict. There is no dispute that before the incident in question the sheriff or- dered a copy of his nephew's criminal record. While the sheriff spoke euphemistically on the witness stand of a "driv- ing record," the scope of the requested documentation in- cluded crimes beyond motor vehicle violations and the sher- 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 426 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Souter, J., dissenting iff never denied that he knew this. He admitted that he read some of that record; he said he knew it was "long"; he said he was sure he had noticed charges of driving with a suspended license; and he said that he had taken the trouble to make an independent search for any outstanding warrant for Burns's arrest. As he put it, however, he somehow failed to "notice" charges of assault and battery or the list of of- fenses so long as to point either to contempt for law or to incapacity to obey it. Although the jury might have ac- cepted the sheriff's disclaimer, no one who has read the tran- script would assume that the jurors gave any credit to that testimony,4 and it was open to them to find that the sheriff 4 After Sheriff Moore testified that he knew Burns had been charged with driving while intoxicated, the following exchange with respondent's counsel took place: "Q. And how did you obtain that information? "A. I don't remember now how I got it. "Q. Did you make an inquiry with the proper authorities in Oklahoma to get a copy of Mr. Burns' rap sheet? "A. I run his driving record, yes. "Q. All right. And you can get that rap sheet immediately, can't you? "A. It don't take long. "Q. All right. And did you not see on there where Mr. Burns had been arrested for assault and battery. Did you see that one on there? "A. I never noticed it, no. "Q. Did you notice on there he'd been arrested or charged with [Driving While License Suspended] on several occasions? . . . . . "A. I'm sure I did. "Q. All right. Did you notice on there that he'd been arrested and con- victed for possession of false identification? "A. No, I never noticed that. "Q. Did you notice on there where he had been arrested for public drunk? "A. He had a long record. "Q. Did you notice on there where he had been arrested for resisting arrest? "A. No, I didn't. 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 427 Souter, J., dissenting was simply lying under oath about his limited perusal. The Court of Appeals noted this possibility, see 67 F. 3d 1174, 1184 (CA5 1995), which is more likely than any other reading of the evidence. Law enforcement officers, after all, are not characteristically so devoid of curiosity as to lose interest part way through the criminal record of a subject of per- sonal investigation. If, as is likely, the jurors did disbelieve the sheriff and concluded he had read the whole record, they certainly could have eliminated any possibility that the sheriff's decision to "Q. Did you make any inquiries after you got that information to deter- mine exactly what the disposition of those charges were? "A. No, I didn't. "Q. Did you not make any attempt to find out the status of Mr. Burns' criminal record at that time? "A. As far as him having a criminal record, I don't believe he had a crimi- nal record. It was just all driving and-most of it was, misdemeanors. "Q. Well, did you make any attempts to determine whether or not Mr. Burns was on probation at the time you placed him out there? "A. I didn't know he was on probation, no. "Q. Did you make any effort to find out? "A. I didn't have no idea he was on probation, no. "Q. Well, you saw on his rap sheet where he had been charged with [Driv- ing Under the Influence], didn't you? "A. I had heard about that. I don't remember whether I had seen it on the rap sheet or not. "Q. So you'd heard about it? . . . . . "A. I don't know remember whether I seen it on the rap sheet or heard about it. "Q. All right. Well, whichever way you, it came to your attention, you didn't check to find out with the proper authorities as to what the disposi- tion of that charge was, did you? . . . . . "A. I don't really know. I can't say. "Q. Did you check to see if Mr. Burns had an arrest warrant out for him? "A. We-I run him through [the National Crime Information Center] and there wasn't-didn't show no warrant, no." 9 Record 672­675. 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 428 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Souter, J., dissenting employ his relative was an act of mere negligence or poor judgment. He did not even claim, for example, that he thought any assault must have been just a youthful pecca- dillo magnified out of proportion by the criminal charge, or that he had evaluated the assault as merely eccentric behav- ior in a young man of sound character, or that he was con- vinced that wild youth had given way to discretion. There being no such evidence of reasonable but mistaken judgment, the jury could readily have found that the sheriff knew his nephew's proven propensities, that he thought the thrust of the evidence was so damaging that he would lie to protect his reputation and the county treasury, and that he simply chose to put a family member on the payroll (the third rela- tive, in fact 5) disregarding the risk to the public. At trial, petitioner's expert witness stated during cross- examination that Burns's rap sheet listed repeated traffic vi- olations, including driving while intoxicated and driving with a suspended license, resisting arrest, and more than one charge of assault and battery. The witness further testified that Burns pleaded guilty to assault and battery and other charges 16 months before he was hired by Sheriff Moore.6 5 Burns is the son of Sheriff Moore's nephew and Burns's grandfather had been involved with the sheriff's department for 16 years. See 67 F. 3d 1174, 1184 (CA5 1995). 6 The Court points out that Burns had only one conviction for assault and battery, that respondent has never claimed otherwise, and that her expert witness so testified. See ante, at 413­414, n. 2. This is entirely correct. But the issue here is not what might have been learned by thor- oughly investigating Burns's behavior; the issue is the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding that the sheriff acted with deliberate indifference when he hired Burns. Specifically, assuming the jury found that the sheriff looked at Burns's criminal record, an assumption the Court acknowledges is "plausible," see ante, at 414, what does the evidence show that the sheriff learned from this examination? The criminal record was not itself introduced into evidence in written form, but it was, in relevant part, read to the jury by petitioner's expert witness Ken Barnes. Accord- ing to Barnes's testimony, this criminal record's list of numerous charges included four references to assault and battery, two of which the witness 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 429 Souter, J., dissenting Respondent's expert witness testified that Burns's arrest record showed a "blatant disregard for the law and problems that may show themselves in abusing the public or using excessive force," 7 Record 316, and petitioner's own expert agreed that Burns's criminal history should have caused con- cern. When asked if he would have hired Burns, he replied that it was "doubtful." 9 Record 537. On this evidence, the jury could have found that the string of arrests and convic- tions revealed "that Burns had [such] a propensity for vio- lence and a disregard for the law," see 67 F. 3d, at 1184, n. 20, that his subsequent resort to excessive force was the plainly obvious consequence of hiring him as a law enforcement officer authorized to employ force in performing his duties. III The county escapes from liability through the Court's un- toward application of an enhanced fault standard to a record of inculpatory evidence showing a contempt for constitu- tional obligations as blatant as the nepotism that apparently occasioned it. The novelty of this escape shows something said were duplicative, though he conceded this was not necessarily so. See 9 Record 532­533. The upshot was that if the jury found that the sheriff looked at the written record, it could have found that he read four separate references to assault and battery charges. That is not to say that four assaults necessarily occurred, but only that the record refers four times to such charges before listing one conviction for assault and battery. Barnes also testified that the record does not contain a disposi- tion for all the charges listed, and that a sheriff reviewing such a record should have investigated further to determine the disposition of such charges. See id., at 536. In my judgment, the evidence would have been sufficient (under the majority's test) if it had shown no more than one complaint and conviction for assault and battery, given the mixture of charges of resisting an officer, public drunkenness, and multiple traffic offenses over a 4-month period ending only 16 months before Burns was hired. The inference to be drawn would have been that a repeatedly lawless young man had shown a proclivity to violence against the person. But, as it turns out, the evi- dentiary record is ostensibly more damaging than that. 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 430 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Breyer, J., dissenting unsuspected (by me, at least) until today. Despite argu- ments that Monell's policy requirement was an erroneous reading of § 1983, see Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S., at 834 (Stevens, J., dissenting), I had not previously thought that there was sufficient reason to unsettle the precedent of Monell. Now it turns out, however, that Monell is hardly settled. That being so, Justice Breyer's powerful call to reexamine § 1983 municipal liability afresh finds support in the Court's own readiness to rethink the matter. I respectfully dissent. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting. In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658 (1978), this Court said that municipalities cannot be held liable for constitutional torts under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 "on a respondeat superior theory," but they can be held lia- ble "when execution of" a municipality's "policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury." 436 U. S., at 691, 694. That state- ment has produced a highly complex body of interpretive law. Today's decision exemplifies the law's complexity, for it distinguishes among a municipal action that "itself violates federal law," ante, at 404, an action that "intentionally de- prive[s] a plaintiff of a federally protected right," ante, at 405, and one that "has caused an employee to do so," ibid. It then elaborates this Court's requirement that a conse- quence be "so likely" to occur that a policymaker could "rea- sonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent" with respect to it, Canton v. Harris, 489 U. S. 378, 390 (1989) (em- phasis added), with an admonition that the unconstitutional consequence must be "plainly obvious," ante, at 411. The majority fears that a contrary view of prior precedent would undermine Monell's basic distinction. That concern, how- ever, rather than leading us to spin ever finer distinctions as we try to apply Monell's basic distinction between liability that rests upon policy and liability that is vicarious, suggests 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 431 Breyer, J., dissenting that we should reexamine the legal soundness of that basic distinction itself. I believe that the legal prerequisites for reexamination of an interpretation of an important statute are present here. The soundness of the original principle is doubtful. The original principle has generated a body of interpretive law that is so complex that the law has become difficult to apply. Factual and legal changes have divorced the law from the distinction's apparent original purposes. And there may be only a handful of individuals or groups that have significantly relied upon perpetuation of the original distinction. If all this is so, later law has made the original distinction, not simply wrong, but obsolete and a potential source of confu- sion. Cf., e. g., Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 47­49 (1977) (reexamining Sherman Act's inter- pretation set forth in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U. S. 365 (1967)); Hubbard v. United States, 514 U. S. 695, 697­715 (1995) (reexamining interpretation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001 set forth in United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503 (1955)); Monell, supra, at 664­690, 695­701 (reexamining in- terpretation of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 set forth in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961)). See also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 521­522 (1995). First, consider Monell's original reasoning. The Monell "no vicarious liability" principle rested upon a historical analysis of § 1983 and upon § 1983's literal language-lan- guage that imposes liability upon (but only upon) any "per- son." Justice Stevens has clearly explained why neither of these rationales is sound. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808, 834­844 (1985) (dissenting opinion); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U. S. 469, 489­491 (1986) (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Essentially, the his- tory on which Monell relied consists almost exclusively of the fact that the Congress that enacted § 1983 rejected an amendment (called the Sherman amendment) that would have made municipalities vicariously liable for the maraud- 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 432 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Breyer, J., dissenting ing acts of private citizens. Monell, supra, at 666­667, 694. Cf. Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U. S. 701, 726­729 (1989) (plurality opinion). That fact, as Justice Stevens and others have pointed out, does not argue against vicarious liability for the act of municipal employ- ees-particularly since municipalities, at the time, were vi- cariously liable for many of the acts of their employees. See Tuttle, supra, at 836, n. 8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing cases); Pembaur, supra, at 489­490 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). See also, e. g., Kramer & Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 S. Ct. Rev. 249, 256­265; Mead, 42 U. S. C. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Be- comes a Distorted Picture, 65 N. C. L. Rev. 517, 535­537 (1987). But see Welch & Hofmeister, Praprotnik, Municipal Policy and Policymakers: The Supreme Court's Constriction of Municipal Liability, 13 S. Ill. U. L. J. 857, 881 (1989) (adopt- ing Monell's reading of the legislative history). Without supporting history, it is difficult to find § 1983's words "[e]very person" inconsistent with respondeat supe- rior liability. In 1871 "bodies politic and corporate," such as municipalities, were "person[s]." See Act of Feb. 25, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431 (repealed 1939); Monell, supra, at 688­689. Section 1983 requires that the "person" either "subjec[t]" or "caus[e]" a different person "to be subjected" to a "depriva- tion" of a right. As a purely linguistic matter, a municipal- ity, which can act only through its employees, might be said to have "subject[ed]" a person or to have "cause[d]" that person to have been "subjected" to a loss of rights when a municipality's employee acts within the scope of his or her employment. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1957); W. Landes & R. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 120­121 (1987). Federal courts on occasion have interpreted the word "person" or the equivalent in other statutes as authorizing forms of vicarious liability. See, e. g., American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Winback and 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 433 Breyer, J., dissenting Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F. 3d 1421, 1429­1434 (CA3 1994), cert. denied, 514 U. S. 1103 (1995) (Lanham Act); American Soc. of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U. S. 556 (1982) (Sherman Act); United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U. S. 121, 124­125 (1958) (criminal statute). See also Tuttle, supra, at 835 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Second, Monell's basic effort to distinguish between vicar- ious liability and liability derived from "policy or custom" has produced a body of law that is neither readily under- standable nor easy to apply. Today's case provides a good example. The District Court in this case told the jury it must find (1) Sheriff Moore's screening "so likely to result in violations of constitutional rights" that he could "reasonably [be] said to have been deliberately indifferent to the consti- tutional needs of the Plaintiff" and (2) that the "inadequate hiring . . . policy directly caused the Plaintiff's injury." App. 123a (emphasis added). This instruction comes close to repeating this Court's language in Canton v. Harris. In Canton, the Court said (of the city's failure to train officers in the use of deadly force): "[I]n light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliber- ately indifferent to the need." 489 U. S., at 390 (empha- sis added). The majority says that the District Court and the Court of Appeals did not look closely enough at the specific facts of this case. It also adds that the harm must be a "plainly obvious consequence" of the "decision to hire" Burns. Ante, at 411. But why elaborate Canton's instruction in this way? The Court's verbal formulation is slightly different; and that being so, a lawyer or judge will ignore the Court's precise 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 434 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Breyer, J., dissenting words at his or her peril. Yet those words, while adding complexity, do not seem to reflect a difference that signifi- cantly helps one understand the difference between "vicari- ous" liability and "policy." Cf. ante, at 421­422 (Souter, J., dissenting). Even if the Court means only that the record evidence does not meet Canton's standard, it will be difficult for juries, and for judges, to understand just why that is so. It will be difficult for them to apply today's elaboration of Canton-except perhaps in the limited context of police force hiring decisions that are followed by a recruit's uncon- stitutional conduct. Consider some of the other distinctions that this Court has had to make as it has sought to distinguish liability based upon policymaking from liability that is "vicarious." It has proved necessary, for example, to distinguish further, between an exercise of policymaking authority and an exercise of delegated discretionary policy-implementing au- thority. See St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U. S. 112, 126­127 (1988) (plurality opinion). Compare Tuttle, 471 U. S., at 817 (plurality opinion), with Canton, supra, at 389­390. With- out some such distinction, "municipal liability [might] col- laps[e] into respondeat superior," ante, at 410, for the law would treat similarly (and hold municipalities responsible for) both a police officer's decision about how much force to use when making a particular arrest and a police chief's deci- sion about how much force to use when making a particular kind of arrest. But the distinction is not a clear one. It requires federal courts to explore state and municipal law that distributes different state powers among different local officials and local entities. Praprotnik, supra, at 125­126, 127­131 (plurality opinion); Jett, supra, at 737­738. That law is highly specialized; it may or may not say just where policymaking authority lies, and it can prove particularly dif- ficult to apply in light of the Court's determination that a decision can be "policymaking" even though it applies only to a single instance. Pembaur, 475 U. S., at 481. See also 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 435 Breyer, J., dissenting Praprotnik, supra, at 143 (Brennan, J., concurring in judg- ment); Schnapper, A Monell Update: Clarity, Conflict, and Complications, Practising Law Institute, Litigation and Ad- ministrative Practice Series, No. 381, Vol. 2, p. 36 (1989); Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some Les- sons From Tort Law and Organization Theory, 77 Geo. L. J. 1753, 1774­1779 (1989). It is not surprising that results have sometimes proved inconsistent. Compare ante, at 408 (sheriff was final policy- maker in hiring matters), with Greensboro Professional Fire Fighters Assn., Local 3157 v. Greensboro, 64 F. 3d 962, 965­ 966 (CA4 1995) (fire chief was not policymaker with respect to hiring and firing), and Harris v. Pagedale, 821 F. 2d 499, 505­508 (CA8) (municipality was deliberately indifferent to charges of sexual assault), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 986 (1987), with Wilson v. Chicago, 6 F. 3d 1233, 1240­1241 (CA7 1993) (municipal policymaker was not deliberately indifferent to charges of abuse of pretrial detainees), cert. denied, 511 U. S. 1088 (1994). See also Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F. 2d 397, 400­ 401 (CA7 1992) (describing confusion in courts). Nor does the location of "policymaking" authority pose the only conceptually difficult problem. Lower courts must also decide whether a failure to make policy was "deliber- ately indifferent," rather than "grossly negligent." Can- ton, supra, at 388, n. 7. And they must decide, for exam- ple, whether it matters that some such failure occurred in the officer-training, rather than the officer-hiring, process. Ante, at 409­410. Given the basic Monell principle, these distinctions may be necessary, for without them, the Court cannot easily avoid a "municipal liability" that "collaps[es] into respondeat supe- rior." Ante, at 410. But a basic legal principle that re- quires so many such distinctions to maintain its legal life may not deserve such longevity. See Mead, 65 N. C. L. Rev., at 542 (describing the "confusion and uncertainty" in the lower courts "caused by the Monell Court's choice of the 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN 436 BOARD OF COMM'RS OF BRYAN CTY. v. BROWN Breyer, J., dissenting policy or custom causation requirement"); Schuck, supra, at 1783 (noting the "extraordinary unpredictability of the `offi- cial policy' test"). Finally, relevant legal and factual circumstances may have changed in a way that affects likely reliance upon Monell's liability limitation. The legal complexity just described makes it difficult for municipalities to predict just when they will be held liable based upon "policy or custom." Moreover, their potential liability is, in a sense, greater than that of individuals, for they cannot assert the "qualified immunity" defenses that individuals may raise. Owen v. Independence, 445 U. S. 622 (1980). Further, many States have statutes that appear to, in effect, mimic respondeat superior by au- thorizing indemnification of employees found liable under § 1983 for actions within the scope of their employment. See, e. g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7­465 (1997); Idaho Code § 6­903 (1990); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 745, § 10/2­302 (1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75­6109 (1989); Minn. Stat. § 466.07 (1994); Mont. Code Ann. § 2­9­305 (1994); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.0349 (1989); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29­A:2 (1988); N. D. Cent. Code § 32­12.1­ 04(4) (Supp. 1993); Okla. Stat., Tit. 51, § 162 (Supp. 1995); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8548 (1982); S. D. Codified Laws § 3­19­1 (1994); Utah Code Ann. § 63­30­36 (1993); W. Va. Code § 29­ 112A­11 (1992); Wis. Stat. § 895.46 (1993­1994). These stat- utes-valuable to government employees as well as to civil rights victims-can provide for payments from the govern- ment that are similar to those that would take place in the absence of Monell's limitations. To the extent that they do so, municipal reliance upon the continuation of Monell's "pol- icy" limitation loses much of its significance. Any statement about reliance, of course, must be tentative, as we have not heard argument on the matter. We do not know the pattern of indemnification: how often, and to what extent, States now indemnify their employees, and which of their employees they indemnify. I also realize that there may be other reasons, constitutional and otherwise, that I 520US2 Unit: $U47 [09-10-99 18:49:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997) 437 Breyer, J., dissenting have not discussed that argue strongly for reaffirmation of Monell's holding. See, e. g., Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and Municipal Accountabil- ity under Section 1983, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 539 (1989) (discuss- ing federalism); Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 24­25 (1982) (de- scribing Monell as having the "proper approach to local gov- ernment accountability under section 1983" and describing a fault-based interpretation of § 1983); Welch & Hofmeister, 13 S. Ill. U. L. J., at 883, n. 176 (discussing disadvantages of an "expansive view of municipal liability," including lack of insurance coverage). Nonetheless, for the reasons I have set forth, I believe the case for reexamination is a strong one. Today's decision underscores this need. Consequently, I would ask for fur- ther argument that would focus upon the continued viability of Monell's distinction between vicarious municipal liability and municipal liability based upon policy and custom. 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 438 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus STRATE, ASSOCIATE TRIBAL JUDGE, TRIBAL COURT OF THE THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF THE FORT BERTHOLD INDIAN RESERVATION, et al. v. A­1 CONTRACTORS et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit No. 95­1872. Argued January 7, 1997-Decided April 28, 1997 Vehicles driven by petitioner Fredericks and respondent Stockert collided on a portion of a North Dakota state highway that runs through the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. The 6.59-mile stretch of highway within the reservation is open to the public, affords access to a federal water resource project, and is maintained by North Dakota under a federally granted right-of-way that lies on land held by the United States in trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes and their members. Nei- ther driver is a member of the Tribes or an Indian, but Fredericks is the widow of a deceased tribal member and has five adult children who are also members. The truck driven by Stockert belonged to his em- ployer, respondent A­1 Contractors, a non-Indian-owned enterprise with its principal place of business outside the reservation. At the time, A­1 was under a subcontract with LCM Corporation, a corpora- tion wholly owned by the Tribes, to do landscaping within the reserva- tion. The record does not show whether Stockert was engaged in sub- contract work at the time of the accident. Fredericks filed a personal injury action in Tribal Court against Stockert and A­1, and Fredericks' adult children filed a loss-of-consortium claim in the same lawsuit. The Tribal Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over Fredericks' claim and therefore denied respondents' motion to dismiss, and the Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals affirmed. Respondents then com- menced this action in the Federal District Court against Fredericks, her adult children, the Tribal Court, and Tribal Judge Strate, seeking a declaratory judgment that, as a matter of federal law, the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Fredericks' claims; respondents also sought an injunction against further Tribal Court proceedings. Rely- ing particularly on National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U. S. 845, and Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U. S. 9, the Dis- trict Court dismissed the action, determining that the Tribal Court had civil jurisdiction over Fredericks' complaint against respondents. The 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 438 (1997) 439 Syllabus en banc Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that the controlling prece- dent was Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544, and that, under Mon- tana, the Tribal Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute. Held: When an accident occurs on a public highway maintained by the State pursuant to a federally granted right-of-way over Indian reserva- tion land, a civil action against allegedly negligent nonmembers falls within state or federal regulatory and adjudicatory governance; absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of non- members driving on the State's highway, tribal courts may not exercise jurisdiction in such cases. This Court expresses no view on the govern- ing law or proper forum when an accident occurs on a tribal road within a reservation. Pp. 445­460. (a) Absent express authorization by federal statute or treaty, tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers' conduct exists only in limited circum- stances. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, the Court held that tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Later, in Mon- tana v. United States, the Court set forth the general rule that, absent a different congressional direction, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reserva- tion, subject to exceptions relating to (1) the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members and (2) nonmember conduct that threatens or directly affects the tribe's political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare. 450 U. S., at 564­567. Pp. 445­448. (b) Montana controls this case. Contrary to petitioners' contention, National Farmers and Iowa Mutual do not establish a rule converse to Montana's. Neither case establishes that tribes presumptively retain adjudicatory authority over claims against nonmembers arising from oc- currences anywhere within a reservation. Rather, these cases pre- scribe a prudential, nonjurisdictional exhaustion rule requiring a federal court in which tribal-court jurisdiction is challenged to stay its hand, as a matter of comity, until after the tribal court has had an initial and full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction. See 471 U. S., at 857; 480 U. S., at 20, n. 14; see also id., at 16, n. 8. This exhaustion rule, as explained in National Farmers, 471 U. S., at 855­856, reflects the more extensive jurisdiction tribal courts have in civil cases than in criminal proceedings and the corresponding need to inspect relevant statutes, treaties, and other materials in order to determine tribal adjudicatory authority. National Farmers' exhaustion requirement does not conflict with Montana, in which the Court made plain that the general rule and exceptions there announced govern only in the absence of a delegation 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 440 STRATE v. A­1 CONTRACTORS Syllabus of tribal authority by treaty or statute. See 450 U. S., at 557­563. Read in context, the Court's statement in Iowa Mutual, 480 U. S., at 18, that "[c]ivil jurisdiction over [the] activities [of non-Indians on reserva- tion lands] presumptively lies in the tribal courts," addresses only situa- tions in which tribes possess authority to regulate nonmembers' activi- ties. As to nonmembers, a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction, absent congressional direction enlarg- ing tribal-court jurisdiction. Pp. 448­453. (c) It is unavailing to argue, as petitioners do, that Montana does not govern this case because the land underlying the accident scene is held in trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes and their members. Petitioners are correct that Montana and the cases following its instruction-Bren- dale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U. S. 408, and South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U. S. 679-all involved alien- ated, non-Indian-owned reservation land. However, the right-of-way North Dakota acquired for its highway renders the 6.59-mile stretch here at issue equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes, to such alienated, non-Indian land. The right-of-way was granted to facilitate public access to a federal water resource project, forms part of the State's highway, and is open to the public. Traffic on the highway is subject to the State's control. The granting instrument details only one specific reservation to Indian landowners, the right to construct neces- sary crossings, and the Tribes expressly reserved no other right to exer- cise dominion or control over the right-of-way. Rather, they have con- sented to, and received payment for, the State's use of the stretch at issue, and so long as that stretch is maintained as part of the State's highway, they cannot assert a landowner's right to occupy and exclude. Pp. 454­456. (d) Petitioners refer to no treaty or federal statute authorizing the Three Affiliated Tribes to entertain highway-accident tort suits of the kind Fredericks commenced against A­1 and Stockert. Nor have they shown that Fredericks' tribal-court action qualifies under either of the exceptions to Montana's general rule. The tortious conduct alleged by Fredericks does not fit within the first exception for "activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other ar- rangements," 450 U. S., at 565, particularly when measured against the conduct at issue in the cases cited by Montana, id., at 565­566, as fitting within the exception, Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 223; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384; Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950; and Washing- ton v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, 152­ 154. This dispute is distinctly nontribal in nature, arising between two non-Indians involved in a run-of-the-mill highway accident. Although 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 438 (1997) 441 Syllabus A­1 was engaged in subcontract work on the reservation, and therefore had a "consensual relationship" with the Tribes, Fredericks was not a party to the subcontract, and the Tribes were strangers to the accident. Montana's second exception, concerning conduct that "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe," 450 U. S., at 566, is also inapplicable. The cases cited by Montana as stating this exception each raised the question whether a State's (or Territory's) exercise of authority would trench unduly on tribal self-government. Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Mont., 424 U. S. 382, 386; Williams, 358 U. S., at 220; Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U. S. 118, 128­129; and Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 273. Opening the Tribal Court for Fredericks' optional use is not necessary to protect tribal self-government; and requiring A­1 and Stockert to defend against this commonplace state highway accident claim in an unfamiliar court is not crucial to the Tribes' political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare. Pp. 456­459. 76 F. 3d 930, affirmed. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Melody L. McCoy argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the brief was Donald R. Wharton. Jonathan E. Nuechterlein argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant At- torney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, and Edward J. Shawaker. Patrick J. Ward argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation et al. by Reid Peyton Chambers; for the Northern Plains Tribal Judges Association by B. J. Jones; for the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux (Dakota) Community et al. by Kurt V. BlueDog and Richard A. Duncan; and for the Yavapai-Apache Nation et al. by Susan M. Williams and Gwenellen P. Janov. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Montana et al. by Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of Montana, Clay R. Smith, Solicitor, and Harley R. Harris, Assistant Attorney General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as fol- 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 442 STRATE v. A­1 CONTRACTORS Opinion of the Court Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the adjudicatory authority of tribal courts over personal injury actions against defendants who are not tribal members. Specifically, we confront this ques- tion: When an accident occurs on a portion of a public high- way maintained by the State under a federally granted right-of-way over Indian reservation land, may tribal courts entertain a civil action against an allegedly negligent driver and the driver's employer, neither of whom is a member of the tribe? Such cases, we hold, fall within state or federal regulatory and adjudicatory governance; tribal courts may not entertain claims against nonmembers arising out of accidents on state highways, absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers on the highway in ques- tion. We express no view on the governing law or proper forum when an accident occurs on a tribal road within a reservation. I In November 1990, petitioner Gisela Fredericks and re- spondent Lyle Stockert were involved in a traffic accident on a portion of a North Dakota state highway running through the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. The highway strip crossing the reservation is a 6.59-mile stretch of road, open to the public, affording access to a federal water resource project. North Dakota maintains the road under a right-of- lows: Grant Woods of Arizona, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Scott Harshbarger of Massa- chusetts, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Jan Gra- ham of Utah, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, James E. Doyle of Wisconsin, and William U. Hill of Wyoming; for Lake County, Montana, et al. by Jon Metropoulos; for the American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al. by Michele Odorizzi, Andrew J. Pincus, and Daniel R. Barney; and for the Council of State Governments et al. by Richard Ruda and Charles F. Lettow. 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 438 (1997) 443 Opinion of the Court way granted by the United States to the State's Highway Department; the right-of-way lies on land held by the United States in trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes (Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara) and their members. The accident occurred when Fredericks' automobile col- lided with a gravel truck driven by Stockert and owned by respondent A­1 Contractors, Stockert's employer. A­1 Contractors, a non-Indian-owned enterprise with its princi- pal place of business outside the reservation, was at the time under a subcontract with LCM Corporation, a corporation wholly owned by the Tribes, to do landscaping work related to the construction of a tribal community building. A­1 Contractors performed all work under the subcontract within the boundaries of the reservation.1 The record does not show whether Stockert was engaged in subcontract work at the time of the accident. Neither Stockert nor Freder- icks is a member of the Three Affiliated Tribes or an Indian. Fredericks, however, is the widow of a deceased member of the Tribes and has five adult children who are tribal members.2 Fredericks sustained serious injuries in the accident and was hospitalized for 24 days. In May 1991, she sued re- spondents A­1 Contractors and Stockert, as well as A­1 Con- tractors' insurer, in the Tribal Court for the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation. In the same law- suit, Fredericks' five adult children filed a loss-of-consortium 1 Respondents state that the subcontract had forum-selection and choice-of-law provisions selecting Utah state courts and Utah law for dis- pute resolution. See Brief for Respondents 2. Petitioners do not contest this point, but the subcontract is not part of the record in this case. 2 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated that petitioner Fredericks resides on the reservation. See 76 F. 3d 930, 932 (1996) (en banc). Respondents assert, however, that there is an unresolved factual dispute regarding Fredericks' residence at the time of the accident. See Brief for Respondents 1­2, n. 2; Brief in Opposition 3, n. 4. Under our disposition of the case, Fredericks' residence at the time of the accident is immaterial. 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 444 STRATE v. A­1 CONTRACTORS Opinion of the Court claim. Together, Fredericks and her children sought dam- ages exceeding $13 million. App. 8­10. Respondents and the insurer made a special appearance in the Tribal Court to contest that court's personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. The Tribal Court ruled that it had authority to adjudicate Gisela Fredericks' case, and therefore denied respondents' motion to dismiss the action. Id., at 24­25.3 Respondents appealed the Tribal Court's ju- risdictional ruling to the Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals, which affirmed. Id., at 36. Thereafter, pursu- ant to the parties' stipulation, the Tribal Court dismissed the insurer from the suit. See id., at 38­40. Before Tribal Court proceedings resumed, respondents commenced this action in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota. Naming as defendants Fredericks, her adult children, the Tribal Court, and Tribal Judge William Strate, respondents sought a declaratory judgment that, as a matter of federal law, the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Fredericks' claims. The re- spondents also sought an injunction against further proceed- ings in the Tribal Court. See id., at 41­45. Relying particularly on this Court's decisions in National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U. S. 845 (1985), and Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U. S. 9 (1987), the District Court determined that the Tribal Court had civil jurisdiction over Fredericks' complaint against A­1 Contrac- tors and Stockert; accordingly, on cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court dismissed the action. App. 54­67. On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. App. 68­ 90. The Eighth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and, in an 8-to-4 decision, reversed the District Court's judgment. 3 Satisfied that it could adjudicate Gisela Fredericks' claims, the Tribal Court declined to address her adult children's consortium claim, App. 25; thus, no ruling on that claim is here at issue. 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 438 (1997) 445 Opinion of the Court 76 F. 3d 930 (1996). The Court of Appeals concluded that our decision in Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544 (1981), was the controlling precedent, and that, under Mon- tana, the Tribal Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute.4 We granted certiorari, 518 U. S. 1056 (1996), and now affirm. II Our case law establishes that, absent express authoriza- tion by federal statute or treaty, tribal jurisdiction over the conduct of nonmembers exists only in limited circumstances. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U. S. 191 (1978), the Court held that Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.5 Montana v. United States, decided three years later, is the pathmarking case concerning tribal civil authority over nonmembers. Montana concerned the au- thority of the Crow Tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on lands within the Tribe's reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians. The Court said in Montana that the restriction on tribal criminal jurisdiction recognized in Oliphant rested on principles that support a more "general proposition." 450 U. S., at 565. In the main, the Court explained, "the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe"-those powers a tribe enjoys apart from express pro- vision by treaty or statute-"do not extend to the activities 4 Petitioner Fredericks has commenced a similar lawsuit in a North Da- kota state court "to protect her rights against the running of the State's six-year statute of limitations." Reply Brief 6, n. 2. Respondents assert that they have answered the complaint and "are prepared to proceed in that forum." Brief for Respondents 8, n. 6. Respondents also note, with- out contradiction, that the state forum "is physically much closer by road to the accident scene . . . than [is] the tribal courthouse." Ibid. 5 In Duro v. Reina, 495 U. S. 676, 684­685 (1990), we held that Indian tribes also lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. Shortly after our decision in Duro, Congress provided for tribal criminal jurisdic- tion over nonmember Indians. See 25 U. S. C. § 1301(2). 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 446 STRATE v. A­1 CONTRACTORS Opinion of the Court of nonmembers of the tribe." Ibid. The Montana opinion added, however, that in certain circumstances, even where Congress has not expressly authorized it, tribal civil jurisdic- tion may encompass nonmembers: "To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, li- censing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also retain inher- ent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." Id., at 565­566 (citations and footnote omitted). The term "non-Indian fee lands," as used in this passage and throughout the Montana opinion, refers to reservation land acquired in fee simple by non-Indian owners. See id., at 548. Montana thus described a general rule that, absent a dif- ferent congressional direction, Indian tribes lack civil author- ity over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation, subject to two exceptions: The first ex- ception relates to nonmembers who enter consensual rela- tionships with the tribe or its members; the second concerns activity that directly affects the tribe's political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare. The Montana Court recognized that the Crow Tribe retained power to limit or forbid hunting or fishing by nonmembers on land still owned by or held in trust for the Tribe. Id., at 557. The Court held, however, that the Tribe lacked authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on land within the Tribe's 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 438 (1997) 447 Opinion of the Court reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians. Id., at 564­567.6 Petitioners and the United States as amicus curiae urge that Montana does not control this case. They maintain that the guiding precedents are National Farmers and Iowa Mutual, and that those decisions establish a rule converse to Montana's. Whatever Montana may instruct regarding regulatory authority, they insist, tribal courts retain adjudi- catory authority in disputes over occurrences inside a reser- vation, even when the episode-in-suit involves nonmembers, unless a treaty or federal statute directs otherwise. Peti- tioners, further supported by the United States, argue, alter- nately, that Montana does not cover lands owned by, or held 6 Montana's statement of the governing law figured prominently in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U. S. 408 (1989), and in South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U. S. 679 (1993). The Court held in Brendale, 6 to 3, that the Yakima Indian Nation lacked authority to zone nonmembers' land within an area of the Tribe's reserva- tion open to the general public; almost half the land in the area was owned in fee by nonmembers. The Court also held, 5 to 4, that the Tribe re- tained authority to zone fee land in an area of the reservation closed to the general public. No opinion garnered a majority. Justice White, writ- ing for four Members of the Court, concluded that, under Montana, the Tribe lacked authority to zone fee land in both the open and closed areas of the reservation. 492 U. S., at 422­432. Justice Stevens, writing for two Justices, concluded that the Tribe retained zoning authority over non- member land only in the closed area. Id., at 443­444. Justice Blackmun, writing for three Justices, concluded that, under Montana's second excep- tion, the Tribe retained authority to zone fee land in both the open and the closed areas. Id., at 456­459. In Bourland, the Court considered whether the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe could regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians in an area within the Tribe's reservation, but acquired by the United States for the opera- tion of a dam and a reservoir. We determined, dominantly, that no treaty or statute reserved to the Tribe regulatory authority over the area, see 508 U. S., at 697, and we left for resolution on remand the question whether either Montana exception applied, see 508 U. S., at 695­696; see also 39 F. 3d 868, 869­870 (CA8 1994) (decision of divided panel on remand that neither Montana exception justified regulation by the Tribe). 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 448 STRATE v. A­1 CONTRACTORS Opinion of the Court in trust for, a tribe or its members. Montana holds sway, petitioners say, only with respect to alienated reservation land owned in fee simple by non-Indians. We address these arguments in turn. A We begin with petitioners' contention that National Farmers and Iowa Mutual broadly confirm tribal-court civil jurisdiction over claims against nonmembers arising from oc- currences on any land within a reservation. We read our precedent differently. National Farmers and Iowa Mu- tual, we conclude, are not at odds with, and do not displace, Montana. Both decisions describe an exhaustion rule allowing tribal courts initially to respond to an invocation of their jurisdiction; neither establishes tribal-court adjudica- tory authority, even over the lawsuits involved in those cases. Accord, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U. S. 408, 427, n. 10 (1989) (opinion of White, J.). National Farmers involved a federal-court challenge to a tribal court's jurisdiction over a personal injury action initi- ated on behalf of a Crow Indian minor against a Montana school district. The accident-in-suit occurred when the minor was struck by a motorcycle in an elementary school parking lot. The school occupied land owned by the State within the Crow Indian Reservation. See 471 U. S., at 847. The school district and its insurer sought a federal-court in- junction to stop proceedings in the Crow Tribal Court. See id., at 848. The District Court granted the injunction, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that federal courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain such a case. See id., at 848­849. We reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and held that federal courts have authority to determine, as a matter "aris- ing under" federal law, see 28 U. S. C. § 1331, whether a tribal court has exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction. See 471 U. S., at 852­853. We further held, however, that the fed- 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 438 (1997) 449 Opinion of the Court eral suit was premature. Ordinarily, we explained, a federal court should stay its hand "until after the Tribal Court has had a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction." Id., at 857. Finding no cause for immediate federal-court intervention,7 we remanded the case, leaving initially to the District Court the question "[w]hether the federal action should be dismissed, or merely held in abeyance pending . . . further Tribal Court proceedings." Ibid. Petitioners underscore the principal reason we gave in Na- tional Farmers for the exhaustion requirement there stated. Tribal-court jurisdiction over non-Indians in criminal cases is categorically restricted under Oliphant, we observed, while in civil matters "the existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as em- bodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judi- cial decisions." 471 U. S., at 855­856 (footnote omitted). The Court's recognition in National Farmers that tribal courts have more extensive jurisdiction in civil cases than in criminal proceedings, and of the need to inspect relevant statutes, treaties, and other materials, does not limit Mon- tana's instruction. As the Court made plain in Montana, the general rule and exceptions there announced govern only in the absence of a delegation of tribal authority by treaty or statute. In Montana itself, the Court examined the trea- ties and legislation relied upon by the Tribe and explained 7 The Court indicated in National Farmers that exhaustion is not an unyielding requirement: "We do not suggest that exhaustion would be required where an asser- tion of tribal jurisdiction `is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith,' or where the action is patently violative of express jurisdic- tional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court's jurisdiction." 471 U. S., at 856, n. 21 (citation omitted). 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 450 STRATE v. A­1 CONTRACTORS Opinion of the Court why those measures did not aid the Tribe's case. See 450 U. S., at 557­563. Only after and in light of that examina- tion did the Court address the Tribe's assertion of "inherent sovereignty," and formulate, in response to that assertion, Montana's general rule and exceptions to it. In sum, we do not extract from National Farmers anything more than a prudential exhaustion rule, in deference to the capacity of tribal courts "to explain to the parties the precise basis for accepting [or rejecting] jurisdiction." 471 U. S., at 857. Iowa Mutual involved an accident in which a member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe was injured while driving a cattle truck within the boundaries of the reservation. 480 U. S., at 11. The injured member was employed by a Montana corporation that operated a ranch on reservation land owned by Blackfeet Indians residing on the reservation. See ibid. The driver and his wife, also a Tribe member, sued in the Blackfeet Tribal Court, naming several defendants: the Mon- tana corporation that employed the driver; the individual owners of the ranch; the insurer of the ranch; and an inde- pendent insurance adjuster representing the insurer. See ibid. Over the objection of the insurer and the insurance adjuster-both companies not owned by members of the Tribe-the Tribal Court determined that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. See id., at 12. Thereafter, the insurer commenced a federal-court action against the driver, his wife, the Montana corporation, and the ranch owners. See ibid. Invoking federal jurisdiction based on the parties' diverse citizenship, see 28 U. S. C. § 1332, the insurer alleged that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the Montana corporation or the ranch owners be- cause the injuries asserted by the driver and his wife fell outside the coverage of the applicable insurance policies. See 480 U. S., at 12­13. The Federal District Court dis- missed the insurer's action for lack of subject-matter juris- diction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. See id., at 13­14. 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 438 (1997) 451 Opinion of the Court We reversed. Holding that the District Court had diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction over the insurer's com- plaint, we remanded, as in National Farmers, for a determi- nation whether "the federal action should be stayed pending further Tribal Court proceedings or dismissed." 480 U. S., at 20, n. 14. The Court recognized in Iowa Mutual that the exhaustion rule stated in National Farmers was "pruden- tial," not jurisdictional. 480 U. S., at 20, n. 14; see also id., at 16, n. 8 (stating that "[e]xhaustion is required as a matter of comity, not as a jurisdictional prerequisite"). Respect for tribal self-government made it appropriate "to give the tribal court a `full opportunity to determine its own jurisdic- tion.' " Id., at 16 (quoting National Farmers, 471 U. S., at 857). That respect, the Court reasoned, was equally in order whether federal-court jurisdiction rested on § 1331 (federal question) or on § 1332 (diversity of citizenship). 480 U. S., at 17­18. Elaborating on the point, the Court stated: "Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sover- eignty. See Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544, 565­566 (1981); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, 152­153 (1980); Fisher v. District Court [of Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Mont.], 424 U. S. [382,] 387­389 [(1976)]. Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute. . . . In the absence of any indication that Congress intended the diversity statute to limit the jurisdiction of the tribal courts, we decline petitioner's invitation to hold that tribal sover- eignty can be impaired in this fashion." Id., at 18. Petitioners and the United States fasten upon the Court's statement that "[c]ivil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts." Read in context, however, this language scarcely supports the view that the 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 452 STRATE v. A­1 CONTRACTORS Opinion of the Court Montana rule does not bear on tribal-court adjudicatory authority in cases involving nonmember defendants. The statement stressed by petitioners and the United States was made in refutation of the argument that "Con- gress intended the diversity statute to limit the jurisdiction of the tribal courts." 480 U. S., at 18. The statement is preceded by three informative citations. The first citation points to the passage in Montana in which the Court ad- vanced "the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe," 450 U. S., at 565, with two prime exceptions, id., at 565­566. The case cited second is Wash- ington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U. S. 134 (1980), a decision the Montana Court listed as illus- trative of the first Montana exception, applicable to "non- members who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members," 450 U. S., at 565­566; the Court in Colville acknowledged inherent tribal authority to tax "non-Indians entering the reservation to engage in economic activity," 447 U. S., at 153. The third case noted in conjunction with the Iowa Mutual statement is Fisher v. District Court of Six- teenth Judicial Dist. of Mont., 424 U. S. 382 (1976) (per cu- riam), a decision the Montana Court cited in support of the second Montana exception, covering on-reservation activity of nonmembers bearing directly "on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." 450 U. S., at 566. The Court held in Fisher that a tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding when all parties were members of the tribe and resided on its reservation. See 424 U. S., at 383, 389. State-court ju- risdiction over such matters, the Court said, "plainly would interfere with the powers of self-government conferred upon the . . . Tribe and exercised through the Tribal Court." Id., at 387. The Court observed in Fisher that state courts may not exercise jurisdiction over disputes arising out of 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 438 (1997) 453 Opinion of the Court on-reservation conduct-even over matters involving non- Indians-if doing so would " `infring[e] on the right of res- ervation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.' " Id., at 386 (citation omitted). In light of the citation of Montana, Colville, and Fisher, the Iowa Mutual statement emphasized by petitioners does not limit the Montana rule. In keeping with the precedent to which Iowa Mutual refers, the statement stands for noth- ing more than the unremarkable proposition that, where tribes possess authority to regulate the activities of non- members, "[c]ivil jurisdiction over [disputes arising out of] such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts." 480 U. S., at 18. Recognizing that our precedent has been variously inter- preted, we reiterate that National Farmers and Iowa Mu- tual enunciate only an exhaustion requirement, a "prudential rule," see Iowa Mutual, 480 U. S., at 20, n. 14, based on com- ity, see id., at 16, n. 8. These decisions do not expand or stand apart from Montana's instruction on "the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe." 450 U. S., at 565. While Montana immediately involved regulatory authority, the Court broadly addressed the concept of "inherent sover- eignty." Id., at 563. Regarding activity on non-Indian fee land within a reservation, Montana delineated-in a main rule and exceptions-the bounds of the power tribes retain to exercise "forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians." Id., at 565. As to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe's adjudica- tive jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction. Absent congressional direction enlarging tribal-court juris- diction, we adhere to that understanding. Subject to con- trolling provisions in treaties and statutes, and the two ex- ceptions identified in Montana, the civil authority of Indian tribes and their courts with respect to non-Indian fee lands generally "do[es] not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe." Ibid. 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 454 STRATE v. A­1 CONTRACTORS Opinion of the Court B We consider next the argument that Montana does not govern this case because the land underlying the scene of the accident is held in trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes and their members. Petitioners and the United States point out that in Montana, as in later cases following Montana's instruction-Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U. S. 408 (1989), and South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U. S. 679 (1993), described supra, at 447, n. 6-the challenged tribal authority related to nonmember activity on alienated, non-Indian reservation land. We "can readily agree," in accord with Montana, 450 U. S., at 557, that tribes retain considerable control over nonmember con- duct on tribal land.8 On the particular matter before us, however, we agree with respondents: The right-of-way North Dakota acquired for the State's highway renders the 6.59-mile stretch equivalent, for nonmember governance pur- poses,9 to alienated, non-Indian land. Congress authorized grants of rights-of-way over Indian lands in 1948 legislation. Act of Feb. 5, 1948, ch. 45, 62 Stat. 17, 25 U. S. C. §§ 323­328. A grant over land belonging to a tribe requires "consent of the proper tribal officials," § 324, 8 Petitioners note in this regard the Court's unqualified recognition in Montana that "the Tribe may prohibit nonmembers from hunting or fish- ing on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the Tribe." 450 U. S., at 557. The question addressed was "the power of the Tribe to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of the Tribe." Ibid.; see Brief for Petition- ers 15­16. 9 For contextual treatment of rights-of-way over Indian land, compare 18 U. S. C. § 1151 (defining "Indian country" in criminal law chapter gener- ally to include "rights-of-way running through [a] reservation") with §§ 1154(c) and 1156 (term "Indian country," as used in sections on dispensa- tion and possession of intoxicants, "does not include . . . rights-of-way through Indian reservations"). 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 438 (1997) 455 Opinion of the Court and the payment of just compensation, § 325.10 The grant involved in this case was made, pursuant to the federal stat- ute, in 1970. Its purpose was to facilitate public access to Lake Sakakawea, a federal water resource project under the control of the Army Corps of Engineers. In the granting instrument, the United States conveyed to North Dakota "an easement for a right-of-way for the re- alignment and improvement of North Dakota State Highway No. 8 over, across and upon [specified] lands." App. to Brief for Respondents 1. The grant provides that the State's "easement is subject to any valid existing right or adverse claim and is without limitation as to tenure, so long as said easement shall be actually used for the purpose . . . speci- fied." Id., at 3. The granting instrument details only one specific reservation to Indian landowners: "The right is reserved to the Indian land owners, their lessees, successors, and assigns to construct crossings of the right-of-way at all points reasonably necessary to the undisturbed use and occupan[cy] of the premises af- fected by the right-of-way; such crossings to be con- structed and maintained by the owners or lawful occu- pants and users of said lands at their own risk and said occupants and users to assume full responsibility for avoiding, or repairing any damage to the right-of-way, which may be occasioned by such crossings." Id., at 3­4. Apart from this specification, the Three Affiliated Tribes ex- pressly reserved no right to exercise dominion or control over the right-of-way. Forming part of the State's highway, the right-of-way is open to the public, and traffic on it is subject to the State's 10 Rights-of-way granted over lands of individual Indians also require payment of compensation, 25 U. S. C. § 325, and ordinarily require consent of the individual owners, see § 324 (describing circumstances in which rights-of-way may be granted without the consent of owners). 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 456 STRATE v. A­1 CONTRACTORS Opinion of the Court control.11 The Tribes have consented to, and received pay- ment for, the State's use of the 6.59-mile stretch for a public highway. They have retained no gatekeeping right. So long as the stretch is maintained as part of the State's high- way, the Tribes cannot assert a landowner's right to occupy and exclude. Cf. Bourland, 508 U. S., at 689 (regarding res- ervation land acquired by the United States for operation of a dam and a reservoir, Tribe's loss of "right of absolute and exclusive use and occupation . . . implies the loss of regula- tory jurisdiction over the use of the land by others"). We therefore align the right-of-way, for the purpose at hand, with land alienated to non-Indians. Our decision in Mon- tana, accordingly, governs this case. III Petitioners and the United States refer to no treaty or statute authorizing the Three Affiliated Tribes to entertain highway-accident tort suits of the kind Fredericks com- menced against A­1 Contractors and Stockert. Rather, petitioners and the United States ground their defense of tribal-court jurisdiction exclusively on the concept of re- tained or inherent sovereignty. Montana, we have ex- plained, is the controlling decision for this case. To prevail here, petitioners must show that Fredericks' tribal-court ac- tion against nonmembers qualifies under one of Montana's two exceptions. The first exception to the Montana rule covers "activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the 11 We do not here question the authority of tribal police to patrol roads within a reservation, including rights-of-way made part of a state highway, and to detain and turn over to state officers nonmembers stopped on the highway for conduct violating state law. Cf. State v. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 390, 850 P. 2d 1332, 1341 (en banc) (recognizing that a limited tribal power "to stop and detain alleged offenders in no way confers an unlimited authority to regulate the right of the public to travel on the Reservation's roads"), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 931 (1993). 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 438 (1997) 457 Opinion of the Court tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements." 450 U. S., at 565. The tor- tious conduct alleged in Fredericks' complaint does not fit that description. The dispute, as the Court of Appeals said, is "distinctly non-tribal in nature." 76 F. 3d, at 940. It "arose between two non-Indians involved in [a] run-of-the- mill [highway] accident." Ibid. Although A­1 was en- gaged in subcontract work on the Fort Berthold Reservation, and therefore had a "consensual relationship" with the Tribes, "Gisela Fredericks was not a party to the subcon- tract, and the [T]ribes were strangers to the accident." Ibid. Montana's list of cases fitting within the first exception, see 450 U. S., at 565­566, indicates the type of activities the Court had in mind: Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 223 (1959) (declaring tribal jurisdiction exclusive over lawsuit arising out of on-reservation sales transaction between nonmember plaintiff and member defendants); Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384 (1904) (upholding tribal permit tax on nonmember- owned livestock within boundaries of the Chickasaw Nation); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (CA8 1905) (upholding Tribe's permit tax on nonmembers for the privilege of con- ducting business within Tribe's borders; court characterized as "inherent" the Tribe's "authority . . . to prescribe the terms upon which noncitizens may transact business within its borders"); Colville, 447 U. S., at 152­154 (tribal authority to tax on-reservation cigarette sales to nonmembers "is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status"). Measured against these cases, the Fredericks-Stockert highway accident presents no "con- sensual relationship" of the qualifying kind. The second exception to Montana's general rule concerns conduct that "threatens or has some direct effect on the po- litical integrity, the economic security, or the health or wel- fare of the tribe." 450 U. S., at 566. Undoubtedly, those 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 458 STRATE v. A­1 CONTRACTORS Opinion of the Court who drive carelessly on a public highway running through a reservation endanger all in the vicinity, and surely jeopar- dize the safety of tribal members. But if Montana's second exception requires no more, the exception would severely shrink the rule. Again, cases cited in Montana indicate the character of the tribal interest the Court envisioned. The Court's statement of Montana's second exceptional category is followed by citation of four cases, ibid.; each of those cases raised the question whether a State's (or Territo- ry's) exercise of authority would trench unduly on tribal self-government. In two of the cases, the Court held that a State's exercise of authority would so intrude, and in two, the Court saw no impermissible intrusion. The Court referred first to the decision recognizing the exclusive competence of a tribal court over an adoption pro- ceeding when all parties belonged to the Tribe and resided on its reservation. See Fisher, 424 U. S., at 386; supra, at 452­453. Next, the Court listed a decision holding a tribal court exclusively competent to adjudicate a claim by a non- Indian merchant seeking payment from tribe members for goods bought on credit at an on-reservation store. See Wil- liams, 358 U. S., at 220 ("[A]bsent governing Acts of Con- gress, the question [of state-court jurisdiction over on- reservation conduct] has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."). Thereafter, the Court referred to two decisions dealing with objections to a county or territorial government's imposition of a property tax on non-Indian-owned livestock that grazed on reserva- tion land; in neither case did the Court find a significant tribal interest at stake. See Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U. S. 118, 128­129 (1906) ("the Indians' interest in this kind of property [livestock], situated on their reservations, was not sufficient to exempt such property, when owned by private individuals, from [state or territorial] taxation"); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 273 (1898) ("[terri- 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 438 (1997) 459 Opinion of the Court torial] tax put upon the cattle of [non-Indian] lessees is too remote and indirect to be deemed a tax upon the lands or privileges of the Indians"). Read in isolation, the Montana rule's second exception can be misperceived. Key to its proper application, however, is the Court's preface: "Indian tribes retain their inherent power [to punish tribal offenders,] to determine tribal mem- bership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members. . . . But [a tribe's inherent power does not reach] beyond what is neces- sary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations." 450 U. S., at 564. Neither regulatory nor adju- dicatory authority over the state highway accident at issue is needed to preserve "the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." Williams, 358 U. S., at 220. The Montana rule, therefore, and not its exceptions, applies to this case. Gisela Fredericks may pursue her case against A­1 Con- tractors and Stockert in the state forum open to all who sus- tain injuries on North Dakota's highway.12 Opening the Tribal Court for her optional use is not necessary to protect tribal self-government; and requiring A­1 and Stockert to defend against this commonplace state highway accident claim in an unfamiliar court 13 is not crucial to "the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the [Three Affiliated Tribes]." Montana, 450 U. S., at 566.14 12 See supra, at 445, n. 4. 13 Within the federal system, when nonresidents are the sole defendants in a suit filed in state court, the defendants ordinarily may remove the case to federal court. See 28 U. S. C. § 1441. 14 When, as in this case, it is plain that no federal grant provides for tribal governance of nonmembers' conduct on land covered by Montana's main rule, it will be equally evident that tribal courts lack adjudicatory authority over disputes arising from such conduct. As in criminal pro- ceedings, state or federal courts will be the only forums competent to adjudicate those disputes. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U. S. 845, 854 (1985). Therefore, when tribal-court juris- 520US2 Unit: $U48 [09-10-99 18:53:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 460 STRATE v. A­1 CONTRACTORS Opinion of the Court * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is Affirmed. diction over an action such as this one is challenged in federal court, the otherwise applicable exhaustion requirement, see supra, at 449­450, must give way, for it would serve no purpose other than delay. Cf. National Farmers, 471 U. S., at 856, n. 21; supra, at 449, n. 7. 520US2 Unit: $U49 [09-10-99 18:55:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 461 Syllabus JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit No. 96­203. Argued February 25, 1997-Decided May 12, 1997 Petitioner Johnson testified before a federal grand jury, investigating, inter alia, the disposition of proceeds from her boyfriend's alleged drug trafficking, that she had obtained tens of thousands of dollars to improve her home from a box of cash given her late mother by one Talcott. Subsequently, she was charged with violating 18 U. S. C. § 1623, which proscribes "knowingly mak[ing] any false material declaration" under oath before a grand jury. At her trial, it was revealed that her boy- friend had negotiated the purchase of her home and had an interest in a corporation whose checks had been used to help pay for the property, and that Talcott had died several years before the time he allegedly gave her mother the money. Johnson did not object when, in accord- ance with then-extant Circuit precedent, the judge instructed the jury that materiality was a question for him to decide, and that he had deter- mined that her statements were material. Johnson was convicted of perjury, but before her appeal, this Court ruled, in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, that the materiality of a false statement must be decided by a jury rather than a trial judge. On appeal, Johnson's claim that her conviction was invalid under Gaudin was reviewed by the Elev- enth Circuit pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which allows plain errors affecting substantial rights to be noticed even though no objection has been made. Following the analysis outlined in United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, the court assumed, arguendo, that the District Court's failure to submit materiality to the jury constituted "error" that was "clear or obvious." However, it concluded that any such error did not affect "substantial rights" because its independent review of the record showed that there was "overwhelming" evidence of materiality and that no reasonable juror could conclude that Johnson's false statements about the money's source were not material to the grand jury's investigation. Held: The trial court's action in this case was not "plain error" of the sort which an appellate court may notice under Rule 52(b). (a) Since § 1623's text leaves no doubt that materiality is an element of perjury, Gaudin dictates that materiality in this case be decided by the jury, not the court. Johnson's failure to timely assert that right before the trial court ordinarily would result in forfeiture of the right 520US2 Unit: $U49 [09-10-99 18:55:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN 462 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES Syllabus pursuant to Rule 30. However, Rule 52(b) mitigates Rule 30 and, con- trary to Johnson's argument, governs her direct appeal. The Olano test for applying Rule 52(b) requires that there be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If these three conditions are met, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to notice a for- feited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integ- rity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Pp. 465­466. (b) The first prong of Olano is satisfied here, as Gaudin must be ap- plied to Johnson's case on direct review. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 328. The second prong is met as well. In a case such as this-where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal-it is sufficient that the error be plain at the time of appellate consideration. Even assuming that the third prong is also satisfied, a court must still determine whether the forfeited error meets the fourth prong before it may exercise its discretion to correct the error. In this case the fourth question must be answered in the negative. Materiality was essentially uncontroverted at trial and has remained so on appeal. Johnson has presented no plausible argu- ment that her false statement under oath-lying about the source of the money she used to improve her home-was somehow not mate- rial to the grand jury investigation. It would be the reversal of her conviction, not the failure to notice the error, that would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceed- ings. Pp. 466­470. 82 F. 3d 429, affirmed. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, which was unani- mous except insofar as Scalia, J., did not join Parts II­B and II­C. William J. Sheppard argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were D. Gray Thomas and Elizabeth L. White. Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting So- licitor General Dellinger, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen- eral Keeney, and Jonathan E. Nuechterlein.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Neal Goldfarb, Barbara Bergman, and Blair G. Brown; and for David R. Knoll by Stephen L. Braga. 520US2 Unit: $U49 [09-10-99 18:55:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 461 (1997) 463 Opinion of the Court Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.* In this case the trial court itself decided the issue of mate- riality in a perjury prosecution, rather than submitting it to the jury as our decision in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506 (1995), now requires. No objection was made by the petitioner, Joyce B. Johnson, and we hold that the court's action in this case was not "plain error" of the sort which an appellate court may notice under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). In the late 1980's, a federal investigation into the cocaine and marijuana trafficking of Earl James Fields revealed that he and his partner had amassed some $10 million from their illicit activities. Following the money trail, federal authori- ties subpoenaed Johnson, Fields' long-time girlfriend, to tes- tify before a federal grand jury. Johnson, who is the mother of a child by Fields, earned about $34,000 a year at the Flor- ida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. She testified before the grand jury that she owned five pieces of real property, including her house. That house was pur- chased by Johnson in 1991 for $75,600, and in the next two years she added sufficient improvements to it that in 1993 it was appraised at $344,800. When asked the source of her home improvement funds, Johnson stated that she had put $80,000 to $120,000 into her house, all of which had come from a box of cash given her late mother by one Gerald Tal- cott in 1985 or 1986. On the basis of this testimony, Johnson was indicted for perjury under 18 U. S. C. § 1623. At trial, it was revealed that Fields had negotiated the original purchase of Johnson's home and that Johnson had paid for the property with eight different cashier's checks, including two from a corporation in which Fields had an interest. It was also established that Gerald Talcott had died in April 1982, several years before *Justice Scalia joins all but Parts II­B and II­C of this opinion. 520US2 Unit: $U49 [09-10-99 18:55:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN 464 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court the time Johnson claimed he had given her mother the box full of cash. At the close of Johnson's trial, and in accordance with then-extant Circuit precedent, see, e. g., United States v. Molinares, 700 F. 2d 647, 653 (CA11 1983), the District Judge instructed the jury that the element of materiality was a question for the judge to decide, and that he had determined that her statements were material. App. 72. Johnson did not object to this instruction. Indeed, when the prosecution had presented evidence concerning materiality during the trial, she had then objected, on the ground that materiality was a matter for the judge, and not the jury, to decide. Id., at 61. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and Johnson was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment, three years' su- pervised release, and a $30,000 fine. After Johnson was convicted, but before her appeal to the Court of Appeals, we decided United States v. Gaudin, supra, which held that the materiality of a false statement must be submitted to the jury rather than decided by the trial judge. On her appeal, Johnson argued that the trial judge's failure to submit materiality to the jury rendered her conviction invalid under Gaudin. Because Johnson had failed to object to the trial judge's deciding materiality, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed for plain error. Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting sub- stantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." Following our analysis in United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725 (1993), the Court of Appeals assumed, arguendo, that the District Court's failure to submit materiality to the jury constituted "error" that was "clear or obvious," but con- cluded nonetheless that any such error did not affect the "substantial rights" of the defendant. That conclusion was 520US2 Unit: $U49 [09-10-99 18:55:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 461 (1997) 465 Opinion of the Court based on the court's independent review of the record and determination that there was "overwhelming" evidence of materiality and that "[n]o reasonable juror could conclude that Johnson's false statements about the source of the money . . . were not material to the grand jury's investiga- tion." App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a (judgt. order reported at 82 F. 3d 429 (CA11 1996)). Due to the conflict between this decision and the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in United States v. Keys, 95 F. 3d 874 (1996), we granted certiorari. 519 U. S. 989 (1996). We now affirm. I Title 18 U. S. C. § 1623 proscribes "knowingly mak[ing] any false material declaration" under oath before a grand jury. Although we merely assumed in Gaudin that materiality is an element of making a false statement under 18 U. S. C. § 1001, and although we recently held that materiality is not an element of making a false statement to a federally insured bank under 18 U. S. C. § 1014, United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482 (1997), there is no doubt that materiality is an ele- ment of perjury under § 1623. The statutory text expressly requires that the false declaration be "material." Gaudin therefore dictates that materiality be decided by the jury, not the court. Petitioner, however, did not object to the trial court's treatment of materiality. Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "No party may assign as error any portion of the [jury] charge or omission therefrom unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection." This Rule is sim- ply the embodiment of the "familiar" principle that a right " `may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.' " Olano, supra, at 731 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 444 (1944)). 520US2 Unit: $U49 [09-10-99 18:55:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN 466 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court The Rule is mitigated, however, by Rule 52(b), which allows plain errors affecting substantial rights to be noticed even though there was no objection. Petitioner argues that she need not fall within the "lim- ited" and "circumscribed" strictures of Olano, because the error she complains of here is "structural," and so is outside Rule 52(b) altogether. But the seriousness of the error claimed does not remove consideration of it from the ambit of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. None of the cases discussing "structural error," upon which petitioner re- lies, were direct appeals from judgments of conviction in the federal system. Several came from state courts which had considered the claimed error under their own rules. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963); Arizona v. Ful- minante, 499 U. S. 279 (1991); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U. S. 275 (1993). Others came here by way of federal habeas challenges to state convictions. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254 (1986); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U. S. 168 (1984). None of them were subject to the provisions of Rule 52. But it is that Rule which by its terms governs direct ap- peals from judgments of conviction in the federal system, and therefore governs this case. We cautioned against any unwarranted expansion of Rule 52(b) in United States v. Young, 470 U. S. 1 (1985), because it "would skew the Rule's `careful balancing of our need to encourage all trial partici- pants to seek a fair and accurate trial the first time around against our insistence that obvious injustice be promptly re- dressed,' " id., at 15 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 163 (1982)). Even less appropriate than an unwar- ranted expansion of the Rule would be the creation out of whole cloth of an exception to it, an exception which we have no authority to make. See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416, 425­426 (1996). II We therefore turn to apply here Rule 52(b) as outlined in Olano. Under that test, before an appellate court can cor- 520US2 Unit: $U49 [09-10-99 18:55:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 461 (1997) 467 Opinion of the Court rect an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) "error," (2) that is "plain," and (3) that "affect[s] substantial rights." 507 U. S., at 732. If all three conditions are met, an appel- late court may then exercise its discretion to notice a for- feited error, but only if (4) the error " ` "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceed- ings." ' " Ibid. (quoting United States v. Young, supra, at 15, in turn quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U. S. 157, 160 (1936)). A There is no doubt that if petitioner's trial occurred today, the failure to submit materiality to the jury would be error under Gaudin. Under Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 (1987), a "new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases . . . pending on direct review . . . , with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a `clear break' with the past." Id., at 328. Because petitioner is still on direct review, Griffith requires that we apply Gaudin retroactively. Accordingly, under Gaudin there was "error," and the first prong of Olano is satisfied. B The second prong is more difficult. Olano explained that the word "plain" is "synonymous with `clear' or, equivalently, `obvious.' " 507 U. S., at 734. But Olano refrained from de- ciding when an error must be plain to be reviewable. "At a minimum," Olano concluded, the error must be plain "under current law." Ibid. In the case with which we are faced today, the error is certainly clear under "current law," but it was by no means clear at the time of trial. The Government contends that for an error to be "plain," it must have been so both at the time of trial and at the time of appellate consideration. In this case, it says, petitioner should have objected to the court's deciding the issue of ma- teriality, even though near-uniform precedent both from this 520US2 Unit: $U49 [09-10-99 18:55:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN 468 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Court and from the Courts of Appeals held that course proper.1 Petitioner, on the other hand, urges that such a rule would result in counsel's inevitably making a long and virtually useless laundry list of objections to rulings that were plainly supported by existing precedent. We agree with petitioner on this point, and hold that in a case such as this-where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal-it is enough that an error be "plain" at the time of appellate consider- ation. Here, at the time of trial it was settled that the issue of materiality was to be decided by the court, not the jury; by the time of appellate consideration, the law had changed, and it is now settled that materiality is an issue for the jury. The second part of the Olano test is therefore satisfied. C But even though the error be "plain," it must also "affec[t] substantial rights." It is at this point that petitioner's argu- ment that the failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury is "structural error" becomes relevant. She con- tends in effect that if an error is so serious as to defy harmless-error analysis, it must also "affec[t] substantial rights." A "structural" error, we explained in Arizona v. Fulminante, is a "defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself," 499 U. S., at 310. We have found struc- tural errors only in a very limited class of cases: See Gideon 1 See United States v. Corsino, 812 F. 2d 26, 31, n. 3 (CA1 1987); United States v. Bernard, 384 F. 2d 915, 916 (CA2 1967); United States v. Greber, 760 F. 2d 68, 73 (CA3 1985); Nilson Van & Storage Co. v. Marsh, 755 F. 2d 362, 367 (CA4 1985); United States v. Hausmann, 711 F. 2d 615, 616­617 (CA5 1983); United States v. Chandler, 752 F. 2d 1148, 1150­1151 (CA6 1985); United States v. Brantley, 786 F. 2d 1322, 1327, and n. 2 (CA7 1986); United States v. Hicks, 619 F. 2d 752, 758 (CA8 1980); United States v. Daily, 921 F. 2d 994, 1004 (CA10 1990); United States v. Lopez, 728 F. 2d 1359, 1362, n. 4 (CA11 1984); United States v. Hansen, 772 F. 2d 940, 950 (CADC 1985). 520US2 Unit: $U49 [09-10-99 18:55:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 461 (1997) 469 Opinion of the Court v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963) (a total deprivation of the right to counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927) (lack of an impartial trial judge); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254 (1986) (unlawful exclusion of grand jurors of defendant's race); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U. S. 168 (1984) (the right to self-representation at trial); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U. S. 39 (1984) (the right to a public trial); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U. S. 275 (1993) (erroneous reasonable-doubt instruction to jury). It is by no means clear that the error here fits within this limited class of cases. Sullivan v. Louisiana, the case most closely on point, held that the erroneous definition of "rea- sonable doubt" vitiated all of the jury's findings because one could only speculate what a properly charged jury might have done. Id., at 280. The failure to submit materiality to the jury, as in this case, can just as easily be analogized to improperly instructing the jury on an element of the of- fense, e. g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U. S. 391 (1991); Carella v. California, 491 U. S. 263 (1989) (per curiam); Pope v. Illi- nois, 481 U. S. 497 (1987); Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570 (1986), an error which is subject to harmless-error analysis, as it can be to failing to give a proper reasonable-doubt instruction altogether. Cf. California v. Roy, 519 U. S. 2, 5 (1996) (per curiam) ("The specific error at issue here-an error in the instruction that defined the crime-is . . . as easily char- acterized as a `misdescription of an element' of the crime, as it is characterized as an error of `omission' "). D But we need not decide that question because, even assum- ing that the failure to submit materiality to the jury "af- fec[ted] substantial rights," it does not meet the final re- quirement of Olano. When the first three parts of Olano are satisfied, an appellate court must then determine whether the forfeited error " `seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings' " before 520US2 Unit: $U49 [09-10-99 18:55:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN 470 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court it may exercise its discretion to correct the error. Olano, 507 U. S., at 736 (quoting Atkinson, 297 U. S., at 160). In this case that question must be answered in the nega- tive. As the Court of Appeals noted, the evidence support- ing materiality was "overwhelming." App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a. Materiality was essentially uncontroverted at trial 2 and has remained so on appeal. The grand jury here was inves- tigating petitioner's long-time boyfriend's alleged cocaine and marijuana trafficking and the "disposition of money which was proceeds of this cocaine and [marijuana] distri- bution activity, including the possible concealment of such proceeds as investments in real estate." App. 5­6. Before the Eleventh Circuit and in her briefing before this Court, petitioner has presented no plausible argument that the false statement under oath for which she was convicted-lying about the source of the tens of thousands of dollars she used to improve her home-was somehow not material to the grand jury investigation. On this record there is no basis for concluding that the error "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Indeed, it would be the reversal of a conviction such as this which would have that effect. "Reversal for error, regardless of its effect on the judgment, encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule it." R. Traynor, The Rid- dle of Harmless Error 50 (1970). No "miscarriage of justice" will result here if we do not notice the error, Olano, supra, at 736, and we decline to do so. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore Affirmed. 2 The Government represents-and petitioner has not disputed-that the sum total of petitioner's argument at trial concerning materiality con- sisted of the following conclusory sentence: " `I would argue that the ele- ment of materiality has been insufficiently proven and that the Court ought to grant a judgment of acquittal.' " Brief for United States 5 (quot- ing trial transcript); see also Reply Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 5. 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 471 Syllabus RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BOARD et al. appeal from the united states district court for the district of columbia No. 95­1455. Argued December 9, 1996-Decided May 12, 1997* Appellee Bossier Parish School Board (Board) is subject to the preclear- ance requirements of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act) and must therefore obtain the approval of either the United States Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia before implementing any changes to a voting "qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure." Based on the 1990 census, the Board redrew its 12 single-member districts, adopting the redistricting plan that the Attorney General had recently precleared for use in elections of the parish's primary governing body (the Jury plan). In doing so, the Board rejected a plan proposed by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which would have created two majority-black districts. The Attorney General objected to pre- clearance, finding that the NAACP plan, which had not been available when the Jury plan was originally approved, demonstrated that black residents were sufficiently numerous and geographically compact to constitute a majority in two districts; that, compared with this alter- native, the Board's plan unnecessarily limited the opportunity for mi- nority voters to elect their candidates of choice and thereby diluted their voting strength in violation of § 2 of the Act; and that the Attor- ney General must withhold preclearance where necessary to prevent a clear § 2 violation. The Board then filed this action with the Dis- trict Court, and appellant Price and others intervened as defendants. A three-judge panel granted the preclearance request, rejecting appel- lants' contention that a voting change's failure to satisfy § 2 constituted an independent reason to deny preclearance under § 5 and their related argument that a court must still consider evidence of a § 2 violation as evidence of discriminatory purpose under § 5. Held:1. Preclearance under §5 may not be denied solely on the basis that a covered jurisdiction's new voting "standard, practice, or procedure" violates § 2. This Court has consistently understood § 5 and § 2 to com- *Together with No. 95­1508, Price et al. v. Bossier Parish School Board et al., also on appeal from the same court. 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 472 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Syllabus bat different evils and, accordingly, to impose very different duties upon the States. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U. S. 874, 883 (plurality opinion). Section 5 freezes election procedures in a covered jurisdiction until that jurisdiction proves that its proposed changes do not have the purpose, and will not have the effect, of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race. See Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 140. It is designed to combat only those effects that are retrogressive. Retro- gression, by definition, requires a comparison of a jurisdiction's new vot- ing plan with its existing plan, see Holder, supra, at 883 (plurality opin- ion), and necessarily implies that the jurisdiction's existing plan is the benchmark against which the "effect" of voting changes is measured. Section 2, on the other hand, applies in all jurisdictions and uses as its benchmark for comparison in vote dilution claims a hypothetical, undi- luted plan. Making compliance with § 5 contingent upon compliance with § 2, as appellants urge, would, for all intents and purposes, replace the standards for § 5 with those for § 2, thus contradicting more than 20 years of precedent interpreting § 5. See, e. g., Beer, supra. Appel- lants' contentions that their reading of § 5 is supported by the Beer deci- sion, by the Attorney General's regulations, and by public policy consid- erations are rejected. Pp. 476­485. 2. Evidence showing that a jurisdiction's redistricting plan dilutes mi- norities' voting power may be relevant to establish a jurisdiction's "in- tent to retrogress" under § 5, so there is no need to decide today whether such evidence is relevant to establish other types of discriminatory in- tent or whether § 5's purpose inquiry ever extends beyond the search for retrogressive intent. Because this Court cannot say with confidence that the District Court considered the evidence proffered to show that the Board's reapportionment plan was dilutive, this aspect of that court's holding must be vacated. Pp. 486­490. (a) Section 2 evidence may be "relevant" within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 401, for the fact that a plan has a dilutive impact makes it "more probable" that the jurisdiction adopting that plan acted with an intent to retrogress than "it would be without the evi- dence." This does not, of course, mean that evidence of a plan's dilutive impact is dispositive of the § 5 purpose inquiry. Indeed, if it were, § 2 would be effectively incorporated into § 5, a result this Court finds un- satisfactory. In conducting their inquiry into a jurisdiction's motivation in enacting voting changes, courts should look for guidance to Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, which sets forth a framework for examining discriminatory purpose. Pp. 486­489. (b) This Court is unable to determine whether the District Court deemed irrelevant all evidence of the dilutive impact of the redistricting 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 473 Syllabus plan adopted by the Board. While some language in its opinion is con- sistent with today's holding that the existence of less dilutive options was at least relevant to the purpose inquiry, the District Court also appears to have endorsed the notion that dilutive impact evidence is irrelevant even to an inquiry into retrogressive intent. The District Court will have the opportunity to apply the Arlington Heights test on remand as well as to address appellants' additional arguments that it erred in refusing to consider evidence that the Board was in violation of an ongoing injunction to remedy any remaining vestiges of a dual school system. Pp. 489­490. 907 F. Supp. 434, vacated and remanded. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined in full, and in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined except insofar as Part III is in- consistent with the views expressed in the concurrence of Breyer, J. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 490. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Gins- burg, J., joined, post, p. 493. Stevens, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part, in which Souter, J., joined, post, p. 497. Assistant Attorney General Patrick argued the cause for appellant in No. 95­1455. With him on the briefs were Act- ing Solicitor General Dellinger, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Cornelia T. L. Pillard, David K. Flynn, and Steven H. Rosenbaum. John W. Borkowski argued the cause for appellants in No. 95­1508. With him on the briefs were Walter A. Smith, Jr., Patricia A. Brannan, Barbara R. Arn- wine, Thomas J. Henderson, Brenda Wright, and Samuel L. Walters. Michael A. Carvin argued the cause for appellee Bossier Parish School Board in both cases. With him on the brief were David H. Thompson, James J. Thornton, and Michael P. McDonald. Laughlin McDonald, Neil Bradley, Steven R. Shapiro, Elaine R. Jones, Norman J. Chachkin, and Jacqueline Berrien filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Sharon L. Browne and Deborah J. La Fetra filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 474 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Opinion of the Court Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Today we clarify the relationship between § 2 and § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1973, 1973c. Specifically, we decide two ques- tions: (i) whether preclearance must be denied under § 5 whenever a covered jurisdiction's new voting "standard, practice, or procedure" violates § 2; and (ii) whether evidence that a new "standard, practice, or procedure" has a dilutive impact is always irrelevant to the inquiry whether the cov- ered jurisdiction acted with "the purpose . . . of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color" under § 5. We answer both in the negative. I Appellee Bossier Parish School Board (Board) is a jurisdic- tion subject to the preclearance requirements of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, and must therefore obtain the approval of either the United States At- torney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia before implementing any changes to a voting "qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or pro- cedure." The Board has 12 members who are elected from single-member districts by majority vote to serve 4-year terms. When the 1990 census revealed wide population dis- parities among its districts, see App. to Juris. Statement 93a (Stipulations of Fact and Law ¶ 82), the Board decided to redraw the districts to equalize the population distribution. During this process, the Board considered two redistrict- ing plans. It considered, and initially rejected, the redis- tricting plan that had been recently adopted by the Bossier Parish Police Jury, the parish's primary governing body (the Jury plan), to govern its own elections. Just months before, the Attorney General had precleared the Jury plan, which also contained 12 districts. Id., at 88a (Stipulations ¶ 68). None of the 12 districts in the Board's existing plan or in the Jury plan contained a majority of black residents. Id., at 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 475 Opinion of the Court 93a (Stipulations ¶ 82) (under 1990 population statistics in the Board's existing districts, the three districts with highest black concentrations contain 46.63%, 43.79%, and 30.13% black residents, respectively); id., at 85a (Stipulations ¶ 59) (population statistics for the Jury plan, with none of the plan's 12 districts containing a black majority). Because the Board's adoption of the Jury plan would have maintained the status quo regarding the number of black-majority districts, the parties stipulated that the Jury plan was not "retrogress- ive." Id., at 141a (Stipulations ¶ 252) ("The . . . plan is not retrogressive to minority voting strength compared to the existing benchmark plan . . ."). Appellant George Price, president of the local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), presented the Board with a second option-a plan that created two dis- tricts each containing not only a majority of black residents, but a majority of voting-age black residents. Id., at 98a (Stipulations ¶ 98). Over vocal opposition from local resi- dents, black and white alike, the Board voted to adopt the Jury plan as its own, reasoning that the Jury plan would almost certainly be precleared again and that the NAACP plan would require the Board to split 46 electoral precincts. But the Board's hopes for rapid preclearance were dashed when the Attorney General interposed a formal objection to the Board's plan on the basis of "new information" not avail- able when the Justice Department had precleared the plan for the Police Jury-namely, the NAACP's plan, which dem- onstrated that "black residents are sufficiently numerous and geographically compact so as to constitute a majority in two single-member districts." Id., at 155a­156a (Attorney Gen- eral's August 30, 1993, objection letter). The objection let- ter asserted that the Board's plan violated § 2 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973, because it "unnecessarily limit[ed] the oppor- tunity for minority voters to elect their candidates of choice," App. to Juris. Statement, at 156a, as compared to the new alternative. Relying on 28 CFR § 51.55(b)(2) (1996), which 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 476 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Opinion of the Court provides that the Attorney General shall withhold pre- clearance where "necessary to prevent a clear violation of amended Section 2 [42 U. S. C. § 1973]," the Attorney Gen- eral concluded that the Board's redistricting plan warranted a denial of preclearance under § 5. App. to Juris. Statement 157a. The Attorney General declined to reconsider the decision. Ibid. The Board then filed this action seeking preclearance under § 5 in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Appellant Price and others intervened as defendants. The three-judge panel granted the Board's request for preclear- ance, over the dissent of one judge. 907 F. Supp. 434, 437 (1995). The District Court squarely rejected the appellants' contention that a voting change's alleged failure to satisfy § 2 constituted an independent reason to deny preclearance under § 5: "We hold, as has every court that has considered the question, that a political subdivision that does not violate either the `effect' or the `purpose' prong of section 5 cannot be denied preclearance because of an alleged section 2 viola- tion." Id., at 440­441. Given this holding, the District Court quite properly expressed no opinion on whether the Jury plan in fact violated § 2, and its refusal to reach out and decide the issue in dicta does not require us, as Justice Stevens insists, to "assume that the record discloses a `clear violation' of § 2." See post, at 499 (opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part). That issue has yet to be decided by any court. The District Court did, however, reject ap- pellants' related argument that a court "must still consider evidence of a section 2 violation as evidence of discrimina- tory purpose under section 5." Id., at 445. We noted prob- able jurisdiction on June 3, 1996. 517 U. S. 1232. II The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act), 42 U. S. C. § 1973 et seq., was enacted by Congress in 1964 to "attac[k] the blight of voting discrimination" across the Nation. S. Rep. No. 97­ 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 477 Opinion of the Court 417, 2d Sess., p. 4 (1982); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308 (1966). Two of the weapons in the Federal Government's formidable arsenal are § 5 and § 2 of the Act. Although we have consistently understood these sections to combat different evils and, accordingly, to impose very dif- ferent duties upon the States, see Holder v. Hall, 512 U. S. 874, 883 (1994) (plurality opinion) (noting how the two sec- tions "differ in structure, purpose, and application"), appel- lants nevertheless ask us to hold that a violation of § 2 is an independent reason to deny preclearance under § 5. Unlike Justice Stevens, post, at 502­503, and n. 5 (opinion dissent- ing in part and concurring in part), we entertain little doubt that the Department of Justice or other litigants would "routinely" attempt to avail themselves of this new reason for denying preclearance, so that recognizing § 2 violations as a basis for denying § 5 preclearance would inevitably make compliance with § 5 contingent upon compliance with § 2. Doing so would, for all intents and purposes, replace the standards for § 5 with those for § 2. Because this would con- tradict our longstanding interpretation of these two sections of the Act, we reject appellants' position. Section 5, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, was enacted as "a response to a common practice in some jurisdictions of staying one step ahead of the federal courts by pass- ing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been struck down. . . . Congress therefore de- cided, as the Supreme Court held it could, `to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victim,' by `freezing election procedures in the covered areas unless the changes can be shown to be nondiscriminatory.' " Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 140 (1976) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 94­196, pp. 57­58 (1970)). In light of this limited purpose, § 5 applies only to certain States and their political subdivisions. Such a covered ju- 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 478 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Opinion of the Court risdiction may not implement any change in a voting "quali- fication, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure" un- less it first obtains either administrative preclearance of that change from the Attorney General or judicial preclearance from the District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. To obtain judicial preclearance, the juris- diction bears the burden of proving that the change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." Ibid.; City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 183, n. 18 (1980) (covered jurisdiction bears burden of proof). Because § 5 focuses on "freez[ing] election procedures," a plan has an impermissible "effect" under § 5 only if it "would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." Beer, supra, at 141. Retrogression, by definition, requires a comparison of a jurisdiction's new voting plan with its existing plan. See Holder, supra, at 883 (plurality opinion) ("Under § 5, then, the proposed voting practice is measured against the exist- ing voting practice to determine whether retrogression would result from the proposed change"). It also necessar- ily implies that the jurisdiction's existing plan is the bench- mark against which the "effect" of voting changes is meas- ured. In Beer, for example, we concluded that the city of New Orleans' reapportionment of its council districts, which created one district with a majority of voting-age blacks where before there had been none, had no discriminatory "effect." 425 U. S., at 141­142 ("It is thus apparent that a legislative reapportionment that enhances the position of ra- cial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise can hardly have the `effect' of diluting or abridging the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of § 5"). Likewise, in City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U. S. 125 (1983), we found that the city's new char- ter had no retrogressive "effect" even though it maintained 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 479 Opinion of the Court the city's prior practice of electing its council members at- large from numbered posts, and instituted a new practice of electing two of the city's four council members every year (instead of electing all the council members every two years). While each practice could "have a discriminatory effect under some circumstances," id., at 135, the fact remained that "[s]ince the new plan did not increase the degree of dis- crimination against [the city's Mexican-American popula- tion], it was entitled to § 5 preclearance [because it was not retrogressive]," id., at 134 (emphasis added). Section 2, on the other hand, was designed as a means of eradicating voting practices that "minimize or cancel out the voting strength and political effectiveness of minority groups," S. Rep. No. 97­417, at 28. Under this broader man- date, § 2 bars all States and their political subdivisions from maintaining any voting "standard, practice, or procedure" that "results in a denial or abridgement of the right . . . to vote on account of race or color." 42 U. S. C. § 1973(a). A voting practice is impermissibly dilutive within the meaning of § 2 "if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by [members of a class defined by race or color] in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect repre- sentatives of their choice." 42 U. S. C. § 1973(b). A plaintiff claiming vote dilution under § 2 must initially es- tablish that: (i) "[the racial group] is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single- member district"; (ii) the group is "politically cohesive"; and (iii) "the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 480 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Opinion of the Court Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 50­51 (1986); Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. 25, 40 (1993). The plaintiff must also demonstrate that the totality of the circumstances supports a finding that the voting scheme is dilutive. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1011 (1994); see Gingles, supra, at 44­45 (listing factors to be considered by a court in assessing the totality of the circumstances). Because the very concept of vote dilution implies-and, indeed, necessitates-the ex- istence of an "undiluted" practice against which the fact of dilution may be measured, a § 2 plaintiff must also postulate a reasonable alternative voting practice to serve as the benchmark "undiluted" voting practice. Holder v. Hall, 512 U. S., at 881 (plurality opinion); id., at 950­951 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Appellants contend that preclearance must be denied under § 5 whenever a covered jurisdiction's redistricting plan violates § 2. The upshot of this position is to shift the focus of § 5 from nonretrogression to vote dilution, and to change the § 5 benchmark from a jurisdiction's existing plan to a hypothetical, undiluted plan. But § 5, we have held, is designed to combat only those effects that are retrogressive. See supra, at 477­479. To adopt appellants' position, we would have to call into ques- tion more than 20 years of precedent interpreting § 5. See, e. g., Beer, supra; City of Lockhart, supra. This we decline to do. Section 5 already imposes upon a covered jurisdiction the difficult burden of proving the absence of discriminatory purpose and effect. See, e. g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 219 (1960) ("[A]s a practical matter it is never easy to prove a negative"). To require a jurisdiction to litigate whether its proposed redistricting plan also has a dilutive "result" before it can implement that plan-even if the Attor- ney General bears the burden of proving that "result"-is to increase further the serious federalism costs already impli- cated by § 5. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 926 (1995) (noting the "federalism costs exacted by § 5 preclearance"). 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 481 Opinion of the Court Appellants nevertheless contend that we should adopt their reading of § 5 because it is supported by our decision in Beer, by the Attorney General's regulations, and by con- siderations of public policy. In Beer, we held that § 5 prohib- ited only retrogressive effects and further observed that "an ameliorative new legislative apportionment cannot violate § 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution." 425 U. S., at 141. Although there had been no allegation that the redistricting plan in Beer "so . . . discriminate[d] on the basis of race or color as to be unconstitutional," we cited in dicta a few cases to illustrate when a redistricting plan might be found to be constitutionally offensive. Id., at 142, n. 14. Among them was our decision in White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), in which we sustained a vote dilution challenge, brought under the Equal Protection Clause, to the use of multimember election districts in two Texas counties. Ap- pellants argue that "[b]ecause vote dilution standards under the Constitution and Section 2 were generally coextensive at the time Beer was decided, Beer's discussion meant that practices that violated Section 2 would not be entitled to preclearance under Section 5." Brief for Federal Appel- lant 36­37. Even assuming, arguendo, that appellants' argument had some support in 1976, it is no longer valid today because the applicable statutory and constitutional standards have changed. Since 1980, a plaintiff bringing a constitutional vote dilution challenge, whether under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment, has been required to establish that the State or political subdivision acted with a discriminatory purpose. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 62 (1980) (plu- rality opinion) ("Our decisions . . . have made clear that ac- tion by a State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose"); id., at 66 ("[O]nly if there is purposeful discrimi- nation can there be a violation of the Equal Protection 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 482 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Opinion of the Court Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); see also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265 (1977) ("Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Pro- tection Clause"). When Congress amended § 2 in 1982, it clearly expressed its desire that § 2 not have an intent com- ponent, see S. Rep. No. 97­417, at 2 ("Th[e 1982] amendment is designed to make clear that proof of discriminatory intent is not required to establish a violation of Section 2"). Be- cause now the Constitution requires a showing of intent that § 2 does not, a violation of § 2 is no longer a fortiori a viola- tion of the Constitution. Congress itself has acknowledged this fact. See id., at 39 ("The Voting Rights Act is the best example of Congress' power to enact implementing legisla- tion that goes beyond the direct prohibitions of the Constitu- tion itself"). Justice Stevens argues that the subsequent divergence of constitutional and statutory standards is of no moment because, in his view, we "did not [in Beer] purport to distin- guish between challenges brought under the Constitution and those brought under the [Voting Rights] statute." Post, at 504 (opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part). Our citation to White, he posits, incorporated White's stand- ard into our exception for nonretrogressive apportionments that violate § 5, whether or not that standard continued to coincide with the constitutional standard. In essence, Jus- tice Stevens reads Beer as creating an exception for non- retrogressive apportionments that so discriminate on the basis of race or color as to violate any federal law that hap- pens to coincide with what would have amounted to a con- stitutional violation in 1976. But this reading flatly con- tradicts the plain language of the exception we recognized, which applies solely to apportionments that "so discrimi- nat[e] on the basis of race or color as to violate the Con- stitution." Beer, supra, at 141 (emphasis added). We cited White, not for itself, but because it embodied the current 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 483 Opinion of the Court constitutional standard for a violation of the Equal Protec- tion Clause. See also 425 U. S., at 143, n. 14 (noting that New Orleans' plan did "not remotely approach a violation of the constitutional standards enunciated in" White and other cited cases (emphasis added)). When White ceased to repre- sent the current understanding of the Constitution, a viola- tion of its standard-even though that standard was later incorporated in § 2-no longer constituted grounds for denial of preclearance under Beer. Appellants' next claim is that we must defer to the At- torney General's regulations interpreting the Act, one of which states: "In those instances in which the Attorney General concludes that, as proposed, the submitted change is free of discriminatory purpose and retrogressive effect, but also concludes that a bar to implementation of the change is necessary to prevent a clear violation of amended Section 2, the Attorney General shall withhold Section 5 preclearance." 28 CFR § 51.55(b)(2) (1996). Although we normally accord the Attorney General's con- struction of the Act great deference, "we only do so if Con- gress has not expressed its intent with respect to the ques- tion, and then only if the administrative interpretation is reasonable." Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U. S. 491, 508 (1992). Given our longstanding interpretation of § 5, see supra, at 477­479, 480­482 and this page, which Congress has declined to alter by amending the language of § 5, Arkan- sas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U. S. 212, 222, n. 7 (1988) (placing some weight on Congress' failure to express disfavor with our 25-year interpretation of a tax statute), we believe Congress has made it sufficiently clear that a violation of § 2 is not grounds in and of itself for denying preclearance under § 5. That there may be some suggestion to the contrary in the Senate Report to the 1982 Voting Rights Act amend- ments, S. Rep. No. 97­417, supra, at 12, n. 31, does not 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 484 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Opinion of the Court change our view. With those amendments, Congress, among other things, renewed § 5 but did so without changing its applicable standard. We doubt that Congress would depart from the settled interpretation of § 5 and impose a demon- strably greater burden on the jurisdictions covered by § 5, see supra, at 480, by dropping a footnote in a Senate Report instead of amending the statute itself. See Pierce v. Under- wood, 487 U. S. 552, 567 (1988) ("Quite obviously, reenacting precisely the same language would be a strange way to make a change"). See also City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U. S. 125 (1983) (reaching its holding over Justice Marshall's dissent, which raised the argument now advanced by appel- lants regarding this passage in the Senate Report). Nor does the portion of the House Report cited by Justice Stevens unambiguously call for the incorporation of § 2 into § 5. That portion of the Report states: "[M]any voting and election practices currently in ef- fect are outside the scope of [§ 5] . . . because they were in existence before 1965. . . . Under the Voting Rights Act, whether a discriminatory practice or procedure is of recent origin affects only the mechanism that triggers relief, i. e., litigation [under § 2] or preclearance [under § 5]." H. R. Rep. No. 97­227, p. 28 (1981). The obvious thrust of this passage is to establish that pre- 1965 discriminatory practices are not free from scrutiny under the Act just because they need not be precleared under § 5: Such practices might still violate § 2. But to say that pre-1965 practices can be reached solely by § 2 is not to say that all post-1965 changes that might violate § 2 may be reached by both § 2 and § 5 or that "the substantive stand- ards for § 2 and § 5 [are] the same," see post, at 506 (opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part). Our ultimate con- clusion is also not undercut by statements found in the "post- enactment legislative record," see post, at 506, n. 9, given that "the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 485 Opinion of the Court basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). We therefore de- cline to give these sources controlling weight. Appellants' final appeal is to notions of public policy. They assert that if the district court or Attorney General examined whether a covered jurisdiction's redistricting plan violates § 2 at the same time as ruling on preclearance under § 5, there would be no need for two separate actions and judi- cial resources would be conserved. Appellants are undoubt- edly correct that adopting their interpretation of § 5 would serve judicial economy in those cases where a § 2 challenge follows a § 5 proceeding. But this does not always happen, and the burden on judicial resources might actually increase if appellants' position prevailed because § 2 litigation would effectively be incorporated into every § 5 proceeding. Appellants lastly argue that preclearance is an equitable remedy, obtained through a declaratory judgment action in district court, see 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, or through the exercise of the Attorney General's discretion, see 28 CFR § 51.52(a) (1996). A finding that a redistricting plan violates § 2 of the Act, they contend, is an equitable "defense," on the basis of which a decisionmaker should, in the exercise of its equita- ble discretion, be free to deny preclearance. This argument, however, is an attempt to obtain through equity that which the law-i. e., the settled interpretation of § 5-forbids. Be- cause "it is well established that `[c]ourts of equity can no more disregard statutory and constitutional requirements and provisions than can courts of law,' " INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U. S. 875, 883 (1988) (citing Hedges v. Dixon County, 150 U. S. 182, 192 (1893)), this argument must fail. Of course, the Attorney General or a private plaintiff re- mains free to initiate a § 2 proceeding if either believes that a jurisdiction's newly enacted voting "qualification, prerequi- site, standard, practice, or procedure" may violate that sec- tion. All we hold today is that preclearance under § 5 may not be denied on that basis alone. 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 486 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Opinion of the Court III Appellants next contend that evidence showing that a jurisdiction's redistricting plan dilutes the voting power of minorities is at least relevant in a § 5 proceeding because it tends to prove that the jurisdiction enacted its plan with a discriminatory "purpose." The District Court, reasoning that "[t]he line [between § 2 and § 5] cannot be blurred by allowing a defendant to do indirectly what it cannot do di- rectly," 907 F. Supp., at 445, rejected this argument and held that it "will not permit section 2 evidence to prove discrimi- natory purpose under section 5," ibid. Because we hold that some of this "§ 2 evidence" may be relevant to establish a jurisdiction's "intent to retrogress" and cannot say with con- fidence that the District Court considered the evidence prof- fered to show that the Board's reapportionment plan was dilutive, we vacate this aspect of the District Court's hold- ing and remand. In light of this conclusion, we leave open for another day the question whether the § 5 purpose in- quiry ever extends beyond the search for retrogressive in- tent. See Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U. S. 454, 465, n. 5 (1989) (declining to decide an issue that "is not necessary to our decision"). Reserving this question is particularly appropriate when, as in this suit, it was not squarely addressed by the decision below or in the parties' briefs on appeal. See Brief for Federal Appellant 23; Brief for Appellant Price et al. 31­33, 34­35; Brief for Appellee 42­43. But in doing so, we do not, contrary to Justice Stevens' view, see post, at 499 (opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part), necessarily assume that the Board enacted the Jury plan with some nonretrogressive, but nev- ertheless discriminatory, "purpose." The existence of such a purpose, and its relevance to § 5, are issues to be decided on remand. Although § 5 warrants a denial of preclearance if a covered jurisdiction's voting change "ha[s] the purpose [or] . . . the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 487 Opinion of the Court of race or color," 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, we have consistently interpreted this language in light of the purpose underlying § 5-"to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities." Beer, 425 U. S., at 141. Accordingly, we have adhered to the view that the only "effect" that violates § 5 is a retrogressive one. Ibid.; City of Lockhart, 460 U. S., at 134. Evidence is "relevant" if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina- tion of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed. Rule Evid. 401. As we observed in Arlington Heights, 429 U. S., at 266, the im- pact of an official action is often probative of why the action was taken in the first place since people usually intend the natural consequences of their actions. Thus, a jurisdiction that enacts a plan having a dilutive impact is more likely to have acted with a discriminatory intent to dilute minority voting strength than a jurisdiction whose plan has no such impact. A jurisdiction that acts with an intent to dilute mi- nority voting strength is more likely to act with an intent to worsen the position of minority voters-i. e., an intent to retrogress-than a jurisdiction acting with no intent to di- lute. The fact that a plan has a dilutive impact therefore makes it "more probable" that the jurisdiction adopting that plan acted with an intent to retrogress than "it would be without the evidence." To be sure, the link between dilutive impact and intent to retrogress is far from direct, but "the basic standard of relevance . . . is a liberal one," Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579, 587 (1993), and one we think is met here. That evidence of a plan's dilutive impact may be relevant to the § 5 purpose inquiry does not, of course, mean that such evidence is dispositive of that inquiry. In fact, we have pre- viously observed that a jurisdiction's single decision to choose a redistricting plan that has a dilutive impact does not, with- 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 488 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Opinion of the Court out more, suffice to establish that the jurisdiction acted with a discriminatory purpose. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899, 914, n. 6 (1996) ("[W]e doubt that a showing of discriminatory effect under § 2, alone, could support a claim of discrimina- tory purpose under § 5"). This is true whether the jurisdic- tion chose the more dilutive plan because it better comported with its traditional districting principles, see Miller v. John- son, 515 U. S., at 922 (rejecting argument that a jurisdiction's failure to adopt the plan with the greatest possible number of majority black districts establishes that it acted with a discriminatory purpose); Shaw, supra, at 912­913 (same), or if it chose the plan for no reason at all. Indeed, if a plan's dilutive impact were dispositive, we would effectively incor- porate § 2 into § 5, which is a result we find unsatisfactory no matter how it is packaged. See Part II, supra. As our discussion illustrates, assessing a jurisdiction's mo- tivation in enacting voting changes is a complex task requir- ing a "sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence as may be available." Arlington Heights, 429 U. S., at 266. In conducting this inquiry, courts should look to our decision in Arlington Heights for guidance. There, we set forth a framework for analyzing "whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor" in a govern- ment body's decisionmaking. Ibid. In addition to serving as the framework for examining discriminatory purpose in cases brought under the Equal Protection Clause for over two decades, see, e. g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 644 (1993) (citing Arlington Heights standard in context of Equal Pro- tection Clause challenge to racial gerrymander of districts); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 618 (1982) (evaluating vote dilution claim under Equal Protection Clause using Arling- ton Heights test); Mobile, 446 U. S., at 70­74 (same), the Ar- lington Heights framework has also been used, at least in part, to evaluate purpose in our previous § 5 cases. See Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U. S. 462, 469­470 (1987) (considering city's history in rejecting annexation of 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 489 Opinion of the Court black neighborhood and its departure from normal proce- dures when calculating costs of annexation alternatives); see also Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 516­517 (DC 1982), summarily aff'd, 459 U. S. 1166 (1983) (referring to Arlington Heights test); Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 987, 1019, aff'd, 459 U. S. 159 (1982) (same). The "important starting point" for assessing discrimina- tory intent under Arlington Heights is "the impact of the official action whether it `bears more heavily on one race than another.' " 429 U. S., at 266 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 242 (1976)). In a § 5 case, "impact" might include a plan's retrogressive effect and, for the rea- sons discussed above, its dilutive impact. Other considera- tions relevant to the purpose inquiry include, among other things, "the historical background of the [jurisdiction's] deci- sion"; "[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision"; "[d]epartures from the normal proce- dural sequence"; and "[t]he legislative or administrative his- tory, especially . . . [any] contemporary statements by mem- bers of the decisionmaking body." 429 U. S., at 266­268. We are unable to determine from the District Court's opin- ion in this action whether it deemed irrelevant all evidence of the dilutive impact of the redistricting plan adopted by the Board. At one point, the District Court correctly stated that "the adoption of one nonretrogressive plan rather than another nonretrogressive plan that contains more majority- black districts cannot by itself give rise to the inference of dis- criminatory intent." 907 F. Supp., at 450 (emphasis added). This passage implies that the District Court believed that the existence of less dilutive options was at least relevant to, though not dispositive of, its purpose inquiry. While this language is consistent with our holding today, see supra, at 486­488, the District Court also declared that "we will not permit section 2 evidence to prove discriminatory purpose under section 5," supra, at 486. With this statement, the District Court appears to endorse the notion that evidence 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 490 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Thomas, J., concurring of dilutive impact is irrelevant even to an inquiry into retro- gressive intent, a notion we reject. See supra, at 486­488. The Board contends that the District Court actually "pre- sumed that white majority districts had [a dilutive] effect," Brief for Appellee 35, and "cut directly to the dispositive question `started' by the existence of [a dilutive] impact: did the Board have `legitimate, nondiscriminatory motives' for adopting its plan[?]" Id., at 33. Even if the Board were correct, the District Court gave no indication that it was assuming the plan's dilutive effect, and we hesitate to attrib- ute to the District Court a rationale it might not have em- ployed. Because we are not satisfied that the District Court considered evidence of the dilutive impact of the Board's re- districting plan, we vacate this aspect of the District Court's opinion. The District Court will have the opportunity to apply the Arlington Heights test on remand as well as to address appellants' additional arguments that it erred in re- fusing to consider evidence that the Board was in violation of an ongoing injunction "to `remedy any remaining vestiges of [a] dual [school] system,' " 907 F. Supp., at 449, n. 18. * * * The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. It is so ordered. Justice Thomas, concurring. Although I continue to adhere to the views I expressed in Holder v. Hall, 512 U. S. 874, 891 (1994) (opinion concurring in judgment), I join today's opinion because it is consistent with our vote dilution precedents. I fully anticipate, how- ever, that as a result of today's holding, all of the problems we have experienced in § 2 vote dilution cases will now be replicated and, indeed, exacerbated in the § 5 retrogression inquiry. I have trouble, for example, imagining a reapportionment change that could not be deemed "retrogressive" under our 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 491 Thomas, J., concurring vote dilution jurisprudence by a court inclined to find it so. We have held that a reapportionment plan that "enhances the position of racial minorities" by increasing the number of majority-minority districts does not "have the `effect' of diluting or abridging the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of § 5." Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976). But in so holding we studiously avoided addressing one of the necessary consequences of increasing majority-minority districts: Such action necessarily de- creases the level of minority influence in surrounding dis- tricts, and to that extent "dilutes" the vote of minority vot- ers in those other districts, and perhaps dilutes the influence of the minority group as a whole. See, e. g., Hays v. Louisi- ana, 936 F. Supp. 360, 364, n. 17 (WD La. 1996) (three-judge court) (noting that plaintiffs' expert "argues convincingly that our plan, with its one black majority and three influence districts, empowers more black voters statewide than does" a plan with two black-majority districts and five "bleached" districts in which minority influence was reduced in order to create the second black-majority district); cf. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1007 (1994) (noting that dilution can occur by "fragmenting the minority voters among several districts . . . or by packing them into one or a small number of districts to minimize their influence in the districts next door"). Under our vote dilution jurisprudence, therefore, a court could strike down any reapportionment plan, either because it did not include enough majority-minority districts or be- cause it did (and thereby diluted the minority vote in the remaining districts). A court could presumably even strike down a new reapportionment plan that did not significantly alter the status quo at all, on the theory that such a plan did not measure up to some hypothetical ideal. With such an indeterminate "rule," § 5 ceases to be primarily a prophylac- tic tool in the important war against discrimination in voting, and instead becomes the means whereby the Federal Gov- ernment, and particularly the Department of Justice, usurps 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 492 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Thomas, J., concurring the legitimate political judgments of the States. And such an empty "rule" inevitably forces the courts to make political judgments regarding which type of apportionment best serves supposed minority interests-judgments that the courts are ill equipped to make. I can at least find some solace in the belief that today's opinion will force us to confront, with a renewed sense of urgency, this fundamental inconsistency that lies at the heart of our vote dilution jurisprudence. Beyond my general objection to our vote dilution prece- dent, the one portion of the majority opinion with which I disagree is the majority's new suggestion that preclearance standards established by the Department of Justice are "nor- mally" entitled to deference. See ante, at 483.* Section 5 sets up alternative routes for preclearance, and the primary route specified is through the District Court for the District of Columbia, not through the Attorney General's office. See 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (generally requiring District Court pre- clearance, with a proviso that covered jurisdictions may ob- tain preclearance by the Attorney General in lieu of District Court preclearance, but providing no authority for the Attor- ney General to preclude judicial preclearance). Requiring the District Court to defer to adverse preclearance decisions by the Attorney General based upon the very preclearance standards she articulates would essentially render the inde- pendence of the District Court preclearance route a nullity. Moreover, given our own "longstanding interpretation of § 5," see ante, at 483, deference to the particular preclearance regulation addressed in this action would be inconsistent with another of the Attorney General's regulations, which provides: "In making determinations [under § 5] the Attor- ney General will be guided by the relevant decisions of the *I do not address the separate question, not presented by this action, whether the Department's interpretation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as opposed to its articulation of standards applicable to its own preclear- ance determinations, is entitled to deference. The regulation at issue here only purports to be the latter. 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 493 Opinion of Breyer, J. Supreme Court of the United States and of other Federal courts." 28 CFR § 51.56 (1996). Thus, while I agree with the majority's decision not to defer to the Attorney General's standards, I would reach that result on different grounds. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join Parts I and II of the majority opinion, and Part III insofar as it is not inconsistent with this opinion. I write separately to express my disagreement with one aspect of the majority opinion. The majority says that we need not decide "whether the § 5 purpose inquiry ever extends beyond the search for retrogressive intent." Ante, at 486. In my view, we should decide the question, for otherwise the Dis- trict Court will find it difficult to evaluate the evidence that we say it must consider. Cf. post, at 508 (Stevens, J., dis- senting in part and concurring in part). Moreover, the an- swer to the question is that the "purpose" inquiry does ex- tend beyond the search for retrogressive intent. It includes the purpose of unconstitutionally diluting minority voting strength. The language of § 5 itself forbids a change in "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting," where that change either (1) has the "purpose" or (2) will have the "effect" of "denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. These last few words reiterate in context the language of the Fifteenth Amendment itself: "The right of citizens . . . to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of race [or] color . . . ." This use of constitutional language indicates that one purpose for- bidden by the statute is a purpose to act unconstitutionally. And a new plan enacted with the purpose of unconstitu- tionally diluting minority votes is an unconstitutional plan. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 62­63, 66 (1980) (plurality opinion); ante, at 481­482. 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 494 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Opinion of Breyer, J. Of course, the constitutional language also applies to § 5's prohibition that rests upon "effects." The Court assumes, in its discussion of "effects," that the § 5 word "effects" does not now embody a purely constitutional test, whether or not it ever did so. See ante, at 478; City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 173, 177 (1980). And that fact, here, is beside the point. The separate argument about the meaning of the word "effect" concerns how far beyond the Constitu- tion's requirements Congress intended that word to reach. The argument about "purpose" is simply whether Congress intended the word to reach as far as the Constitution itself, embodying those purposes that, in relevant context, the Con- stitution itself would forbid. I can find nothing in the Court's discussion that shows that Congress intended to re- strict the meaning of the statutory word "purpose" short of what the Constitution itself requires. And the Court has previously expressly indicated that minority vote dilution is a harm that § 5 guards against. Allen v. State Bd. of Elec- tions, 393 U. S. 544, 569 (1969). Consider a hypothetical example that will clarify the pre- cise legal question here at issue. Suppose that a covered jurisdiction is choosing between two new voting plans, A and B. Neither plan is retrogressive. Plan A violates every traditional districting principle, but from the perspective of minority representation, it maintains the status quo, thereby meeting the "effects" test of § 5. See ante, at 478­479. Plan B is basically consistent with traditional districting princi- ples and it also creates one or two new majority-minority districts (in a State where the number of such districts is significantly less than proportional to minority voting age population). Suppose further that the covered jurisdiction adopts Plan A. Without any other proposed evidence or jus- tification, ordinary principles of logic and human experience suggest that the jurisdiction would likely have adopted Plan A with "the purpose . . . of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." § 1973c. It is reason- 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 495 Opinion of Breyer, J. able to assume that the Constitution would forbid the use of such a plan. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 617 (1982) (Fourteenth Amendment covers vote dilution claims); Mo- bile, 446 U. S., at 66 (plurality opinion) (same). And com- pare id., at 62­63 (intentional vote dilution may be illegal under the Fifteenth Amendment) and Gomillion v. Light- foot, 364 U. S. 339, 346 (1960) (Fifteenth Amendment covers municipal boundaries drawn to exclude blacks), with Mo- bile, supra, at 84, n. 3 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (Mobile plurality said that Fifteenth Amendment does not reach vote dilution); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146, 159 (1993) ("This Court has not decided whether the Fifteenth Amendment applies to vote-dilution claims . . ."); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 645 (1993) (endorsing the Gomillion concurrence's Fourteenth Amendment approach); and Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 142, n. 14 (1976). Then, to read § 5's "purpose" language to require approval of Plan A, even though the jurisdiction cannot provide a neutral expla- nation for its choice, would be both to read § 5 contrary to its plain language and also to believe that Congress would have wanted a § 5 court (or the Attorney General) to approve an unconstitutional plan adopted with an unconstitutional purpose. In light of this example, it is not surprising that this Court has previously indicated that the purpose part of § 5 prohib- its a plan adopted with the purpose of unconstitutionally di- luting minority voting strength, whether or not the plan is retrogressive in its effect. In Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899 (1996), for example, the Court doubted "that a showing of discriminatory effect under § 2, alone, could support a claim of discriminatory purpose under § 5." Id., at 914, n. 6 (em- phasis added). The word "alone" suggests that the evidence of a discriminatory effect there at issue-evidence of dilu- tion-could be relevant to a discriminatory purpose claim. And if so, the more natural understanding of § 5 is that an unlawful purpose includes more than simply a purpose to 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 496 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Opinion of Breyer, J. retrogress. Otherwise, dilution would either dispositively show an unlawful discriminatory effect (if retrogressive) or it would almost always be irrelevant (if not retrogressive). Either way, it would not normally have much to do with un- lawful purpose. See also the discussions in Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 378­379 (1975) (annexation plan did not have an impermissible dilutive effect but the Court remanded for a determination of whether there was an im- permissible § 5 purpose); Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U. S. 462, 471­472, and n. 11 (1987) (purpose to minimize future black voting strength is impermissible under § 5); Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U. S. 159, 168 (1982) (a plan adopted for a discriminatory purpose is invalid under § 5 even if it "might otherwise be said to reflect the political strength of the minority community"); post, at 507­508 (Ste- vens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900 (1995), also implicitly as- sumed that § 5's "purpose" stretched beyond the purely ret- rogressive. There, the Justice Department pointed out that Georgia made a choice between two redistricting plans, one of which (call it Plan A) had more majority-black districts than the other (call it Plan B). The Department argued that the fact that Georgia chose Plan B showed a forbidden § 5 discriminatory purpose. The Court rejected this argument, but the reason that the majority gave for that rejection is important. The Court pointed out that Plan B embodied traditional state districting principles. It reasoned that "[t]he State's policy of adhering to other districting princi- ples instead of creating as many majority-minority districts as possible does not support an inference" of an unlawful discriminatory purpose. Id., at 924. If the only relevant "purpose" were a retrogressive purpose, this reasoning, with its reliance upon traditional districting principles, would have been beside the point. The Court would have con- cerned itself only with Georgia's intent to worsen the posi- tion of minorities, not with the reasons why Georgia could 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 497 Opinion of Stevens, J. have adopted one of two potentially ameliorative plans. In- deed, the Court indicated that an ameliorative plan would run afoul of the § 5 purpose test if it violated the Constitu- tion. Ibid. See also Shaw v. Hunt, supra, at 912­913. In sum, the Court today should make explicit an assump- tion implicit in its prior cases. Section 5 prohibits a covered State from making changes in its voting practices and proce- dures where those changes have the unconstitutional "pur- pose" of unconstitutionally diluting minority voting strength. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter joins, dissenting in part and concurring in part. In my view, a plan that clearly violates § 2 is not entitled to preclearance under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The majority's contrary view would allow the Attorney Gen- eral of the United States to place her stamp of approval on a state action that is in clear violation of federal law. It would be astonishing if Congress had commanded her to do so. In fact, however, Congress issued no such command. Surely no such command can be found in the text of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.1 Moreover, a fair review of the text 1 As originally enacted, § 5 provided: "Sec. 5. Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 4(a) are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, and unless and until the court enters such judgment no per- son shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such quali- fication prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be en- forced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney Gen- 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 498 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Opinion of Stevens, J. and the legislative history of the 1982 amendment to § 2 of that Act indicates that Congress intended the Attorney Gen- eral to deny preclearance under § 5 whenever it was clear that a new voting practice was prohibited by § 2. This does not mean that she must make an independent inquiry into possible violations of § 2 whenever a request for preclearance is made. It simply means that, as her regulations provide, she must refuse preclearance when "necessary to prevent a clear violation of amended section 2." 28 CFR § 51.55(b)(2) (1996). It is, of course, well settled that the Attorney General must refuse to preclear a new election procedure in a covered jurisdiction if it will "lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976). A retrogressive effect or a retrogressive purpose is a sufficient basis for denying a preclearance re- quest under § 5. Today, however, the Court holds that ret- rogression is the only kind of effect that will justify denial of preclearance under § 5, ante, at 476­485, and it assumes that "the § 5 purpose inquiry [never] extends beyond the search for retrogressive intent." Ante, at 486. While I agree that this action must be remanded even under the Court's miserly interpretation of § 5, I disagree with the Court's holding/assumption that § 5 is concerned only with retrogressive effects and purposes. Before explaining my disagreement with the Court, I think it important to emphasize the three factual predicates that underlie our analysis of the issues. First, we assume eral and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, except that neither the Attorney General's failure to object nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. Any action under this sec- tion shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accord- ance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code [28 U. S. C. § 2284] and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court." 79 Stat. 439. 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 499 Opinion of Stevens, J. that the plan submitted by the Bossier Parish School Board (Board) was not "retrogressive" because it did not make mat- ters any worse than they had been in the past. None of the 12 districts had ever had a black majority and a black person had never been elected to the Board. App. to Juris. State- ment 67a. Second, because the majority in both the District Court and this Court found that even clear violations of § 2 must be precleared and thus found it unnecessary to discuss whether § 2 was violated in this action, we may assume that the record discloses a "clear violation" of § 2. This means that, in the language of § 2, it is perfectly clear that "the political processes leading to nomination or election [to posi- tions on the Board] are not equally open to participation by members of [the African-American race] in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to . . . elect representatives of their choice." 42 U. S. C. § 1973(b).2 Third, if the Court is correct in assuming that the purpose inquiry under § 5 may be limited to evidence of "retrogressive intent," it must also be willing to assume that the documents submitted in support of the request for pre- clearance clearly establish that the plan was adopted for the specific purpose of preventing African-Americans from ob- taining representation on the Board. Indeed, for the pur- pose of analyzing the legal issues, we must assume that Judge Kessler, concurring in part and dissenting in part, accurately summarized the evidence when she wrote: "The evidence in this case demonstrates overwhelm- ingly that the School Board's decision to adopt the Police Jury redistricting plan was motivated by discriminatory 2 Although the majority in the District Court refused to consider any of the evidence relevant to a § 2 violation, the parties' stipulations suggest that the plan violated § 2. For instance, the parties' stipulated that there had been a long history of discrimination against black voters in Bossier Parish, see App. to Juris. Statement 130a­140a; that voting in Bossier Parish was racially polarized, see id., at 122a­127a; and that it was possible to draw two majority-black districts without violating traditional district- ing principles, see id., at 76a, 82a­83a, 114a­115a. 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 500 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Opinion of Stevens, J. purpose. The adoption of the Police Jury plan bears heavily on the black community because it denies its members a reasonable opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. The history of discrimination by the Bossier School System and the Parish itself demon- strates the Board's continued refusal to address the con- cerns of the black community in Bossier Parish. The sequence of events leading up to the adoption of the plan illustrate the Board's discriminatory purpose. The School Board's substantive departures from traditional districting principles is similarly probative of discrimi- natory motive. Three School Board members have ac- knowledged that the Board is hostile to black represen- tation. Moreover, some of the purported rationales for the School Board's decision are flat-out untrue, and oth- ers are so glaringly inconsistent with the facts of the case that they are obviously pretexts." 907 F. Supp. 434, 463 (DC 1995). If the purpose and the effect of the Board's plan were simply to maintain the discriminatory status quo as described by Judge Kessler, the plan would not have been retrogressive. But, as I discuss below, that is not a sufficient reason for concluding that it complied with § 5. I In the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress enacted a com- plex scheme of remedies for racial discrimination in voting. As originally enacted, § 2 of the Act was "an uncontroversial provision" that "simply restated" the prohibitions against such discrimination "already contained in the Fifteenth Amendment," Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 61 (1980) (plu- rality opinion). Like the constitutional prohibitions against discriminatory districting practices that were invalidated in cases like Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), and White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), § 2 was made applica- ble to every State and political subdivision in the country. 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 501 Opinion of Stevens, J. Section 5, on the other hand, was highly controversial be- cause it imposed novel, extraordinary remedies in certain areas where discrimination had been most flagrant. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 334­335 (1966).3 Jurisdictions like Bossier Parish in Louisiana are covered by § 5 because their history of discrimination against African- Americans was a matter of special concern to Congress. Be- cause these jurisdictions had resorted to various strategies to avoid complying with court orders to remedy discrimina- tion, "Congress had reason to suppose that [they] might try similar maneuvers in the future in order to evade the reme- dies for voting discrimination contained in the Act itself." Id., at 335. Thus Congress enacted § 5, not to maintain the discriminatory status quo, but to stay ahead of efforts by the most resistant jurisdictions to undermine the Act's purpose of "rid[ding] the country of racial discrimination." Id., at 315 ("The heart of the Act is a complex scheme of stringent remedies aimed at areas where voting discrimination has been most flagrant"). In areas of the country lacking a history of pervasive dis- crimination, Congress presumed that voting practices were generally lawful. Accordingly, the burden of proving a vio- lation of § 2 has always rested on the party challenging the voting practice. The situation is dramatically different in covered jurisdictions. In those jurisdictions, § 5 flatly pro- hibits the adoption of any new voting procedure unless the State or political subdivision institutes an action in the Fed- eral District Court for the District of Columbia and obtains a declaratory judgment that the change will not have a dis- criminatory purpose or effect. See 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. The burden of proving compliance with the Act rests on the juris- diction. A proviso to § 5 gives the Attorney General the authority to allow the new procedure to go into effect, but 3 Section 4 of the Act sets forth the formula for identifying the jurisdic- tions in which such discrimination had occurred, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 317­318. 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 502 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Opinion of Stevens, J. like the immigration statutes that give her broad discre- tion to waive deportation of undesirable aliens, it does not expressly impose any limit on her discretion to refuse pre- clearance. See ibid. The Attorney General's discretion is, however, cabined by regulations that are presumptively valid if they "are reasonable and do not conflict with the Voting Rights Act itself," Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526, 536 (1973). Those regulations provide that preclear- ance will generally be granted if a proposed change "is free of discriminatory purpose and retrogressive effect"; they also provide, however, that in "those instances" in which the Attorney General concludes "that a bar to implementation of the change is necessary to prevent a clear violation of amended section 2," preclearance shall be withheld.4 There is no basis for the Court's speculation that litigants would so " `routinely,' " ante, at 477, employ this 10-year-old regulation as to "make compliance with § 5 contingent upon compliance with § 2," ibid. Nor do the regulations require the jurisdic- tion to assume the burden of proving the absence of vote 4 Title 28 CFR § 51.55 (1996) provides: "Consistency with constitutional and statutory requirements. "(a) Consideration in general. In making a determination the Attor- ney General will consider whether the change is free of discriminatory purpose and retrogressive effect in light of, and with particular attention being given to, the requirements of the 14th, 15th, and 24th amendments to the Constitution, 42 U. S. C. 1971(a) and (b), sections 2, 4(a), 4(f)(2), 4(f)(4), 201, 203(c), and 208 of the Act, and other constitutional and statu- tory provisions designed to safeguard the right to vote from denial or abridgment on account of race, color, or membership in a language minor- ity group. "(b) Section 2. (1) Preclearance under section 5 of a voting change will not preclude any legal action under section 2 by the Attorney Gen- eral if implementation of the change subsequently demonstrates that such action is appropriate. "(2) In those instances in which the Attorney General concludes that, as proposed, the submitted change is free of discriminatory purpose and retrogressive effect, but also concludes that a bar to implementation of the change is necessary to prevent a clear violation of amended section 2, the Attorney General shall withhold section 5 preclearance." 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 503 Opinion of Stevens, J. dilution, see ante, at 480. They merely preclude preclear- ance when "necessary to prevent a clear violation of . . . section 2." While the burden of disproving discriminatory purpose or retrogressive effect is on the submitting jurisdic- tion, if the Attorney General's conclusion that the change would clearly violate § 2 is challenged, the burden on that issue, as in any § 2 challenge, should rest on the Attorney General.5 The Court does not suggest that this regulation is incon- sistent with the text of § 5. Nor would this be persuasive, since the language of § 5 forbids preclearance of any voting practice that would have "the purpose [or] effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. Instead the Court rests its entire analy- sis on the flawed premise that our cases hold that a change, even if otherwise unlawful, cannot have an effect prohib- ited by § 5 unless that effect is retrogressive. The two cases on which the Court relies, Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), and City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U. S. 125 (1983), do hold (as the current regulations provide) that proof that a change is not retrogressive is normally sufficient to justify preclearance under § 5. In neither case, however, was the Court confronted with the question whether that showing would be sufficient if the proposed change was so discriminatory that it clearly violated some other federal law. 5 Thus, I agree with those courts that have found that the jurisdiction is not required to prove that its proposed change will not violate § 2 in order to receive preclearance. See Arizona v. Reno, 887 F. Supp. 318, 321 (DC 1995). Although several three-judge District Courts have concluded that § 2 standards should not be incorporated into § 5, none has held that preclearance should be granted when there is a clear violation of § 2; rather, they appear simply to have determined that a § 2 inquiry is not routinely required in a § 5 case. See, e. g., Georgia v. Reno, 881 F. Supp. 7, 12­14 (DC 1994); New York v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 394, 398­399 (DC 1994); cf. Burton v. Sheheen, 793 F. Supp. 1329, 1350 (SC 1992) (hold- ing that although courts are not "obligated to completely graft" § 2 stand- ards onto § 5, "[i]t would be incongruous for the court to adopt a plan which did not comport with the standards and guidelines of § 2"). 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 504 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Opinion of Stevens, J. In fact, in Beer-which held that a legislative reapportion- ment enhancing the position of African-American voters did not have a discriminatory effect-the Court stated that "an ameliorative new legislative apportionment cannot violate § 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution." 425 U. S., at 141.6 Thus, to the extent that the Beer Court ad- dressed the question at all, it suggested that certain nonret- rogressive changes that were nevertheless discriminatory should not be precleared. The Court discounts the significance of the "unless" clause because it refers to a constitutional violation rather than a statutory violation. According to the Court's reading, the Beer dictum at most precludes preclearance of changes that violate the Constitution rather than changes that violate § 2. This argument is unpersuasive. As the majority notes, the Beer Court cites White v. Regester, 412 U. S., at 766, which found unconstitutional a reapportionment scheme that gave African-American residents "less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political proc- esses and to elect legislators of their choice." Because, in 1976, when Beer was decided, the § 2 standard was coexten- sive with the constitutional standard, Beer did not purport to distinguish between challenges brought under the Consti- tution and those brought under the statute. Rather Beer's dictum suggests that any changes that violate the standard established in White v. Regester should not be precleared.7 6 In Lockhart the Court disavowed reliance on the ameliorative charac- ter of the change reviewed in Beer, see 460 U. S., at 134, n. 10. It left open the question whether Congress had altered the Beer standard when it amended § 2 in 1982, 460 U. S., at 133, n. 9, and said nothing about the possible significance of a violation of a constitutional or statutory prohibi- tion against vote dilution. 7 In response to this dissent, the majority contends that, at most, Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), allows denial of preclearance for those changes that violate the Constitution. See ante, at 482­483. Thus, the majority apparently concedes that our "settled interpretation," ante, 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 505 Opinion of Stevens, J. As the Court recognizes, ante, at 481­482, the law has changed in two respects since the announcement of the Beer dictum. In 1980, in what was perceived by Congress to be a change in the standard applied in White v. Regester, a plu- rality of this Court concluded that discriminatory purpose is an essential element of a constitutional vote dilution chal- lenge. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 62. In reaction to that decision, in 1982 Congress amended § 2 by placing in the statute the language used in the White opinion to de- scribe what is commonly known as the "results" standard for evaluating vote dilution challenges. See 96 Stat. 134 (now codified at 42 U. S. C. §§ 1973(a)­(b)); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 35 (1986).8 Thus Congress preserved, as a mat- ter of statutory law, the very same standard that the Court had identified in Beer as an exception to the general rule requiring preclearance of nonretrogressive changes. Be- cause in 1975 Beer required denial of preclearance for voting plans that violated the White standard, it follows that Con- gress, in preserving the White standard, intended also that the Attorney General should continue to refuse to preclear plans violating that standard. That intent is confirmed by the legislative history of the 1982 Act. The Senate Report states: "Under the rule of Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), a voting change which is ameliorative is not objectionable unless the change `itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitu- tion.' 425 U. S. at 141; see also 142 n. 14 (citing to the dilution cases from Fortson v. Dorsey[, 379 U. S. 433 (1965),] through White v. Regester). In light of the amendment to section 2, it is intended that a section 5 objection also follow if a new voting procedure itself so at 484, of § 5 supports a denial of preclearance for at least some nonretro- gressive changes. 8 The amended version of § 2 tracks the language in White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 766 (1973). 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 506 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Opinion of Stevens, J. discriminates as to violate section 2." S. Rep. No. 97­ 417, p. 12, n. 31 (1982). The House Report conveys the same message in different language. It unequivocally states that whether a discrimi- natory practice or procedure was in existence before 1965 (and therefore only subject to attack under § 2) or is the product of a recent change (and therefore subject to preclear- ance under § 5) "affects only the mechanism that triggers re- lief." H. R. Rep. No. 97­227, p. 28 (1981). This statement plainly indicates that the Committee understood the substan- tive standards for § 2 and § 5 violations to be the same when- ever a challenged practice in a covered jurisdiction repre- sents a change subject to the dictates of § 5.9 Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Congress, by endorsing the "un- less" clause in Beer, contemplated the denial of preclearance for any change that clearly violates amended § 2. The ma- jority, by belittling this legislative history, abrogates Con- 9 The postenactment legislative record also supports the Attorney Gen- eral's interpretation of § 5. In 1985, the Attorney General first proposed regulations requiring a denial of preclearance "based upon violation of Section 2 if there is clear and convincing evidence of such a violation." 50 Fed. Reg. 19122, 19131. Congress held oversight hearings in which several witnesses, including the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, testified that clear violations of § 2 should not be precleared. See Oversight Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitu- tional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Proposed Changes to Regulations Governing Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 47, 149, 151­152 (1985). Following these hearings, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights issued a Re- port in which it concluded "that it is a proper interpretation of the legisla- tive history of the 1982 amendments to use Section 2 standards in the course of making Section 5 determinations." Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Voting Rights Act: Proposed Section 5 Regulations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No. 9, p. 5 (Comm. Print 1986). Although this history does not provide direct evidence of the enacting Congress' intent, it does constitute an in- formed expert opinion concerning the validity of the Attorney General's regulation. 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 507 Opinion of Stevens, J. gress' effort, in enacting the 1982 amendments, "to broaden the protection afforded by the Voting Rights Act." Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U. S. 380, 404 (1991). Despite this strong evidence of Congress' intent, the ma- jority holds that no deference to the Attorney General's reg- ulation is warranted. The Court suggests that had Con- gress wished to alter "our longstanding interpretation" of § 5, Congress would have made this clear. Ante, at 483. But nothing in our "settled interpretation" of § 5, ante, at 484, is inconsistent with the Attorney General's reading of the statute. To the contrary, our precedent actually indi- cates that nonretrogressive plans that are otherwise discrim- inatory under White v. Regester should not be precleared. As neither the language nor the legislative history of § 5 can be said to conflict with the view that changes that clearly violate § 2 are not entitled to preclearance, there is no legiti- mate basis for refusing to defer to the Attorney General's regulation. See Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U. S. 491, 508 (1992). II In Part III of its opinion the Court correctly concludes that this action must be remanded for further proceedings because the District Court erroneously refused to consider certain evidence that is arguably relevant to whether the Board has proved an absence of discriminatory purpose under § 5. Because the Court appears satisfied that the disputed evidence may be probative of an " `intent to retro- gress,' " it concludes that it is unnecessary to decide "whether the § 5 purpose inquiry ever extends beyond the search for retrogressive intent." Ante, at 486. For two reasons, I think it most unwise to reverse on such a narrow ground. First, I agree with Justice Breyer, see ante, at 493, that there is simply no basis for imposing this limitation on the purpose inquiry. None of our cases have held that § 5's purpose test is limited to retrogressive intent. In Pleasant 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN 508 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD. Opinion of Stevens, J. Grove v. United States, 479 U. S. 462, 469­472 (1987), for in- stance, we found that the city had failed to prove that its annexation of certain white areas lacked a discriminatory purpose. Despite the fact that the annexation lacked a ret- rogressive effect, we found it was subject to § 5 preclearance. Ibid.; see also id., at 474­475 (Powell, J., dissenting) (con- tending that the majority erred in holding that a discrimina- tory purpose could be found even though there was no intent "to have a retrogressive effect"). Furthermore, limiting the § 5 purpose inquiry to retrogressive intent is inconsistent with the basic purpose of the Act. Assume, for example, that the record unambiguously disclosed a long history of deliberate exclusion of African-Americans from participating in local elections, including a series of changes each of which was adopted for the specific purpose of maintaining the sta- tus quo. None of those changes would have been motivated by an "intent to regress," but each would have been moti- vated by a "discriminatory purpose" as that term is com- monly understood. Given the long-settled understanding that § 5 of the Act was enacted to prevent covered jurisdic- tions from "contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination," South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 335, it is inconceivable that Congress intended to authorize preclearance of changes adopted for the sole purpose of perpetuating an existing pattern of discrimination. Second, the Court's failure to make this point clear can only complicate the task of the District Court on remand. If that court takes the narrow approach suggested by the Court, another appeal will surely follow; if a majority ulti- mately agrees with my view of the issue, another remand will then be necessary. On the other hand, if the District Court does not limit its consideration to evidence of retro- gressive intent, and if it therefore rules against the Board, appellees will bring the action back and the Court would then have to resolve the issue definitively. 520US2 Unit: $U50 [09-10-99 19:05:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 471 (1997) 509 Opinion of Stevens, J. In sum, both the interest in orderly procedure and the fact that a correct answer to the issue is pellucidly clear should be sufficient to persuade the Court to state definitively that § 5 preclearance should be denied if Judge Kessler's evalua- tion of the record is correct. Accordingly, while I concur in the judgment insofar as it remands the action for further proceedings, I dissent from the decision insofar as it fails to authorize proceedings in accordance with the views set forth above. 520US2 Unit: $U51 [09-10-99 19:11:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN 510 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus INTER-MODAL RAIL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION et al. v. ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY CO., et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 96­491. Argued March 17, 1997-Decided May 12, 1997 As employees of respondent Santa Fe Terminal Services, Inc. (SFTS), a wholly owned subsidiary of respondent The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. (ATSF), the individual petitioners were entitled, among other things, to pension, health, and welfare benefits under SFTS- Teamsters Union collective bargaining agreements. The resulting ben- efit plans were subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Ultimately ATSF bid the work being done by petitioners to respondent In-Terminal Services (ITS) and terminated SFTS employees who declined to continue employment with ITS. The ITS-Teamsters pension and welfare benefit plans were less generous than the SFTS-Teamsters plans. Petitioners filed suit, alleging that the terminations violated § 510 of ERISA, which makes it unlawful to "discharge . . . a [plan] participant . . . for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan." (Emphasis added.) The District Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss. Concluding that § 510 only prohibits interference with the attainment of rights that are capable of "vesting," the Court of Appeals reinstated petitioners' claim for inter- ference with pension benefits, but affirmed the dismissal of their claim for interference with welfare benefits, which do not vest. Held: The Court of Appeals' holding that § 510 bars interference only with vested rights is contradicted by § 510's plain language, whose use of the word "plan" all but forecloses that position. ERISA defines "plan" to include an "employee welfare benefit plan," 29 U. S. C. § 1002(3), even though welfare plans are exempted from its stringent vesting require- ments, see § 1051(1). Had Congress intended to confine § 510's protec- tion to "vested" rights, it could have easily substituted "pension plan" for "plan" or "nonforfeitable right" for "any right." The flexibility an employer enjoys to unilaterally amend or eliminate its welfare benefit plan, see Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U. S. 73, 78, does not justify a departure from § 510's plain language. Such flexibility helps employers avoid the complicated administration and increased cost of vested plans, and encourages them to offer more generous benefits at the outset, since they can reduce benefits should economic conditions 520US2 Unit: $U51 [09-10-99 19:11:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 510 (1997) 511 Opinion of the Court sour. Section 510 counterbalances this flexibility by requiring employ- ers to follow a plan's formal amendment process, thus ensuring that employers do not "circumvent the provision of promised benefits." Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133, 143. Any tension that might exist between an employer's amendment power and a partici- pant's § 510 rights is the product of a careful balance of competing inter- ests, not the type of "absurd or glaringly unjust" result, Ingalls Ship- building, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 519 U. S. 248, 261, that would warrant departure from § 510's plain lan- guage. On remand, the Court of Appeals should have the first opportu- nity to evaluate respondents' remaining arguments, including their ar- gument that petitioners were eligible to receive welfare benefits under the SFTS-Teamsters plan at the time they were discharged and, thus, cannot state a § 510 claim. Pp. 514­517. 80 F. 3d 348, vacated and remanded. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Richard E. Schwartz argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was James E. Parrot. Cornelia T. L. Pillard argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Deputy So- licitor General Kneedler, J. Davitt McAteer, Allen H. Feld- man, and Mark S. Flynn. James D. Holzhauer argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondents Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al. was Alan E. Untereiner. Pat- rick W. Jordan and Robin M. Schachter filed a brief for respondent In-Terminal Services.* Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 895, makes it unlawful to *Mary Ellen Signorille, Melvin Radowitz, and Ronald Dean filed a brief for the American Association of Retired Persons et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Robert N. Eccles, Karen M. Wahle, Jan S. Amundson, Quentin Riegel, Robert W. Blanchette, and Kenneth P. Kolson filed a brief for the Em- ployers Group et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. 520US2 Unit: $U51 [09-10-99 19:11:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN 512 INTER-MODAL RAIL EMPLOYEES ASSN. v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. CO. Opinion of the Court "discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary [of an employee benefit plan] for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan." 29 U. S. C. § 1140. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that § 510 only prohibits interfer- ence with the attainment of rights that are capable of "vest- ing," as that term is defined in ERISA. We disagree. I The individual petitioners are former employees of re- spondent Santa Fe Terminal Services, Inc. (SFTS), a wholly owned subsidiary of respondent The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. (ATSF), which was responsible for transferring cargo between railcars and trucks at ATSF's Hobart Yard in Los Angeles, California. While petitioners were employed by SFTS, they were entitled to retirement benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1312, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 231 et seq., and to pension, health, and welfare benefits under collective bargaining agreements involving SFTS and the Teamsters Union. SFTS provided its workers with pension, health, and welfare benefits through employee benefit plans subject to ERISA's comprehensive regulations. In January 1990, ATSF entered into a formal "Service Agreement" with SFTS to have SFTS do the same "inter- modal" work it had done at the Hobart Yard for the previous 15 years without a contract. Seven weeks later, ATSF exer- cised its right to terminate the newly formed agreement and opened up the Hobart Yard work for competitive bidding. Respondent In-Terminal Services (ITS) was the successful bidder, and SFTS employees who declined to continue em- ployment with ITS were terminated. ITS, unlike SFTS, was not obligated to make contributions to the Railroad Re- tirement Account under the Railroad Retirement Act. ITS also provided fewer pension and welfare benefits under its 520US2 Unit: $U51 [09-10-99 19:11:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 510 (1997) 513 Opinion of the Court collective bargaining agreement with the Teamsters Union than had SFTS. Workers who continued their employment with ITS "lost their Railroad Retirement Act benefits" and "suffered a substantial reduction in Teamsters benefits." 80 F. 3d 348, 350 (CA9 1996) (per curiam). Petitioners sued respondents SFTS, ATSF, and ITS in the United States District Court for the Central District of Cali- fornia, alleging that respondents had violated § 510 of ERISA by "discharg[ing]" petitioners "for the purpose of in- terfering with the attainment of . . . right[s] to which" they would have "become entitled" under the ERISA pension and welfare plans adopted pursuant to the SFTS-Teamsters col- lective bargaining agreement. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 29a, Complaint ¶ 33. Had SFTS remained their employer, petitioners contended, they would have been entitled to as- sert claims for benefits under the SFTS-Teamsters benefit plans, at least until the collective bargaining agreement that gave rise to those plans expired. The substitution of ITS for SFTS, however, precluded them from asserting those claims and relegated them to asserting claims under the less generous ITS-Teamsters benefit plans. According to peti- tioners, the substitution "interfer[ed] with the attainment" of their "right" to assert those claims and violated § 510. Respondents moved to dismiss these § 510 claims, and the District Court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 80 F. 3d 348 (1996). The court reinstated petitioners' claim under § 510 for interference with their pension benefits, concluding that § 510 " `protects plan participants from termination motivated by an employ- er's desire to prevent a pension from vesting.' " Id., at 350­ 351 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133, 143 (1990)). But the Court of Appeals affirmed the dis- missal of petitioners' claim for interference with their wel- fare benefits. "Unlike pension benefits," the Court of Ap- peals observed, "welfare benefits do not vest." 80 F. 3d, at 520US2 Unit: $U51 [09-10-99 19:11:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN 514 INTER-MODAL RAIL EMPLOYEES ASSN. v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. CO. Opinion of the Court 351. As a result, the Court of Appeals noted, "employers remain free to unilaterally amend or eliminate [welfare] plans," and "employees have no present `right' to future, an- ticipated welfare benefits.' " Ibid. (emphasis deleted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted). Because the "existence of a present `right' is [a] prerequisite to section 510 relief," the Court of Appeals concluded that § 510 did not state a cause of action for interference with welfare benefits. Ibid. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on this issue,* 519 U. S. 1003 (1996), and now vacate the decision below and remand. II The Court of Appeals' holding that § 510 bars interference only with vested rights is contradicted by the plain language of § 510. As noted above, that section makes it unlawful to "discharge . . . a [plan] participant or beneficiary . . . for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan." 29 U. S. C. § 1140 (emphasis added). ERISA defines a "plan" to include both "an employee welfare benefit plan [and] an employee pension benefit plan," § 1002(3), and specifically exempts "employee welfare benefit plan[s]" from its strin- gent vesting requirements, see § 1051(1). Because a "plan" includes an "employee welfare benefit plan," and because welfare plans offer benefits that do not "vest" (at least inso- far as ERISA is concerned), Congress' use of the word "plan" in § 510 all but forecloses the argument that § 510's interfer- *See Shahid v. Ford Motor Co., 76 F. 3d 1404, 1411 (CA6 1996) (holding that § 510 draws no distinction between benefits that vest and those that do not); Heath v. Varity Corp., 71 F. 3d 256, 258 (CA7 1995) (same); Sea- man v. Arvida Realty Sales, 985 F. 2d 543, 546 (CA11) (same), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 916 (1993); see also McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F. 2d 401, 408 (CA5 1991) (implying the same), cert. denied sub nom. Greenburg v. H & H Music Co., 506 U. S. 981 (1992); Andes v. Ford Motor Co., 70 F. 3d 1332, 1336 (CADC 1995) (implying the same). 520US2 Unit: $U51 [09-10-99 19:11:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 510 (1997) 515 Opinion of the Court ence clause applies only to "vested" rights. Had Congress intended to confine § 510's protection to "vested" rights, it could have easily substituted the term "pension plan," see 29 U. S. C. § 1002(2), for "plan," or the term "nonforfeitable" right, see § 1002(19), for "any right." But § 510 draws no distinction between those rights that "vest" under ERISA and those that do not. The right that an employer or plan sponsor may enjoy in some circumstances to unilaterally amend or eliminate its welfare benefit plan does not, as the Court of Appeals appar- ently thought, justify a departure from § 510's plain language. It is true that ERISA itself "does not regulate the substan- tive content of welfare-benefit plans." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 732 (1985). Thus, unless an employer contractually cedes its freedom, see, e. g., Adcox v. Teledyne, Inc., 21 F. 3d 1381, 1389 (CA6), cert. de- nied, 513 U. S. 871 (1994), it is "generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate [its] welfare pla[n]." Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoone- jongen, 514 U. S. 73, 78 (1995). The flexibility an employer enjoys to amend or eliminate its welfare plan is not an accident; Congress recognized that "requir[ing] the vesting of these ancillary benefits would se- riously complicate the administration and increase the cost of plans." S. Rep. No. 93­383, p. 51 (1973). Giving employ- ers this flexibility also encourages them to offer more gener- ous benefits at the outset, since they are free to reduce bene- fits should economic conditions sour. If employers were locked into the plans they initially offered, "they would err initially on the side of omission." Heath v. Varity Corp., 71 F. 3d 256, 258 (CA7 1995). Section 510 counterbalances this flexibility by ensuring that employers do not "circumvent the provision of promised benefits." Ingersoll-Rand Co., supra, at 143 (citing S. Rep. No. 93­127, pp. 35­36 (1973); H. R. Rep. No. 93­533, p. 17 (1973)). In short, "§ 510 helps to make promises credible." Heath, supra, at 258. An employer 520US2 Unit: $U51 [09-10-99 19:11:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN 516 INTER-MODAL RAIL EMPLOYEES ASSN. v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. CO. Opinion of the Court may, of course, retain the unfettered right to alter its prom- ises, but to do so it must follow the formal procedures set forth in the plan. See 29 U. S. C. § 1102(b)(3) (requiring plan to "provide a procedure for amending such plan"); Schoone- jongen, supra, at 78 (observing that the "cognizable claim [under ERISA] is that the company did not [amend its wel- fare benefit plan] in a permissible manner"). Adherence to these formal procedures "increases the likelihood that pro- posed plan amendments, which are fairly serious events, are recognized as such and given the special consideration they deserve." Schoonejongen, supra, at 82. The formal amendment process would be undermined if § 510 did not apply because employers could "informally" amend their plans one participant at a time. Thus, the power to amend or abolish a welfare benefit plan does not include the power to "discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discrimi- nate against" the plan's participants and beneficiaries "for the purpose of interfering with [their] attainment of . . . right[s] . . . under the plan." To be sure, when an employer acts without this purpose, as could be the case when making fundamental business decisions, such actions are not barred by § 510. But in the case where an employer acts with a purpose that triggers the protection of § 510, any tension that might exist between an employer's power to amend the plan and a participant's rights under § 510 is the product of a careful balance of competing interests, and is most surely not the type of "absurd or glaringly unjust" result, Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensa- tion Programs, 519 U. S. 248, 261 (1997), that would warrant departure from the plain language of § 510. Respondents argue that the Court of Appeals' decision must nevertheless be affirmed because § 510, when applied to benefits that do not "vest," only protects an employee's right to cross the "threshold of eligibility" for welfare bene- fits. See Brief for Respondent Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al. 18. In other words, argue respondents, 520US2 Unit: $U51 [09-10-99 19:11:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 510 (1997) 517 Opinion of the Court an employee who is eligible to receive benefits under an ERISA welfare benefit plan has already "attain[ed]" her "right[s]" under the plan, so that any subsequent actions taken by an employer cannot, by definition, "interfer[e]" with the "attainment of . . . right[s]" under the plan. According to respondents, petitioners were eligible to receive welfare benefits under the SFTS-Teamsters plan at the time they were discharged, so they cannot state a claim under § 510. The Court of Appeals' approach precluded it from evaluating this argument, and others presented to us, and we see no reason not to allow it the first opportunity to consider these matters on remand. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN 518 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus LAMBRIX v. SINGLETARY, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit No. 96­5658. Argued January 15, 1997-Decided May 12, 1997 In the sentencing phase of the trial at which petitioner Lambrix was con- victed on two counts of first-degree murder, the Florida state-court jury rendered an advisory verdict recommending death sentences on both counts. Finding numerous aggravating circumstances in connection with both murders, and no mitigating circumstances as to either, the trial court sentenced Lambrix to death on both counts. After his con- viction and sentence were upheld on direct and collateral review by the Florida courts, he filed a habeas petition in the Federal District Court, which rejected all of his claims. While his appeal was pending before the Eleventh Circuit, this Court decided in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U. S. 1079, that if the sentencing judge in a "weighing" State (i. e., a State such as Florida that requires specified aggravating circumstances to be weighed against any mitigating circumstances at a capital trial's sentencing phase) is required to give deference to a jury's advisory sen- tencing recommendation, then neither the jury nor the judge is constitu- tionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances. Since one of Lambrix's claims was that his sentencing jury was improperly instructed on the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator, Espinosa had obvious relevance to his habeas petition. The Eleventh Circuit held its proceedings in abeyance to permit Lambrix to present his Espinosa claim to the Florida Supreme Court, which rejected the claim without considering its merits on the ground that the claim was procedurally barred. Without even acknowledging the procedural bar, the Eleventh Circuit denied relief, ruling that Espinosa announced a "new rule" which cannot be applied retroactively on federal habeas under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288. Held:1. Although the question whether a federal court should resolve a claim of procedural bar before considering a claim of Teague bar has not previously been presented, the Court's opinions-most particularly, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722-suggest that the procedural bar issue should ordinarily be considered first. The Court nonetheless chooses not to resolve this case on the procedural bar ground. Lambrix asserts several reasons why procedural bar does not apply, the validity 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 518 (1997) 519 Syllabus of which is more appropriately determined by the lower federal courts, which are more familiar with the procedural practices of the States in which they sit. Rather than prolong this litigation by a remand, the Court proceeds to decide the question presented. Pp. 522­525. 2. A prisoner whose conviction became final before Espinosa is fore- closed from relying on that decision in a federal habeas proceeding. Pp. 525­540. (a) To apply Teague, a federal habeas court must: (1) determine the date on which the defendant's conviction became final; (2) survey the legal landscape as it existed on that date to determine whether a state court then considering the defendant's claim would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule the defendant seeks was constitutionally required; and (3) if not, consider whether the relief sought falls within one of two narrow exceptions to nonretroactivity. Pp. 525­527. (b) A survey of the legal landscape as of the date that Lambrix's conviction became final shows that Espinosa was not dictated by then- existing precedent, but announced a "new rule" as defined in Teague. It is significant that Espinosa, supra, at 1082, cited only a single case in support of its central conclusion, Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U. S. 372, 382, and introduced that lone citation with a "cf."-an introductory sig- nal indicating authority that supports the point in dictum or by analogy. Baldwin states, on the page that Espinosa cites, 472 U. S., at 382, that the defendant's Espinosa-like argument "conceivably might have merit" in circumstances not present in that case. The decisions relied on most heavily by Lambrix-Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420; Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356; and Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738- do not dictate the result ultimately reached in Espinosa. Rather, a close examination of the Florida death penalty scheme, in light of cases such as Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242, 253 (joint opinion); id., at 260­261 (White, J., concurring in judgment); and Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447, 451, 466, indicates that a reasonable jurist considering the matter at the time Lambrix's sentence became final could have reached a result different from Espinosa. That conclusion is confirmed by Wal- ton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 653­654. The fact that Espinosa was handed down as a per curiam without oral argument is insignificant, since the decision followed by just three weeks Sochor v. Florida, 504 U. S. 527, in which the identical issue was fully briefed and argued, but could not be decided for jurisdictional reasons. Pp. 527­539. (c) Espinosa's new rule does not fall within either of the exceptions to this Court's nonretroactivity doctrine. The first exception plainly has no application, since Espinosa neither decriminalizes a class of con- duct nor prohibits the imposition of capital punishment on a particular 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 520 LAMBRIX v. SINGLETARY Opinion of the Court class of persons. E. g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 494­495. Lam- brix does not contend that the second exception-for watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the criminal proceeding's fundamental fairness and accuracy-applies to Espinosa errors, and Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 241­244, makes clear that it does not. Pp. 539­540. 72 F. 3d 1500, affirmed. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 540. O'Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 546. Matthew C. Lawry, by appointment of the Court, 519 U. S. 1005, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Mark Evan Olive. Carol M. Dittmar, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General.* Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether a prisoner whose conviction became final before our decision in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U. S. 1079 (1992) (per curiam), is foreclosed from relying on that decision in a federal habeas corpus proceeding because it announced a "new rule" as defined in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). I On February 5, 1983, Cary Michael Lambrix and his girl- friend, Frances Smith, met Clarence Moore and Aleisha Bryant at a local tavern. The two couples returned to Lam- brix's trailer for dinner, where Lambrix killed Moore and Bryant in brutal fashion. Lambrix was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder. In the sentencing phase of trial, the jury rendered an advisory verdict recommending *Kent S. Scheidegger filed a brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Founda- tion as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 518 (1997) 521 Opinion of the Court that the trial court sentence Lambrix to death on both counts. The trial court, after finding five aggravating cir- cumstances in connection with the murder of Moore, four aggravating circumstances in connection with the murder of Bryant, and no mitigating circumstances as to either murder, sentenced Lambrix to death on both counts. Lambrix's con- viction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal by the Florida Supreme Court. Lambrix v. State, 494 So. 2d 1143 (1986). After the Florida courts denied his repeated efforts to ob- tain collateral relief, Lambrix v. Dugger, 529 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1988); Lambrix v. State, 534 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1988); Lambrix v. State, 559 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1990), Lambrix filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida; that court rejected all of his claims. While Lambrix's appeal was pending before the Court of Ap- peals for the Eleventh Circuit, this Court decided Espinosa v. Florida, supra, which held that if the sentencing judge in a "weighing" State (i. e., a State that requires specified aggravating circumstances to be weighed against any miti- gating circumstances at the sentencing phase of a capital trial) is required to give deference to a jury's advisory sen- tencing recommendation, then neither the jury nor the judge is constitutionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances. Since Florida is such a State, and since one of Lambrix's claims was that his sentencing jury was improperly instructed on the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" (HAC) aggravator, Espinosa had obvious relevance to his habeas petition. Rather than address this issue in the first instance, however, the Eleventh Circuit held its proceedings in abeyance to permit Lambrix to present his Espinosa claim to the Florida state courts. The Florida Supreme Court rejected Lambrix's Espinosa claim without considering its merits on the ground that the claim was procedurally barred. Lambrix v. Singletary, 641 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 522 LAMBRIX v. SINGLETARY Opinion of the Court So. 2d 847 (1994). That court explained that although Lam- brix had properly preserved his Espinosa objection at trial by requesting a limiting instruction on the HAC aggravator, he had failed to raise the issue on direct appeal. 641 So. 2d, at 848. The Florida Supreme Court also rejected Lambrix's claim that the procedural bar should be excused because his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the for- feited issue, explaining that this claim was itself procedurally barred and was, in any event, meritless. Id., at 848­849. After the Florida Supreme Court entered judgment against Lambrix, the Eleventh Circuit adjudicated his ha- beas petition. Without even acknowledging the procedural bar-which was expressly raised and argued by the State- the Court of Appeals proceeded to address the Espinosa claim, and determined that Espinosa announced a new rule which cannot be applied retroactively on federal habeas under Teague v. Lane, supra. 72 F. 3d 1500, 1503 (1996). We granted certiorari. 519 U. S. 958 (1996). II Before turning to the question presented in this case, we pause to consider the State's contention that Lambrix's Es- pinosa claim is procedurally barred because he failed to con- tend that the jury was instructed with a vague HAC aggra- vator on his direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court. According to the State, the Florida Supreme Court "has con- sistently required that an Espinosa issue must have been objected to at trial and pursued on direct appeal in order to be reviewed in postconviction proceedings." Brief for Re- spondent 30, citing Chandler v. Dugger, 634 So. 2d 1066, 1069 (Fla. 1994), Jackson v. Dugger, 633 So. 2d 1051, 1055 (Fla. 1993), and Henderson v. Singletary, 617 So. 2d 313 (Fla.), cert. denied, 507 U. S. 1047 (1993). In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 729 (1991), we reaffirmed that this Court "will not review a question of fed- eral law decided by a state court if the decision of that court 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 518 (1997) 523 Opinion of the Court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." See also Harris v. Reed, 489 U. S. 255, 262 (1989). We in fact lack jurisdiction to review such independently supported judg- ments on direct appeal: Since the state-law determination is sufficient to sustain the decree, any opinion of this Court on the federal question would be purely advisory. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 125­126 (1945); see also Sochor v. Florida, 504 U. S. 527, 533­534, and n. (1992). The "inde- pendent and adequate state ground" doctrine is not techni- cally jurisdictional when a federal court considers a state prisoner's petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2254, since the federal court is not formally reviewing a judgment, but is determining whether the prisoner is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." We have nonetheless held that the doctrine applies to bar consideration on federal habeas of federal claims that have been defaulted under state law. Coleman, supra, at 729­730, 750; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 81, 82 (1977), discussing Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 486­487 (1953), and Ex parte Spencer, 228 U. S. 652 (1913); Harris, supra, at 262. Application of the "independent and adequate state ground" doctrine to federal habeas review is based upon equitable considerations of federalism and comity. It "en- sures that the States' interest in correcting their own mis- takes is respected in all federal habeas cases." Coleman, 501 U. S., at 732. "[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the State's procedural requirements for presenting his federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportu- nity to address those claims in the first instance." Ibid. If the "independent and adequate state ground" doctrine were not applied, a federal district court or court of appeals would be able to review claims that this Court would have been unable to consider on direct review. See id., at 730­731. 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 524 LAMBRIX v. SINGLETARY Opinion of the Court We have never had occasion to consider whether a federal court should resolve a State's contention that a petitioner's claim is procedurally barred before considering whether his claim is Teague barred. Our opinions, however-most par- ticularly, Coleman-certainly suggest that the procedural- bar issue should ordinarily be considered first. It was spec- ulated at oral argument that the Court of Appeals may have resolved the Teague issue without first considering proce- dural bar because our opinions have stated that the Teague retroactivity decision is to be made as a "threshold matter." E. g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 329 (1989); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U. S. 383, 389 (1994). That simply means, how- ever, that the Teague issue should be addressed "before con- sidering the merits of [a] claim." 510 U. S., at 389. It does not mean that the Teague inquiry is antecedent to consider- ation of the general prerequisites for federal habeas corpus which are unrelated to the merits of the particular claim- such as the requirement that the petitioner be "in custody," see 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a), or that the state-court judgment not be based on an independent and adequate state ground. Constitutional issues are generally to be avoided, and as even a cursory review of this Court's new-rule cases reveals (including our discussion in Part IV, infra), the Teague in- quiry requires a detailed analysis of federal constitutional law. See, e. g., Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 233­241 (1990); Penry, supra, at 316­319; Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U. S. 333, 339­344 (1993); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 488­494 (1990). We are somewhat puzzled that the Eleventh Circuit, after having held proceedings in abeyance while petitioner brought his claim in state court, did not so much as mention the Florida Supreme Court's determination that Lambrix's Espinosa claim was procedurally barred. The State of Flor- ida raised that point before both the District Court and the Court of Appeals, going so far as to reiterate it in a postjudg- 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 518 (1997) 525 Opinion of the Court ment Motion for Clarification and/or Modification of Opinion before the Court of Appeals, reprinted at App. 176. A State's procedural rules are of vital importance to the or- derly administration of its criminal courts; when a federal court permits them to be readily evaded, it undermines the criminal justice system. We do not mean to suggest that the procedural-bar issue must invariably be resolved first; only that it ordinarily should be. Judicial economy might counsel giving the Teague question priority, for example, if it were easily resolvable against the habeas petitioner, whereas the procedural-bar issue involved complicated issues of state law. Cf. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(b)(2) (permitting a federal court to deny a habeas petition on the merits notwithstand- ing the applicant's failure to exhaust state remedies). Despite our puzzlement at the Court of Appeals' failure to resolve this case on the basis of procedural bar, we hesitate to resolve it on that basis ourselves. Lambrix asserts sev- eral reasons why his claim is not procedurally barred, which seem to us insubstantial but may not be so; as we have re- peatedly recognized, the courts of appeals and district courts are more familiar than we with the procedural practices of the States in which they regularly sit, see, e. g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 267, n. 7 (1980); County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 153­154 (1979). Rather than prolong this litigation by a remand, we proceed to decide the case on the Teague grounds that the Court of Appeals used. III Florida employs a three-stage sentencing procedure. First, the jury weighs statutorily specified aggravating circumstances against any mitigating circumstances, and renders an "advisory sentence" of either life imprisonment or death. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(2) (Supp. 1992). Second, the trial court weighs the aggravating and mitigating circum- stances, and enters a sentence of life imprisonment or death; 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 526 LAMBRIX v. SINGLETARY Opinion of the Court if the latter, its findings must be set forth in writing. § 921.141(3). The jury's advisory sentence is entitled to "great weight" in the trial court's determination, Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975), but the court has an independent obligation to determine the appropriate punish- ment, Ross v. State, 386 So. 2d 1191, 1197 (Fla. 1980). Third, the Florida Supreme Court automatically reviews all cases in which the defendant is sentenced to death. § 921.141(4). Lambrix's jury, which was instructed on five aggravating circumstances, recommended that he be sentenced to death for each murder. The trial court found five aggravating cir- cumstances as to Moore's murder and four as to Bryant's, including that each murder was "especially heinous and atro- cious"; it found no mitigating circumstances as to either mur- der; it concluded that the aggravating circumstances out- weighed the mitigating, and sentenced Lambrix to death on each count. App. 20­21. Although Lambrix failed to raise any claims concerning the sentencing procedure on direct ap- peal, the Florida Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's findings as to the aggravating circumstances. Lambrix v. State, 494 So. 2d, at 1148. Lambrix contends that the jury's consideration of the HAC aggravator violated the Eighth Amendment because the jury instructions concerning this circumstance failed to provide sufficient guidance to limit the jury's discretion. Like the Eleventh Circuit, see 72 F. 3d, at 1503, we assume, arguendo, that this was so. Lambrix further contends (and this is at the heart of the present case) that the trial court's independ- ent weighing did not cure this error. Prior to our opinion in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U. S. 1079 (1992), the State had contended that Lambrix was not entitled to relief because the sentencing judge properly found and weighed a narrowed HAC aggravator. In Espinosa, however, we established the principle that if a "weighing" State requires the sentencing trial judge to give deference to a jury's advisory recommen- dation, neither the judge nor the jury is constitutionally per- 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 518 (1997) 527 Opinion of the Court mitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances. Lam- brix seeks the benefit of that principle; the State contends that it constitutes a new rule under Teague and thus cannot be relied on in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.1 In Teague we held that, in general, "new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are an- nounced." 489 U. S., at 310­311. To apply Teague, a fed- eral court engages in a three-step process. First, it deter- mines the date upon which the defendant's conviction became final. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U. S., at 390. Second, it must " `[s]urve[y] the legal landscape as it then existed,' Gra- ham v. Collins, [506 U. S. 461, 468 (1993)], and `determine whether a state court considering [the defendant's] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution,' Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 488 (1990)." Ibid. Finally, if the court deter- mines that the habeas petitioner seeks the benefit of a new rule, the court must consider whether the relief sought falls within one of the two narrow exceptions to nonretroactivity. See Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U. S., at 345. IV Lambrix's conviction became final on November 24, 1986, when his time for filing a petition for certiorari expired. Thus, our first and principal task is to survey the legal landscape as of that date, to determine whether the rule later announced in Espinosa was dictated by then-existing precedent-whether, that is, the unlawfulness of Lambrix's 1 Lambrix also contends that the trial court itself failed to apply a prop- erly narrowed HAC aggravator. We decline to consider this contention because it is not fairly within the question presented, which asked only whether Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), bars relief based upon Es- pinosa v. Florida, 505 U. S. 1079 (1992) (per curiam), Pet. for Cert. i. See this Court's Rule 14.1(a). 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 528 LAMBRIX v. SINGLETARY Opinion of the Court conviction was apparent to all reasonable jurists. See, e. g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 477 (1993); Butler v. Mc- Kellar, 494 U. S. 407, 415 (1990); id., at 417­418 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Espinosa, we determined that the Florida capital jury is, in an important respect, a cosentencer with the judge. As we explained: "Florida has essentially split the weighing process in two. Initially, the jury weighs aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the result of that weighing process is then in turn weighed within the trial court's proc- ess of weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances." 505 U. S., at 1082. We then concluded that the jury's consid- eration of a vague aggravator tainted the trial court's sen- tence because the trial court gave deference to the jury ver- dict (and thus indirectly weighed the vague aggravator) in the course of weighing the aggravating and mitigating cir- cumstances. Ibid. We reasoned that this indirect weigh- ing created the same risk of arbitrariness as the direct weighing of an invalid aggravating factor. Ibid.2 In our view, Espinosa was not dictated by precedent, but announced a new rule which cannot be used as the basis for federal habeas corpus relief. It is significant that Espinosa itself did not purport to rely upon any controlling precedent.3 2 Our description of the holding of Espinosa in the preceding paragraph of text is so clear that we are at a loss to explain Justice Stevens's impression that we accord Espinosa the "novel interpretation" that "the constitutional error in the jury instruction will `automatically render a defendant's sentence unconstitutional.' " Post, at 541 (dissenting opinion) (quoting infra, at 530). The sentence from which the phrase quoted by Justice Stevens is wrenched (so violently that the word "not" which precedes it is omitted) is not discussing the holding of Espinosa; indeed, it does not even mention Espinosa; nor does the entire paragraph or the previous or subsequent paragraphs. 3 Justice Stevens maintains that this statement is proved wrong by Espinosa's citation of Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 (1980), and Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975). Post, at 541, n. 2. This is wordplay. While those two cases can be called "controlling authority" in the sense that the two propositions they established (that an instruction to the 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 518 (1997) 529 Opinion of the Court The opinion cited only a single case, Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U. S. 372, 382 (1985), in support of its central conclusion that indirect weighing of an invalid aggravator "creates the same potential for arbitrariness" as direct weighing of an invalid aggravator. Espinosa, 505 U. S., at 1082. And it in- troduced that lone citation with a "cf."-an introductory sig- nal which shows authority that supports the point in dictum or by analogy, not one that "controls" or "dictates" the result. Baldwin itself contains further evidence that Espinosa set forth a new rule. Baldwin considered the constitutionality of Alabama's death sentencing scheme, in which the jury was required to "fix the punishment at death" if it found the de- fendant guilty of an aggravated offense, whereupon the trial court would conduct a sentencing hearing at which it would determine a sentence of death or of life imprisonment. 472 U. S., at 376. The defendant contended that because the jury's mandatory sentence would have been unconstitutional standing alone, see Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 288­305 (1976) (plurality opinion), it was impermissible for the trial court to consider that verdict in determining its own sentence. We did not reach that contention because we concluded that under Alabama law the jury's verdict formed no part of the trial judge's sentencing calculus. Id., at 382. We noted, however, on the page of the opinion that Espinosa cited, that the defendant's "argument conceivably might have merit if the judge actually were required to consider the jury's `sentence' as a recommendation as to the sentence the jury believed would be appropriate, cf. Proffitt v. Flor- sentencing jury which fails to define the HAC aggravator violates the Eighth Amendment, and that the Florida sentencing judge must give great weight to the jury's recommendation) were among the "givens" from which any decision in Espinosa had to be derived, they assuredly were not "controlling authority" in the sense we obviously intend: that they compel the outcome in Espinosa. They do not answer the definitive ques- tion: whether the jury's advisory verdict taints the trial court's sentence, that is, whether indirect weighing of an invalid factor creates the same potential for arbitrariness as direct weighing. 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 530 LAMBRIX v. SINGLETARY Opinion of the Court ida, 428 U. S. 242 (1976), and if the judge were obligated to accord some deference to it." Baldwin, 472 U. S., at 382 (emphasis added); see also id., at 386, n. 8 ("express[ing] no view" on the same point). This highly tentative expression, far from showing that Baldwin "dictate[s]" the result in Espinosa, see Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S., at 235, suggests just the opposite. Indeed, in Baldwin the Chief Justice, who believed that Alabama's scheme did contemplate that the trial judge would consider the jury's "sentence," none- theless held the scheme constitutional. 472 U. S., at 392 (opinion concurring in judgment). The Supreme Court decisions relied upon most heavily by petitioner are Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 (1980); May- nard v. Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356 (1988); and Clemons v. Mis- sissippi, 494 U. S. 738 (1990). In Godfrey, we held that Georgia's "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhu- man" aggravator was impermissibly vague, reasoning that there was nothing in the words "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" "that implies any inherent re- straint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence," and concluded that these terms alone "gave the jury no guidance." 446 U. S., at 428­429 (plurality opinion). Similarly, in Maynard v. Cartwright, applied retroactively to February 1985 in Stringer v. Black, 503 U. S. 222 (1992), we held that Oklahoma's HAC aggravator, which is identically worded to Florida's HAC aggravator, was impermissibly vague because the statute gave no more guidance than the vague aggravator at issue in Godfrey and the sentencing jury was not given a limiting instruction. 486 U. S., at 363­364. Although Godfrey and Maynard support the proposition that vague aggravators must be sufficiently narrowed to avoid arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, these cases, and others, demonstrate that the failure to instruct the sen- tencing jury properly with respect to the aggravator does not automatically render a defendant's sentence unconsti- tutional. We have repeatedly indicated that a sentencing 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 518 (1997) 531 Opinion of the Court jury's consideration of a vague aggravator can be cured by appellate review. Thus, in Godfrey itself, we were less con- cerned about the failure to instruct the jury properly than we were about the Georgia Supreme Court's failure to nar- row the facially vague aggravator on appeal. Had the Geor- gia Supreme Court applied a narrowing construction of the aggravator, we would have rejected the Eighth Amendment challenge to Godfrey's death sentence, notwithstanding the failure to instruct the jury on that narrowing construction. Godfrey, supra, at 431­432. Likewise in Maynard, we stressed that the vague HAC aggravator had not been suffi- ciently limited on appeal by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals "to cure the unfettered discretion of the jury." 486 U. S., at 364. We reached a similar conclusion in Clemons v. Mississippi, applied retroactively to February 1985 in Stringer. Clem- ons considered the question whether the sentencer's weigh- ing of a vague HAC aggravator rendered that sentence un- constitutional in a "weighing" State. The sentencing jury in Clemons, as in Maynard, was given a HAC instruction that was unconstitutionally vague. We held that "the Fed- eral Constitution does not prevent a state appellate court from upholding a death sentence that is based in part on an invalid or improperly defined aggravating circumstance either by reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating evidence or by harmless-error review." Clemons, supra, at 741, 745; see also Stringer, supra, at 230. The principles of the above-described cases do not dictate the result we ultimately reached in Espinosa. Florida, un- like Oklahoma, see Maynard, supra, at 360, had given its facially vague HAC aggravator a limiting construction suffi- cient to satisfy the Constitution. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S., at 255­256 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); id., at 260 (White, J., concurring in judgment). Thus, unlike the sentencing juries in Clemons, Maynard, and Godfrey, who were not instructed with a properly lim- 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 532 LAMBRIX v. SINGLETARY Opinion of the Court ited aggravator, the sentencing trial judge in Espinosa did find the HAC aggravator under a properly limited construc- tion. See Espinosa, 505 U. S., at 1082, citing Walton v. Ari- zona, 497 U. S. 639, 653 (1990).4 A close examination of the Florida death penalty scheme persuades us that a reasonable jurist considering Lambrix's sentence in 1986 could have reached a conclusion different from the one Espinosa an- nounced in 1992. There were at least three different, but somewhat related, approaches that would have suggested a different outcome: (1) The mere cabining of the trial court's discretion would avoid arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, and thus avoid unconstitutionality. In Proffitt v. Florida, supra, we upheld the Florida death penalty scheme against the contention that it resulted in arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 188 (1976), because "trial judges are given specific and detailed guidance to assist them in deciding whether to impose a death penalty or imprisonment for life" and because the Florida Supreme 4 Justice Stevens's dissent says that "[g]iven that the judge's instruc- tion to the jury failed to narrow the HAC aggravator, there is no reason to believe that [the trial judge] appropriately narrowed the [HAC] factor in his . . . deliberations." Post, at 545. Our cases establish that there is always a "reason to believe" that, which we consider fully adequate: "Trial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their decisions. If the [State] Supreme Court has narrowed the definition of the [HAC] aggravating circumstance, we presume that [state] trial judges are applying the narrower definition." Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S., at 653. Without abandoning our precedent, the most Justice Ste- vens can argue is that the ordinary presumption is overcome by failure to instruct. The factual support for such an argument is questionable: Judges fail to instruct juries about rules of law they are aware of all the time. Moreover, if the argument were correct, the holding in Espinosa itself would have been unnecessary: We could have simply said there (as Justice Stevens would have us say here) that the failure to instruct on the narrowing construction displayed the judge's ignorance of the narrowing construction. Instead, of course, Espinosa cited the passage from Walton quoted above. Espinosa, 505 U. S., at 1082. 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 518 (1997) 533 Opinion of the Court Court reviewed sentences for consistency. Proffitt, 428 U. S., at 253 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); id., at 260­261 (opinion of White, J., joined by the Chief Jus- tice and Rehnquist, J.). (In Proffitt itself, incidentally, the jury had not been instructed on an appropriately narrowed HAC aggravator, see Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F. 2d 1227, 1264, n. 57 (CA11 1982), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 1002 (1983).) From what was said in Proffitt it would, as the en banc Elev- enth Circuit noted, "sensibly follow that the judge's proper review of the sentence cures any risk of arbitrariness occa- sioned by the jury's consideration of an unconstitutionally vague aggravating circumstance." Glock v. Singletary, 65 F. 3d 878, 886 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U. S. 888 (1996). It could have been argued, of course, as Justice Stevens con- tends, see post, at 543 (dissenting opinion), that prior consti- tutional error by a sentencing-determining jury would make a difference, but both the conclusion and the premise of that argument were debatable: not only whether it would make a difference, but even (as the succeeding point demonstrates) whether there was any constitutional error by a sentencing- determining jury. (2) There was no error for the trial judge to cure, since under Florida law the trial court, not the jury, was the sen- tencer. In Espinosa we concluded, in effect, that the jury was at least in part a cosentencer along with the trial court. That determination can fairly be traced to our opinion in Sochor v. Florida, 504 U. S. 527 (1992), decided just three weeks earlier, where we explained that under Florida law the trial court "is at least a constituent part of `the sen- tencer,' " implying that the jury was that as well. Id., at 535­536. That characterization is in considerable tension with our pre-1986 view. In Proffitt, for example, after con- sidering Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975), on which Espinosa primarily relied, the Court determined that the trial court was the sentencer. E. g., 428 U. S., at 249 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) ("[T]he actual 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 534 LAMBRIX v. SINGLETARY Opinion of the Court sentence is determined by the trial judge" (emphasis added)); id., at 251 (the trial court is "[t]he sentencing authority in Florida"); id., at 252 ("[T]he sentence is determined by the judge rather than by the jury"); id., at 260 (White, J., con- curring in judgment). We even distinguished the Florida scheme from the Georgia scheme on the ground that "in Florida the sentence is determined by the trial judge rather than by the jury." Id., at 252 (joint opinion) (emphasis added). Some eight years later, just two years before peti- tioner's conviction became final, we continued to describe the judge as the sentencer. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447 (1984); see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939, 952­954 (1983) (plurality opinion); id., at 962 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). (Although he now believes the jury is a co- sentencer, at the time Lambrix's conviction became final Justice Stevens had explained that "the sentencing au- thority [is] the jury in Georgia, the judge in Florida." Ibid.) It would not have been unreasonable to rely on what we had said in Proffitt, Spaziano, and Barclay-that the trial court was the sentencer-and to conclude that where the sentencer considered properly narrowed aggravators there was simply no error under Godfrey or Maynard. The Florida Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit held precisely that in 1989, see Smalley v. State, 546 So. 2d 720, 722; Bertolotti v. Dug- ger, 883 F. 2d 1503, 1526­1527, cert. denied, 497 U. S. 1032 (1990); and in 1985 the Eleventh Circuit foresaw the possi- bility of such a holding: "[Spaziano's] reasoning calls into question whether any given error in such a merely `advisory' proceeding should be considered to be of constitutional mag- nitude." Proffitt v. Wainwright, 756 F. 2d 1500, 1502. (3) The trial court's weighing of properly narrowed ag- gravators and mitigators was sufficiently independent of the jury to cure any error in the jury's consideration of a vague aggravator. Although the Florida Supreme Court had interpreted its statute-which provided that the judge was the sentencer, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3) (Supp. 1992), and that the 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 518 (1997) 535 Opinion of the Court jury rendered merely an "advisory sentence," § 921.141(2)-as requiring the trial judge to give "great weight" to a jury's advisory recommendation, Tedder v. State, supra, that court nonetheless emphasized that the trial court must "independ- ently weigh the evidence in aggravation and mitigation," and that "[u]nder no combination of circumstances can th[e] [jury's] recommendation usurp the judge's role by limiting his discretion." Eutzy v. State, 458 So. 2d 755, 759 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U. S. 1045 (1985). In one case, the Florida Supreme Court vacated a sentence because the trial court had given "undue weight to the jury's recommenda- tion of death and did not make an independent judgment of whether or not the death penalty should be imposed." Ross v. State, 386 So. 2d 1191, 1197 (1980) (emphasis added). In Spaziano v. Florida, supra, we acknowledged that the Flor- ida trial court conducts "its own weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances," id., at 451, and that "[r]egard- less of the jury's recommendation, the trial judge is required to conduct an independent review of the evidence and to make his own findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances," id., at 466 (emphasis added); see also Prof- fitt, 428 U. S., at 251.5 Given these precedents, it was rea- 5 Justice Stevens accuses us of "simply ignoring the reasoning in Tedder." Post, at 543 (dissenting opinion). We have of course not done so. See supra, at 526, 533­534 and this page. Justice Stevens, how- ever, fails to discuss, or indeed even mention, the cases interpreting Tedder that contradict the dissent's view-cases in both this Court and the Florida Supreme Court repeatedly emphasizing the trial judge's obli- gation to make an independent assessment and weighing of the aggra- vating and mitigating circumstances. He relies, for example, upon the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Riley v. Wainwright, 517 So. 2d 656 (1987), see post, at 541, n. 3 (a decision rendered after Lambrix's conviction became final and hence not technically relevant). But subsequent to that case the Florida Supreme Court summarized its jurisprudence as follows: "Our case law contains many instances where a trial judge's override of a jury recommendation of life has been upheld. Notwithstanding the jury recommendation, whether it be for life imprisonment or death, the judge is required to make an independent determination, based on the 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 536 LAMBRIX v. SINGLETARY Opinion of the Court sonable to think that the trial court's review would at least constitute the sort of "reweighing" that would satisfy Clem- ons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738 (1990), see also Stringer, 503 U. S., at 237. In fact, given the view of some Members of this Court that appellate reweighing was inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment, see, e. g., Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U. S. 376, 400­401, 404 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.); Clemons, supra, at 769­772 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part), it would have been reasonable to think that trial-court re- weighing was preferable. As one Court of Appeals was prompted to note, "Clemons's holding, which arguably points in the opposite direction from Espinosa, indicates that even in 1990 Espinosa's result would not have been dictated by precedent." Glock v. Singletary, 65 F. 3d, at 887 (en banc). That Espinosa announced a new rule is strongly confirmed by our decision in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990). Although decided after petitioner's conviction became final, Walton is a particularly good proxy for what a reasonable jurist would have thought in 1986, given that the only rele- vant cases decided by this Court in the interim were May- nard and Clemons, the holdings of both of which, we later aggravating and mitigating factors. Moreover, this procedure has been previously upheld against constitutional challenge." Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833, 840 (Fla. 1988) (emphasis added; citations omitted). "It is clear . . . that the prosecutor correctly stated the law in Florida: the judge is the sentencing authority and the jury's role is merely advisory." Id., at 839. It is not our burden, of course, to establish that these state- ments in Grossman, or in the other cases we rely upon, were accurate; as we later determined, they were wrong and the dissent's (current) reading of Tedder is correct. But the question before us is whether a reasonable jurist could have disagreed with the dissent's interpretation of Tedder at the time of Lambrix's conviction. In treating as relevant to that question only that portion of precedent vindicated by later decisions, Justice Ste- vens "endues the jurist with prescience, not reasonableness." Stringer v. Black, 503 U. S. 222, 244 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting). 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 518 (1997) 537 Opinion of the Court held, were compelled by the law in 1985, see Stringer, supra. In Walton, we rejected a claim that Arizona's HAC aggrava- tor failed sufficiently to channel the sentencer's discretion. Summarizing Godfrey and Maynard, we explained that "in neither case did the state appellate court, in reviewing the propriety of the death sentence, purport to affirm the death sentence by applying a limiting definition," and this, we said, "w[as] crucial to the conclusion we reached in Maynard." Walton, supra, at 653. This reasoning suggests that even following Maynard, a weighing-state death sentence would satisfy the Eighth Amendment so long as the vague aggrava- tor was narrowed at some point in the process. Addition- ally, in the course of our opinion, we characterized Clemons as follows: "[E]ven if a trial judge fails to apply the narrowing con- struction or applies an improper construction, the Con- stitution does not necessarily require that a state appel- late court vacate a death sentence based on that factor. Rather, as we held in Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738 (1990), a state appellate court may itself determine whether the evidence supports the existence of the ag- gravating circumstance as properly defined or the court may eliminate consideration of the factor altogether and determine whether any remaining aggravating circum- stances are sufficient to warrant the death penalty." Walton, supra, at 653­654 (emphasis added). Our use of the disjunctive suggests that as late as 1990, if a Florida trial court determined that the defendant's conduct fell within the narrowed HAC aggravator, the sentence would satisfy the Eighth Amendment irrespective of whether the trial court reweighed the aggravating and miti- gating factors.6 The holdings in Stringer, Maynard, Clem- 6 Justice Stevens is thus simply wrong in stating that we have con- fused appellate application of a limiting construction with a trial court's deference to a tainted jury recommendation, see post, at 545 (dissenting 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 538 LAMBRIX v. SINGLETARY Opinion of the Court ons, and Godfrey cannot be thought to suggest otherwise, because there was no indication in those cases that the state courts had found the facts of the crimes to fall within appro- priately narrowed definitions of the aggravators. Before Espinosa, we had never invalidated a death sentence where a court found the challenged aggravator to be within the appellate court's narrowed definition of a facially vague aggravator. Most of Justice Stevens's dissent is devoted to making a forceful case that Espinosa was a reasonable interpreta- tion of prior law-perhaps even the most reasonable one. But the Teague inquiry-which is applied to Supreme Court decisions that are, one must hope, usually the most reason- able interpretation of prior law-requires more than that. It asks whether Espinosa was dictated by precedent-i. e., whether no other interpretation was reasonable. We think it plain from the above that a jurist considering all the rele- vant material (and not, like Justice Stevens's dissent, con- sidering only the material that favors the Espinosa result) could reasonably have reached a conclusion contrary to our holding in that case. Indeed, both before and after Lam- brix's conviction became final, every court decision we are aware of did so. See, e. g., Smalley v. State, 546 So. 2d, at 722; Proffitt v. Wainwright, 756 F. 2d, at 1502; Bertolotti v. Dugger, 883 F. 2d, at 1527; Sanchez-Velasco v. State, 570 So. 2d 908, 916 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U. S. 929 (1991). It has been suggested that Espinosa was not a new rule because our decision was handed down as a per curiam with- out oral argument. See, e. g., Glock v. Singletary, 65 F. 3d, at 896, n. 11 (en banc) (Tjoflat, C. J., dissenting). Whatever opinion). Walton indicated that our precedents provided two distinct and permissible routes to satisfy the Eighth Amendment where the sen- tencer considered a vague aggravator: a court's finding of the aggravator under a proper limiting construction, or independent reweighing of the circumstances. 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 518 (1997) 539 Opinion of the Court inference of established law a summary, per curiam disposi- tion might normally carry is precluded by the peculiar cir- cumstances surrounding the summary per curiam in Es- pinosa. Just three weeks prior to our issuance of Espinosa, we had decided a case that raised the identical issue, and in which that issue had been fully briefed and argued; we found ourselves without jurisdiction to decide the point, however, because the defendant had failed to preserve his objection in the state courts. See Sochor v. Florida, 504 U. S., at 533­ 534. It is obvious on the face of the matter that Espinosa was only in the most technical sense an "unargued" case: We used that case, which was pending on petition for certiorari when Sochor was decided, as the vehicle for resolving a fully argued point without consuming additional resources. V Since we have determined that Espinosa announced a new rule under Teague, there remains only the task of determin- ing whether that new rule nonetheless falls within one of the two exceptions to our nonretroactivity doctrine. "The first exception permits the retroactive application of a new rule if the rule places a class of private conduct beyond the power of the State to proscribe, see Teague, 489 U. S., at 311, or addresses a `substantive categorical guarante[e] accorded by the Constitution,' such as a rule `prohibiting a certain cate- gory of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.' " Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S., at 494 (quot- ing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S., at 329, 330). Plainly, this exception has no application to this case. Espinosa "neither decriminalize[s] a class of conduct nor prohibit[s] the imposi- tion of capital punishment on a particular class of persons." 494 U. S., at 495. The second exception is for " `watershed rules of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accu- racy of the criminal proceeding." Ibid. (quoting Teague, 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 540 LAMBRIX v. SINGLETARY Stevens, J., dissenting supra, at 311). Lambrix does not contend that this excep- tion applies to Espinosa errors, and our opinion in Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S., at 241­244, makes it quite clear that that is so. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is Affirmed. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join, dissenting. Two propositions of law supported our holding in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U. S. 1079 (1992) (per curiam): First, in a capital sentencing proceeding in a State where the sen- tencer weighs aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the Eighth Amendment is violated by a jury instruction that fails to define the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" (HAC) aggravating circumstance. Second, in a Flor- ida sentencing proceeding the trial court must give " `great weight' " to the jury's recommendation, whether it be for life or death. Id., at 1082. For these reasons, we concluded in Espinosa that constitutional error that taints the jury's recommendation presumptively taints the judge's sentence as well. Ibid. The two propositions supporting the Es- pinosa holding were well established when that case was decided. The first proposition dates back to 1980 when we decided Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420, 428­429,1 and the second was announced by the Florida Supreme Court in 1 Godfrey, of course, held that Georgia's "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" aggravating factor failed to adequately channel the jury's discretion. See 446 U. S., at 428­429. We found the "heinous, atro- cious or cruel" aggravator unconstitutional in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356, 359 (1988), and subsequently noted that application of Godfrey to the HAC instruction did not create a new rule. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U. S. 222, 228­229 (1992). 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 518 (1997) 541 Stevens, J., dissenting 1975 in Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910.2 Thus I agree with Chief Judge Tjoflat that our per curiam opinion in Es- pinosa amounted to "nothing more than an application of well-settled principles. . . . In declaring the Florida HAC instruction unconstitutional, the Court simply applied the law as announced initially in Godfrey and later reaffirmed in Maynard [v. Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356 (1988]). The Court's conclusion-that the invalid instruction may have tainted the jury's death penalty recommendation and the trial judge's sentence-merely acknowledged what the Supreme Court of Florida has been holding for years." Glock v. Singletary, 65 F. 3d 878, 896 (CA11 1995) (dissenting opinion) (footnotes omitted).3 Today the Court reaches the conclusion that Espinosa an- nounced a new rule by placing a novel interpretation on its holding. The majority apparently construes Espinosa as holding that the constitutional error in the jury instruction will "automatically render a defendant's sentence unconstitu- tional." Ante, at 530.4 The Court suggests that our hold- ings in Godfrey, Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356 (1988), and Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 745 (1990)-that 2 These two "controlling precedents," both of which were cited in the Espinosa opinion, provided sufficient support for its holding. Thus the Court is simply mistaken when it asserts that "Espinosa itself did not purport to rely upon any controlling precedent." Ante, at 528. 3 Tedder, of course, was not an isolated decision. In Riley v. Wain- wright, 517 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 1987), the State Supreme Court put the point succinctly: "If the jury's recommendation, upon which the judge must rely, results from an unconstitutional procedure, then the entire sentencing process necessarily is tainted by that procedure." Id., at 659. The Riley court relied on a pre-Tedder decision stating that the advisory opinion of the jury "is an integral part of the death sentencing process." 517 So. 2d, at 657 (citing Lamadline v. State, 303 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1974)). 4 Responding to this dissent in n. 2, ante, at 528, the Court states that the clause I have quoted was not intended to describe the Court's under- standing of the holding in Espinosa. If that be so, the relevance of this portion of the Court's opinion, including its reliance on Godfrey and May- nard, is opaque, at best. 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 542 LAMBRIX v. SINGLETARY Stevens, J., dissenting an appellate court could cure a sentencing jury's weighing of an invalid aggravator-might have led a reasonable jurist down a road different from the one the Court followed in Espinosa.5 But in holding that a trial judge's sentence may be infected by the jury's consideration of an invalid aggra- vating factor, Espinosa did not address the entirely separate question of whether the jury's error could be cured or con- sidered harmless either at the trial or the appellate level. Indeed, in subsequent proceedings the Supreme Court of Florida did conclude that the error in Espinosa's case was harmless and upheld his sentence of death. See Espinosa v. State, 626 So. 2d 165, 167 (1993) (ruling that Espinosa's HAC instruction claim was procedurally barred because he had challenged the HAC factor rather than the instruction itself and, alternatively, that any error in the instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 511 U. S. 1152 (1994), and affirmed Espinosa's sentence. Our de- cision in Espinosa did not create a new rule prohibiting trial courts from curing a jury's error, rather it held that "if a weighing State decides to place capital sentencing authority in two actors rather than one, neither actor must be permit- ted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances." 505 U. S., at 1082. This holding is a logical consequence of applying Godfrey to Florida's sentencing scheme. In a sinuous, difficult to follow argument, the Court sug- gests that three hypothetical propositions of law somehow demonstrate that the narrow holding in Espinosa was not dictated by Godfrey and Tedder. First, the Court posits that a reasonable jurist might have believed that "[t]he mere cabining of the trial court's discretion" was alone enough to avoid constitutional error. Ante, at 532 (emphasis deleted). 5 The Court also relies heavily on a passage in our opinion in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990), noting that a trial judge's failure to apply a narrowing construction to an invalid aggravator " `does not necessarily require that a state appellate court vacate a death sentence based on that factor.' " Ante, at 537. 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 518 (1997) 543 Stevens, J., dissenting A critical part of that "cabining," however, is Florida's re- quirement that a properly instructed jury must have an op- portunity to recommend a life sentence, and that the judge must give great weight to that recommendation. The role of the jury is to provide one of the cabin's four walls. The fact that three walls remain standing hardly excuses an error that removed the wall represented by the jury's recommen- dation. At the time of petitioner's sentencing, the Florida Supreme Court recognized the jury's critical role, and, when error occurred before the jury, did not hesitate to remand for resentencing, even when the trial judge claimed to be unaffected by the error. For example in Messer v. State, 330 So. 2d 137, 142 (1976), the State Supreme Court re- manded for resentencing when the trial court failed to allow the jury to consider certain mitigating evidence. The court rejected the argument that the trial court's subsequent weighing of the mitigating evidence cured the error: The Florida scheme, the court concluded, was one of "checks and balances in which the input of the jury serves as an integral part." Ibid. Our holding in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242, 255 (1976) (joint opinion), that Florida's sentencing scheme is not facially unconstitutional does not suggest oth- erwise. There, we determined that the State's sentencing procedure provided adequate safeguards against arbitrary imposition of the death sentence in part because of the proce- dures followed by the trial judge in fixing the sentence. Our focus was on the adequacy of the guidance provided by the sentencing scheme; accordingly, we had no need to exten- sively examine or discuss the judge's relationship to the jury or Florida Supreme Court decisions like Tedder. Second, simply ignoring the reasoning in Tedder, the Court suggests that there was "no error for the trial judge to cure, since under Florida law the trial court, not the jury, was the sentencer." Ante, at 533 (emphasis deleted). It is, of course, true that the judge imposes the sentence after receiving the jury's recommendation. But this has never 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 544 LAMBRIX v. SINGLETARY Stevens, J., dissenting meant that constitutional error in the proceedings before the jury is simply irrelevant. Cf. Messer v. State, supra. As then-Justice Rehnquist noted in 1983, it is well-settled Florida law that if the jury makes a recommendation of life imprisonment, "the trial judge may not impose a death sen- tence unless `the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.' Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (1975)." Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939, 955­956 (plurality opin- ion).6 Similarly, a trial judge should not disturb a jury rec- ommendation of death "unless there appear strong reasons to believe that reasonable persons could not agree with the recommendation." See LeDuc v. State, 365 So. 2d 149, 151 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 885 (1979). Given this, it is vacuous to argue that our prior references to the judge as the sentencer somehow imply that an error before the jury would not affect the ultimate sentence. It is equally vacuous to suggest that our conclusion in Espinosa "that the jury was at least in part a cosentencer" had its source in a case decided "just three weeks earlier," ante, at 533 (citing Sochor v. Florida, 504 U. S. 527 (1992)). In that earlier case, we cited Tedder after explaining that the jury was a constit- uent element of the sentencer "because the trial judge does not render wholly independent judgment, but must accord deference to the jury's recommendation." Sochor, 504 U. S., at 533. Third, the Court suggests that the trial court's "weighing of properly narrowed aggravators and mitigators was suffi- ciently independent of the jury to cure any error in the jury's consideration of a vague aggravator." Ante, at 534 (em- 6 The Florida Supreme Court has applied Tedder in numerous cases to reverse a trial judge's override of a jury's life sentence. See, e. g., Wasko v. State, 505 So. 2d 1314, 1318 (1987); Goodwin v. State, 405 So. 2d 170, 172 (1981); Odom v. State, 403 So. 2d 936, 942­943 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 925 (1982); Neary v. State, 384 So. 2d 881, 885­886 (1980); Malloy v. State, 382 So. 2d 1190, 1193 (1979). 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 518 (1997) 545 Stevens, J., dissenting phasis deleted). This suggestion is doubly flawed. Given that the judge's instruction to the jury failed to narrow the HAC aggravator, there is no reason to believe that he ap- propriately narrowed the factor in his own deliberations.7 More importantly, even if he did apply a limiting definition, his sentencing decision was made without the benefit of an untainted recommendation from the jury, and, under Florida law, he could not have simply resentenced the petitioner without regard to the jury's tainted recommendation. Nor can one simply conclude that this error made no practical difference in petitioner's sentence. There is nothing in the record to suggest that had the jury recommended a life sen- tence, the judge would have found that "the facts suggesting a sentence of death were so clear and convincing that virtu- ally no reasonable person could differ," as Tedder requires. Here, again, the Court finds that our statements in cases like Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990), that a state appellate court may affirm a death sentence resulting from an unconstitutionally broad aggravator by applying a limit- ing definition, suggest that Espinosa is a new rule. The ma- jority's analysis confuses an appellate court's application of a limiting definition on appellate review with a trial judge's deference to a tainted jury recommendation. The judge in this case did not indicate that he was applying a limiting definition of the HAC factor, or that he was in some other way curing or discounting the error in the jury instruction. At the time of petitioner's sentencing, given Godfrey and Tedder, this rendered petitioner's death sentence constitu- tionally defective. As a matter of logic and law there was nothing new about Espinosa's holding that the jury plays a central role in Flori- da's capital sentencing scheme. Moreover, as statistics that 7 Nothing in the record indicates that the judge recognized that the jury instruction was erroneous, or that he sought to cure that error in his own weighing process. In finding that the HAC aggravator was present, the judge merely stated: "The facts speak for themselves." App. 20. 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 546 LAMBRIX v. SINGLETARY O'Connor, J., dissenting I have previously summarized demonstrate, it was equally clear as a matter of fact that "erroneous instructions to the jury at the sentencing phase of the trial may make the differ- ence between life or death." Sochor v. Florida, 504 U. S., at 552.8 I respectfully dissent. Justice O'Connor, dissenting. Although I agree with much of the reasoning set forth in Part II of the Court's opinion, I disagree with its disposition of the case. I would instead vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case so that the Court of Appeals might consider the procedural bar issue in the first instance. The Court holds that, as a general practice, a federal ha- beas court should consider whether the relief a habeas peti- tioner requests is a "new rule" under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), only after resolving the State's argument that his claim is procedurally barred. Ante, at 525. Usu- 8 "As a matter of fact, the jury sentence is the sentence that is usually imposed by the Florida Supreme Court. The State has attached an ap- pendix to its brief, see App. to Brief for Respondent A1­A70, setting forth data concerning 469 capital cases that were reviewed by the Florida Su- preme Court between 1980 and 1991. In 341 of those cases (73%), the jury recommended the death penalty; in none of those cases did the trial judge impose a lesser sentence. In 91 cases (19%), the jury recommended a life sentence; in all but one of those cases, the trial judge overrode the jury's recommended life sentence and imposed a death sentence. In 69 of those overrides (77%), however, the Florida Supreme Court vacated the trial judge's sentence and either imposed a life sentence itself or remanded for a new sentencing hearing. "Two conclusions are evident. First, when the jury recommends a death sentence, the trial judge will almost certainly impose that sentence. Second, when the jury recommends a life sentence, although overrides have been sustained occasionally, the Florida Supreme Court will nor- mally uphold the jury rather than the judge. It is therefore clear that in practice, erroneous instructions to the jury at the sentencing phase of the trial may make the difference between life or death." Sochor v. Florida, 504 U. S., at 551­552 (footnote omitted). 520US2 Unit: $U52 [09-10-99 19:18:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 518 (1997) 547 O'Connor, J., dissenting ally, then, when a federal habeas court has before it conten- tions that a petitioner's claim is barred both on state proce- dural grounds and because the petitioner seeks to rely on a "new rule" under Teague, the court should consider the Teague question only after the procedural bar issue has been resolved in the petitioner's favor. As the Court recognizes, addressing the procedural bar issue first avoids unnecessary consideration of constitutional questions and accords fitting respect to the State's procedural rules, which are indispen- sable to the administration of its criminal justice system. Ante, at 524­525. With this much of the Court's opinion I agree. Of course, there may be exceptions to the rule that the procedural bar issue should be resolved first. One case might be where the procedural bar question is excessively complicated, but the Teague issue can be easily resolved. The Court of Appeals here gave no reason for its failure to consider the Florida Supreme Court's determination that petitioner's claim based on Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U. S. 1079 (1992) (per curiam), was procedurally barred. Indeed, the Court of Appeals did not even discuss the state court's holding, let alone decide that resolution of the procedural bar issue would be inappro- priate in this case. I see no reason to think resolution of the procedural bar question would be especially troublesome, nor do I see any other reason for the Court of Appeals' fail- ure to give priority to the State's argument that an in- dependent and adequate state ground barred petitioner's Espinosa claim. Accordingly, I would remand the case to the Court of Ap- peals for it to resolve the procedural bar issue. As the Court points out, the Court of Appeals is better suited to evaluating matters of state procedure than are we. Ante, at 525. In my view, then, it is premature to address the State's contention that petitioner's Espinosa claim is barred on Teague grounds. Nevertheless, since the Court reaches the question, I wish to express my agreement with Justice Stevens' resolution of the Teague issue. 520US2 Unit: $U53 [09-10-99 19:24:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN 548 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus HARBOR TUG & BARGE CO. v. PAPAI et ux. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­1621. Argued January 13, 1997-Decided May 12, 1997 Respondent Papai was injured while painting the housing structure of the tug Pt. Barrow. Petitioner Harbor Tug & Barge Co., the tug's opera- tor, had hired him to do the work, which was expected to last one day and would not involve sailing with the vessel. Papai had been em- ployed by Harbor Tug on 12 previous occasions in the 21/2 months before his injury, receiving those jobs through the Inland Boatman's Union (IBU) hiring hall. He had been getting short-term jobs with various vessels through the hiring hall for about 21 4 years. Most of those were deckhand work, which Papai said involved manning the lines on- and off-board vessels while they dock or undock. Papai sued Harbor Tug, claiming, inter alia, negligence under the Jones Act, and his wife joined as a plaintiff, claiming loss of consortium. The District Court granted Harbor Tug summary judgment upon finding that Papai did not enjoy seaman status under the Jones Act, and it later confirmed that adjudica- tion. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for a trial of, among other things, Papai's seaman status and his corresponding Jones Act claim. Based on Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U. S. 347, the court de- scribed the relevant inquiry as not whether Papai had a permanent con- nection with the vessel but whether his relationship with a vessel or an identifiable group of vessels was substantial in duration and nature, and found that this required consideration of his employment's total circum- stances. The court determined that a reasonable jury could conclude that Papai satisfied that test, for if the type of work a maritime worker customarily performs would entitle him to seaman status if performed for a single employer, he should not be deprived of that status simply because the industry operates under a daily assignment, rather than a permanent employment, system. Held:1. Because the issue whether the record permits a reasonable jury to conclude that Papai is a Jones Act seaman is here resolved in the em- ployer's favor, this Court does not reach the question whether an admin- istrative ruling for an employee on his claim of Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act coverage bars his claim of seaman status in a Jones Act suit. P. 550. 520US2 Unit: $U53 [09-10-99 19:24:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 548 (1997) 549 Syllabus 2. This record would not permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Papai is a Jones Act seaman. Jones Act coverage is confined to seamen, those workers who face regular exposure to the perils of the sea. An important part of the test for determining who is a seaman is whether the injured worker has a substantial connection to a vessel or to a fleet of vessels, and the latter concept requires a requisite degree of common ownership or control. Chandris, 515 U. S., at 366. The requisite link is not established by the mere use of the same hiring hall which draws from the same pool of employees. The various vessels on which Papai worked through the IBU hiring hall in the 21 4 years before his injury were not linked by any common ownership or control. Considering prior employments with independent employers in making the seaman status inquiry would undermine "the interests of employers and mari- time workers alike in being able to predict who will be covered by the Jones Act . . . before a particular work day begins," id., at 363, and there would be no principled basis for limiting which prior employments are considered for determining seaman status. That the IBU Deckhands Agreement classified Papai as a deckhand does not give him claim to seaman status. Seaman status is based on his actual duties, South Chi- cago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251, 260, and Papai's duties during the employment in question included no seagoing activity. Nor is it reasonable to infer from his testimony that his 12 prior employ- ments with Harbor Tug involved work of a seagoing nature that could qualify him for seaman status. Pp. 553­560. 67 F. 3d 203, reversed. Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Ste- vens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 560. Eric Danoff argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Richard K. Willard. Thomas J. Boyle argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. David C. Frederick argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Deputy Solicitor 520US2 Unit: $U53 [09-10-99 19:24:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN 550 HARBOR TUG & BARGE CO. v. PAPAI Opinion of the Court General Kneedler, J. Davitt McAteer, Allen H. Feldman, Nathaniel I. Spiller, and Mark S. Flynn.* Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Adjudication to determine whether a maritime employee is a seaman under the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688(a), or a maritime employee covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 44 Stat. (pt. 2) 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., continues to be of con- cern in our system. The distinction between the two mutu- ally exclusive categories can be difficult to implement, and many cases turn on their specific facts. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in this case that there was a jury question as to whether an injured worker was a Jones Act seaman. Granting the employer's petition for a writ of certiorari, we brought two questions before us. The first is whether an administrative ruling in favor of the employee on his claim of coverage under the LHWCA bars his claim of seaman status in the Jones Act suit he wishes to pursue in district court. The second is whether this record would permit a reasonable jury to con- clude the employee is a Jones Act seaman. We resolve the second question in the employer's favor and, as it is disposi- tive of the case, we do not reach the first. On the question of seaman status, there is an issue of sig- nificance beyond the facts of this case. Our statement in an earlier case that a worker may establish seaman status based on the substantiality of his connection to "an identifiable group of . . . vessels" in navigation, see Chandris, Inc. v. *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Industrial Indem- nity Co. et al. by Roger A. Levy and J. Mark Foley; and for the Ship- builders Council of America et al. by Charles T. Carroll, Jr., F. Edwin Froelich, Franklin W. Losey, and Lloyd A. Schwartz. A brief of amicus curiae urging affirmance was filed for the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America by John T. DeCarlo and John R. Hillsman. 520US2 Unit: $U53 [09-10-99 19:24:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 548 (1997) 551 Opinion of the Court Latsis, 515 U. S. 347, 368 (1995), has been subject to differing interpretations, and we seek to provide clarification. I Respondent John Papai was painting the housing structure of the tug Pt. Barrow when a ladder he was on moved, he alleges, causing him to fall and injure his knee. App. 50. Petitioner Harbor Tug & Barge Co., the tug's operator, had hired Papai to do the painting work. Id., at 44. A prime coat of paint had been applied and it was Papai's task to apply the finish coat. Id., at 45. There was no vessel cap- tain on board and Papai reported to the port captain, who had a dockside office. Id., at 36­37. The employment was expected to begin and end the same day, id., at 35, 48, and Papai was not going to sail with the vessel after he finished painting, id., at 51. Papai had been employed by Harbor Tug on 12 previous occasions in the 21 2 months before his injury. Papai received his jobs with Harbor Tug through the In- land Boatman's Union (IBU) hiring hall. He had been get- ting jobs with various vessels through the hiring hall for about 21 4 years. All the jobs were short term. The longest lasted about 40 days and most were for 3 days or under. Id., at 29, 34. In a deposition, Papai described the work as com- ing under three headings: maintenance, longshoring, and deckhand. Id., at 30­32. Papai said maintenance work in- volved chipping rust and painting aboard docked vessels. Id., at 30, 34­35. Longshoring work required helping to dis- charge vessels. Id., at 31. Deckhand work involved man- ning the lines on- and off-board vessels while they docked or undocked. Id., at 30. As for the assignments he obtained through the hiring hall over 21 4 years, most of them, says Papai, involved deckhand work. Id., at 34. After his alleged injury aboard the Pt. Barrow, Papai sued Harbor Tug in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, claiming negligence under 520US2 Unit: $U53 [09-10-99 19:24:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN 552 HARBOR TUG & BARGE CO. v. PAPAI Opinion of the Court the Jones Act and unseaworthiness under general maritime law, in addition to other causes of action. His wife joined as a plaintiff, claiming loss of consortium. Harbor Tug sought summary judgment on Papai's Jones Act and unseaworthi- ness claims, contending he was not a seaman and so could not prevail on either claim. The District Court granted Harbor Tug's motion and later denied Papai's motion for reconsid- eration. After our decisions in McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U. S. 337 (1991), and Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U. S. 81 (1991), the District Court granted a motion by Harbor Tug "to confirm" the earlier summary adjudication of Papai's nonseaman status. The District Court reasoned, under a test since superseded, see Chan- dris, supra, that Papai was not a seaman within the mean- ing of the Jones Act or the general maritime law, because "he did not have a `more or less permanent connection' with the vessel on which he was injured nor did he perform sub- stantial work on the vessel sufficient for seaman status." App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for a trial of Papai's seaman status and his corre- sponding Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims. Based on our decision in Chandris, the court described the relevant inquiry as "not whether plaintiff had a permanent connection with the vessel [but] whether plaintiff's relationship with a vessel (or a group of vessels) was substantial in terms of duration and nature, which requires consideration of the total circumstances of his employment." 67 F. 3d 203, 206 (1995). A majority of the panel believed it would be reason- able for a jury to conclude the employee satisfied that test. In the majority's view, "[i]f the type of work a maritime worker customarily performs would entitle him to seaman status if performed for a single employer, the worker should not be deprived of that status simply because the industry operates under a daily assignment rather than a permanent employment system." Ibid. The majority also said the 520US2 Unit: $U53 [09-10-99 19:24:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 548 (1997) 553 Opinion of the Court "circumstance" that Papai had worked for Harbor Tug on 12 occasions during the 21 2 months before his injury "may in itself provide a sufficient connection" to Harbor Tug's vessels to establish seaman status. Ibid. Judge Poole dissented from the majority's holding that there was a triable issue as to Papai's seaman status. He recognized that Chandris held out the possibility of being a seaman without a substantial connection to a particular ves- sel in navigation, provided one nevertheless had the required connection to " `an identifiable group of such vessels.' " 67 F. 3d, at 209 (quoting 515 U. S., at 368). Judge Poole said, however, it would be a mistake to view Chandris as holding that, for seaman-status purposes, a "group may be identified simply as those vessels on which a sailor sails, not just those of a particular employer or controlling entity. . . . Th[e major- ity's holding] renders the `identifiable group' or `fleet' re- quirement a nullity." 67 F. 3d, at 209 (citation omitted). Judge Poole also noted that the majority's position conflicted with that of the Fifth Circuit (en banc) and of a Third Circuit panel. Ibid. (citing Barrett v. Chevron, U. S. A., Inc., 781 F. 2d 1067 (CA5 1986) (en banc); Reeves v. Mobile Dredg- ing & Pumping Co., 26 F. 3d 1247 (CA3 1994)); see also John- son v. Continental Grain Co., 58 F. 3d 1232 (CA8 1995); but see Fisher v. Nichols, 81 F. 3d 319, 323 (CA2 1996) (rejecting common ownership or control requirement). We granted certiorari, 518 U. S. 1055 (1996), and now reverse. II The LHWCA, a maritime workers' compensation scheme, excludes from its coverage "a master or member of a crew of any vessel," 33 U. S. C. § 902(3)(G). These masters and crewmembers are the seamen entitled to sue for damages under the Jones Act. Chandris, 515 U. S., at 355­358. In other words, the LHWCA and the Jones Act are "mutually exclusive." Id., at 355­356. 520US2 Unit: $U53 [09-10-99 19:24:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN 554 HARBOR TUG & BARGE CO. v. PAPAI Opinion of the Court Our recent cases explain the proper inquiry to determine seaman status. We need not restate that doctrinal develop- ment, see id., at 355­368; Wilander, supra, at 341­354, to resolve Papai's claim. It suffices to cite Chandris, which held, in pertinent part: "[T]he essential requirements for seaman status are twofold. First, . . . an employee's duties must contrib- ut[e] to the function of the vessel or to the accomplish- ment of its mission. . . . "Second, and most important for our purposes here, a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is sub- stantial in terms of both its duration and its nature." 515 U. S., at 368 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The seaman inquiry is a mixed question of law and fact, and it often will be inappropriate to take the question from the jury. Nevertheless, "summary judgment or a directed ver- dict is mandated where the facts and the law will reasonably support only one conclusion." Wilander, supra, at 356; see also Chandris, 515 U. S., at 368­369. Harbor Tug does not dispute that it would be reasonable for a jury to conclude Papai's duties aboard the Pt. Barrow (or any other vessel he worked on through the IBU hiring hall) contributed to the function of the vessel or the accom- plishment of its mission, satisfying Chandris' first standard. Nor does Harbor Tug dispute that a reasonable jury could conclude that the Pt. Barrow or other vessels Papai worked on were in navigation. The result, as will often be the case, is that seaman status turns on the part of Chandris' second standard which requires the employee to show "a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature." Id., at 368. We explained the rule as follows: 520US2 Unit: $U53 [09-10-99 19:24:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 548 (1997) 555 Opinion of the Court "The fundamental purpose of th[e] substantial connec- tion requirement is to give full effect to the remedial scheme created by Congress and to separate the sea- based maritime employees who are entitled to Jones Act protection from those land-based workers who have only a transitory or sporadic connection with a vessel in navi- gation, and therefore whose employment does not regu- larly expose them to the perils of the sea." Ibid. For the substantial connection requirement to serve its pur- pose, the inquiry into the nature of the employee's connection to the vessel must concentrate on whether the employee's duties take him to sea. This will give substance to the in- quiry both as to the duration and nature of the employee's connection to the vessel and be helpful in distinguishing land-based from sea-based employees. Papai argues, and the Court of Appeals majority held, that Papai meets Chandris' second test based on his employments with the various vessels he worked on through the IBU hir- ing hall in the 21 4 years before his injury, vessels owned, it appears, by three different employers not linked by any com- mon ownership or control, App. 38. He also did longshoring work through the hiring hall, id., at 31, and it appears this was for still other employers, id., at 38. As noted above, Papai testified at his deposition that the majority of his work during this period was deckhand work. According to Papai, this satisfies Chandris because the group of vessels Papai worked on through the IBU hiring hall constitutes "an iden- tifiable group of . . . vessels" to which he has a "substantial connection." 515 U. S., at 368. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was the first to hold that a worker could qualify as a seaman based on his connection to a group of vessels rather than a particular one. In Braniff v. Jackson Ave.-Gretna Ferry, Inc., 280 F. 2d 523 (1960), the court held the employer was not entitled to summary judgment on the seaman-status question where an 520US2 Unit: $U53 [09-10-99 19:24:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN 556 HARBOR TUG & BARGE CO. v. PAPAI Opinion of the Court employee's job was to perform maintenance work on the em- ployer's fleet of ferry boats, often while the boats were run- ning: "The usual thing, of course, is for a person to have a Jones Act seaman status in relation to a particular vessel. But there is nothing about this . . . concept to limit it mechan- ically to a single ship." Id., at 528. There is "no insur- mountable difficulty," the court explained, in finding seaman status based on the employee's relationship to "several spe- cific vessels"-"an identifiable fleet"-as opposed to a single one. Ibid. We, in turn, adverted to the group of vessels concept in Chandris. We described it as a rule "allow[ing] seaman sta- tus for those workers who had the requisite connection with an `identifiable fleet' of vessels, a finite group of vessels under common ownership or control." 515 U. S., at 366. The ma- jority in the Court of Appeals did not discuss our description of the group of vessels concept as requiring common owner- ship or control, nor did it discuss other Courts of Appeals cases applying the concept, see, e. g., Reeves v. Mobile Dredging & Pumping Co., 26 F. 3d, at 1258. The court pointed to this statement from Chandris: "[W]e see no rea- son to limit the seaman status inquiry . . . exclusively to an examination of the overall course of a worker's service with a particular employer." 515 U. S., at 371­372. It interpreted this to mean "it may be necessary to examine the work per- formed by the employee while employed by different em- ployers during the relevant time period." 67 F. 3d, at 206. The court did not define what it meant by "the relevant time period." In any event, the context of our statement in Chandris makes clear our meaning, which is that the employ- ee's prior work history with a particular employer may not affect the seaman inquiry if the employee was injured on a new assignment with the same employer, an assignment with different "essential duties" from his previous ones. 515 U. S., at 371. In Chandris, the words "particular employer" give emphasis to the point that the inquiry into the nature 520US2 Unit: $U53 [09-10-99 19:24:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 548 (1997) 557 Opinion of the Court of the employee's duties for seaman-status purposes may concentrate on a narrower, not broader, period than the em- ployee's entire course of employment with his current em- ployer. There was no suggestion of a need to examine the nature of an employee's duties with prior employers. See also id., at 367 ("Since Barrett [v. Chevron, U. S. A., Inc., 781 F. 2d 1067 (CA5 1986) (en banc)], the Fifth Circuit consist- ently has analyzed the problem [of determining seaman sta- tus] in terms of the percentage of work performed on vessels for the employer in question"). The Court of Appeals ma- jority interpreted the words "particular employer" outside the limited discussion in which we used them and, as a result, gave the phrase a meaning opposite from what the context requires. The Court of Appeals stressed that various of Papai's em- ployers had "join[ed] together to obtain a common labor pool on which they draw by means of a union hiring hall." 67 F. 3d, at 206; see also id., at 206, n. 3 (suggesting that this case involves a "group of vessels [that] have collectively agreed to obtain employees" from a hiring hall). There is no evidence in the record that the contract Harbor Tug had with the IBU about employing deckhands (IBU Deckhands Agreement) was negotiated by a multiemployer bargaining group, and, even if it had been, that would not affect the result here. There was no showing that the group of vessels the court sought to identify were subject to unitary owner- ship or control in any aspect of their business or operation. So far as the record shows, each employer was free to hire, assign, and direct workers for whatever tasks and time period they each determined, limited, at most, by the IBU Deckhands Agreement. In deciding whether there is an identifiable group of vessels of relevance for a Jones Act seaman-status determination, the question is whether the vessels are subject to common ownership or control. The requisite link is not established by the mere use of the same hiring hall which draws from the same pool of employees. 520US2 Unit: $U53 [09-10-99 19:24:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN 558 HARBOR TUG & BARGE CO. v. PAPAI Opinion of the Court Considering prior employments with independent employ- ers in making the seaman-status inquiry would undermine "the interests of employers and maritime workers alike in being able to predict who will be covered by the Jones Act (and, perhaps more importantly for purposes of the employ- ers' workers' compensation obligations, who will be covered by the LHWCA) before a particular work day begins." Chandris, supra, at 363. There would be no principled basis for limiting which prior employments are considered for determining seaman status. The Court of Appeals spoke of a "relevant time period" but, as noted above, it did not define this term. Since the substantial connection standard is often, as here, the determinative element of the seaman inquiry, it must be given workable and practical confines. When the inquiry further turns on whether the employee has a substantial connection to an identifiable group of vessels, common ownership or control is essential for this purpose. Papai contends his various employers through the hiring hall would have been able to predict his status as a seaman under the Jones Act based on the seagoing nature of some of the duties he could have been hired to perform consistent with his classification as a "qualified deckhand" under the IBU Deckhands Agreement. By the terms of the agree- ment, Papai was qualified as a "satisfactory helmsman and lookout," for example, and he could have been hired to serve a vessel while it was underway, in which case his duties would have included "conduct[ing] a check of the engine room status a minimum of two (2) times each watch . . . for vessel safety reasons." App. 77. In South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251 (1940), we rejected a claim to seaman status grounded on the employee's job title, which also happened to be "deckhand." "The question," we said, "concerns his actual duties." Id., at 260. See also North- east Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U. S. 249, 268, n. 30 (1977) (reasoning that employee's membership in longshore- men's union was, in itself, irrelevant to whether employee 520US2 Unit: $U53 [09-10-99 19:24:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 548 (1997) 559 Opinion of the Court was covered by the LHWCA, as fact of union membership was unrelated to the purposes of the LHWCA's coverage provisions). The question is what connection the employee had in actual fact to vessel operations, not what a union agreement says. Papai was qualified under the IBU Deck- hands Agreement to perform nonseagoing work in addition to the seagoing duties described above. His actual duty on the Pt. Barrow throughout the employment in question did not include any seagoing activity; he was hired for one day to paint the vessel at dockside and he was not going to sail with the vessel after he finished painting it. App. 44, 48, 51. This is not a case where the employee was hired to perform seagoing work during the employment in question, however brief, and we need not consider here the consequences of such an employment. The IBU Deckhands Agreement gives no reason to assume that any particular percentage of Papai's work would be of a seagoing nature, subjecting him to the perils of the sea. In these circumstances, the union agreement does not advance the accuracy of the seaman- status inquiry. Papai argues he qualifies as a seaman if we consider his 12 prior employments with Harbor Tug over the 21 2 months before his injury. Papai testified at his deposition that he worked aboard the Pt. Barrow on three or four occasions before the day he was injured, the most recent of which was more than a week earlier. Id., at 35, 44. Each of these en- gagements involved only maintenance work while the tug was docked. Id., at 34­35. The nature of Papai's connec- tion to the Pt. Barrow was no more substantial for seaman- status purposes by virtue of these engagements than the one during which he was injured. Papai does not identify with specificity what he did for Harbor Tug the other eight or nine times he worked for the company in the 21 2 months before his injury. The closest he comes is his deposition tes- timony that 70 percent of his work over the 21 4 years before his injury was deckhand work. Id., at 34. Coupled with 520US2 Unit: $U53 [09-10-99 19:24:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN 560 HARBOR TUG & BARGE CO. v. PAPAI Stevens, J., dissenting the fact that none of Papai's work aboard the Pt. Barrow was of a seagoing nature, it would not be reasonable to infer from Papai's testimony that his recent engagements with Harbor Tug involved work of a seagoing nature. In any event, these discrete engagements were separate from the one in question, which was the sort of "transitory or spo- radic" connection to a vessel or group of vessels that, as we explained in Chandris, does not qualify one for seaman status. 515 U. S., at 368. Jones Act coverage is confined to seamen, those workers who face regular exposure to the perils of the sea. An im- portant part of the test for determining who is a seaman is whether the injured worker seeking coverage has a substan- tial connection to a vessel or a fleet of vessels, and the latter concept requires a requisite degree of common ownership or control. The substantial connection test is important in dis- tinguishing between sea- and land-based employment, for land-based employment is inconsistent with Jones Act cover- age. This was the holding in Chandris, and we adhere to it here. The only connection a reasonable jury could identify among the vessels Papai worked aboard is that each hired some of its employees from the same union hiring hall from which Papai was hired. That is not sufficient to establish seaman status under the group of vessels concept. Papai had the burden at summary judgment to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e). He failed to meet it. The Court of Appeals erred in holding otherwise. Its judgment is reversed. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join, dissenting. During the 2-year period immediately before his injury, respondent Papai worked as a maintenance man and a deck- hand for various employers who hired out of the Inland Boat- 520US2 Unit: $U53 [09-10-99 19:24:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 548 (1997) 561 Stevens, J., dissenting man's Union hiring hall. He testified that about 70 percent of his work was as a deckhand, and that "most of that work [was] done while the boats were moving on the water." App. 34. If all of that deckhand work had been performed for petitioner, there would be no doubt about Papai's status as a seaman. Petitioner, however, did not maintain a permanent crew on any of its vessels. 67 F. 3d 203, 204 (CA9 1995). Instead, like other tugboat operators in the San Francisco Bay area, it obtained its deckhands on a job-by-job basis through the union hiring hall. Under these circumstances, I believe the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Papai's status as a seaman should be tested by the character of his work for the group of vessel owners that used the same union agent to make selections from the same pool of employees. In Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U. S. 347 (1995), the Court rejected a "voyage test" of seaman status, concluding that an employee who was injured while performing his duties on a vessel on the high seas was not necessarily a Jones Act seaman. Id., at 358­364. The Court instead adopted a status-based inquiry that looked at the nature and duration of the employee's relationship to a vessel-or an identifiable group of vessels-in navigation to determine whether that employee received Jones Act coverage. Id., at 370­371. Today, the majority apparently concludes that an employee is not necessarily protected by the Jones Act even if he was injured aboard a vessel in navigation and his work over the preceding two years was primarily seaman's work. I be- lieve this conclusion is unsupported by either the reasoning or the language in the Chandris opinion. Chandris' status-based test requires a maritime worker to have a relationship that is substantial in duration and nature with a vessel, or an identifiable group of vessels, in naviga- tion. See id., at 376. Nothing in the Court's holding there intimated that the "identifiable group of vessels" need all be 520US2 Unit: $U53 [09-10-99 19:24:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN 562 HARBOR TUG & BARGE CO. v. PAPAI Stevens, J., dissenting owned by the same person.1 Particularly in a labor market designed to allow employers to rely on temporary workers for a range of jobs, there is "no reason to limit the seaman status inquiry . . . exclusively to an examination of the over- all course of a worker's service with a particular employer." Id., at 371­372. As the Court of Appeals observed in this case: "If the type of work a maritime worker customarily performs would entitle him to seaman status if performed for a single employer, the worker should not be deprived of that status simply because the industry operates under a daily assignment rather than a permanent employment system." 67 F. 3d, at 206. The unfairness created by the Court's rule is evident. Let us assume that none of the tugboat operators in the bay area have permanent crews and that all of them obtain their deckhands on a more or less random basis through the same hiring hall. Further, assume that about 70 percent of the work performed by the employees thus obtained is seaman's work, while the remainder is shore-based maintenance work. A typical employee working for a typical employer in that pool would have the status of a seaman, and both the employ- ees and the employers would be aware of this reality about their work environment. But under the Court's reasoning, even if over 70 percent of his randomly selected assignments during a 2-year period were seaman assignments, an injured worker would not be a seaman for Jones Act purposes if he happened to receive only a few assignments with the owner of the particular boat on which he was injured and those assignments were not seaman's work. 1 The majority puts great weight on Chandris' description of the Fifth Circuit's case law developing the fleet doctrine as "modif[ying] the test to allow seaman status for those workers who had the requisite connection with an `identifiable fleet' of vessels, a finite group of vessels under com- mon ownership or control." Chandris, 515 U. S., at 366. See ante, at 556. But that description of the lower court's case law did not form part of the Chandris holding, and it should not control the outcome here. 520US2 Unit: $U53 [09-10-99 19:24:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 548 (1997) 563 Stevens, J., dissenting The majority tries to justify this conclusion with the argu- ment that a rule acknowledging an employee's status as a seaman based on the work he does for a number of employers who hire out of the same hiring hall would create uncertain- ties for employers. Ante, at 558. The Court's concern is that an employer might not realize that an employee he had selected to chip paint on a docked boat had spent most of the past year as a deckhand on a neighboring vessel. This fear is exaggerated, since an employer who hires its workers out of a union hiring hall should be presumed to be familiar with the general character of their work. Moreover, surely the unfairness created by the majority's rule outweighs this concern. Of course, in order to hold a particular employer liable, an employment relationship must have existed between the worker and the particular vessel owner at the time of the injury. Chandris teaches us, however, that the specific ac- tivity being performed at the time of the injury is not suffi- cient to establish the employee's status under the Jones Act. Rather, we must determine whether an employee has sea- man status by looking at his work history. The character of that history in the market from which a vessel owner obtains all of its crews seems to me just as relevant as the assign- ments to the particular operator for whom work was being performed when the injury occurred. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.2 2 On the question the Court does not reach, I think the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted our opinion in Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U. S. 81 (1991). See also G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty 435 (2d ed. 1975). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 564 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON et al. certiorari to the supreme judicial court of maine No. 94­1988. Argued October 9, 1996-Decided May 19, 1997 Petitioner, a Maine nonprofit corporation, operates a church camp for chil- dren, most of whom are not Maine residents. Petitioner is financed through camper tuition and other revenues. From 1989 to 1991, it paid over $20,000 per year in real estate and personal property taxes. A state statute provides a general exemption from those taxes for chari- table institutions incorporated in Maine. With respect to institutions operated principally for the benefit of Maine nonresidents, however, a charity may only qualify for a more limited tax benefit, and then only if its weekly charge for services does not exceed $30 per person. Petitioner was ineligible for any exemption, because its campers were largely nonresidents and its weekly tuition was roughly $400 per camper. After respondent town of Harrison (Town) rejected its re- quest for a refund of taxes already paid and a continuing exemption from future taxes, which was based principally on a claim that the tax exemption statute violated the Commerce Clause, petitioner filed suit and was awarded summary judgment by the Superior Court. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that petitioner had not met its burden of persuasion that the statute is unconstitutional. Held: An otherwise generally applicable state property tax violates the Commerce Clause if its exemption for property owned by charitable institutions excludes organizations operated principally for the benefit of nonresidents. Pp. 571­595. (a) Because the Government lacked power to regulate interstate com- merce during the Nation's first years, the States freely adopted meas- ures fostering local interests without regard to possible prejudice to nonresidents, resulting in a "conflict of commercial regulations, destruc- tive to the harmony of the States." Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 224 (Johnson, J., concurring in judgment). Arguably, this was the cause of the Constitutional Convention. Ibid. The Commerce Clause not only granted Congress express authority to override restrictive and conflict- ing state commercial regulations, but also effected a curtailment of state power even absent congressional legislation. Pp. 571­572. (b) The Court is unpersuaded by the Town's arguments that the dor- mant Commerce Clause is inapplicable here, either because campers are 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 565 Syllabus not "articles of commerce," or more generally because interstate com- merce is not implicated. The camp is unquestionably engaged in com- merce, not only as a purchaser, see, e. g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 300­301, but also as a provider of goods and services akin to a hotel, see, e. g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 244, 258. Although the latter case involved Congress' affirmative powers, its reasoning is applicable in the dormant Commerce Clause context. See, e. g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 326, n. 2. The Town's further argument that the dormant Clause is inapplicable be- cause a real estate tax is at issue is also rejected. Even assuming, as the Town argues, that Congress could not impose a national real estate tax, States are not free to levy such taxes in a manner that discriminates against interstate commerce. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 596. Pp. 572­575. (c) There is no question that if this statute targeted profit-making entities, it would violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The statute discriminates on its face against interstate commerce: It expressly dis- tinguishes between entities that serve a principally interstate clientele and those that primarily serve an intrastate market, singling out camps that serve mostly in-staters for beneficial tax treatment, and penalizing those camps that do a principally interstate business. Such laws are virtually per se invalid. E. g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U. S. 325, 331. Because the Town did not attempt to defend the statute by dem- onstrating that it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, e. g., Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Ore., 511 U. S. 93, 101, the Court does not address this question. See Fulton Corp., 516 U. S., at 333­334. Pp. 575­583. (d) The rule applicable to profit-making enterprises also applies to a discriminatory tax exemption for charitable and benevolent institu- tions. The dormant Commerce Clause's applicability to the nonprofit sector follows from this Court's decisions holding not-for-profit insti- tutions subject to laws regulating commerce, e. g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 103, 129, and to the federal antitrust laws, e. g., Na- tional Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U. S. 85, 100, n. 22. The Court has already held that the dormant Clause applies to activities not intended to earn a profit, Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 172, n. 1, and there is no reason why an enter- prise's nonprofit character should exclude it from the coverage of either the affirmative or the negative aspect of the Clause, see, e. g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S., at 326, n. 2. Whether operated on a for-profit or 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 566 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Syllabus nonprofit basis, camps such as petitioner's purchase goods and services in competitive markets, offer their facilities to a variety of patrons, and derive revenues from a variety of local and out-of-state sources. Any categorical distinction on the basis of profit is therefore wholly illusory. Pp. 583­588. (e) The Town's arguments that the exemption statute should be viewed as either a legitimate discriminatory subsidy of those charities that focus on local concerns, see, e. g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S. 186, 199, or alternatively as a governmental "purchase" of charitable services falling within the narrow exception to the dor- mant Commerce Clause for States in their role as "market participants," see, e. g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794; Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429, are unpersuasive. Although tax exemptions and subsidies serve similar ends, they differ in important and relevant re- spects that preclude approval of the statute at issue. See, e. g., West Lynn, 512 U. S., at 269, 278 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). As for the "market participant" argument, the Court has already rejected the Town's position in New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 277, and in any event respondents' open-ended exemption is not analo- gous to the industry-specific state actions approved in Alexandria Scrap and Reeves. Pp. 588­594. (f) This case's facts, viewed in isolation, do not appear to pose any threat to the national economy's health. Nevertheless, history, includ- ing the history of commercial conflict that preceded the Constitutional Convention as well as the uniform course of Commerce Clause jurispru- dence animated and enlightened by that early history, has shown that even the smallest discrimination invites significant inroads on national solidarity. See Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 523. P. 595. 655 A. 2d 876, reversed. Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Thomas and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 595. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, and in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined as to Part I, post, p. 609. William H. Dempsey argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Robert B. Wasserman, William H. Dale, Emily A. Bloch, and Sally J. Daggett. 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 567 Opinion of the Court William L. Plouffe argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.* Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether an otherwise generally applicable state property tax violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, because its exemption for property owned by charitable institutions excludes organizations operated principally for the benefit of nonresidents. I Petitioner is a Maine nonprofit corporation that operates a summer camp for the benefit of children of the Christian Sci- ence faith. The regimen at the camp includes supervised prayer, meditation, and church services designed to help the children grow spiritually and physically in accordance with the tenets of their religion. App. 40­41. About 95 percent of the campers are not residents of Maine. Id., at 44. The camp is located in the town of Harrison (Town); it occupies 180 acres on the shores of a lake about 40 miles northwest of Portland. Brief for Respondents 4, and n. 6. Petitioner's revenues include camper tuition averaging about $400 per week for each student, contributions from private donors, and income from a "modest endowment." App. 42, 51. In recent years, the camp has had an annual operating deficit of approximately $175,000. Id., at 41. From 1989 to 1991, it paid over $20,000 in real estate and personal prop- erty taxes each year.1 Id., at 42­43. *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Council on Education et al. by Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, Carter G. Phil- lips, Nathan C. Sheers, and Adam Yarmolinsky; and for the Christian Legal Society et al. by James C. Geoly, Kevin R. Gustafson, and Steven T. McFarland. 1 Most of petitioner's tax bill was for real estate taxes. See, e. g., App. 43 (petitioner paid 1991 real estate taxes of $20,770.71 and personal prop- erty taxes of $994.70). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 568 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Opinion of the Court The Maine statute at issue, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 36, § 652(1)(A) (Supp. 1996), provides a general exemption from real estate and personal property taxes for "benevolent and charitable institutions incorporated" in the State. With respect to institutions that are "in fact conducted or oper- ated principally for the benefit of persons who are not resi- dents of Maine," however, a charity may only qualify for a more limited tax benefit, and then only if the weekly charge for services provided does not exceed $30 per person. § 652(1)(A)(1).2 Because most of the campers come from out 2 The statute provides: "The following property of institutions and organizations is exempt from taxation: "1. Property of institutions and organizations. "A. The real estate and personal property owned and occupied or used solely for their own purposes by benevolent and charitable institutions incorporated by this State, and none of these may be deprived of the right of exemption by reason of the source from which its funds are derived or by reason of limitation in the classes of persons for whose benefit such funds are applied. "(1) Any such institution that is in fact conducted or operated princi- pally for the benefit of persons who are not residents of Maine is entitled to an exemption not to exceed $50,000 of current just value only when the total amount of any stipends or charges that it makes or takes during any tax year, as defined by section 502, for its services, benefits or advantages divided by the total number of persons receiving such services, benefits or advantages during the same tax year does not result in an average rate in excess of $30 per week when said weekly rate is computed by dividing the average yearly charge per person by the total number of weeks in a tax year during which such institution is in fact conducted or operated principally for the benefit of persons who are not residents of Maine. No such institution that is in fact conducted or operated principally for the benefit of persons who are not residents of Maine and makes charges that result in an average weekly rate per person, as computed under this sub- paragraph, in excess of $30 may be entitled to tax exemption. This sub- paragraph does not apply to institutions incorporated as nonprofit corpora- tions for the sole purpose of conducting medical research. "For the purposes of this paragraph, `benevolent and charitable institu- tions' include, but are not limited to, nonprofit nursing homes and nonprofit 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 569 Opinion of the Court of State, petitioner could not qualify for a complete exemp- tion.3 And, since the weekly tuition was roughly $400, peti- tioner was ineligible for any charitable tax exemption at all. In 1992 petitioner made a formal request to the Town for a refund of taxes paid from 1989 through 1991, and a continu- ing exemption from future property taxes, based principally on a claim that the tax exemption statute violated the Com- merce Clause of the Federal Constitution.4 The request was denied, and petitioner filed suit in the Superior Court against the Town and its tax assessors and collectors.5 After the boarding homes and boarding care facilities licensed by the Department of Human Services pursuant to Title 22, chapter 1665 or its successor, nonprofit community mental health service facilities licensed by the Com- missioner of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Substance Abuse Services, pursuant to Title 34­B, chapter 3 and nonprofit child care centers incorporated by this State as benevolent and charitable institutions. For the purposes of this paragraph, `nonprofit' means a facility exempt from taxation under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code . . . ." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 36, § 652(1)(A) (Supp. 1996). 3 The statute's language reserving the property tax exemption for those entities operated "principally for the benefit" of Maine residents is not without ambiguity. The parties are in agreement, however, that because petitioner's camp is attended almost entirely by out-of-staters, it would not qualify for the exemption under any reading of the language. See Brief for Petitioner 2; Brief for Respondents 2, n. 3; Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. The courts below appear to have presumed the same, and we of course accept their interpretation of state law. 4 Petitioner also argued below that the Maine statute violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Art. IV, § 2, of the Federal Constitution. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court had already found the statute constitu- tional under an equal protection analysis in a prior decision, and adhered to its earlier view. See Green Acre Baha'i Institute v. Eliot, 159 Me. 395, 193 A. 2d 564 (1963); 655 A. 2d 876, 879­880 (1995). As for the privileges and immunities claim, the Supreme Judicial Court found petitioner's argu- ment unavailing. Id., at 880. These claims are not before us. 5 The Superior Court referred to all of the original defendants as "Mu- nicipal Defendants" because the State of Maine intervened to defend the constitutionality of its statute. App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a. However, the 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 570 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Opinion of the Court parties agreed on the relevant facts, they filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Superior Court ruled for peti- tioner, explaining that under Maine's statute: "Denial of a tax exemption is explicitly and primarily triggered by engaging in a certain level of interstate commerce. This denial makes operation of the institu- tions serving non-residents more expensive. This in- creased cost results from an impermissible distinc- tion between in-state and out-of-state consumers. See Commonwealth Edison Co., 453 U. S., at 617­19. . . . Maine's charitable tax exemption is denied, not because there is a difference between the activities of charitable institutions serving residents and non-residents, but be- cause of the residency of the people whom the institu- tions serve." App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a­15a (footnote omitted). The Town, but not the State, appealed and the Maine Su- preme Judicial Court reversed. 655 A. 2d 876 (1995). Not- ing that a Maine statute 6 characterized tax exemptions as "tax expenditures," it viewed the exemption for charitable institutions as the equivalent of a purchase of their services. Id., at 878. Because the exemption statute "treats all Maine charities alike"-given the fact that "all have the opportu- nity to qualify for an exemption by choosing to dispense the majority of their charity locally"-it "regulates evenhand- edly with only incidental effects on interstate commerce." Id., at 879. In the absence of evidence that petitioner's camp "competes with other summer camps outside of or within Maine," or that the statute "impedes interstate travel" or that it "provides services that are necessary for interstate travel," the Court concluded that petitioner had State did not appeal the adverse decision of the Superior Court and, there- fore, is not a respondent in this Court. We shall use the term "Town" to refer to the respondents collectively. 6 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 36, § 196 (1990). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 571 Opinion of the Court "not met its heavy burden of persuasion that the statute is unconstitutional." Ibid. We granted certiorari. 516 U. S. 1157. For the reasons that follow, we now reverse. II During the first years of our history as an independent confederation, the National Government lacked the power to regulate commerce among the States. Because each State was free to adopt measures fostering its own local interests without regard to possible prejudice to nonresidents, what Justice Johnson characterized as a "conflict of commercial regulations, destructive to the harmony of the States," en- sued. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 224 (1824) (opinion concurring in judgment). In his view, this "was the immedi- ate cause that led to the forming of a [constitutional] conven- tion." Ibid. "If there was any one object riding over every other in the adoption of the constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse among the States free from all invidious and partial restraints." Id., at 231.7 We have subsequently endorsed Justice Johnson's ap- praisal of the central importance of federal control over in- terstate and foreign commerce and, more narrowly, his con- clusion that the Commerce Clause had not only granted Congress express authority to override restrictive and con- flicting commercial regulations adopted by the States, but that it also had immediately effected a curtailment of state power. "In short, the Commerce Clause even without im- plementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. 7 See also West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S. 186, 193, n. 9 (1994) (noting that "[t]he `negative' aspect of the Commerce Clause was considered the more important by the `father of the Constitution,' James Madison"); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 325­326 (1979); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794, 807, n. 16 (1976) (quoting W. Rut- ledge, A Declaration of Legal Faith 25­26 (1947)). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 572 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Opinion of the Court Sullivan, 325 U. S. 761 [(1945)]; Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 [(1946)]." Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 252 (1946). Our decisions on this point reflect, "upon fullest con- sideration, the course of adjudication unbroken through the Nation's history." Ibid. See also H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 534­535 (1949). Although Con- gress unquestionably has the power to repudiate or substan- tially modify that course of adjudication,8 it has not done so. This case involves an issue that we have not previously addressed-the disparate real estate tax treatment of a non- profit service provider based on the residence of the con- sumers that it serves. The Town argues that our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is wholly inapplicable to this case, because interstate commerce is not implicated here and Congress has no power to enact a tax on real estate. We first reject these arguments, and then explain why we think our prior cases make it clear that if profit-making en- terprises were at issue, Maine could not tax petitioner more heavily than other camp operators simply because its camp- ers come principally from other States. We next address the novel question whether a different rule should apply to a discriminatory tax exemption for charitable and benevolent institutions. Finally, we reject the Town's argument that the exemption should either be viewed as a permissible sub- sidy or as a purchase of services by the State acting as a "market participant." III We are unpersuaded by the Town's argument that the dormant Commerce Clause is inapplicable here, either be- cause campers are not "articles of commerce" or, more gen- erally, because the camp's "product is delivered and `con- sumed' entirely within Maine." Brief for Respondents 8 See New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 171 (1992); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298, 318 (1992); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benja- min, 328 U. S. 408, 429­430, 434­435 (1946). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 573 Opinion of the Court 17­18. Even though petitioner's camp does not make a profit, it is unquestionably engaged in commerce, not only as a purchaser, see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 300­ 301 (1964); United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 558 (1995), but also as a provider of goods and services. It markets those services, together with an opportunity to enjoy the natural beauty of an inland lake in Maine, to campers who are attracted to its facility from all parts of the Nation. The record reflects that petitioner "advertises for campers in [out-of-state] periodicals . . . and sends its Executive Direc- tor annually on camper recruiting trips across the country." App. 49­50. Petitioner's efforts are quite successful; 95 per- cent of its campers come from out of State. The attendance of these campers necessarily generates the transportation of persons across state lines that has long been recognized as a form of "commerce." Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 172 (1941); see also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 491 (1917); Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 320 (1913). Summer camps are comparable to hotels that offer their guests goods and services that are consumed locally. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241 (1964), we recognized that interstate commerce is sub- stantially affected by the activities of a hotel that "solicits patronage from outside the State of Georgia through various national advertising media, including magazines of national circulation." Id., at 243. In that case, we held that com- merce was substantially affected by private race discrimina- tion that limited access to the hotel and thereby impeded interstate commerce in the form of travel. Id., at 244, 258; see Lopez, 514 U. S., at 558­559. Official discrimination that limits the access of nonresidents to summer camps creates a similar impediment. Even when business activities are purely local, if " `it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which ap- plies the squeeze.' " Heart of Atlanta, 379 U. S., at 258 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 574 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Opinion of the Court (quoting United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Assn., 336 U. S. 460, 464 (1949)). Although Heart of Atlanta involved Congress' affirmative Commerce Clause powers, its reasoning is applicable here. As we stated in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322 (1979): "The definition of `commerce' is the same when relied on to strike down or restrict state legislation as when relied on to support some exertion of federal control or regulation." Id., at 326, n. 2. That case in turn rested upon our reasoning in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617 (1978), in which we rejected a "two-tiered definition of commerce." Id., at 622. "Just as Congress ha[d] power to regulate the inter- state movement of [the] wastes" at issue in that case, so too we held were States "not free from constitutional scrutiny when they restrict that movement." Id., at 622­623. See also Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U. S. 941, 953 (1982). The Town's arguments that the dormant Commerce Clause is inapplicable to petitioner because the campers are not "ar- ticles of commerce," or more generally that interstate com- merce is not at issue here, are therefore unpersuasive. The services that petitioner provides to its principally out-of- state campers clearly have a substantial effect on commerce, as do state restrictions on making those services available to nonresidents. Cf. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U. S. 383, 391 (1994). The Town also argues that the dormant Commerce Clause is inapplicable because a real estate tax is at issue. We dis- agree. A tax on real estate, like any other tax, may imper- missibly burden interstate commerce. We may assume as the Town argues (though the question is not before us) that Congress could not impose a national real estate tax. It does not follow that the States may impose real estate taxes in a manner that discriminates against interstate commerce. A State's "power to lay and collect taxes, comprehensive and necessary as that power is, cannot be exerted in a way which 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 575 Opinion of the Court involves a discrimination against [interstate] commerce." Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 596 (1923). To allow a State to avoid the strictures of the dormant Commerce Clause by the simple device of labeling its dis- criminatory tax a levy on real estate would destroy the bar- rier against protectionism that the Constitution provides. We noted in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S. 186 (1994), that "[t]he paradigmatic . . . law discriminating against interstate commerce is the protective [import] tariff or customs duty, which taxes goods imported from other States, but does not tax similar products produced in State." Id., at 193. Such tariffs are "so patently unconstitutional that our cases reveal not a single attempt by a State to enact one." Ibid. Yet, were the Town's theory adopted, a State could create just such a tariff with ease. The State would need only to pass a statute imposing a special real estate tax on property used to store, process, or sell imported goods. By gearing the increased tax to the value of the imported goods at issue, the State could create the functional equiva- lent of an import tariff. As this example demonstrates, to accept the Town's theory would have radical and unaccept- able results. We therefore turn to the question whether our prior cases preclude a State from imposing a higher tax on a camp that serves principally nonresidents than on one that limits its services primarily to residents. IV There is no question that were this statute targeted at profit-making entities, it would violate the dormant Com- merce Clause. "State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are `virtually per se invalid.' " Ful- ton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U. S. 325, 331 (1996) (quoting Ore- gon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Ore., 511 U. S. 93, 99 (1994)). It is not necessary to look beyond the text of this statute to determine that it 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 576 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Opinion of the Court discriminates against interstate commerce. The Maine law expressly distinguishes between entities that serve a princi- pally interstate clientele and those that primarily serve an intrastate market, singling out camps that serve mostly in- staters for beneficial tax treatment, and penalizing those camps that do a principally interstate business. As a practi- cal matter, the statute encourages affected entities to limit their out-of-state clientele, and penalizes the principally non- resident customers of businesses catering to a primarily in- terstate market. If such a policy were implemented by a statutory prohibi- tion against providing camp services to nonresidents, the statute would almost certainly be invalid. We have "con- sistently . . . held that the Commerce Clause . . . precludes a state from mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural re- sources located within its borders or to the products derived therefrom." New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U. S. 331, 338 (1982). Our authorities on this point date to the early part of the century.9 Petitioner's "product" is 9 In West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229 (1911), we held invalid under the Commerce Clause an Oklahoma statute that had the effect of preventing out-of-state consumers from purchasing Oklahoma natural gas. We ruled similarly in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923), that a West Virginia statute limiting out-of-state users' access to West Virginia gas to that not "required to meet the local needs for all purposes," id., at 594, violated the Commerce Clause. We found those cases directly analogous in New England Power, ruling invalid a state law that reserved for state citizens domestically generated hydroelectric power. In Phila- delphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617 (1978), we struck down a New Jersey statute prohibiting certain categories of out-of-state waste from flowing into the State's landfills, noting that "a State may not accord its own inhab- itants a preferred right of access over consumers in other States to natural resources located within its borders." Id., at 627. And, in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S., at 338, we ruled that a statute prohibiting the export of minnows for sale out of State violated the Commerce Clause. We held similarly in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U. S. 941, 958 (1982), that a provision preventing the export of ground water to States not allowing reciprocal export rights was an impermissible barrier to com- 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 577 Opinion of the Court in part the natural beauty of Maine itself and, in addition, the special services that the camp provides. In this way, the Maine statute is like a law that burdens out-of-state access to domestically generated hydroelectric power, New England Power, or to local landfills, Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617 (1978). In those cases, as in this case, the burden fell on out-of-state access both to a natural resource and to related services provided by state residents.10 Avoiding this sort of "economic Balkanization," Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S., at 325, and the retaliatory acts of other States that may follow, is one of the central purposes of our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See ibid.; West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229, 255 (1911) (ex- pressing concern that "embargo may be retaliated by em- bargo, and commerce will be halted at state lines"). And, as we noted in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U. S. 573, 580 (1986): "Economic protectionism is not limited to attempts to convey advan- merce. Insofar as Sporhase suggests certain narrow circumstances in which the reservation of natural resources for state citizens may be per- missible, see id., at 956­957, these concerns are not implicated here. 10 We have long noted the applicability of our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence to service industries. See, e. g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U. S. 383, 391 (1994) ("[T]he article of commerce is not so much the solid waste itself, but rather the service of processing and disposing of it"); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 504 U. S. 353, 359 (1992) (noting that "arrangements between out-of-state generators of waste and the . . . operator of a waste disposal site" may be "viewed as `sales' of garbage or `purchases' of trans- portation and disposal services"); Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U. S. 318, 337 (1977) ("[N]o State may discriminatorily tax . . . the business operations performed in any other State"); Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U. S. 27, 42 (1980) (striking down state statute under dormant Commerce Clause that favored in-state over out- of-state entities in the investor services market). Given the substantial portion of the national economy now devoted to service industries, see Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995, p. 779 (Table 1288) (noting service industries constituted approximately 20 per- cent of gross domestic product in 1992), this is a natural development in our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 578 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Opinion of the Court tages on local merchants; it may include attempts to give local consumers an advantage over consumers in other States." 11 By encouraging economic isolationism, prohibi- tions on out-of-state access to in-state resources serve the very evil that the dormant Commerce Clause was designed to prevent. Of course, this case does not involve a total prohibition. Rather, the statute provides a strong incentive for affected entities not to do business with nonresidents if they are able to so avoid the discriminatory tax. In this way, the statute is similar to the North Carolina "intangibles tax" that we struck down in Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U. S., at 327. That case involved the constitutionality under the Commerce Clause of a state "regime that taxe[d] stock [held by in-state shareholders] only to the degree that its issuing corporation participates in interstate commerce." Id., at 333. We held the statute facially discriminatory, in part because it tended "to discourage domestic corporations from plying their trades in interstate commerce." Ibid. Maine's statute has a like effect. To the extent that affected Maine organizations are not deterred by the statute from doing a principally interstate business, it is clear that discriminatory burdens on interstate commerce imposed by regulation or taxation may also vio- late the Commerce Clause. We have held that special fees assessed on nonresidents directly by the State when they attempt to use local services impose an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. See, e. g., Chemical Waste Man- agement, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U. S. 334, 342 (1992) (discrimina- tory tax imposed on disposal of out-of-state hazardous waste). That the tax discrimination comes in the form of a deprivation of a generally available tax benefit, rather than 11 The Town argues that "the Commerce Clause protects out-of-state competitors but does not protect out-of state consumers." Brief for Re- spondents 16. As the discussion above indicates, our cases have rejected this view. 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 579 Opinion of the Court a specific penalty on the activity itself, is of no moment. Thus, in New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 274 (1988), the Court invalidated an Ohio statute that pro- vided a tax credit for sales of ethanol produced in State, but not ethanol produced in certain other States; the law "de- prive[d] certain products of generally available beneficial tax treatment because they are made in certain other States, and thus on its face appear[ed] to violate the cardinal re- quirement of nondiscrimination." 12 Given the fact that the burden of Maine's facially discriminatory tax scheme falls by design in a predictably disproportionate way on out- of-staters,13 the pernicious effect on interstate commerce is 12 See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263, 268 (1984) (discrimi- natory excise tax exemption); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 756 (1981) (tax scheme "unquestionably discriminates against interstate com- merce . . . as the necessary result of various tax credits and exclusions"); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U. S. 388, 399­400, and n. 9 (1984) (per curiam); see also West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S., at 210 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 13 Because the Maine tax is facially discriminatory, this case is unlike Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609 (1981). There, we held permissible under the Commerce Clause a generally applicable Mon- tana severance tax on coal extracted from in-state mines. Appellants challenged the tax arguing, inter alia, that it discriminated against inter- state commerce because 90 percent of the coal happened to be shipped to out-of-state users, and the tax burden was therefore borne principally by nonresidents. We rejected this claim, noting that "there is no real dis- crimination in this case; the tax burden is borne according to the amount of coal consumed and not according to any distinction between in-state and out-of-state consumers." Id., at 619. We recognized that an approach to the dormant Commerce Clause requiring an assessment of the likely de- mand for a particular good by nonresidents and a State's ability to shift its tax burden out of State "would require complex factual inquiries about such issues as elasticity of demand for the product and alternative sources of supply," id., at 619, n. 8, and declined to adopt such a difficult to police test. Here, in contrast, the tax scheme functions by design and on its face to burden out-of-state users disproportionately. Our analysis in Commonwealth Edison is therefore inapplicable. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U. S. 69 (1987), is also inapposite. In that case, we rejected the argument that a facially nondis- 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 580 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Opinion of the Court the same as in our cases involving taxes targeting out-of- staters alone. Unlike in Chemical Waste, we recognize that here the dis- criminatory burden is imposed on the out-of-state customer indirectly by means of a tax on the entity transacting busi- ness with the non-Maine customer. This distinction makes no analytic difference. As we noted in West Lynn Creamery discussing the general phenomenon of import tariffs: "For over 150 years, our cases have rightly concluded that the imposition of a differential burden on any part of the stream of commerce-from wholesaler to retailer to consumer-is invalid, because a burden placed at any point will result in a disadvantage to the out-of-state producer." 512 U. S., at 202 (citing cases). So too here, it matters little that it is the camp that is taxed rather than the campers. The record demonstrates that the economic incidence of the tax falls at least in part on the campers, the Town has not contested the point, and the courts below based their decision on this presumption. App. 49; 655 A. 2d, at 879; App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a, n. 2.14 With respect to those businesses-like petitioner's-that continue to engage in a primarily interstate trade, the Maine statute therefore functionally serves as an export tariff that targets out-of-state consumers by taxing the businesses that criminatory state law deterring hostile tender offers violated the dormant Commerce Clause because most such offers "are launched by offerors out- side Indiana." Id., at 88. We explained that "nothing in the . . . Act imposes a greater burden on out-of-state offerors than it does on similarly situated Indiana offerors." Ibid. (emphasis added). Here, the discrimi- nation appears on the face of the Maine statute. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S. 117 (1978), is similarly distinguishable. See id., at 126 ("The fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some inter- state companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce"). 14 We therefore have no need to consider these matters further. Cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U. S. 325, 341 (1996) (noting "complexity of economic incidence analysis"). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 581 Opinion of the Court principally serve them. As our cases make clear, this sort of discrimination is at the very core of activities forbidden by the dormant Commerce Clause. " `[A] State may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State.' " Chemical Waste, 504 U. S., at 342 (quoting Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638, 642 (1984)); see West Lynn Cream- ery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S., at 193 (tariffs forbidden by the dormant Commerce Clause). Ninety-five percent of petitioner's campers come from out of State. Insofar as Maine's discriminatory tax has in- creased tuition, that burden is felt almost entirely by out- of-staters, deterring them from enjoying the benefits of camping in Maine.15 In sum, the Maine statute facially dis- criminates against interstate commerce, and is all but per se invalid. See, e. g., Oregon Waste, 511 U. S., at 100­101. We recognize that the Town might have attempted to de- fend the Maine law under the per se rule by demonstrating that it " `advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alterna- tives.' " Id., at 101 (quoting New Energy Co., 486 U. S., at 278). In assessing respondents' arguments, we would have applied our "strictest scrutiny." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 15 The Town argues that these effects are entirely speculative, because the record does not reflect any decision by a potential camper not to attend petitioner's camp as a result of the burden imposed. Brief for Respond- ents 16. The Supreme Judicial Court appears to have adopted similar reasoning. 655 A. 2d, at 879. This misconstrues the proper analysis. As we made clear most recently in Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U. S., at 333, n. 3, there is no " `de minimis' defense to a charge of discriminatory taxation under the Commerce Clause." A particularized showing of the sort respondent seeks is not required. See Associated Industries of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U. S. 641, 650 (1994) ("[A]ctual discrimination, wherever it is found, is impermissible, and the magnitude and scope of the discrimina- tion have no bearing on the determinative question whether discrimina- tion has occurred"); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S., at 756; see also Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U. S., at 334, n. 13. 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 582 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Opinion of the Court U. S., at 337. This is an extremely difficult burden, "so heavy that `facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal de- fect.' " Oregon Waste, 511 U. S., at 101 (quoting Hughes, 441 U. S., at 337); see Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U. S., at 342 ("Once a state tax is found to discrimi- nate against out-of-state commerce, it is typically struck down without further inquiry"). Perhaps realizing the weight of its burden, the Town has made no effort to defend the statute under the per se rule, and so we do not address this question. See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U. S., at 333­334.16 We have no doubt that if petitioner's camp were 16 Justice Scalia submits that we err by following our precedent in Fulton and declining to address an argument that the Town itself did not think worthy of pressing. Post, at 602­603. But even if there were rea- son to consider the State's compliance with the per se rule, the Town would not prevail. In the single case Justice Scalia points to in which we found the per se standard to have been met, Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131 (1986), the State had no " `reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives,' " Oregon Waste, 511 U. S., at 101 (quoting New Energy Co., 486 U. S., at 278), to the action it had taken. Absent a bar on the import of certain minnows, there was no way for Maine to protect its natural environment from the hazard of parasites and nonnative species that might have been accidentally introduced into the State's waters. Taylor, 477 U. S., at 141. In contrast, here Maine has ample alternatives short of a facially dis- criminatory property tax exemption to achieve its apparent goal of subsi- dizing the attendance of the State's children at summer camp. Maine could, for example, achieve this end by offering direct financial support to parents of resident children. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). Though we have not had the occasion to address the issue, it might also be permissible for the State to subsidize Maine camps directly to the extent that they serve residents. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S., at 199, n. 15; New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 278 (1988) (noting that "[d]irect subsidization of domestic in- dustry does not ordinarily run afoul" of the Commerce Clause); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S., at 816 (Stevens, J., concurring). While the Town does argue its case under the less exacting analysis set forth in, e. g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970), "this lesser scrutiny is only available `where other [nondiscriminatory] legisla- tive objectives are credibly advanced and there is no patent discrimination 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 583 Opinion of the Court a profit-making entity, the discriminatory tax exemption would be impermissible. V The unresolved question presented by this case is whether a different rule should apply to tax exemptions for charitable and benevolent institutions. Though we have never had cause to address the issue directly, the applicability of the dormant Commerce Clause to the nonprofit sector of the economy follows from our prior decisions. Our cases have frequently applied laws regulating com- merce to not-for-profit institutions. In Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 103 (1937), for example, we held the Na- tional Labor Relations Act as applied to the Associated Press' (A. P.'s) newsgathering activities to be an enactment entirely within Congress' Commerce Clause power, despite the fact that the A. P. "does not sell news and does not oper- ate for a profit." Id., at 129. Noting that the A. P.'s activi- ties "involve[d] the constant use of channels of interstate and foreign communication," we concluded that its operations "amount[ed] to commercial intercourse, and such intercourse is commerce within the meaning of the Constitution." Id., against interstate trade.' " Chemical Waste, 504 U. S., at 343, n. 5 (quot- ing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S., at 624 (emphasis added)). Be- cause the Maine statute is facially discriminatory, the more deferential standard is inapplicable. Contrary to Justice Scalia's suggestion, this case is quite unlike General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U. S. 278 (1997). There, the Court premised its holding that the statute at issue was not facially discriminatory on the view that sellers of "bundled" and "unbun- dled" natural gas were principally competing in different markets. See id., at 297­298, 300 ("dormant Commerce Clause protects markets and par- ticipants in markets, not taxpayers as such"). While it may be true that "[d]isparate treatment constitutes discrimination only if the objects of the disparate treatment are . . . similarly situated," post, at 601, there is no question that the statute at issue here is facially discriminatory because it disparately treats identically situated Maine nonprofit camps depending upon whether they favor in-state, as opposed to out-of-state, campers. 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 584 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Opinion of the Court at 128. See also Polish National Alliance of United States v. NLRB, 322 U. S. 643 (1944). We have similarly held that federal antitrust laws are applicable to the anticompetitive activities of nonprofit orga- nizations. See National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U. S. 85, 100, n. 22 (1984) (Sherman Act § 1 applies to nonprofits); American Soc. of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U. S. 556, 576 (1982) ("[I]t is beyond debate that nonprofit organi- zations can be held liable under the antitrust laws"); Gold- farb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975). The non- profit character of an enterprise does not place it beyond the purview of federal laws regulating commerce. See also NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U. S. 672, 681, n. 11 (1980) (not- ing that in context of amendments to National Labor Re- lations Act "Congress appears to have agreed that non- profit institutions `affect commerce' under modern economic conditions"). We have already held that the dormant Commerce Clause is applicable to activities undertaken without the intention of earning a profit. In Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160 (1941), we addressed the constitutionality of a California statute prohibiting the transport into that State of indigent persons. We struck the statute down as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, reasoning that "the transpor- tation of persons is `commerce,' " and that the California statute was an "unconstitutional barrier to [that] interstate commerce." Id., at 172­173. In determining whether the transportation of persons is "commerce," we noted that "[i]t is immaterial whether or not the transportation is commer- cial in character." Id., at 172, n. 1. We see no reason why the nonprofit character of an enter- prise should exclude it from the coverage of either the af- firmative or the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause. See Hughes, 441 U. S., at 326, n. 2; Philadelphia v. New Jer- sey, 437 U. S., at 621­623 (rejecting "two-tiered definition of commerce"); Sporhase, 458 U. S., at 953; see also supra, at 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 585 Opinion of the Court 572­574. There are a number of lines of commerce in which both for-profit and nonprofit entities participate. Some edu- cational institutions, some hospitals, some child care facilities, some research organizations, and some museums generate significant earnings; and some are operated by not-for-profit corporations. See Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enter- prise, 89 Yale L. J. 835, 835, and n. 1, 865 (1980). A nonprofit entity is ordinarily understood to differ from a for-profit corporation principally because it "is barred from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exer- cise control over it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees." Id., at 838.17 Nothing intrinsic to the nature of nonprofit entities prevents them from engaging in interstate commerce. Summer camps may be operated as for-profit or nonprofit entities; nonprofits may depend-as here-in sub- stantial part on fees charged for their services. Clotfelter, The Distributional Consequences of Nonprofit Activities, in Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector? 1, 6 (C. Clotfelter ed. 1992) (nonprofits in some sectors are "heavily dependent on fees by paying customers, with private payments account- ing for at least half of total revenues"). Whether operated on a for-profit or nonprofit basis, they purchase goods and 17 Maine's law governing nonprofits embraces this conception, see Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13­B, § 102(9) (1981), as does the tax exemption stat- ute at issue here. The exemption applies to "benevolent and charitable institutions." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 36, § 652(1)(A) (Supp. 1996). To qualify, the entity must devote "[a]ll profits derived from [its] operation . . . and the proceeds from the sale of its property . . . exclusively to the purposes for which it is organized." § 652(1)(C)(3). "A director, trustee, officer or employee of an organization claiming exemption is not entitled to receive directly or indirectly any pecuniary profit from the operation of that organization, excepting reasonable compensation for services in effecting its purposes." § 652(1)(C)(2). The statute also expressly desig- nates certain categories of entities (nonprofit nursing homes, boarding homes, community mental health service facilities, and child care centers) that qualify for tax exempt status under federal law, 26 U. S. C. § 501(c)(3), as falling within its ambit. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 36, § 652(1)(A) (Supp. 1996) (" `[B]enevolent and charitable institutions' include, but are not limited to, [the specified entities]"). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 586 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Opinion of the Court services in competitive markets, offer their facilities to a variety of patrons, and derive revenues from a variety of sources, some of which are local and some out of State. For purposes of Commerce Clause analysis, any categori- cal distinction between the activities of profit-making enter- prises and not-for-profit entities is therefore wholly illusory. Entities in both categories are major participants in inter- state markets. And, although the summer camp involved in this case may have a relatively insignificant impact on the commerce of the entire Nation, the interstate commercial activities of nonprofit entities as a class are unquestionably significant.18 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127­ 128 (1942); Lopez, 514 U. S., at 556, 559­560. 18 We are informed by amici that "the nonprofit sector spends over $389 billion each year in operating expenses-approximately seven percent of the gross national product." Brief for American Council on Education et al. as Amici Curiae 19. In recent years, nonprofits have employed approximately seven percent of the Nation's paid workers, roughly 9.3 million people in 1990. V. Hodgkinson, M. Weitzman, C. Toppe, & S. Noga, Nonprofit Almanac 1992­1993: Dimensions of the Independent Sector 29 (1992) (Table 1.5). Justice Scalia wrongly suggests that Maine's law offers only a "nar- row tax exemption," post, at 598, which he implies has no substantial effect on interstate commerce and serves only "to relieve the State of its burden of caring for its residents," post, at 596. This characterization is quite misleading. The statute expressly exempts from tax property used by such important nonprofit service industries as nursing homes and child care centers. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 36, § 652(1)(A)(1) (Supp. 1996). Nonprofit participation in these sectors is substantial. Nationally, non- profit nursing homes had estimated revenues of $18 billion in 1994. U. S. Bureau of the Census, Service Annual Survey: 1994 (1996) (Table 7.3). These entities compete with a sizeable for-profit nursing home sector, which had revenues of approximately $40 billion in 1994. Id., at Table 7.1. Similarly, the $5 billion nonprofit market in child day care services competes with an $11 billion for-profit industry. Id., at Tables 8.1, 8.3 (1994 data). Nonprofit hospitals and health maintenance organizations also receive an exemption from Maine's property tax. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 587 Opinion of the Court From the State's standpoint it may well be reasonable to use tax exemptions as a means of encouraging nonprofit in- stitutions to favor local citizens, notwithstanding any possi- ble adverse impact on the larger markets in which those in- 36, §§ 652(1)(A), (K) (Supp. 1996). While operating as nonprofit entities, their activities are serious business. In Maine Medical Center v. Lucci, 317 A. 2d 1 (1974), the Supreme Judicial Court presumed that a "large hospital" employing 2,000 people qualified as a "benevolent and charitable institution" for purposes of the § 652(1)(A) exemption, and held that a newly constructed $3.3 million parking facility-which patients, visitors, and staff were charged a fee to use-was also exempt from the tax. Though the garage was being operated at an immediate loss, "projected estimates of income and expense indicated a possible recovery of the capi- tal investment over a period of twenty years." Id., at 2. Nonprofit hos- pitals had national revenues of roughly $305 billion in 1994, considerably more than the $34 billion in revenues collected by hospitals operated on a for-profit basis. U. S. Bureau of the Census, Service Annual Survey: 1994 (1996) (Tables 7.1, 7.3). Maine law further permits qualifying nonprofits to rent out their prop- erty on a commercial basis at market rates in order to support other activi- ties, so long as that use of the property is only incidental to their own purposes. See Maine Medical Center, 317 A. 2d, at 2 (citing with ap- proval Curtis v. Androscoggin Lodge, No. 24, Independent Order of Odd Fellows, 99 Me. 356, 360, 59 A. 518, 520 (1904)); State Young Men's Chris- tian Assn. v. Winthrop, 295 A. 2d 440, 442 (Me. 1972). Although Maine's tax exemption statute was amended in 1953 to specify that the property need not be occupied by the charity to qualify for the exemption, but may also be "used solely" for its own purposes, see ibid., this extension did not alter the "well defined rul[e] of exemption" permitting "occasional or purely incidental" renting. Green Acre Baha'i Institute, 150 Me., at 354, 110 A. 2d, at 584; see also Alpha Rho Zeta of Lambda Chi Alpha, Inc. v. Waterville, 477 A. 2d 1131, 1141 (Me. 1984). But cf. Nature Conservancy of the Pine Tree State, Inc. v. Bristol, 385 A. 2d 39, 43 (Me. 1978) (holding that requirement that property be used "solely" for institution's own pur- poses prohibits tax exemption where grantor of property to charity main- tains private rights of use). Maine's statute expressly contemplates that entities receiving the benefit of the tax exemption may well earn profits, though of course these must be plowed back into the enterprise or other- wise appropriately used. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 36, § 652(1)(C)(3) (Supp. 1996). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 588 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Opinion of the Court stitutions participate. Indeed, if we view the issue solely from the State's perspective, it is equally reasonable to use discriminatory tax exemptions as a means of encouraging the growth of local trade. But as our cases clearly hold, such exemptions are impermissible. See, e. g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263, 273 (1984). Protectionism, whether targeted at for-profit entities or serving, as here, to encourage nonprofits to keep their efforts close to home, is forbidden under the dormant Commerce Clause.19 If there is need for a special exception for nonprofits, Congress not only has the power to create it,20 but also is in a far better position than we to determine its dimensions.21 VI Rather than urging us to create a categorical exception for nonprofit entities, the Town argues that Maine's exemption statute should be viewed as an expenditure of government money designed to lessen its social service burden and to foster the societal benefits provided by charitable organiza- tions. So characterized, the Town submits that its tax ex- emption scheme is either a legitimate discriminatory subsidy 19 Contrary to Justice Scalia's suggestion, nothing in our holding today "prevent[s] a State from giving a tax break to charities that benefit the State's inhabitants." Post, at 595. The States are, of course, free to provide generally applicable nondiscriminatory tax exemptions without running afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause. 20 See n. 8, supra. 21 We must admit to some puzzlement as to the force of the argument underlying Justice Scalia's dissent. On the one hand, he suggests that a categorical exemption of nonprofit activities from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny would be proper. Post, at 607­608. Yet at the same time, he makes a great effort to characterize this statute as being so nar- row that, whatever the appropriate generally applicable rule, the dormant Commerce Clause ought not to apply here. Post, at 598. As we have explained, the argument in favor of a categorical exemption for nonprofits is unpersuasive, and we disagree with Justice Scalia's characterization of this statute's effects. Accordingly, we reject his position on either of these theories. 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 589 Opinion of the Court of only those charities that choose to focus their activities on local concerns, or alternatively a governmental "purchase" of charitable services falling within the narrow exception to the dormant Commerce Clause for States in their role as "market participants," see, e. g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794 (1976); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429 (1980). We find these arguments unpersuasive. Al- though tax exemptions and subsidies serve similar ends, they differ in important and relevant respects, and our cases have recognized these distinctions. As for the "market partici- pant" argument, we have already rejected the Town's posi- tion in a prior case, and in any event respondents' open- ended exemption for charitable and benevolent institutions is not analogous to the industry-specific state actions that we reviewed in Alexandria Scrap and Reeves. The Town argues that its discriminatory tax exemption is, in economic reality, no different from a discriminatory sub- sidy of those charities that cater principally to local needs. Noting our statement in West Lynn Creamery that "[a] pure subsidy funded out of general revenue ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce, but merely assists local busi- ness," 512 U. S., at 199, the Town submits that since a dis- criminatory subsidy may be permissible, a discriminatory ex- emption must be, too. We have "never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies," id., at 199, n. 15, and we need not address these questions today. Assuming, argu- endo, that the Town is correct that a direct subsidy benefit- ing only those nonprofits serving principally Maine residents would be permissible, our cases do not sanction a tax exemp- tion serving similar ends.22 22 As the Supreme Judicial Court made clear, 655 A. 2d, at 878, under Maine law an exemption is categorized as a "tax expenditure." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 36, § 196 (1990). The Town's effort to argue that this state statutory categorization allows it to elide the federal constitutional distinc- tion between tax exemptions and subsidies is unavailing. We recognized long ago that a tax exemption can be viewed as a form of government 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 590 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Opinion of the Court In Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664 (1970), notwithstanding our assumption that a direct subsidy of religious activity would be invalid,23 we held that New York's tax exemption for church property did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.24 That holding rested, in part, on the premise that there is a consti- tutionally significant difference between subsidies and tax exemptions.25 We have expressly recognized that this dis- tinction is also applicable to claims that certain state action designed to give residents an advantage in the marketplace is prohibited by the Commerce Clause. In New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269 (1988), we found unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause an Ohio tax scheme that provided a sales tax credit for ethanol produced in State, or manufactured in another State to the extent that State gave similar tax advantages to ethanol produced in Ohio. We recognized that the party challenging the Ohio scheme was "eligible to receive a cash subsidy" spending. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540, 544 (1983). The distinction we have drawn for dormant Commerce Clause purposes does not turn on this point. 23 We noted: "Obviously a direct money subsidy would be a relationship pregnant with involvement and, as with most governmental grant pro- grams, could encompass sustained and detailed administrative relation- ships for enforcement of statutory or administrative standards, but that is not this case." Walz, 397 U. S., at 675. 24 We reasoned that "New York's statute [cannot be read] as attempting to establish religion; it . . . simply spar[es] the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation levied on private profit institutions." Id., at 673. 25 "The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the govern- ment does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the church support the state. No one has ever sug- gested that tax exemption has converted libraries, art galleries, or hospi- tals into arms of the state or put employees `on the public payroll.' " Id., at 675. As Justice Brennan noted: "Tax exemptions and general subsidies . . . are qualitatively different." Id., at 690 (concurring opinion). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 591 Opinion of the Court from its home State, and was therefore "the potential bene- ficiary of a scheme no less discriminatory than the one that it attacks, and no less effective in conferring a commer- cial advantage over out-of-state competitors." Id., at 278. That was of no importance. We noted: "The Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action designed to give its residents an advantage in the marketplace, but only action of that description in connection with the State's regulation of interstate commerce. Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of that prohibition; discriminatory taxation . . . does." Ibid. (emphasis in origi- nal). See also West Lynn, 512 U. S., at 210 (Scalia, J., con- curring in judgment) (drawing similar distinction between forbidden generally applicable tax with discriminatory "ex- emption" and permissible "subsidy . . . funded from the State's general revenues"). This distinction is supported by scholarly commentary as well as precedent, and we see no reason to depart from it. See Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 377, 442­443 (1996); Hellerstein & Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 789, 846­848 (1996).26 The Town's claim that its dis- criminatory tax scheme should be viewed as a permissible subsidy is therefore unpersuasive.27 26 The distinction provides a sufficient response to the Town's argument that our ruling today would invalidate a State's subsidization of all or part of its residents' tuition at state-owned universities. 27 Justice Scalia, post, at 605­606, and n. 4, would distinguish this line of authority by holding that it should not apply where a State is giving tax relief to charitable enterprises. As explained in Part V, supra, we see no categorical reason to treat for-profit and nonprofit entities differ- ently under the dormant Commerce Clause. Justice Scalia's heavy reli- ance upon Board of Ed. of Ky. Annual Conference of Methodist Episcopal Church v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 553 (1906), is misplaced. In that case, a be- quest to a Kentucky charitable corporation did not qualify for an exemp- 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 592 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Opinion of the Court Finally, the Town argues that its discriminatory tax ex- emption scheme falls within the "market-participant" excep- tion. As we explained in New Energy Co.: "That doctrine differentiates between a State's acting in its distinctive gov- ernmental capacity, and a State's acting in the more general capacity of a market participant; only the former is subject to the limitations of the negative Commerce Clause." 486 U. S., at 277. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U. S. 204, 208 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S., at 436­437; Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S., at 810. In Alexandria Scrap we concluded that the State of Mary- land had, in effect, entered the market for abandoned auto- mobile hulks as a purchaser because it was using state funds to provide bounties for their removal from Maryland streets and junkyards. Id., at 809­810. In Reeves, the State of South Dakota similarly participated in the market for ce- ment as a seller of the output of the cement plant that it had owned and operated for many years. 447 U. S., at 431­432. And in White, the city of Boston had participated in the con- struction industry by funding certain projects. 460 U. S., at 205­206. These three cases stand for the proposition that, for purposes of analysis under the dormant Commerce Clause, a State acting in its proprietary capacity as a pur- tion from the Illinois inheritance tax because the corporate legatee was not incorporated in Illinois. In this case, the petitioner is a Maine corpo- ration, and the validity of the portion of the Maine statute that denies the exemption to out-of-state corporations is not at issue. Moreover, unlike the situation in Board of Ed. of Ky., in which none of the charitable activi- ties of the legatee were performed in Illinois, all of the benefits of attend- ing petitioner's camp in Maine are "bestowed within her borders." Id., at 563. While the dictum that Justice Scalia quotes, post, at 606, is consistent with his analysis, it does not purport to address the applicability of the dormant Commerce Clause to charities in general, to resident chari- ties, or to nonresident charities that provide benefits for both residents and nonresidents. 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 593 Opinion of the Court chaser or seller may "favor its own citizens over others." Alexandria Scrap, 426 U. S., at 810. Maine's tax exemption statute cannot be characterized as a proprietary activity falling within the market-participant exception. In New Energy Co., Ohio argued similarly that a discriminatory tax credit program fell within the excep- tion. We noted that the tax program had "the purpose and effect of subsidizing a particular industry, as do many dis- positions of the tax laws." 486 U. S., at 277. "That," we explained, "does not transform it into a form of state partici- pation in the free market." Ibid. "The Ohio action ulti- mately at issue is neither its purchase nor its sale of ethanol, but its assessment and computation of taxes-a primeval governmental activity." Ibid. As we indicated in White: "[I]n this kind of case there is `a single inquiry: whether the challenged "program constituted direct state participation in the market." ' " 460 U. S., at 208 (quoting Reeves, 447 U. S., at 436, n. 7). A tax exemption is not the sort of direct state involvement in the market that falls within the market- participation doctrine. Even if we were prepared to expand the exception in the manner suggested by the Town, the Maine tax statute at issue here would be a poor candidate. Like the tax exemp- tion upheld in Walz-which applied to libraries, art galleries, and hospitals as well as churches 28-the exemption that has been denied to petitioner is available to a broad category of charitable and benevolent institutions.29 For that rea- son, nothing short of a dramatic expansion of the "market- 28 See Walz, 397 U. S., at 666­667, and n. 1. 29 See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 36, § 652(1)(A) (Supp. 1996) ("For the purposes of this paragraph, `benevolent and charitable institutions' in- clude, but are not limited to, nonprofit nursing homes and nonprofit board- ing homes and boarding care facilities . . . , nonprofit community mental health service facilities . . . [,] and nonprofit child care centers") (empha- sis added). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 594 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Opinion of the Court participant" exception would support its application to this case. Alexandria Scrap involved Maryland's entry into the market for automobile hulks, a discrete activity focused on a single industry. Similarly, South Dakota's participation in the market for cement was-in part because of its narrow scope-readily conceived as a proprietary action of the State. In contrast, Maine's tax exemption-which sweeps to cover broad swathes of the nonprofit sector-must be viewed as action taken in the State's sovereign capacity rather than a proprietary decision to make an entry into all of the markets in which the exempted charities function. See White, 460 U. S., at 211, n. 7 (noting that "there are some limits on a state or local government's ability to impose restric- tions that reach beyond the immediate parties with which the government transacts business"). The Town's version of the "market-participant" exception would swallow the rule against discriminatory tax schemes. Contrary to the Town's submission, the notion that whenever a State pro- vides a discriminatory tax abatement it is "purchasing" some service in its proprietary capacity is not readily confined to the charitable context. A special tax concession for liquors indigenous to Hawaii, for example, might be conceived as a "purchase" of the jobs produced by local industry, or an investment in the unique local cultural value provided by these beverages. Cf. Bacchus, 468 U. S., at 270­271. Dis- criminatory schemes favoring local farmers might be seen as the "purchase" of agricultural services in order to ensure that the State's citizens will have a steady local supply of the product. Cf. West Lynn, 512 U. S., at 190 (striking down statute protecting in-state milk producers designed to "pre- serve . . . local industry," "thereby ensur[ing] a continuous and adequate supply of fresh milk for our market" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Our cases provide no support for the Town's radical effort to expand the market- participant doctrine. 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 595 Scalia, J., dissenting VII As was true in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, the facts of this particular case, viewed in isolation, do not appear to pose any threat to the health of the national economy. Nev- ertheless, history, including the history of commercial con- flict that preceded the Constitutional Convention as well as the uniform course of Commerce Clause jurisprudence ani- mated and enlightened by that early history, provides the context in which each individual controversy must be judged. The history of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence has shown that even the smallest scale discrimination can inter- fere with the project of our Federal Union. As Justice Car- dozo recognized, to countenance discrimination of the sort that Maine's statute represents would invite significant in- roads on our "national solidarity": "The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not divi- sion." Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 523 (1935). The judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court is reversed. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice Thomas, and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting. The Court's negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence has drifted far from its moorings. Originally designed to create a national market for commercial activity, it is today invoked to prevent a State from giving a tax break to charities that benefit the State's inhabitants. In my view, Maine's tax exemption, which excuses from taxation only that property 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 596 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Scalia, J., dissenting used to relieve the State of its burden of caring for its residents, survives even our most demanding Commerce Clause scrutiny. I We have often said that the purpose of our negative Com- merce Clause jurisprudence is to create a national market. As Justice Jackson once observed, the "vision of the Found- ers" was "that every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them." H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 539 (1949). In our zeal to advance this policy, however, we must take care not to overstep our mandate, for the Commerce Clause was not intended "to cut the States off from legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life, and safety of their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country." Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 443­444 (1960). Our cases have struggled (to put it nicely) to develop a set of rules by which we may preserve a national market with- out needlessly intruding upon the States' police powers, each exercise of which no doubt has some effect on the commerce of the Nation. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U. S. 175, 180­183 (1995). The rules that we currently use can be simply stated, if not simply applied: Where a state law facially discriminates against interstate commerce, we observe what has sometimes been referred to as a "virtually per se rule of invalidity;" where, on the other hand, a state law is nondiscriminatory, but nonetheless ad- versely affects interstate commerce, we employ a deferential "balancing test," under which the law will be sustained un- less "the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits," Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). See Oregon 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 597 Scalia, J., dissenting Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Qual- ity of Ore., 511 U. S. 93, 99 (1994). While the "virtually per se rule of invalidity" entails appli- cation of the "strictest scrutiny," Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 337 (1979), it does not necessarily result in the invalidation of facially discriminatory state legislation, see, e. g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131 (1986) (upholding abso- lute ban on the importation of baitfish into Maine), for "what may appear to be a `discriminatory' provision in the consti- tutionally prohibited sense-that is, a protectionist enact- ment-may on closer analysis not be so," New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 278 (1988). Thus, even a stat- ute that erects an absolute barrier to the movement of goods across state lines will be upheld if "the discrimination is de- monstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism," id., at 274, or to put a finer point on it, if the state law "advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alter- natives," id., at 278. In addition to laws that employ suspect means as a neces- sary expedient to the advancement of legitimate state ends, we have also preserved from judicial invalidation laws that confer advantages upon the State's residents but do so with- out regulating interstate commerce. We have therefore excepted the State from scrutiny when it participates in markets rather than regulates them-by selling cement, for example, see Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429 (1980), or purchasing auto hulks, see Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794 (1976), or hiring contractors, see White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U. S. 204 (1983). Likewise, we have said that direct subsi- dies to domestic industry do not run afoul of the Commerce Clause. See New Energy Co., supra, at 278. In sum, we have declared that "[t]he Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action designed to give its residents an advantage in the marketplace, but only action of that description in con- 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 598 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Scalia, J., dissenting nection with the State's regulation of interstate commerce." Ibid. (emphasis in original). II In applying the foregoing principles to the case before us, it is of course important to understand the precise scope of the exemption created by Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 36, § 652(1)(A) (Supp. 1996­1997). The Court's analysis suffers from the misapprehension that § 652(1)(A) "sweeps to cover broad swathes of the nonprofit sector," ante, at 594, including nonprofit corporations engaged in quintessentially commer- cial activities. That is not so. A review of Maine law dem- onstrates that the provision at issue here is a narrow tax exemption, designed merely to compensate or subsidize those organizations that contribute to the public fisc by dis- pensing public benefits the State might otherwise provide. Although Maine allows nonprofit corporations to be orga- nized "for any lawful purpose," Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13­B, § 201 (1981 and Supp. 1996­1997), the exemption sup- plied by § 652(1)(A) does not extend to all nonprofit organi- zations, but only to those "benevolent and charitable insti- tutions," § 652(1)(A), which are "organized and conducted exclusively for benevolent and charitable purposes," § 652(1)(C)(1) (emphasis added), and only to those parcels of real property and items of personal property that are used "solely," § 652(1)(A), "to further the organization's charitable purposes," Poland v. Poland Springs Health Institute, Inc., 649 A. 2d 1098, 1100 (Me. 1994). The Maine Supreme Judi- cial Court has defined the statutory term "benevolent and charitable institutions" to include only those nonprofits that dispense "charity," which is in turn defined to include only those acts which are " `for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the in- fluence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint, by assisting them 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 599 Scalia, J., dissenting to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or main- taining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.' " Lewiston v. Marcotte Congregate Housing, Inc., 673 A. 2d 209, 211 (1996) (em- phasis added). Moreover, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has further limited the § 652(1)(A) exemption by insisting that the party claiming its benefit "bring its claim unmistakably within the spirit and intent of the act creating the exemption," ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted), and by proclaiming that the spirit and intent of § 652(1)(A) is to compensate charita- ble organizations for their contribution to the public fisc. As the court has explained: " `[A]ny institution which by its charitable activities re- lieves the government of part of [its] burden is confer- ring a pecuniary benefit upon the body politic, and in receiving exemption from taxation it is merely being given a "quid pro quo" for its services in providing something which otherwise the government would have to provide.' " Episcopal Camp Foundation, Inc. v. Hope, 666 A. 2d 108, 110 (1995) (quoting Young Men's Christian Assn. of Germantown v. Philadelphia, 323 Pa. 401, 413, 187 A. 204, 210 (1936)). Thus, § 652(1)(A) exemptions have been denied to organiza- tions that do not provide substantial public benefits, as de- fined by reference to the state public policy. In one case, for example, an organization devoted to maintaining a wild- life sanctuary was denied exemption on the ground that the preserve's prohibition on deer hunting conflicted with state policy on game management, so that the preserve could not be deemed to provide a public benefit. See Holbrook Island Sanctuary v. Brooksville, 214 A. 2d 660 (Me. 1965). Even churches have been denied exemptions, see Pentecostal Assembly of Bangor v. Maidlow, 414 A. 2d 891, 893­894 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 600 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Scalia, J., dissenting (Me. 1980) ("religious purposes are not to be equated with benevolent and charitable purposes"). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has adhered rigorously to the requirement that the exempt property be used "solely" for charitable purposes. Even when there is no question that the organization owning the property is de- voted exclusively to charitable purposes, the entire exemp- tion will be forfeited if even a small fraction of the property is not used in furtherance of those purposes. See Lewiston, supra, at 212­213 (denying exemption to a building 18 per- cent of which was leased at market rates); Nature Conser- vancy of Pine Tree State, Inc. v. Bristol, 385 A. 2d 39, 43 (1978) (denying exemption to a nature preserve on which the grantors had reserved rights-of-way). That § 652(1)(A) serves to compensate private charities for helping to relieve the State of its burden of caring for its residents should not be obscured by the fact that this partic- ular case involves a summer camp rather than a more tradi- tional form of social service. The statute that the Court strikes down does not speak of "camps" at all, but rather lists as examples of "benevolent and charitable institutions" nonprofit nursing homes, boarding homes, community men- tal health service facilities, and child care centers, see § 652(1)(A). Some summer camps fall within the exemption under a 1933 decision of the Supreme Judicial Court which applied it to a tuition-free camp for indigent children, see Camp Emoh Associates v. Inhabitants of Lyman, 166 A. 59, 60, and under a recent 4-to-3 decision which relied heavily on the fact that the camp at issue provided "moral instruc- tion" and training in "social living and civic responsibility," and was not only "nonprofit" but furnished its camping serv- ices below cost, see Episcopal Camp Foundation, supra, at 109, 111. What is at issue in this case is not whether a sum- mer camp can properly be regarded as relieving the State of social costs, but rather whether, assuming it can, a dis- tinction between charities serving mainly residents and 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 601 Scalia, J., dissenting charities operated principally for the benefit of nonresidents is constitutional.1 III I turn next to the validity of this focused tax exemption- applicable only to property used solely for charitable pur- poses by organizations devoted exclusively to charity-under the negative Commerce Clause principles discussed earlier. The Court readily concludes that, by limiting the class of eligible property to that which is used "principally for the benefit of persons who are Maine residents," the statute "facially discriminates" against interstate commerce. That seems to me not necessarily true. Disparate treatment con- stitutes discrimination only if the objects of the disparate treatment are, for the relevant purposes, similarly situated. See General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U. S. 278, 298­299 1 The Court protests that "there is no `de minimis' defense to a charge of discriminatory taxation under the Commerce Clause," ante, at 581, n. 15-as though that were the point of our emphasizing in this Part II the narrowness of the challenged limitation. It is not. Rather, the point is (1) that Maine's limitation focuses upon a particular state interest that is deserving of exemption from negative Commerce Clause invalidation, and (2) that acknowledging the principle of such an exemption (as devel- oped in Part III below) will not place the "national market" in any peril. What the Court should have gleaned from our discussion, it did not: It persists in misdescribing the exemption we defend as "a categorical ex- emption of nonprofit activities from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny." Ante, at 588, n. 21; see also ante, at 591­592, n. 27. The Court also makes an attempt to contest on the merits the nar- rowness of the exemption, suggesting a massive effect upon interstate commerce by reciting the multi-billion-dollar annual revenues of nonprofit nursing homes, child care centers, hospitals, and health maintenance organizations. See ante, at 586­587, n. 18. But of course most of the services provided by those institutions are provided locally, to local bene- ficiaries. (In that regard the summer camp that is the subject of the present suit is most atypical.) The record does not show the number of nonprofit nursing homes, child care centers, hospitals, and HMO's in Maine that have been denied the charitable exemption because their property is not used "principally for the benefit of persons who are Maine residents"; but it would be a good bet that the number is zero. 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN 602 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Scalia, J., dissenting (1997). And for purposes of entitlement to a tax subsidy from the State, it is certainly reasonable to think that prop- erty gratuitously devoted to relieving the State of some of its welfare burden is not similarly situated to property used "principally for the benefit of persons who are not resi- dents of [the State]," § 652(1)(A). As we have seen, the theory underlying the exemption is that it is a quid pro quo for uncompensated expenditures that lessen the State's burden of providing assistance to its residents. The Court seeks to establish "facial discrimination" by showing that the effect of treating disparate property dis- parately is to produce higher costs for those users of the property who come from out of State. But that could be regarded as an indirect effect upon interstate commerce produced by a tax scheme that is not facially discriminatory, which means that the proper mode of analysis would be the more lenient "balancing" standard discussed above. We fol- low precisely this mode of analysis in Tracy, upholding an Ohio law that provides preferential tax treatment to domes- tic public utilities. Such entities, we conclude, are not "simi- larly situated" to other fuel distributors; their insulation from out-of-state competition does not violate the negative Commerce Clause because it "serves important interests in health and safety." 519 U. S., at 306. The Court in Tracy paints a compelling image of people shivering in their homes in the dead of winter without the assured service that competition-sheltered public utilities provide. See id., at 301­302, 306. No less important, however, is the availability of many of the benefits provided by Maine's private charities and facilitated not by total insulation from competition but by favorable tax treatment: care for the sick and dying, for example, or nursing services for the elderly. Even if, however, the Maine statute displays "facial dis- crimination" against interstate commerce, that is not the end of the analysis. The most remarkable thing about today's judgment is that it is rendered without inquiry into whether the purposes of the tax exemption justify its favoritism. 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 603 Scalia, J., dissenting Once having concluded that the statute is facially discrimina- tory, the Court rests. "[T]he Town," it asserts, "has made no effort to defend the statute under the per se rule." Ante, at 582. This seems to me a pointless technicality. The town of Harrison (Town) has asserted that the State's interest in encouraging private entities to shoulder part of its social- welfare burden validates this provision under the negative Commerce Clause. Whether it does so because the presence of that interest causes the resident-benefiting charities not to be "similarly situated" to the non-resident-benefiting charities, and hence negates "facial discrimination," or rather because the presence of that interest justifies "facial discrim- ination," is a question that is not only of no consequence but is also probably unanswerable. To strike down this statute because the Town's lawyers put the argument in one form rather than the other is truly senseless.2 If the Court were to proceed with that further analysis it would have to conclude, in my view, that this is one of those cases in which the "virtually per se rule of invalidity" does not apply. Facially discriminatory or not, the exemption is no more an artifice of economic protectionism than any state law which dispenses public assistance only to the State's resi- dents.3 Our cases have always recognized the legitimacy of 2 I do not understand the Court's contention, ante, at 582, and n. 16, that Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U. S. 325 (1996), provides precedent for such a course. In Fulton, the arguments left unaddressed had not been made in another form, but had not been made at all. There (unlike here) the State conceded facial discrimination, and relied exclusively on the compensatory tax defense, see id., at 333, which the Court found had not been made out, see id., at 344. That narrow defense could not possi- bly have been regarded as an invocation of broader policy justifications such as those asserted here. 3 In a footnote responding to this dissent, the Court does briefly address whether the statute fails the "virtually per se rule of invalidity." It con- cludes that it does fail because "Maine has ample alternatives short of a facially discriminatory property tax exemption," such as offering direct cash subsidies to parents of resident children or to camps that serve resi- dents. Ante, at 582, n. 16. These are nonregulatory alternatives (and hence immune from negative Commerce Clause attack), but they are not 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 604 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Scalia, J., dissenting limiting state-provided welfare benefits to bona fide resi- dents. As Justice Stevens once wrote for a unanimous Court: "Neither the overnight visitor, the unfriendly agent of a hostile power, the resident diplomat, nor the illegal en- trant, can advance even a colorable claim to a share in the bounty that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own citizens." Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 80 (1976). States have restricted public assistance to their own bona fide residents since colonial times, see, M. Ierley, With Char- ity For All, Welfare and Society, Ancient Times to the Pres- ent 41 (1984), and such self-interested behavior (or, put more benignly, application of the principle that charity begins at home) is inherent in the very structure of our federal system, cf. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U. S. 624, 644 (1982) ("[T]he State has no legitimate interest in protecting nonresi- dent[s]"). We have therefore upheld against equal protec- tion challenge continuing residency requirements for munici- pal employment, see McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U. S. 645 (1976) (per curiam), and bona fide nondiscriminatory alternatives, which is what the exception to the "vir- tually per se rule of invalidity" requires. See Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Ore., 511 U. S. 93, 101 (1994) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 278 (1988)). Surely, for example, our decision in Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131 (1986), which upheld Maine's regulatory ban on the importation of baitfish, would not have come out the other way if it had been shown that a state subsidy of sales of in-state baitfish could have achieved the same goal-by making the out-of-state fish noncompetitive and thereby excluding them from the market even more effectively than a difficult-to-police ban on importation. Where regulatory discrimination against out-of-state interests is appro- priate, the negative Commerce Clause is not designed to push a State into nonregulatory discrimination instead. It permits state regulatory action disfavoring out-of-staters where disfavoring them is indispensable to the achievement of an important and nonprotectionist state objective. As applied to the present case: It is obviously impossible for a State to dis- tribute social welfare benefits only to its residents without discriminating against nonresidents. 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 605 Scalia, J., dissenting residency requirements for free primary and secondary schooling, see Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U. S. 321 (1983). If the negative Commerce Clause requires the invalidation of a law such as § 652(1)(A), as a logical matter it also re- quires invalidation of the laws involved in those cases. After all, the Court today relies not on any discrimination against out-of-state nonprofits, but on the supposed discrimi- nation against nonresident would-be recipients of charity (the nonprofits' "customers"); surely those individuals are similarly discriminated against in the direct distribution of state benefits. The problem, of course, is not limited to mu- nicipal employment and free public schooling, but extends also to libraries, orphanages, homeless shelters, and refuges for battered women. One could hardly explain the constitu- tionality of a State's limiting its provision of these to its own residents on the theory that the State is a "market partici- pant." These are traditional governmental functions, far re- moved from commercial activity and utterly unconnected to any genuine private market. If, however, a State that provides social services directly may limit its largesse to its own residents, I see no reason why a State that chooses to provide some of its social serv- ices indirectly-by compensating or subsidizing private char- itable providers-cannot be similarly restrictive.4 In fact, we have already approved it. In Board of Ed. of Ky. An- nual Conference of Methodist Episcopal Church v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 553 (1906), we upheld a state law providing an in- 4 It is true, of course, that the legitimacy of a State's subsidizing domes- tic commercial enterprises out of general funds does not establish the le- gitimacy of a State's giving domestic commercial enterprises preferential tax treatment. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S. 186, 210­212 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). But there is no valid comparison between, on the one hand, the State's giving tax relief to an enterprise devoted to the making of profit and, on the other hand, the State's giving tax relief to an enterprise which, for the purpose at hand, has the same objective as the State itself (the expenditure of funds for social welfare). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 606 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Scalia, J., dissenting heritance tax exemption to in-state charities but denying a similar exemption to out-of-state charities. We recognized that such exemptions are nothing but compensation to pri- vate organizations for their assistance in alleviating the State's burden of caring for its less fortunate residents, see id., at 561. "[I]t cannot be said," we wrote, "that if a State exempts property bequeathed for charitable or educational purposes from taxation it is unreasonable or arbitrary to re- quire the charity to be exercised or the education to be be- stowed within her borders and for her people," id., at 563.5 It is true that the opinion in Board of Ed. of Ky. addressed only the Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and not the Com- merce Clause. A Commerce Clause argument was unques- tionably raised by the plaintiff in error, however, in both brief, see Brief for Plaintiff in Error, D. T. 1906, No. 103, pp. 30­38, and oral argument, see 203 U. S., at 555 (argument of counsel), and the Court could not have reached the dispo- sition it did without rejecting it. "[T]he Court implicitly rejected [the] argumen[t] . . . by refusing to address [it]." Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 747­748, n. 3 (1990). The Commerce Clause objection went undiscussed, I think, because it was (as it is here) utterly contrived: The State's 5 The Court attempts to distinguish Board of Ed. of Ky. on the ground that the statute upheld in that case treated charities differently based on whether they were incorporated within the State, rather than on whether they dispensed charity within the State, see ante, at 591­592, n. 27. That is quite impossible, inasmuch as we have held that out-of-state incorpora- tion is not a constitutional basis for discriminating between charities. And in the case that announced that holding (invalidating the denial of a property tax exemption to a nonprofit corporation incorporated in another State), we distinguished Board of Ed. of Ky. on the ground that the stat- ute at issue there withheld the exemption "by reason of the foreign corpo- ration's failure or inability to benefit the State in the same measure as do domestic nonprofit corporations." WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117, 120 (1968) (per curiam). The Court's analysis contradicts both the hold- ing of this case and its reading of Board of Ed. of Ky.-which is obviously the correct one. 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 607 Scalia, J., dissenting legislated distinction between charity "bestowed within her borders and for her people" and charity bestowed elsewhere or for others did not implicate commerce at all, except to the indirect and permissible extent that innumerable state laws do. Finally, even if Maine's property tax exemption for local charities constituted facial discrimination against out-of- state commerce, and even if its policy justification (unrelated to economic protectionism) were insufficient to survive our "virtually per se rule of invalidity," cf. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131 (1986), there would remain the question whether we should not recognize an additional exception to the nega- tive Commerce Clause, as we have in Tracy. As that case explains, just as a public health justification unrelated to economic protectionism may justify an overt discrimination against goods moving in interstate commerce, "so may health and safety considerations be weighed in the process of decid- ing the threshold question whether the conditions entailing application of the dormant Commerce Clause are present." 519 U. S., at 307. Today's opinion goes to great length to reject the Town's contention that Maine's property tax ex- emption does not fall squarely within either the "market par- ticipant" or "subsidy" exceptions to the negative Commerce Clause, but never stops to ask whether those exceptions are the only ones that may apply. As we explicitly acknowledge in Tracy-which effectively creates what might be called a "public utilities" exception to the negative Commerce Clause-the "subsidy" and "market participant" exceptions do not exhaust the realm of state actions that we should abstain from scrutinizing under the Commerce Clause. In my view, the provision by a State of free public schooling, public assistance, and other forms of social welfare to only (or principally) its own residents-whether it be accomplished directly or by providing tax exemptions, cash, or other prop- erty to private organizations that perform the work for the State-implicates none of the concerns underlying our 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 608 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Scalia, J., dissenting negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence. That is, I think, self-evidently true, despite the Court's effort to label the recipients of the State's philanthropy as "customers," or "cli- entele," see, e. g., ante, at 576. Because § 652(1)(A) clearly serves these purposes and has nothing to do with economic protectionism, I believe that it is beyond scrutiny under the negative Commerce Clause. * * * As I have discussed, there are various routes by which the Court could validate the statute at issue here: on the ground that it does not constitute "facial discrimination" against in- terstate commerce and readily survives the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing test; on the ground that it does constitute "facial discrimination" but is supported by such traditional and important state interests that it survives scrutiny under the "virtually per se rule of invalidity"; or on the ground that there is a "domestic charity" exception (just as there is a "public utility" exception) to the negative Commerce Clause. Whichever route is selected, it seems to me that the quid pro quo exemption at issue here is such a reasonable exercise of the State's taxing power that it is not prohibited by the Commerce Clause in the absence of congressional action. We held as much in Board of Ed. of Ky. and should not over- rule that decision. The State of Maine may have special need for a charitable-exemption limitation of the sort at issue here: Its lands and lakes are attractive to various charities of more densely populated Eastern States, which would (if the limi- tation did not exist) compel the taxpayers of Maine to sub- sidize their generosity. But the principle involved in our disapproval of Maine's exemption limitation has broad appli- cation elsewhere. A State will be unable, for example, to exempt private schools that serve its citizens from state and local real estate taxes unless it exempts as well private schools attended predominantly or entirely by students from 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 609 Thomas, J., dissenting out of State. A State that provides a tax exemption for real property used exclusively for the purpose of feeding the poor must provide an exemption for the facilities of an organiza- tion devoted exclusively to feeding the poor in another coun- try. These results may well be in accord with the parable of the Good Samaritan, but they have nothing to do with the Commerce Clause. I respectfully dissent. Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins, and with whom The Chief Justice joins as to Part I, dissenting. The tax at issue here is a tax on real estate, the quintes- sential asset that does not move in interstate commerce. Maine exempts from its otherwise generally applicable prop- erty tax, and thereby subsidizes, certain charitable organiza- tions that provide the bulk of their charity to Maine's own residents. By invalidating Maine's tax assessment on the real property of charitable organizations primarily serving non-Maine residents, because of the tax's alleged indirect effect on interstate commerce, the majority has essentially created a "dormant" Necessary and Proper Clause to sup- plement the "dormant" Commerce Clause. This move works a significant, unwarranted, and, in my view, improv- ident expansion in our "dormant," or "negative," Commerce Clause jurisprudence.1 For that reason, I join Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion. 1 Although the terms "dormant" and "negative" have often been used interchangeably to describe our jurisprudence in this area, I believe "neg- ative" is the more appropriate term. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jef- ferson Lines, Inc., 514 U. S. 175, 200 (1995) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]he `negative Commerce Clause' . . . is `negative' not only because it negates state regulation of commerce, but also because it does not appear in the Constitution"). There is, quite frankly, nothing "dormant" about our jurisprudence in this area. See Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Yale L. J. 425, 425, n. 1 (1982). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 610 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Thomas, J., dissenting I write separately, however, because I believe that the im- proper expansion undertaken today is possible only because our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence, developed primarily to invalidate discriminatory state taxation of interstate commerce, was already both overbroad and un- necessary. It was overbroad because, unmoored from any constitutional text, it brought within the supervisory author- ity of the federal courts state action far afield from the dis- criminatory taxes it was primarily designed to check. It was unnecessary because the Constitution would seem to provide an express check on the States' power to levy certain discriminatory taxes on the commerce of other States-not in the judicially created negative Commerce Clause, but in the Art. I, § 10, Import-Export Clause, our decision in Wood- ruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 (1869), notwithstanding. That the expansion effected by today's decision finds some support in the morass of our negative Commerce Clause case law only serves to highlight the need to abandon that failed juris- prudence and to consider restoring the original Import- Export Clause check on discriminatory state taxation to what appears to be its proper role. As I explain in Part III, the tax (and tax exemption) at issue in this case seems easily to survive Import-Export Clause scrutiny; I would therefore, in all likelihood, sustain Maine's tax under that Clause as well, were we to apply it instead of the judicially created negative Commerce Clause. I The negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application. See, e. g., Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U. S. 232, 259­265 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U. S. 888, 895­898 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). In one fashion 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 611 Thomas, J., dissenting or another, every Member of the current Court 2 and a goodly number of our predecessors 3 have at least recognized these problems, if not been troubled by them.4 Because the 2 See, e. g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U. S. 383, 401 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("The scope of the dormant Com- merce Clause is a judicial creation"); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298, 309 (1992) (Stevens, J., writing for a unanimous Court) (recog- nizing that the Commerce Clause "says nothing about the protection of interstate commerce in the absence of any action by Congress"); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U. S. 437, 461­462 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehn- quist, C. J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing the "negative Com- merce Clause" as "nontextual"); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U. S. 662, 706 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he juris- prudence of the `negative side' of the Commerce Clause remains hopelessly confused"); cf. U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 797, n. 12 (1995) (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.) ("[T]he Constitution is clearly silent on the subject of state legislation that discriminates against interstate commerce"). 3 See, e. g., Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U. S. 1, 17 (1986) (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (referring to "the cloudy waters of this Court's `dormant Commerce Clause' doctrine"); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 623 (1978) (Stewart, J.) ("The bounds of [the restraints imposed by the Commerce Clause itself, in the absence of federal legislation], appear nowhere in the words of the Commerce Clause"); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450, 457, 458 (1959) (Clark, J.) (referring to our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence as a "tangled underbrush" and a "quagmire" (internal quotation marks omitted)); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 534­535 (1949) (Jackson, J.) (describing the negative Commerce Clause as filling in one of the "great silences of the Constitution"); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U. S. 176, 189 (1940) (Black, J., joined by Frankfurter and Douglas, JJ., dissenting) (criticizing the negative Commerce Clause as arising out of "[s]pasmodic and unrelated instances of litigation [that] cannot afford an adequate basis for the creation of integrated national rules" that "Congress alone" is posi- tioned to develop). 4 Scholarly commentary, too, has been critical of our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See D. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years 1789­1888, p. 234 (1985) (describing the negative Commerce Clause as "arbitrary, conclusory, and irreconcilable with the constitutional text"); see also, e. g., L. Tribe, American Constitu- 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 612 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Thomas, J., dissenting expansion effected by today's holding further undermines the delicate balance in what we have termed "Our Federal- ism," Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 44 (1971), I think it worth revisiting the underlying justifications for our involve- ment in the negative aspects of the Commerce Clause, and the compelling arguments demonstrating why those justifi- cations are illusory. To cover its exercise of judicial power in an area for which there is no textual basis, the Court has historically offered two different theories in support of its negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The first theory posited was that the Commerce Clause itself constituted an exclusive grant of power to Congress. See, e. g., Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 393­400 (1849).5 The "exclusivity" rationale was likely wrong from the outset, however. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 32, p. 154 (M. Beloff ed. 1987) (A. Hamilton) ("[N]otwith- standing the affirmative grants of general authorities, there has been the most pointed care in those cases where it was deemed improper that the like authorities should reside in the states, to insert negative clauses prohibiting the exercise tional Law 439 (2d ed. 1988) ("The Supreme Court's approach to commerce clause issues . . . often appears to turn more on ad hoc reactions to particu- lar cases than on any consistent application of coherent principles"); Red- ish & Nugent, "The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism," 1987 Duke L. J. 569, 573 ("[N]ot only is there no textual basis [for it], the dormant Commerce Clause actually contradicts, and therefore directly undermines, the Constitution's carefully established textual structure for allocating power between federal and state sover- eigns"); B. Gavit, The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution 22 (1932) (noting that the Court has set "no conscious standard" but has rather, "in an imperial way," decided whether each particular state action presented to it "was or was not an invalid regulation of interstate commerce"). 5 See also Mayor of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 157­159 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting); Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 449, 504, 506­508 (1841) (McLean, J., concurring); Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadel- phia ex rel. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12 How. 299 (1852) (adopt- ing a partial-exclusivity rationale for dormant Commerce Clause cases). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 613 Thomas, J., dissenting of them by the states").6 It was seriously questioned even in early cases. See License Cases, 5 How. 504, 583, 615, 618, 624 (1847) (four, and arguably five, of the seven participating Justices contending that the Commerce Clause was not ex- clusive). And, in any event, the Court has long since "repu- diated" the notion that the Commerce Clause operates as an exclusive grant of power to Congress, and thereby forecloses state action respecting interstate commerce. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 259, 262 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concur- ring); see also, e. g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U. S. 761, 766­767 (1945) ("Ever since Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245, and Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, it has been recognized that, in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it"); James v. Watt, 716 F. 2d 71, 73 (CA1 1983) (Breyer, J.) (noting that "the strong Madison/Marshall `preemptive' view of the Interstate Commerce Clause is no longer the law of the land"), cert. denied, 467 U. S. 1209 (1984).7 6 See also F. Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite 13 (1937) ("The conception that the mere grant of the commerce power to Congress dislodged state power finds no expression" in the rec- ords of the Philadelphia Convention nor the discussions preceding ratifi- cation); id., at 17­19 (noting that Chief Justice Marshall's discussion of the "exclusiveness" doctrine in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 197­209 (1824), "was logically irrelevant to [his] holding," and adding: "It was an audacious doctrine, which, one may be sure, would hardly have been publicly avowed in support of the adoption of the Constitution. Indeed, The Federalist in effect denied it, by assuring that only express prohibitions in the Constitu- tion limited the taxing power of the states" (citing The Federalist No. 32)). 7 The majority's assertion that James Madison viewed what we have termed the "negative" aspect of the Commerce Clause as more significant than its positive aspects, see ante, at 571, n. 7, is based on a letter written by Madison more than 40 years after the Convention, see 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 478 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (hereinafter Farrand) (reprinting letter from James Madison to J. C. Cabell, Feb. 13, 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 614 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Thomas, J., dissenting Indeed, the Court's early view that the Commerce Clause, on its own, prohibited state impediments to interstate com- merce such that "Congress cannot re-grant, or in any manner reconvey to the states that power," Cooley v. Board of War- dens of Port of Philadelphia ex rel. Soc. for Relief of Dis- tressed Pilots, 12 How. 299, 318 (1852), quickly proved un- tenable. Compare Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518 (1852) (holding that construction of the Wheeling Bridge impeded commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause), with Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Bel- mont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 426 (1856) (upholding Federal Act that declared the Wheeling Bridge to be "[a] lawful structur[e]"); see also Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691, 701 (1883) ("It is Congress, and not the Judicial Department, to which the Constitution has given the power to regulate commerce").8 And, as this Court's definition of the scope of congressional authority under the positive Com- merce Clause has expanded, the exclusivity rationale has moved from untenable to absurd. The second theory offered to justify creation of a negative Commerce Clause is that Congress, by its silence, pre-empts state legislation. See Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489, 493 (1887) (asserting that congressional 1829). The majority's interpretation of the letter is anachronistic. There is nothing in the letter to suggest that Madison had in mind the "negative" Commerce Clause we have created which supposedly operates of its own force to allow courts to invalidate state laws that affect commerce. Rather, Madison's reference to the Clause as granting a "power" strongly suggests that he was merely asserting that the Convention designed the Clause more to enable "the General Government," namely, Congress, to negate state laws impeding commerce "rather than as a power to be used for the positive purposes of the General Government." Ibid. 8 See also ante, at 572 ("Congress unquestionably has the power to re- pudiate or substantially modify th[e] course of [our negative Commerce Clause] adjudication"); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U. S. 761, 769 (1945) (Congress has "undoubted" power to "permit the states to regulate the commerce in a manner which would otherwise not be permissible"). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 615 Thomas, J., dissenting silence evidences congressional intent that there be no state regulation of commerce). In other words, we presumed that congressional "inaction" was "equivalent to a declaration that inter-State commerce shall be free and untrammelled." Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 282 (1876). To the extent that the "pre-emption-by-silence" rationale ever made sense, it, too, has long since been rejected by this Court in virtually every analogous area of the law. For example, ever since the watershed case of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), this Court has rejected the notion that it can create a federal common law to fill in great silences left by Congress, and thereby pre-empt state law. We have recognized that "a federal court could not generally apply a federal rule of decision, despite the existence of juris- diction, in the absence of an applicable Act of Congress." Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304, 313 (1981).9 The limited areas in which we have created federal com- mon law typically involve either uniquely federal issues or the rights and responsibilities of the United States or its agents. See Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 641 (1981). But where a federal rule is not essential, or where state law already operates within a particular field, we have applied state law rather than opting to create federal common law. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U. S. 715, 730 (1979) (rejecting "generalized 9 See also Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U. S. 213, 218 (1997) (rejecting the "judicial `creation' of a special federal rule of decision" and noting that " `[w]hether latent federal power should be exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress,' not the federal courts" (citation omit- ted)); O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U. S. 79, 83 (1994) (rejecting, as "so plainly wrong," the contention that federal common law governs appli- cation of state causes of action brought by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver for a federally insured savings and loan); Milwau- kee, 451 U. S., at 313, n. 7, 314 ("Federal common law is a `necessary' expe- dient" resorted to only when the Court is "compelled to consider federal questions `which cannot be answered from federal statutes alone' " (cita- tions omitted)). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 616 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Thomas, J., dissenting pleas for uniformity" as a basis for creating federal common law); see also Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U. S. 213, 225­226 (1997) (same). Similarly, even where Congress has legislated in an area subject to its authority, our pre-emption jurisprudence ex- plicitly rejects the notion that mere congressional silence on a particular issue may be read as pre-empting state law: "As is always the case in our pre-emption jurispru- dence, where `federal law is said to bar state action in fields of traditional state regulation, . . . we have worked on the "assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con- gress." ' " California Div. of Labor Standards En- forcement v. Dillingham Constr. N. A., Inc., 519 U. S. 316, 325 (1997) (citations omitted). See also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519 (1977) (same); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218 (1947) (same). To be sure, we have overcome our reluctance to pre-empt state law in two types of situations: (1) where a state law directly conflicts with a federal law; and (2) where Congress, through extensive legislation, can be said to have pre-empted the field. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 98 (1992). But those two forms of pre- emption provide little aid to defenders of the negative Com- merce Clause. Conflict pre-emption only applies when there is a direct clash between an Act of Congress and a state statute, but the very premise of the negative Commerce Clause is the absence of congressional action. Field pre-emption likewise is of little use in areas where Congress has failed to enter the field, and certainly does not support the general proposition of "pre-emption-by-silence" that is used to provide a veneer of legitimacy to our negative Commerce Clause forays. Furthermore, field pre-emption 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 617 Thomas, J., dissenting is itself suspect, at least as applied in the absence of a con- gressional command that a particular field be pre-empted. Perhaps recognizing this problem, our recent cases have fre- quently rejected field pre-emption in the absence of statu- tory language expressly requiring it. See, e. g., O'Mel- veny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U. S. 79, 85 (1994) ("Nor would we adopt a court-made rule to supplement federal statutory regulation that is comprehensive and detailed; matters left unaddressed in such a scheme are presumably left subject to the disposition provided by state law"). Even when an ex- press pre-emption provision has been enacted by Congress, we have narrowly defined the area to be pre-empted. See, e. g., Dillingham, supra, at 324­325; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 517 (1992). In the analogous context of statutory construction, we have similarly refused to rely on congressional inaction to alter the proper construction of a pre-existing statute. See Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 180­185 (1994). And, even more troubling, the "pre-emption-by-silence" rationale virtu- ally amounts to legislation by default, in apparent violation of the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and pre- sentment. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 951­959 (1983). Thus, even were we wrongly to assume that congressional silence evidenced a desire to pre-empt some undefined cate- gory of state laws, and an intent to delegate such policy- laden categorization to the courts, treating unenacted con- gressional intent as if it were law would be constitutionally dubious. In sum, neither of the Court's proffered theoretical justi- fications-exclusivity or pre-emption-by-silence-currently supports our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence, if either ever did. Despite the collapse of its theoretical foun- dation, I suspect we have nonetheless adhered to the nega- tive Commerce Clause because we believed it necessary to check state measures contrary to the perceived spirit, if not 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 618 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Thomas, J., dissenting the actual letter, of the Constitution. Thus, in one of our early uses of the negative Commerce Clause, we invalidated a state tax on the privilege of selling goods "which are not the growth, produce, or manufacture of the State." Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S., at 278. And in Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566 (1878), we struck down a state tax on out-of- state goods sold at auction. See also, e. g., I. M. Darnell & Son Co. v. Memphis, 208 U. S. 113 (1908); Voight v. Wright, 141 U. S. 62 (1891); Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446 (1886); Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344 (1881). To this day, we find discriminatory state taxes on out-of-state goods to be "virtually per se invalid" under our negative Commerce Clause. See, e. g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S. 186 (1994); Associated Industries of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U. S. 641 (1994); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269 (1988); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725 (1981). Though each of these cases reached what intuitively seemed to be a desirable result-and in some cases arguably was the constitutionally correct result, as I describe below-the negative Commerce Clause rationale upon which they rested remains unsettling because of that rationale's lack of a tex- tual basis. Moreover, our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence has taken us well beyond the invalidation of obviously dis- criminatory taxes on interstate commerce. We have used the Clause to make policy-laden judgments that we are ill equipped and arguably unauthorized to make. See Moor- man Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 278­280 (1978) (recogniz- ing that establishing a formula for apportioning taxes on multistate corporations would require "extensive judicial lawmaking" for which the courts are ill suited). In so doing, we have developed multifactor tests in order to assess the perceived "effect" any particular state tax or regulation has on interstate commerce. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977); see also Quill Corp. v. North 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 619 Thomas, J., dissenting Dakota, 504 U. S. 298 (1992). And in an unabashedly legisla- tive manner, we have balanced that "effect" against the per- ceived interests of the taxing or regulating State, as the very description of our "general rule" indicates: "Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectu- ate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be up- held unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene- fits. Huron [Portland] Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 443 [(1960)]. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the ex- tent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). Any test that requires us to assess (1) whether a particu- lar statute serves a "legitimate" local public interest; (2) whether the effects of the statute on interstate commerce are merely "incidental" or "clearly excessive in relation to the putative benefits"; (3) the "nature" of the local interest; and (4) whether there are alternative means of furthering the local interest that have a "lesser impact" on interstate commerce, and even then makes the question "one of de- gree," surely invites us, if not compels us, to function more as legislators than as judges. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U. S., at 897­898 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (urging abandonment of the Pike balancing test so as to "leave essentially legislative judg- ments to the Congress"). Moreover, our open-ended balancing tests in this area have allowed us to reach different results based merely "on differ- ing assessments of the force of competing analogies." Okla- 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 620 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Thomas, J., dissenting homa Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U. S. 175, 196, n. 7 (1995). The examples are almost too numerous to count, but there is perhaps none that more clearly makes the point than a comparison of our decisions in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617 (1978), and its progeny, on the one hand, and Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 125 U. S. 465 (1888), and its progeny, on the other. In Bowman, we recognized that States can prohibit the importation of "cattle or meat or other provisions that are diseased or de- cayed, or otherwise, from their condition and quality, unfit for human use or consumption," id., at 489, a view to which we have adhered for more than a century, see, e. g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131 (1986); Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251 (1908). In Philadelphia, however, we held that New Jersey could not prohibit the importation of "solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial lim- its of the State." 437 U. S., at 618 (internal quotation marks omitted). The cases were arguably distinguishable, but only on policy grounds and not on any distinction derived from the text of the Constitution itself. Similarly, we have in some cases rejected attempts by a State to limit use of the State's own natural resources to that State's residents. See, e. g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 338 (1979). But in other cases, we have upheld just such preferential access. See, e. g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U. S. 941, 955­957 (1982); cf. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U. S. 371 (1978). Again, the distinctions turned on often subtle policy judg- ments, not the text of the Constitution. In my view, none of this policy-laden decisionmaking is proper. Rather, the Court should confine itself to interpret- ing the text of the Constitution, which itself seems to pro- hibit in plain terms certain of the more egregious state taxes on interstate commerce described above, see supra, at 618, and leaves to Congress the policy choices necessary for any further regulation of interstate commerce. 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 621 Thomas, J., dissenting II Article I, § 10, cl. 2, of the Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports . . . ." To the 20th-century reader, the Clause appears only to prohibit States from levying certain kinds of taxes on goods imported from or exported to foreign nations. But a strong argument can be made that for the Constitution's Framers and ratifi- ers-representatives of States which still viewed themselves as semi-independent sovereigns-the terms "imports" and "exports" encompassed not just trade with foreign nations, but trade with other States as well. The late Professor William Crosskey, in a persuasive treat- ment of this subject nearly a half century ago, unearthed numerous founding-era examples in which the word "import" referred to goods produced in other States. See The True Meaning of the Imports and Exports Clause: Herein of "In- terstate Trade Barriers," in 1787, 1 Politics and the Constitu- tion in the History of the United States 295­323 (1953). Crosskey recounts, for example, that merchants frequently published advertisements in the local newspapers announc- ing recent shipments of such "imported" goods as "Philadel- phia Flour," "Carolina Rice," and "Connecticut Beef." Id., at 298.10 Similarly, the word "export" was used to refer to 10 See also Gazette of the State of Georgia, Oct. 11, 1787, p. 3, col. 3 ("Just imported . . . Superfine Philadelphia flour"); Newport [R. I.] Mercury, June 12, 1784, p. 4, col. 2 ("Just imported . . . Burlington [New Jersey] and Carolina, Pork, in Barrels"); ibid. ("Just imported . . . best Philadelphia Flour"); South Carolina Weekly Gazette, Sept. 13, 1783, p. 3, col. 2 ("Just imported, In the Sloop Rosana, . . . from Rhode-Island, . . . Potatoes, Apples, Onions by the bunch and bushel, Beats, Carrots, and good war- ranted Cheese"); Columbian Herald [Charleston, S. C.], Nov. 26, 1787, p. 4, col. 4 ("Just imported, From Philadelphia, . . . Dr. Martin's Celebrated Medicine for Cancers, Ulcers, Wens, Scurvies, Tetters, Ringworms, &c."); Newport Mercury, July 31, 1786, p. 2, col. 2 (complaining that "last year upwards of 700,000 bushels of corn were imported into [South Carolina] from North Carolina and Virginia"); Columbian Herald, Feb. 14, 1785, p. 2, 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 622 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Thomas, J., dissenting goods shipped both to other States and abroad. One writer, for example, urged his fellow Connecticut citizens to manu- facture stockings in sufficient quantity not only for the sup- ply of Connecticut "but for exportation to other States" as well. Letter from "A. C.," Massachusetts Centinel, Sept. 5, 1787, p. 1, col. 1, reprinted from New Haven Gazette (empha- sis added). Another argued that Connecticut could enrich itself "[b]y making and refining Cyder for exportation with which we might supply the Southern States, as well as the large provinces of Quebec and Nova-Scotia." Connecticut Farmer, New-Haven Gazette, Oct. 6, 1785, p. 2, col. 3 (second and third emphases added). More significantly, the early statute books are replete with examples of these commonplace 18th-century understandings of the terms "import" and "export." The Virginia cheese- duty Act of October 1786, for example, provided for a duty of "three pence a pound on all cheese . . . imported into this commonwealth." 12 Hening, Virginia Statutes at Large, ch. 29, § 2, p. 289 (emphasis added). As complaints published in New England newspapers indicate, that duty was imposed on cheese produced by the New England States. See Salem [Mass.] Mercury, Mar. 3, 1787, p. 2, col. 2. Moreover, the duty was but one of many imposed by Virginia, which had for some time, it seems, "imposed like duties upon the impor- tation of New-England rum, Lynn [Mass.] Shoes, Cheese, Cordage, and a variety of other articles manufactured in the Eastern States." Independent Chronicle [Boston], Apr. 19, 1787, p. 3, col. 2; see 11 Hening, Virginia Statutes at Large, ch. 8, § 8, pp. 121­122 (Oct. 1782) (imposing a tonnage duty "on all vessels . . . from or to foreign parts, or from or to any of the United States," and an impost duty on goods "im- ported or brought into this commonwealth . . . from any port or place whatsoever"). col. 4 (complaint about legislation pending in Georgia-later adopted- taxing "all goods imported into the back part of that state from South Carolina"). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 623 Thomas, J., dissenting Maryland, for its part, taxed certain "articles exported out of" the State, including flour shipped to New England. 1784 Md. Laws, ch. 84, § 1; see also Letter from "A Citizen," Nor- wich [Conn.] Packet, Jan. 17, 1788, p. 1, col. 1 ("The New- England States have imported, for four years past, from the State of Maryland, upwards of twenty five thousand barrels of flour annually-on which they have been obliged to pay a duty for the liberty of exportation"). And, when it provided for the inspection of salted foods "exported and imported from and to the town of Baltimore," Maryland expressly in- cluded salted foods "brought or imported into the said town, from any part of this state, or any one of the United States, or from any foreign port whatever." 1786 Md. Laws, ch. 17, § 5. In similar fashion, Connecticut adopted an excise tax that distinguished between "imported Chocolate," taxed at three pence per pound, and "Chocolate made within this State," taxed at one penny per pound. 1783 Conn. Acts and Laws 619. And in May 1784, Connecticut adopted an import duty that expressly applied to certain enumerated articles "im- ported or brought into this State, by Land or Water, from any of the United States of America." 1784 Conn. Acts and Laws 271.11 11 Some commentators have argued that the phrase "imported or brought" suggests that Connecticut lawmakers intended to distinguish be- tween foreign goods "imported" and other States' goods "brought" into the State. This supposed distinction between "imported" and "brought" is not consistent with the remainder of the statute, however. For exam- ple, the second paragraph of the Act uses the phrase "brought or imported into this State" when referring exclusively to items "that are not the Growth, Produce, or Manufacture of the United States." 1784 Conn. Acts and Laws 271. And conversely, "imported" is used alone in contexts where it plainly covers goods produced in other States. See, e. g., id., at 309 (setting duty for sugar, "whether the Produce or Manufacture of the United States, or not, imported into this State"); cf. 1786 Md. Laws, ch. 17, § 6 (setting standards for "all beef and pork barrels brought to, or imported into, Baltimore-town, from any part of this state"). The more plausible view, therefore, is that the words "brought" and "imported" are 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 624 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Thomas, J., dissenting In fact, when state legislators of the founding generation intended to limit the term "imports" only to goods of foreign origin, they were quite adept at so indicating. See id., at 269 (provision regarding merchants "who shall import annu- ally into [New London or New Haven] from Europe, Asia or Africa, Goods, Wares and Merchandise, the Growth, Produce or Manufacture of said Countries"); id., at 270 (setting duties for "Goods imported into this State from any Foreign Port, Island or Plantation not within any of The United States"); 2 New York Laws, ch. 7, p. 12 (1886) (Act of Nov. 18, 1784, setting duties for certain "articles imported from Europe"). Thus, based on this common 18th-century usage of the words "import" and "export," and the lack of any textual indication that the Clause was intended to apply exclusively to foreign goods, it seems likely that those who drafted the Constitu- tion sought, through the Import-Export Clause, to prohibit States from levying duties and imposts on goods imported from, or exported to, other States as well as foreign nations, and that those who ratified the Constitution would have so understood the Clause. Our Civil War era decision in Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 (1869), of course, held that the Import-Export Clause applied only to foreign trade. None of the parties to these proceedings have challenged that holding, but given that the common 18th-century understanding of the words used in the Clause extended to interstate as well as foreign trade, it is largely redundant and, to the extent they refer to different activities, the distinction in the phrase is not between foreign goods "imported" into Connecticut, on the one hand, and other States' goods "brought" into Con- necticut, on the other, but between goods of both kinds-domestic and foreign-commercially "imported" in quantity and those "brought" in lim- ited quantities by individuals in their own baggage. Compare 1784 Conn. Acts and Laws, at 272 (using the phrase "imported or brought" when re- ferring both to a ship's cargo and to the "Baggage of Passengers"), with id., at 273 (using only the word "imported" when referring solely to the ship's cargo). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 625 Thomas, J., dissenting worth assessing the Woodruff Court's reasoning with an eye toward reconsidering that decision in an appropriate case. The Woodruff Court began with a textual argument, con- tending that the power to levy "imposts" given to Congress in Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, applied only to foreign imports. Such a limited reading of the word "imposts" in that Clause was necessary, the Court claimed, because any other reading would be nonsensical: Goods "imported" by one State from another State, explained the Court, would be an "export" of the State where the goods were produced or grown, and the supposed power given to Congress in Art. I, § 8, to levy an "impost" on such "imports" would be prohibited by the Art. I, § 9, provision that "[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Arti- cles exported from any State." This apparent tension be- tween § 8 and § 9 led the Court to believe that the word "im- posts" in § 8 must be read as applying only to foreign imports in order to avoid a partial negation of the Art. I, § 8, power. The Court then extrapolated from this reading that the word "impost" in Art. I, § 10, similarly had the same limited appli- cation to foreign imports. As we have already seen, how- ever, see supra, at 621­623, the word "import" derived its meaning from the jurisdiction into which goods were im- ported; consequently, it does not necessarily follow that the imports on which Congress was given the power to lay "im- posts" in Art. I, § 8, were identical to the imports and exports on which the several States were prohibited from levying "Imposts or Duties" by Art. I, § 10.12 The Woodruff Court bolstered its textual argument with two further arguments, neither of which appear still to be 12 Even assuming that the word "impost" in the two Clauses applied to the same class of "imports," there is nothing nonsensical in reading "im- post" in Art. I, § 8, as applicable to interstate as well as foreign trade. It is frequently the case that a broad grant of power in one Clause is re- stricted by another Clause. Moreover, a State could also import goods from a federal territory, and the congressional power to lay an impost on such (nonforeign) trade would not run afoul of the Art. I, § 9, prohibition. 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 626 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Thomas, J., dissenting valid, if ever they were: First, that in the history of the Con- stitution's formation and adoption, "the words imports and imposts were used with exclusive reference to articles im- ported from foreign countries," id., at 133 (emphasis added), and second, the policy concern that goods imported from other States would be forever exempt from tax if the Clause were read to apply to interstate imports. As to the first nontextual argument, the Woodruff Court was selective in its use of history, to say the least. It first asserted that, in Articles VI and IX of the Articles of Con- federation, the words "imports, exports, and imposts are used with exclusive reference to foreign trade, because [those articles] have regard only to the treaty-making power of the federation." Id., at 134. Even if the Woodruff Court's assertion was accurate as to Articles VI and IX, which is doubtful,13 Article IV cannot be so read. That Arti- cle expressly permitted "duties" and "impositions" to be lev- ied on property removed from one State to another, as long 13 Article VI, § 3, merely provided that "[n]o State shall lay any imposts or duties, which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties, entered into by the United States in Congress assembled." 1 Stat. 5. And Arti- cle IX provided: "The United States, in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . entering into treaties and alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made, whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained from impos- ing such imposts and duties on foreigners, as their own people are sub- jected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever. . . ." 1 Stat. 6. As should be evi- dent, neither Article requires a reading of "impost" as applicable exclu- sively to foreign imports. The better reading is that when the States levied imposts in their individual capacities, they could not interfere with treaties enacted by the States in their collective capacity. In fact, the two provisions, read together, suggest the existence of much broader classes of "imposts," "imports," and "exports," and that only the subclass of imposts interfering with foreign trade might be prohibited. The absence of this very qualifier in the later enacted Import-Export Clause creates a nega- tive inference that the unqualified constitutional language covered more than did the limited prohibition in the Articles of Confederation. 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 627 Thomas, J., dissenting as the property was not owned by "the United States, or either of them." 14 The Woodruff Court next turned to the use of the words "duty" and "import" in the Continental Congress. The Court noted that the Continental Congress recommended that the States give it permission to levy a duty of five per- cent on all "foreign merchandise imported into the country," and that, though "imperfectly . . . preserved," the debates in the Congress "are full of the subject of the injustice done by the States who had good seaports, by duties levied in those ports on foreign goods designed for States who had no such ports." Id., at 134. There is, of course, no question that the ability of seaport States to tax the foreign imports of their neighbors was a source of discord between the States, and continued to be so through the Constitutional Convention itself. In order to support its contention, however, the Woodruff Court was ob- ligated to show not merely that the words "duty," "impost," and "imports" were used in reference to foreign goods, but 14 Indeed, some New Englanders apparently believed that the Virginia duty on New England cheese, see supra, at 622, was contrary to Article IV's provision that "no imposition, duties or restriction, shall be laid by any State, on the property of the United States, or either of them." 1 Stat. 4. See Salem [Mass.] Mercury, Mar. 3, 1787. The general view of the Clause, however, and certainly the view of the several States that imposed duties on interstate trade, see supra, at 622­623, was that it ap- plied only to goods actually owned by the States, not to goods grown or manufactured within them. See Salem [Mass.] Mercury, Mar. 3, 1787 ("[T]he proper construction of that part of the Articles of Confederation is, that no state in the union shall lay a tax on publick property imported therein-for, be it remembered, Congress were, at the time the Confedera- tion was formed, exporters of almost every necessary for carrying on the war, & the clause alluded to was intended to prevent any individual state from laying a duty on those necessary supplies"); see also 12 Hening, Vir- ginia Statutes at Large, ch. 40, § 3, pp. 304­305 (Oct. 1786) (distinguishing between articles "which are the property of the United States, or either of them," and articles "which shall be proved to be of the growth, produce or manufacture of the State from which they shall be imported"). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 628 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Thomas, J., dissenting that foreign goods were the exclusive reference. Contrary to the Woodruff Court's claim, the historical record does not appear to support such an exclusive use of the words. The records of the Continental Congress contain numerous examples of the words "duty," "impost," and "import" being used with reference to interstate trade. In 1785, for exam- ple, in response to the increasing animosities between the States engendered by conflicting interstate trade regula- tions, an amendment to the Articles of Confederation was proposed that would have vested in the Continental Con- gress the power to lay "such imposts and duties upon imports and exports, as may be necessary for the purpose" of "regu- lating the trade of the States, as well with foreign Nations, as with each other." 28 Journals of the Continental Con- gress, Mar. 28, 1785, p. 201 (1933) (emphasis added). Two provisos within the proposed amendment further suggest that interstate imports and exports were very much within the purview of the amendment: First, "that the Citizens of the States shall in no instance be subjected to pay higher imposts and duties, than those imposed on the subjects of foreign powers"; and second, "that the Legislative power of the several States shall not be restrained from prohibiting the importation or exportation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever." Ibid. As early as 1779, the problems posed by interstate trade barriers had become acute enough to warrant a request by the Continental Congress urging the States "to repeal all laws or other restrictions laid on the inland trade between the said states." Resolution of Aug. 25, 1779, 14 Journals of the Continental Congress 986; id., at 996 (adopting resolu- tion). While this particular resolution does not use the words "duties" or "imports," it seems evident from a survey of the statutory "duties" being levied by some States on goods "imported" from other States, see supra, at 622­623, that the resolution was directed at just such duties on im- ports from other States. 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 629 Thomas, J., dissenting Many of the States ignored the request, of course, and their "rival, conflicting and angry regulations" continued to be a source of conflict until the new Constitution went into effect. See Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787 (Draft), circa 1836, in 3 Farrand 547; see also, e. g., William Ellery to Samuel Dick, Aug. 2, 1784, in 7 Letters of Members of the Continental Congress 579 (E. Burnett ed. 1934) (hereinafter Burnett's Letters) (predicting that Rhode Island would not agree to the national impost requested by the Congress in 1781 "until the States shall have agreed not to lay any duties upon goods imported into them from any one of their Sister States; perhaps not then" (emphasis added)); William Samuel Johnson to Jonathan Sturges (draft), Jan. 26, 1785, in 8 Burnett's Letters 13 (noting that the Conti- nental Congress was considering asking the States "to invest Congress with the Power of regulating their Trade as well with foreign Nations as with each other," a move which "might probably overturn the System [of "duties" on "im- ported" goods, see supra, at 623,] Conn[ecticu]t has adopt'd as relat[iv]e to N. Y. which it is said she will counteract by regulat[ion]s of her Assembly now convening" (emphasis in original)). In fact, the animosity engendered by the various duties levied on imports from other States was one of the motivat- ing factors leading to the Annapolis Convention of 1786. See T. Powell, Vagaries and Varieties in Constitutional Inter- pretation 182 (1956) ("When the Framers spoke in 1787, the states were substantially sovereign, and their exercises of sovereign powers in adversely affecting trade from sister states was one of the factors leading to the Annapolis confer- ence"). As noted by Tench Coxe, one of the Pennsylvania Commissioners appointed to attend the Convention: "Goods of the growth product and manufacture of the Other States in Union were [in several of the States] charged with high Duties upon importation into the enacting State-as great in many instances as those imposed on foreign Articles of 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 630 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Thomas, J., dissenting the same Kinds." Coxe, Letter to the Virginia Commission- ers at Annapolis, Sept. 13, 1786, reprinted in 9 The Papers of James Madison 125 (Rutland ed. 1975). Coxe thought the very purpose of the Annapolis Convention had been "[t]o pro- cure an alteration" of this and other practices, which were, he added, "evidently opposed to the great principles and Spirit of the Union." Ibid. Similarly, one of the first criticisms leveled against the Ar- ticles of Confederation during the ensuing Federal Conven- tion was the general Government's inability to prevent "quar- rels between states," including those arising from the various "duties" the States imposed upon each other, both on foreign goods moving through the seaport States and on each other's goods. See 1 Farrand 19, 25 (Edmund Randolph, May 29); see also Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787 (draft), circa 1836, in 3 Farrand 547­548 ("Some of the States, as Connecticut, taxed imports as from Massts higher than imports even from G. B. of w[hi]ch Massts. complained to Virga. and doubtless to other States"). While the focus of the Convention quickly moved beyond the mere abolition of trade barriers, of course, there are pas- sages in the available Convention debates which indicate that interstate trade barriers remained a concern, and that the words of the Import-Export Clause applied to interstate, as well as to foreign, trade. George Mason, for example, proposed to exempt from the Import-Export Clause prohibi- tion duties necessary for the States' execution of their in- spection laws. Otherwise, he argued, the "restriction on the States would prevent the incidental duties necessary for the inspection & safe-keeping of their produce, and be ruinous to the [Southern] Staple States." 2 Farrand 588 (Sept. 12). James Madison seconded the motion, and his comment that any feared abuse of the power to levy duties on exports for inspection purposes was perhaps best guarded against by "the right in the Genl. Government to regulate trade be- tween State & State," id., at 588­589 (emphasis added), 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 631 Thomas, J., dissenting strongly suggests that exports to other States were within the Clause's reach.15 These references to duties on interstate imports and exports are bolstered by several more in the ratification debates. See, e. g., 2 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Con- stitution 57­58 (2d ed. 1891) (hereinafter Elliot) (Dawes, Massachusetts ratifying convention) ("As to commerce, it is well known that the different states now pursue different systems of duties in regard to each other. By this, and for want of general laws of prohibition through the Union, we have not secured even our own domestic traffic that passes from state to state" (original emphasis deleted)). Indeed, one of the principal Anti-Federalist complaints against the new Constitution was that States were prohibited from lay- ing any duties or imposts on imports or exports, a prohibi- tion that, in their view, left only direct taxation as a means for the States to support their own governments. See, e. g., Brutus 1, Oct. 18, 1787, in 13 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 415 (J. Kaminsky & G. Sala- dino eds. 1981) (hereinafter Doc. Hist.) ("No state can . . . lay any duties, or imposts, on imports, or exports . . . . [T]he only mean therefore left, for any state to support its govern- ment and discharge its debts, is by direct taxation").16 This 15 Furthermore, in response to concerns that the inspection exemp- tion might be used merely as a pretext for taxing neighboring States, see 2 Farrand 589, Mason's proposal was further amended to make any such State inspection laws "subject to the revision and controul of Congress," id., at 607, 624. The need for, and existence of, this fur- ther limitation on the States' authority to tax imports and exports sug- gests that the Commerce Clause power itself, referred to by Madison, would not operate to limit the States of its own accord. See supra, at 613­614, n. 7. 16 See also John Quincy Adams to William Cranch, Oct. 14, 1787, in 14 Doc. Hist. 222 ("How will it be possible for each particular State to pay its debts, when the power of laying imposts or duties, on imports or ex- ports, shall be taken from them-By direct taxes, it may be said"); George Lee Turberville to James Madison, Dec. 11, 1787, in id., at 407 ("Why shou'd the states be prevented from raising a Revenue by Duties or 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 632 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Thomas, J., dissenting complaint overstates the case somewhat-States could still levy excises, and duties other than those on imports and ex- ports. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 32, p. 151 (M. Beloff ed. 1987) (A. Hamilton) ("([W]ith the sole exception of duties on imports and exports)[, States] would, under the plan of the convention, retain [the] authority [to raise their own reve- nues] in the most absolute and unqualified sense"). But it does suggest that the Anti-Federalists, at least, viewed the Import-Export Clause as prohibiting all other state taxes, including the duties then in place on goods imported from neighboring States. And moves in various States shortly after the Constitution's ratification to repeal the offending duties on interstate trade support the Anti-Federalist view. Compare An Act repealing the Laws made for levying and collecting a Duty on Articles imported into this State, 1789 Conn. Acts and Laws 377 (Jan. 1789), with, e. g., An Act for levying and collecting Duties on the Importation of certain Articles, and for appropriating the same, 1784 Conn. Acts and Laws 309 (Oct. 1784) (providing for, inter alia, a duty of three pence "on each Pound of Sugar . . . whether the Produce or Manufacture of the United States, or not, im- ported into this State"). Justice Nelson, of course, pointed out in his Woodruff dis- sent that a lack of "security or protection" against "obstruc- tions and interruptions of commerce among the States" was "one of the principal grievances that led to the Convention of 1787, and to the adoption of the Federal Constitution." 8 Wall., at 140­141. But he seems not to have had in his arse- Taxes-on their own Exports? Are the states not bound down to direct Taxation for the support of their police & government?"); A Federal Re- publican, A Review of the Constitution Proposed by the Late Convention, Oct. 28, 1787, in 3 The Complete Anti-Federalist 79 (H. Storing ed. 1981) (hereinafter Storing) ("The [Import-Export Clause] is reducing [the States] to the necessity of laying direct taxes"); Vox Populi, Massachusetts Gazette, Oct.­Nov. 1787, in 4 Storing 47 ("Must we be confined to a dry tax on polls and estates . . . ?"). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 633 Thomas, J., dissenting nal many of the historical materials cited above, which indi- cate that the words used in the Import-Export Clause en- compassed, at the time the Constitution was written, both interstate and foreign trade.17 Indeed, the Woodruff major- ity itself felt compelled to note that its "research [had] extended" only so far as permitted by "the discussions on this subject, as they have come down to us from that time." Id., at 136; see also id., at 134 (referring to the "imperfectly . . . preserved" discussions of the Continental Congress). Whatever the cause, the Woodruff Court's analysis of the historical usage of the words overlooked many contrary examples and is thus not especially compelling. The second contention that the Woodruff Court used to bolster its textual argument was a policy concern based on an unnecessarily broad view of the Import-Export Clause's prohibition. The Woodruff Court believed that the prohibi- tion on "Duties or Imposts on Exports or Imports" exempted imported articles, and the merchants who traded in them, from state taxation of any kind, at least so long as they re- mained in their original packages. Id., at 137. This view of the Clause's prohibition would result in "the grossest in- justice," said the Court, were the Clause to be read as apply- ing to "articles brought from one State into another," for "[n]either the State nor the city which protects [the import merchant's] life and property [could] make him contribute a dollar to support its government." Ibid. 17 Farrand did not publish his volumes until 1911 (although the Woodruff Court did have available to it Madison's notes, as well as the more perfunc- tory convention journal); Burnett's Letters were published between 1921 and 1936; the Journals of the Continental Congress were published be- tween 1904 and 1937; volume 9 of The Papers of James Madison, in which Tench Coxe's letter was first reprinted, was not published until 1975; and a useful, readily accessible collection of the various Anti-Federalist writ- ings was not available until 1981. This is not to say that the original documents reprinted in these volumes would not have been available to the Woodruff Court. But our ready access to, as well as our appreciation of, such documents has increased over time. 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 634 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Thomas, J., dissenting Woodruff's broad reading of the Clause's prohibition was explicitly adopted three years later in Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. 29 (1872), a case involving foreign imports. But we expressly overruled Low 20 years ago, in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U. S. 276, 279 (1976), holding that the Import-Export Clause "cannot be read to accord imported goods preferential treatment that permits escape from uni- form taxes imposed without regard to foreign origin for services which the State supplies," id., at 287; cf. United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 857­859 (1996) (distinguishing the Art. I, § 9, cl. 5, Ex- port Clause, which bars the United States from imposing any tax on exports, from the Import-Export Clause, which pro- hibits States from levying only duties and imposts). While Michelin and Low dealt with foreign imports, the expansive interpretation of the Import-Export Clause's prohibition re- jected by Michelin was the same interpretation that gave the Woodruff Court pause and that seems to have been an impetus to its refusal to read the Clause as applying to im- ports from other States. Thus, after Michelin, the second argument the Woodruff Court used to bolster its weak tex- tual analysis-that it would be a gross injustice to prohibit States from levying any taxes on goods which were produced in other States-no longer has any force. There is nothing else of consequence to support the Wood- ruff Court's holding. The only remaining argument made by the Woodruff majority was that it was "improbable" that the Convention would have permitted States to tax "im- ports" from other States merely with the assent of Congress, because the revenues that would accrue to Congress by granting such assent would prove too great a temptation for Congress to serve as a neutral arbiter regarding such taxes. Woodruff, supra, at 133. The Woodruff Court's speculation was without historical support, however, and pales in com- parison to the substantial evidence described above regard- 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 635 Thomas, J., dissenting ing the meaning of the words in the Clause, see supra, at 621­624.18 In short, there is little in the Woodruff opinion to sustain its holding, and its weakness is even more evident given the contrary precedent rejected by the Woodruff Court. In Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 449 (1827), Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, suggested: "[W]e suppose the principles laid down in this case [namely, that a state license tax on importers of foreign articles was invalid both under the Import-Export Clause and the Act of Congress which authorizes importation] to apply equally to importa- tions from a sister State." And just eight years before Woodruff, Chief Justice Taney, writing for a unanimous Court, struck down a stamp tax on bills of lading for gold being shipped from California to New York, holding that "the State tax in question is a duty upon the export of gold and silver, and consequently repugnant to the [Import- Export] clause in the Constitution." Almy v. California, 24 How. 169, 175 (1861) (emphasis added). Chief Justice Marshall's statement in Brown was merely dicta, of course, but the Woodruff majority's rejection of the precedential force of Almy, based solely on its assertion that "[i]t seems to have escaped the attention of counsel on both sides, and of the Chief Justice who delivered the opinion, 18 Indeed, were I similarly to speculate, I would not find it "improbable" that the Convention would have trusted Congress to serve as a referee between individual States. Since many States would necessarily be harmed by a single State's impost, the institutional checks would in all likelihood be sufficient to counter any revenue "temptation" Congress might have faced, especially given the extensive revenue authority granted directly to Congress in Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. My "speculation" is at least consistent with the recorded Convention debates. Roger Sherman proposed the requirement that any revenues raised by congressionally ap- proved state imposts go into the federal treasury not as a separate means of raising national revenues, but to ensure that the States not use a protec- tionist impost as a pretext for raising revenues from other States. See 2 Farrand 441­442 (Aug. 28). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 636 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Thomas, J., dissenting that the case was one of inter-state commerce," 8 Wall., at 137, is harder to sustain. The Almy Court expressly noted that Mr. Almy was charged with failing to pay the stamp tax on a bill of lading for "a quantity of gold-dust for transporta- tion to New York" from San Francisco, 24 How., at 172, and the explicit "question presented by the case" was whether a State had a right "to tax such instruments when used in commerce among the States," Brief for Plaintiff in Error in Almy v. California, D. T. 1860, No. 23, pp. 1­2 (emphasis added); see also id., at 3 (referring to fact that the tax was on bills of lading "for exports to other States"). Woodruff's rejection of Brown and Almy-precedent which better reflected the historical record and common usage of the Clause's words-was thus highly questionable. In sum, it would seem that Woodruff was, in all likelihood, wrongly decided. Of course, much of what the Import- Export Clause appears to have been designed to protect against has since been addressed under the negative Com- merce Clause. As the majority recognizes, discriminatory state taxation of interstate commerce is one of the core pieces of our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Ante, at 581. Were it simply a matter of invalidating state laws under one Clause of the Constitution rather than an- other, I might be inclined to leave well enough alone. In- deed, our rule that state taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce are virtually per se invalid under the negative Commerce Clause may well approximate the appar- ent prohibition of the Import-Export Clause itself. But, as already described, without the proper textual roots, our neg- ative Commerce Clause has gone far afield of its core-and we have yet to articulate either a coherent rationale for per- mitting the courts effectively to legislate in this field, or a workable test for assessing which state laws pass negative Commerce Clause muster. Precedent as unworkable as our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence has become is sim- ply not entitled to the weight of stare decisis. See Holder 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 637 Thomas, J., dissenting v. Hall, 512 U. S. 874, 936­937 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). And it is quite possible that, were we to re- visit Woodruff, we might find that the Constitution already affords us a textual mechanism with which to address the more egregious of state actions discriminating against inter- state commerce. III Were we thus to shed ourselves of our nontextual negative Commerce Clause and all the accompanying multifactor bal- ancing tests we have employed, and instead merely apply what appears to me to be the relevant provision of the Con- stitution, this would seem to be a fairly straightforward case (although I reserve final judgment of the matter for a case when the Import-Export Clause is specifically addressed by the parties). Unlike the Export Clause of Art. I, § 9, which prohibits the Congress from levying any tax on exports, the Import-Export Clause only prohibits States from levying "duties" and "imposts." See International Business Ma- chines, 517 U. S., at 857­858. The Maine property tax at issue here is almost certainly not an impost, for, as 18th-century usage of the word indi- cates, an impost was a tax levied on goods at the time of importation. See, e. g., The Observer-No. XII, Connecticut Courant and Weekly Intelligencer, Jan. 7, 1790, p. 1, col. 2 ("[I]mpost is a tax on merchandize, payable at the port of entry"); 19 N. Bailey, An Universal Etymological English Dic- tionary (26 ed. 1789) (defining "impost" as "a tax or tribute, but more especially such as is received by a prince or state, for goods brought into any haven from other nations"); 20 19 See also Providence Gazette and Country Journal, Feb. 13, 1790, p. 1, col. 1 (reprinting same); Gazette of the United States, Jan. 9, 1790, p. 2, col. 1 (same). 20 See also T. Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the English Language (6th ed. 1796) ("Impost . . . A tax; a toll; custom paid"); S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (7th ed. 1785) ("Impost. A tax; a toll; a custom paid. Taxes and imposts upon merchants do seldom good to the 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 638 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Thomas, J., dissenting Michelin, 423 U. S., at 287 ("[I]mposts and duties . . . are essentially taxes on the commercial privilege of bringing goods into a country"). Because the tax at issue here is levied on real property-property that cannot possibly have been "imported"-the tax would not seem to fit within any of the commonly accepted definitions of "impost." "Duty," however, though frequently used like "impost" to denote "money paid for custom of goods," An Universal Etymological English Dictionary, supra, does not appear to have been limited to taxes assessed at portside. See, e. g., S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (7th ed. 1785) ("Duty . . . Tax; impost; custom; toll. All the wines make their way through several duties and taxes, before they reach the port" (second emphasis added)); 2 Elliot 331 (John Williams, New York ratifying convention) (noting that Congress' Art. I, § 8, power "extend[s] to duties on all kinds of goods, to tonnage and poundage of vessels, to duties on written instruments, newspapers, almanacs, &c"). In fact, "imposts" seems to have been viewed as a particular subclass of duties; the fact that the two words are used disjunctively in the Import-Export Clause suggests, therefore, that some- thing broader than portside customs was within the constitu- tional prohibition. Because of the somewhat ambiguous usage of the words "duty" and "impost," Luther Martin inquired of their mean- ing during the Convention. James Wilson, a member of the king's revenue; for that that he wins in the hundred, he loseth in the shire. Bacon's Essays"); Barclay's Universal English Dictionary 471 (B. Woodward rev. 1782) ("Impost. A toll; custom paid for goods or merchan- dise"); T. Blount, A Law-Dictionary (1670) ("Impost Tribute, Tallage, or Custom; but more particularly it is that Tax which the King receives for such merchandises as are imported into any Haven, from other Nations. . . . And it may be distinguished from Custom, which is rather that profit which the King raises from Wares exported; but they are some- times confounded"); cf. 7 Oxford English Dictionary 733 (2d ed. 1989) ("[I]mpost . . . A tax, duty, imposition, tribute; spec. a customs-duty levied on merchandise. Now chiefly Hist"). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997) 639 Thomas, J., dissenting Committee on Detail, replied as follows: "[D]uties are appli- cable to many objects to which the word imposts does not relate. The latter are appropriated to commerce; the former extend to a variety of objects, as stamp duties &c." 2 Far- rand 305 (emphasis in original); see also 2 Storing 54 (Luther Martin, in Maryland Convention, describing same colloquy); The Fallacies of the Freeman Detected by a Farmer, Free- man's Journal, April 1788, in 3 Storing 186­187 ("Under the term duties [in Art. I, § 8], every species of indirect taxes is included, but it especially means the power of levying money upon printed books, and written instruments"). What seems likely from these descriptions is that a duty, though broader than an impost, was still a tax on particular goods or written instruments. It is important to note, moreover, that the Martin-Wilson colloquy is in reference to the Art. I, § 8, power given to Congress to levy duties. That power is broader than the prohibition on States found in Art. I, § 10, which reaches not all duties, but only those on "imports or exports." 21 But even without this additional limitation, one kind of tax that duties almost certainly did not encompass were "direct" taxes, such as property taxes and poll taxes. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 12 (A. Hamilton) (distinguishing direct taxes, 21 See, e. g., DeWitt, Letter To the Free Citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, American Herald, Boston, Oct.­Dec. 1787, in 4 Storing 23 (noting that Congress "shall have the exclusive power of imposts and the duties on imports and exports, [and, implicitly, a concurrent] power of laying excises and other duties" (emphasis added)); Letters from The Fed- eral Farmer, Oct. 10, 1787, in 2 Storing 239 (distinguishing between "im- post duties, which are laid on imported goods [and] may usually be col- lected in a few seaport towns," and "internal taxes, [such] as poll and land taxes, excises, duties on all written instruments, etc. [which] may fix themselves on every person and species of property in the community"); Essays of Brutus, Dec. 13, 1787 in 2 Storing 392­393 (same); see also 2 Farrand 589 (noting that Morris "did not consider the dollar per Hhd laid on Tobo. in Virga. as a duty on exportation, as no drawback would be allowed on Tobo. taken out of the Warehouse for internal consumption"). 520US2 Unit: $U54 [09-10-99 19:36:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 640 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWN OF HARRISON Thomas, J., dissenting such as property taxes, from indirect taxes, such as imposts, duties, and excises); Freeman's Journal, in 3 Storing 186­187 ("Under the term duties [in Art. I, § 8], every species of indi- rect taxes is included"); see also Michelin, supra, at 286, 290­291. The tax at issue here is nothing more than a tax on real property. Such taxes were classified as "direct" taxes at the time of the framing, and were not within the class of "indi- rect" taxes encompassed by the common understanding of the word "duties." The amount of the Maine tax is tied to the value of the real property on which it is imposed, not to any particular goods, and not even to the number of campers served. It does not appear, therefore, to be a "duty" on "im- ports" in any sense of the words.22 Even when coupled with the tax exemption for certain Maine charities (which is, in truth, no different than a subsidy paid out of the State's gen- eral revenues), Maine's property tax would not seem to be a "Duty or Impost on Imports or Exports" within the meaning of the Import-Export Clause. Thus, were we to overrule Woodruff and apply the Import-Export Clause to this case, I would in all likelihood sustain this tax under that Clause as well. 22 Even were I to agree with the majority that a particular property tax may be a property tax in name only, see ante, at 574­575, and even were I to assume that travel across state lines to consume services in another State renders those traveling consumers "imports," it is difficult to char- acterize the tax at issue here as a duty on imports. It is, rather, as the ma- jority recognizes, a "generally applicable state property tax." Ante, at 567. Maine's grant of an exemption from the tax to some charitable orga- nizations that dispense their charity primarily to Maine residents makes the tax something less than universal, but it does not make the tax, even in practical effect, one that is levied exclusively, or even primarily, on im- ports. See, e. g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269 (1988); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 756 (1981); License Cases, 5 How. 504, 576 (1847); cf. Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 821 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing, in an analogous context, that "the fact that a State may elect to grant a preference, or an exemption, to a small percentage of its residents does not make the tax discriminatory"). 520US2 Unit: $U55 [09-10-99 19:40:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 641 Syllabus EDWARDS et al. v. BALISOK certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­1352. Argued November 13, 1996-Decided May 19, 1997 Respondent, an inmate of a Washington state prison, was found guilty of prison rule infractions and sentenced to, inter alia, the loss of 30 days' good-time credit he had previously earned toward his release. Alleging that the procedures used in his disciplinary proceeding violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, he filed this suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for a declaration that those procedures were unconstitu- tional, compensatory and punitive damages for their use, and an injunc- tion to prevent future violations. Although he expressly reserved the right to seek restoration of the lost good-time credits in an appropriate forum, he refrained from requesting that relief in light of Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 500, under which the sole remedy in federal court for a prisoner seeking such restoration is habeas corpus. The District Court applied Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 487, which held that a state prisoner's claim for damages is not cognizable under § 1983 if a judgment for him would "necessarily imply" the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, unless he can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated. Although holding that a judgment for respondent would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary hearing and the resulting sanctions, the court did not dis- miss the suit, but stayed it pending filing and resolution of a state-court action for restoration of the good-time credits. The Ninth Circuit re- versed, holding that a claim challenging only the procedures used in a disciplinary hearing is always cognizable under § 1983. Held:1. Respondent's claim for declaratory relief and money damages is not cognizable under § 1983. The principle relied on by the Ninth Circuit- that a claim seeking damages only for using the wrong procedures, not for reaching the wrong result, is always cognizable under § 1983-is in- correct, since it disregards the possibility, clearly envisioned by Heck, supra, at 482­483, 486­487, and n. 6, that the nature of the challenge to the procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment. If established, respondent's allegations of deceit and bias by the hearing officer at his disciplinary proceeding would necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time credits. Cf., e. g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 535. His contrary contention, which 520US2 Unit: $U55 [09-10-99 19:40:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 642 EDWARDS v. BALISOK Syllabus is based on Washington's "some or any evidence" standard, is rejected. Pp. 644­648. 2. Although a prayer for prospective injunctive relief ordinarily will not "necessarily imply" the invalidity of a previous loss of good-time credits, and so may properly be brought under § 1983, respondent's claim for such relief must be remanded because it was not considered by either lower court, and its validity was neither briefed nor argued here. Pp. 648­649. 3. The District Court erred in staying this § 1983 action. That court was mistaken in its view that once respondent had exhausted his state remedies, the action could proceed. Section 1983 contains no judicially imposed exhaustion requirement, Heck, supra, at 481, 483; absent some other bar to the suit, a claim either is cognizable under § 1983 and should immediately go forward, or is not cognizable and should be dismissed. P. 649. 70 F. 3d 1277, reversed and remanded. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Souter and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 649. Kathleen D. Mix, Chief Deputy Attorney General of Wash- ington, argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General, and Talis Merle Abolins, William Berggren Collins, Mary E. Fairhurst, and Daniel J. Judge, Assistant Attorneys General. Thomas H. Speedy Rice argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was George A. Critchlow.* *A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of Cali- fornia et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Peter J. Siggins, Se- nior Assistant Attorney General, Charles F. C. Ruff, Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, and by the Attorneys General for their respec- tive States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Grant Woods of Ari- zona, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joe Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, 520US2 Unit: $U55 [09-10-99 19:40:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 641 (1997) 643 Opinion of the Court Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 487 (1994), this Court held that a state prisoner's claim for damages is not cogniza- ble under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 if "a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convic- tion or sentence," unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated. This case presents the question whether a claim for damages and declaratory relief brought by a state prisoner challeng- ing the validity of the procedures used to deprive him of good-time credits is cognizable under § 1983. Respondent Jerry Balisok is an inmate at the Washington State Penitentiary in Walla Walla. On August 16, 1993, he was charged with, and at a hearing on September 2 was found guilty of, four prison infractions. He was sentenced to 10 days in isolation, 20 days in segregation, and depriva- tion of 30 days' good-time credit he had previously earned toward his release. His appeal within the prison's appeal system was rejected for failure to comply with the applicable procedural requirements. On January 26, 1994, respondent filed the present § 1983 action alleging that the procedures used in his disciplinary proceeding violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. His amended complaint requested a declaration that the procedures employed by state officials violated due proc- ess, compensatory and punitive damages for use of the un- constitutional procedures, an injunction to prevent future violations, and any other relief the court deems just and equitable. Taking account of our opinion in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 500 (1973), which held that the sole remedy in federal court for a prisoner seeking restoration Charles Molony Condon of South Carolina, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, and James E. Doyle of Wisconsin. David C. Fathi, John Midgley, Patricia J. Arthur, Don Saunders, Katrin E. Frank, and Steven R. Shapiro filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. 520US2 Unit: $U55 [09-10-99 19:40:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 644 EDWARDS v. BALISOK Opinion of the Court of good-time credits is a writ of habeas corpus, Balisok's amended complaint did not request restoration of the lost credits. (As the District Court noted, however, he ex- pressly reserved the right to seek that relief in an appro- priate forum. App. to Pet. for Cert. F­4.) The District Court, applying our opinion in Heck, held that a judgment in Balisok's favor "would necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary hearing and the resulting sanc- tions." App. to Pet. for Cert. F­14. Rather than grant petitioners' motion to dismiss, however, the District Court stayed this action pending filing and resolution of a state- court action for restoration of the good-time credits. It au- thorized an immediate appeal of its ruling pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b), and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that a claim challenging only the procedures employed in a disciplinary hearing is always cog- nizable under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. A­2, judgt. order reported at 70 F. 3d 1277 (1995). We granted certio- rari. 517 U. S. 1166 (1996). The violations of due process alleged by respondent are similar to those alleged by the plaintiff in Heck. There, the allegations were that the state officials had conducted an ar- bitrary investigation, had knowingly destroyed exculpatory evidence, and had caused an illegal voice identification proce- dure to be used at the plaintiff's criminal trial. 512 U. S., at 479. Here, respondent principally alleged that petitioner Edwards, who was the hearing officer at his disciplinary pro- ceeding, concealed exculpatory witness statements and re- fused to ask specified questions of requested witnesses, App. to Pet. for Cert. I­3 to I­7, which prevented respondent from introducing extant exculpatory material and "intentionally denied" him the right to present evidence in his defense, Brief for Respondent 3. (Respondent also alleged that Ed- wards failed to provide a statement of the facts supporting the guilty finding against him, App. to Pet. for Cert. I­6 520US2 Unit: $U55 [09-10-99 19:40:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 641 (1997) 645 Opinion of the Court to I­7, and that petitioner Wood erroneously rejected his appeal as exceeding the page limitation, id., at I­7 to I­8.) There is, however, this critical difference from Heck: Re- spondent, in his amended complaint, limited his request to damages for depriving him of good-time credits without due process, not for depriving him of good-time credits unde- servedly as a substantive matter.* That is to say, his claim posited that the procedures were wrong, but not necessarily that the result was. The distinction between these two sorts of claims is clearly established in our case law, as is the plaintiff's entitlement to recover at least nominal damages under § 1983 if he proves the former one without also proving the latter one. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 266­267 (1978). The Court of Appeals was of the view that this dif- ference from Heck was dispositive, following Circuit prece- dent to the effect that a claim challenging only the proce- dures employed in a disciplinary hearing is always cognizable under § 1983. See App. to Pet. for Cert. A­2, citing Gotcher v. Wood, 66 F. 3d 1097, 1099 (CA9 1995), cert. pending, No. 95­1385. That principle is incorrect, since it disregards the possibil- ity, clearly envisioned by Heck, that the nature of the chal- lenge to the procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment. This possibility is alluded to in the very passage from Heck relied upon by the Court of Appeals, a passage that distinguished the earlier case of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974), as follows: "In light of the earlier language characterizing the claim as one of `damages for the deprivation of civil rights,' rather than damages for the deprivation of good-time credits, we think this passage recognized a § 1983 claim for using the wrong procedures, not for reaching the *The amended complaint could be considered ambiguous on the point, but this was the Court of Appeals' interpretation, which has been accepted by petitioners. Brief for Petitioners 5. 520US2 Unit: $U55 [09-10-99 19:40:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 646 EDWARDS v. BALISOK Opinion of the Court wrong result (i. e., denying good-time credits). Nor is there any indication in the opinion, or any reason to believe, that using the wrong procedures necessarily vi- tiated the denial of good-time credits. Thus, the claim at issue in Wolff did not call into question the lawfulness of the plaintiff's continuing confinement." Heck, 512 U. S., at 482­483 (emphasis added and deleted). The same point was apparent in Heck's summary of its holding: "We hold that, in order to recover damages for al- legedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,6 a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been [overturned]." Id., at 486­487 (emphasis added). The footnote appended to the above-italicized clause gave a concrete example of "a § 1983 action that does not seek dam- ages directly attributable to conviction or confinement but whose successful prosecution would necessarily imply that the plaintiff's criminal conviction was wrongful." Id., at 486, n. 6. The Court of Appeals was thus incorrect in asserting that a claim seeking damages only "for using the wrong procedure, not for reaching the wrong result," Gotcher, supra, at 1099, would never be subject to the limi- tation announced in Heck. The principal procedural defect complained of by respond- ent would, if established, necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time credits. His claim is, first of all, that he was completely denied the opportunity to put on a defense through specifically identified witnesses who possessed exculpatory evidence. It appears that all witness testimony in his defense was excluded. See App. to Pet. for Cert. F­2 (District Court opinion) ("At the infraction hearing . . . , [respondent] asked that the witness statements be read into the record. According to [respondent], Edwards replied 520US2 Unit: $U55 [09-10-99 19:40:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 641 (1997) 647 Opinion of the Court that no witness statements had been submitted on his be- half"). This is an obvious procedural defect, and state and federal courts have reinstated good-time credits (absent a new hearing) when it is established. See, e. g., Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F. 2d 26, 27, 31 (CA2 1991); Dumas v. State, 654 So. 2d 48, 49 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994); Mahers v. State, 437 N. W. 2d 565, 568­569 (Iowa 1989); In re Contras, 199 App. Div. 2d 601, 602, 604 N. Y. S. 2d 651, 652 (1993). Cf. In re Reismiller, 101 Wash. 2d 291, 293­297, 678 P. 2d 323, 325, 326 (1984); In re Burton, 80 Wash. App. 573, 585, 910 P. 2d 1295, 1304 (1996). Respondent's claim, however, goes even further, asserting that the cause of the exclusion of the exculpatory evidence was the deceit and bias of the hearing officer himself. He contends that the hearing officer lied about the nonexistence of witness statements, see App. to Pet. for Cert. I­4, I­6, I­7; Brief for Respondent 2­3; App. 4, and thus "intentionally denied" him the right to present the extant exculpatory evidence, Brief for Respondent 3. A criminal defendant tried by a partial judge is entitled to have his conviction set aside, no matter how strong the evidence against him. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 535 (1927); Ari- zona v. Fulminante, 499 U. S. 279, 308 (1991). The due process requirements for a prison disciplinary hearing are in many respects less demanding than those for criminal prose- cution, but they are not so lax as to let stand the decision of a biased hearing officer who dishonestly suppresses evidence of innocence. Cf. Wolff, supra, at 570­571. Respondent contends that a judgment in his favor would not imply the invalidity of the loss of his good-time credits because Washington courts follow a "some or any evidence" standard, under which, "if there is any evidence in the record to support the prison hearing determination, then the court will not undertake an entire review of the record and will uphold prison hearing results." Brief for Respondent 7, cit- ing Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution at Wal- pole v. Hill, 472 U. S. 445 (1985); Brief for Respondent 21 520US2 Unit: $U55 [09-10-99 19:40:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 648 EDWARDS v. BALISOK Opinion of the Court (citing Washington state cases). Here, respondent points out, the record contains ample evidence to support the judg- ment under this standard. That may be true, but when the basis for attacking the judgment is not insufficiency of the evidence, it is irrelevant. As the Washington Supreme Court has explained: "The evidentiary requirements of due process are satisfied if there is `some evidence' in the record to support a prison disciplinary decision revoking good time credits." In re Johnston, 109 Wash. 2d 493, 497, 745 P. 2d 864, 867 (1987) (emphasis added). Similarly, our discussion in Hill in no way abrogated the due process requirements enunciated in Wolff, but simply held that in addition to those requirements, revocation of good-time credits does not com- port with " `the minimum requirements of procedural due process,' " unless the findings are "supported by some evi- dence in the record." 472 U. S., at 454 (quoting Wolff, supra, at 558). We conclude, therefore, that respondent's claim for declar- atory relief and money damages, based on allegations of de- ceit and bias on the part of the decisionmaker that necessar- ily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, is not cognizable under § 1983. Respondent also requests, how- ever, prospective injunctive relief. His amended complaint alleges that prison officials routinely fail to date-stamp wit- ness statements that are made in cases involving "jail house attorney[s]" like himself, in order to weaken any due process challenge for failure to call witnesses. App. to Pet. for Cert. I­4. He requests an injunction requiring prison officials to date-stamp witness statements at the time they are received. Id., at I­10. Ordinarily, a prayer for such prospective relief will not "necessarily imply" the invalidity of a previous loss of good-time credits, and so may properly be brought under § 1983. To prevail, of course, respondent must establish standing, see Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 351­354 (1996), and meet the usual requirements for injunctive relief, see, e. g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 499, 502 (1974). Nei- 520US2 Unit: $U55 [09-10-99 19:40:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 641 (1997) 649 Ginsburg, J., concurring ther the Ninth Circuit nor the District Court considered this injunctive claim, and its validity was neither briefed nor argued here. We leave this issue for consideration by the lower courts on remand. Since we are remanding, we must add a word concerning the District Court's decision to stay this § 1983 action while respondent sought restoration of his good-time credits, rather than dismiss it. The District Court was of the view that once respondent had exhausted his state remedies, the § 1983 action could proceed. App. to Pet. for Cert. F­14. This was error. We reemphasize that § 1983 contains no ju- dicially imposed exhaustion requirement, Heck, 512 U. S., at 481, 483; absent some other bar to the suit, a claim either is cognizable under § 1983 and should immediately go forward, or is not cognizable and should be dismissed. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Souter and Justice Breyer join, concurring. I agree that Balisok's claim is not cognizable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 to the extent that it is "based on allegations of deceit and bias on the part of the decisionmaker," ante, at 648; those allegations, as the Court explains, "necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed," ibid.; see ante, at 646­648. Balisok alleged other procedural defects, however, including the failure of prison official Edwards "to specify what facts and evidence supported the finding of guilt." App. to Pet. for Cert. F­3 (District Court order); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 564­565 (1974) (in- mate subjected to discipline is entitled to a written state- ment of reasons and evidence relied on). A defect of this order, unlike the principal "deceit and bias" procedural de- fect Balisok alleged, see ante, at 646­647, would not neces- 520US2 Unit: $U55 [09-10-99 19:40:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 650 EDWARDS v. BALISOK Ginsburg, J., concurring sarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time credits, and therefore is immediately cognizable under § 1983. On this understanding, I join the Court's opinion. 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 651 Syllabus EDMOND v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the armed forces No. 96­262. Argued February 24, 1997-Decided May 19, 1997* The Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals (formerly the Coast Guard Court of Military Review) hears appeals from the decisions of courts- martial, and its decisions are subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Under Article 66(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), its judges may be commis- sioned officers or civilians. During the times here relevant, the court had two civilian members, both of whom were originally assigned to the court by the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation. In anticipation of the possible invalidation of these assignments under the Appointments Clause, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, the Secretary of Transportation issued a memorandum "adopting" the General Counsel's earlier judicial assignments as appointments of his own. In Ryder v. United States, 515 U. S. 177, this Court overturned a conviction that had been affirmed, before the secretarial appointments, by a Coast Guard Court of Military Review panel that included both civilian members, as it was conceded that the judges had not been validly appointed pursuant to the Appoint- ments Clause. The present case concerns the validity of six convictions that were affirmed by the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals (or its predecessor), with one or both civilian judges participating, after the secretarial appointments. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces affirmed the convictions, relying on its holding on remand in Ryder that the Secretary's appointments were valid and cured the defect that had previously existed. Held: The judicial appointments at issue are valid. Pp. 655­666. (a) Congress has authorized the Secretary to appoint civilian mem- bers of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioners' argu- ment that those appointments are invalid because the Secretary lacks the power under 49 U. S. C. § 323(a) to appoint Coast Guard judges is rejected. Although § 323(a) does not specifically mention such judges, its plain language authorizes the Secretary to "appoint and fix the pay of officers and employees of the Department." This Court rejects peti- *Together with Lazenby v. United States; Leaver v. United States; Leonard v. United States; Nichols v. United States; and Venable v. United States, also on certiorari to the same court (see this Court's Rule 12.4). 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 652 EDMOND v. UNITED STATES Syllabus tioners' assertion that § 323(a) is a default statute superseded by express language in Article 66(a) of the UCMJ giving the Judge Advocate Gen- eral of each military branch exclusive authority to appoint Court of Criminal Appeals judges. Conspicuously absent from Article 66(a) is any mention of "appointment." Instead, the statute refers only to judges "who are assigned to a Court of Criminal Appeals" (emphasis added). The fact that this Court found the distinction to be significant in Weiss v. United States, 510 U. S. 163, 171­172, suggests that Article 66(a) concerns not the appointment of judges, but only their assignment. A contrary interpretation of Article 66(a) would render it unconstitu- tional, for under the Appointments Clause Congress could not give Judge Advocates General power to "appoint" even inferior officers of the United States. Pp. 655­658. (b) The Secretary's authorization to appoint civilian Court of Crimi- nal Appeals judges is constitutional. The Appointments Clause gives the President the exclusive power to select principal officers by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, but authorizes Congress to "vest the Appointment of . . . inferior Officers . . . in the Heads of De- partments." Despite the importance of the responsibilities the judges in question bear, they are "inferior Officers" under the Clause. Gener- ally speaking, "inferior officers" are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the Senate's advice and consent. See, e. g., ch. 4, §§ 1, 2, 1 Stat. 28. Supervision of the work of Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals judges is divided between the General Counsel of the Depart- ment of Transportation (who is subordinate to the Secretary) and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. See Arts. 66(f), 67(a), UCMJ. Significantly, these judges have no power to render a final decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted to do so by other Executive officers, and hence they are inferior within the meaning of Article II. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 671­672, and Freytag v. Commis- sioner, 501 U. S. 868, distinguished. Pp. 658­666. 45 M. J. 19 (first judgment), 44 M. J. 273 (second, third, fifth, and sixth judgments), and 44 M. J. 272 (fourth judgment), affirmed. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in which Souter, J., joined as to Parts I and II. Souter, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 666. Alan B. Morrison argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Allen Lotz. 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 651 (1997) 653 Opinion of the Court Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor Gen- eral Dellinger, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Douglas N. Letter, Nancy E. McFadden, Paul M. Geier, Peter J. Plocki, and Frank R. Levi. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. We must determine in this case whether Congress has au- thorized the Secretary of Transportation to appoint civilian members of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, and if so, whether this authorization is constitutional under the Appointments Clause of Article II. I The Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals (formerly known as the Coast Guard Court of Military Review) is an intermediate court within the military justice system. It is one of four military Courts of Criminal Appeals; others exist for the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy-Marine Corps. The Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals hears appeals from the decisions of courts-martial, and its decisions are subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (formerly known as the United States Court of Military Appeals).1 Appellate military judges who are assigned to a Court of Criminal Appeals must be members of the bar, but may be commissioned officers or civilians. Art. 66(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U. S. C. § 866(a). During the times relevant to this case, the Coast Guard Court of Crimi- nal Appeals has had two civilian members, Chief Judge Jo- seph H. Baum and Associate Judge Alfred F. Bridgman, Jr. These judges were originally assigned to serve on the court by the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation, 1 The names of the Courts of Military Review and of the United States Court of Military Appeals were changed, effective October 5, 1994, by Pub. L. 103­337, § 924, 108 Stat. 2831. 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 654 EDMOND v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court who is, ex officio, the Judge Advocate General of the Coast Guard, Art. 1(1), UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 801(1). Subsequent events, however, called into question the validity of these assignments. In Weiss v. United States, 510 U. S. 163 (1994), we con- sidered whether the assignment of commissioned military officers to serve as military judges without reappointment under the Appointments Clause was constitutional. We held that military trial and appellate judges are officers of the United States and must be appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause. Id., at 170. We upheld the judicial assignments at issue in Weiss because each of the military judges had been previously appointed by the President as a commissioned military officer, and was serving on active duty under that commission at the time he was assigned to a military court. We noted, however, that "allowing civil- ians to be assigned to Courts of Military Review, without being appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause, obvi- ously presents a quite different question." Id., at 170, n. 4. In anticipation of our decision in Weiss, Chief Judge Baum sent a memorandum to the Chief Counsel of the Coast Guard requesting that the Secretary, in his capacity as a depart- ment head, reappoint the judges so the court would be con- stitutionally valid beyond any doubt. See United States v. Senior, 36 M. J. 1016, 1018 (C. G. C. M. R. 1993). On January 15, 1993, the Secretary of Transportation issued a memoran- dum "adopting" the General Counsel's assignments to the Coast Guard Court of Military Review "as judicial appoint- ments of my own." The memorandum then listed the names of "[t]hose judges presently assigned and appointed by me," including Chief Judge Baum and Judge Bridgman. Adden- dum to Brief for Petitioners A6. Two Terms ago, in Ryder v. United States, 515 U. S. 177 (1995), we considered the validity of a conviction that had been affirmed by a panel of the Coast Guard Court of Mili- tary Review, including its two civilian members, before the 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 651 (1997) 655 Opinion of the Court secretarial appointments of January 15, 1993. The Govern- ment conceded that the civilian judges of the Court of Mili- tary Review had not been appointed pursuant to the Ap- pointments Clause, see Brief for United States in Ryder v. United States, O. T. 1994, No. 94­431, p. 9, n. 9, but argued that Ryder's conviction should be affirmed notwithstanding this defect. We disagreed, holding that Ryder was "entitled to a hearing before a properly appointed panel of" the Coast Guard Court of Military Review. 515 U. S., at 188. We did not consider the validity of convictions affirmed by the court after the secretarial appointments. Each of the petitioners in the present case was convicted by court-martial. In each case the conviction and sentence were affirmed, in whole or in part, by the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals (or its predecessor the Court of Military Review) after the January 15, 1993, secretarial appoint- ments. Chief Judge Baum participated in each decision, and Judge Bridgman participated in the appeals involving two of the petitioners. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces affirmed the convictions, relying on its holding on remand in United States v. Ryder, 44 M. J. 9 (1996), that the Secretary of Transportation's appointments were valid and cured the defect that had previously existed. 45 M. J. 19 (1996); 44 M. J. 273 (1996); 44 M. J. 272 (1996). Petitioners sought re- view in a consolidated petition pursuant to this Court's Rule 12.4, and we granted certiorari, 519 U. S. 977 (1996). II Petitioners argue that the Secretary's civilian appoint- ments to the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals are invalid for two reasons: First, the Secretary lacks authority under 49 U. S. C. § 323(a) to appoint members of the court; second, judges of military Courts of Criminal Appeals are principal, not inferior, officers within the meaning of the Ap- pointments Clause, and must therefore be appointed by the 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 656 EDMOND v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court President with the advice and consent of the Senate. We consider these contentions in turn. Congress has established the Coast Guard as a military service and branch of the Armed Forces that, except in time of war (when it operates as a service within the Navy), is part of the Department of Transportation. 14 U. S. C. §§ 1­3. The Secretary of Transportation has broad author- ity over the Coast Guard, including the power to "promul- gate such regulations and orders as he deems appropriate to carry out the provisions of [Title 14] or any other law applica- ble to the Coast Guard," § 633. The Commandant of the Coast Guard is required to "carry out duties and powers pre- scribed by the Secretary of Transportation," and he "reports directly to the Secretary." 49 U. S. C. § 108(b). Most rele- vant to the present case, § 323(a) provides: "The Secretary of Transportation may appoint and fix the pay of officers and employees of the Department of Transportation and may prescribe their duties and powers." Petitioners do not dispute that judges of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals are officers of the Department of Transportation. Thus, although the statute does not specifically mention Coast Guard judges, the plain language of § 323(a) appears to give the Secretary power to appoint them. Petitioners argue, however, that § 323(a) is a default stat- ute, applicable only where Congress has not otherwise pro- vided for the appointment of specific officers. Petitioners contend that Article 66(a) of the UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 866(a), gives the Judge Advocate General of each military branch exclusive authority to appoint judges of his respective Court of Criminal Appeals. That provision reads as follows: "Each Judge Advocate General shall establish a Court of Criminal Appeals which shall be composed of one or more panels, and each such panel shall be composed of not less than three appellate military judges. . . . Appel- late military judges who are assigned to a Court of 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 651 (1997) 657 Opinion of the Court Criminal Appeals may be commissioned officers or civil- ians, each of whom must be a member of a bar of a Fed- eral court or of the highest court of a State. The Judge Advocate General shall designate as chief judge one of the appellate military judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals established by him. The chief judge shall de- termine on which panels of the court the appellate judges assigned to the court will serve and which mili- tary judge assigned to the court will act as senior judge on each panel." Were we to accept petitioners' interpretation of Article 66(a) as providing for the "appointment" of Court of Criminal Appeals judges, their argument that Congress intended it to be the exclusive means of appointment might prove persua- sive. Ordinarily, where a specific provision conflicts with a general one, the specific governs. Busic v. United States, 446 U. S. 398, 406 (1980). Conspicuously absent from Article 66(a), however, is any mention of the "appointment" of mili- tary judges. Instead, the statute refers to judges "who are assigned to a Court of Criminal Appeals" (emphasis added). The difference between the power to "assign" officers to a particular task and the power to "appoint" those officers is not merely stylistic. In Weiss, we upheld the assignment of military officers to serve on military courts because they had previously been "appointed" as officers of the United States pursuant to the Appointments Clause, and because Congress had not designated the position of a military judge as one requiring reappointment. 510 U. S., at 176. We noted in Weiss that Congress has consistently used the word "ap- point" with respect to military positions requiring a separate appointment, rather than using terms not found within the Appointments Clause, such as "assign": "Congress repeat- edly and consistently distinguished between an office that would require a separate appointment and a position or duty to which one could be `assigned' or `detailed' by a superior 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN 658 EDMOND v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court officer." Id., at 172. We found it significant that the sec- tions of the UCMJ relating to military judges "speak explic- itly and exclusively in terms of `detail' or `assign'; nowhere in these sections is mention made of a separate appoint- ment." Ibid. This analysis suggests that Article 66(a) con- cerns not the appointment of Court of Criminal Appeals judges, but only their assignment. Moreover, we see no other way to interpret Article 66(a) that would make it consistent with the Constitution. Under the Appointments Clause, Congress could not give the Judge Advocates General power to "appoint" even inferior officers of the United States; that power can be conferred only upon the President, department heads, and courts of law. Thus, petitioners are asking us to interpret Article 66(a) in a man- ner that would render it clearly unconstitutional-which we must of course avoid doing if there is another reasonable in- terpretation available. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi- cago, 440 U. S. 490, 500 (1979); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142 (1927). Petitioners respond that reading § 323(a) to permit the Secretary to appoint Court of Criminal Appeals judges causes us unnecessarily to reach the constitutional question whether those judges are inferior officers under the Appointments Clause, since Congress may vest only the appointment of inferior officers in a department head. But a constitutional question confronted in order to preserve, if possible, a congressional enactment is not a constitutional question confronted unnecessarily. We conclude that Article 66(a) does not give Judge Ad- vocates General authority to appoint Court of Criminal Appeals judges; that § 323(a) does give the Secretary of Transportation authority to do so; and we turn to the con- stitutional question whether this is consistent with the Ap- pointments Clause. III The Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution reads as follows: 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 651 (1997) 659 Opinion of the Court "[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambas- sadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Depart- ments." U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. As we recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam), the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of "etiquette or protocol"; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional en- croachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches. See id., at 128­131; Weiss, supra, at 183­185 (Souter, J., concur- ring); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868, 904, and n. 4 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). This disposition was also de- signed to assure a higher quality of appointments: The Fram- ers anticipated that the President would be less vulnerable to interest-group pressure and personal favoritism than would a collective body. "The sole and undivided responsi- bility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty, and a more exact regard to reputation." The Federalist No. 76, p. 387 (M. Beloff ed. 1987) (A. Hamilton); accord, 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 374­375 (1833). The President's power to select prin- cipal officers of the United States was not left unguarded, however, as Article II further requires the "Advice and Con- sent of the Senate." This serves both to curb Executive abuses of the appointment power, see 3 Story, supra, at 376­ 377, and "to promote a judicious choice of [persons] for filling the offices of the union," The Federalist No. 76, at 386­387. 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN 660 EDMOND v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court By requiring the joint participation of the President and the Senate, the Appointments Clause was designed to ensure public accountability for both the making of a bad appoint- ment and the rejection of a good one. Hamilton observed: "The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the president singly and absolutely. The censure of reject- ing a good one would lie entirely at the door of the sen- ate; aggravated by the consideration of their having counteracted the good intentions of the executive. If an ill appointment should be made, the executive for nominating, and the senate for approving, would partici- pate, though in different degrees, in the opprobrium and disgrace." Id., No. 77, at 392. See also 3 Story, supra, at 375 ("If [the President] should . . . surrender the public patronage into the hands of profligate men, or low adventurers, it will be impossible for him long to retain public favour"). The prescribed manner of appointment for principal offi- cers is also the default manner of appointment for inferior officers. "[B]ut," the Appointments Clause continues, "the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." This pro- vision, sometimes referred to as the "Excepting Clause," was added to the proposed Constitution on the last day of the Grand Convention, with little discussion. See 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 627­628 (1911 ed.). As one of our early opinions suggests, its obvious pur- pose is administrative convenience, see United States v. Ger- maine, 99 U. S. 508, 510 (1879)-but that convenience was deemed to outweigh the benefits of the more cumbersome procedure only with respect to the appointment of "inferior Officers." Section 323(a), which confers appointment power upon the Secretary of Transportation, can constitutionally be 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 651 (1997) 661 Opinion of the Court applied to the appointment of Court of Criminal Appeals judges only if those judges are "inferior Officers." Our cases have not set forth an exclusive criterion for dis- tinguishing between principal and inferior officers for Ap- pointments Clause purposes. Among the offices that we have found to be inferior are that of a district court clerk, Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 225, 258 (1839), an election supervi- sor, Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 397­398 (1880), a vice consul charged temporarily with the duties of the consul, United States v. Eaton, 169 U. S. 331, 343 (1898), and a "United States commissioner" in district court proceedings, Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 352­ 354 (1931). Most recently, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654 (1988), we held that the independent counsel created by provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U. S. C. §§ 591­599, was an inferior officer. In reaching that conclusion, we relied on several factors: that the independent counsel was subject to removal by a higher officer (the Attor- ney General), that she performed only limited duties, that her jurisdiction was narrow, and that her tenure was limited. 487 U. S., at 671­672. Petitioners are quite correct that the last two of these con- clusions do not hold with regard to the office of military judge at issue here. It is not "limited in tenure," as that phrase was used in Morrison to describe "appoint[ment] es- sentially to accomplish a single task [at the end of which] the office is terminated." Id., at 672. Nor are military judges "limited in jurisdiction," as used in Morrison to refer to the fact that an independent counsel may investigate and prose- cute only those individuals, and for only those crimes, that are within the scope of jurisdiction granted by the special three-judge appointing panel. See Weiss, 510 U. S., at 192 (Souter, J., concurring). However, Morrison did not pur- port to set forth a definitive test for whether an office is "inferior" under the Appointments Clause. To the contrary, it explicitly stated: "We need not attempt here to decide ex- 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN 662 EDMOND v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court actly where the line falls between the two types of officers, because in our view [the independent counsel] clearly falls on the `inferior officer' side of that line." 487 U. S., at 671. To support principal-officer status, petitioners emphasize the importance of the responsibilities that Court of Criminal Appeals judges bear. They review those court-martial pro- ceedings that result in the most serious sentences, including those "in which the sentence, as approved, extends to death, dismissal . . . , dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for one year or more." Art. 66(b)(1), UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 866(b)(1). They must ensure that the court- martial's finding of guilt and its sentence are "correct in law and fact," id., Art. 66(c), § 866(c), which includes resolution of constitutional challenges. And finally, unlike most appellate judges, Court of Criminal Appeals judges are not required to defer to the trial court's factual findings, but may inde- pendently "weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of wit- nesses, and determine controverted questions of fact, rec- ognizing that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses." Ibid. We do not dispute that military appellate judges are charged with exercising significant authority on behalf of the United States. This, however, is also true of offices that we have held were "inferior" within the meaning of the Ap- pointments Clause. See, e. g., Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S., at 881­882 (special trial judges having "significan[t] . . . duties and discretion" are inferior officers). The exercise of "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States" marks, not the line between principal and inferior officer for Appointments Clause purposes, but rather, as we said in Buckley, the line between officer and nonofficer. 424 U. S., at 126. Generally speaking, the term "inferior officer" connotes a relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers below the President: Whether one is an "inferior" officer de- pends on whether he has a superior. It is not enough that other officers may be identified who formally maintain a 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 651 (1997) 663 Opinion of the Court higher rank, or possess responsibilities of a greater magni- tude. If that were the intention, the Constitution might have used the phrase "lesser officer." Rather, in the context of a Clause designed to preserve political accountability rel- ative to important Government assignments, we think it evident that "inferior officers" are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate. This understanding of the Appointments Clause conforms with the views of the first Congress. On July 27, 1789, Con- gress established the first Executive department, the De- partment of Foreign Affairs. In so doing, it expressly des- ignated the Secretary of the Department as a "principal officer," and his subordinate, the Chief Clerk of the Depart- ment, as an "inferior officer: "Section 1. Be it enacted . . . That there shall be an Executive department, to be denominated the Depart- ment of Foreign Affairs, and that there shall be a prin- cipal officer therein, to be called the Secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs, who shall perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be en- joined on or intrusted to him by the President of the United States, agreeable to the Constitution, relative to [matters respecting foreign affairs]; and furthermore, that the said principal officer shall conduct the business of the said department in such manner as the President of the United States shall from time to time order or instruct. "Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That there shall be in the said department, an inferior officer, to be ap- pointed by the said principal officer, and to be employed therein as he shall deem proper, and to be called the chief Clerk in the Department of Foreign Affairs. . . ." Ch. 4, 1 Stat. 28. 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN 664 EDMOND v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Congress used similar language in establishing the Depart- ment of War, repeatedly referring to the Secretary of that department as a "principal officer," and the Chief Clerk, who would be "employed" within the Department as the Sec- retary "shall deem proper," as an "inferior officer." Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49. Supervision of the work of Court of Criminal Appeals judges is divided between the Judge Advocate General (who in the Coast Guard is subordinate to the Secretary of Trans- portation) and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. The Judge Advocate General exercises administrative over- sight over the Court of Criminal Appeals. He is charged with the responsibility to "prescribe uniform rules of proce- dure" for the court, and must "meet periodically [with other Judge Advocates General] to formulate policies and proce- dure in regard to review of court-martial cases." Art. 66(f), UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 866(f). It is conceded by the parties that the Judge Advocate General may also remove a Court of Criminal Appeals judge from his judicial assignment without cause. The power to remove officers, we have recognized, is a powerful tool for control. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 727 (1986); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926). The Judge Advocate General's control over Court of Crimi- nal Appeals judges is, to be sure, not complete. He may not attempt to influence (by threat of removal or otherwise) the outcome of individual proceedings, Art. 37, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 837, and has no power to reverse decisions of the court. This latter power does reside, however, in another Executive Branch entity, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.2 That court reviews every decision of the 2 Article 141 of the UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 941, states that the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces "is established under article I of the Consti- tution," and "is located for administrative purposes only in the Depart- ment of Defense." Although the statute does not specify the court's "loca- tion" for nonadministrative purposes, other provisions of the UCMJ make clear that it is within the Executive Branch. The court reviews the judg- 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 651 (1997) 665 Opinion of the Court Courts of Criminal Appeals in which: (a) the sentence ex- tends to death; (b) the Judge Advocate General orders such review; or (c) the court itself grants review upon petition of the accused. Id., Art. 67(a), § 867(a). The scope of review is narrower than that exercised by the Court of Criminal Appeals: so long as there is some competent evidence in the record to establish each element of the offense beyond a rea- sonable doubt, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces will not reevaluate the facts. Id., Art. 67(c), § 867(c); United States v. Wilson, 6 M. J. 214 (C. M. A. 1979). This limitation upon review does not in our opinion render the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals principal officers. What is significant is that the judges of the Court of Criminal Ap- peals have no power to render a final decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted to do so by other Execu- tive officers. Finally, petitioners argue that Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868 (1991), which held that special trial judges charged with assisting Tax Court judges were inferior offi- cers and could be appointed by the Chief Judge of the Tax Court, suggests that Court of Criminal Appeals judges are principal officers. Petitioners contend that Court of Criminal Appeals judges more closely resemble Tax Court judges-who we implied (according to petitioners) were principal officers-than they do special trial judges. We note initially that Freytag does not hold that Tax Court judges are principal officers; only the appointment of special trial judges was at issue in that case. Moreover, there are two significant distinctions between Tax Court judges and Court of Criminal Appeals judges. First, there is no Execu- ments of only military tribunals, id., Art. 67, § 867; its judges must meet annually in committee with the Judge Advocates General and two mem- bers appointed by the Secretary of Defense to survey the operation of the military justice system, id., Art. 146, § 946; and the President may remove its judges for neglect of duty, misconduct, or mental or physical disability, id., Art. 142(c), § 942(c). 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN 666 EDMOND v. UNITED STATES Opinion of Souter, J. tive Branch tribunal comparable to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces that reviews the work of the Tax Court; its decisions are appealable only to courts of the Third Branch. 26 U. S. C. § 7482. And second, there is no officer comparable to a Judge Advocate General who supervises the work of the Tax Court, with power to determine its proce- dural rules, to remove any judge without cause, and to order any decision submitted for review. Freytag does not control our decision here. * * * We conclude that 49 U. S. C. § 323(a) authorizes the Secre- tary of Transportation to appoint judges of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals; and that such appointment is in conformity with the Appointments Clause of the Constitu- tion, since those judges are "inferior Officers" within the meaning of that provision, by reason of the supervision over their work exercised by the General Counsel of the Depart- ment of Transportation in his capacity as Judge Advocate General and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. The judicial appointments at issue in this case are therefore valid. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Ap- peals for the Armed Forces with respect to each petitioner. It is so ordered. Justice Souter, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join in Parts I and II of the Court's opinion and agree with the reasoning in Part III insofar as it describes an important, and even necessary, reason for holding judges of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals to be inferior officers within the meaning of the Appointments Clause, U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Court states that "[g]en- erally speaking, the term `inferior officer' connotes a rela- tionship [of supervision and direction] with some higher 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 651 (1997) 667 Opinion of Souter, J. ranking officer or officers below the President: Whether one is an `inferior' officer depends on whether he has a superior." Ante, at 662. The Court goes on to show that administra- tive supervision of these judges by the Judge Advocate Gen- eral of the Coast Guard, combined with his power to control them by removal from a case, establishes that the interme- diate appellate judges here have the necessary superior. With this conclusion I agree, but unlike the Court I am not prepared to decide on that basis alone that these judges are inferior officers. Because the term "inferior officer" implies an official supe- rior, one who has no superior is not an inferior officer. This unexceptionable maxim will in some instances be dispositive of status; it might, for example, lead to the conclusion that United States district judges cannot be inferior officers, since the power of appellate review does not extend to them personally, but is limited to their judgments. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F. 2d 476, 483 (CADC), rev'd sub nom. Mor- rison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654 (1988) (suggesting that "lower federal judges . . . are principal officers" because they are "not subject to personal supervision," 838 F. 2d, at 483); cf. ante, at 665. It does not follow, however, that if one is subject to some supervision and control, one is an inferior officer. Having a superior officer is necessary for inferior officer status, but not sufficient to establish it. See, e. g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S., at 654, 722 ("To be sure, it is not a sufficient condi- tion for `inferior' officer status that one be subordinate to a principal officer. Even an officer who is subordinate to a department head can be a principal officer") (Scalia, J., dis- senting). Accordingly, in Morrison, the Court's determina- tion that the independent counsel was "to some degree `infe- rior' " to the Attorney General, see id., at 671, did not end the enquiry. The Court went on to weigh the duties, juris- diction, and tenure associated with the office, id., at 671­672, before concluding that the independent counsel was an infe- 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN 668 EDMOND v. UNITED STATES Opinion of Souter, J. rior officer. Thus, under Morrison, the Solicitor General of the United States, for example, may well be a principal offi- cer, despite his statutory "inferiority" to the Attorney Gen- eral. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 505 (directing Presidential ap- pointment, with the advice and consent of the Senate, of a Solicitor General to "assist the Attorney General in the per- formance of his duties"). The mere existence of a "superior" officer is not dispositive. In this case, as the Court persuasively shows, the Judge Advocate General has substantial supervisory authority over the judges of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals. As the Court notes, the Judge Advocate General prescribes rules of procedure for the Court of Criminal Appeals, formu- lates policies for review of court-martial cases, and is author- ized to remove judges from their judicial assignments with- out cause. See ante, at 664. While these facts establish that the condition of supervision and control necessary for inferior officer status has been met, I am wary of treating them as sufficient to demonstrate that the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals are actually inferior officers under the Constitution. In having to go beyond the Court's opinion to decide that the criminal appeals judges are inferior officers, I do not claim the convenience of a single sufficient condition, and, indeed, at this stage of the Court's thinking on the matter, I would not try to derive a single rule of sufficiency. What is needed, instead, is a detailed look at the powers and duties of these judges to see whether reasons favoring their inferior officer status within the constitutional scheme weigh more heavily than those to the contrary. Having tried to do this in a concurring opinion in Weiss v. United States, 510 U. S. 163, 182 (1994), I will not repeat the essay. See id., at 192­ 194 (reviewing the Morrison factors, including tenure, juris- diction, duties, and removal; concluding that because it is "hard to say with any certainty" whether Courts of Military Review judges should be considered principal or inferior of- 520US2 Unit: $U56 [09-10-99 19:44:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 651 (1997) 669 Opinion of Souter, J. ficers, deference to the political branches' judgment is appro- priate). Here it is enough to add that after the passage of three Terms since writing in Weiss, I am unrepentant. I therefore join not only in the Court's conclusion that the nec- essary supervisory condition for inferior officer status is sat- isfied here, but in the Court's ultimate holding that the judges of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals are inferior officers within the meaning of the Appointments Clause. 520US3 Unit: $U57 [09-11-99 17:02:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 670 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus UNITED STATES v. HYDE certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 96­667. Argued April 15, 1997-Decided May 27, 1997 Respondent pleaded guilty to several federal fraud counts, pursuant to a plea agreement in which the Government agreed to move for dismissal of other charges. The District Court accepted the plea but deferred decision on whether to accept the plea agreement, pending completion of the presentence report. Before sentencing and the court's decision on the plea agreement, respondent sought to withdraw his plea. Find- ing that he had not provided a "fair and just reason" for withdrawing the plea before sentencing, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e), the court denied respondent's request. The court then accepted the plea agreement, entered judgment, and sentenced respond- ent. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that if a court defers ac- ceptance of a plea or of a plea agreement, a defendant may withdraw his plea for any or no reason, until the court accepts both the plea and the agreement. Held: In the circumstances presented here, a defendant may not withdraw his plea unless he shows a "fair and just reason" under Rule 32(e). Nothing in the text of Rule 11, which sets out the prerequisites to ac- cepting a guilty plea and plea agreement, supports the Court of Appeals' holding. That text shows that guilty pleas can be accepted while plea agreements are deferred and the acceptance of the two can be separated in time. The Court of Appeals' requirement that a district court shall not accept a guilty plea without accepting the plea agreement is absent from the list of prerequisites to accepting a plea set out in Rules 11(c) and (d). If a court decides to reject a plea agreement such as the one here, the defendant is given "the opportunity to then withdraw the plea," Rule 11(e)(4), and he does not have to comply with Rule 32(e)'s "fair and just reason" requirement. This provision implements the commonsense notion that a defendant can no longer be bound by an agreement that the court has refused to sanction, and its necessary im- plication is that if the court has neither rejected nor accepted the agree- ment, the defendant is not granted the "opportunity" to automatically withdraw his plea. The Court of Appeals' holding contradicts this im- plication and thus strips Rule 11(e)(4) of any meaning. It also debases the judicial proceeding at which a defendant pleads and the court ac- cepts his plea by allowing him to withdraw his plea simply on a lark. 520US3 Unit: $U57 [09-11-99 17:02:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 670 (1997) 671 Opinion of the Court In addition, the holding would allow little, if any, time for the "fair and just reason" standard to apply, for a court's decision to accept a plea agreement is often made at the sentencing hearing. Respondent's ar- guments-that the "fair and just reason" standard was not meant to apply to guilty pleas conditioned on acceptance of the plea agreement, and that the Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 32(b)(3) support the Court of Appeals' holding-are rejected. Pp. 673­680. 92 F. 3d 779, reversed. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Del- linger, Acting Assistant Attorney General Richard, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Patty Merkamp Stemler. Jonathan D. Soglin, by appointment of the Court, 519 U. S. 1106, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.* Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Rule 32(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that a district court may allow a defendant to with- draw his guilty plea before he is sentenced "if the defendant shows any fair and just reason." After the defendant in this case pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, the Dis- trict Court accepted his plea but deferred decision on whether to accept the plea agreement. The defendant then sought to withdraw his plea. We hold that in such circum- stances a defendant may not withdraw his plea unless he shows a "fair and just reason" under Rule 32(e). A federal grand jury indicted respondent Robert Hyde on eight counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, and other fraud- related crimes. On the morning of his trial, respondent indicated his desire to enter plea negotiations with the Gov- ernment. Those negotiations produced a plea agreement *Lisa Kemler filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 520US3 Unit: $U57 [09-11-99 17:02:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 672 UNITED STATES v. HYDE Opinion of the Court in which respondent agreed to plead guilty to four of the counts. In exchange, the Government agreed to move to dismiss the remaining four counts and not to bring further charges against respondent for other allegedly fraudulent conduct. That afternoon, the parties appeared again before the Dis- trict Court and submitted the plea agreement to the court, along with respondent's "application for permission to enter [a] plea of guilty." After placing respondent under oath, the court questioned him extensively to ensure that his plea was knowing and voluntary, and that he understood the conse- quences of pleading guilty, including the possibility of a maxi- mum sentence of 30 years. The court asked respondent what he had done, and respondent admitted committing the crimes set out in the four counts. The court then asked the Government to set out what it was prepared to prove, and the Government did so. The court asked respondent whether he was pleading guilty because he was in fact guilty of the crimes set out in the four counts. Respondent said that he was. Finally, the court asked respondent how he pleaded to each count, and respondent stated "guilty." The District Court concluded that respondent was plead- ing guilty knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and that there was a factual basis for the plea. The court therefore stated that it was accepting respondent's guilty plea. It also stated that it was deferring decision on whether to accept the plea agreement, pending completion of the presentence report. One month later, before sentencing and the District Court's decision about whether to accept the plea agreement, respondent filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. His motion alleged that he had pleaded guilty under duress from the Government and that his admissions to the District Court had in fact been false. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that there was no evidence to support respondent's claim of duress, and that respondent 520US3 Unit: $U57 [09-11-99 17:02:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 670 (1997) 673 Opinion of the Court had not provided a "fair and just reason" for withdrawing his guilty plea, as required by Rule 32(e). The court therefore refused to let respondent withdraw his guilty plea. The court then accepted the plea agreement, entered judgment against respondent on the first four counts, dismissed the indictment's remaining four counts on the Government's mo- tion, and sentenced respondent to a prison term of 21 2 years. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, hold- ing that respondent had an absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea before the District Court accepted the plea agree- ment. 92 F. 3d 779, 781 (1996). The court reasoned as fol- lows: First, before a district court has accepted a defendant's guilty plea, the defendant has an absolute right to withdraw that plea. Id., at 780 (citing United States v. Washman, 66 F. 3d 210, 212­213 (CA9 1995)). Second, the guilty plea and the plea agreement are " `inextricably bound up together,' " such that the court's deferral of the decision whether to ac- cept the plea agreement also constitutes an automatic defer- ral of its decision whether to accept the guilty plea, even if the court explicitly states that it is accepting the guilty plea. 92 F. 3d, at 780 (quoting United States v. Cordova-Perez, 65 F. 3d 1552, 1556 (CA9 1995)). Combining these two proposi- tions, the Court of Appeals held that "[i]f the court defers acceptance of the plea or of the plea agreement, the defend- ant may withdraw his plea for any reason or for no reason, until the time that the court does accept both the plea and the agreement." 92 F. 3d, at 781. The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have reached the opposite conclusion on this issue. United States v. Ewing, 957 F. 2d 115, 118­119 (CA4 1992); United States v. Ellison, 798 F. 2d 1102, 1106 (CA7 1986). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 519 U. S. 1086 (1997), and now reverse. To understand why we hold that Rule 32(e) governs here, we must go back to Rule 11, the principal provision in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure dealing with the sub- 520US3 Unit: $U57 [09-11-99 17:02:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 674 UNITED STATES v. HYDE Opinion of the Court ject of guilty pleas and plea agreements. The Court of Ap- peals equated acceptance of the guilty plea with acceptance of the plea agreement, and deferral of the plea agreement with deferral of the guilty plea. Nothing in the text of Rule 11 supports these conclusions. In fact, the text shows that the opposite is true: Guilty pleas can be accepted while plea agreements are deferred, and the acceptance of the two can be separated in time. The prerequisites to accepting a guilty plea are set out in subdivisions (c) and (d) of Rule 11. Subdivision (c) says: "Before accepting a plea of guilty . . . , the court must ad- dress the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant under- stands," numerous consequences of pleading guilty. For example, the court must ensure the defendant understands the maximum possible penalty that he may face by pleading guilty, Rule 11(c)(1), and the important constitutional rights he is waiving, including the right to a trial, Rules 11(c)(3), (4). Subdivision (d) says: "The court shall not accept a plea of guilty . . . without first, by addressing the defendant per- sonally in open court, determining that the plea is volun- tary." 1 The opening words of these two subdivisions are important: Together, they speak of steps a district court must take "[b]efore accepting a plea of guilty," and without which it "shall not accept a plea of guilty." Based on this language, we conclude that once the court has taken these steps, it may, in its discretion, accept a defendant's guilty plea. The Court of Appeals would read an additional pre- requisite into this list: A district court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first accepting the plea agreement. But that "prerequisite" is absent from the list set out in subdivi- sions (c) and (d), strongly suggesting that no such addition is warranted. 1 See also Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(f) (court should not enter judgment on an accepted guilty plea without confirming that the plea has a factual basis). 520US3 Unit: $U57 [09-11-99 17:02:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 670 (1997) 675 Opinion of the Court Subdivision (e), which covers plea agreements, also con- tradicts the Court of Appeals' holding. That subdivision di- vides plea agreements into three types, based on what the Government agrees to do: In type A agreements, the Gov- ernment agrees to move for dismissal of other charges; in type B, it agrees to recommend (or not oppose the defend- ant's request for) a particular sentence; and in type C, it agrees that the defendant should receive a specific sentence. As to type A and type C agreements, the Rule states that "the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report." 2 Rule 11(e)(2). The plea agreement in this case is a type A agreement: The Government agreed to move to dismiss four counts, did not agree to recommend a particular sentence, and did not agree that a specific sentence was the appro- priate disposition. The District Court deferred its decision about whether to accept or reject the agreement. If the court had decided to reject the plea agreement, it would have turned to subdivision (e)(4) of Rule 11. That subdivision, a critical one for our purposes, provides: "If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court shall . . . advise the defendant personally . . . that the court is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw the plea, and advise the defendant that if the defendant persists in a guilty plea . . . the disposition of the case may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement." Rule 11(e)(4) (emphasis added). 2 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a district court is required to defer its decision about whether to accept a type A or type C agreement until after it has reviewed the presentence report, unless the court believes that a presentence report is not required. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 6B1.1(c) (Nov. 1995) (USSG). 520US3 Unit: $U57 [09-11-99 17:02:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 676 UNITED STATES v. HYDE Opinion of the Court Thus, if the court rejects the agreement, the defendant can "then" withdraw his plea for any reason and does not have to comply with Rule 32(e)'s "fair and just reason" requirement. This provision implements the commonsense notion that a defendant can no longer be bound by an agreement that the court has refused to sanction. Under the Court of Appeals' holding, however, the defend- ant can withdraw his plea "for any reason or for no reason" even if the district court does not reject the plea agreement, but merely defers decision on it. Thus, for the Court of Ap- peals, the rejection of the plea agreement has no significance: Before rejection, the defendant is free to withdraw his plea; after rejection, the same is true. But the text of Rule 11(e)(4) gives the rejection of the agreement a great deal of significance. Only "then" is the defendant granted "the opportunity" to withdraw his plea. The necessary implica- tion of this provision is that if the court has neither rejected nor accepted the agreement, the defendant is not granted "the opportunity to then withdraw" his plea. The Court of Appeals' holding contradicts this implication, and thus strips subdivision (e)(4) of any meaning. Not only is the Court of Appeals' holding contradicted by the very language of the Rules, it also debases the judicial proceeding at which a defendant pleads and the court accepts his plea. After the defendant has sworn in open court that he actually committed the crimes, after he has stated that he is pleading guilty because he is guilty, after the court has found a factual basis for the plea, and after the court has explicitly announced that it accepts the plea, the Court of Appeals would allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea simply on a lark. The Advisory Committee, in adding the "fair and just reason" standard to Rule 32(e) in 1983, explained why this cannot be so: "Given the great care with which pleas are taken under [the] revised Rule 11, there is no reason to view pleas so taken as merely `tentative,' subject to withdrawal be- 520US3 Unit: $U57 [09-11-99 17:02:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 670 (1997) 677 Opinion of the Court fore sentence whenever the government cannot estab- lish prejudice. `Were withdrawal automatic in every case where the defendant decided to alter his tactics and present his theory of the case to the jury, the guilty plea would become a mere gesture, a temporary and mean- ingless formality reversible at the defendant's whim. In fact, however, a guilty plea is no such trifle, but a "grave and solemn act," which is "accepted only with care and discernment." ' " Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 794 (quoting United States v. Barker, 514 F. 2d 208, 221 (CADC 1975), in turn quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 748 (1970)). We think the Court of Appeals' holding would degrade the otherwise serious act of pleading guilty into something akin to a move in a game of chess. The basis for the Court of Appeals' decision was its prior statement in Cordova-Perez that "[t]he plea agreement and the [guilty] plea are inextricably bound up together." 65 F. 3d, at 1556 (internal quotation marks omitted). This statement, on its own, is not necessarily incorrect. The guilty plea and the plea agreement are "bound up together" in the sense that a rejection of the agreement simultaneously frees the defendant from his commitment to plead guilty. See Rule 11(e)(4). And since the guilty plea is but one side of the plea agreement, the plea is obviously not wholly inde- pendent of the agreement. But the Rules nowhere state that the guilty plea and the plea agreement must be treated identically. Instead, they explicitly envision a situation in which the defendant per- forms his side of the bargain (the guilty plea) before the Gov- ernment is required to perform its side (here, the motion to dismiss four counts). If the court accepts the agreement and thus the Government's promised performance, then the contemplated agreement is complete and the defendant gets the benefit of his bargain. But if the court rejects the Gov- 520US3 Unit: $U57 [09-11-99 17:02:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 678 UNITED STATES v. HYDE Opinion of the Court ernment's promised performance, then the agreement is ter- minated and the defendant has the right to back out of his promised performance (the guilty plea), just as a binding contractual duty may be extinguished by the nonoccurrence of a condition subsequent. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Law of Contracts § 11­7, p. 441 (3d ed. 1987); 3A A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 628, p. 17 (1960).3 If the Court of Appeals' holding were correct, it would also be difficult to see what purpose Rule 32(e) would serve. Since 1983, that Rule has provided: "If a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . is made before sentence is imposed, the court may permit the plea to be withdrawn if the defendant shows any fair and just reason." Under the Court of Ap- peals' holding, the "fair and just reason" standard would only be applicable between the time that the plea agreement is accepted and the sentence is imposed. Since the decision whether to accept the plea agreement will often be deferred until the sentencing hearing, see Rule 11(e)(2); USSG § 6B1.1(c), at which time the presentence report will have been submitted to the parties, objected to, revised, and filed with the court, see Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32(b)(6), the deci- sion whether to accept the plea agreement will often be made at the same time that the defendant is sentenced. This leaves little, if any, time in which the "fair and just 3 Respondent argues that it is unfair to bind the defendant to the terms of the plea agreement before the Government is so bound. He therefore argues that, as a policy matter, an interpretation of the Rules that results in such a differential treatment should be rejected. Even if respond- ent were correct in arguing that the defendant is bound before the Gov- ernment is bound (a point we do not decide), the fact remains that our task here is not to act as policymaker, deciding how to make the Rules as fair as possible, but rather to determine what the Rules actually provide. Cf. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416, 444­445 (1996) (district court may not use "inherent supervisory power" to correct perceived unfairness in application of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29(a)'s 7-day time limit for filing motions for judgment of acquittal, if use of the power would "circumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure"). 520US3 Unit: $U57 [09-11-99 17:02:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 670 (1997) 679 Opinion of the Court reason" standard would actually apply. We see no indica- tion in the Rules to suggest that Rule 32(e) can be eviscer- ated in this manner, and the Court of Appeals did not point to one. Respondent defends this cramped understanding of Rule 32(e) by arguing that the "fair and just reason" standard was meant to apply only to "fully accepted" guilty pleas, as op- posed to "conditionally accepted" pleas-i. e., pleas that are accepted but later withdrawn under Rule 11(e)(4) if the plea agreement is rejected. He points out that the "fair and just reason" standard was derived from dictum in our pre-Rules opinion in Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220, 224 (1927), see Advisory Committee's Notes on Rule 32, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 794, and that Kercheval spoke of a guilty plea as a final, not a conditional, act, see 274 U. S., at 223 ("A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an extra-judicial confession; it is itself a con- viction. Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence"). He then argues that since the Rule 32(e) standard was derived from Kercheval, the Rule must also have incorporated the Kercheval view that a guilty plea is a final, unconditional act. Thus, since his guilty plea was conditioned on the District Court accepting the plea agree- ment, the Rule simply does not apply. We reject this somewhat tortuous argument. When the "fair and just reason" standard was added in 1983, the Rules already provided that the district court could defer decision on whether to accept the plea agreement, that it could then reject the agreement, and that the defendant would then be able to withdraw his guilty plea. Guilty pleas made pursu- ant to plea agreements were thus already subject to this sort of condition subsequent. Yet neither the new Rule 32(e) nor the Advisory Committee's Notes accompanying it attempted to draw a distinction between "fully accepted" and "con- ditionally accepted" guilty pleas. Instead, the Rule simply 520US3 Unit: $U57 [09-11-99 17:02:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 680 UNITED STATES v. HYDE Opinion of the Court says that the standard applies to motions to withdraw a guilty plea "made before sentence is imposed." Respond- ent's speculation that the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress had the Kercheval view of a guilty plea in mind when Rule 32(e) was amended in 1983 is thus contradicted by the Rules themselves. Respondent's only other substantial argument in defense of the Court of Appeals' holding relies on an interpretation of the Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 32(b)(3). That Rule, concerning presentence reports, provides: "The report must not be submitted to the court or its contents disclosed to anyone unless the defendant has consented in writing, has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, or has been found guilty." This Rule obviously does not deal at all with motions to withdraw guilty pleas, and any comments in the Advisory Committee's Notes to this Rule dealing with plea withdrawal could not alter the meaning of Rules 11 and 32(e) as we have construed them. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore Reversed. 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 681 Syllabus CLINTON v. JONES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit No. 95­1853. Argued January 13, 1997-Decided May 27, 1997 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and Arkansas law to recover damages from petitioner, the current President of the United States, alleging, inter alia, that while he was Governor of Arkansas, petitioner made "abhorrent" sexual advances to her, and that her rejec- tion of those advances led to punishment by her supervisors in the state job she held at the time. Petitioner promptly advised the Federal District Court that he would file a motion to dismiss on Presidential immunity grounds, and requested that all other pleadings and motions be deferred until the immunity issue was resolved. After the court granted that request, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss without preju- dice and to toll any applicable statutes of limitation during his Presi- dency. The District Judge denied dismissal on immunity grounds and ruled that discovery could go forward, but ordered any trial stayed until petitioner's Presidency ended. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dis- missal denial, but reversed the trial postponement as the "functional equivalent" of a grant of temporary immunity to which petitioner was not constitutionally entitled. The court explained that the President, like other officials, is subject to the same laws that apply to all citizens, that no case had been found in which an official was granted immunity from suit for his unofficial acts, and that the rationale for official immu- nity is inapposite where only personal, private conduct by a President is at issue. The court also rejected the argument that, unless immunity is available, the threat of judicial interference with the Executive Branch would violate separation of powers. Held:1. This Court need not address two important constitutional issues not encompassed within the questions presented by the certiorari petition: (1) whether a claim comparable to petitioner's assertion of immunity might succeed in a state tribunal, and (2) whether a court may compel the President's attendance at any specific time or place. Pp. 689­692. 2. Deferral of this litigation until petitioner's Presidency ends is not constitutionally required. Pp. 692­710. (a) Petitioner's principal submission-that in all but the most ex- ceptional cases, the Constitution affords the President temporary immu- 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 682 CLINTON v. JONES Syllabus nity from civil damages litigation arising out of events that occurred before he took office-cannot be sustained on the basis of precedent. The principal rationale for affording Presidents immunity from damages actions based on their official acts-i. e., to enable them to perform their designated functions effectively without fear that a particular decision may give rise to personal liability, see, e. g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 749, 752, and n. 32-provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct. Moreover, immunities for acts clearly within official capacity are grounded in the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. Forrester v. White, 484 U. S. 219, 229. The Court is also unpersuaded by petitioner's historical evidence, which sheds little light on the question at issue, and is largely canceled by conflicting evidence that is itself consistent with both the doctrine of Presidential immunity as set forth in Fitzgerald, and rejec- tion of the immunity claim in this case. Pp. 692­697. (b) The separation-of-powers doctrine does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office. Even accepting the unique importance of the Presidency in the constitutional scheme, it does not follow that that doctrine would be violated by allowing this action to proceed. The doctrine provides a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one of the three coequal branches of Government at the expense of another. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 122. But in this case there is no suggestion that the Federal Judiciary is being asked to perform any function that might in some way be described as "executive." Respond- ent is merely asking the courts to exercise their core Article III jurisdic- tion to decide cases and controversies, and, whatever the outcome, there is no possibility that the decision here will curtail the scope of the Exec- utive Branch's official powers. The Court rejects petitioner's conten- tion that this case-as well as the potential additional litigation that an affirmance of the Eighth Circuit's judgment might spawn-may place unacceptable burdens on the President that will hamper the perform- ance of his official duties. That assertion finds little support either in history, as evidenced by the paucity of suits against sitting Presidents for their private actions, or in the relatively narrow compass of the issues raised in this particular case. Of greater significance, it is settled that the Judiciary may severely burden the Executive Branch by re- viewing the legality of the President's official conduct, see, e. g., Youngs- town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, and may direct appro- priate process to the President himself, see, e. g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683. It must follow that the federal courts have power to determine the legality of the President's unofficial conduct. The rea- 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 683 Syllabus sons for rejecting a categorical rule requiring federal courts to stay private actions during the President's term apply as well to a rule that would, in petitioner's words, require a stay "in all but the most excep- tional cases." Pp. 697­706. (c) Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's ruling, the District Court's stay order was not the "functional equivalent" of an unconstitutional grant of temporary immunity. Rather, the District Court has broad discre- tion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket. See, e. g., Landis v. North American Co., 299 U. S. 248, 254. Moreover, the potential burdens on the President posed by this litiga- tion are appropriate matters for that court to evaluate in its manage- ment of the case, and the high respect owed the Presidency is a matter that should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding. Nevertheless, the District Court's stay decision was an abuse of discretion because it took no account of the importance of respondent's interest in bringing the case to trial, and because it was premature in that there was nothing in the record to enable a judge to assess whether postponement of trial after the completion of discovery would be warranted. Pp. 706­708. (d) The Court is not persuaded of the seriousness of the alleged risks that this decision will generate a large volume of politically motivated harassing and frivolous litigation and that national security concerns might prevent the President from explaining a legitimate need for a continuance, and has confidence in the ability of federal judges to deal with both concerns. If Congress deems it appropriate to afford the President stronger protection, it may respond with legislation. Pp. 708­710. 72 F. 3d 1354, affirmed. Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Gins- burg, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judg- ment, post, p. 710. Robert S. Bennett argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Carl S. Rauh, Alan Kriegel, Amy R. Sabrin, and David A. Strauss. Acting Solicitor General Dellinger argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Malcolm L. Stewart, and Douglas N. Letter. 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 684 CLINTON v. JONES Opinion of the Court Gilbert K. Davis argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Joseph Cammarata.* Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. This case raises a constitutional and a prudential question concerning the Office of the President of the United States. Respondent, a private citizen, seeks to recover damages from the current occupant of that office based on actions allegedly taken before his term began. The President submits that in all but the most exceptional cases the Constitution requires federal courts to defer such litigation until his term ends and that, in any event, respect for the office warrants such a stay. Despite the force of the arguments supporting the Presi- dent's submissions, we conclude that they must be rejected. I Petitioner, William Jefferson Clinton, was elected to the Presidency in 1992, and reelected in 1996. His term of office expires on January 20, 2001. In 1991 he was the Governor of the State of Arkansas. Respondent, Paula Corbin Jones, is a resident of California. In 1991 she lived in Arkansas, and was an employee of the Arkansas Industrial Develop- ment Commission. On May 6, 1994, she commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas by filing a complaint naming petitioner and Danny Ferguson, a former Arkansas State Police officer, as defendants. The *John C. Jeffries, Jr., and Pamela S. Karlan filed a brief for Law Pro- fessors as amicus curiae urging reversal. Christopher A. Hansen and Steven R. Shapiro filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amicus curiae were filed for the Coalition of American Veter- ans by Laurence A. Elgin; and for Law Professors by Ronald D. Rotunda, Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Stephen B. Burbank, William Cohen, Geoffrey P. Miller, Robert F. Nagel, and Richard Parker. 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 685 Opinion of the Court complaint alleges two federal claims, and two state-law claims over which the federal court has jurisdiction because of the diverse citizenship of the parties.1 As the case comes to us, we are required to assume the truth of the detailed- but as yet untested-factual allegations in the complaint. Those allegations principally describe events that are said to have occurred on the afternoon of May 8, 1991, during an official conference held at the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Governor delivered a speech at the confer- ence; respondent-working as a state employee-staffed the registration desk. She alleges that Ferguson persuaded her to leave her desk and to visit the Governor in a business suite at the hotel, where he made "abhorrent" 2 sexual ad- vances that she vehemently rejected. She further claims that her superiors at work subsequently dealt with her in a hostile and rude manner, and changed her duties to punish her for rejecting those advances. Finally, she alleges that after petitioner was elected President, Ferguson defamed her by making a statement to a reporter that implied she had accepted petitioner's alleged overtures, and that various persons authorized to speak for the President publicly branded her a liar by denying that the incident had occurred. Respondent seeks actual damages of $75,000 and punitive damages of $100,000. Her complaint contains four counts. The first charges that petitioner, acting under color of state law, deprived her of rights protected by the Constitution, in violation of Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The second charges that petitioner and Ferguson engaged in a conspir- acy to violate her federal rights, also actionable under fed- eral law. See Rev. Stat. § 1980, 42 U. S. C. § 1985. The third is a state common-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, grounded primarily on the incident at the 1 See 28 U. S. C. § 1332. Jurisdiction over the federal claims is author- ized by 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 2 Complaint ¶ 26. 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 686 CLINTON v. JONES Opinion of the Court hotel. The fourth count, also based on state law, is for defa- mation, embracing both the comments allegedly made to the press by Ferguson and the statements of petitioner's agents. Inasmuch as the legal sufficiency of the claims has not yet been challenged, we assume, without deciding, that each of the four counts states a cause of action as a matter of law. With the exception of the last charge, which arguably may involve conduct within the outer perimeter of the President's official responsibilities, it is perfectly clear that the alleged misconduct of petitioner was unrelated to any of his official duties as President of the United States and, indeed, oc- curred before he was elected to that office.3 II In response to the complaint, petitioner promptly advised the District Court that he intended to file a motion to dismiss on grounds of Presidential immunity, and requested the court to defer all other pleadings and motions until after the immu- nity issue was resolved.4 Relying on our cases holding that immunity questions should be decided at the earliest possible stage of the litigation, 858 F. Supp. 902, 905 (ED Ark. 1994), our recognition of the " `singular importance of the Presi- dent's duties,' " id., at 904 (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 751 (1982)), and the fact that the question did not require any analysis of the allegations of the complaint, 858 F. Supp., at 905, the court granted the request. Petitioner thereupon filed a motion "to dismiss . . . without prejudice and to toll any statutes of limitation [that may be applicable] until he is no longer President, at which time the plaintiff 3 As the matter is not before us, see Jones v. Clinton, 72 F. 3d 1354, 1359, n. 7 (CA8 1996), we do not address the question whether the Presi- dent's immunity from damages liability for acts taken within the "outer perimeter" of his official responsibilities provides a defense to the fourth count of the complaint. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 756 (1982). 4 Record, Doc. No. 9; see 858 F. Supp. 902, 904 (ED Ark. 1994). 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 687 Opinion of the Court may refile the instant suit." Record, Doc. No. 17. Exten- sive submissions were made to the District Court by the parties and the Department of Justice.5 The District Judge denied the motion to dismiss on immu- nity grounds and ruled that discovery in the case could go forward, but ordered any trial stayed until the end of peti- tioner's Presidency. 869 F. Supp. 690 (ED Ark. 1994). Al- though she recognized that a "thin majority" in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731 (1982), had held that "the President has absolute immunity from civil damage actions arising out of the execution of official duties of office," she was not con- vinced that "a President has absolute immunity from civil causes of action arising prior to assuming the office." 6 She was, however, persuaded by some of the reasoning in our opinion in Fitzgerald that deferring the trial if one were required would be appropriate.7 869 F. Supp., at 699­700. Relying in part on the fact that respondent had failed to bring her complaint until two days before the 3-year period of limitations expired, she concluded that the public interest in avoiding litigation that might hamper the President in conducting the duties of his office outweighed any demon- strated need for an immediate trial. Id., at 698­699. Both parties appealed. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss, but because it regarded the order postponing the trial until the 5 See App. to Pet. for Cert. 53. 6 869 F. Supp., at 698. She explained: "Nowhere in the Constitution, congressional acts, or the writings of any judge or scholar, may any credi- ble support for such a proposition be found. It is contrary to our form of government, which asserts as did the English in the Magna Carta and the Petition of Right, that even the sovereign is subject to God and the law." Ibid. 7 Although, as noted above, the District Court's initial order permitted discovery to go forward, the court later stayed discovery pending the out- come of the appeals on the immunity issue. 879 F. Supp. 86 (ED Ark. 1995). 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 688 CLINTON v. JONES Opinion of the Court President leaves office as the "functional equivalent" of a grant of temporary immunity, it reversed that order. 72 F. 3d 1354, 1361, n. 9, 1363 (CA8 1996). Writing for the major- ity, Judge Bowman explained that "the President, like all other government officials, is subject to the same laws that apply to all other members of our society," id., at 1358, that he could find no "case in which any public official ever has been granted any immunity from suit for his unofficial acts," ibid., and that the rationale for official immunity "is inappo- site where only personal, private conduct by a President is at issue," id., at 1360. The majority specifically rejected the argument that, unless immunity is available, the threat of judicial interference with the Executive Branch through scheduling orders, potential contempt citations, and sanc- tions would violate separation-of-powers principles. Judge Bowman suggested that "judicial case management sensitive to the burdens of the presidency and the demands of the President's schedule" would avoid the perceived danger. Id., at 1361. In dissent, Judge Ross submitted that even though the holding in Fitzgerald involved official acts, the logic of the opinion, which "placed primary reliance on the prospect that the President's discharge of his constitutional powers and duties would be impaired if he were subject to suits for damages," applies with equal force to this case. 72 F. 3d, at 1367. In his view, "unless exigent circumstances can be shown," all private actions for damages against a sitting President must be stayed until the completion of his term. Ibid. In this case, Judge Ross saw no reason why the stay would prevent respondent from ultimately obtaining an adju- dication of her claims. In response to the dissent, Judge Beam wrote a separate concurrence. He suggested that a prolonged delay may well create a significant risk of irreparable harm to respondent because of an unforeseeable loss of evidence or the possible 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 689 Opinion of the Court death of a party. Id., at 1363­1364. Moreover, he argued that in civil rights cases brought under § 1983 there is a "pub- lic interest in an ordinary citizen's timely vindication of . . . her most fundamental right against alleged abuse of power by government officials." Id., at 1365. In his view, the dis- sent's concern about judicial interference with the function- ing of the Presidency was "greatly overstated." Ibid. Nei- ther the involvement of prior Presidents in litigation, either as parties or as witnesses, nor the character of this "rela- tively uncomplicated civil litigation," indicated that the threat was serious. Id., at 1365­1366. Finally, he saw "no basis for staying discovery or trial of the claims against Trooper Ferguson." Id., at 1366.8 III The President, represented by private counsel, filed a peti- tion for certiorari. The Acting Solicitor General, represent- ing the United States, supported the petition, arguing that the decision of the Court of Appeals was "fundamentally mis- taken" and created "serious risks for the institution of the Presidency." 9 In her brief in opposition to certiorari, re- spondent argued that this "one-of-a-kind case is singularly inappropriate" for the exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction because it did not create any conflict among the Courts of Appeals, it "does not pose any conceivable threat to the func- tioning of the Executive Branch," and there is no precedent supporting the President's position.10 While our decision to grant the petition, 518 U. S. 1016 (1996), expressed no judgment concerning the merits of the case, it does reflect our appraisal of its importance. The 8 Over the dissent of Judge McMillian, the Court of Appeals denied a suggestion for rehearing en banc. 81 F. 3d 78 (CA8 1996). 9 Brief for United States in Support of Petition 5. 10 Brief in Opposition 8, 10, 23. 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 690 CLINTON v. JONES Opinion of the Court representations made on behalf of the Executive Branch as to the potential impact of the precedent established by the Court of Appeals merit our respectful and deliberate consideration. It is true that we have often stressed the importance of avoiding the premature adjudication of constitutional ques- tions.11 That doctrine of avoidance, however, is applicable to the entire Federal Judiciary, not just to this Court, cf. Ari- zonans for Official English v. Arizona, ante, p. 43, and comes into play after the court has acquired jurisdiction of a case. It does not dictate a discretionary denial of every certiorari petition raising a novel constitutional question. It does, however, make it appropriate to identify two important con- stitutional issues not encompassed within the questions pre- sented by the petition for certiorari that we need not address today.12 11 As we have explained: " `If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.' Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105 [(1944)]. It has long been the Court's `considered practice not to decide abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions . . . or to de- cide any constitutional question in advance of the necessity for its deci- sion . . . or to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is re- quired by the precise facts to which it is to be applied . . . or to decide any constitutional question except with reference to the particular facts to which it is to be applied . . . .' Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450, 461 [(1945)]. `It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.' Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 295 [(1905)]." Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U. S. 549, 570, n. 34 (1947). 12 The two questions presented in the certiorari petition are: "1. Whether the litigation of a private civil damages action against an incumbent President must in all but the most exceptional cases be de- ferred until the President leaves office"; and "2. Whether a district court, 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 691 Opinion of the Court First, because the claim of immunity is asserted in a fed- eral court and relies heavily on the doctrine of separation of powers that restrains each of the three branches of the Federal Government from encroaching on the domain of the other two, see, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam), it is not necessary to consider or decide whether a comparable claim might succeed in a state tribu- nal. If this case were being heard in a state forum, instead of advancing a separation-of-powers argument, petitioner would presumably rely on federalism and comity concerns,13 as well as the interest in protecting federal officials from possible local prejudice that underlies the authority to re- move certain cases brought against federal officers from a state to a federal court, see 28 U. S. C. § 1442(a); Mesa v. California, 489 U. S. 121, 125­126 (1989). Whether those concerns would present a more compelling case for immunity is a question that is not before us. Second, our decision rejecting the immunity claim and allowing the case to proceed does not require us to confront the question whether a court may compel the attendance of the President at any specific time or place. We assume that the testimony of the President, both for discovery and for use at trial, may be taken at the White House at a time that as a proper exercise of judicial discretion, may stay such litigation until the President leaves office." Our review is confined to these issues. See this Court's Rule 14.1(a). 13 Because the Supremacy Clause makes federal law "the supreme Law of the Land," Art. VI, cl. 2, any direct control by a state court over the President, who has principal responsibility to ensure that those laws are "faithfully executed," Art. II, § 3, may implicate concerns that are quite different from the interbranch separation-of-powers questions addressed here. Cf., e. g., Hancock v. Train, 426 U. S. 167, 178­179 (1976); Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441, 445 (1943). See L. Tribe, American Constitu- tional Law 513 (2d ed. 1988) ("[A]bsent explicit congressional consent no state may command federal officials . . . to take action in derogation of their . . . federal responsibilities"). 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 692 CLINTON v. JONES Opinion of the Court will accommodate his busy schedule, and that, if a trial is held, there would be no necessity for the President to attend in person, though he could elect to do so.14 IV Petitioner's principal submission-that "in all but the most exceptional cases," Brief for Petitioner i, the Constitution affords the President temporary immunity from civil dam- ages litigation arising out of events that occurred before he took office-cannot be sustained on the basis of precedent. Only three sitting Presidents have been defendants in civil litigation involving their actions prior to taking office. Complaints against Theodore Roosevelt and Harry Truman had been dismissed before they took office; the dismissals were affirmed after their respective inaugurations.15 Two companion cases arising out of an automobile accident were filed against John F. Kennedy in 1960 during the Presidential campaign.16 After taking office, he unsuccessfully argued that his status as Commander in Chief gave him a right to a stay under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U. S. C. App. §§ 501­525. The motion for a stay was de- nied by the District Court, and the matter was settled out of court.17 Thus, none of those cases sheds any light on the constitutional issue before us. The principal rationale for affording certain public serv- ants immunity from suits for money damages arising out of 14 Although Presidents have responded to written interrogatories, given depositions, and provided videotaped trial testimony, see infra, at 704­ 705, no sitting President has ever testified, or been ordered to testify, in open court. 15 See People ex rel. Hurley v. Roosevelt, 179 N. Y. 544, 71 N. E. 1137 (1904); DeVault v. Truman, 354 Mo. 1193, 194 S. W. 2d 29 (1946). 16 See Complaints in Bailey v. Kennedy, No. 757,200, and Hills v. Ken- nedy, No. 757,201 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed Oct. 27, 1960). 17 See 72 F. 3d, at 1362, n. 10. 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 693 Opinion of the Court their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct. In cases involving prosecutors, legislators, and judges we have repeatedly explained that the immunity serves the public in- terest in enabling such officials to perform their designated functions effectively without fear that a particular decision may give rise to personal liability.18 We explained in Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193 (1979): "As public servants, the prosecutor and the judge repre- sent the interest of society as a whole. The conduct of their official duties may adversely affect a wide variety of different individuals, each of whom may be a potential source of future controversy. The societal interest in providing such public officials with the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with the public at large has long been recognized as an acceptable justification for official immunity. The point of immunity for such officials is to forestall an atmosphere of intimidation that would conflict with their resolve to perform their designated functions in a principled fashion." Id., at 202­204. That rationale provided the principal basis for our holding that a former President of the United States was "entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts," Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 749. See id., at 752 (citing Ferri v. Ackerman). Our central concern was to 18 Some of these cases defined the immunities of state and local officials in actions filed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 422­423 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity); Tenney v. Brand- hove, 341 U. S. 367, 376­377 (1951) (legislative immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554­555 (1967) (judicial immunity). The rationale under- lying our official immunity jurisprudence in cases alleging constitutional violations brought against federal officials is similar. See, e. g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 500­501 (1978). 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 694 CLINTON v. JONES Opinion of the Court avoid rendering the President "unduly cautious in the dis- charge of his official duties." 457 U. S., at 752, n. 32.19 This reasoning provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct. As we explained in Fitzgerald, "the sphere of protected action must be related closely to the im- munity's justifying purposes." Id., at 755. Because of the President's broad responsibilities, we recognized in that case an immunity from damages claims arising out of official acts extending to the "outer perimeter of his authority." Id., at 757. But we have never suggested that the President, or any other official, has an immunity that extends beyond the scope of any action taken in an official capacity. See id., at 759 (Burger, C. J., concurring) (noting that "a President, like Members of Congress, judges, prosecutors, or congressional aides-all having absolute immunity-are not immune for acts outside official duties"); see also id., at 761, n. 4. Moreover, when defining the scope of an immunity for acts clearly taken within an official capacity, we have applied a functional approach. "Frequently our decisions have held that an official's absolute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions of his office." Id., at 755. Hence, for example, a judge's absolute immunity does not extend to actions performed in a purely administra- 19 Petitioner draws our attention to dicta in Fitzgerald, which he sug- gests are helpful to his cause. We noted there that "[b]ecause of the sin- gular importance of the President's duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government," 457 U. S., at 751, and suggested further that "[c]ognizance of . . . personal vulnerability frequently could distract a Pres- ident from his public duties," id., at 753. Petitioner argues that in this aspect the Court's concern was parallel to the issue he suggests is of great importance in this case, the possibility that a sitting President might be distracted by the need to participate in litigation during the pendency of his office. In context, however, it is clear that our dominant concern was with the diversion of the President's attention during the decisionmaking process caused by needless worry as to the possibility of damages actions stemming from any particular official decision. Moreover, Fitzgerald did not present the issue raised in this case because that decision involved claims against a former President. 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 695 Opinion of the Court tive capacity. See Forrester v. White, 484 U. S. 219, 229­230 (1988). As our opinions have made clear, immunities are grounded in "the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it." Id., at 229. Petitioner's effort to construct an immunity from suit for unofficial acts grounded purely in the identity of his office is unsupported by precedent. V We are also unpersuaded by the evidence from the histori- cal record to which petitioner has called our attention. He points to a comment by Thomas Jefferson protesting the sub- poena duces tecum Chief Justice Marshall directed to him in the Burr trial,20 a statement in the diaries kept by Senator William Maclay of the first Senate debates, in which then- Vice President John Adams and Senator Oliver Ellsworth are recorded as having said that "the President personally [is] not . . . subject to any process whatever," lest it be "put . . . in the power of a common Justice to exercise any Author- ity over him and Stop the Whole Machine of Government," 21 and to a quotation from Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution.22 None of these sources sheds much light on the question at hand.23 20 In Jefferson's view, the subpoena jeopardized the separation of powers by subjecting the Executive Branch to judicial command. See 10 Works of Thomas Jefferson 404, n. (P. Ford ed. 1905); Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 751, n. 31 (quoting Jefferson's comments). 21 9 Documentary History of First Federal Congress of the United States 168 (K. Bowling & H. Veit eds. 1988) (Diary of William Maclay). 22 See 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1563, pp. 418­419 (1833). 23 Jefferson's argument provides little support for petitioner's position. As we explain later, the prerogative Jefferson claimed was denied him by the Chief Justice in the very decision Jefferson was protesting, and this Court has subsequently reaffirmed that holding. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974). The statements supporting a similar proposi- tion recorded in Senator Maclay's diary are inconclusive of the issue before us here for the same reason. In addition, this material is hardly proof of the unequivocal common understanding at the time of the founding. Immediately after mentioning the positions of Adams and Ellsworth, 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 696 CLINTON v. JONES Opinion of the Court Respondent, in turn, has called our attention to conflicting historical evidence. Speaking in favor of the Constitution's adoption at the Pennsylvania Convention, James Wilson- who had participated in the Philadelphia Convention at which the document was drafted-explained that, although the President "is placed [on] high," "not a single privilege is annexed to his character; far from being above the laws, he is amenable to them in his private character as a citizen, and in his public character by impeachment." 2 J. Elliot, De- bates on the Federal Constitution 480 (2d ed. 1863) (emphasis deleted). This description is consistent with both the doc- trine of Presidential immunity as set forth in Fitzgerald and rejection of the immunity claim in this case. With respect to acts taken in his "public character"-that is, official acts- the President may be disciplined principally by impeach- ment, not by private lawsuits for damages. But he is other- wise subject to the laws for his purely private acts. In the end, as applied to the particular question before us, we reach the same conclusion about these historical materi- als that Justice Jackson described when confronted with an issue concerning the dimensions of the President's power. Maclay went on to point out in his diary that he virulently disagreed with them, concluding that his opponents' view "[s]hows clearly how amazingly fond of the old leven many People are." Diary of Maclay 168. Finally, Justice Story's comments in his constitutional law treatise pro- vide no substantial support for petitioner's position. Story wrote that because the President's "incidental powers" must include "the power to perform [his duties], without any obstruction," he "cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess an official inviolability." 3 Story § 1563, at 418­419 (emphasis added). Story said only that "an official inviolabil- ity," ibid. (emphasis added), was necessary to preserve the President's ability to perform the functions of the office; he did not specify the dimen- sions of the necessary immunity. While we have held that an immunity from suits grounded on official acts is necessary to serve this purpose, see Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 749, it does not follow that the broad immunity from all civil damages suits that petitioner seeks is also necessary. 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 697 Opinion of the Court "Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envi- sioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharoah. A century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on each side . . . . They largely cancel each other." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 634­635 (1952) (concurring opinion). VI Petitioner's strongest argument supporting his immunity claim is based on the text and structure of the Constitution. He does not contend that the occupant of the Office of the President is "above the law," in the sense that his conduct is entirely immune from judicial scrutiny.24 The President argues merely for a postponement of the judicial proceedings that will determine whether he violated any law. His argu- ment is grounded in the character of the office that was created by Article II of the Constitution, and relies on separation-of-powers principles that have structured our constitutional arrangement since the founding. As a starting premise, petitioner contends that he occupies a unique office with powers and responsibilities so vast and important that the public interest demands that he devote his undivided time and attention to his public duties. He submits that-given the nature of the office-the doctrine of separation of powers places limits on the authority of the 24 For that reason, the argument does not place any reliance on the Eng- lish ancestry that informs our common-law jurisprudence; he does not claim the prerogatives of the monarchs who asserted that "[t]he King can do no wrong." See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *246. Although we have adopted the related doctrine of sovereign immunity, the common-law fiction that "[t]he king . . . is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong," ibid., was rejected at the birth of the Republic. See, e. g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 415, and nn. 7­8 (1979); Langford v. United States, 101 U. S. 341, 342­343 (1880). 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 698 CLINTON v. JONES Opinion of the Court Federal Judiciary to interfere with the Executive Branch that would be transgressed by allowing this action to proceed. We have no dispute with the initial premise of the ar- gument. Former Presidents, from George Washington to George Bush, have consistently endorsed petitioner's charac- terization of the office.25 After serving his term, Lyndon Johnson observed: "Of all the 1,886 nights I was President, there were not many when I got to sleep before 1 or 2 a.m., and there were few mornings when I didn't wake up by 6 or 6:30." 26 In 1967, the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the Con- stitution was adopted to ensure continuity in the per- formance of the powers and duties of the office; 27 one of the sponsors of that Amendment stressed the importance of pro- viding that "at all times" there be a President "who has com- plete control and will be able to perform" those duties.28 As Justice Jackson has pointed out, the Presidency concentrates executive authority "in a single head in whose choice the whole Nation has a part, making him the focus of public hopes and expectations. In drama, magnitude and finality his decisions so far overshadow any others that almost alone he fills the public eye and ear." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S., at 653 (concurring opinion). We have, in short, long recognized the "unique position in the constitutional scheme" that this office occupies. Fitzgerald, 25 See, e. g., A. Tourtellot, The Presidents on the Presidency 346­374 (1964) (citing comments of, among others, George Washington, John Quincy Adams, Benjamin Harrison, Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson); H. Finer, The Presidency: Crisis and Regener- ation 35­37 (1960) (citing similar remarks by a number of Presidents, in- cluding James Monroe, James K. Polk, and Harry Truman). 26 L. Johnson, The Vantage Point 425 (1971). 27 The Amendment sets forth, inter alia, an elaborate procedure for Presidential succession in the event that the Chief Executive becomes in- capacitated. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 25, §§ 3­4. 28 111 Cong. Rec. 15595 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 699 Opinion of the Court 457 U. S., at 749.29 Thus, while we suspect that even in our modern era there remains some truth to Chief Justice Mar- shall's suggestion that the duties of the Presidency are not entirely "unremitting," United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807), we accept the initial premise of the Executive's argument. It does not follow, however, that separation-of-powers principles would be violated by allowing this action to pro- ceed. The doctrine of separation of powers is concerned with the allocation of official power among the three coequal branches of our Government. The Framers "built into the tripartite Federal Government . . . a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 122.30 Thus, for example, the Congress may not exercise the judicial power to revise final judgments, Plaut v. Spendthrift 29 We noted in Fitzgerald: "Article II, § 1, of the Constitution provides that `[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States . . . .' This grant of authority establishes the President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These in- clude the enforcement of federal law-it is the President who is charged constitutionally to `take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed'; the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in which the Court has recognized that `[i]t would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on infor- mation properly held secret'; and management of the Executive Branch- a task for which `imperative reasons requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove the most important of his subordinates in their most important duties.' " 457 U. S., at 749­750 (footnotes omitted). 30 See Loving v. United States, 517 U. S. 748, 756­757 (1996); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 382 (1989) ("[C]oncern of encroachment and aggrandizement . . . has animated our separation-of-powers jurispru- dence"); The Federalist No. 51, p. 349 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist en- croachments of the others"). 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 700 CLINTON v. JONES Opinion of the Court Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211 (1995),31 or the executive power to manage an airport, see Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U. S. 252, 276 (1991) (holding that "[i]f the power is exec- utive, the Constitution does not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it").32 See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928) (Congress may not "invest itself or its members with either executive power or judicial power"). Similarly, the President may not exercise the leg- islative power to authorize the seizure of private property for public use. Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 588. And, the ju- dicial power to decide cases and controversies does not in- clude the provision of purely advisory opinions to the Execu- tive,33 or permit the federal courts to resolve nonjusticiable questions.34 31 See also United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 147 (1872) (noting that Congress had "inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legisla- tive from the judicial power"). 32 See also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 726 (1986) ("structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws"). Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 958 (1983); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 202­203 (1928). 33 See United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40 (1852); Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792). As we explained in Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 113 (1948): "This Court early and wisely determined that it would not give advisory opinions even when asked by the Chief Executive." More generally, "we have broadly stated that `executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on judges holding office under Art. III of the Constitution.' " Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 677 (1988) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 123 (1976) (per curiam)). These restrictions on judicial ac- tivities "help ensure the independence of the Judicial Branch and to pre- vent the Judiciary from encroaching into areas reserved for the other branches." 487 U. S., at 678; see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S., at 385. 34 We have long held that the federal courts may not resolve such mat- ters. See, e. g., Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849). As we explained in Nixon v. United States, 506 U. S. 224 (1993): "A controversy is nonjusticia- ble-i. e., involves a political question-where there is a `textually demon- 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 701 Opinion of the Court Of course the lines between the powers of the three branches are not always neatly defined. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 380­381 (1989).35 But in this case there is no suggestion that the Federal Judiciary is being asked to perform any function that might in some way be described as "executive." Respondent is merely asking the courts to exercise their core Article III jurisdiction to decide cases and controversies. Whatever the outcome of this case, there is no possibility that the decision will curtail the scope of the official powers of the Executive Branch. The litigation of questions that relate entirely to the unoffi- cial conduct of the individual who happens to be the Presi- dent poses no perceptible risk of misallocation of either judi- cial power or executive power. Rather than arguing that the decision of the case will produce either an aggrandizement of judicial power or a narrowing of executive power, petitioner contends that-as a byproduct of an otherwise traditional exercise of judicial power-burdens will be placed on the President that will hamper the performance of his official duties. We have rec- ognized that "[e]ven when a branch does not arrogate power to itself . . . the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its consti- tutional duties." Loving v. United States, 517 U. S. 748, 757 (1996); see also Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977). As a factual matter, petitioner contends that this particular case-as well as the potential strable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it . . . .' Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 (1962). But the courts must, in the first instance, interpret the text in question and deter- mine whether and to what extent the issue is textually committed. See ibid.; Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 519 (1969)." Id., at 228. 35 See also Olson, 487 U. S., at 693­694; Nixon v. Administrator of Gen- eral Services, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 707 (1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 702 CLINTON v. JONES Opinion of the Court additional litigation that an affirmance of the Court of Ap- peals judgment might spawn-may impose an unacceptable burden on the President's time and energy, and thereby im- pair the effective performance of his office. Petitioner's predictive judgment finds little support in either history or the relatively narrow compass of the issues raised in this particular case. As we have already noted, in the more than 200-year history of the Republic, only three sitting Presidents have been subjected to suits for their pri- vate actions.36 See supra, at 692. If the past is any indi- cator, it seems unlikely that a deluge of such litigation will ever engulf the Presidency. As for the case at hand, if prop- erly managed by the District Court, it appears to us highly unlikely to occupy any substantial amount of petitioner's time. Of greater significance, petitioner errs by presuming that interactions between the Judicial Branch and the Executive, even quite burdensome interactions, necessarily rise to the level of constitutionally forbidden impairment of the Execu- tive's ability to perform its constitutionally mandated func- tions. "[O]ur . . . system imposes upon the Branches a de- gree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as independence the absence of which `would pre- clude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing it- self effectively.' " Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 381 (quoting Buck- 36 In Fitzgerald, we were able to discount the lack of historical support for the proposition that official-capacity actions against the President posed a serious threat to the office on the ground that a right to sue federal officials for damages as a result of constitutional violations had only recently been recognized. See 457 U. S., at 753, n. 33; Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). The situation with respect to suits against the President for actions taken in his private ca- pacity is quite different because such suits may be grounded on legal theo- ries that have always been applicable to any potential defendant. More- over, because the President has contact with far fewer people in his private life than in his official capacity, the class of potential plaintiffs is considerably smaller and the risk of litigation less intense. 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 703 Opinion of the Court ley, 424 U. S., at 121). As Madison explained, separation of powers does not mean that the branches "ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other." 37 The fact that a federal court's exercise of its tradi- tional Article III jurisdiction may significantly burden the time and attention of the Chief Executive is not sufficient to establish a violation of the Constitution. Two long-settled propositions, first announced by Chief Justice Marshall, sup- port that conclusion. First, we have long held that when the President takes official action, the Court has the authority to determine whether he has acted within the law. Perhaps the most dra- matic example of such a case is our holding that President Truman exceeded his constitutional authority when he is- sued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation's steel mills in order to avert a national catastrophe. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). Despite the seri- ous impact of that decision on the ability of the Executive Branch to accomplish its assigned mission, and the substan- tial time that the President must necessarily have devoted to the matter as a result of judicial involvement, we exer- cised our Article III jurisdiction to decide whether his official conduct conformed to the law. Our holding was an applica- tion of the principle established in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id., at 177. Second, it is also settled that the President is subject to judicial process in appropriate circumstances. Although Thomas Jefferson apparently thought otherwise, Chief Jus- tice Marshall, when presiding in the treason trial of Aaron Burr, ruled that a subpoena duces tecum could be directed 37 The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325­326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). See Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 381; Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S., at 442, n. 5. 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 704 CLINTON v. JONES Opinion of the Court to the President. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807).38 We unequivocally and em- phatically endorsed Marshall's position when we held that President Nixon was obligated to comply with a subpoena commanding him to produce certain tape recordings of his conversations with his aides. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974). As we explained, "neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an ab- solute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances." Id., at 706.39 Sitting Presidents have responded to court orders to pro- vide testimony and other information with sufficient fre- quency that such interactions between the Judicial and Exec- utive Branches can scarcely be thought a novelty. President Monroe responded to written interrogatories, see Rotunda, Presidents and Ex-Presidents as Witnesses: A Brief Histori- cal Footnote, 1975 U. Ill. L. Forum 1, 5­6, President Nixon- as noted above-produced tapes in response to a subpoena 38 After the decision was rendered, Jefferson expressed his distress in a letter to a prosecutor at the trial, noting that "[t]he Constitution enjoins [the President's] constant agency in the concerns of 6. millions of people." 10 Works of Thomas Jefferson 404, n. (P. Ford ed. 1905). He asked: "Is the law paramount to this, which calls on him on behalf of a single one?" Ibid.; see also Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 751­752, n. 31 (quoting Jefferson's comments at length). For Chief Justice Marshall, the answer-quite plainly-was yes. 39 Of course, it does not follow that a court may " `proceed against the president as against an ordinary individual,' " United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 715 (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (No. 14,694) (CC Va. 1807)). Special caution is appropriate if the materials or testi- mony sought by the court relate to a President's official activities, with respect to which "[t]he interest in preserving confidentiality is weighty indeed and entitled to great respect." 418 U. S., at 712. We have made clear that in a criminal case the powerful interest in the "fair administra- tion of criminal justice" requires that the evidence be given under appro- priate circumstances lest the "very integrity of the judicial system" be eroded. Id., at 709, 711­712. 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 705 Opinion of the Court duces tecum, see United States v. Nixon, President Ford complied with an order to give a deposition in a criminal trial, United States v. Fromme, 405 F. Supp. 578 (ED Cal. 1975), and President Clinton has twice given videotaped testimony in criminal proceedings, see United States v. Mc- Dougal, 934 F. Supp. 296 (ED Ark. 1996); United States v. Branscum, No. LRP­CR­96­49 (ED Ark., June 7, 1996). Moreover, sitting Presidents have also voluntarily complied with judicial requests for testimony. President Grant gave a lengthy deposition in a criminal case under such circum- stances, 1 R. Rotunda & J. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 7.1 (2d ed. 1992), and President Carter similarly gave videotaped testimony for use at a criminal trial, id., § 7.1(b) (Supp. 1997). In sum, "[i]t is settled law that the separation-of-powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the United States." Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 753­754. If the Judiciary may severely burden the Execu- tive Branch by reviewing the legality of the President's offi- cial conduct, and if it may direct appropriate process to the President himself, it must follow that the federal courts have power to determine the legality of his unofficial conduct. The burden on the President's time and energy that is a mere byproduct of such review surely cannot be considered as onerous as the direct burden imposed by judicial review and the occasional invalidation of his official actions.40 We there- fore hold that the doctrine of separation of powers does not 40 There is, no doubt, some truth to Learned Hand's comment that a lawsuit should be "dread[ed] . . . beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death." 3 Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Lectures on Legal Topics 105 (1926). We recognize that a President, like any other official or private citizen, may become distracted or preoccupied by pending litigation. Presidents and other officials face a variety of demands on their time, however, some private, some political, and some as a result of official duty. While such distractions may be vexing to those subjected to them, they do not ordinarily implicate constitutional separation-of-powers concerns. 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 706 CLINTON v. JONES Opinion of the Court require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office. The reasons for rejecting such a categorical rule apply as well to a rule that would require a stay "in all but the most exceptional cases." Brief for Petitioner i. Indeed, if the Framers of the Constitution had thought it necessary to pro- tect the President from the burdens of private litigation, we think it far more likely that they would have adopted a cate- gorical rule than a rule that required the President to liti- gate the question whether a specific case belonged in the "exceptional case" subcategory. In all events, the question whether a specific case should receive exceptional treatment is more appropriately the subject of the exercise of judicial discretion than an interpretation of the Constitution. Ac- cordingly, we turn to the question whether the District Court's decision to stay the trial until after petitioner leaves office was an abuse of discretion. VII The Court of Appeals described the District Court's dis- cretionary decision to stay the trial as the "functional equiva- lent" of a grant of temporary immunity. 72 F. 3d, at 1361, n. 9. Concluding that petitioner was not constitutionally entitled to such an immunity, the court held that it was error to grant the stay. Ibid. Although we ultimately conclude that the stay should not have been granted, we think the issue is more difficult than the opinion of the Court of Ap- peals suggests. Strictly speaking the stay was not the functional equiva- lent of the constitutional immunity that petitioner claimed, because the District Court ordered discovery to proceed. Moreover, a stay of either the trial or discovery might be justified by considerations that do not require the recogni- tion of any constitutional immunity. The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket. See, e. g., Landis v. North 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 707 Opinion of the Court American Co., 299 U. S. 248, 254 (1936). As we have ex- plained, "[e]specially in cases of extraordinary public mo- ment, [a plaintiff] may be required to submit to delay not immoderate in extent and not oppressive in its consequences if the public welfare or convenience will thereby be pro- moted." Id., at 256. Although we have rejected the argu- ment that the potential burdens on the President violate separation-of-powers principles, those burdens are appro- priate matters for the District Court to evaluate in its man- agement of the case. The high respect that is owed to the office of the Chief Executive, though not justifying a rule of categorical immunity, is a matter that should inform the con- duct of the entire proceeding, including the timing and scope of discovery.41 Nevertheless, we are persuaded that it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to defer the trial until after the President leaves office. Such a lengthy and categorical stay takes no account whatever of the respondent's interest in bringing the case to trial. The complaint was filed within the statutory limitations period-albeit near the end of that period-and delaying trial would increase the danger of 41 Although these claims are in fact analytically distinct, the District Court does not appear to have drawn that distinction. Rather than bas- ing its decision on particular factual findings that might have buttressed an exercise of discretion, the District Court instead suggested that a dis- cretionary stay was supported by the legal conclusion that such a stay was required by Fitzgerald. See 869 F. Supp., at 699. We therefore re- ject petitioner's argument that we lack jurisdiction over respondent's cross-appeal from the District Court's alternative holding that its decision was "also permitted," inter alia, "under the equity powers of the Court." Ibid. The Court of Appeals correctly found that pendent appellate juris- diction over this issue was proper. See 72 F. 3d, at 1357, n. 4. The Dis- trict Court's legal ruling that the President was protected by a temporary immunity from trial-but not discovery-was "inextricably intertwined," Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U. S. 35, 51 (1995), with its sug- gestion that a discretionary stay having the same effect might be proper; indeed, "review of the [latter] decision [is] necessary to ensure meaningful review of the [former]," ibid. 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 708 CLINTON v. JONES Opinion of the Court prejudice resulting from the loss of evidence, including the inability of witnesses to recall specific facts, or the possible death of a party. The decision to postpone the trial was, furthermore, pre- mature. The proponent of a stay bears the burden of estab- lishing its need. Id., at 255. In this case, at the stage at which the District Court made its ruling, there was no way to assess whether a stay of trial after the completion of dis- covery would be warranted. Other than the fact that a trial may consume some of the President's time and attention, there is nothing in the record to enable a judge to assess the potential harm that may ensue from scheduling the trial promptly after discovery is concluded. We think the Dis- trict Court may have given undue weight to the concern that a trial might generate unrelated civil actions that could con- ceivably hamper the President in conducting the duties of his office. If and when that should occur, the court's discre- tion would permit it to manage those actions in such fashion (including deferral of trial) that interference with the Presi- dent's duties would not occur. But no such impingement upon the President's conduct of his office was shown here. VIII We add a final comment on two matters that are discussed at length in the briefs: the risk that our decision will gener- ate a large volume of politically motivated harassing and frivolous litigation, and the danger that national security concerns might prevent the President from explaining a le- gitimate need for a continuance. We are not persuaded that either of these risks is serious. Most frivolous and vexatious litigation is terminated at the pleading stage or on summary judgment, with little if any personal involvement by the defendant. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12, 56. Moreover, the availability of sanctions pro- vides a significant deterrent to litigation directed at the President in his unofficial capacity for purposes of political 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 709 Opinion of the Court gain or harassment.42 History indicates that the likelihood that a significant number of such cases will be filed is remote. Although scheduling problems may arise, there is no reason to assume that the district courts will be either unable to accommodate the President's needs or unfaithful to the tra- dition-especially in matters involving national security- of giving "the utmost deference to Presidential responsi- bilities." 43 Several Presidents, including petitioner, have given testimony without jeopardizing the Nation's security. See supra, at 704­705. In short, we have confidence in the ability of our federal judges to deal with both of these concerns. If Congress deems it appropriate to afford the President stronger protection, it may respond with appropriate legisla- tion. As petitioner notes in his brief, Congress has enacted more than one statute providing for the deferral of civil litigation to accommodate important public interests. Brief for Petitioner 34­36. See, e. g., 11 U. S. C. § 362 (litigation against debtor stayed upon filing of bankruptcy petition); Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U. S. C. App. §§ 501­525 (provisions governing, inter alia, tolling or stay of civil claims by or against military personnel during course of active duty). If the Constitution embodied the rule that 42 See, e. g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11; 28 U. S. C. § 1927; Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U. S. 32, 50 (1991) (noting that "if in the informed discre- tion of the court, neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power" in imposing appropriate sanctions). Those sanctions may be set at a level "sufficient to deter repe- tition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11(c)(2). As Rule 11 indicates, sanctions may be ap- propriate where a claim is "presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass," including any claim based on "allegations and other factual contentions [lacking] evidentiary support" or unlikely to prove well- grounded after reasonable investigation. Rules 11(b)(1), (3). 43 United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 710­711; see also Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 753 ("Courts traditionally have recognized the President's consti- tutional responsibilities and status as factors counseling judicial deference and restraint"). 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 710 CLINTON v. JONES Breyer, J., concurring in judgment the President advocates, Congress, of course, could not re- peal it. But our holding today raises no barrier to a statu- tory response to these concerns. The Federal District Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. Like every other citizen who properly invokes that jurisdiction, respondent has a right to an orderly disposition of her claims. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment. I agree with the majority that the Constitution does not automatically grant the President an immunity from civil lawsuits based upon his private conduct. Nor does the "doc- trine of separation of powers . . . require federal courts to stay" virtually "all private actions against the President until he leaves office." Ante, at 705­706. Rather, as the Court of Appeals stated, the President cannot simply rest upon the claim that a private civil lawsuit for damages will "interfere with the constitutionally assigned duties of the Executive Branch . . . without detailing any specific responsi- bilities or explaining how or the degree to which they are affected by the suit." 72 F. 3d 1354, 1361 (CA8 1996). To obtain a postponement the President must "bea[r] the burden of establishing its need." Ante, at 708. In my view, however, once the President sets forth and explains a conflict between judicial proceeding and public du- ties, the matter changes. At that point, the Constitution permits a judge to schedule a trial in an ordinary civil dam- ages action (where postponement normally is possible with- out overwhelming damage to a plaintiff) only within the con- straints of a constitutional principle-a principle that forbids a federal judge in such a case to interfere with the Presi- dent's discharge of his public duties. I have no doubt that the Constitution contains such a principle applicable to civil suits, based upon Article II's vesting of the entire "executive Power" in a single individual, implemented through the Con- 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 711 Breyer, J., concurring in judgment stitution's structural separation of powers, and revealed both by history and case precedent. I recognize that this case does not require us now to apply the principle specifically, thereby delineating its contours; nor need we now decide whether lower courts are to apply it directly or categorically through the use of presumptions or rules of administration. Yet I fear that to disregard it now may appear to deny it. I also fear that the majority's description of the relevant precedents de-emphasizes the ex- tent to which they support a principle of the President's in- dependent authority to control his own time and energy, see, e. g., ante, at 693, 694 (describing the "central concern" of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731 (1982), as "to avoid render- ing the President `unduly cautious' "); ante, at 695, 696, and n. 23 (describing statements by Story, Jefferson, Adams, and Ellsworth as providing "little" or "no substantial support" for the President's position). Further, if the majority is wrong in predicting the future infrequency of private civil litigation against sitting Presidents, ante, at 702, acknowl- edgment and future delineation of the constitutional princi- ple will prove a practically necessary institutional safeguard. For these reasons, I think it important to explain how the Constitution's text, history, and precedent support this prin- ciple of judicial noninterference with Presidential functions in ordinary civil damages actions. I The Constitution states that the "executive Power shall be vested in a President." Art. II, § 1. This constitutional delegation means that a sitting President is unusually busy, that his activities have an unusually important impact upon the lives of others, and that his conduct embodies an author- ity bestowed by the entire American electorate. He (along with his constitutionally subordinate Vice President) is the only official for whom the entire Nation votes, and is the only elected officer to represent the entire Nation both domesti- cally and abroad. 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 712 CLINTON v. JONES Breyer, J., concurring in judgment This constitutional delegation means still more. Arti- cle II makes a single President responsible for the actions of the Executive Branch in much the same way that the en- tire Congress is responsible for the actions of the Legisla- tive Branch, or the entire Judiciary for those of the Judi- cial Branch. It thereby creates a constitutional equivalence between a single President, on the one hand, and many legis- lators, or judges, on the other. The Founders created this equivalence by consciously de- ciding to vest Executive authority in one person rather than several. They did so in order to focus, rather than to spread, Executive responsibility thereby facilitating account- ability. They also sought to encourage energetic, vigorous, decisive, and speedy execution of the laws by placing in the hands of a single, constitutionally indispensable, individual the ultimate authority that, in respect to the other branches, the Constitution divides among many. Compare U. S. Const., Art. II, § 1 (vesting power in "a President"), with U. S. Const., Art. I, § 1 (vesting power in "a Congress" that "consist[s] of a Senate and House of Representatives"), and U. S. Const., Art. III, § 1 (vesting power in a "supreme Court" and "inferior Courts"). The authority explaining the nature and importance of this decision is legion. See, e. g., J. Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government § 144 (J. Gough ed. 1947) (desirability of a perpetual Executive); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *242­ *243 (need for single Executive); The Federalist No. 70, p. 423 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (Executive "[e]n- ergy" needed for security, "steady administration of the laws," "protection of property," "justice," and protection of "liberty"); Ellsworth, The Landholder, VI, in Essays on the Constitution 161, 163 (P. Ford ed. 1892) ("supreme executive should be one person, and unfettered otherwise than by the laws he is to execute"); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 698­699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing history); id., at 705 (describing textual basis); id., at 729 (describing 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 713 Breyer, J., concurring in judgment policy arguments). See also The Federalist No. 71, at 431 (A. Hamilton); P. Kurland, Watergate and the Constitution 135 (1978) (President is "sole indispensable man in govern- ment" and "should not be called" from his duties "at the in- stance of any other . . . branch of government"); Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 23, 37­47 (1995). Cf. T. Roosevelt, An Auto- biography 372 (1913). For present purposes, this constitutional structure means that the President is not like Congress, for Congress can function as if it were whole, even when up to half of its mem- bers are absent, see U. S. Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 1. It means that the President is not like the Judiciary, for judges often can designate other judges, e. g., from other judicial circuits, to sit even should an entire court be detained by personal litigation. It means that, unlike Congress, which is regu- larly out of session, U. S. Const., Art. I, §§ 4, 5, 7, the Presi- dent never adjourns. More importantly, these constitutional objectives explain why a President, though able to delegate duties to others, cannot delegate ultimate responsibility or the active obliga- tion to supervise that goes with it. And the related consti- tutional equivalence between President, Congress, and the Judiciary means that judicial scheduling orders in a private civil case must not only take reasonable account of, say, a particularly busy schedule, or a job on which others critically depend, or an underlying electoral mandate. They must also reflect the fact that interference with a President's abil- ity to carry out his public responsibilities is constitutionally equivalent to interference with the ability of the entirety of Congress, or the Judicial Branch, to carry out its public obligations. II The leading case regarding Presidential immunity from suit is Nixon v. Fitzgerald. Before discussing Fitzgerald, it is helpful to understand the historical precedent on which it 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 714 CLINTON v. JONES Breyer, J., concurring in judgment relies. While later events have called into question some of the more extreme views on Presidential immunity, the es- sence of the constitutional principle remains true today. The historical sources, while not in themselves fully determi- native, in conjunction with this Court's precedent inform my judgment that the Constitution protects the President from judicial orders in private civil cases to the extent that those orders could significantly interfere with his efforts to carry out his ongoing public responsibilities. A Three of the historical sources this Court cited in Fitzger- ald, 457 U. S., at 749, 750­752, n. 31-a commentary by Joseph Story, an argument attributed to John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth, and a letter written by Thomas Jefferson- each make clear that this is so. First, Joseph Story wrote in his Commentaries: "There are . . . incidental powers, belonging to the exec- utive department, which are necessarily implied from the nature of the functions, which are confided to it. Among those, must necessarily be included the power to perform them, without any obstruction or impediment whatsoever. The president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this pur- pose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess an official inviolability." 3 J. Story, Com- mentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1563, pp. 418­419 (1833) (emphasis added), quoted in Fitzgerald, supra, at 749. As interpreted by this Court in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the words "for this purpose" would seem to refer to the Presi- dent's need for "official inviolability" in order to "perform" the duties of his office without "obstruction or impediment." As so read, Story's commentary does not explicitly define the 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 715 Breyer, J., concurring in judgment contours of "official inviolability." But it does suggest that the "inviolability" is timebound ("while . . . in the discharge of the duties of his office"); that it applies in private lawsuits (for it attaches to the President's "person" in "civil cases"); and that it is functional ("necessarily implied from the nature of the [President's] functions"). Since Fitzgerald did not involve a physical constraint, the Court's reliance upon Justice Story's commentary makes clear, in the Court's view, that the commentary does not limit the scope of "inviolability" to an immunity from a physical imprisonment, physical detention, or physical "arrest"-a now abandoned procedure that permitted the arrest of cer- tain civil case defendants (e. g., those threatened by bank- ruptcy) during a civil proceeding. I would therefore read Story's commentary to mean what it says, namely, that Article II implicitly grants an "official inviolability" to the President "while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office," and that this inviolability must be broad enough to permit him "to perform" his official duties without "obstruction or impediment." As this Court has previously held, the Constitution may grant this kind of pro- tection implicitly; it need not do so explicitly. See Fitzger- ald, supra, at 750, n. 31; United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 705­706, n. 16 (1974); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 406 (1819). Second, during the first Congress, then-Vice President John Adams and then-Senator Oliver Ellsworth expressed a view of an applicable immunity far broader than any cur- rently asserted. Speaking of a sitting President, they said that the " `President, personally, was not the subject to any process whatever . . . . For [that] would . . . put it in the power of a common justice to exercise any authority over him and stop the whole machine of Government.' " 457 U. S., at 751, n. 31 (quoting Journal of William Maclay 167 (E. Maclay ed. 1890) (Sept. 26 journal entry reporting ex- change between Sen. Maclay, Adams, and Ellsworth)). They 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 716 CLINTON v. JONES Breyer, J., concurring in judgment included in their claim a kind of immunity from criminal, as well as civil, process. They responded to a counterargu- ment-that the President "was not above the laws," and would have to be arrested if guilty of crimes-by stating that the President would first have to be impeached, and could then be prosecuted. 9 Documentary History of First Federal Congress of United States 168 (K. Bowling & H. Veit eds. 1988) (Diary of William Maclay). This Court's rejection of Adams' and Ellsworth's views in the context of criminal proceedings, see ante, at 703­704, does not deprive those views of authority here. See Fitzgerald, supra, at 751­752, n. 31. Nor does the fact that Senator William Maclay, who reported the views of Adams and Ellsworth, "went on to point out in his diary that he virulently disagreed with them." Ante, at 696, n. 23. Maclay, unlike Adams and Ells- worth, was not an important political figure at the time of the constitutional debates. See Diary of William Maclay xi­xiii. Third, in 1807, a sitting President, Thomas Jefferson, dur- ing a dispute about whether the federal courts could sub- poena his presence in a criminal case, wrote the following to United States Attorney George Hay: "The leading principle of our Constitution is the inde- pendence of the Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional du- ties?" 10 Works of Thomas Jefferson 404, n. (P. Ford ed. 1905) (letter of June 20, 1807, from President Thomas Jefferson to United States Attorney George Hay), quoted in Fitzgerald, supra, at 751, n. 31. 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 717 Breyer, J., concurring in judgment Three days earlier Jefferson had written to the same correspondent: "To comply with such calls would leave the nation with- out an executive branch, whose agency, nevertheless, is understood to be so constantly necessary, that it is the sole branch which the constitution requires to be always in function. It could not then mean that it should be withdrawn from its station by any co-ordinate author- ity." 10 Works of Thomas Jefferson, at 401 (letter of June 17, 1807, from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay). Jefferson, like Adams and Ellsworth, argued strongly for an immunity from both criminal and civil judicial process-an immunity greater in scope than any immunity, or any special scheduling factor, now at issue in the civil case before us. The significance of his views for present purposes lies in his conviction that the Constitution protected a sitting President from litigation that would "withdraw" a President from his current "constitutional duties." That concern may not have applied to Mr. Fitzgerald's 1982 case against a former Presi- dent, but it is at issue in the current litigation. Precedent that suggests to the contrary-that the Consti- tution does not offer a sitting President significant protec- tions from potentially distracting civil litigation-consists of the following: (1) In several instances sitting Presidents have given depositions or testified at criminal trials, and (2) this Court has twice authorized the enforcement of subpoenas seeking documents from a sitting President for use in a crim- inal case. I agree with the majority that these precedents reject any absolute Presidential immunity from all court process. But they do not cast doubt upon Justice Story's basic conclusion that "in civil cases," a sitting President "possess[es] an offi- cial inviolability" as necessary to permit him to "perform" the duties of his office without "obstruction or impediment." 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 718 CLINTON v. JONES Breyer, J., concurring in judgment The first set of precedents tells us little about what the Constitution commands, for they amount to voluntary ac- tions on the part of a sitting President. The second set of precedents amounts to a search for documents, rather than a direct call upon Presidential time. More important, both sets of precedents involve criminal proceedings in which the President participated as a witness. Criminal proceedings, unlike private civil proceedings, are public acts initiated and controlled by the Executive Branch; see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 693­696; they are not normally subject to postponement, see U. S. Const., Amdt. 6; and ordinarily they put at risk, not a private citizen's hope for monetary compensation, but a private citizen's freedom from enforced confinement, 418 U. S., at 711­712, and n. 19; Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 754, n. 37. See also id., at 758, n. 41. Nor is it normally possible in a criminal case, unlike many civil cases, to provide the plaintiff with interest to compensate for scheduling delay. See, e. g., Winter v. Cerro Gordo County Conservation Bd., 925 F. 2d 1069, 1073 (CA8 1991); Foley v. Lowell, 948 F. 2d 10, 17­18 (CA1 1991); Wooten v. McClen- don, 272 Ark. 61, 62­63, 612 S. W. 2d 105, 106 (1981). The remaining precedent to which the majority refers does not seem relevant in this case. That precedent, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 585 (1952), con- cerns official action. And any Presidential time spent deal- ing with, or action taken in response to, that kind of case is part of a President's official duties. Hence court review in such circumstances could not interfere with, or distract from, official duties. Insofar as a court orders a President, in any such a proceeding, to act or to refrain from action, it defines, or determines, or clarifies the legal scope of an official duty. By definition (if the order itself is lawful), it cannot impede, or obstruct, or interfere with the President's basic task- the lawful exercise of his Executive authority. Indeed, if constitutional principles counsel caution when judges con- sider an order that directly requires the President properly 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 719 Breyer, J., concurring in judgment to carry out his official duties, see Franklin v. Massachu- setts, 505 U. S. 788, 827 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (describing the "apparently un- broken historical tradition . . . implicit in the separation of powers" that a President may not be ordered by the Judi- ciary to perform particular Executive acts); id., at 802­803 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.), so much the more must those principles counsel caution when such an order threat- ens to interfere with the President's properly carrying out those duties. B Case law, particularly, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, strongly sup- ports the principle that judges hearing a private civil dam- ages action against a sitting President may not issue orders that could significantly distract a President from his official duties. In Fitzgerald, the Court held that former President Nixon was absolutely immune from civil damages lawsuits based upon any conduct within the "outer perimeter" of his official responsibilities. 457 U. S., at 756. The holding rested upon six determinations that are relevant here. First, the Court found that the Constitution assigns the President singularly important duties (thus warranting an "absolute," rather than a "qualified," immunity). Id., at 750­751. Second, the Court held that "recognition of immunity" does not require a "specific textual basis" in the Constitution. Id., at 750, n. 31. Third, although physical constraint of the President was not at issue, the Court never- theless considered Justice Story's constitutional analysis, dis- cussed supra, at 714­715, "persuasive." 457 U. S., at 749. Fourth, the Court distinguished contrary precedent on the ground that it involved criminal, not civil, proceedings. Id., at 754, and n. 37. Fifth, the Court's concerns encompassed the fact that "the sheer prominence of the President's office" could make him "an easily identifiable target for suits for civil damages." Id., at 752­753. Sixth, and most impor- tant, the Court rested its conclusion in important part upon 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 720 CLINTON v. JONES Breyer, J., concurring in judgment the fact that civil lawsuits "could distract a President from his public duties, to the detriment of not only the President and his office but also the Nation that the Presidency was designed to serve." Id., at 753. The majority argues that this critical, last-mentioned, fea- ture of the case is dicta. Ante, at 694, n. 19. In the majori- ty's view, since the defendant was a former President, the lawsuit could not have distracted him from his official duties; hence the case must rest entirely upon an alternative con- cern, namely, that a President's fear of civil lawsuits based upon his official duties could distort his official decision- making. The majority, however, overlooks the fact that Fitzgerald set forth a single immunity (an absolute immu- nity) applicable both to sitting and former Presidents. Its reasoning focused upon both. Its key paragraph, explaining why the President enjoys an absolute immunity rather than a qualified immunity, contains seven sentences, four of which focus primarily upon time and energy distraction and three of which focus primarily upon official decision distortion. Indeed, that key paragraph begins by stating: "Because of the singular importance of the President's duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective func- tioning of government." 457 U. S., at 751. Moreover, the Court, in numerous other cases, has found the problem of time and energy distraction a critically impor- tant consideration militating in favor of a grant of immunity. See, e. g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 817­818 (1982) (qualified immunity for Presidential assistants based in part on "costs of trial" and "burdens of broad-reaching discovery" that are "peculiarly disruptive of effective government"); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 423 (1976) (absolute im- munity of prosecutors based in part upon concern about "de- flection of the prosecutor's energies from his public duties"); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377 (1951) (absolute im- 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 721 Breyer, J., concurring in judgment munity for legislators avoids danger they will "be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial"). Indeed, cases that provide public officials, not with immunity, but with special protective procedures such as interlocutory appeals, rest entirely upon a "time and energy distraction" rationale. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U. S. 299, 306, 308 (1996) ("[G]overnment official['s] right . . . to avoid standing trial [and] to avoid the burdens of such pretrial matters as discovery" are sufficient to support an immediate appeal from "denial of a claim of qualified immunity" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 526 (1985) ("[E]ntitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation . . . is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial" (citing Harlow, supra, at 818)). It is not surprising that the Court's immunity-related case law should rely on both distraction and distortion, for the ultimate rationale underlying those cases embodies both con- cerns. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554 (1967) (abso- lute judicial immunity is needed because of "burden" of liti- gation, which leads to "intimidation"); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 349 (1872) (without absolute immunity a judge's "office [would] be degraded and his usefulness destroyed," and he would be forced to shoulder "burden" of keeping full records for use in defending against suits). The cases ulti- mately turn on an assessment of the threat that a civil dam- ages lawsuit poses to a public official's ability to perform his job properly. And, whether they provide an absolute im- munity, a qualified immunity, or merely a special procedure, they ultimately balance consequent potential public harm against private need. Distraction and distortion are equally important ingredients of that potential public harm. In- deed, a lawsuit that significantly distracts an official from his public duties can distort the content of a public decision just as can a threat of potential future liability. If the latter con- cern can justify an "absolute" immunity in the case of a Pres- 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 722 CLINTON v. JONES Breyer, J., concurring in judgment ident no longer in office, where distraction is no longer a consideration, so can the former justify, not immunity, but a postponement, in the case of a sitting President. III The majority points to the fact that private plaintiffs have brought civil damages lawsuits against a sitting President only three times in our Nation's history; and it relies upon the threat of sanctions to discourage, and "the court's discre- tion" to manage, such actions so that "interference with the President's duties would not occur." Ante, at 708. I am less sanguine. Since 1960, when the last such suit was filed, the number of civil lawsuits filed annually in Federal District Courts has increased from under 60,000 to about 240,000, see Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary 27 (1995); Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts-1960, p. 224 (1961); the number of federal dis- trict judges has increased from 233 to about 650, see Admin- istrative Office of United States Courts, Judicial Business of United States Courts 7 (1994); Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts- 1960, supra, at 205; the time and expense associated with both discovery and trial have increased, see, e. g., Bell, Varner, & Gottschalk, Automatic Disclosure in Discovery- The Rush To Reform, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 9­11 (1992); see also S. Rep. No. 101­416, p. 1 (1990); Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101­650, 104 Stat. 5089; an increasingly com- plex economy has led to increasingly complex sets of stat- utes, rules, and regulations that often create potential lia- bility, with or without fault. And this Court has now made clear that such lawsuits may proceed against a sitting Presi- dent. The consequence, as the Court warned in Fitzgerald, is that a sitting President, given "the visibility of his office," could well become "an easily identifiable target for suits for civil damages," 457 U. S., at 753. The threat of sanctions 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997) 723 Breyer, J., concurring in judgment could well discourage much unneeded litigation, ante, at 708­ 709, but some lawsuits (including highly intricate and compli- cated ones) could resist ready evaluation and disposition; and individual district court procedural rulings could pose a sig- nificant threat to the President's official functions. I concede the possibility that district courts, supervised by the Courts of Appeals and perhaps this Court, might prove able to manage private civil damages actions against sitting Presidents without significantly interfering with the dis- charge of Presidential duties-at least if they manage those actions with the constitutional problem in mind. Nonethe- less, predicting the future is difficult, and I am skeptical. Should the majority's optimism turn out to be misplaced, then, in my view, courts will have to develop administrative rules applicable to such cases (including postponement rules of the sort at issue in this case) in order to implement the basic constitutional directive. A Constitution that separates powers in order to prevent one branch of Government from significantly threatening the workings of another could not grant a single judge more than a very limited power to second-guess a President's reasonable determination (an- nounced in open court) of his scheduling needs, nor could it permit the issuance of a trial scheduling order that would sig- nificantly interfere with the President's discharge of his du- ties-in a private civil damages action the trial of which might be postponed without the plaintiff suffering enormous harm. As Madison pointed out in The Federalist No. 51: "The great security against a gradual concentration of the several pow- ers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack." Id., at 321­322 (emphasis added). I agree with the majori- ty's determination that a constitutional defense must await a more specific showing of need; I do not agree with what I 520US3 Unit: $U58 [09-11-99 17:25:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN 724 CLINTON v. JONES Breyer, J., concurring in judgment believe to be an understatement of the "danger." And I be- lieve that ordinary case-management principles are unlikely to prove sufficient to deal with private civil lawsuits for dam- ages unless supplemented with a constitutionally based re- quirement that district courts schedule proceedings so as to avoid significant interference with the President's ongoing discharge of his official responsibilities. IV This case is a private action for civil damages in which, as the District Court here found, it is possible to preserve evi- dence and in which later payment of interest can compensate for delay. The District Court in this case determined that the Constitution required the postponement of trial during the sitting President's term. It may well be that the trial of this case cannot take place without significantly interfer- ing with the President's ability to carry out his official duties. Yet, I agree with the majority that there is no automatic temporary immunity and that the President should have to provide the District Court with a reasoned explanation of why the immunity is needed; and I also agree that, in the absence of that explanation, the court's postponement of the trial date was premature. For those reasons, I concur in the result. 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 725 Syllabus SUITUM v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 96­243. Argued February 26, 1997-Decided May 27, 1997 Petitioner Suitum owns an undeveloped lot near Lake Tahoe. Respond- ent Tahoe Regional Planning Agency determined that the lot is ineligi- ble for development under agency regulations, but that Suitum is enti- tled to receive certain allegedly valuable "Transferable Development Rights" (TDR's) that she can sell to other landowners with the agency's approval. Suitum did not seek those rights, but instead brought this action for compensation under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, claiming that the agency's determinations amounted to a regulatory taking of her prop- erty without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court held that her claim is not ripe for adjudication because she has not attempted to sell her TDR's, so that their specific values are unknown and the court could not realistically assess whether the agency's regulations have frustrated her reasonable expectations. The Ninth Circuit agreed and affirmed, reasoning, inter alia, that action on a TDR transfer application would be the requisite "final decision" by the agency regarding its regulations' application to Suitum's lot. Held: Suitum's regulatory takings claim is ripe for adjudication. Pp. 733­744. (a) Suitum must satisfy the prudential ripeness principle requiring that she receive a "final decision" from the agency regarding the applica- tion of its regulations to her property. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172, 186. Pp. 733­734. (b) The Ninth Circuit's rationale for holding Suitum's claim unripe- that she had failed to obtain a final and authoritative agency decision- is unsupported by this Court's precedents. See, e. g., Williamson County, supra, at 191, 193; MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U. S. 340, 349. These precedents make two points clear about the finality requirement: it applies to decisions about how a tak- ings plaintiff's particular parcel may be used, see, e. g., Williamson County, supra, at 191, and it responds to the high degree of discretion characteristically possessed by land-use boards in softening the stric- tures of the general regulations they administer, see, e. g., MacDonald, supra, at 350. Suitum's claim satisfies the demand for finality. It is 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 726 SUITUM v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY Syllabus undisputed that the agency has finally determined that her land lies entirely within a zone in which development is not permitted. Because the agency has no discretion to exercise over her right to use her land, no occasion exists for applying Williamson County's requirement that a landowner take steps to obtain a final decision about the use that will be permitted on the particular parcel. Although the parties contest the relevance of the TDR's to the question whether a taking has occurred, resolution of that legal issue will require no further agency action of the sort demanded by Williamson County. Pp. 735­739. (c) Contrary to the lower courts' holdings, action on a possible appli- cation by Suitum to transfer her TDR's is not the type of "final decision" required by the Court's Williamson County precedents. Although those precedents dealt with land, not TDR's, such a decision might be required, given the agency's position that TDR's should be considered when determining whether a taking has occurred, if there were any question here whether Suitum would obtain a discretionary award of salable TDR's. No such question is presented, however, since the par- ties agree on the particular TDR's to which Suitum is entitled, and no discretionary decision must be made by any agency official for her to obtain them or to offer them for sale. Pp. 739­740. (d) The agency's argument that Suitum's case is not ripe because no values attributable to her TDR's are known is just a variation on the preceding position, and fares no better. First, as to her rights to re- ceive TDR's that she may later sell, little or no uncertainty remains. Second, as to her right to transfer her TDR's, the only contingency apart from private market demand turns on the right of the agency or a local regulatory body to deny approval for a specific transfer based on the buyer's intended improper use of the TDR's. However, because the agency does not deny that there are many potential lawful buyers whose receipt of the TDR's would unquestionably be approved, the TDRs' valu- ation is simply an issue of fact about possible market prices, on which the District Court had considerable evidence. Similar determinations are routinely made by courts without the benefit of a market transaction in the subject property. Pp. 740­742. (e) The agency's argument that Suitum's claim is unripe under the "fitness for review" requirement of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 148­149, is rejected. Abbott Laboratories is not on point be- cause the petitioners there were challenging the validity of a regulation as beyond the scope of its issuing agency's authority, whereas Suitum seeks not to invalidate the regulations here at issue, but to be paid for their consequences. Indeed, to the extent that Abbott Laboratories is in any sense instructive in the disposition of this case, it cuts directly against the agency: Suitum is just as definitively barred from taking any 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 725 (1997) 727 Syllabus affirmative step to develop her land as the petitioners there, who pre- vailed against the contention that their claim was unripe, were bound to take affirmative steps to comply with the regulations they were chal- lenging. Pp. 742­744. 80 F. 3d 359, vacated and remanded. Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in which O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined except as to Parts II­B and II­C. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concur- ring in the judgment, in which O'Connor and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 745. R. S. Radford argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Robin L. Rivett, Victor J. Wolski, and William Patterson Cashill. Richard J. Lazarus argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were J. Peter Byrne, J. Thomas Susich, Vicki E. Hartigan, Rachelle J. Nicolle, and Susan E. Scholley. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellin- ger, Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Anne S. Almy, and John A. Bryson.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Farm Bureau Federation et al. by Timothy S. Bishop, Michael F. Rosen- blum, John J. Rademacher, and Richard L. Krause; for the Building In- dustry Association of Washington by Richard M. Stephens and John M. Groen; for the Defenders of Property Rights et al. by Nancie G. Marzulla; for the Institute of Justice by William H. Mellor, Clint Bolick, Scott G. Bullock, and Richard A. Epstein; for the Southeastern Legal Foundation by Henry D. Granberry III; for the Tahoe Lakefront Owners' Association by Ronald A. Zumbrun, John H. Findley, and Meriem L. Hubbard; for the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., by Lawrence L. Hoffman; and for the Mayhews et al. by Charles L. Siemon. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Governor of California et al. by Michael A. Mantell; for the State of Nevada et al. by Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, and William J. Frey and C. Wayne Howle, Deputy Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 728 SUITUM v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY Opinion of the Court Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner Bernadine Suitum owns land near the Nevada shore of Lake Tahoe. Respondent Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, which regulates land use in the region, determined that Suitum's property is ineligible for development but enti- tled to receive certain allegedly valuable "Transferable De- velopment Rights" (TDR's). Suitum has brought an action for compensation under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, claiming that the agency's determinations amounted to a reg- ulatory taking of her property. While the pleadings raise issues about the significance of the TDR's both to the claim that a taking has occurred and to the constitutional require- ment of just compensation, we have no occasion to decide, and we do not decide, whether or not these TDR's may be considered in deciding the issue whether there has been a taking in this case, as opposed to the issue whether just com- pensation has been afforded for such a taking. The sole question here is whether the claim is ripe for adjudication, General for their respective States as follows: Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Mary- land, and Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana; for the State of New Jersey by Peter Verniero, Attorney General, Mary C. Jacobson, Assistant Attorney General, and Rachel J. Horowitz, Deputy Attorney General; for the State of New York by Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General, Barbara G. Billett, Solicitor General, Peter H. Schiff, Deputy Solicitor General, and John J. Sipos and Lisa M. Burianek, Assistant Attorneys General; for the City of New York by Paul A. Crotty, Leonard J. Koerner, Stephen J. McGrath, and Cheryl Payer; for the League to Save Lake Tahoe by E. Clement Shute, Jr., and Christy H. Taylor; for the National League of Cities et al. by Richard Ruda; and for the National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States et al. by Jerold S. Kayden, Louise H. Renne, R. Jeffrey Lyman, and Elizabeth S. Merritt. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Planning Association by Brian W. Blaesser and H. Bissell Carey III; for the Columbia River Gorge Commission by Lawrence Watters; for the National Association of Home Builders et al. by John J. Delaney, Lawrence R. Liebesman, Mary V. DiCrescenzo, and Nick Cammarota; and for Dr. James Nicholas et al. by John D. Echeverria. 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 725 (1997) 729 Opinion of the Court even though Suitum has not attempted to sell the develop- ment rights she has or is eligible to receive. We hold that it is. I In 1969, Congress approved the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact between the States of California and Nevada, creat- ing respondent as an interstate agency to regulate develop- ment in the Lake Tahoe basin. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 394 (1979). After the 1969 compact had proven inadequate for protection of the lake and its environment, the States pro- posed and Congress approved an amendment in 1980, requir- ing the agency to adopt a plan barring any development exceeding such specific "environmental threshold carrying capacities" as the agency might find appropriate. Pub. L. 96­551, Arts. I(b), V(b), V(g), 94 Stat. 3234, 3239­3241.1 In 1987, the agency adopted a new Regional Plan provid- ing for an "Individual Parcel Evaluation System" (IPES) to rate the suitability of vacant residential parcels for building and other modification. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency Code of Ordinances, ch. 37 (TRPA Code). Whereas any property must attain a minimum IPES score to qualify for construction, id., § 37.8.E; App. 145, an undeveloped parcel in certain areas carrying runoff into the watershed (known as "Stream Environment Zones" (SEZ's)) receives an IPES score of zero, TRPA Code § 37.4.A(3). With limited excep- tions not relevant here, the agency permits no "additional land coverage or other permanent land disturbance" on such a parcel. Id., § 20.4. 1 The 1980 compact defines "[e]nvironmental threshold carrying capac- ity" as "an environmental standard necessary to maintain a significant scenic, recreational, educational, scientific or natural value of the region or to maintain public health and safety within the region. Such standards shall include but not be limited to standards for air quality, water quality, soil conservation, vegetation preservation and noise." Art. II(i), 94 Stat. 3235. 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 730 SUITUM v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY Opinion of the Court Although the agency's 1987 plan does not provide for the variances and exceptions of conventional land-use schemes, it addresses the potential sharpness of its restrictions by granting property owners TDR's that may be sold to owners of parcels eligible for construction, id., §§ 20.3.C, 34.0 to 34.3. There are three kinds of residential TDR's. An owner needs both a "Residential Development Right" and a "Resi- dential Allocation" to place a residential unit on a buildable parcel, id., §§ 21.6.C, 33.2.A; the latter permits construction to begin in a specific calendar year, but expires at year's end, id., § 33.2.B(3)(b). An owner must also have "Land Cover- age Rights" for each square foot of impermeable cover placed upon land. App. 145; see also TRPA Code, ch. 20. All own- ers of vacant residential parcels that existed at the effective date of the 1987 plan (July 1, 1987), including SEZ parcels, automatically receive one Residential Development Right, id., § 21.6.A; owners of SEZ property may obtain and trans- fer bonus points equivalent to three additional Residential Development Rights, id., §§ 35.2.C, 35.2.D. SEZ property owners also receive Land Coverage Rights authorizing cov- erage of an area equal to 1% of the surface area of their land. Id., §§ 20.3.A, 37.11. Finally, SEZ owners, like other property owners, may apply for a Residential Allocation, awarded by local jurisdictions in random drawings each year.2 Id., § 33.2.B; App. 98­99. All three kinds of TDR's may be transferred for the benefit of any eligible property in the Lake Tahoe region, subject to approval by the agency based on the eligibility of the receiving parcel for develop- ment. TRPA Code §§ 20.3.C, 34.1 to 34.3. In 1972, Suitum and her late husband bought an undevel- oped lot in Washoe County, Nevada, within the agency's jurisdiction, and 17 years later, after adoption of the 1987 2 Counsel for the agency at oral argument represented that "at this point" there are "fewer applicants than there are allocations" in Washoe County, where petitioner's land is located, and there is thus a "100 percent chance of winning the [drawing]." Tr. of Oral Arg. 39­40. 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 725 (1997) 731 Opinion of the Court Regional Plan, Suitum obtained a Residential Allocation through Washoe County's annual drawing. When she then applied to the agency for permission to construct a house on her lot, the agency determined that her property was located within a SEZ, assigned it an IPES score of zero, and denied permission to build. Suitum appealed the denial to the agency's governing board, which itself denied relief. After the agency turned down the request for a building permit, Suitum made no effort to transfer any of the TDR's that were hers under the 1987 plan, and there is no dispute that she still has the one Residential Development Right that owners of undeveloped lots automatically received, plus the Land Coverage Rights for 183 square feet that she got as the owner of 18,300 square feet of SEZ land. It is also com- mon ground that Suitum has the right to receive three "bonus" Residential Development Rights. Although Suitum has questioned the certainty that she would obtain a new Residential Allocation if she sought one, the agency has represented to this Court that she undoubtably would, see n. 2, supra. Instead, Suitum brought this 42 U. S. C. § 1983 action al- leging that in denying her the right to construct a house on her lot, the agency's restrictions deprived her of "all reason- able and economically viable use" of her property, and so amounted to a taking of her property without just compensa- tion in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.3 App. 15, 16. The agency responded by objecting, among other things, that Suitum's takings claim was not ripe due to her "failure to obtain a final decision by TRPA as to the amount of development . . . that may be allowed by" the agency. Id., at 10. On cross-motions for summary judg- ment, the District Court ordered supplemental briefing on 3 Suitum's complaint may have also raised substantive due process and equal protection claims, see App. 16, 153, but her petition for a writ of certiorari did not address those issues and they are not considered here. See n. 6, infra. 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 732 SUITUM v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY Opinion of the Court the nature of Suitum's TDR's, including "what [TDR's] can be transferred in [Suitum's] case and the procedures, prereq- uisites and value of such transfer as applicable in this case." Id., at 89. The agency introduced an affidavit from a real estate appraiser, whose opinion was that the Residential Development Right that Suitum already has, and the three more to which she is entitled, have a market value between $1,500 and $2,500 each; that her Land Coverage Rights can be sold for $6 to $12 per square foot ($1,098­$2,196 total); and that her lot devoid of all TDR's would sell for $7,125 to $16,750. Id., at 131­132. The appraiser also said that if Suitum were to obtain a Residential Allocation and sell it with a Development Right, together they would bring be- tween $30,000 and $35,000. Ibid. As if in spite of the fig- ures supplied by its own affidavit, however, the agency main- tained that the "actual benefits of the [TDR] program for [Suitum] . . . can only be known if she pursues an appropriate [transfer] application," with the result that Suitum's claim was not ripe for adjudication. Id., at 91. For her part, Suitum insisted that trying to transfer her TDR's would be an " `idle and futile act' " because the TDR program is a "sham," 4 and she supplied the affidavit of one of the agency's former employees whose view was that "there is little to no value to [Suitum's TDR's] at the present time as . . . either [there is] no market for them or the procedure for transfer- ring one particular right would restrict the opportunity to transfer a remaining right." Id., at 135.5 The District Court decided that Suitum's claim was not ripe for consideration because "[a]s things now stand, there 4 See Suitum's Response to Defendant's Memorandum Concerning its Transfer of Development Program 1­2. 5 The District Court disregarded this affidavit, however, because "[t]here [was] no showing that [Suitum's affiant] is an expert . . . as to the valuation of development rights" sufficient to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). No. CV­N­91­040­ECR (D. Nev., Mar. 30, 1994), App. to Pet. for Cert. C­2, n. 1. 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 725 (1997) 733 Opinion of the Court is no final decision as to how [Suitum] will be allowed to use her property." No. CV­N­91­040­ECR (D. Nev., Mar. 30, 1994), App. to Pet. for Cert. C­3. Although the court found that "there is significant value in the transfer of [Suitum's TDR's], . . . until [specific] values attributable to the transfer program are known, the court cannot realisti- cally assess whether and to what extent [the agency's] regu- lations have frustrated [Suitum's] reasonable expectations." Id., at C­3 to C­4. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed this ripeness ruling for the like reason that "[w]ithout an applica- tion for the transfer of development rights" there would be no way to "know the regulations' full economic impact or the degree of their interference with [Suitum's] reasonable investment-backed expectations," and without action on a transfer application there would be no " `final decision from [the agency] regarding the application of the regulation[s] to the property at issue.' " 6 80 F. 3d 359, 362­363 (1996). We granted certiorari to consider the ripeness of Suitum's tak- ings claim, 519 U. S. 926 (1996), and now reverse. II The only issue presented is whether Suitum's claim of a regulatory taking of her land in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is ready for judicial review under prudential ripeness principles.7 There are two independent 6 The court held that "[t]hese ripeness requirements," while developed in the regulatory taking context, "are equally applicable to the due process and equal protection claims." 80 F. 3d, at 362, n. 1. We address only the ripeness requirements for Suitum's takings claim, however, and express no opinion on the ripeness of her other claims. 7 "We have noted that ripeness doctrine is drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction." Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U. S. 43, 57, n. 18 (1993). The agency does not question that Suitum properly presents a genuine "case or controversy" sufficient to satisfy Article III, but maintains only that Suitum's action fails to satisfy our prudential ripe- ness requirements. 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 734 SUITUM v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY Opinion of the Court prudential hurdles to a regulatory takings claim brought against a state entity in federal court. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985), explained that a plaintiff must demonstrate that she has both received a "final decision re- garding the application of the [challenged] regulations to the property at issue" from "the government entity charged with implementing the regulations," id., at 186, and sought "compensation through the procedures the State has pro- vided for doing so," id., at 194. The first requirement fol- lows from the principle that only a regulation that "goes too far," Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922), results in a taking under the Fifth Amendment, see, e. g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U. S. 340, 348 (1986) ("A court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone `too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes"); see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1014­1019 (1992) (regulation " `goes too far' " and results in a taking "at leas[t] in the extraordi- nary circumstance when no productive or economically bene- ficial use of land is permitted"). The second hurdle stems from the Fifth Amendment's proviso that only takings with- out "just compensation" infringe that Amendment; "if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just com- pensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation," Williamson County, supra, at 195. Because only the "final decision" prong of Williamson was addressed below and briefed before this Court, we confine our discussion here to that issue.8 8 We therefore do not decide whether Williamson County's "state proce- dures" requirement has been satisfied in this case. Ordinarily, a plaintiff must seek compensation through state inverse condemnation proceedings before initiating a takings suit in federal court, unless the State does not provide adequate remedies for obtaining compensation. See Williamson County, 473 U. S., at 194­196. Suitum's counsel stated at oral argument 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 725 (1997) 735 Opinion of the Court A In holding Suitum's claim to be unripe, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the agency's argument that Suitum had failed to obtain a final and authoritative decision from the agency sufficient to satisfy the first prong of Williamson County, supra. Although it is unclear whether the agency still urges precisely that position before this Court, see, e. g., Brief for Respondent 21 (conceding that "[w]e know the full extent of the regulation's impact in restricting petitioner's develop- ment of her own land"), we think it important to emphasize that the rationale adopted in the decision under review is unsupported by our precedents. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255 (1980), is the first case in which this Court employed a notion of ripeness in declining to reach the merits of an as-applied regulatory tak- ings claim.9 In Agins, the landowners who challenged zon- that "the position of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency is that they do not . . . have provisions for paying just compensation," Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, thus suggesting that the agency is not subject to inverse condemnation proceedings, and the agency's counsel did not disagree. Suitum's position therefore appears to be that the sole remedy against the agency for a taking without just compensation is a § 1983 suit for damages, such as she has brought here. Cf. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 911 F. 2d 1331, 1341­1342 (CA9 1990). We leave this matter to the Court of Appeals on remand. 9 Two years earlier, in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978), we reached the merits of Penn Central's claim that the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission's denial of permis- sion to construct an office building on top of Grand Central Terminal was a taking, despite our observation that "it simply cannot be maintained, on this record, that appellants have been prohibited from occupying any portion of the airspace above the Terminal. While the [City's] actions in denying applications to construct an office building in excess of 50 stories above the Terminal may indicate that it will refuse to issue a certificate of appropriateness for any comparably sized structure, . . . [t]he [City has] emphasized that whether any construc- tion would be allowed depended upon whether the proposed addition `would harmonize in scale, material, and character with [the Termi- 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 736 SUITUM v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY Opinion of the Court ing ordinances restricting the number of houses they could build on their property sued without seeking approval for any particular development on their land. We held that the only issue justiciable at that point was whether mere enact- ment of the statute amounted to a taking.10 Id., at 260. Without employing the term "ripeness," the Court explained that because the owners "ha[d] not submitted a plan for de- velopment of their property as the [challenged] ordinances permit[ted], there [was] as yet no concrete controversy re- garding the application of the specific zoning provisions." Ibid. The following Term, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981), toughened our nascent ripeness requirement. There, coal producers and landowners challenged the enactment of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U. S. C. § 1201 et seq., as a taking of their property. As in Agins, we con- cluded that an as-applied challenge was unripe, reasoning that "[t]here is no indication in the record that appellees ha[d] availed themselves of the opportunities provided by the Act to obtain administrative relief by requesting . . . a vari- ance from the [applicable provisions of the Act]," 452 U. S., at 297.11 Hodel thus held that where the regulatory regime nal].' Since appellants have not sought approval for the construction of a smaller structure, we do not know that appellants will be denied any use of any portion of the airspace above the Terminal." Id., at 136­137 (citation omitted). 10 Such "facial" challenges to regulation are generally ripe the moment the challenged regulation or ordinance is passed, but face an "uphill bat- tle," Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. 470, 495 (1987), since it is difficult to demonstrate that " `mere enactment' " of a piece of legislation "deprived [the owner] of economically viable use of [his] property." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 297 (1981). Suitum does not purport to challenge the agency's regulations on their face. 11 As in Agins, we found the Hodel plaintiffs' "facial" takings challenge to be ripe, but ruled it out on the merits. 452 U. S., at 295­297. 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 725 (1997) 737 Opinion of the Court offers the possibility of a variance from its facial require- ments, a landowner must go beyond submitting a plan for development and actually seek such a variance to ripen his claim. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Ham- ilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985), confirmed Hodel's holding. In Williamson County, a developer's plan to build a residential complex was rejected by the local plan- ning commission as inconsistent with zoning ordinances and subdivision regulations in eight different respects. This Court acknowledged that "[r]espondent ha[d] submitted a plan for developing its property, and thus ha[d] passed be- yond the Agins threshold," 473 U. S., at 187, but nonetheless held the takings challenge unripe, reasoning that "among the factors of particular significance in the [takings] inquiry are the economic impact of the challenged action and the extent to which it interferes with reasonable investment-backed ex- pectations," id., at 191, "factors [that] simply cannot be eval- uated until the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regula- tions at issue to the particular land in question," ibid. Thus, a developer must at least "resort to the procedure for obtain- ing variances . . . [and obtain] a conclusive determination by the Commission whether it would allow" the proposed devel- opment, id., at 193, in order to ripen its takings claim. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U. S. 340 (1986), reaffirmed Williamson County's requirement of a final agency position. In MacDonald, a developer pur- chased property and presented a tentative subdivision plan to the local planning commission. After the commission treated the proposal as inconsistent with the zoning regula- tions in several respects, the developer immediately filed suit. Without even relying on the character of the dry run in the submission of a merely tentative plan, we emphasized that in the course of litigation two state courts had given opinions that development of the property was possible 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 738 SUITUM v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY Opinion of the Court under the regulations in question, flatly contrary to the de- veloper's conclusory allegation that the regulations required him to provide a greenbelt as a public gratuity. See 477 U. S., at 345­347. Hence, we held the claim unripe under the rationale of Williamson County: " `the effect [of] the Commission's application of the zoning ordinance . . . on the value of respondent's property . . . cannot be measured until a final decision is made as to how the regulations will be applied to [the developer's] property.' " MacDonald, supra, at 349 (quoting Williamson County, supra, at 199­200). Leaving aside the question of how definitive a local zoning decision must be to satisfy Williamson County's demand for finality,12 two points about the requirement are clear: it ap- plies to decisions about how a takings plaintiff's own land may be used, and it responds to the high degree of discretion characteristically possessed by land-use boards in softening the strictures of the general regulations they administer. As the Court said in MacDonald, "local agencies charged with administering regulations governing property develop- ment are singularly flexible institutions; what they take with the one hand they may give back with the other." 477 U. S., at 350. When such flexibility or discretion may be brought to bear on the permissible use of property as singular as a 12 MacDonald suggested that the Williamson County "final decision" requirement might sometimes require multiple proposals or variance ap- plications before a landowner's case will be considered ripe. We wrote, for example, that "[r]ejection of exceedingly grandiose development plans does not logically imply that less ambitious plans will receive similarly unfavorable reviews." 477 U. S., at 353, n. 9; compare Williamson County, 473 U. S., at 191 (applicant must obtain final definitive position on how regulations will be applied to the land in question), with id., at 193 (applicant must obtain conclusive determination whether specific proposed development will be permitted). Amici the Mayhews et al. urge us to establish a rule that a takings plaintiff need only make a single proposal and a single request for a variance to ensure the ripeness of his claim. Brief for Mayhews et al. as Amici Curiae 22. That issue is not presented in this case. 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 725 (1997) 739 Opinion of the Court parcel of land, a sound judgment about what use will be al- lowed simply cannot be made by asking whether a parcel's characteristics or a proposal's details facially conform to the terms of the general use regulations. The demand for finality is satisfied by Suitum's claim, how- ever, there being no question here about how the "regula- tions at issue [apply] to the particular land in question." Williamson County, supra, at 191. It is undisputed that the agency "has finally determined that petitioner's land lies entirely within an SEZ," Brief for Respondent 21, and that it may therefore permit "[n]o additional land coverage or other permanent land disturbance" on the parcel, TRPA Code § 20.4. Because the agency has no discretion to exercise over Suitum's right to use her land, no occasion exists for applying Williamson County's requirement that a land- owner take steps to obtain a final decision about the use that will be permitted on a particular parcel. The parties, of course, contest the relevance of the TDR's to the issue of whether a taking has occurred, but resolution of that legal issue will require no further agency action of the sort de- manded by Williamson County. B The agency nonetheless argued below, and the lower courts agreed, see supra, at 732­733, that there remains a "final decision" for the agency to make: action on a possible application by Suitum to transfer the TDR's to which she is indisputably entitled. This is not, however, the type of "final decision" required by our Williamson County prece- dents. Those precedents addressed the virtual impossibility of determining what development will be permitted on a par- ticular lot of land when its use is subject to the decision of a regulatory body invested with great discretion, which it has not yet even been asked to exercise. No such question is presented here. The parties agree on the particular TDR's to which Suitum is entitled, and no discretionary decision 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 740 SUITUM v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY Opinion of the Court must be made by any agency official for her to obtain them or to offer them for sale. The only decision left to the agency is approval of a particular transfer of TDR's to make certain that a given potential buyer may lawfully use them. But whether a particular sale of TDR's may be completed is quite different from whether TDR's are salable; so long as the par- ticular buyer is not the only person who can lawfully buy, the rights would not be rendered unsalable even if the agency were to make a discretionary decision to kill a partic- ular sale. And the class of buyers is not even arguably so limited here, where there is no question so far as the law is concerned that TDR's may be bought and used for the benefit of all sorts of land parcels and lots. C The agency's argument that Suitum's case is not ripe be- cause no " `values attributable to [Suitum's TDR's] are known,' " Brief for Respondent 23 (quoting No. CV­N­91­ 040­ECR (D. Nev., Mar. 30, 1994), App. to Pet. for Cert. C­4, is just a variation on the preceding position, and fares no better. First, as to Suitum's rights to receive TDR's that she may later sell, we have already noted that little or no uncertainty remains. Although the value of a Residential Development Right may well be greater if it is offered to- gether with a Residential Allocation, and although Suitum must still enter the lottery for the latter, there is no discre- tionary decision to be made in determining whether she will get one; in fact, the probability of her getting one is "100 percent" according to the agency, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 40, since there are fewer applications than available allocations, see id., at 39­40. But even if that were not the case, as it probably will not always be, it would be unreasonable to re- quire Suitum to enter the drawing in order to ripen her suit. The agency does not, and surely could not, maintain that if the odds of success in the allocation lottery were low, 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 725 (1997) 741 Opinion of the Court Suitum's takings claim could be kept at bay from year to year until she actually won the drawing; such a rule would allow any local authority to stultify the Fifth Amendment's guarantee. Rather, in such circumstances, the value attrib- utable to the allocation Suitum might or might not receive in the drawing would simply be discounted to reflect the mathe- matical likelihood of her obtaining one. Second, as to Suitum's right to transfer her TDR's, the only contingency apart from private market demand turns on the right of the agency to deny approval for a specific transfer on grounds that the buyer's use of the TDR's would violate the terms of the scheme or other local land-use reg- ulation, and the right of a local regulatory body to deny transfer approval for the latter reason. See TRPA Code §§ 20.3.C, 34.2, 34.3. But even if these potential bars based on a buyer's intended use of TDR's should turn out to involve the same degree of discretion assumed in the Williamson County ripeness requirement, that discretion still would not render the value of the TDR's nearly as unknowable as the chances of particular development being permitted on a par- ticular parcel in the absence of a zoning board decision that could quite lawfully be either yes or no. While a particular sale is subject to approval, salability is not, and the agency's own position assumes that there are many potential, lawful buyers for Suitum's TDR's, whose receipt of those rights would unquestionably be approved. The valuation of Suitum's TDR's is therefore simply an issue of fact about possible market prices, and one on which the District Court had considerable evidence before it, see supra, at 731­732.13 Of course, as the agency appears to be saying, see, e. g., Brief for Respondent 22­23, the very best evidence of the value of Suitum's TDR's might be their actual 13 Moreover, the court may, of course, request additional briefing on this subject if necessary, and a trial could be held if the issue cannot be decided on summary judgment. 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 742 SUITUM v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY Opinion of the Court selling price (assuming, of course, that the sale were made in good faith and at arm's length). But similar determina- tions of market value are routinely made in judicial proceed- ings without the benefit of a market transaction in the sub- ject property. See, e. g., United States v. 819.98 Acres of Land, More or Less, Located in Wasatch and Summit Coun- ties, 78 F. 3d 1468, 1469­1470 (CA10 1996) (upholding valua- tion of condemned land based on expert testimony relating to comparable sales and discounted cash flow); United States v. L. E. Cooke Co., 991 F. 2d 336, 338­339 (CA6 1993) (same with respect to valuation of mineral rights leases); see also 5 J. Sackman, Nichols' Law of Eminent Domain § 23­01, p. 23­6 (rev. 3d ed. 1997) ("[I]t is well established that the value of . . . land taken or injured by the exercise of the power of eminent domain may be shown by opinion evi- dence"); see generally 4 id., § 12.02 (discussing establishment of market value of condemned land). While it is true that market value may be hard to calculate without a regular trade in TDR's, if Suitum is ready to proceed in spite of this difficulty, ripeness doctrine does not block her. In fact, the reason for the agency's objection is probably a concern that without much market experience in sales of TDR's, their market values will get low estimates. But this is simply one of the risks of regulatory pioneering, and the pioneer here is the agency, not Suitum. III Finally, the agency argues (for the first time, before this Court) that Suitum's claim is unripe under the "fitness for review" requirement of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136 (1967). Abbott Laboratories arose on a petition under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §§ 701­704 (1964 ed., Supp. II), by a group of drug manufac- turers seeking review of a labeling regulation promulgated by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs (FDA) but not yet the subject of any enforcement action against the manufac- turers. The petitioners claimed that the FDA lacked statu- 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 725 (1997) 743 Opinion of the Court tory authority to impose the new labeling requirement; the FDA countered that the claim was not ripe for judicial re- view for want of any proceedings to enforce the regulation. The Court dealt with ripeness under a two-pronged test: "Without undertaking to survey the intricacies of the ripeness doctrine it is fair to say that its basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. The problem is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." 387 U. S., at 148­149 (footnote omitted). Under the "fitness for review" prong, we first noted that the FDA's adoption of the labeling regulation was "final agency action" within the meaning of § 10 of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 704, and then rejected the Government's argument that re- view must await enforcement. 387 U. S., at 149­152. We reasoned that "the impact of the regulations upon the peti- tioners is sufficiently direct and immediate as to render the issue appropriate for judicial review at this stage" because promulgation of the regulations "puts petitioners in a di- lemma": "Either they must comply with the [labeling] re- quirement and incur the costs of changing over their promo- tional material and labeling or they must follow their present course and risk prosecution." Id., at 152 (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, the immediate impact of the reg- ulation on the manufacturers satisfied the "hardship" prong: "Where the legal issue presented is fit for judicial resolution, and where a regulation requires an immediate and significant change in the plaintiffs' conduct of their affairs with serious 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 744 SUITUM v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY Opinion of the Court penalties attached to noncompliance," hardship has been demonstrated and "access to the courts . . . must be permit- ted." Id., at 153. Abbott Laboratories is not on point. The drug companies in that case were challenging the validity of a regulation as beyond the scope of the FDA's authority. Whatever the arguable merit of the FDA's position on ripeness may have been, it rested on the fact that the manufacturers could have precipitated their challenge (if they had wanted) by violating the regulation and defending any subsequent prosecution by placing the regulation's validity in question. Suitum is in a different position from the manufacturers. She does not challenge the validity of the agency's regulations; her litigat- ing position assumes that the agency may validly bar her land development just as all agree it has actually done, and her only challenge to the TDR's raises a question about their value, not about the lawfulness of issuing them. Suitum seeks not to be free of the regulations but to be paid for their consequences, and even if for some odd reason she had decided to bring things to a head by building without a per- mit, a § 1983 action for money would not be a defense to an equity proceeding to enjoin development. Indeed, to the extent that Abbott Laboratories is in any sense instructive in the disposition of the case before us, it cuts directly against the agency: Suitum is just as definitively barred from taking any affirmative step to develop her land as the drug companies were bound to take affirmative steps to change their labels. The only discretionary step left to an agency in either situation is enforcement, not determining applicability. * * * Because we find that Suitum has received a "final decision" consistent with Williamson County's ripeness requirement, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 725 (1997) 745 Opinion of Scalia, J. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I concur in the judgment of the Court, and join its opinion except for Parts II­B and II­C. Those sections consider whether the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) must have reached a final decision regarding Suitum's ability to sell her Transferable Development Rights (TDRs), and whether the value of Suitum's TDRs must be known. That discussion presumes that the answers to those questions may be relevant to the issue presented at this preliminary stage of the present case: whether Suitum's takings claim is ripe for judicial review under the "final decision" requirement. In my view they are not relevant to that issue, and the Court's discussion is beside the point. To describe the nature of the "final decision" inquiry, the Court's opinion quotes only the vague language of William- son County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985), that there must be a "final decision regarding the application of the [challenged] regulations to the property at issue," id., at 186, quoted ante, at 734, and of MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U. S. 340 (1986), that "[a] court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone `too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes," id., at 348, quoted ante, at 734. Unmentioned in the opinion are other, more specific, state- ments in those very cases (and elsewhere) which display quite clearly that the quoted generalizations (and the "final decision" inquiry) have nothing to do with TDRs. Later in Williamson County, for example, we explained that the pur- pose of the "final decision" requirement was to ensure that the Court can ascertain "how [the takings plaintiff] will be allowed to develop its property," Williamson County, supra, at 190. And on the very same page from which the Court extracted the vague statement, MacDonald says quite pre- cisely that the essential function of the "final decision" re- 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 746 SUITUM v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY Opinion of Scalia, J. quirement is to ensure that there has been a "determination of the type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject property," MacDonald, supra, at 348; and says later that "[o]ur cases uniformly reflect an insistence on knowing the nature and extent of permitted development before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that purport to limit it," 477 U. S., at 351. The Court fails even to mention, in its otherwise encyclopedic description of the development of the "final decision" requirement, the most recent of our opinions addressing the subject, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003 (1992), in which we relied exclusively on these more precise formulations and did not mention the vague language quoted by the Court today, see id., at 1011. The focus of the "final decision" inquiry is on ascertaining the extent of the governmental restriction on land use, not what the government has given the landowner in exchange for that restriction. When our cases say, as the Court ex- plains ante, at 734, that without a "final decision" it is impos- sible to know whether the regulation "goes too far," Penn- sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922), they mean "goes too far in restricting the profitable use of the land," not "goes not far enough in providing compensation for restricting the profitable use of the land." The latter pertains not to whether there has been a taking, but to the subsequent question of whether, if so, there has been just compensation. In all of the cases discussed in Part II­A of the Court's opinion bearing on the question whether a "final decision" requisite to a takings claim had been made, the point at issue was whether the government had finally determined the per- missible use of the land. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255 (1980), discussed ante, at 735­736, the government had not yet determined how many houses the challenged zoning ordinance would permit on the plaintiff's property. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 725 (1997) 747 Opinion of Scalia, J. Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981), discussed ante, at 736­737, the gov- ernment had not yet determined whether a variance from the land-use restrictions of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 would be allowed. In Williamson County, supra, discussed ante, at 737, the government had not yet determined whether it would approve the developer's plan to build a residential complex. And in MacDonald, supra, discussed ante, at 737­738, the government had again not yet determined whether the developer's subdivision plan would be approved. TDRs, of course, have nothing to do with the use or devel- opment of the land to which they are (by regulatory decree) "attached." The right to use and develop one's own land is quite distinct from the right to confer upon someone else an increased power to use and develop his land. The latter is valuable, to be sure, but it is a new right conferred upon the landowner in exchange for the taking, rather than a reduc- tion of the taking. In essence, the TDR permits the land- owner whose right to use and develop his property has been restricted or extinguished to extract money from others. Just as a cash payment from the government would not re- late to whether the regulation "goes too far" (i. e., restricts use of the land so severely as to constitute a taking), but rather to whether there has been adequate compensation for the taking; and just as a chit or coupon from the government, redeemable by and hence marketable to third parties, would relate not to the question of taking but to the question of compensation; so also the marketable TDR, a peculiar type of chit which enables a third party not to get cash from the government but to use his land in ways the government would otherwise not permit, relates not to taking but to com- pensation. It has no bearing upon whether there has been a "final decision" concerning the extent to which the plain- tiff's land use has been constrained. Putting TDRs on the taking rather than the just- compensation side of the equation (as the Ninth Circuit did 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 748 SUITUM v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY Opinion of Scalia, J. below) is a clever, albeit transparent, device that seeks to take advantage of a peculiarity of our Takings-Clause juris- prudence: Whereas once there is a taking, the Constitution requires just (i. e., full) compensation, see, e. g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Monroe and Pike County Land, 441 U. S. 506, 510 (1979) (owner must be put " `in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken' "); Monon- gahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 326 (1893) ("[T]he compensation must be a full and perfect equivalent for the property taken"), a regulatory taking generally does not occur so long as the land retains substantial (albeit not its full) value, see, e. g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978). If money that the government- regulator gives to the landowner can be counted on the ques- tion of whether there is a taking (causing the courts to say that the land retains substantial value, and has thus not been taken), rather than on the question of whether the compensa- tion for the taking is adequate, the government can get away with paying much less. That is all that is going on here. It would be too obvious, of course, for the government simply to say "although your land is regulated, our land-use scheme entitles you to a government payment of $1,000." That is patently compensation and not retention of land value. It would be a little better to say "under our land-use scheme, TDRs are attached to every parcel, and if the parcel is regu- lated its TDR can be cashed in with the government for $1,000." But that still looks too much like compensation. The cleverness of the scheme before us here is that it causes the payment to come, not from the government but from third parties-whom the government reimburses for their outlay by granting them (as the TDRs promise) a variance from otherwise applicable land-use restrictions. Respondent maintains that Penn Central supports the conclusion that TDRs are relevant to the question whether there has been a taking. In Penn Central we remarked that because the rights to develop the airspace above Grand Cen- 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 725 (1997) 749 Opinion of Scalia, J. tral Terminal had been made transferable to other parcels in the vicinity (some of which the owners of the terminal themselves owned), it was "not literally accurate to say that [the owners] have been denied all use of [their] pre-existing air rights"; and that even if the TDRs were inadequate to constitute "just compensation" if a taking had occurred, they could nonetheless "be taken into account in considering the impact of regulation." Id., at 137 (emphasis in original). This analysis can be distinguished from the case before us on the ground that it was applied to landowners who owned at least eight nearby parcels, some immediately adjacent to the terminal, that could be benefited by the TDRs. See id., at 115. The relevant land, it could be said, was the aggrega- tion of the owners' parcels subject to the regulation (or at least the contiguous parcels); and the use of that land, as a whole, had not been diminished. It is for that reason that the TDRs affected "the impact of the regulation." This analysis is supported by the concluding clause of the opinion, which says that the restrictions "not only permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities further to enhance not only the Terminal site proper but also other properties." Id., at 138. If Penn Central's one-paragraph expedition into the realm of TDRs were not distinguishable in this fashion, it would deserve to be overruled. Considering in the takings calculus the mar- ket value of TDRs is contrary to the import of a whole series of cases, before and since, which make clear that the relevant issue is the extent to which use or development of the land has been restricted. Indeed, it is contrary to the whole principle that land-use regulation, if severe enough, can con- stitute a taking which must be fully compensated. I do not mean to suggest that there is anything undesir- able or devious about TDRs themselves. To the contrary, TDRs can serve a commendable purpose in mitigating the economic loss suffered by an individual whose property use is restricted, and property value diminished, but not so sub- 520US3 Unit: $U59 [09-11-99 19:13:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN 750 SUITUM v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY Opinion of Scalia, J. stantially as to produce a compensable taking. They may also form a proper part, or indeed the entirety, of the full compensation accorded a landowner when his property is taken. Accord, Penn Central, supra, at 152 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that Penn Central had been "offered substantial amounts" for its TDRs and suggesting the appro- priateness of a remand for a determination of whether the TDRs are valuable enough to constitute full compensation). I suggest only that the relevance of TDRs is limited to the compensation side of the takings analysis, and that taking them into account in determining whether a taking has oc- curred will render much of our regulatory takings juris- prudence a nullity, see Comment, Environmental Interest Groups and Land Regulation: Avoiding the Clutches of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 48 U. Miami L. Rev. 1179, 1212 (1994). In sum, I would resolve the question of whether there has been a "final decision" in this case by looking only to the fixing of petitioner's rights to use and develop her land. There has never been any dispute over whether that has oc- curred. Before bringing the present suit, petitioner applied for permission to build a house on her lot, and was denied permission to do so on the basis of TRPA's determination that her property is located within a "Stream Environment Zone"-a designation that carries the consequence that "[n]o additional land coverage or other permanent land disturb- ance shall be permitted," TRPA Code § 20.4. Respondent in fact concedes that "[w]e know the full extent of the regula- tion's impact in restricting petitioner's development of her own land," Brief for Respondent 21. That is all we need to know to conclude that the "final decision" requirement has been met. 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 751 Syllabus UNITED STATES v. LaBONTE et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the first circuit No. 95­1726. Argued January 7, 1997-Decided May 27, 1997 Title 28 U. S. C. § 994(h) directs the United States Sentencing Commission to "assure" that its Sentencing Guidelines specify a prison sentence "at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of" adult offenders who commit their third felony drug offense or violent crime. The Com- mission sought to implement this directive in its "Career Offender Guideline," Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1. That Guideline initially failed to designate which "maximum term" a sentencing court should use when federal law establishes a basic statutory maximum for persons convicted of a particular offense, but also provides an enhanced penalty for career offenders convicted of that same offense. The District Court used such an enhancement in sentencing respondents, each of whom was convicted of federal drug felonies and qualified as a career offender under § 4B1.1. After the First Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, the Com- mission adopted Amendment 506, which, inter alia, altered § 4B1.1's commentary to preclude consideration of statutory sentence enhance- ments. One District Court Judge found that Amendment 506 was con- trary to § 994(h) and refused to reduce the sentences of respondents Dyer and Hunnewell, but another such judge upheld the amendment and reduced respondent LaBonte's prison term. The First Circuit con- solidated the ensuing appeals and held that § 4B1.1, as construed under Amendment 506, was a reasonable implementation of § 994(h)'s directive. Held: Amendment 506 is inconsistent with § 994(h)'s plain and unambigu- ous language and therefore must give way. Stinson v. United States, 508 U. S. 36, 38. Assuming that Congress said what it meant in draft- ing § 994(h), and giving the words used their "ordinary meaning," Moskal v. United States, 498 U. S. 103, 108, the phrase "maximum term authorized" must be read to include all applicable statutory sentencing enhancements. Respondents' contrary argument that the phrase refers only to the highest penalty authorized by the offense of conviction, excluding any enhancements, has little merit. Their assertion that § 994(h) is ambiguous is based, at least in part, on a strained and flawed construction of the phrase "categories of defendants." Their claim that Amendment 506 satisfies Congress' mandate to sentence repeat offend- ers "at or near" the maximum sentence authorized is also rejected. Al- though the phrase "at or near" unquestionably permits a certain degree 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 752 UNITED STATES v. LaBONTE Opinion of the Court of flexibility for upward and downward departures and adjustments, it does not license the Commission to select as the relevant "maximum term" a sentence that is different from the congressionally authorized maximum term. Finally, this Court is unmoved by respondents' heavy reliance on the Commission's inapposite assertions that Amendment 506 avoids unwarranted double counting of prior offenses and eliminates unwarranted disparity associated with variations in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in seeking enhanced penalties. Pp. 757­762. 70 F. 3d 1396, reversed and remanded. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 762. Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Acting So- licitor General Dellinger, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen- eral Keeney, Malcolm L. Stewart, and J. Douglas Wilson. David N. Yellen argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were John A. Ciraldo, by appointment of the Court, 518 U. S. 1037, Peter Goldberger, by appointment of the Court, 518 U. S. 1037, and Michael C. Bourbeau, by appointment of the Court, 518 U. S. 1037.* Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. In 28 U. S. C. § 994(h), Congress directed the United States Sentencing Commission (Commission) to "assure" that the Sentencing Guidelines specify a prison sentence "at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of" adult of- fenders who commit their third felony drug offense or violent crime. We are asked to decide whether, by "maximum term authorized," Congress meant (1) the maximum term avail- able for the offense of conviction including any applicable *David Duncan, Lisa B. Kemler, and David M. Zlotnick filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 751 (1997) 753 Opinion of the Court statutory sentencing enhancements, as the United States ar- gues, or (2) the maximum term available without such en- hancements, as the Commission has determined. We con- clude that the Commission's interpretation is inconsistent with § 994(h)'s plain language, and therefore hold that "maxi- mum term authorized" must be read to include all applicable statutory sentencing enhancements. I A In 1984, Congress created the Commission and charged it with "establish[ing] sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system." 28 U. S. C. § 991; see Mis- tretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 367­370 (1989). The Commission, however, was not granted unbounded discre- tion. Instead, Congress articulated general goals for fed- eral sentencing and imposed upon the Commission a variety of specific requirements. See §§ 994(b)­(n). Among those requirements, Congress directed that the Commission "shall assure that the guidelines specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of defendants in which the de- fendant is eighteen years old or older and- "(1) has been convicted of a felony that is- "(A) a crime of violence; or "(B) an offense described in section 401 of the Con- trolled Substances Act (21 U. S. C. 841) . . . ; and "(2) has previously been convicted of two or more prior [such] felonies . . . ." 28 U. S. C. § 994(h). The Commission sought to implement this directive by prom- ulgating the "Career Offender Guideline," which created a table of enhanced total offense levels to be used in calculat- ing sentences for "career offenders." United States Sen- tencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (Nov. 1987) 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 754 UNITED STATES v. LaBONTE Opinion of the Court (USSG). Pursuant to that Guideline, each defendant who qualifies for career offender status is automatically placed in criminal history "Category VI," the highest available under the Guidelines. The table then assigns the appropriate offense level based on the so-called "offense statutory maximum." When the Commission coined the phrase "offense statu- tory maximum," it defined it, unhelpfully, as "the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the offense of convic- tion." USSG App. C, amdt. 267 (Nov. 1989) (adding § 4B1.1, comment., n. 2). Neither the Career Offender Guideline it- self, however, nor the accompanying commentary designated which "maximum term" was to be used when federal law established a basic statutory maximum for persons convicted of a particular offense, but also provided an enhanced maxi- mum penalty for career offenders convicted of that same of- fense.1 The Courts of Appeals, required to choose between sentencing "at or near the maximum" of the base sentence, or of the base sentence plus the relevant statutory enhance- ments, uniformly concluded that the "offense statutory maxi- mum" for a defendant with prior convictions was the en- hanced maximum term.2 The Commission subsequently amended the Career Of- fender Guideline's commentary to preclude consideration of statutory enhancements in calculating the "offense statu- tory maximum." Rejecting the approach prevailing in the 1 We note that imposition of an enhanced penalty is not automatic. Such a penalty may not be imposed unless the Government files an information notifying the defendant in advance of trial (or prior to the acceptance of a plea) that it will rely on that defendant's prior convictions to seek a pen- alty enhancement. 21 U. S. C. § 851(a)(1). If the Government does not file such notice, however, the lower sentencing range will be applied even though the defendant may otherwise be eligible for the increased penalty. 2 See United States v. Smith, 984 F. 2d 1084, 1087 (CA10), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 873 (1993); United States v. Garrett, 959 F. 2d 1005, 1009­1011 (CADC 1992); United States v. Amis, 926 F. 2d 328, 329­330 (CA3 1991); United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F. 2d 541, 558­560 (CA9 1989). 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 751 (1997) 755 Opinion of the Court Courts of Appeals, the Commission defined the phrase "of- fense statutory maximum" as: "the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the offense of conviction that is a crime of violence or con- trolled substance offense, not including any increase in that maximum term under a sentencing enhancement provision that applies because of the defendant's prior criminal record . . . ." USSG App. C, amdt. 506 (Nov. 1994) (amending USSG § 4B1.1, comment., n. 2). Pursuant to its authority under 28 U. S. C. § 994(u), the Com- mission opted to give Amendment 506 retroactive effect, providing sentencing courts with discretion to reduce sen- tences imposed before the amendment's November 1, 1994, effective date. See USSG § 1B1.10(c) (Nov. 1996). B Prior to the adoption of Amendment 506, respondents George LaBonte, Alfred Lawrence Hunnewell, and Stephen Dyer were convicted of various federal controlled substance offenses in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. Each respondent qualified as a career offender under USSG § 4B1.1 (Nov. 1987), had received the required notice that an enhanced penalty would be sought, and was sentenced under the Career Offender Guideline using the en- hancement. The First Circuit affirmed each respondent's conviction and sentence. Following the adoption of Amend- ment 506, however, each respondent sought a reduction in his sentence. In the cases of respondents Dyer and Hun- newell, the District Court found that the amendment was contrary to 21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1)(C) and 28 U. S. C. § 994(h), and refused to reduce the sentences. In respondent La- Bonte's case, however, a different judge of the same District Court upheld the amendment and reduced LaBonte's sen- tence. The First Circuit consolidated the ensuing appeals and a divided panel, applying the approach set forth in Chev- ron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 756 UNITED STATES v. LaBONTE Opinion of the Court 467 U. S. 837 (1984), upheld Amendment 506 as an appro- priate exercise of the Commission's discretion. 70 F. 3d 1396, 1403­1409 (1995). The First Circuit looked to the stat- utory language and "f[ou]nd no clear congressional directive regarding the meaning of the term `maximum' as that term is used in section 994(h)." Id., at 1406. In the court's view, the meaning of the word "maximum" was influenced by its presence in the phrase " `maximum term authorized for [cer- tain] categories of defendants.' " Id., at 1404 (bracketed term in original). While acknowledging that the phrase could apply exclusively to that category of repeat offenders for whom the Government filed a notice to seek sentence enhancement, the court also observed that the word "catego- ries" could plausibly be defined "to include all offenders (or all repeat offenders) charged with transgressing the same criminal statute, regardless of whether the prosecution chooses to invoke the sentence-enhancing mechanism against a particular defendant." Id., at 1404­1405 (emphasis added). Under the latter view, the court reasoned, the word "maxi- mum" would necessarily refer to the unenhanced statutory maximum "since this represents the highest possible sen- tence applicable to all defendants in the category." Id., at 1405. Based on that perceived ambiguity, the court explained that the "Career Offender Guideline, read through the prism of Amendment 506, adopts an entirely plausible version of the categorical approach that the statute suggests." Id., at 1407. The court thus held that the Career Offender Guide- line, as construed under Amendment 506, was a reasonable implementation of § 994(h)'s command to designate sentences at or near the authorized maximum term. Id., at 1409. In validating Amendment 506, the First Circuit here reached the same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit later did in United States v. Dunn, 80 F. 3d 402, 404 (1996). Five other Courts of Appeals, however, have reached the opposite con- clusion, finding Amendment 506 at odds with the plain lan- 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 751 (1997) 757 Opinion of the Court guage of § 994(h).3 We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 518 U. S. 1016 (1996), and now reverse. II Congress has delegated to the Commission "significant dis- cretion in formulating guidelines" for sentencing convicted federal offenders. Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 377. Broad as that discretion may be, however, it must bow to the specific directives of Congress. In determining whether Amend- ment 506 accurately reflects Congress' intent, we turn, as we must, to the statutory language. If the Commission's re- vised commentary is at odds with § 994(h)'s plain language, it must give way. Cf. Stinson v. United States, 508 U. S. 36, 38 (1993) (explaining that the Guidelines commentary "is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute"). In § 994(h), Congress directed the Commission to "assure" that for adult offenders who commit their third felony drug offense or crime of violence, the Guidelines prescribe a sen- tence of imprisonment "at or near the maximum term au- thorized." 28 U. S. C. § 994(h). We do not start from the premise that this language is imprecise. Instead, we as- sume that in drafting this legislation, Congress said what it meant. Giving the words used their "ordinary meaning," Moskal v. United States, 498 U. S. 103, 108 (1990), we find that the word "maximum" most naturally connotes the "greatest quantity or value attainable in a given case." Webster's New International Dictionary 1396 (2d ed. 1958); Black's Law Dictionary 979 (6th ed. 1990) ("The highest or greatest amount, quality, value, or degree"). We similarly 3 See United States v. McQuilkin, 97 F. 3d 723, 731­733 (CA3 1996), cert. pending, No. 96­6810; United States v. Branham, 97 F. 3d 835, 845­846 (CA6 1996); United States v. Hernandez, 79 F. 3d 584, 595­601 (CA7 1996), cert. pending, Nos. 95­8469, 95­9335; United States v. Fountain, 83 F. 3d 946, 950­953 (CA8 1996), cert. pending, No. 96­6001; United States v. Novey, 78 F. 3d 1483, 1486­1488 (CA10 1996), cert. pending, No. 95­8791. 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 758 UNITED STATES v. LaBONTE Opinion of the Court conclude, and the parties do not dispute, that the phrase "term authorized" refers not to the period of incarceration specified by the Guidelines, but to that permitted by the applicable sentencing statutes.4 Accordingly, the phrase "maximum term authorized" should be construed as requir- ing the "highest" or "greatest" sentence allowed by statute. Respondents, however, argue that "maximum term au- thorized" refers only to the highest penalty authorized by the offense of conviction, excluding any statutory sentencing enhancements. We find little merit in that contention. In calculating the "highest" term prescribed for a specific of- fense, it is not sufficient merely to identify the basic penalty associated with that offense. Congress has expressly pro- vided enhanced maximum penalties for certain categories of repeat offenders in an effort to treat them more harshly than other offenders. Section 994(h) explicitly refers, for exam- ple, to 21 U. S. C. § 841, which establishes a base "term of imprisonment of not more than 20 years" for certain drug traffickers, but then adds that "[i]f any person commits such a violation after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final, such person shall be sentenced to a term 4 Indeed, the Commission has explicitly recognized that "the phrase `maximum term authorized' should be construed as the maximum term authorized by statute." USSG § 4B1.1, comment., backg'd (Nov. 1987) (emphasis added). And, in our view, the phrase refers to all applicable statutes that would affect the district court's calculation of the prison term. Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, however, 18 U. S. C. § 3584 does not affect the maximum term authorized. Section 3584 merely in- structs a sentencing court whether to run "multiple terms of imprison- ment" consecutively or concurrently; it says nothing about how the indi- vidual term is to be calculated. § 3584 (emphasis added). Of course, § 3584(c), which the dissent highlights, post, at 770, directs that "[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment . . . shall be treated for administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment." 18 U. S. C. § 3584(c) (emphasis added). Each of the sections cited by the dissent falls within this "admin- istrative purposes" carve-out, which in no way undercuts, and in fact plainly bolsters, our point. 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 751 (1997) 759 Opinion of the Court of imprisonment of not more than 30 years." § 841(b)(1)(C). Where Congress has enacted a base penalty for first-time offenders or nonqualifying repeat offenders, and an enhanced penalty for qualifying repeat offenders, the "maximum term authorized" for the qualifying repeat offenders is the en- hanced, not the base, term. As a consequence, the "maxi- mum term authorized" for repeat offenders convicted under § 841(b)(1)(C) is 30 years-the enhanced statutory maxi- mum-not the unenhanced maximum of 20 years. Respondents' assertion that § 994(h) is ambiguous is based, at least in part, on a strained construction of the phrase "cat- egories of defendants." They claim that the word "catego- ries" can be defined broadly to encompass all repeat offend- ers charged with violating the same criminal statute- including those for whom the Government did not file a no- tice under § 851(a)(1) and who are therefore ineligible for the penalty enhancement. See n. 1, supra. If "categories of defendants" is defined in this way, respondents argue, a sen- tence "at or near the maximum term authorized" for this broader "category" of repeat offenders would necessarily permit only the unenhanced maximum because this is the highest possible sentence that could apply to all of the de- fendants within that category. We see at least two serious flaws in this reasoning. First, respondents' construction of the word "categories" is overin- clusive because it subsumes within a single category both defendants who have received notice under § 851(a)(1) and those who have not. The statutory scheme, however, obvi- ously contemplates two distinct categories of repeat offend- ers for each possible crime. The Commission is no more free to ignore this distinction than it is to ignore the distinction made between those defendants who distributed certain con- trolled substances and those whose distribution also directly resulted in the death of a user. See, e. g., 21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Thus, for defendants who have received the 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 760 UNITED STATES v. LaBONTE Opinion of the Court notice under § 851(a)(1), as respondents did here, the "maxi- mum term authorized" is the enhanced term. For defend- ants who did not receive the notice, the unenhanced maxi- mum applies. Second, to read the phrase "categories of defendants" as respondents suggest would largely eviscerate the penalty en- hancements Congress enacted in statutes such as § 841. We are unwilling to read § 994(h) as essentially rendering mean- ingless entire provisions of other statutes to which it ex- pressly refers. Under respondents' novel construction, a re- peat drug or violent felon could only receive a sentence at or near the maximum allowed for defendants who had no such prior qualifying convictions or who had never received the notice under § 851(a)(1). Indeed, if this interpretation of the term "categories" were adopted, a sentencing court could be forbidden to impose the enhanced maximum penalty. Con- gress surely did not establish enhanced penalties for repeat offenders only to have the Commission render them a virtual nullity. Respondents further seek to circumvent § 994(h)'s plain meaning by claiming that Amendment 506 satisfies Congress' mandate to sentence repeat offenders "at or near" the maxi- mum sentence authorized. The flexibility afforded by the phrase "at or near," respondents contend, justifies the Com- mission's decision to rely on the unenhanced maximum. This statutory phrase unquestionably permits a certain de- gree of flexibility for upward and downward departures and adjustments. The pertinent issue, however, "is not how close the sentence must be to the statutory maximum, but to which statutory maximum it must be close." United States v. Fountain, 83 F. 3d 946, 952 (CA8 1996), cert. pending, No. 96­6001. Whatever latitude § 994(h) affords the Com- mission in deciding how close a sentence must come to the maximum to be "near" it, the statute does not license the Commission to select as the relevant "maximum term" a sen- 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 751 (1997) 761 Opinion of the Court tence that is different from the congressionally authorized maximum term.5 Finally, respondents rely heavily on the Commission's stated justifications for choosing the unenhanced maximum. We are unmoved. First, the Commission asserted that, by precluding the use of the statutory enhancements, Amend- ment 506 "avoids unwarranted double counting" of the de- fendant's prior offenses. 59 Fed. Reg. 23608, 23609 (1994). That argument is entirely beside the point. Congress has instructed the Commission to assure that the sentences of repeat offenders closely track the statutory maximum. The number of steps the Commission employs to achieve that re- quirement is unimportant, provided the Commission's mech- anism results in sentences "at or near" the "maximum term authorized." Second, respondents invoke the Commission's assertion that its amended commentary eliminates "unwarranted dis- parity associated with variations in the exercise of prosecu- tional discretion in seeking enhanced penalties based on prior convictions." Ibid. As we understand it, this argu- ment posits that if the Government provides notice under § 851(a)(1) to one defendant, but not to another, the resulting 5 Respondents' reliance on United States v. R. L. C., 503 U. S. 291 (1992), is inapposite. There, we construed 18 U. S. C. § 5037(c), which provides that the sentence ordered by a court for a juvenile delinquent may not extend beyond "the maximum term of imprisonment that would be author- ized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult." We held that the applicable "maximum" term authorized was the upper limit of the Guidelines range that would apply to a similarly situated adult offender. 503 U. S., at 306­307. R. L. C. involved a directive to a sentencing court, however, whereas 28 U. S. C. § 994(h) is a directive to the Commission. Because § 994(h) is designed to cabin the Commission's discretion in the promulgation of guidelines for career offenders, it would be entirely circu- lar to suggest that the Commission had complied with § 994(h) merely by specifying sentences "at or near" the top of the Guidelines range. The Commission itself recognizes that the "maximum term authorized" within the meaning of § 994(h) is the statutory maximum, not the otherwise appli- cable Guidelines maximum. See n. 4, supra. 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 762 UNITED STATES v. LaBONTE Breyer, J., dissenting difference in the maximum possible term is an "unwarranted disparity." Insofar as prosecutors, as a practical matter, may be able to determine whether a particular defendant will be subject to the enhanced statutory maximum, any such discretion would be similar to the discretion a prosecutor exercises when he decides what, if any, charges to bring against a criminal suspect. Such discretion is an integral feature of the criminal justice system, and is appropriate, so long as it is not based upon improper factors. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U. S. 456, 464­465 (1996); Wayte v. United States, 470 U. S. 598, 607 (1985). Any disparity in the maximum statutory penalties between defendants who do and those who do not receive the notice is a foreseeable- but hardly improper-consequence of the statutory notice requirement.6 III In sum, we hold that the phrase "at or near the maximum term authorized" is unambiguous and requires a court to sen- tence a career offender "at or near" the "maximum" prison term available once all relevant statutory sentencing en- hancements are taken into account. Accordingly, we re- verse the judgment below and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting. The United States Sentencing Commission has interpreted three statutory words-the words "maximum term author- ized"-to mean "maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the offense of conviction . . . not including . . . sentenc- ing enhancement provision[s]" for recidivists. 28 U. S. C. 6 Inasmuch as we find the statute at issue here unambiguous, we need not decide whether the Commission is owed deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 751 (1997) 763 Breyer, J., dissenting § 994(h); United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1, comment., n. 2 (Nov. 1995) (USSG). The majority finds this interpretation unlawful. It believes that the three statutory words are unambiguous; that they are not susceptible to the Commission's interpretation; and that the only possible interpretation is one that does not except recidivist enhancement provisions. In my view, however, the words "maximum term au- thorized" are ambiguous. They demand an answer to the question "authorized by what?" The statute itself does not tell us "what." Nor does the statute otherwise "directly [speak] to the precise [Guideline] question at issue." Chev- ron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984); see Smiley v. Citibank (South Da- kota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735 (1996). In light of the statutory ambiguity, we should defer to the Commission's views about what Guideline the statute permits it to write; and we should uphold the Guideline the Commission has written because it "is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, supra, at 843. I A To understand the legal issue before us, one must keep in mind both what the Guidelines are and how they work. The Guidelines themselves are a set of legal rules written by the United States Sentencing Commission acting under author- ity delegated to it by a congressional statute, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Sentencing Act), Pub. L. 98­473, § 217, 98 Stat. 2017­ 2026, as amended, 28 U. S. C. §§ 991­998. See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361 (1989). Congress established the United States Sentencing Com- mission both to create a more honest sentencing sys- tem (through the elimination of parole, see Pub. L. 98­473, § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 2027) and to create a fairer system by reducing the "unjustifiably wide range of sentences [pre- 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 764 UNITED STATES v. LaBONTE Breyer, J., dissenting viously imposed upon] offenders with similar histories, con- victed of similar crimes, committed under similar circum- stances," under the pre-existing indeterminate system of sentencing. S. Rep. No. 98­225, p. 38 (1983). See also Mis- tretta, supra, at 366. At the same time, Congress said that the Commission, when reducing disparity, should not "sacrific[e] proportional- ity"-the principle that criminal conduct of greater severity should be punished more harshly than less serious conduct. United States Sentencing Commission, Supplementary Re- port on the Initial Sentencing Guidelines and Policy State- ments 13 (June 1987) (Supplementary Report). See also 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (sentences should "reflect the serious- ness of the offense" and "provide just punishment"); 28 U. S. C. §§ 994(a)(2) and (g). This effort to achieve propor- tionality required the Commission to identify those factors that make criminal conduct more or less serious and provide a way for those factors to be taken into account in the Guide- lines. Yet because the list of relevant sentencing factors is long, and their interaction impossibly complex, the Commis- sion had to strike a compromise between the need for propor- tionality on the one hand and the need for Guidelines that were simple enough to be administered. USSG ch. 1, pt. A3, p. s. The upshot is a Guidelines system that balances vari- ous, sometimes conflicting, general goals, including reduction of disparity, proportionality, and administrability. The Guidelines divide sentencing factors into two basic categories: "offense" characteristics and "offender" charac- teristics. See generally USSG § 1B1.1. The Guidelines first look to the characteristics of the "offense." The Guide- lines tell a sentencing judge to consider the behavior in which an offender engaged when he committed the crime of which he was convicted. They assign a number-called a "Base Offense Level"-to the behavior that constituted the crime itself. (For example, they assign the Base Offense Level 20 to robbery. Id., § 2B3.1(a).) They next tell the 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 751 (1997) 765 Breyer, J., dissenting judge to look to the way in which the offender committed the crime; and they provide specific upward adjustments in light of certain aggravating features of the criminal behav- ior-adjustments they call "Specific Offense Characteris- tics." (For example, if the robber used a gun, the judge adds six levels. Id., § 2B3.1(b)(2)(B).) The Guidelines then tell the judge to turn to the relevant characteristics of the defendant, see 28 U. S. C. § 994(d)-fea- tures not of the crime, but of the criminal. In particular, they tell the judge to assign a number of "points" determined by what the Commission has determined to be the single most important offender characteristic, namely, the offend- er's prior criminal behavior. These points in turn cor- respond to one of six Criminal History Categories. (For example, if the robber had one serious prior criminal conviction, that is, one that led to a sentence of imprisonment of more than 13 months, the judge will assign three points, which places the offender in Criminal History Category II. USSG § 4A1.1(a), and id., ch. 5, pt. A (table).) After determining the "offense level" and Criminal His- tory Category applicable to the offender, the sentencing judge (after making various other possible adjustments) will consult a table, the rows of which consist of "levels" and the columns of which consist of "Categories." The intersection of the appropriate row and column will normally indicate a narrow range of months of imprisonment. (For example, at the intersection of level 26 and Category II lies a sentencing range of 70­87 months' imprisonment. Id., ch. 5, pt. A (table).) In an ordinary case, the judge will sentence within that indicated range. I say "in an ordinary case" because almost all Guideline rules are meant to govern typical cases. See 18 U. S. C. § 3553(b); 28 U. S. C. §§ 991(b)(1)(B), 994(b)(2) (requiring strict limits upon judge's sentencing discretion in ordinary cases). At the same time, the sentencing judge is free to depart from the Guidelines sentence in an atypical case-one 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 766 UNITED STATES v. LaBONTE Breyer, J., dissenting outside the "heartland" of cases embodying the conduct that individual Guidelines describe. 18 U. S. C. § 3553(b); USSG ch. 1, pt. A4(b); Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81, 92­96 (1996). This "departure authority" is important because no set of Guidelines can anticipate every situation. Where "there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guide- lines," a judge has the authority to impose an appropriate sentence, so long as that sentence is within the range author- ized by the statute under which the defendant was convicted. See 18 U. S. C. § 3553(b); see also 28 U. S. C. § 991(b)(1)(B). As the Commission has pointed out, this system reflects the Sentencing Act's "detailed instructions . . . the most im- portant of which directs the Commission to create categories of offense behavior and offender characteristics." USSG ch. 1, pt. A2 (emphasis added). See also 28 U. S. C. §§ 994(c) and (d). Twenty-five statutory subsections, §§ 994(a)­(y), contain these and other "detailed instructions"-instructions that both "delegat[e] broad authority to the Commission to . . . rationalize the federal sentencing process," USSG ch. 1, pt. A2, and also describe, at least in rough outline, how the Commission should go about exercising that authority. The case before us concerns 1 of those 25 subsections, 28 U. S. C. § 994(h), which I shall call the "career offender" subsection. B The "career offender" subsection provides more specific directions than most other subsections. It says that the Commission "shall assure that the guidelines specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of defendants in which the defendant is eighteen years old or older and- "(1) has been convicted of a felony that is- "(A) a crime of violence; or 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 751 (1997) 767 Breyer, J., dissenting "(B) an offense described in section 401 of the Con- trolled Substances Act (21 U. S. C. 841) . . . ; and "(2) has previously been convicted of two or more [similar] prior felonies . . . ." § 994(h) (emphasis added). This provision, for present purposes, is not quite as compli- cated as it appears, for the words that follow the italicized words "maximum term authorized" do not modify or ex- plain those italicized words. Rather, they describe the kind of person whom the Commission must make certain is sen- tenced to a term "at or near the maximum term authorized." It is as if the statute said to the Commission: Focus upon "categories" of individuals who have previously committed two serious crimes (involving drugs or violence) and make certain that the Guidelines specify, for those "categories" of individuals, "a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized." The Commission has recently rewritten the Guideline so that it now imposes sentences based upon "the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the offense of conviction . . . not including any increase in that maximum term under a sentencing enhancement provision that applies because of the defendant's prior criminal record." USSG § 4B1.1, comment., n. 2. To understand how the new Guideline works, consider an example: The basic drug distribution statute, 21 U. S. C. § 841, has two relevant subsections, (a) and (b). Subsection (a) makes it a crime to "possess" a "controlled substance," such as cocaine, with "intent to distribute" it. Subsection (b) sets forth penalties-both minimum and maximum penal- ties-for violating subsection (a). Those penalties depend primarily upon the amount of drugs at issue, but also upon recidivism. One part of subsection (b), namely, subsection (b)(1)(B), for example, specifies a minimum penalty of 5 years and a maximum penalty of 40 years where the amount of cocaine ranges from 500 grams to 5 kilograms. A later por- 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 768 UNITED STATES v. LaBONTE Breyer, J., dissenting tion of that part increases the minimum penalty to 10 years and the maximum penalty to life if the offender has a pre- vious drug felony conviction. The Commission's Career Offender Guideline treats the statutory term "authorized" as if it referred to the "maximums" that § 841 provides, except for this last-mentioned part. II We must decide whether the career offender statute per- mits the Commission to write this Career Offender Guide- line-a Guideline that looks to the maximum sentences that individual criminal statutes authorize for the behavior that constitutes the offense. That Guideline does not look to the maximum sentence that an individual criminal statute au- thorizes for recidivism-perhaps the most important of- fender characteristic. In a sense, it says that the career offender statute, which tells the Commission to transform statutory maximums into approximate Guideline minimums, is Congress' basic recidivism provision. That is to say, the Commission's Guideline essentially reads the career offender statute as permitting an implementing Guideline that sub- stitutes for, rather than supplements, other statutory recidivism-based maximum-sentence enhancements. The question that divides this Court is not about the wis- dom of this implementing interpretation. It is whether the "career offender" statute's words "maximum term author- ized" are open to the Commission's interpretation or whether they unambiguously forbid it. In my view, the words, whether read by themselves, read within the context of sen- tencing law, or read against the historic background of sen- tencing reform, do not unambiguously forbid the Guideline. Rather, their ambiguity indicates that Congress simply has not "addressed the precise question." Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843. First, the language itself-the words "maximum term authorized"-is ambiguous. As I previously pointed out, 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 751 (1997) 769 Breyer, J., dissenting supra, at 767, the immediately subsequent words (about cat- egories of offenders) do not explain the words "maximum term authorized," for they do not modify those words. Hence the question remains, "authorized by what?" All par- ties agree that the relevant maximum is the maximum set by sentencing statutes and not, for example, the top of the otherwise applicable Guideline range. But still, to which sentencing statutes does the phrase refer? The answer to this question is not written upon the statute's face. The phrase could not possibly refer to every sentencing statute, nor to every statute that controls the length of the maximum legally possible sentence for a particular of- fender or kind of offender. It seems most unlikely that the phrase was intended to include, for example, 18 U. S. C. § 3565(a)(2)-a statute that authorizes a sentence for a proba- tion violator up to the maximum initially available for the underlying crime. I have never heard anyone claim that an offender who commits his third drug crime while on proba- tion for, say, a minor part in a counterfeiting offense, see § 471; USSG § 2B5.1, should receive a sentence that approxi- mates the statutory maximum for the drug offense plus the 15-year counterfeiting statutory maximum added in addition. But see ante, at 757­758. Nor, to take another example, could the phrase mean to include the federal statute that governs "[m]ultiple sentences of imprisonment," 18 U. S. C. § 3584-a statute that grants sentencing judges broad authority to "run" multiple sen- tences either "concurrently or consecutively." That statute would permit a judge to impose, say, a 20-year maximum sentence for each count of a six-count indictment and run those sentences consecutively, producing a total sentence of 120 years. Yet judges would not impose a sentence of 120 years upon an offender who engaged in a single related set of six 10-gram cocaine sales, even if each sale were the sub- ject of a separate count in a prosecutor's indictment. (The Guidelines would not permit this 120-year imaginary sen- 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 770 UNITED STATES v. LaBONTE Breyer, J., dissenting tence. See USSG §§ 3D1.2(d), 3D1.3(b).) No one thinks that Congress intended the Commission to write its "career offender" Guideline with an eye toward the maximum sen- tences that this kind of statute (the "multiple sentences" statute) theoretically would authorize. The majority, in providing a set of arguments for the cor- rect conclusion that the phrase "maximum term authorized" does not include the statute just mentioned, effectively con- cedes this point. The majority cannot say that the terms of imprisonment authorized by this statute do not even poten- tially fall within the scope of the phrase "maximum term authorized," for the majority's interpretation of this stat- ute-intended to avoid its application-is itself neither obvi- ous nor even necessarily correct. (Compare the majority's use of the words "term of imprisonment," for example, see ante, at 758, n. 4, with the numerous instances in which sen- tencing law, including a portion of the "multiple sentence" statute itself, 18 U. S. C. § 3584(c), uses those words to refer to the actual time to be served as the result of a sentence imposed on a defendant. E. g., §§ 3582, 3585, 3621, 3624.) And once one understands the need to engage in rather com- plex exercises in statutory interpretation to separate out, from the set of all potentially applicable sentencing statutes, those to which the word "authorized" refers, one under- stands that the referent of that word "authorized" is not ob- vious-and that is the main point here at issue. Nor can one resolve the linguistic ambiguity by claiming (as the drafters of the relevant statutory language seem to have claimed, see infra, at 775) that Congress simply meant to refer to the maximum statutory penalties for the "of- fenses" of which offenders are convicted. That is because the word "offense" is a technical term in the criminal law, referring to a crime made up of statutorily defined "ele- ments." See Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 604 (1994); Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 419, 424 (1985). Although some criminal statutes consider recidivism an ele- 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 751 (1997) 771 Breyer, J., dissenting ment of the offense, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 922(g) (felon in posses- sion of a firearm), many other important criminal statutes do not. Under the drug possession statute, for example, recidivism is not an element of the offense, but, rather, a sentencing-related circumstance that the prosecution need not charge or prove at trial. Compare 21 U. S. C. § 841(a) (defining the offense) with § 841(b) (setting penalties). Thus, one might read the statute as referring to the maximum sen- tences imposed for "offenses" technically defined (a reading that would leave out most statutory recidivism enhance- ments) or one might not. The language of the statute, even if read as referring to offenses, does not say. Second, background sentencing law does not provide an unambiguous answer to the "authorized by what" question. That background law includes a fundamental distinction between "offense characteristics" and "offender charac- teristics." This distinction underlies the Guidelines' basic structure, see supra, at 764­766; it is embodied in the Commission's authorizing statute, 28 U. S. C. §§ 994(c) and (d); and it grows out of pre-Guideline sentencing law, see, e. g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion); Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U. S. 51, 55 (1937). Thus, it is not surprising that the Commission should write a Career Offender Guideline that itself reflects that distinction; nor can one consider the dis- tinction arbitrary, as if, for example, the Commission were to have picked and chosen among different offense charac- teristics. Cf. ante, at 759. To the contrary, this aspect of background sentencing law makes plausible a reading that sees this directive to create a generally applicable Career Offender Guideline as, in a sense, a substitute for other, more specific recidivism-based sentence enhancements already scattered throughout the Federal Criminal Code. Of course, one could also read the statute as a supplement to those pro- visions. But the statute itself does not tell us which reading is correct. 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 772 UNITED STATES v. LaBONTE Breyer, J., dissenting One further background circumstance helps to explain why the Commission's reading of the statute is not arbitrary, i. e., why it is not unreasonable for the Guideline to treat recidi- vist enhancements differently from enhancements based on conduct. The career offender subsection was enacted in the context of a sweeping overhaul of the federal system of crim- inal sentencing brought about by the Sentencing Act. One objective of the Act was honesty in sentencing, the idea that an offender actually should serve approximately the time stated in the sentence that the judge imposed. S. Rep. No. 98­225, at 56. Congress achieved this objective by abolish- ing parole. It thereby transformed the sentence the judge pronounced from an enormous overstatement (given the fact that the offender would have spent perhaps one-third to one-half or even more of that time on parole), into real-time years almost all of which the offender would actually spend in prison. In other words, given parole, a 30-year sentence might mean 10 to 20 years; a 15-year sentence might mean 5. See generally id., at 46­49; Supplementary Report, App. C. When it abolished parole, however, Congress did not ex- pect the Commission to write Guidelines that automatically transformed into "real time" the parole-inflated 20- or 30- year terms that judges had previously imposed upon, say, bank robbers or drug offenders. Rather Congress expected the Commission to adjust the length of the sentence the judge pronounced downward to reflect the fact that hence- forth there would be no parole and the offender would really serve close to the entire term. See 28 U. S. C. § 994(m). That is what the Commission did. Supplementary Report 21.This contextual circumstance helps to explain why Con- gress might indeed have expected that the Commission would read the career offender subsection to refer to statu- tory offenses plus conduct-based enhancements alone (with- out recidivism-based sentence enhancements). Congress re- alized that the pre-Guideline sentencing system would have 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 751 (1997) 773 Breyer, J., dissenting translated the words "20 years maximum" in, say, a drug statute into maximum sentences that approximated, say, 12 real-time years. Congress similarly realized that the pre- Guideline sentencing system would have translated the words "30 years maximum" in, say, a drug statute's recidi- vism provision, into maximum sentences that approximated, say, 20 real-time years. That is to say, Congress realized that, pre-Guidelines (because of parole), even the most seri- ous class of recidivist offenders (in the absence of other ag- gravating conduct) would have likely been imprisoned for no more than 20 real-time years. Under these circumstances, a legislator could reasonably have taken the career offender statute's basic objective as one of assuring that all three-time recidivists serve the, say, 20 real-time years that only the worst of them would previously have served. That is to say, by mandating sentences at or near the (newly enacted) 20 year nonrecidivist maximum (for large quantities of cocaine), the career offender subsection would ensure that all career offenders serve terms at or near the real-time maximum that only the most serious offenders would have served under a pre-Guidelines (parole-based) system. And in this way as well, the career-offender provision would significantly in- crease the likely real-time sentences served by most three- time offenders. To understand the impact of real-time sentencing thus helps explain why recidivist maximums are different from maximums associated with offense characteristics; it shows how the Commission's reading is consistent with Congress' obvious intent to increase recidivist sentences significantly; it shows how a general recidivist Guideline has an effect of a different kind than the statutory recidivist enhancements contained in prior law and hence might have been thought of as operating without reference to those enhancements; and it explains how legislators might reasonably have sought the goals implicit in the Commission's reading of the statute. Of course, it may also be the case that no legislator actually 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 774 UNITED STATES v. LaBONTE Breyer, J., dissenting considered the problem before us. Or Congress instead might have had quite different goals in mind. As the major- ity says, Congress might have intended the Commission to insist that all three-time career offenders serve a real-time sentence significantly longer that the worst of them would likely have served before the Guidelines. The important point for present purposes is that the statute itself does not tell us which of these alternative goals Congress sought to achieve. The basic objectives of the career offender subsec- tion-ensuring increased penalties for recidivist offenders who have committed crimes involving drugs or violence- and of sentencing reform are consistent with either basic purpose and thus do not resolve the ambiguity. Third, the statute's legislative history, insofar as it is rele- vant, helps to explain why any search for a clear expression of congressional intent is pointless. When first enacted into law, the career offender subsection did not leave the word "authorized" hanging in midair. Rather, it said "maximum term authorized by section 3581(b) of title 18, United States Code." Pub. L. 98­473, 98 Stat. 2021 (emphasis added). The subsection to which the word "authorized" referred-a subsection that classified crimes by letter-read as follows: "Authorized Terms.-The authorized terms of impris- onment are- "(1) for a Class A felony, the duration of the defend- ant's life or any period of time; "(2) for a Class B felony, not more than twenty-five years; "(3) for a Class C felony, not more than twelve years; "(4) for a Class D felony, not more than six years; "(5) for a Class E felony, not more than three years; "(6) for a Class A misdemeanor, not more than one year; "(7) for a Class B misdemeanor, not more than six months; 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 751 (1997) 775 Breyer, J., dissenting "(8) for a Class C misdemeanor, not more than thirty days; and "(9) for an infraction, not more than five days." 18 U. S. C. § 3581(b). A cross-reference to this classifying subsection does not help, however, for that subsection serves almost no significant purpose in the Federal Criminal Code. In fact, Congress later enacted a technical amendment that eliminated the cross-reference (leaving the word "authorized" without an explicit reference), Pub. L. 99­646, 100 Stat. 3592, because the cross-reference was "misleading" and "incorrect" in that "[t]o date, no Federal offense" uses the classification system in the section to which it referred. H. R. Rep. No. 99­797, p. 18 (1986). The drafters of the technical amendment thought that the "maximum term of an offense is that term prescribed by the provision of law defining the offense." Ibid. But, as we have seen, this view of the matter is not conclusive. See supra, at 770­771. One can find a possible historical explanation for what oc- curred. The classifying subsection, like the sentencing law itself, originated in a congressional effort to rewrite the en- tire Federal Criminal Code. See, e. g., S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. 1630, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981). That rewrite attached a classifying letter to each substantive crime. The classifying subsection attached a maximum penalty to each letter; and the penalty was a real-time penalty, for the rewrite contained the later enacted new sentencing law, which abolished parole and cre- ated real-time sentences. For example, the rewrite charac- terized its only drug recidivism provision-an enhanced pen- alty for a recidivist opiate crime-as a Class B felony; to which the classifying subsection attached a 25-year maxi- mum sentence. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 95­605, pt. 1, pp. 798, 801 (1977). The rewrite did not become law. Congress, in- stead, enacted into law its sentencing provisions, which in- cluded a career offender statute that initially contained a 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 776 UNITED STATES v. LaBONTE Breyer, J., dissenting cross-reference to the classifying subsection that no longer served any significant purpose. This history may help to explain why Congress did not directly provide a clear cross-reference in the career offender subsection. But it does not itself provide such a reference. A reader still might see in that subsection a predominating congressional focus upon increasing all career offenders' real-time terms to a typical real-time maximum term (in which case it is natural to read the subsection as omitting statutory recidivism provisions) or one might see in it a predominating congressional insistence upon further major increases in the real-time maximum terms themselves (in which case it is natural to read the subsection's cross- reference as picking up statutory recidivism provisions). The subsection's language, whether read by itself, read in a broader context of sentencing law, or read against the pro- vision's history, is consistent with either interpretation. Finally, the majority is wrong when it argues that the Ca- reer Offender Guideline "eviscerate[s] the penalty enhance- ments Congress enacted in statutes such as § 841." Ante, at 760. Section 841 increases maximum penalties for recidi- vists, for example, for crimes involving less than 500 grams of cocaine, from 20 years to 30 years. The Commission's career offender penalties for these offenses yield sentences "at or near" the "non-recidivist" maximum. This increased statutory maximum increases what would otherwise be a statutory cap on any sentence imposed, thereby permitting the sentencing judge to sentence a recidivist to more than the statute's first offender maximum (20 years for 30 grams). Consequently, the statutory increase authorizes a higher sen- tence when the relevant Guideline range reaches beyond that first offender maximum (as it does in the case of some of the ranges prescribed by the Career Offender Guideline). See, e. g., USSG § 4B1.1 (table); id., ch. 5, pt. A (table). It author- izes a higher sentence when the sentencing judge faces an atypical case warranting a departure upward. See 18 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 751 (1997) 777 Breyer, J., dissenting U. S. C. § 3553(b). And, most important, it authorizes a higher sentence should the Commission decide to write other Guidelines with specific offense characteristics that tell a judge to sentence certain especially dangerous recidivists (say, violent drug offenders) to more than the first offender maximums. See, e. g., USSG § 2D1.1(a)(1). The upshot is that the majority cannot find here, or any- where else in sentencing law, a clear indication of what Con- gress must have meant by its open-ended term "authorized." The term is ambiguous. III Although the Court does not "decide whether the Commis- sion is owed deference under Chevron," ante, at 762, n. 6, I believe that it is. Chevron directs courts to defer to "an agency's construction of the statute which it administers," 467 U. S., at 842, when Congress, because it has not clearly addressed an issue in the statute itself, likely intends that the consequent "ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows. See Chevron, supra, at 843­844." Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S., at 741. This kind of inference makes sense in this case. Although the Commission is in the "judicial branch" of Government, 28 U. S. C. § 991(a); Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 384­397, Congress intended it to carry out a task similar to rulemaking tasks that Congress has often delegated to administrative agen- cies. The Commission's overall congressional mandate is sweeping. See 28 U. S. C. § 994(f) ("providing certainty and fairness in sentencing and reducing unwarranted sentence disparities"); § 991(b). Without broad delegated authority, it would not be possible to reconcile Congress' general objec- tives-of uniformity, proportionality, and administrability- nor to reconcile those general objectives with a host of more 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 778 UNITED STATES v. LaBONTE Breyer, J., dissenting specific statutory instructions. § 994. Thus the very na- ture of the task, along with the structure of the Sentencing Act, indicates a congressional intent to delegate primarily to the Commission the job of interpreting, and harmonizing, the authorizing Act's specific statutory instructions-subject, of course, to the kind of judicial supervision and review that courts would undertake were the Commission a typical ad- ministrative agency. This Court has previously implied that this is so. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U. S. 36, 44­45 (1993); cf. Mistretta, supra, at 393­394. Were the Commission a typical administrative agency, we would ask whether its "policy" choice is "reasonable," hence "permissible," given the statute. Chevron, supra, at 843­ 844, 866. And we would give the Commission considerable interpretive leeway in light of the fact that the choice here at issue lies at the very heart of the Commission's policy- related "expertise." Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora- tion v. LTV Corp., 496 U. S. 633, 651­652 (1990) ("[P]ractical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind Chevron deference"); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U. S. 833, 845 (1986). The Commission's exer- cise of that expertise here-its Career Offender Guideline- meets this legal requirement. As a matter of policy, the Commission could take account of the fact that the Guideline that the majority believes the statute requires would significantly interfere with one of the Sentencing Act's basic objectives-greater uniformity in sen- tencing. 28 U. S. C. §§ 991(b)(1)(B), 994(f). That is because at least one important set of statutory recidivist enhance- ments-the drug crime enhancements contained in 21 U. S. C. § 841(b)-may be imposed only when the prosecutor files a specific document requesting it. § 851(a). Conse- quently, the majority's interpretation of 28 U. S. C. § 994(h) places significant power in the hands of the prosecutor to determine the length of the offender's sentence; and different prosecutors at different times may exercise that power in 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 751 (1997) 779 Breyer, J., dissenting different ways. The Commission concluded that its inter- pretation avoids "unwarranted disparity associated with variations in the exercise of prosecut[orial] discretion," 59 Fed. Reg. 23608, 23609 (1994), in furtherance of the overrid- ing congressional objective. 28 U. S. C. § 991(b)(1)(B). The majority counters that "any such discretion would be similar to the discretion a prosecutor exercises when he de- cides what, if any, charges to bring against a criminal sus- pect." Ante, at 762. But this reply overlooks the fact that the Guidelines themselves, by basing punishments primarily upon the actual behavior that underlies an offense, are writ- ten to diminish the impact of such prosecutorial discretion. See USSG § 1B1.3. The Commission recognized that the problem is one of diminishing, rather than aggravating, sen- tencing disparity among similarly situated defendants. And the Commission's interpretation finds support in that basic objective. As a matter of policy, the Commission was free to consider the practical impact of the competing interpretations-in terms both of their comparative effectiveness in furthering the basic goals of punishment (deterrence, incapacitation, just deserts, rehabilitation), 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a); 28 U. S. C. § 994(a)(2); USSG ch. 1, pt. A3, and their comparative costs in terms of real resources, 28 U. S. C. § 994(g). And it might have thought that its present interpretation better balanced these objectives. Consider an example: The ordinary (non-Career Offender) Guideline sentence, applicable to a three-time offender, for possession with intent to distribute a single dose of cocaine is 18 months; for possession with intent to distribute 400 grams it is 6 years. The statutory first-offender maximum is 20 years. The recidivist maximum is 30 years. As a mat- ter of policy, the Commission might have thought that an increase from 18 months (or 6 years) to 20 real-time years adequately served basic punishment objectives (as well as Congress' specific instruction to assure "substantial prison 520US3 Unit: $U60 [09-11-99 17:40:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 780 UNITED STATES v. LaBONTE Breyer, J., dissenting terms" for repeat drug offenders, S. Rep. No. 98­225, at 175). And, at the same time, it might have thought an increase to 30 real-time years would have added significantly to costs, without significantly advancing any other punitive purpose. See generally Supplementary Report 71, 73 (predicting an 8%­10% increase in federal prison populations from 1987 to 2002 due solely to the effects of the career offender subsection). Finally, as a matter of policy, the Commission might have believed the Guidelines would create a more coherent sen- tencing system if its Career Offender Guideline basically re- created recidivist real-time maximums, rather than increas- ing those maximums by folding in the additional time that previously had represented parole. Supra, at 772­774. This discussion of policy may help to make clear one reason why I find the majority's decision regrettable. The decision interferes with a legitimate exercise of the Commission's au- thority to write Guidelines that reconcile the various, some- times competing, goals that Congress set forth. The United States Criminal Code contains a highly complicated group of statutes. Congress wrote many of them long before it thought of creating sentencing Guidelines. Congress con- tinues to write other statutes that the Commission, when revising its Guidelines, may, or may not, find easy to recon- cile with what has gone before. Congress understood that the Commission's task is complex. Congress understood the importance of the statute's general goals-a fairer and more rational sentencing system. I believe that courts, when in- terpreting the authorizing Act, should recall Congress' over- riding objectives and Congress' understood need to grant to this arm of the "judicial branch of the United States," 28 U. S. C. § 991(a), the discretionary authority necessary to achieve them. I would allow the Commission to interpret the ambiguous words of the statute before us with these general congressional objectives in mind. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:20] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 781 Syllabus McMILLIAN v. MONROE COUNTY, ALABAMA certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit No. 96­542. Argued March 18, 1997-Decided June 2, 1997 After spending six years on Alabama's death row, petitioner's capital murder conviction was reversed on the ground that the State had suppressed exculpatory evidence. He then sued respondent Monroe County and others under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for the allegedly unconstitu- tional actions of, inter alios, County Sheriff Tom Tate in suppressing the evidence. A county is liable under § 1983 for those actions of its sheriff that constitute county "policy." Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 694. The District Court dismissed the claims, holding that Tate's unlawful acts did not represent Monroe County's policy, because an Alabama county has no authority to make law enforcement policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that a sheriff acting in his law enforcement capacity is not a policymaker for the county. Held: Alabama sheriffs, when executing their law enforcement duties, represent the State of Alabama, not their counties. Pp. 784­796. (a) In determining a local government's § 1983 liability, a court's task is to identify those who speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the violation at issue. Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U. S. 701, 737. The parties agree that Sheriff Tate has final policymak- ing authority in the area of law enforcement, but they disagree about whether Alabama sheriffs are policymakers for the State or the county when acting in their law enforcement capacity. In deciding this dis- pute, the question is not whether Alabama sheriffs act as county or state officials in all of their official actions, but whom they represent in a particular area or on a particular issue. Ibid. This inquiry is depend- ent on the definition of the official's functions under relevant state law. Cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U. S. 425, 429, n. 5. Pp. 784­786. (b) The Court defers considerably to the Court of Appeals' expertise in interpreting Alabama law, see Jett, supra, at 738, and concludes that the State's constitutional provisions concerning sheriffs, the historical development of those provisions, and the interpretation given them by the State Supreme Court strongly support Monroe County's contention that sheriffs represent the State when acting in their law enforcement capacity. The relevant portions of the Alabama Code, although less 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:20] PAGES PGT: OPIN 782 McMILLIAN v. MONROE COUNTY Syllabus compelling, also support this conclusion. Code provisions cutting in favor of the conclusion that sheriffs are county officials are insufficient to tip the balance in petitioner's favor. Pp. 786­793. (c) The Court rejects petitioner's arguments that the result here will create a lack of uniformity in Alabama-by allowing 67 county sher- iffs to have different state law enforcement policies in their counties- and throughout the country-by permitting sheriffs to be classified as state officials in some States and county officials in others. The com- mon law itself envisioned the possibility that state law enforcement "policies" might vary locally, as particular sheriffs adopted varying prac- tices for arresting criminals or securing evidence. And the Nation's federal nature allows the States wide authority to set up their state and local governments as they wish. Petitioner's and his amici's concern that state and local governments will manipulate local officials' titles in a blatant effort to shield local governments from liability is fore- closed by St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U. S. 112, 127 (plurality opinion). Pp. 793­796. 88 F. 3d 1573, affirmed. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Con- nor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 796. Bryan A. Stevenson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Robert B. McDuff. Paul M. Smith argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Donald B. Verrilli, Thomas J. Per- relli, James W. Webb, Kendrick E. Webb, Daryl L. Masters, and Bart Harmon.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen- eral Pinzler, Deputy Solicitor General Waxman, Lisa Schiavo Blatt, and Miriam R. Eisenstein; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Steven R. Shapiro, Paul C. Saunders, Marc L. Fleischaker, Norman Red- lich, Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, Mitchell F. Dolin, and Robert A. Long, Jr.; and for the Southern States Police Benevolent Asso- ciation by J. Michael McGuinness. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Jefferson County, Alabama, by Jeffrey M. Sewell and Charles S. Wagner; and for the Na- tional Association of Counties et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley. 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:20] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 781 (1997) 783 Opinion of the Court Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner sued Monroe County, Alabama, under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, for allegedly unconstitutional ac- tions taken by Monroe County Sheriff Tom Tate. If the sheriff's actions constitute county "policy," then the county is liable for them. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 694 (1978). The parties agree that the sheriff is a "policymaker" for § 1983 purposes, but they dis- agree about whether he is a policymaker for Monroe County or for the State of Alabama. We hold that, as to the actions at issue here, Sheriff Tate represents the State of Alabama and is therefore not a county policymaker. We thus affirm the Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioner's § 1983 claims against Monroe County. I In November 1986, Ronda Morrison was murdered in Mon- roe County, a sparsely populated county located in southwest Alabama. Petitioner and one Ralph Myers were indicted for this crime. Myers then pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and testified against petitioner at his trial. A jury convicted petitioner of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him to death. After two remands, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reversed petitioner's conviction, holding that the State had violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), by suppressing statements from Myers that contra- dicted his trial testimony and other exculpatory evidence. McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d 933, 942­948 (1993). Thus, after spending six years in prison, petitioner was released. He then brought this § 1983 lawsuit in the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama against respondent Mon- roe County and numerous officials, including the three men in charge of investigating the Morrison murder-Tom Tate, the Sheriff of Monroe County; Larry Ikner, an investigator with the District Attorney's office in Monroe County; and Simon Benson, an investigator with the Alabama Bureau of 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:20] PAGES PGT: OPIN 784 McMILLIAN v. MONROE COUNTY Opinion of the Court Investigation. Only two of the officials were sued in their official capacities-Sheriff Tate and investigator Ikner-and it is only these official-capacity suits that concern us here.1 Petitioner principally alleged that Tate and Ikner, in their capacities as officials of Monroe County, not as officers of the State of Alabama, intimidated Myers into making false state- ments and suppressed exculpatory evidence. App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a­33a; McMillian v. Johnson, 878 F. Supp. 1473, 1486­1488 (MD Ala. 1995). The District Court dismissed the claims against Monroe County and the claims against Tate and Ikner in their official capacities. The court held that "any unlawful acts of De- fendants Tate and Ikner cannot be said to represent [Mon- roe] County's policy," because "an Alabama county has [no] authority to make policy in the area of law enforcement." App. to Pet. for Cert. 55a. Petitioner appealed the District Court's decision as to Sheriff Tate. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the District Court that "Sheriff Tate is not a final policymaker for Mon- roe County in the area of law enforcement, because Monroe County has no law enforcement authority." McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F. 3d 1573, 1583 (1996). We granted certiorari, 519 U. S. 1025 (1996), and now affirm. II A We held in Monell, 436 U. S., at 694, that a local govern- ment is liable under § 1983 for its policies that cause constitu- tional torts. These policies may be set by the government's lawmakers, "or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy." Ibid. A court's task is to 1 The claims against the defendants in their individual capacities have proceeded independently in the lower courts, with some of petitioner's claims surviving motions for summary judgment. See McMillian v. Johnson, 878 F. Supp. 1473, 1544­1545 (MD Ala. 1995). 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:20] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 781 (1997) 785 Opinion of the Court "identify those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the partic- ular constitutional or statutory violation at issue." Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U. S. 701, 737 (1989). Here, the parties agree that Sheriff Tate has "final policy- making authority" in the area of law enforcement. They sharply disagree, however, about whether Alabama sheriffs are policymakers for the State or for the county when they act in a law enforcement capacity.2 In deciding this dispute, our inquiry is guided by two prin- ciples. First, the question is not whether Sheriff Tate acts for Alabama or Monroe County in some categorical, "all or nothing" manner. Our cases on the liability of local govern- ments under § 1983 instruct us to ask whether governmental officials are final policymakers for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue. See ibid. (court must identify "those officials who have the power to make official policy on a particular issue" (emphasis added)); id., at 738 (question is whether school district superintendent "possessed final policymaking authority in the area of em- ployee transfers" (emphasis added)); St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U. S. 112, 123 (1988) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he chal- lenged action must have been taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the official or officials responsible under state law for making policy in that area of the city's business"). Thus, we are not seeking to make a characterization of Alabama sheriffs that will hold true for every type of official action they engage in. We simply ask whether Sheriff Tate repre- 2 We have explained that a suit against a governmental officer "in his official capacity" is the same as a suit " `against [the] entity of which [the] officer is an agent,' " Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 165 (1985) (quot- ing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)), and that victory in such an "official-capacity" suit "imposes liability on the entity that [the officer] represents," Brandon v. Holt, 469 U. S. 464, 471 (1985). 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:20] PAGES PGT: OPIN 786 McMILLIAN v. MONROE COUNTY Opinion of the Court sents the State or the county when he acts in a law enforce- ment capacity. Second, our inquiry is dependent on an analysis of state law. Cf. Jett, supra, at 737 (" `[W]hether a particular official has "final policymaking authority" is a question of state law' " (quoting, with original emphasis, Praprotnik, supra, at 123 (plurality opinion))); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U. S. 469, 483 (1986) (plurality opinion) (same). This is not to say that state law can answer the question for us by, for example, simply labeling as a state official an official who clearly makes county policy. But our understanding of the actual function of a governmental official, in a particular area, will necessarily be dependent on the definition of the official's functions under relevant state law. Cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U. S. 425, 429, n. 5 (1997) ("[The] federal question can be answered only after considering the provi- sions of state law that define the agency's character"). B The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that under Alabama law, a sheriff acting in his law enforce- ment capacity is not a policymaker for the county. Since the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals includes Alabama, we defer considerably to that court's expertise in interpreting Alabama law.3 See Jett, supra, at 738 ("We think the Court of Appeals [for the Fifth Circuit], whose expertise in inter- preting Texas law is greater than our own, is in a better position to determine whether [the school district superin- tendent] possessed final policymaking authority in the area of employee transfers"); Pembaur, supra, at 484, n. 13 ("We 3 We note that two of the three judges on the Eleventh Circuit's panel are based in Alabama. In addition, this is the second Eleventh Circuit panel to have reached this conclusion. See Swint v. Wadley, 5 F. 3d 1435, 1450­1451 (1993), vacated for lack of appellate jurisdiction, 514 U. S. 35 (1995). 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 781 (1997) 787 Opinion of the Court generally accord great deference to the interpretation and application of state law by the courts of appeals"). We begin with the Alabama Constitution, "the supreme law of the state." Alexander v. State ex rel. Carver, 150 So. 2d 204, 208 (Ala. 1963). We agree with the Court of Ap- peals that the constitutional provisions concerning sheriffs, the historical development of those provisions, and the inter- pretation given them by the Alabama Supreme Court strongly support Monroe County's contention that sheriffs represent the State, at least for some purposes. Alabama's Constitution, adopted in 1901, states that "[t]he executive de- partment shall consist of a governor, lieutenant governor, attorney-general, state auditor, secretary of state, state treasurer, superintendent of education, commissioner of agri- culture and industries, and a sheriff for each county." Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. V, § 112. This designation is especially important for our purposes, because although every Alabama Constitution has included sheriffs as constitutional officers and has provided for their election by county voters, see Ala. Const. of 1819, Art. IV, § 24; Ala. Const. of 1861, Art. IV, § 24; Ala. Const. of 1865, Art. VII, § 3; Ala. Const. of 1867, Art. V, § 21; Ala. Const. of 1875, Art. V, § 26; Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. V, § 138, sheriffs have not always been explicitly listed as members of the state "executive department." Thus, the 1867 Constitution listed only the "governor, lieutenant gov- ernor, secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, and attorney general" as constituting "the executive department." Ala. Const. of 1867, Art. V, § 1. This changed with the 1875 Con- stitution, when sheriffs and the superintendent of education were added to the list. Ala. Const. of 1875, Art. V, § 1.4 4 Executive department officers have to take the constitutional oath of office, Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. XVII, § 279; Ala. Const. of 1875, Art. XV, § 1, and are required to submit written reports to the Governor on de- mand. Submitting a false report was originally a crime, Ala. Const. of 1875, Art. V, § 9, and is now an impeachable offense, Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. V, § 121. 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN 788 McMILLIAN v. MONROE COUNTY Opinion of the Court The framers of the 1901 Constitution took two significant steps in an attempt to solidify the place of sheriffs in the executive department, and to clarify that sheriffs were act- ing for the State when exercising their law enforcement functions. First, faced with reports that sheriffs were allowing mobs to abduct prisoners and lynch them, the fram- ers made such "neglect" by sheriffs an impeachable offense. See Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. V, § 138 ("Whenever any pris- oner is taken from jail, or from the custody of any sheriff or his deputy, and put to death, or suffers grievous bodily harm, owing to the neglect, connivance, cowardice, or other grave fault of the sheriff, such sheriff may be impeached"); State ex rel. Garber v. Cazalas, 162 Ala. 210, 50 So. 296 (1909) (sheriff's failure to close jail doors, resulting in lynching of prisoner, constitutes impeachable offense); M. McMillan, Constitutional Development in Alabama, 1789­1901, p. 338, n. 186 (1955) (impeachment provision resulted in "much prog- ress made against lynching"). Second, authority to impeach sheriffs was moved from the county courts to the State Supreme Court, because of "[t]he failure of county courts to punish sheriffs for neglect of duty." Parker v. Amerson, 519 So. 2d 442, 443 (Ala. 1987). One of the primary purposes of this change, proposed by ex-Governor Thomas Goode Jones at the 1901 Convention, was "to augment the power of the Governor." Id., at 444. After this change, the Governor could order the State Su- preme Court, rather than the county court, to begin im- peachment proceedings against a wayward sheriff, and would not have to worry that local support for the sheriff would annul his effort at centralized control. See ibid.; Strengthening the Power of the Executive, Address of Emmet O'Neal, Governor of Alabama, pp. 9­10 (Sept. 12, 1911) (new impeachment provision increases Governor's con- trol of sheriffs and "gives the Executive real power which is respected and feared"). Thus, sheriffs now share the same impeachment procedures as state legal officers and lower state court judges, Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. VII, § 174, 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 781 (1997) 789 Opinion of the Court rather than county and municipal officers, Ala. Const. of 1875, Art. VII, § 3. Critically for our case, the Alabama Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions and their historical background as evidence of "the framers' intent to ensure that sheriffs be considered executive officers of the state." Parker, 519 So. 2d, at 444. Based primarily on this understanding of the State Constitution, the court has held unequivocally that sheriffs are state officers, and that tort claims brought against sheriffs based on their official acts therefore consti- tute suits against the State, not suits against the sheriff's county. Id., at 443­445.5 Thus, Alabama counties are not liable under a theory of respondeat superior for a sheriff's official acts that are tortious. Id., at 442. The issues in Parker are strikingly similar to the ones in the present case, and that decision is therefore strong evidence in favor of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that sheriffs act on behalf of the State, rather than the county, when acting in their law enforcement capacity. Turning from the Alabama Constitution to the Alabama Code, the relevant provisions are less compelling, but still support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals to some ex- tent. Section 36­22­3 of the code sets out a sheriff's duties. First, a sheriff must "attend upon" the state courts in his county, must "obey the lawful orders and directions" of those courts, and must "execute and return the process and or- ders" of any state court, even those outside his county. Ala. Code §§ 36­22­3(1), (2) (1991). Thus, judges (who are state officers, see Ala. Const. of 1901, Amdt. 328, § 6.01) may order 5 As a result of this holding and the State Constitution's sovereign im- munity provision, see Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. I, § 14 ("[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity"), the Alabama Supreme Court has held that a sheriff is absolutely immune from all suits for damages based on his official acts. Parker v. Amerson, 519 So. 2d 442, 446 (Ala. 1987). See also King v. Colbert County, 620 So. 2d 623, 626 (Ala. 1993); Boshell v. Walker County Sheriff, 598 So. 2d 843, 844 (Ala. 1992); Hereford v. Jefferson County, 586 So. 2d 209, 210 (Ala. 1991). 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN 790 McMILLIAN v. MONROE COUNTY Opinion of the Court the sheriff to take certain actions, even if the judge sits in a distant county. And under Ala. Code § 12­17­24 (1995), the presiding circuit judge "exercise[s] a general supervision" over the county sheriffs in his circuit,6 just as if the sheriffs are normal "court [i. e., state] employees," see § 12­17­1. Second, the sheriff must give to the county treasurer a sworn written statement detailing the funds he has received for the county since his last statement, and must pay these funds to the treasurer. § 36­22­3(3). In contrast to the state judges, however, the county treasurer does not appear to have any statutory authority to direct the sheriff to take specific actions. Third and most importantly, "[i]t shall be the duty of sher- iffs in their respective counties, by themselves or deputies, to ferret out crime, to apprehend and arrest criminals and, insofar as within their power, to secure evidence of crimes in their counties and to present a report of the evidence so secured to the district attorney or assistant district attorney for the county." § 36­22­3(4). By this mandate, sheriffs are given complete authority to enforce the state criminal law in their counties. In contrast, the "powers and duties" of the counties themselves-creatures of the State who have only the powers granted to them by the State, Alexander, 150 So. 2d, at 206-do not include any provision in the area of law enforcement. Ala. Code § 11­3­11 (1989). Thus, the "governing body" of the counties-which in every Alabama county is the county commission, see Calvert v. Cullman County Comm'n, 669 So. 2d 119 (Ala. 1995) (citing § 11­ 1­5)-cannot instruct the sheriff how to ferret out crime, how to arrest a criminal, or how to secure evidence of a crime. And when the sheriff does secure such evidence, he has an obligation to share this information not with the county commission, but with the district attorney (a state official, see Hooks v. Hitt, 539 So. 2d 157, 159 (Ala. 1988)). 6 Seventeen of the forty judicial circuits in Alabama contain more than one county, including the circuit in which Monroe County sits. Ala. Code § 12­11­2 (1995). 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 781 (1997) 791 Opinion of the Court While the county commission thus has no direct control over how the sheriff fulfills his law enforcement duty, the Governor and the attorney general do have this kind of con- trol. Pursuant to § 36­22­5, they can direct the sheriff to investigate "any alleged violation of law in their counties." And after "proceed[ing] promptly" to complete this investi- gation, the sheriff must "promptly" write a report to the state official in charge of the investigation, stating his find- ings, listing the witnesses he has secured, and summarizing what the witnesses can prove. Ibid. In addition, the sala- ries of all sheriffs are set by the state legislature, not by the county commissions. § 36­22­16. To all of this, petitioner counters with four important pro- visions that cut in favor of the conclusion that sheriffs are county officials. First, the sheriff's salary is paid "out of the county treasury." Ibid. Second, the county provides the sheriff with equipment (including cruisers), supplies, lodg- ing, and reimbursement for expenses, to the extent "reason- ably needed for the proper and efficient conduct of the affairs of the sheriff's office." § 36­22­18. Third, the sheriff's ju- risdiction is limited to the borders of his county. See, e. g., § 36­22­3(4) ("It shall be the duty of sheriffs in their respec- tive counties . . . to ferret out crime" (emphasis added)). Fourth, the sheriff is elected locally by the voters in his county (as he has been since Alabama's 1819 Constitution). See Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. V, § 138; Ala. Const. of 1819, Art. IV, § 24. We do not find these provisions sufficient to tip the balance in favor of petitioner. The county's payment of the sheriff's salary does not translate into control over him, since the county neither has the authority to change his salary nor the discretion to refuse payment completely. The county com- missions do appear to have the discretion to deny funds to the sheriffs for their operations beyond what is "reasonably necessary." See Etowah County Comm'n v. Hayes, 569 So. 2d 397, 399 (Ala. 1990) (per curiam). But at most, this 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN 792 McMILLIAN v. MONROE COUNTY Opinion of the Court discretion would allow the commission to exert an attenu- ated and indirect influence over the sheriff's operations. Petitioner's contention that sheriffs are county officials be- cause "state policymakers" typically make policy for the en- tire State (without limits on their jurisdiction) and are typi- cally elected on a statewide (not local) basis, surely has some force. But district attorneys and state judges are often con- sidered (and in Alabama are considered) state officials, even though they, too, have limited jurisdictions and are elected locally. These characteristics are therefore consistent with an understanding of the 67 Alabama sheriffs as state officials who have been locally placed throughout the State, with an element of control granted to the officials and residents of the county that receives the sheriff's services.7 7 Petitioner also makes three other points that we believe have little merit. First, he points out that when the sheriff's office is vacant or when the sheriff is incapacitated, it is the county coroner that fills in for the sheriff. Ala. Code § 11­5­5 (1989). We note that this temporary assign- ment only lasts until the Governor appoints a replacement for the sheriff, who then serves out the remainder of the sheriff's term. Ala. Code § 36­ 9­17 (1991). Thus, even assuming that the county coroner is a county official, we place little weight on this assignment of temporary responsibil- ity, which by its nature must fall to an official who is already in the county and available to step in for the sheriff at any time. Second, petitioner cites several instances in the code where a group of officials that includes the sheriff is designated a group of "county officials" or "county employ- ees." See, e. g., §§ 36­3­4, 36­15­1, 36­22­16. But in light of the Ala- bama Supreme Court's conclusion that (i) sheriffs are state officials accord- ing to the State Constitution, see Parker, 519 So. 2d, at 443, and (ii) contrary statements in that court's prior decisions had ignored the Consti- tution and therefore should not be followed, id., at 445 (citing, among other cases, In re Opinions of Justices, 225 Ala. 359, 143 So. 345 (1932)), we think that any contrary implication in the code is entitled to little weight. Finally, petitioner relies on the Monroe County Commission's insurance policy-which, according to the District Court, "may cover . . . some, but not all, of the claims made against" Monroe County and Sheriff Tate in this suit, App. to Pet. for Cert. 77a-to establish that the commission will pay any judgment rendered against Sheriff Tate. But this policy shows, at the most, that there was uncertainty as to whether the courts would con- 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 781 (1997) 793 Opinion of the Court In sum, although there is some evidence in Alabama law that supports petitioner's argument, we think the weight of the evidence is strongly on the side of the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals: Alabama sheriffs, when executing their law enforcement duties, represent the State of Ala- bama, not their counties. Cf. Praprotnik, 485 U. S., at 125 ("We are not, of course, predicting that state law will always speak with perfect clarity"); id., at 126­127 ("It may not be possible to draw an elegant line that will resolve this conundrum"). C Petitioner argues that this conclusion will create a lack of uniformity in Alabama and throughout the country. First, he argues that it is anomalous to have 67 different "state policymakers" in the person of Alabama's 67 county sheriffs, all of whom may have different "state law enforcement poli- cies" in their counties. Second, he points out that most Fed- eral Courts of Appeals have found county sheriffs to be county, not state, officials, and he implies that our affirmance of the Court of Appeals will either call those decisions into question or create an unacceptable patchwork of rulings as to § 1983 liability of counties for the acts of their sheriffs. We reject both arguments: The first ignores the history of sheriffs, and the second ignores our Nation's federal nature. English sheriffs (or "shire-reeves") were the King 's "reeves" (officers or agents) in the "shires" (counties), at least after the Norman Conquest in 1066. See C. Wigan & D. Meston, Mather on Sheriff and Execution Law 1­2 (1935). Although chosen locally by the shire's inhabitants, the sheriff did "all the king's business in the county," 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 328 (1765), and was "the keeper of the king's peace," id., at 332. See also Wigan & Meston, supra, at 2 ("It is this position of the Sher- sider Sheriff Tate a county policymaker in these circumstances, not that the county would pay any judgment against him. 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN 794 McMILLIAN v. MONROE COUNTY Opinion of the Court iff as the executive officer of the Crown which has all along been the outstanding characteristic of the office"). As the basic forms of English government were trans- planted in our country, it also became the common under- standing here that the sheriff, though limited in jurisdiction to his county and generally elected by county voters,8 was in reality an officer of the State, and ultimately represented the State in fulfilling his duty to keep the peace. See, e. g., Wager, Introduction, in County Government Across the Na- tion 5 (P. Wager ed. 1950) ("The office of sheriff has an unbro- ken lineage from the Anglo-Saxon shire-reeve"); 1 W. Ander- son, A Treatise on the Law of Sheriffs, Coroners and Constables 5 (1941) ("In the exercise of executive and admin- istrative functions, in conserving the public peace, in vindi- cating the law, and in preserving the rights of the govern- ment, he (the sheriff) represents the sovereignty of the State and he has no superior in his county"); R. Cooley, Handbook on the Law of Municipal Corporations 512 (1914) ("Sheriffs, coroners, clerks and other so-called county officers are prop- erly state officers for the county. Their functions and duties pertain chiefly to the affairs of state in the county"); 3 J. Bouvier, Bouvier's Law Dictionary 3058 (8th ed. 1914) (de- fining sheriff as "[a] county officer representing the executive or administrative power of the state within his county"). This historical sketch indicates that the common law itself envisioned the possibility that state law enforcement "poli- cies" might vary locally, as particular sheriffs adopted vary- ing practices for arresting criminals or securing evidence.9 8 See W. Murfree, A Treatise on the Law of Sheriffs and Other Ministe- rial Officers 6 (1890) (sheriffs elected by county voters in all States but two). 9 Cf. McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F. 3d 1573, 1579 (CA11 1996) ("[W]e see no anomaly in having different state policymakers in different counties. Such a situation would be no different than if each of a city's police pre- cinct commanders had unreviewable authority over how arrestees were processed. Each commander might have a different processing policy, but that does not render a commander's policy that of her precinct as opposed to that of the city when the city is sued under § 1983"). 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 781 (1997) 795 Opinion of the Court Thus, petitioner's disagreement with the concept that "county sheriffs" may actually be state officials is simply a disagreement with the ancient understanding of what it has meant to be a sheriff. Petitioner's second concern is that under our holding here, sheriffs will be characterized differently in different States. But while it might be easier to decide cases arising under § 1983 and Monell if we insisted on a uniform, national char- acterization for all sheriffs, such a blunderbuss approach would ignore a crucial axiom of our government: the States have wide authority to set up their state and local govern- ments as they wish. Understandably, then, the importance of counties and the nature of county government have varied historically from region to region, and from State to State. See, e. g., Wager, supra, at 5­8 (describing different systems of rural government that developed in the Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia colonies, which later resulted in counties having widely varying roles in the four regions); Martin, American County Government, in County Governments in an Era of Change 3­5 (P. Berman ed. 1993) (same); DeSantis & Renner, Governing the County, id., at 16­25 (describing varying levels of power currently exer- cised by counties in different States, and explaining how re- gional influences have resulted in different forms of county government in different States); id., at 19 (listing Alabama as 37th among the 50 States in amount of discretionary au- thority granted to its counties). Thus, since it is entirely natural that both the role of sheriffs and the importance of counties vary from State to State, there is no inconsistency created by court decisions that declare sheriffs to be county officers in one State, and not in another.10 10 Compare, e. g., Strickler v. Waters, 989 F. 2d 1375, 1390 (CA4 1993) (Virginia "city sheriff" does not set city policy in area of jail conditions); Thompson v. Duke, 882 F. 2d 1180, 1187 (CA7 1989) (Illinois sheriff does not set county policy in area of training jail employees, because county board of commissioners has no authority to set policy in this area), with Dotson v. Chester, 937 F. 2d 920, 926­928 (CA4 1991) (Maryland sheriff 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN 796 McMILLIAN v. MONROE COUNTY Ginsburg, J., dissenting The final concern of petitioner and his amici is that state and local governments will manipulate the titles of local offi- cials in a blatant effort to shield the local governments from liability. But such efforts are already foreclosed by our de- cision in Praprotnik. See 485 U. S., at 127 (plurality opin- ion) ("[E]gregious attempts by local governments to insulate themselves from liability for unconstitutional policies are precluded" by allowing plaintiffs to prove that "a widespread practice" has been established by " `custom or usage' with the force of law"). And there is certainly no evidence of such manipulation here; indeed, the Alabama provisions that cut most strongly against petitioner's position predate our decision in Monell by some time. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore Affirmed. Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Stevens, Jus- tice Souter, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting. Petitioner Walter McMillian, convicted of capital murder, spent nearly six years on Alabama's Death Row. In 1993, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals determined that government officials, including the Sheriff of Monroe County, had concealed evidence of McMillian's innocence. Based on that evidence, the court overturned the conviction. The State thereafter dismissed all charges against McMillian and released him from prison. sets county policy in area of jail conditions, based on exhaustive survey of Maryland law; citing no constitutional provision to the contrary); Davis v. Mason County, 927 F. 2d 1473, 1480 (CA9 1991) (Washington sheriff sets county policy in area of training deputy sheriffs, based on statutory provi- sion labeling sheriff "chief executive officer . . . of the county"; citing no constitutional provision to the contrary (internal quotation marks omit- ted)); Turner v. Upton County, 915 F. 2d 133, 136­137 (CA5 1990) (Texas sheriff sets county policy in area of law enforcement, based on "unique structure of county government in Texas"; citing no constitutional provi- sion to the contrary (internal quotation marks omitted)); Crowder v. Sin- yard, 884 F. 2d 804, 828 (CA5 1989) (Arkansas sheriff sets county policy in area of law enforcement; citing no constitutional provision to the contrary). 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 781 (1997) 797 Ginsburg, J., dissenting Seeking redress for an arrest and years of incarceration in violation of his federal constitutional rights, McMillian commenced the instant action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. He named as defendants both Monroe County and the Coun- ty's Sheriff, Tom Tate. McMillian alleged that Sheriff Tate withheld exculpatory evidence, generated false, inculpatory evidence, and subjected him to gross racial insults and re- lentless intimidation. Sheriff Tate, it is uncontested, has "final policymaking au- thority" under Alabama law over matters of law enforcement in Monroe County. Our precedent instructs that, if the sheriff makes policy for the State, Monroe County would not be accountable, under § 1983, for that policy; if, on the other hand, the sheriff acts as law enforcement policymaker for Monroe County, then the county would be answerable under § 1983. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 694 (1978). Alabama has 67 county sheriffs, each elected, paid, and equipped locally, each with countywide, not statewide, au- thority. Unlike judges who work within the State's judicial hierarchy, or prosecutors who belong to a prosecutorial corps superintended by the State's Attorney General, sheriffs are not part of a state command and serve under no "State Sher- iff General." The Court, nonetheless, holds that the policies set by Sheriff Tate in Monroe County, though discrete from, and uncoordinated with, the policies of sheriffs in other coun- ties, "may fairly be said to represent [Alabama] policy." See ibid. I disagree. I In my view, Alabama law defining the office of sheriff indi- cates that the sheriff acts within and for the county when setting and implementing law enforcement policy.1 In ex- 1 The Court observes that this Court must "defer considerably" to the Eleventh Circuit's construction of Alabama law. See ante, at 786. But cf. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U. S. 225, 231 (1991) (courts of appeals review de novo district courts' state-law determinations). Defer- ence, however, does not supplant careful review, see St. Louis v. Praprot- 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN 798 McMILLIAN v. MONROE COUNTY Ginsburg, J., dissenting plaining why it concludes otherwise and deems the sheriff the State's, not the county's, policymaker, the Court leans heavily on provisions of the State's Constitution. The Court relies on the Alabama Constitution's designation of "a sheriff for each county" as a member of the State's "executive de- partment." See Ala. Const., Art. V, § 112; ante, at 787. In addition, the Court points to two 1901 amendments relat- ing to the impeachment of sheriffs. See ante, at 788­789. These measures are the strongest supports for the Court's classification of county sheriffs as state actors. They are not sturdy enough, however, to justify the Court's holding that county sheriffs are state officials. Alabama law does not consistently designate sheriffs as "executive department" officers; instead, Alabama law in several instances refers to sheriffs as county officials. See In re Opinions of Justices, 225 Ala. 359, 143 So. 345 (1932) (sheriffs are county officers for purposes of 1912 constitu- tional amendment regarding county officers' salaries); Ala. Code § 36­3­4(a) (1991) (sheriff, a "county officer," shall be elected to four-year term); Ala. Code § 36­22­16(a) (1991) (sheriffs shall be compensated out of the county treasury in same manner as "other county employees"). Moreover, des- ignations Alabama attaches to sheriffs in its laws and deci- sions are not dispositive of a court's assessment of Sheriff Tate's status for § 1983 purposes. Cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U. S. 425, 429, n. 5 (1997); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U. S. 356, 376 (1990) (defenses to § 1983 actions are ques- tions of federal law); Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277, 284, and n. 8 (1980) (state law granting immunity to parole officers does not control question whether such officers have immunity under § 1983). If a State's designation sufficed to answer the federal question at issue, "States would then be nik, 485 U. S. 112, 129­130, 131­132 (1988) (plurality opinion) (reversing Court of Appeals determination that certain city officials were municipal policymakers), and, in any event, has little place here because the Court's reasoning differs substantially from that of the Eleventh Circuit. 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 781 (1997) 799 Ginsburg, J., dissenting free to nullify for their own people the legislative decisions that Congress has made on behalf of all the People." How- lett, 496 U. S., at 383. Nor are the 1901 impeachment measures secure indicators that a sheriff acts on behalf of the State, not the county. As the Court explains, the impeachment amendments were intended to provide a state check on county sheriffs in view of their glaring lapses in acquiescing to abductions and lynchings in the late 1800's. See ante, at 788. However, making an officer eligible for impeachment, by itself, does not change the governmental unit to which the officer be- longs. See Ala. Const., Art. VII, § 175 (listing numerous county officials subject to impeachment); Ala. Code § 36­11­ 1(a) (1991) (same). And transferring impeachment proceed- ings from county courts to the State Supreme Court, see Ala. Const., Art. VII, § 174, is sensibly seen as an acknowl- edgment of the power wielded by sheriffs within their own counties, and the consequent need for placement of removal authority outside a sheriff's bailiwick. Furthermore, im- peachment of sheriffs is not a power reserved exclusively to state officials; "five resident taxpayers" of the sheriff's county can initiate an impeachment. See Ala. Code § 36­ 11­6 (1991). Impeachment, in sum, provides an ultimate check on flagrant behavior, but does not serve as a tight con- trol rein. The prime controllers of a sheriff's service are the county residents, the people who select their sheriff at quadrennial elections. Sheriff Tate owes his position as chief law en- forcement officer of Monroe County to the county residents who elected him, and who can unseat him. See Ala. Const., Art. V, § 138, as amended by Amdt. No. 35 ("A sheriff shall be elected in each county by the qualified electors thereof . . . ."). On the ballot, candidates for the office of sheriff are grouped with candidates for other county offices, and are not listed with state office candidates. See Ala. Code § 17­8­5 (1995). 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN 800 McMILLIAN v. MONROE COUNTY Ginsburg, J., dissenting Traditionally, Alabama sheriffs have had autonomy to for- mulate and execute law enforcement policy within the geo- graphic confines of their counties. Under Alabama law, "[i]t shall be the duty of sheriffs in their respective counties . . . to ferret out crime, to apprehend and arrest criminals and . . . to secure evidence of crimes." Ala. Code § 36­22­3(4) (1991) (emphasis added); see also Ala. Code § 15­6­1 (1995) ("The sheriff is the principal conservator of the peace in his county, and it is his duty to suppress riots, unlawful assem- blies and affrays. In the execution of such duty, he may summon to his aid as many of the men of his county as he thinks proper." (emphasis added)); § 15­10­1 (sheriffs may make arrests "within their respective counties"). Monroe County pays Sheriff Tate's salary, see Ala. Code § 36­22­16(a) (1991) (sheriffs shall be paid "out of the county treasury as the salaries of other county employees are paid"), and the sheriff operates out of an office provided, furnished, and equipped by the county, see § 36­22­18. The obligation to fully equip the sheriff is substantial, requiring a county commission to "furnish the sheriff with the necessary quar- ters, books, stationery, office equipment, supplies, postage and other conveniences and equipment, including automo- biles and necessary repairs, maintenance and all expenses incidental thereto." Ibid. These obligations are of practi- cal importance, for they mean that purse strings can be pulled at the county level; a county is obliged to provide a sheriff only what is "reasonably needed for the proper and efficient conduct of the affairs of the sheriff's office," ibid. (emphasis added). How generously the sheriff will be equipped is likely to influence that officer's day-to-day con- duct to a greater extent than the remote prospect of im- peachment. See ibid.; see also Geneva Cty. Comm'n v. Tice, 578 So. 2d 1070, 1075 (Ala. 1991) (county may reasonably limit budget for overtime pay for sheriff's deputies); Ala. Code § 36­22­16(a) (1991) (sheriff's salary, paid by county, may be 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 781 (1997) 801 Ginsburg, J., dissenting increased "by law by general or local act"); § 36­22­3(3) (sheriff must render to county treasurer a periodic written statement of moneys collected by sheriff on behalf of county). Sheriff Tate, in short, is in vital respects a county official. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to think of a single official who more completely represents the exercise of significant power within a county. See Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 746 F. 2d 337, 340­341 (CA6 1984) (sheriff elected by residents of county to be county's chief law enforcement officer, paid and equipped by county, is "obvious[ly]" a county official), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U. S. 469 (1986).2 The Court observes that it is "most importan[t]" to its holding that Alabama sheriffs "are given complete authority to enforce the state criminal law in their counties." See ante, at 790. If the Court means to suggest that Sheriff Tate should be classified as a state actor because he is enforc- ing state (as opposed to county or municipal) law, the Court proves far too much. Because most criminal laws are of statewide application, relying on whose law the sheriff en- forces yields an all-state categorization of sheriffs, despite the Court's recognition that such blanket classification is inappropriate. See ante, at 786. Sheriffs in Arkansas, Texas, and Washington, just like sheriffs in Alabama, enforce 2 The majority of Courts of Appeals to have addressed this question have similarly concluded that sheriffs, when engaged in a variety of activi- ties, are county actors. See, e. g., cases cited ante, at 795­796, n. 10; see also Parker v. Williams, 862 F. 2d 1471, 1477­1481 (CA11 1989) (Alabama sheriff acts for county in hiring chief jailor); Lucas v. O'Loughlin, 831 F. 2d 232, 234­235 (CA11 1987) (Florida sheriff acts for county in hiring and firing deputies); Weber v. Dell, 804 F. 2d 796, 802­803 (CA2 1986) (New York sheriff acts for county in setting county jail strip search policy); Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F. 2d 181, 188­189 (CA6 1985) (Michigan sheriff acts for county in training deputies and ratifying deputies' use of force); Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F. 2d 556, 571 (CA1 1985) (Massachusetts sheriff acts for county in setting county jail strip search policy). But see Soder- beck v. Burnett, 821 F. 2d 446, 451­452 (CA7 1987) (Wisconsin sheriff acts on behalf of State, not county, in hiring and firing employees). 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN 802 McMILLIAN v. MONROE COUNTY Ginsburg, J., dissenting the State's law, but that does not make them policymakers for the State rather than the county. See ante, at 795­796, n. 10. In emphasizing that the Monroe County Commission can- not instruct Sheriff Tate how to accomplish his law enforce- ment mission, see ante, at 790, the Court indirectly endorses the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning: Because under Alabama law a county commission does not possess law enforcement authority, a sheriff's law enforcement activities cannot repre- sent county policy. See McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F. 3d 1573, 1578 (CA11 1996). There is an irony in this approach: If a county commission lacks law enforcement authority, then the sheriff becomes a state official; but if a county commis- sion possesses such authority and directs the sheriff's activi- ties, then the sheriff presumably would not be a final policy- maker in the realm of law enforcement, see St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U. S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality opinion). Moreover, in determining who makes county policy, this Court has never reasoned that all policymaking authority must be vested in a single body that either exercises that power or formally delegates it to another. Few local gov- ernments would fit that rigid model. Cf. id., at 124­125 ("The States have extremely wide latitude in determining the form that local government takes . . . . [O]ne may ex- pect to find a rich variety of ways in which the power of government is distributed among a host of different officials and official bodies."). Nor does Monell support such a con- stricted view of the exercise of municipal authority; there, we spoke of § 1983 liability for acts by "lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy." 436 U. S., at 694 (emphasis added). In this case, Sheriff Tate is "the county's final policymaker in the area of law enforcement, not by virtue of delegation by the county's governing body but, rather, by virtue of the office to which the sheriff has been elected." Turner v. Upton Cty., 915 F. 2d 133, 136 (CA5 1990); see also Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F. 2d 556, 571 (CA1 1985); accord, Vera v. Tue, 73 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 781 (1997) 803 Ginsburg, J., dissenting F. 3d 604, 609 (CA5 1996) ("[T]he Sheriff, an elected county official [in Texas], had equal authority to the county commis- sioners in that jurisdiction [so] that his actions constituted those of the county just as much as those of the commission- ers."). An Alabama sheriff is a county policymaker because he independently exercises law enforcement authority for the county. In this most crucial respect, the Alabama ar- rangement resembles the "unique structure of county gov- ernment" in Texas. See Turner, 915 F. 2d, at 136­137, cited ante, at 796, n. 10. The Court also suggests that because the Governor can direct a sheriff to investigate a violation of law in the county, an Alabama sheriff must be a state, not a county, official. See ante, at 791 (citing Ala. Code § 36­22­5 (1991)). It is worth noting that a group of county citizens can likewise trigger an investigation by the sheriff. See § 36­22­6(b). The respondent, Monroe County, did not inform us whether the Governor directs county sheriffs to conduct investiga- tions with any regularity. More important, there is no sug- gestion that Sheriff Tate was proceeding under the Gover- nor's direction when Tate pursued the investigation that led to McMillian's Death Row confinement. If Sheriff Tate were acting on instruction from the Governor, this would be a very different case. But the bare possibility that a Gover- nor might sometime direct a sheriff's law enforcement activi- ties does not lessen the sheriff's authority, as the final county policymaker, in the general run of investigations the sheriff undertakes. II The Court's reliance on "the ancient understanding of what it has meant to be a sheriff," ante, at 795, is no more persuasive than its interpretation of Alabama law. This em- phasis on the historical understanding of the office of sheriff implies, again, an all-state categorization of sheriffs through- out the Nation; but because the Court expressly disclaims such a "blunderbuss" approach, ibid., that cannot be what 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN 804 McMILLIAN v. MONROE COUNTY Ginsburg, J., dissenting this history lesson is intended to convey. In England, it is true, the sheriff did perform "the king's business in the county." 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *339. But the English sheriff, as Blackstone described him, was far closer to the crown than his contemporary counterpart is to the central state government. While sheriffs were for a time chosen locally, "[t]his election," according to Blackstone, "was in all probability not absolutely vested in the [inhabitants of the counties], but required the royal approbation." Id., at *340. Eventually, the king chose the sheriff from a list pro- posed by the judges and other great officers. See id., at *340­*341. Whatever English history may teach, "[t]hroughout U. S. history, the sheriff has remained the principal law enforce- ment officer in the county." G. Felkenes, The Criminal Jus- tice System: Its Functions and Personnel 53 (1973); see id., at 52­53 (referring specifically to Alabama sheriffs). In the United States, "[i]n order to reserve control over the sher- iff's department and its police functions, the people made the sheriff an elective officer." Id., at 53. It is this status as the county's law enforcement officer chosen by the county's residents that is at the root of the contemporary understand- ing of the sheriff as a county officer. * * * A sheriff locally elected, paid, and equipped, who autono- mously sets and implements law enforcement policies opera- tive within the geographic confines of a county, is ordinarily just what he seems to be: a county official. Nothing in Ala- bama law warrants a different conclusion. It makes scant sense to treat sheriffs' activities differently based on the presence or absence of state constitutional provisions of the limited kind Alabama has adopted. The Court's Alabama-specific approach, however, assures that today's immediate holding is of limited reach. The Court does not appear to question that an Alabama sheriff may still be a county policymaker for some purposes, such 520US3 Unit: $U61 [09-11-99 17:51:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 781 (1997) 805 Ginsburg, J., dissenting as hiring the county's chief jailor, see Parker v. Williams, 862 F. 2d 1471, 1477­1481 (CA11 1989). And, as the Court acknowledges, under its approach sheriffs may be policymak- ers for certain purposes in some States and not in others. See ante, at 795, and n. 10. The Court's opinion does not call into question the numerous Court of Appeals decisions, some of them decades old, ranking sheriffs as county, not state, policymakers. Furthermore, the Court's recognition of the historic reasons why Alabama listed sheriffs as mem- bers of the State's "executive department," see ante, at 788­ 789, should discourage endeavors to insulate counties and municipalities from Monell liability by change-the-label de- vices. Thus, the Court's opinion, while in my view mis- guided, does little to alter § 1983 county and municipal liabil- ity in most jurisdictions. 520US3 Unit: $U62 [09-11-99 17:56:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN 806 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus De BUONO, NEW YORK COMMISSIONER OF HEALTH, et al. v. NYSA­ILA MEDICAL AND CLINICAL SERVICES FUND, by its trustees, BOWERS, et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit No. 95­1594. Argued February 24, 1997-Decided June 2, 1997 New York's Health Facility Assessment (HFA) imposes a tax on gross receipts for patient services at, inter alia, diagnostic and treatment cen- ters. The NYSA­ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund (Fund), which administers a plan subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), owns and operates New York treatment centers for longshore workers, retirees, and their dependents. Re- spondents, the Fund's trustees, discontinued paying the tax and filed this action to enjoin petitioner state officials from making future assess- ments and to obtain a refund, alleging that the HFA is a state law that "relates to" the Fund within the meaning of § 514(a) of ERISA, and is therefore pre-empted as applied to hospitals run by ERISA plans. The District Court concluded that the HFA is not pre-empted because it is a tax of general application having only an incidental impact on benefit plans. The Second Circuit reversed, reasoning that the HFA relates to the Fund by reducing the amount of Fund assets that would otherwise be available to provide plan members with benefits, and could cause the plan to limit its benefits or to charge plan members higher fees. On remand from this Court in light of New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645-in which this Court held that ERISA did not pre-empt a New York statute re- quiring hospitals to collect surcharges from patients covered by a com- mercial insurer but not from patients insured by a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan-the Second Circuit reinstated its judgment, distinguishing Travelers on the ground that the statute there at issue had only an indirect economic influence on the decisions of ERISA plan administra- tors, whereas the HFA depletes the Fund's assets directly, and thus has an immediate impact on an ERISA plan's operations. Held: Section 514(a) does not preclude New York from imposing a gross receipts tax on ERISA funded medical centers. Pp. 812­816. (a) When the Second Circuit initially found the HFA pre-empted, it relied substantially on an expansive and literal interpretation of the 520US3 Unit: $U62 [09-11-99 17:56:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 806 (1997) 807 Syllabus words "relate to" in § 514(a). It appears to have adhered to that ap- proach on remand, failing to give proper weight to Travelers' rejection of such a strictly literal reading. In Travelers, the Court unequivocally concluded that the "relates to" language was not intended to modify "the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law." 514 U. S., at 654. In evaluating whether the normal pre- sumption against pre-emption has been overcome in a particular case, this Court must look to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive. Id., at 656. Pp. 812­814. (b) Following that approach here, the HFA clearly operates in a field that has been traditionally occupied by the States: the regulation of health and safety matters. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medi- cal Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 715. Nothing in the HFA's opera- tion convinces this Court that it is the type of state law that Congress intended ERISA to supersede. It is one of myriad state laws of general applicability that impose some burdens on the administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless do not relate to them within the statute's mean- ing. See, e. g., Travelers, 514 U. S., at 668. The supposed difference between direct and indirect impact-upon which the Second Circuit re- lied in distinguishing this case from Travelers-cannot withstand scru- tiny. While the Fund has arranged to provide medical benefits for its beneficiaries directly, had it chosen to purchase the services at independ- ently run hospitals, those hospitals would have passed their HFA costs onto the Fund through their rates. Although the tax would be "indi- rect," its impact on the Fund's decisions would be in all relevant re- spects identical to the "direct" impact felt here. Pp. 814­816. 74 F. 3d 28, reversed. Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 816. M. Patricia Smith, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General, Barbara G. Billet, Solicitor General, Peter H. Schiff, Deputy Solicitor General, and Daniel F. De Vita, Assistant Attorney General. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, 520US3 Unit: $U62 [09-11-99 17:56:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN 808 De BUONO v. NYSA­ILA MEDICAL AND CLINICAL SERVICES FUND Opinion of the Court James A. Feldman, J. Davitt McAteer, Allen H. Feldman, Nathaniel I. Spiller, and Judith D. Heimlich. Donato Caruso argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were C. Peter Lambos, Thomas W. Gleason, and Ernest L. Mathews, Jr.* Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. This is another Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) pre-emption case.1 Broadly stated, the *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Richard Blumen- thal, Attorney General of Connecticut, and Phyllis E. Hyman, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Pamela Carter of Indiana, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michi- gan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Peter Verniero of New Jersey, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Theo- dore R. Kulongoski of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Dan Morales of Texas, Jeffrey L. Ame- stoy of Vermont, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, and James E. Doyle of Wisconsin; for the American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees, AFL­CIO, by Larry Weinberg, John C. Dempsey, Andrew D. Roth, and Nancy E. Hoffman; for the Healthcare Association of New York State et al. by Jeffrey J. Sherrin and Mark Thomas; for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Mary Ellen Signorille and Jeffrey Lewis; and for the National Governors' Association et al. by Rich- ard Ruda. Ronald S. Longhofer and John H. Eggertsen filed a brief for the Self- Insurance Institute of America, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 1 The boundaries of ERISA's pre-emptive reach have been the focus of considerable attention from this Court. This case is one of three address- ing the issue this Term. See Boggs v. Boggs, post, p. 833; California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc., 519 U. S. 316 (1997). And in the 16 years since we first took up the question, we have decided no fewer than 13 cases. See New York State Conference 520US3 Unit: $U62 [09-11-99 17:56:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 806 (1997) 809 Opinion of the Court question presented is whether hospitals operated by ERISA plans are subject to the same laws as other hospitals. More precisely, the question is whether the opaque language in ERISA's § 514(a) 2 precludes New York from imposing a gross receipts tax on the income of medical centers operated by ERISA funds. We hold that New York may collect its tax. I In 1990, faced with the choice of either curtailing its Med- icaid program or generating additional revenue to reduce the program deficit, the New York General Assembly enacted the Health Facility Assessment (HFA).3 The HFA imposes a tax on gross receipts for patient services at hospitals, resi- dential health care facilities, and diagnostic and treatment of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645 (1995); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank, 510 U. S. 86 (1993); District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U. S. 125 (1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133 (1990); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U. S. 52 (1990); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U. S. 107 (1989); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv- ice, Inc., 486 U. S. 825 (1988); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U. S. 1 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U. S. 58 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85 (1983); and Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504 (1981). The issue has also generated an avalanche of litigation in the lower courts. See Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U. S., at 135, and n. 3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that in 1992, a LEXIS search uncovered more than 2,800 opinions on ERISA pre-emption). 2 Section 514(a) of ERISA informs us that "[e]xcept as provided in sub- section (b) of this section, the provisions of this [statute] shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by the statute. 88 Stat. 897, 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). None of the exceptions in subsection (b) is directly at issue in this case. 3 N. Y. Pub. Health Law § 2807­d (McKinney Supp. 1992). 520US3 Unit: $U62 [09-11-99 17:56:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN 810 De BUONO v. NYSA­ILA MEDICAL AND CLINICAL SERVICES FUND Opinion of the Court centers.4 The assessments become a part of the State's gen- eral revenues. Respondents are the trustees of the NYSA­ILA Medi- cal and Clinical Services Fund (Fund), which administers a self-insured, multiemployer welfare benefit plan. The Fund owns and operates three medical centers-two in New York and one in New Jersey-that provide medical, dental, and other health care benefits primarily to longshore workers, retirees, and their dependents. The New York centers are licensed by the State as "diagnostic and treatment centers," App. 80, and are thus subject to a 0.6 percent tax on gross receipts under the HFA. N. Y. Pub. Health Law § 2807­ d(2)(c) (McKinney 1993). During the period from January through November of 1991, respondents paid HFA assessments totaling $7,066 based on the two New York hospitals' patient care income of $1,177,670. At that time, they discontinued the payments and brought this action against appropriate state officials (petitioners) to enjoin future assessments and to obtain a refund of the tax paid in 1991. The complaint alleged that the HFA is a state law that "relates to" the Fund within the meaning of § 514(a) of ERISA, and is therefore pre-empted as applied to hospitals run by ERISA plans. The District Court denied relief. It concluded that HFA was not pre-empted because it was a "tax of general applica- tion" that did not "interfere with the calculation of benefits or the determination of an employee's eligibility for benefits" and thus had only an incidental impact on benefit plans. App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a.5 4 In addition to taxing the income derived from patient services at these facilities, the HFA taxes investment income and certain operating income. N. Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 2807­d(3)(c), 2807­d(3)(d) (McKinney 1993). The taxation of these activities is not challenged here. 5 In response to the complaint filed in 1992, petitioners objected to fed- eral jurisdiction, relying on the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341, which provides that federal courts "shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such 520US3 Unit: $U62 [09-11-99 17:56:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 806 (1997) 811 Opinion of the Court The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. It distinguished cases in which we had found that certain "laws of general application" were not pre-empted by ERISA,6 ex- plaining that the HFA "targets only the health care indus- try," which is, "by definition, the realm where ERISA wel- fare plans must operate," NYSA­ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund v. Axelrod, M. D., 27 F. 3d 823, 827 (1994). The court reasoned that because the HFA "operates as an immediate tax on payments and contributions which were intended to pay for participants' medical benefits," it directly affects "the very operations and functions that make the Fund what it is, a provider of medical, surgical, and hospital State." Respondents contended that the statute did not apply because the New York courts do not provide the "plain" remedy required to bar federal jurisdiction. The District Court appears to have agreed with re- spondents, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a, but when it ultimately granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, it did not squarely decide the question, id., at 19a, 22a­23a. The Court of Appeals did not address the Tax Injunction Act in either of its two opinions in this case and there is no suggestion anywhere in the papers that the State raised the issue before that court. The Second Circuit had previously held, however, that the Tax Injunction Act is not a bar to actions such as this. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F. 3d 708, 713­714 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travel- ers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645 (1995). In Travelers, we noted, but did not reexamine, that conclusion. See id., at 652­653, n. 4. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals presumably was satisfied that its jurisdiction was secure for the reasons given in Travelers. Before this Court, no party in either Travelers or the current case has mentioned the Tax Injunction Act or questioned the Court of Appeals' conclusion that a "plain" remedy is unavailable in the New York courts. Given our settled practice of accord- ing respect to the courts of appeals' greater familiarity with issues of state law, cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 346­347, and n. 10 (1976), and the State's active participation in nearly four years of federal litigation with no complaint about federal jurisdiction, it is appropriate for us to presume that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that, under these circum- stances, New York courts did not provide a "plain" remedy barring federal consideration of the state tax. 6 See, e. g., Mackey, 486 U. S., at 838 (generally applicable garnishment law not pre-empted); Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U. S., at 19 (state law requiring one-time severance payment not pre-empted). 520US3 Unit: $U62 [09-11-99 17:56:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN 812 De BUONO v. NYSA­ILA MEDICAL AND CLINICAL SERVICES FUND Opinion of the Court care to its participants and their beneficiaries." Ibid. The HFA, concluded the court, thus "related to" the Fund be- cause it reduced the amount of Fund assets that would other- wise be available to provide plan members with benefits, and could cause the plan to limit its benefits, or to charge plan members higher fees. The first petition for certiorari in this case was filed before we handed down our opinion in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645 (1995). In that case we held that ERISA did not pre-empt a New York statute that required hospitals to col- lect surcharges from patients covered by a commercial in- surer but not from patients insured by a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan. Id., at 649­651. After deciding Travelers, we vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case and remanded for further consideration in light of that opin- ion. 514 U. S. 1094 (1995). On remand the Court of Appeals reinstated its original judgment. The court distinguished the statute involved in Travelers on the ground that-by imposing a tax on the health insurance carriers who provided coverage to plans and their beneficiaries-it had only an indirect economic influence on the decisions of ERISA plan administrators, whereas the HFA "depletes the Fund's assets directly, and thus has an immediate impact on the operations of an ERISA plan," NYSA­ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund v. Axelrod, M. D., 74 F. 3d 28, 30 (1996). We granted the New York officials' second petition for certiorari, 519 U. S. 926 (1996), and now reverse. II When the Second Circuit initially found the HFA pre- empted as applied to Fund-operated hospitals, that court re- lied substantially on an expansive and literal interpretation of the words "relate to" in § 514(a) of ERISA. 27 F. 3d, at 826. In reconsidering the case on remand, the court appears to have adhered to that approach, failing to give proper 520US3 Unit: $U62 [09-11-99 17:56:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 806 (1997) 813 Opinion of the Court weight to Travelers' rejection of a strictly literal reading of § 514(a). In Travelers, as in our earlier cases, we noted that the literal text of § 514(a) is "clearly expansive." 514 U. S., at 655. But we were quite clear in that case that the text could not be read to "extend to the furthest stretch of its indeter- minacy, [or] for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its course, for `[r]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere,' H. James, Roderick Hudson xli (New York ed., World's Classics 1980)." Ibid.7 In our earlier ERISA pre-emption cases, it had not been necessary to rely on the expansive character of ERISA's lit- eral language in order to find pre-emption because the state laws at issue in those cases had a clear "connection with or reference to," Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 96­97 (1983), ERISA benefit plans. But in Travelers we confronted directly the question whether ERISA's "relates to" language was intended to modify "the starting presump- tion that Congress does not intend to supplant state law." 514 U. S., at 654.8 We unequivocally concluded that it did not, and we acknowledged "that our prior attempt[s] to construe the phrase `relate to' d[o] not give us much help drawing the line here." Id., at 655. In order to evaluate whether the normal presumption against pre-emption has been overcome in a particular case, we concluded that we "must go beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating diffi- culty of defining its key term, and look instead to the objec- 7 See also Dillingham Constr., 519 U. S., at 335 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[A]pplying the `relate to' provision according to its terms was a project doomed to failure, since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything else"). 8 Where "federal law is said to bar state action in fields of traditional state regulation . . . we have worked on the `assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' " Travelers, 514 U. S., at 655 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). See also Dillingham Constr., 519 U. S., at 325. 520US3 Unit: $U62 [09-11-99 17:56:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN 814 De BUONO v. NYSA­ILA MEDICAL AND CLINICAL SERVICES FUND Opinion of the Court tives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive." Id., at 656. We endorsed that approach once again earlier this Term in concluding that California's prevailing wage law was not pre-empted by ERISA. California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc., 519 U. S. 316, 325 (1997).9 Following that approach here, we begin by noting that the historic police powers of the State include the regulation of matters of health and safety. Hillsborough County v. Auto- mated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 715 (1985). While the HFA is a revenue raising measure, rather than a regulation of hospitals, it clearly operates in a field that " `has been traditionally occupied by the States.' " Ibid. (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977)).10 Re- spondents therefore bear the considerable burden of over- coming "the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law." Travelers, 514 U. S., at 654. There is nothing in the operation of the HFA that con- vinces us it is the type of state law that Congress intended ERISA to supersede.11 This is not a case in which New 9 "The prevailing wage statute alters the incentives, but does not dictate the choices, facing ERISA plans. In this regard, it is `no different from myriad state laws in areas traditionally subject to local regulation, which Congress could not possibly have intended to eliminate.' Travelers, 514 U. S., at 668. We could not hold pre-empted a state law in an area of traditional state regulation based on so tenuous a relation without doing grave violence to our presumption that Congress intended nothing of the sort. We thus conclude that California's prevailing wage laws and ap- prenticeship standards do not have a `connection with,' and therefore do not `relate to,' ERISA plans." Dillingham Constr., 519 U. S., at 334. 10 Indeed, the Court of Appeals rested its conclusion in no small part on the fact that the HFA "targets only the health care industry." NYSA­ ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund v. Axelrod, M. D., 27 F. 3d 823, 827 (CA2 1994). Rather than warranting pre-emption, this point supports the application of the "starting presumption" against pre-emption. 11 The respondents place great weight on the fact that in 1983 Congress added a specific provision to ERISA to save Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Act from pre-emption, and that in so doing, the Legislature noted that 520US3 Unit: $U62 [09-11-99 17:56:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 806 (1997) 815 Opinion of the Court York has forbidden a method of calculating pension benefits that federal law permits,12 or required employers to provide certain benefits.13 Nor is it a case in which the existence of a pension plan is a critical element of a state-law cause of action,14 or one in which the state statute contains provisions that expressly refer to ERISA or ERISA plans.15 A consideration of the actual operation of the state statute leads us to the conclusion that the HFA is one of "myriad state laws" of general applicability that impose some burdens on the administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless do not "relate to" them within the meaning of the govern- ing statute. See Travelers, 514 U. S., at 668; Dillingham ERISA generally does pre-empt "any State tax law relating to employee benefit plans." 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(5)(B)(i). See Brief for Respondents 17­23. But there is no significant difference between the language in this provision and the pre-emption provision in § 514(a), and we are uncon- vinced that a stricter standard of pre-emption should apply to state tax provisions than to other state laws. 12 See, e. g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S., at 524­525 ("Whatever the purpose or purposes of the New Jersey statute, we con- clude that it `relate[s] to pension plans' governed by ERISA because it eliminates one method for calculating pension benefits-integration-that is permitted by federal law"). 13 See, e. g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85 (1983) (ERISA pre-empted state law requiring the provision of pregnancy benefits); Met- ropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724 (1985) (law that required benefit plans to include minimum mental health benefits "related to" ERISA plans). 14 See, e. g., Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U. S., at 139­140 ("We are not deal- ing here with a generally applicable statute that makes no reference to, or indeed functions irrespective of, the existence of an ERISA plan. . . . Here, the existence of a pension plan is a critical factor in establishing liability under the State's wrongful discharge law. As a result, this cause of action relates not merely to pension benefits, but to the essence of the pension plan itself"). 15 See Mackey, 486 U. S., at 828­830 (a provision that explicitly refers to ERISA in defining the scope of the state law's application is pre-empted); Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U. S., at 130­131 ("Section 2(c)(2) of the District's Equity Amendment Act specifically refers to welfare bene- fit plans regulated by ERISA and on that basis alone is pre-empted"). 520US3 Unit: $U62 [09-11-99 17:56:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN 816 De BUONO v. NYSA­ILA MEDICAL AND CLINICAL SERVICES FUND Scalia, J., dissenting Constr., 519 U. S., at 333­334. The HFA is a tax on hospi- tals. Most hospitals are not owned or operated by ERISA funds. This particular ERISA fund has arranged to provide medical benefits for its plan beneficiaries by running hospi- tals directly, rather than by purchasing the same services at independently run hospitals. If the Fund had made the other choice, and had purchased health care services from a hospital, that facility would have passed the expense of the HFA onto the Fund and its plan beneficiaries through the rates it set for the services provided. The Fund would then have had to decide whether to cover a more limited range of services for its beneficiaries, or perhaps to charge plan mem- bers higher rates. Although the tax in such a circumstance would be "indirect," its impact on the Fund's decisions would be in all relevant respects identical to the "direct" impact felt here. Thus, the supposed difference between direct and indirect impact-upon which the Court of Appeals relied in distinguishing this case from Travelers-cannot withstand scrutiny. Any state tax, or other law, that increases the cost of providing benefits to covered employees will have some effect on the administration of ERISA plans, but that simply cannot mean that every state law with such an effect is pre- empted by the federal statute.16 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting. "[I]t is the duty of this court to see to it that the jurisdic- tion of the Circuit Court, which is defined and limited by 16 As we acknowledged in Travelers, there might be a state law whose economic effects, intentionally or otherwise, were so acute "as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or effec- tively restrict its choice of insurers" and such a state law "might indeed be pre-empted under § 514," 514 U. S., at 668. That is not the case here. 520US3 Unit: $U62 [09-11-99 17:56:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 806 (1997) 817 Scalia, J., dissenting statute, is not exceeded." Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149, 152 (1908). Despite our obligation to examine federal-court jurisdiction even if the issue is not raised by either party, ibid., and despite the Court's explicit acknowledgment, ante, at 810­811, n. 5, of the possibility that jurisdiction over this case is barred by the Tax Injunc- tion Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341, the Court proceeds to decide the merits of respondents' Employee Retirement Income Secu- rity Act of 1974 (ERISA) pre-emption challenge. The Court offers two grounds for passing over the threshold question of jurisdiction: our "settled practice of according respect to the courts of appeals' greater familiarity with issues of state law," and petitioners' "active participation in nearly four years of federal litigation with no complaint about federal jurisdiction." Ante, at 811, n. 5. In my view, neither of these factors justifies our proceeding without resolving the issue of jurisdiction. The Tax Injunction Act bars federal-court jurisdiction over an action seeking to enjoin a state tax (such as the one at issue here) where "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 28 U. S. C. § 1341; see Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Central Ark., post, at 825 (describing the Act as a "jurisdictional rule" and "broad jurisdictional barrier"). The District Court in this case sug- gested that the Tax Injunction Act might not bar jurisdiction here, since New York courts might not afford respondents a "plain" remedy within the meaning of the Act. See NYSA­ ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund v. Axelrod, No. 92 Civ. 2779 (SDNY, Feb. 18, 1993), App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a. That suggestion was not, however, based upon the District Court's resolution of any "issues of state law," as today's opinion intimates, ante, at 811, n. 5; rather, it rested upon the District Court's conclusion that uncertainty over the implications of a federal statute-§ 502(e)(1) of ERISA, 29 U. S. C. § 1132(e)(1)-might render the availability of a state- 520US3 Unit: $U62 [09-11-99 17:56:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN 818 De BUONO v. NYSA­ILA MEDICAL AND CLINICAL SERVICES FUND Scalia, J., dissenting court remedy not "plain." App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a.* The Court of Appeals, in turn, made no mention of the jurisdic- tional issue, presumably because, under controlling Circuit precedent, jurisdiction was secure: The Second Circuit had previously held that state courts could not provide any rem- edy for ERISA-based challenges to state taxes within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act, since "Congress has di- vested the state courts of jurisdiction" over ERISA claims. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F. 3d 708, 714 (1993) (citing ERISA § 502(e)(1), 29 U. S. C. § 1132(e)(1)), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645 (1995). That holding (like the District Court's discus- sion of the issue in this case) in no way turns on New York state law, so I am at a loss to understand the Court's invoca- *That the District Court rested its conclusion on 29 U. S. C. § 1132(e)(1) is demonstrated by the sole authorities it cited in support of that conclu- sion: Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 813 F. Supp. 996 (SDNY 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 14 F. 3d 708 (CA2 1993), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645 (1995); and National Carriers' Conference Committee v. Heffernan, 440 F. Supp. 1280, 1283 (Conn. 1977). The only argument in Travelers that supports the conclusion reached here is the argument that "[b]ecause ERISA generally confers exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts [under 29 U. S. C. § 1132(e)(1)], a New York state court might well feel compelled to dismiss a state court action on the grounds that its jurisdiction has been preempted . . . . Thus, at a mini- mum the availability of a state court remedy is not `plain.' " 813 F. Supp., at 1001 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Likewise, Hef- fernan (which arose in Connecticut, not New York) offers pertinent rea- soning based only on federal law: "Jurisdiction over suits arising under ERISA is, with minor exceptions, vested exclusively in the federal courts. 29 U. S. C. § 1132(e)(1). If this suit were brought before a . . . state court, that court might well feel compelled to dismiss the action on the grounds that its jurisdiction had been preempted by federal legislation and the supremacy clause. Consequently the plaintiff cannot be said to have a `plain, speedy and efficient' remedy in state court . . . ." 440 F. Supp., at 1283 (footnote omitted). 520US3 Unit: $U62 [09-11-99 17:56:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 806 (1997) 819 Scalia, J., dissenting tion of "our settled practice of according respect to the courts of appeals' greater familiarity with issues of state law," ante, at 811, n. 5, as a basis for overlooking the question whether the Tax Injunction Act bars federal-court jurisdiction. The second factor relied upon by the Court in support of its treatment of the jurisdictional issue is that petitioners dropped the issue after the District Court failed to adopt their interpretation of the Tax Injunction Act. But the fact that petitioners have "active[ly] participat[ed] in nearly four years of federal litigation with no complaint about federal jurisdiction," ibid., cannot possibly confer upon us jurisdic- tion that we do not otherwise possess. It is our duty to resolve the jurisdictional question, whether or not it has been preserved by the parties. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539, 548, n. 2 (1981); Louisville & Nashville R. Co., supra, at 152. In Sumner we confronted the identical circumstance presented here-a jurisdictional argument raised before the District Court but abandoned before the Court of Appeals- and felt the need to address the jurisdictional issue. 449 U. S., at 547, n. 2. I have previously noted the split among the Circuits on the question whether the Tax Injunction Act deprives fed- eral courts of jurisdiction over ERISA-based challenges to state taxes. See Barnes v. E-Systems, Inc. Group Hospital Medical & Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U. S. 1301, 1302­1303 (1991) (Scalia, J., in chambers). In a prior case, we ex- pressly left the question open, saying that "[w]e express no opinion [on] whether a party [can] sue under ERISA to en- join or to declare invalid a state tax levy, despite the Tax Injunction Act"; we noted that the answer would depend on whether "state law provide[s] no `speedy and efficient rem- edy' " and on whether "Congress intended § 502 of ERISA to be an exception to the Tax Injunction Act." Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U. S. 1, 20, n. 21 (1983). Because I am 520US3 Unit: $U62 [09-11-99 17:56:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN 820 De BUONO v. NYSA­ILA MEDICAL AND CLINICAL SERVICES FUND Scalia, J., dissenting uncertain of the federal courts' jurisdiction over this case, I would set the jurisdictional issue for briefing and argument, and would resolve that issue before reaching the merits of respondents' ERISA pre-emption claim. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from today's opinion. 520US3 Unit: $U63 [09-11-99 17:58:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 821 Syllabus ARKANSAS v. FARM CREDIT SERVICES OF CENTRAL ARKANSAS et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit No. 95­1918. Argued April 21, 1997-Decided June 2, 1997 The Tax Injunction Act (Act) restricts the federal district courts' power to prevent collection or enforcement of state taxes, but makes an ex- ception to that jurisdictional bar where no plain, speedy, or efficient state-court remedy may be had. This Court has established another exception where the United States sues to protect itself or its in- strumentalities from state taxation. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U. S. 355, 358. Production Credit Associations (PCA's) are federally chartered corporate financial institutions orga- nized by farmers primarily to make loans to farmers. During the rele- vant time period, federal law has exempted PCA's from state taxes on their notes, debentures, and other obligations. Respondent PCA's, claiming that they are also immune from Arkansas sales and income taxes, sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting the State from levying such taxes on them. Seeking to overcome the Act's jurisdictional bar, they contended that, as instrumentalities of the United States, they are not subject to the Act's provisions any more than the United States itself. The District Court granted them sum- mary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: PCA's are not included within the judicial exception to the Act by virtue of their designation as instrumentalities of the United States and so may not sue in federal court for an injunction against state taxation without the United States as co-plaintiff. Pp. 825­832. (a) The Act, which has been interpreted and applied as a "jurisdic- tional rule" and a "broad jurisdictional barrier," Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U. S. 463, 470, was enacted to confine federal-court intervention in state government. The federal balance is well served when the several States define and elaborate their own laws through their own courts and administrative processes and without undue interference from the Federal Judiciary. A State's power to tax is basic to its power to exist. Given the federal balance and the basic principle that statutory language is to be enforced according to its terms, federal courts must guard against interpretations of the Act which might defeat its purpose and text. Where the United States Government is a party, the other side of the federal balance must 520US3 Unit: $U63 [09-11-99 17:58:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 822 ARKANSAS v. FARM CREDIT SERVS. OF CENTRAL ARK. Syllabus be considered. The necessity to respect the National Government's au- thority underlies the rule that the Act does not constrain federal judicial power when the United States sues to protect itself and its instrumen- talities from state taxation. Pp. 825­828. (b) When the United States is not a party, the mere fact that a party challenging a tax has interests closely related to those of the Federal Government is not enough, in and of itself, to overcome the Act's bar. Moe, supra, at 471­472. An instrumentality of the United States can enjoy the benefits and immunities conferred by explicit statutes without the further inference that it has all of the rights and privileges of the National Government. The Courts of Appeals have adopted different standards for deciding whether a federal instrumentality may sue in federal court to enjoin state taxation where the United States is not a co-plaintiff. Under any of those tests, PCA's would not be exempt from the Act's restrictions. The United States is not joined as a co-plaintiff and opposes the exercise of jurisdiction. Regardless of whether a fed- eral agency or body with substantial regulatory authority is exempt from the Act when it brings suit in its own name, cf. NLRB v. Nash- Finch Co., 404 U. S. 138, PCA's are not entities of that description. Despite their formal and undoubted designation as instrumentalities of the United States, and despite their entitlement to those tax immunities accorded by the explicit statutory mandate, they do not have or exercise power analogous to that of the National Labor Relations Board or other United States departments or regulatory agencies. Their business is making commercial loans, and their stock is owned by private entities. Their interests are not coterminous with those of the Government any more than most commercial interests. A holding that they are sub- ject to the Act's restriction on federal-court jurisdiction furthers the State's interests without sacrificing those of the Federal Government. Pp. 828­832. 76 F. 3d 961, reversed. Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Martha G. Hunt argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Argrett, David C. Frederick, and David English Carmack. 520US3 Unit: $U63 [09-11-99 17:58:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 821 (1997) 823 Opinion of the Court Richard A. Hanson argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Rufus E. Wolff, Kevin J. Feeley, and Michael L. Fayhee.* Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. The Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341, restricts the power of federal district courts to prevent collection or en- forcement of state taxes. It states: "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." The statute, on its face, yields no exception to the jurisdic- tional bar save where the state remedy is wanting, but at least one other exception is established by our cases: The statute does not constrain the power of federal courts if the *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ohio et al. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Jeffrey S. Sut- ton, State Solicitor, Robert C. Maier, Assistant Attorney General, and Ste- ven M. Houron, Acting Attorney General of New Hampshire, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Robert Butterworth of Florida, Michael J. Bowers of Geor- gia, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Jeffrey A. Modisett of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Jeremiah W. Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Tom Udall of New Mex- ico, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Mark W. Barnett of South Dakota, John Knox Walkup of Tennessee, Jan Graham of Utah, Jeffrey L. Ame- stoy of Vermont, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, and James E. Doyle of Wisconsin; for the American Bankers Association et al. by John J. Gill III and Michael F. Crotty; for the Multistate Tax Commission by Paull Mines; and for the National Association of Securities and Commer- cial Law Attorneys by Kevin P. Roddy, G. Robert Blakey, Patrick E. Caf- ferty, Bryan L. Clobes, and Jonathan W. Cuneo. Michael A. Cardozo and William L. Daly filed a brief for the National Hockey League as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 520US3 Unit: $U63 [09-11-99 17:58:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 824 ARKANSAS v. FARM CREDIT SERVS. OF CENTRAL ARK. Opinion of the Court United States sues to protect itself or its instrumentalities from state taxation. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U. S. 355, 358 (1966). The present case explores the limits of this judicial exception. We decide here whether instrumentalities called Production Credit Associa- tions, corporations chartered under federal law, are included within the exception when they sue by themselves. We hold they are not and so may not sue in federal court for an in- junction against state taxation without the United States as co-plaintiff. The action must be dismissed, and, as a result, we do not reach the merits of the taxation dispute. I Production Credit Associations (PCA's) are corporations chartered by the Farm Credit Administration under the Farm Credit Act of 1971, 85 Stat. 583, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 2001 et seq. A PCA is a corporate financial institution or- ganized by 10 or more farmers and designed in large part to make loans to farmers. §§ 2071, 2075. PCA's have had differing tax-exempt status at different times, depending on whether the United States owned shares of their stock. See, e. g., Farm Credit Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 267. In the pe- riod relevant here (when all PCA stock has been in private hands) they have been exempted, by explicit federal statute, from state taxes on their "notes, debentures, and other obli- gations." 12 U. S. C. § 2077. Four PCA's, respondents here, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas claiming a tax exemption going beyond the express statutory language of § 2077. They assert immunity not only from the taxes described in the exemption statute we have quoted but also from Arkansas sales and income taxes. They seek a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting the State from levying the taxes against them. The District Court granted the PCAs' motion for summary judgment, and a di- 520US3 Unit: $U63 [09-11-99 17:58:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 821 (1997) 825 Opinion of the Court vided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 76 F. 3d 961 (1996). Entitlement to the immunity is the underlying substantive issue, were we to reach it. The Tax Injunction Act, how- ever, is an initial obstacle, for by its terms it would bar the relief the PCA's seek absent some exception. Seeking to overcome the bar under the Tax Injunction Act, the PCA's, first in the trial court and now here, contended that they are instrumentalities of the United States and so not subject to the provisions of the Act any more than the United States itself. The first point is correct: PCA's are instrumentalities of the United States because the statute which charters them says so. 12 U. S. C. §§ 2071(b)(7), 2077. The PCAs' argument about what follows from the designation, however, is incorrect. Instrumentalities of the United States, by vir- tue of that designation alone, do not have the same right as does the United States to avoid the prohibitions of the Tax Injunction Act. An observation is proper respecting our consideration of this threshold question. Although the trial court addressed the meaning and operation of the Tax Injunction Act, in the Court of Appeals the whole question seemed to disappear, though it goes to the heart of judicial authority. Neither party, we are advised, addressed the point and neither opin- ion in the Court of Appeals, majority or dissent, mentions it. While the question of the Act's applicability was not raised in the State's petition for certiorari, the United States, in an amicus brief in support of the petition, called our attention to the point. In granting the petition, we asked the parties to address, in addition to the merits, whether the District Court should have dismissed the case for lack of subject- matter jurisdiction in light of the Act. 519 U. S. 805 (1997). We have interpreted and applied the Tax Injunction Act as a "jurisdictional rule" and a "broad jurisdictional barrier." Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flat- head Reservation, 425 U. S. 463, 470 (1976). In dismissing 520US3 Unit: $U63 [09-11-99 17:58:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 826 ARKANSAS v. FARM CREDIT SERVS. OF CENTRAL ARK. Opinion of the Court an action filed in a United States District Court to challenge state taxes we held that the Tax Injunction Act "deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to hear [the] challenges." California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U. S. 393, 396 (1982). Further, we found no jurisdiction even though the defendant State argued in favor of the federal court's juris- diction. Id., at 417, n. 38. In explaining our holding in Grace Brethren that declaratory relief is as violative of the Tax Injunction Act as an injunction itself, we said the Act was first and foremost a vehicle " `to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes.' " Id., at 408­409 (quoting Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat. Bank, 450 U. S. 503, 522 (1981)). These statements underscore the fundamental im- portance of the restrictions imposed by the Tax Injunction Act, restrictions we proceed to address. II The federal balance is well served when the several States define and elaborate their own laws through their own courts and administrative processes and without undue interference from the Federal Judiciary. The States' interest in the in- tegrity of their own processes is of particular moment re- specting questions of state taxation. In our constitutional system, the power of the State to tax is a concurrent power. "That the power of taxation is one of vital importance; that it is retained by the States; that it is not abridged by the grant of a similar power to the government of the Union; that it is to be concurrently exercised by the two govern- ments: are truths which have never been denied." McCul- loch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 425 (1819). The power to tax is basic to the power of the State to exist. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444 (1940); Rosewell, supra, at 522. Enactment of the Tax Injunction Act of 1937 reflects a congressional concern to confine federal-court intervention 520US3 Unit: $U63 [09-11-99 17:58:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 821 (1997) 827 Opinion of the Court in state government, a concern prominent after the Court's ruling in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), that the Elev- enth Amendment is not in all cases a bar to federal-court interference with individual state officers alleged to have acted in violation of federal law. See Rosewell, supra, at 522, n. 28; Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 104­115 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Given the systemic importance of the federal balance, and given the basic principle that statutory language is to be enforced according to its terms, federal courts must guard against interpretations of the Tax Injunction Act which might defeat its purpose and text. Where the Government of the United States is a party, of course, the other side of the federal balance must be consid- ered. In our constitutional system the National Govern- ment has sovereign interests of its own. The necessity to respect the authority and prerogatives of the National Gov- ernment underlies the now settled rule that the Tax Injunc- tion Act is not a constraint on federal judicial power when the United States sues to protect itself and its instrumentali- ties from state taxation. The importance of allowing the United States to proceed in federal court to determine tax immunity questions is no doubt one reason why the excep- tion was established with little discussion in Department of Employment v. United States. There the Court indicated the exception was consistent with a well-settled understand- ing that the Government is not bound by its own legislative restrictions on the exercise of remedial rights unless the in- tent to bind it is express. 385 U. S., at 358, n. 6 (citing United States v. Livingston, 179 F. Supp. 9, 12 (EDSC 1959) (three-judge District Court), aff'd, 364 U. S. 281 (1960); United States v. Arlington County, 326 F. 2d 929, 931 (CA4 1964); United States v. Bureau of Revenue of N. M., 291 F. 2d 677, 679 (CA10 1961)). See also Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227, 239 (1874). The Court con- cluded, "in accord with an unbroken line of authority, and 520US3 Unit: $U63 [09-11-99 17:58:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 828 ARKANSAS v. FARM CREDIT SERVS. OF CENTRAL ARK. Opinion of the Court convincing evidence of legislative purpose, that § 1341 does not act as a restriction upon suits by the United States to protect itself and its instrumentalities from unconstitutional state exactions." 385 U. S., at 358 (footnotes omitted). In all the District Court and Court of Appeals cases cited in Department of Employment, the United States was either the sole plaintiff or a co-plaintiff. The United States had joined as co-plaintiff with the Red Cross in Department of Employment, arguing that the Red Cross was a federal in- strumentality immune from state taxation, and we held that the Tax Injunction Act did not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction to decide the merits and order relief. We have not before now considered whether federal in- strumentalities fall under the exception to the Tax Injunc- tion Act when they sue without the United States as co- plaintiff. In Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, we reasoned that when the United States is not a party, the mere fact that a party challenging the tax has interests closely related to those of the Federal Government is not enough, in and of itself, to avoid the bar of the Act. We considered whether the Act barred the exercise of fed- eral judicial power when Indian tribes were challenging the lawfulness and constitutionality of certain state taxes. Al- though the tribes did not have formal designations as instru- mentalities of the United States, we assumed the interests they asserted were aligned with the interests of the Federal Government. Reserving the question of the precise signifi- cance of a federal instrumentality designation, the Court said this congruence of interests was not sufficient to give the tribes an exemption from the Act. 425 U. S., at 471­472. We went on to find the tribes exempt from the Act only be- cause a second federal statute granted sweeping federal- court jurisdiction where an Indian tribe was a party. Id., at 472 (citing 28 U. S. C. § 1362 (1976 ed.)). Moe is instructive here. As in Moe, the PCA's say their own mission is defined and controlled by federal law and that their interests are the 520US3 Unit: $U63 [09-11-99 17:58:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 821 (1997) 829 Opinion of the Court same as those of the United States. We conclude here, as we did in Moe, that this argument is insufficient to justify an exception to the Tax Injunction Act. True, important consequences flow from the congressional decision to designate a PCA formed pursuant to statute as "an instrumentality of the United States." 12 U. S. C. § 2071(b)(7). The tax immunity a PCA has under § 2077 is a permitted consequence of its status as a federal instrumen- tality. An instrumentality of the United States can enjoy the benefits and immunities conferred by explicit statutes, however, without the further inference that the instrumen- tality has all of the rights and privileges of the National Government. Respondents attempt to counter this point by arguing that NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U. S. 138 (1971), is applicable here and supports their cause. Nash-Finch involved not the Tax Injunction Act, but the Anti-Injunction Act, the statute which restricts the authority of federal courts to enjoin pro- ceedings in state courts. 28 U. S. C. § 2283. The Anti- Injunction Act provides: "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." Just as the Tax Injunction Act is inapplica- ble where the United States is a party, a parallel rule pre- vails under § 2283. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U. S. 220, 225­226 (1957) (The restrictions of § 2283 are inapplicable in a suit brought by the National Government). The question in Nash-Finch was whether the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) came within the United States' exception to § 2283. We held it did. In so ruling, we observed the NLRB's regulatory power "pre-empts the field." 404 U. S., at 144; see also id., at 147 ("The exclusive- ness of the federal domain is clear . . ."). The case does not aid the PCA's, for their powers are far different from those of the NLRB. As will be discussed in more detail below, the 520US3 Unit: $U63 [09-11-99 17:58:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 830 ARKANSAS v. FARM CREDIT SERVS. OF CENTRAL ARK. Opinion of the Court PCA's more closely resemble the private entities Nash-Finch distinguished from the Federal Government and its agencies. Id., at 146. As to the Tax Injunction Act itself, the Courts of Appeals have adopted different standards over time for deciding whether a federal instrumentality may sue in federal court to enjoin state taxation where the United States is not a co-plaintiff. Under the most restrictive approach, there is no exception to the Tax Injunction Act for federal instru- mentalities unless the United States sues as a co-plaintiff. See, e. g., United States v. State Tax Commission, 481 F. 2d 963, 975 (CA1 1973) ("It is reasonable, as a prerequisite to by-passing normal state tax collection and litigation chan- nels, that [the instrumentalities] persuade the Attorney Gen- eral of the United States . . . to join in their claim"); Housing Authority of Seattle v. State of Washington, Dept. of Reve- nue, 629 F. 2d 1307, 1311 (CA9 1980) (agreeing with the First Circuit in State Tax Commission that "such joinder [with the United States as co-plaintiff] is necessary before a federal instrumentality can overcome the restrictions" of the Tax Injunction Act). After its decision in State Tax Commis- sion, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit modified what had seemed to be a bright-line rule to produce a differ- ent test: "[E]ach instrumentality must be examined in light of its governmental role and the wishes of Congress as ex- pressed in relevant legislation." Federal Reserve Bank of Boston v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation of Mass., 499 F. 2d 60, 64 (1974). Federal Reserve banks, the Court of Appeals noted, are not analogous to private corpo- rations, but rather are "plainly and predominantly fiscal arms of the federal government" with interests "indistin- guishable from those of the sovereign." Id., at 62. The court also pointed to a federal statute giving a Federal Re- serve bank "unrestricted access to the district courts," id., at 63 (referring to 12 U. S. C. § 632); and to the Federal Reserve System's unusual position "outside the executive chain of 520US3 Unit: $U63 [09-11-99 17:58:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 821 (1997) 831 Opinion of the Court command," 499 F. 2d, at 63. See also Bank of New England Old Colony v. Clark, 986 F. 2d 600, 602­603 (CA1 1993) (de- scribing Federal Reserve bank standard as a "flexible test"). Under any of the tests we have described, PCA's would not be exempt from the restrictions of the Tax Injunction Act. The United States has not joined as a co-plaintiff and indeed opposes the District Court's exercise of jurisdiction. We need not inquire whether the holding of Nash-Finch-to the effect that an agency with broad regulatory power is exempt from § 2283 when it sues in its own name and not through the Attorney General or in the name of the United States-is applicable as well to the Tax Injunction Act. Whatever may be the rule under the Tax Injunction Act where a federal agency or body with substantial regula- tory authority brings suit, PCA's are not entities of that description. PCA's are not granted the right to exercise government regulatory authority but rather serve specific commercial and economic purposes long associated with var- ious corporations chartered by the United States. Other examples include the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company (chartered under an Act of 1866 to construct and maintain a railroad and telegraph line from Springfield, Missouri, to the Pacific Ocean, see Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 436­ 437 (1900)); the Rural Telephone Bank (7 U. S. C. § 941); the United States Enrichment Corporation (42 U. S. C. § 2297a, repealed effective on date of privatization, Pub. L. 104­134, § 3116, 110 Stat. 1321). Indeed, in Smith v. Reeves, we treated the federally chartered corporation as a private citi- zen, not as an arm of the United States, and held it to be subject to the Eleventh Amendment bar on suits against States. 178 U. S., at 446­447. The PCAs' business is making commercial loans, and all their stock is owned by private entities. Their interests are not coterminous with those of the Government any more than most commercial interests. Despite their formal and undoubted designation as instrumentalities of the United 520US3 Unit: $U63 [09-11-99 17:58:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 832 ARKANSAS v. FARM CREDIT SERVS. OF CENTRAL ARK. Opinion of the Court States, and despite their entitlement to those tax immunities accorded by the explicit statutory mandate, PCA's do not have or exercise power analogous to that of the NLRB or any of the departments or regulatory agencies of the United States. This suffices for us to conclude that instrumentality status does not in and of itself entitle an entity to the same exemption the United States has under the Tax Injunction Act. The Tax Injunction Act is grounded in the need of States to administer their fiscal affairs without undue interference from federal courts. As all parties concede, respondents have a "speedy, plain, and efficient remedy" in state court. In holding that the PCA's are subject to the Act's restriction on federal-court jurisdiction, we further the State's interests without sacrificing those of the Government of the United States. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 833 Syllabus BOGGS v. BOGGS et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit No. 96­79. Argued January 15, 1997-Decided June 2, 1997 Respondents are the sons of Isaac and Dorothy Boggs. After Dorothy's death in 1979, Isaac married petitioner Sandra Boggs. When Isaac re- tired in 1985, he received various benefits from his employer's retire- ment plans, including a lump-sum savings plan distribution, which he rolled over into an individual retirement account (IRA); shares of stock from the company's employee stock ownership plan (ESOP); and a monthly annuity payment. Following his death in 1989, this dispute over ownership of the benefits arose between Sandra and the sons. The sons' claim is based on Dorothy's purported testamentary transfer to them, under Louisiana law, of a portion of her community property in- terest in Isaac's undistributed pension plan benefits. Sandra contested the validity of that transfer, arguing that the sons' claim is pre-empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. The Federal District Court disagreed and granted summary judgment against Sandra, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Held: ERISA pre-empts a state law allowing a nonparticipant spouse to transfer by testamentary instrument an interest in undistributed pen- sion plan benefits. Pp. 839­854. (a) In order to resolve this case, the Court need not interpret ERISA's pre-emption clause, § 1144(a), but can simply apply conven- tional conflict pre-emption principles, asking whether Louisiana's com- munity property law conflicts with ERISA and frustrates its purposes. Pp. 839­841. (b) To the extent Louisiana law provides the sons with a right to a portion of Sandra's survivor's annuity, it is pre-empted. That annuity is a qualified joint and survivor annuity mandated by § 1055, the object of which is to ensure a stream of income to surviving spouses. ERISA's solicitude for the economic security of such spouses would be under- mined by allowing a predeceasing spouse's heirs and legatees to have a community property interest in the survivor's annuity. Even a plan participant cannot defeat a nonparticipant surviving spouse's statutory entitlement to such an annuity. See § 1055(c)(2). Nothing in ERISA's language supports the conclusion that Congress decided to permit a pre- deceasing nonparticipant spouse to do so. Testamentary transfers such 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN 834 BOGGS v. BOGGS Syllabus as the one at issue could reduce the annuity below the ERISA minimum. See § 1055(d)(1). Perhaps even more troubling, the recipient of the transfer need not be a family member; e. g., the annuity might be sub- stantially reduced so that funds could be diverted to support an unre- lated stranger. In the face of this direct clash between state law and ERISA's provisions and objectives, the state law cannot stand. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 98. Pp. 841­844. (c) The sons' state-law claim to a portion of Isaac's monthly annuity payments, IRA, and ESOP shares is also pre-empted. ERISA's princi- pal object is to protect plan participants and beneficiaries. See, e. g., §§ 1001(b), (c), 1103(c)(1), 1104(a)(1), 1108(a)(2), 1132(a)(1)(B). The Act confers pension plan beneficiary status on a nonparticipant spouse or dependent only to the extent that a survivor's annuity is required in covered plans, § 1055(a), or a "qualified domestic relations order" awards the spouse or dependent an interest in a participant's benefits, §§ 1056(d)(3)(K) and (J). These provisions, which acknowledge and pro- tect specific pension plan community property interests, give rise to the strong implication that other community property claims are not consistent with the statutory scheme. ERISA's silence with respect to the right of a nonparticipant spouse to control pension plan benefits by testamentary transfer provides powerful support for the conclusion that the right does not exist. Cf. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Rus- sell, 473 U. S. 134, 147­148. The sons have no claim to a share of the benefits at issue because they are neither participants nor beneficiaries under §§ 1002(7) and (8), but base their claims on Dorothy's attempted testamentary transfer. It would be inimical to ERISA's purposes to permit them to prevail. Early cases holding that ERISA did not pre- empt spousal community property interests in pension benefits, regard- less of who was the plan participant or beneficiary, are not applicable here in light of subsequent amendments to ERISA. Reading ERISA to permit nonbeneficiary interests, even if not enforced against the plan, would result in troubling anomalies that do not accord with the statu- tory scheme. That Congress intended to pre-empt respondents' inter- ests is given specific and powerful reinforcement by § 1056(d)(1), which requires pension plans to specify that benefits "may not be assigned or alienated." Dorothy's testamentary transfer to her sons is such a prohibited "assignment or alienation" under the applicable regulations. Community property laws have, in the past, been pre-empted in order to prevent the diversion of retirement benefits. See, e. g., Free v. Bland, 369 U. S. 663, 669. It does not matter that respondents have sought to enforce their purported rights only after Isaac's benefits were 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 835 Opinion of the Court distributed, since those rights are based on the flawed theory that they had an interest in the undistributed benefits. Pp. 844­854. 82 F. 3d 90, reversed. Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined, and in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Ginsburg, J., joined as to Part III. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'Connor, J., joined, and in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Ginsburg, J., joined except as to Part II­B­3, post, p. 854. Marian Mysing Livaudais argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were John Catlett Christian, F. Pierre Livaudais, and James F. Willeford. Paul R. Q. Wolfson argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, J. Davitt McAteer, Allen H. Feldman, Nathaniel I. Spiller, and Judith D. Heimlich. Edward J. Deano, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Guy L. Deano, Jr., and Theresa D. Bewig.* Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. We consider whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 832, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., pre-empts a state law allowing a non- *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Association of Retired Persons by Mary Ellen Signorille, Cathy Ventrell- Monsees, and Melvin Radowitz; and for the Employers Council on Flexi- ble Compensation by Daniel B. Stone. Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General of Louisiana, Thomas S. Halligan, Assistant Attorney General, William A. Reppy, Jr., and Cynthia A. Sam- uel filed a brief for the State of Louisiana as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Robert E. Temmerman, Jr., Keith P. Bartel, Randolph B. Godshall, and Michael J. Jones filed a brief for the Estate Planning, Trust and Probate Law Section of the State Bar of California as amicus curiae. The Chief Justice and Justice Ginsburg join Part III of this opinion. 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN 836 BOGGS v. BOGGS Opinion of the Court participant spouse to transfer by testamentary instrument an interest in undistributed pension plan benefits. Given the pervasive significance of pension plans in the national economy, the congressional mandate for their uniform and comprehensive regulation, and the fundamental importance of community property law in defining the marital partner- ship in a number of States, the question is of undoubted im- portance. We hold that ERISA pre-empts the state law. I Isaac Boggs worked for South Central Bell from 1949 until his retirement in 1985. Isaac and Dorothy, his first wife, were married when he began working for the company, and they remained husband and wife until Dorothy's death in 1979. They had three sons. Within a year of Dorothy's death, Isaac married Sandra, and they remained married until his death in 1989. Upon retirement, Isaac received various benefits from his employer's retirement plans. One was a lump-sum distribu- tion from the Bell System Savings Plan for Salaried Employ- ees (Savings Plan) of $151,628.94, which he rolled over into an Individual Retirement Account (IRA). He made no with- drawals and the account was worth $180,778.05 when he died. He also received 96 shares of AT&T stock from the Bell South Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). In addi- tion, Isaac enjoyed a monthly annuity payment during his retirement of $1,777.67 from the Bell South Service Retire- ment Program. The instant dispute over ownership of the benefits is be- tween Sandra (the surviving wife) and the sons of the first marriage. The sons' claim to a portion of the benefits is based on Dorothy's will. Dorothy bequeathed to Isaac one- third of her estate, and a lifetime usufruct in the remaining two-thirds. A lifetime usufruct is the rough equivalent of a common-law life estate. See La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 535 (West 1980). She bequeathed to her sons the naked owner- 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 837 Opinion of the Court ship in the remaining two-thirds, subject to Isaac's usufruct. All agree that, absent pre-emption, Louisiana law controls and that under it Dorothy's will would dispose of her commu- nity property interest in Isaac's undistributed pension plan benefits. A Louisiana state court, in a 1980 order entitled "Judgment of Possession," ascribed to Dorothy's estate a community property interest in Isaac's Savings Plan account valued at the time at $21,194.29. Sandra contests the validity of Dorothy's 1980 testamen- tary transfer, basing her claim to those benefits on her in- terest under Isaac's will and 29 U. S. C. § 1055. Isaac be- queathed to Sandra outright certain real property including the family home. His will also gave Sandra a lifetime usu- fruct in the remainder of his estate, with the naked owner- ship interest being held by the sons. Sandra argues that the sons' competing claim, since it is based on Dorothy's 1980 purported testamentary transfer of her community property interest in undistributed pension plan benefits, is pre-empted by ERISA. The Bell South Service Retirement Program monthly annuity is now paid to Sandra as the surviving spouse. After Isaac's death, two of the sons filed an action in state court requesting the appointment of an expert to compute the percentage of the retirement benefits they would be enti- tled to as a result of Dorothy's attempted testamentary transfer. They further sought a judgment awarding them a portion of: the IRA; the ESOP shares of AT&T stock; the monthly annuity payments received by Isaac during his retirement; and Sandra's survivor annuity payments, both received and payable. In response, Sandra Boggs filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, seeking a declaratory judgment that ERISA pre-empts the application of Louisiana's community property and succes- sion laws to the extent they recognize the sons' claim to an interest in the disputed retirement benefits. The District 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN 838 BOGGS v. BOGGS Opinion of the Court Court granted summary judgment against Sandra Boggs. 849 F. Supp. 462 (1994). It found that, under Louisiana com- munity property law, Dorothy had an ownership interest in her husband's pension plan benefits built up during their marriage. The creation of this interest, the court explained, does not violate 29 U. S. C. § 1056(d)(1), which prohibits pen- sion plan benefits from being "assigned" or "alienated," since Congress did not intend to alter traditional familial and sup- port obligations. In the court's view, there was no assign- ment or alienation because Dorothy's rights in the benefits were acquired by operation of community property law and not by transfer from Isaac. Turning to Dorothy's testamen- tary transfer, the court found it effective because "[ERISA] does not display any particular interest in preserving maxi- mum benefits to any particular beneficiary." 849 F. Supp., at 465. A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 82 F. 3d 90 (1996). The court stressed that Louisiana law affects only what a plan participant may do with his or her benefits after they are received and not the relationship between the pen- sion plan administrator and the plan beneficiary. Id., at 96. For the reasons given by the District Court, it found ERISA's pension plan anti-alienation provision, § 1056(d)(1), inapplicable to Louisiana's creation of Dorothy Boggs' com- munity property interest in the pension plan benefits. It concluded that the transfer of the interest from Dorothy to her sons was not a prohibited assignment or alienation, as this transfer was "two steps removed from the disbursement of benefits." Id., at 97. Six members of the Court of Appeals dissented from the failure to grant rehearing en banc. 89 F. 3d 1169 (1996). In their view, a testamentary transfer of an interest in undis- tributed retirement benefits frustrates ERISA's goals of securing national uniformity in pension plan administration and of ensuring that retirees, and their dependents, are the actual recipients of retirement income. They believed that 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 839 Opinion of the Court Congress' creation of the qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) mechanism in § 1056(d)(3), whose requirements were not met by the 1980 judgment of possession, further sup- ported their position. (A QDRO is a limited exception to the pension plan anti-alienation provision and allows courts to recognize a nonparticipant spouse's community property interest in pension plans under specific circumstances.) The reasoning and holding of the Fifth Circuit's decision is in substantial conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F. 2d 1450 (1991), which held that ERISA pre-empts a testamen- tary transfer by a nonparticipant spouse of her community property interest in undistributed pension plan benefits. The division between the Circuits is significant, for the Fifth Circuit has jurisdiction over the community property States of Louisiana and Texas, while the Ninth Circuit includes the community property States of Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, and Washington. Having granted certiorari to re- solve the issue, 519 U. S. 957 (1996), we now reverse. II ERISA pre-emption questions are recurrent, two other cases on the subject having come before the Court in the current Term alone, see California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc., 519 U. S. 316 (1997); De Buono v. NYSA­ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, ante, p. 806. In large part the number of ERISA pre-emption cases reflects the comprehensive nature of the statute, the centrality of pension and welfare plans in the national economy, and their importance to the financial security of the Nation's work force. ERISA is designed to ensure the proper administration of pension and welfare plans, both during the years of the employee's active service and in his or her retirement years. This case lies at the intersection of ERISA pension law and state community property law. None can dispute the 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 840 BOGGS v. BOGGS Opinion of the Court central role community property laws play in the nine com- munity property States. It is more than a property regime. It is a commitment to the equality of husband and wife and reflects the real partnership inherent in the marital relation- ship. State community property laws, many of ancient lin- eage, "must have continued to exist through such lengths of time because of their manifold excellences and are not lightly to be abrogated or tossed aside." 1 W. de Funiak, Principles of Community Property 11 (1943). The community property regime in Louisiana dates from 1808 when the territorial leg- islature of Orleans drafted a civil code that adopted Spanish principles of community property. Id., at 85­89. Louisi- ana's community property laws, and the community property regimes enacted in other States, implement policies and val- ues lying within the traditional domain of the States. These considerations inform our pre-emption analysis. See His- quierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U. S. 572, 581 (1979). The nine community property States have some 80 million residents, with perhaps $1 trillion in retirement plans. See Brief for Estate Planning, Trust and Probate Law Section of the State Bar of California as Amicus Curiae 1. This case involves a community property claim, but our ruling will af- fect as well the right to make claims or assert interests based on the law of any State, whether or not it recognizes commu- nity property. Our ruling must be consistent with the con- gressional scheme to assure the security of plan participants and their families in every State. In enacting ERISA, Con- gress noted the importance of pension plans in its findings and declaration of policy, explaining: "[T]he growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial; . . . the continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these plans; . . . they are affected with a national public interest [and] they have become an im- portant factor affecting the stability of employment and 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 841 Opinion of the Court the successful development of industrial relations . . . ." 29 U. S. C. § 1001(a). ERISA is an intricate, comprehensive statute. Its federal regulatory scheme governs employee benefit plans, which include both pension and welfare plans. All employee bene- fit plans must conform to various reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary requirements, see §§ 1021­1031, 1101­1114, while pension plans must also comply with participation, vesting, and funding requirements, see §§ 1051­1086. The surviving spouse annuity and QDRO provisions, central to the dispute here, are part of the statute's mandatory participation and vesting requirements. These provisions provide detailed protections to spouses of plan participants which, in some cases, exceed what their rights would be were community property law the sole measure. ERISA's express pre-emption clause states that the Act "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . ." § 1144(a). We can begin, and in this case end, the analysis by simply asking if state law conflicts with the provisions of ERISA or operates to frustrate its objects. We hold that there is a conflict, which suffices to resolve the case. We need not inquire whether the statutory phrase "relate to" provides further and additional support for the pre-emption claim. Nor need we consider the applicability of field pre- emption, see Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153 (1982). We first address the survivor's annuity and then turn to the other pension benefits. III Sandra Boggs, as we have observed, asserts that federal law pre-empts and supersedes state law and requires the surviving spouse annuity to be paid to her as the sole bene- ficiary. We agree. 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 842 BOGGS v. BOGGS Opinion of the Court The annuity at issue is a qualified joint and survivor annu- ity mandated by ERISA. Section 1055(a) provides: "Each pension plan to which this section applies shall provide that- "(1) in the case of a vested participant who does not die before the annuity starting date, the accrued benefit payable to such participant shall be provided in the form of a qualified joint and survivor annuity." ERISA requires that every qualified joint and survivor an- nuity include an annuity payable to a nonparticipant surviv- ing spouse. The survivor's annuity may not be less than 50% of the amount of the annuity which is payable during the joint lives of the participant and spouse. § 1055(d)(1). Provision of the survivor's annuity may not be waived by the participant, absent certain limited circumstances, unless the spouse consents in writing to the designation of another ben- eficiary, which designation also cannot be changed without further spousal consent, witnessed by a plan representative or notary public. § 1055(c)(2). Sandra Boggs, as the surviv- ing spouse, is entitled to a survivor's annuity under these provisions. She has not waived her right to the survivor's annuity, let alone consented to having the sons designated as the beneficiaries. Respondents say their state-law claims are consistent with these provisions. Their claims, they argue, affect only the disposition of plan proceeds after they have been disbursed by the Bell South Service Retirement Program, and thus nothing is required of the plan. ERISA's concern for secur- ing national uniformity in the administration of employee benefit plans, in their view, is not implicated. They argue Sandra's community property obligations, after she receives the survivor annuity payments, "fai[l] to implicate the regu- latory concerns of ERISA." Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U. S. 1, 15 (1987). 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 843 Opinion of the Court We disagree. The statutory object of the qualified joint and survivor annuity provisions, along with the rest of § 1055, is to ensure a stream of income to surviving spouses. Section 1055 mandates a survivor's annuity not only where a participant dies after the annuity starting date but also guarantees one if the participant dies before then. See §§ 1055(a)(2), (e). These provisions, enacted as part of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA), Pub. L. 98­397, 98 Stat. 1426, enlarged ERISA's protection of surviving spouses in significant respects. Before REA, ERISA only required that pension plans, if they provided for the payment of bene- fits in the form of an annuity, offer a qualified joint and survi- vor annuity as an option entirely within a participant's dis- cretion. 29 U. S. C. §§ 1055(a), (e) (1982 ed.). REA modified ERISA to permit participants to designate a beneficiary for the survivor's annuity, other than the nonparticipant spouse, only when the spouse agrees. § 1055(c)(2). Congress' con- cern for surviving spouses is also evident from the expansive coverage of § 1055, as amended by REA. Section 1055's re- quirements, as a general matter, apply to all "individual ac- count plans" and "defined benefit plans." § 1055(b)(1). The terms are defined, for § 1055 purposes, so that all pension plans fall within those two categories. See § 1002(35). While some individual account plans escape § 1055's surviv- ing spouse annuity requirements under certain conditions, Congress still protects the interests of the surviving spouse by requiring those plans to pay the spouse the nonforfeitable accrued benefits, reduced by certain security interests, in a lump-sum payment. § 1055(b)(1)(C). ERISA's solicitude for the economic security of surviving spouses would be undermined by allowing a predeceasing spouse's heirs and legatees to have a community property interest in the survivor's annuity. Even a plan participant cannot defeat a nonparticipant surviving spouse's statutory entitlement to an annuity. It would be odd, to say the least, if Congress permitted a predeceasing nonparticipant spouse 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 844 BOGGS v. BOGGS Opinion of the Court to do so. Nothing in the language of ERISA supports con- cluding that Congress made such an inexplicable decision. Testamentary transfers could reduce a surviving spouse's guaranteed annuity below the minimum set by ERISA (de- fined as 50% of the annuity payable during the joint lives of the participant and spouse). In this case, Sandra's annuity would be reduced by approximately 20%, according to the calculations contained in the sons' state-court filings. There is no reason why testamentary transfers could not reduce a survivor's annuity by an even greater amount. Perhaps even more troubling, the recipient of the testamentary trans- fer need not be a family member. For instance, a surviv- ing spouse's § 1055 annuity might be substantially reduced so that funds could be diverted to support an unrelated stranger. In the face of this direct clash between state law and the provisions and objectives of ERISA, the state law cannot stand. Conventional conflict pre-emption principles require pre-emption "where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, . . . or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 98 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It would undermine the purpose of ERISA's mandated survi- vor's annuity to allow Dorothy, the predeceasing spouse, by her testamentary transfer to defeat in part Sandra's entitle- ment to the annuity § 1055 guarantees her as the surviving spouse. This cannot be. States are not free to change ERISA's structure and balance. Louisiana law, to the extent it provides the sons with a right to a portion of Sandra Boggs' § 1055 survivor's annuity, is pre-empted. IV Beyond seeking a portion of the survivor's annuity, re- spondents claim a percentage of: the monthly annuity pay- 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 845 Opinion of the Court ments made to Isaac Boggs during his retirement; the IRA; and the ESOP shares of AT&T stock. As before, the claim is based on Dorothy Boggs' attempted testamentary transfer to the sons of her community property interest in Isaac's undistributed pension plan benefits. Respondents argue further-and somewhat inconsistently-that their claim again concerns only what a plan participant or beneficiary may do once plan funds are distributed, without imposing any obligations on the plan itself. Both parties agree that the ERISA benefits at issue here were paid after Dorothy's death, and thus this case does not present the question whether ERISA would permit a nonparticipant spouse to ob- tain a devisable community property interest in benefits paid out during the existence of the community between the par- ticipant and that spouse. A brief overview of ERISA's design is necessary to put respondents' contentions in the proper context. The princi- pal object of the statute is to protect plan participants and beneficiaries. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 90 (1983) ("ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans"). Section 1001(b) states that the policy of ERISA is "to protect . . . the interests of partici- pants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries." Section 1001(c) explains that ERISA contains certain safe- guards and protections which help guarantee the "equitable character and the soundness of [private pension] plans" in order to protect "the interests of participants in private pen- sion plans and their beneficiaries." The general policy is im- plemented by ERISA's specific provisions. Apart from a few enumerated exceptions, a plan fiduciary must "discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries." § 1104(a)(1). The assets of a plan, again with certain exceptions, are "held for the exclu- sive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 846 BOGGS v. BOGGS Opinion of the Court administering the plan." § 1103(c)(1). The Secretary of Labor has authority to create exemptions to ERISA's prohi- bition on certain plan holdings, acquisitions, and transac- tions, but only if doing so is in the interests of the plan's "participants and beneficiaries." § 1108(a)(2). Persons with an interest in a pension plan may bring a civil suit under ERISA's enforcement provisions only if they are either a participant or beneficiary. Section 1132(a)(1)(B), for in- stance, provides that a civil action may be brought "by a participant or beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." ERISA confers beneficiary status on a nonparticipant spouse or dependent in only narrow circumstances delin- eated by its provisions. For example, as we have discussed, § 1055(a) requires provision of a surviving spouse annuity in covered pension plans, and, as a consequence, the spouse is a beneficiary to this extent. Section 1056's QDRO provisions likewise recognize certain pension plan community property interests of nonparticipant spouses and dependents. A QDRO is a type of domestic relations order that creates or recognizes an alternate payee's right to, or assigns to an al- ternate payee the right to, a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i). A domestic relations order, in turn, is any judgment, decree, or order that concerns "the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant" and is "made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (in- cluding a community property law)." § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii). A domestic relations order must meet certain requirements to qualify as a QDRO. See §§ 1056(d)(3)(C)­(E). QDRO's, unlike domestic relations orders in general, are exempt from both the pension plan anti-alienation provision, § 1056(d)(3)(A), and ERISA's general pre-emption clause, 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 847 Opinion of the Court § 1144(b)(7). In creating the QDRO mechanism Congress was careful to provide that the alternate payee, the "spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant," is to be considered a plan beneficiary. §§ 1056(d)(3)(K), (J). These provisions are essential to one of REA's central pur- poses, which is to give enhanced protection to the spouse and dependent children in the event of divorce or separation, and in the event of death the surviving spouse. Apart from these detailed provisions, ERISA does not confer beneficiary status on nonparticipants by reason of their marital or de- pendent status. Even outside the pension plan context and its anti- alienation restriction, Congress deemed it necessary to enact detailed provisions in order to protect a dependent's interest in a welfare benefit plan. Through a § 1169 "qualified medi- cal child support order" a child's interest in his or her par- ent's group health care plan can be enforced. A "medical child support order" is defined as any judgment, decree, or order that concerns the provision of child support "made pur- suant to a State domestic relations law (including a commu- nity property law) and relates to benefits under such plan." § 1169(a)(2)(B)(i). As with a QDRO, a "medical child support order" must satisfy certain criteria in order to qualify. See §§ 1169(a)(3)­(4). In accordance with ERISA's care in con- forming entitlements to benefits with participant or benefi- ciary status, the statute treats a child subject to such a quali- fying order as a participant for ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements and as a beneficiary for other pur- poses. § 1169(a)(7). The surviving spouse annuity and QDRO provisions, which acknowledge and protect specific pension plan commu- nity property interests, give rise to the strong implication that other community property claims are not consistent with the statutory scheme. ERISA's silence with respect to the right of a nonparticipant spouse to control pension plan benefits by testamentary transfer provides powerful support 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 848 BOGGS v. BOGGS Opinion of the Court for the conclusion that the right does not exist. Cf. Massa- chusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134, 147­148 (1985). It should cause little surprise that Congress chose to protect the community property interests of separated and divorced spouses and their children, a traditional subject of domestic relations law, but not to accommodate testamen- tary transfers of pension plan benefits. As a general matter, "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States." In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 593­594 (1890). Support obligations, in particular, are "deeply rooted moral responsibilities" that Congress is unlikely to have intended to intrude upon. See Rose v. Rose, 481 U. S. 619, 632 (1987); see also id., at 636­640 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In accord with these principles, Congress ensured that state domestic relations orders, as long as they meet certain statutory requirements, are not pre-empted. We conclude the sons have no claim under ERISA to a share of the retirement benefits. To begin with, the sons are neither participants nor beneficiaries. A "participant" is defined as an "employee or former employee of an em- ployer, or any member or former member of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a ben- efit." § 1002(7). A "beneficiary" is a "person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder." § 1002(8). Respondents' claims are based on Dorothy Boggs' attempted testamentary transfer, not on a designation by Isaac Boggs or under the terms of the retirement plans. They do not even attempt to argue that they are beneficiar- ies by virtue of the judgment of possession qualifying as a QDRO. An amicus, the Estate Planning, Trust and Probate Law Section of the State Bar of California, in support of respond- ents' position, points to pre-REA case law holding that 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 849 Opinion of the Court ERISA does not pre-empt spousal community property in- terests in pension benefits, regardless of who is the plan par- ticipant or beneficiary. As did the District Court below, the amicus relies in particular upon In re Marriage of Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1979), in which the California Court of Appeal for the First District held that ERISA does not bar California courts from joining pension funds in marriage dissolution proceedings and ordering the pension plan to divide pension payments between the em- ployee and his or her former nonparticipant spouse. We dis- missed the pension plan's appeal for want of a substantial federal question, 444 U. S. 1028 (1980), and, although not entitled to full precedential weight, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 670­671 (1974), that disposition constitutes a decision on the merits, see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332, 344 (1975). The state court in Marriage of Campa was not alone in refusing to find ERISA pre-emption in the divorce context. See, e. g., Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (ND Cal. 1978), aff'd, 632 F. 2d 740 (CA9 1980), cert. denied, 453 U. S. 922 (1981); Savings and Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Em- ployees v. Gago, 717 F. 2d 1038 (CA7 1983); Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 584 F. Supp. 899 (SD Tex. 1984). This judicial consensus, amicus argues, was codified by the QDRO provi- sions which were contained in the 1984 REA amendments. The amicus contends that since REA, or the pre-REA case law which it allegedly adopted, did not consider the commu- nity property rights of a nonparticipant spouse in the testa- mentary context, it should not be construed to pre-empt state law governing this different subject. We disagree with this reasoning. It is true that the sub- ject of testamentary transfers is somewhat removed from domestic relations law. The QDRO provisions address the rights of divorced and separated spouses, and their depend- ent children, which are the traditional concern of domestic relations law. The pre-REA federal common-law extension of § 1002(8)'s definition of "beneficiary" by courts in the con- 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 850 BOGGS v. BOGGS Opinion of the Court text of marital dissolution was in part based on an apprecia- tion of the fact that domestic relations law is primarily an area of state concern, see Marriage of Campa, supra, at 124, 152 Cal. Rptr., at 367­368, and the basic principle that a ben- eficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust, despite otherwise applicable protections, can be reached in the context of di- vorce and separation. See E. Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts 389­391 (2d ed. 1947) (summarizing state case law); Restate- ment (Second) of Trusts § 157 (1959). The state court in Marriage of Campa took its implicit determination that the nonparticipant spouse was a beneficiary to its logical conclu- sion, forcing the pension plan to join the marital dissolution proceedings as a party and compelling it to pay the spouse her share of the pension benefits. Whether or not this ex- tension of the definition of "beneficiary" was consistent with the statute then in force, these authorities are not applicable in light of the REA amendments. The QDRO and the sur- viving spouse annuity provisions define the scope of a non- participant spouse's community property interests in pension plans consistent with ERISA. Respondents and their amicus in effect ask us to ignore § 1002(8)'s definition of "beneficiary" and, through case law, create a new class of persons for whom plan assets are to be held and administered. The statute is not amenable to this sweeping extratextual extension. It is unpersuasive to suggest that third parties could assert their claims with- out being counted as "beneficiaries." A plan fiduciary's responsibilities run only to participants and beneficiaries. § 1104(a)(1). Assets of a plan are held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants and benefici- aries and defraying reasonable expenses of administration. § 1103(c)(1). Reading ERISA to permit nonbeneficiary in- terests, even if not enforced against the plan, would result in troubling anomalies. Either pension plans would be run for the benefit of only a subset of those who have a stake in the plan or state law would have to move in to fill the appar- 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 851 Opinion of the Court ent gaps between plan administration responsibilities and ownership rights, resulting in a complex set of requirements varying from State to State. Neither result accords with the statutory scheme. The conclusion that Congress intended to pre-empt re- spondents' nonbeneficiary, nonparticipant interests in the retirement plans is given specific and powerful reinforce- ment by the pension plan anti-alienation provision. Section 1056(d)(1) provides that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." Statutory anti-alienation provisions are potent mechanisms to prevent the dissipation of funds. In His- quierdo we interpreted an anti-alienation provision to bar a divorced spouse's interest in her husband's retirement bene- fits. See 439 U. S., at 583­590. ERISA's pension plan anti- alienation provision is mandatory and contains only two ex- plicit exceptions, see §§ 1056(d)(2), (d)(3)(A), which are not subject to judicial expansion. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat. Pension Fund, 493 U. S. 365, 376 (1990). The anti-alienation provision can "be seen to bespeak a pension law protective policy of special intensity: Retirement funds shall remain inviolate until retirement." J. Langbein & B. Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law 547 (2d ed. 1995). Dorothy's 1980 testamentary transfer, which is the source of respondents' claimed ownership interest, is a prohibited "assignment or alienation." An "assignment or alienation" has been defined by regulation, with certain exceptions not at issue here, as "[a]ny direct or indirect arrangement whereby a party acquires from a participant or beneficiary" an interest enforceable against a plan to "all or any part of a plan benefit payment which is, or may become, pay- able to the participant or beneficiary." 26 CFR § 1.401(a)­ 13(c)(1)(ii) (1997). Those requirements are met. Under Louisiana law community property interests are enforceable against a plan. See Eskine v. Eskine, 518 So. 2d 505, 508 (La. 1988). If respondents' claims were allowed to succeed 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 852 BOGGS v. BOGGS Opinion of the Court they would have acquired, as of 1980, an interest in Isaac's pension plan at the expense of plan participants and beneficiaries. As was true with survivors' annuities, it would be inimical to ERISA's purposes to permit testamentary recipients to acquire a competing interest in undistributed pension bene- fits, which are intended to provide a stream of income to participants and their beneficiaries. See Guidry, supra, at 376 ("[The anti-alienation provision] reflects a considered congressional policy choice, a decision to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners . . . and their dependents . . ."). Pension benefits support participants and beneficiaries in their retirement years, and ERISA's pension plan safeguards are designed to further this end. See § 1001(c). Besides the anti-alienation provision, Congress has enacted other protective measures to guarantee that retirement funds are there when a plan's participants and beneficiaries expect them. There are, for instance, minimum funding standards for pension plans and a pension plan termination insurance program which guarantees benefits in the event a plan is terminated before being fully funded. See §§ 1082, 1301­ 1461. Under respondents' approach, retirees could find their retirement benefits reduced by substantial sums be- cause they have been diverted to testamentary recipients. Retirement benefits and the income stream provided for by ERISA-regulated plans would be disrupted in the name of protecting a nonparticipant spouses' successors over plan participants and beneficiaries. Respondents' logic would even permit a spouse to transfer an interest in a pension plan to creditors, a result incompatible with a spendthrift provision such as § 1056(d)(1). Community property laws have, in the past, been pre- empted in order to ensure the implementation of a federal statutory scheme. See, e. g., McCune v. Essig, 199 U. S. 382 (1905); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U. S. 655 (1950); Free v. Bland, 369 U. S. 663 (1962); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 853 Opinion of the Court U. S. 572 (1979); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U. S. 210 (1981); Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U. S. 581 (1989); cf. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U. S. 46 (1981). Free v. Bland, supra, is of particular relevance here. A husband had purchased United States savings bonds with community funds in the name of both spouses. Under Treasury regulations then in effect, when a co-owner of the bonds died, the surviving co-owner received the entire interest in the bonds. After the wife died, her son-the principal beneficiary of her will-de- manded either one-half of the bonds or reimbursement for loss of the community property interest. The Court held that the regulations pre-empted the community property claim, explaining: "One of the inducements selected by the Treasury is the survivorship provision, a convenient method of avoid- ing complicated probate proceedings. Notwithstanding this provision, the State awarded full title to the co- owner but required him to account for half of the value of the bonds to the decedent's estate. Viewed realisti- cally, the State has rendered the award of title meaning- less." Id., at 669. The same reasoning applies here. If state law is not pre- empted, the diversion of retirement benefits will occur regardless of whether the interest in the pension plan is en- forced against the plan or the recipient of the pension benefit. The obligation to provide an accounting, moreover, as with the probate proceedings referred to in Free, is itself a burden of significant proportions. Under respondents' view, a pen- sion plan participant could be forced to make an accounting of a deceased spouse's community property interest years after the date of death. If the couple had lived in several States, the accounting could entail complex, expensive, and time-consuming litigation. Congress could not have in- tended that pension benefits from pension plans would be given to accountants and attorneys for this purpose. 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 854 BOGGS v. BOGGS Breyer, J., dissenting Respondents contend it is anomalous and unfair that a di- vorced spouse, as a result of a QDRO, will have more control over a portion of his or her spouse's pension benefits than a predeceasing spouse. Congress thought otherwise. The QDRO provisions, as well as the surviving spouse annuity provisions, reinforce the conclusion that ERISA is concerned with providing for the living. The QDRO provisions protect those persons who, often as a result of divorce, might not receive the benefits they otherwise would have had available during their retirement as a means of income. In the case of a predeceased spouse, this concern is not implicated. The fairness of the distinction might be debated, but Congress has decided to favor the living over the dead and we must respect its policy. The axis around which ERISA's protections revolve is the concepts of participant and beneficiary. When Congress has chosen to depart from this framework, it has done so in a careful and limited manner. Respondents' claims, if allowed to succeed, would depart from this framework, upsetting the deliberate balance central to ERISA. It does not matter that respondents have sought to enforce their rights only after the retirement benefits have been distributed since their asserted rights are based on the theory that they had an interest in the undistributed pension plan benefits. Their state-law claims are pre-empted. The judgment of the Fifth Circuit is Reversed. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice O'Connor joins, and with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Ginsburg join except as to Part II­B­3, dissenting. The question in this case is whether the Employee Retire- ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., "pre-empts," and thereby nullifies, state com- munity property law. The state law in question would per- mit a wife to leave to her children her share of the pension 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 855 Breyer, J., dissenting assets that her husband has earned (or, to put the matter in "community property" terms, that she and her husband together have earned) during their marriage. From the perspective of property law, the issue is unusually important, for, we are told, the answer potentially affects nine commu- nity property States, with more than 80 million residents, and over $1 trillion in ERISA-qualified pension plans-plans that are often a couple's most important lifetime assets. In my view, Congress did not intend ERISA to pre-empt this testamentary aspect of community property law-at least not in the circumstances present here, where a first wife's bequest need not prevent a second wife from obtaining precisely those benefits that ERISA specifically sets aside for her. See § 1055(a). The Fifth Circuit's determination is consistent with this view. I would therefore affirm its judgment. I A This case concerns the disposition of pension plan assets earned by an employee who was married; who had children; whose first wife died; who remarried; who retired; and who then died, survived by his second wife. To be more specific, the employee, Isaac Boggs, a resident of Louisiana, began work for South Central Bell Telephone Company (now known as BellSouth) in 1949. He participated in its ERISA-qualified pension plan for about 36 years. He was married to his first wife, Dorothy Boggs, during almost all of that time-from 1949 until 1979, when Dorothy died. The couple had three children. Isaac married his second wife, Sandra, in 1980. He retired in 1985. He died in 1989. Sandra survives him. When Dorothy died, she left a will providing that Isaac would receive " `the maximum [share of her estate] permitted under the law,' " as well as a lifetime " `usufruct' " (rather like a common-law life estate) in the remainder. Brief for 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 856 BOGGS v. BOGGS Breyer, J., dissenting Respondents 1, 2. The parties agree that this meant that Isaac received one-third of her estate outright. Under Lou- isiana law, the three sons of Dorothy and Isaac would receive what was left of the remaining two-thirds at Isaac's death (i. e., the "naked ownership," or the equivalent of a common- law remainder). Throughout his working life, and during his entire 30-year marriage to Dorothy, Isaac participated in a set of Bell- South's ERISA-qualified retirement plans. When Isaac re- tired in 1985 (six years after Dorothy's death), he received three assets from those plans: (1) 96 shares of AT&T stock (from BellSouth's Employee Stock Ownership Plan); (2) a cash payment of about $150,000 (from BellSouth's Savings Plan for Salaried Employees); and (3) an annuity of about $1,800 per month (from BellSouth's Management Pension Plan) for his life and afterwards for that of his surviving second spouse, Sandra. Isaac almost immediately placed the $150,000 cash payment in an Individual Retirement Ac- count (IRA), thereby avoiding immediate payment of an in- come tax. See 26 U. S. C. § 408(e)(1); see also S. Bruce, Pen- sion Claims: Rights and Obligations 7 (2d ed. 1993). Isaac bequeathed a lifetime usufruct in his property, presumably including some or all of the AT&T stock and the funds in the IRA, to his second wife, Sandra. Sandra, as his survivor, also began to receive the $1,800 monthly annuity. B On December 17, 1992, Sandra Boggs filed an action for declaratory judgment in Federal District Court. See 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (plan participant or beneficiary may bring action to "clarify . . . rights to future benefits"). She said that the three children of Isaac and Dorothy had them- selves brought an action in state court against her and against Isaac's estate, seeking a portion of the pension bene- fits from the BellSouth plans. The children said that under Louisiana law, their mother, Dorothy, had owned a one-half 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 857 Breyer, J., dissenting share in Isaac's rights under the BellSouth retirement plans (insofar as they had accrued prior to Dorothy's death) and that she had left them a portion of that share (two-thirds of the "naked interest" after Isaac's death). They asked (in Sandra's words) for "an accounting" as well as "for an undi- vided interest in, and/or the value of an undivided interest in, the assets and/or benefits" that were paid out of the pen- sion plans. Petition for Declaratory Judgment in No. 92­ 4174 (ED La., Nov. 16, 1992), p. 3. Sandra asked the District Court to declare that, insofar as state law entitled the chil- dren to some of the plan benefits, ERISA pre-empted that state law. In a nutshell, she asked the court to say that the shares of stock, the cash, and the annuity payments were entirely hers. The District Court disagreed with Sandra. It denied her motion for summary judgment and declared that "ERISA does not preempt Louisiana's community property laws." 849 F. Supp. 462, 467 (ED La. 1994); see also Judgment in No. 92­4174 (ED La., Mar. 9, 1994), p. 1. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. We are reviewing the Fifth Cir- cuit's decision in respect to pre-emption; and we must there- fore assume its view of the relevant facts and state law. II Judge Wisdom, writing for the Fifth Circuit in this case, described Louisiana's community property law as a "system" that "conceives of marriage as a partnership in which each partner is entitled to an equal share." 82 F. 3d 90, 96 (1996); see also W. McClanahan, Community Property in the United States § 2:27, p. 38 (1982) (hereinafter McClanahan) (commu- nity property law views marriage "as a civil contract be- tween two persons who ente[r] into the relationship as equals and retai[n] their individual personalities"). Recognizing "the value a spouse, though non-employed, contributes to a marriage," 82 F. 3d, at 96, the state law provides that the interest in pension benefits that accrued during Isaac's mar- 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 858 BOGGS v. BOGGS Breyer, J., dissenting riage to Dorothy belongs both to Isaac and to Dorothy-that is, to them as a community-and not to the one any more than to the other. La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 2338 (West 1985) (community property includes "property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or in- dustry of either spouse"); T. L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834, 841­844, 846 (La. 1975) (pension benefits are community property even if the employee spouse makes no cash contributions to plan). Louisiana law, like the law of other States, today allows both women and men to leave their property to their chil- dren. La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 2346 (West 1985) ("Each spouse acting alone may manage, control, or dispose of com- munity property unless otherwise provided by law"). Cf. 16 K. Spaht & W. Hargrave, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Matrimonial Regimes 1­2 (1989) (until 1980, Louisiana law considered a husband to be the " `head and master' " and ex- clusive manager of community property). And we must as- sume, as did the Fifth Circuit, that Louisiana law would per- mit Dorothy's children, to whom she left her property, to obtain an accounting to determine the extent to which the stock, the IRA, and the monthly annuity, in fact belong to them. See 82 F. 3d, at 97 ("[Dorothy's] spouse, or his estate, owes her an obligation to account for her share of the pen- sion"); see also La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 3261 (West 1961) (succession representative has broad power, subject to pro- bate court approval, to liquidate an estate through sale or exchange of estate assets "to pay debts and legacies, or for any other purpose"). Cf. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2801 (West 1991 and Supp. 1997) (judicial partition of assets on divorce); Hare v. Hodgins, 586 So. 2d 118, 123 (La. 1991) (to equalize allocation of community assets on termination, court may grant "cash or other property in lieu of an actual percentage of the pension payments"); T. L. James, supra, at 851, n. 2 (opinion on rehearing) (same); Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919, 924 (La. 1978) (formula for calculating a former spouse's 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 859 Breyer, J., dissenting share of pension benefits); McClanahan § 12:15, pp. 547­550 (state courts may allocate entire pension to employee spouse and allocate to other spouse other community property equal in value to half of pension); cf. also Succession of McVay, 476 So. 2d 1070, 1073­1074 (La. App. 1985) (decedent's IRA, which contained community property assets, could not be listed as an asset of his estate because he had designated a beneficiary; however, his estate would be deemed to contain the equivalent cash value). See generally La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 4 (West 1993) ("When no rule for a particular situ- ation can be derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity"). We ask here whether-or the extent to which-ERISA stands as an obstacle to the enforcement of this state law as applied in this case. It does so if state law "relate[s] to any employee benefit plan," 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a), or if it conflicts with specific provisions of ERISA. Applying the relevant criteria, I can find no basis for pre-emption. A Louisiana community property law "relates to" an ERISA plan within the meaning of § 1144(a) if it expressly "refer[s]" to such a plan, or if it has an impermissible "connection with" a plan. California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc., 519 U. S. 316, 324 (1997). Neither of these grounds for pre-emption is present here. The relevant Louisiana statute does not refer to ERISA or to pensions at all. It simply says that "property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse" is "community property." La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 2338 (West 1985). Nor does the statute act exclusively on, or rely on the existence of, ERISA plans. See Dillingham, supra, at 324­325. The statute's application to this case arises out of judicial interpretation, see T. L. James, supra, at 841; McClanahan § 6:21, p. 365, of a sort that is likely to be present whenever a generally 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 860 BOGGS v. BOGGS Breyer, J., dissenting phrased state statute affects an ERISA plan, among other things. Hence there is no specific "reference" problem. The "connection" problem is more difficult. Insofar as that term refers to a conflict with an ERISA purpose, I dis- cuss the matter primarily in Part II­B, infra. The term "connection," however, might also encompass the question whether state law intrudes into an area Congress (given ERISA's basic objectives) would have wanted to reserve ex- clusively for federal legislation. Dillingham, supra, at 324 (quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645, 655 (1995)). Cf. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504 (1978) (state law is pre-empted when it falls within a field that Con- gress has sought to occupy); San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 244­245 (1959) (States may not regulate activities that are protected or prohibited under National Labor Relations Act); Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U. S. 485, 498­499 (1953) (States may not add to or subtract from remedies provided in National Labor Relations Act). In my view, this latter problem (sometimes called "field pre- emption," see Dillingham, supra, at 336 (Scalia, J., concur- ring)) is not present here. The state law in question concerns the ownership of bene- fits. I concede that a primary concern of ERISA is the proper financial management of pension and welfare benefit funds themselves, Dillingham, supra, at 326­327 (citing Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U. S. 107, 115 (1989)), and that payment of benefits (which amounts to the writing of checks from those funds) is closely "connected with" that manage- ment. I also concede that state laws that affect those pay- ments lie closer to ERISA's federal heart than do state laws that, say, affect those goods and services that ERISA benefit plans purchase, such as apprenticeship training programs, 519 U. S., at 332­334, or medical benefits, De Buono v. NYSA­ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, ante, at 814­816. But, even so, I cannot say that the state law at 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 861 Breyer, J., dissenting issue here concerns a subject that Congress wished to place outside the State's legal reach. My reason in part lies in the fact that the state law in question involves family, property, and probate-all areas of traditional, and important, state concern. Rose v. Rose, 481 U. S. 619, 625 (1987) (domestic relations law traditionally left to state regulation); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U. S. 572, 581 (1979) (same); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U. S. 429, 440 (1968) ("The several States, of course, have traditionally reg- ulated the descent and distribution of estates"). But see ante, at 848 (majority's effort to distinguish property inter- ests passing at divorce from those passing by devise). When this Court considers pre-emption, it works "on the `as- sumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' " Dillingham, supra, at 325 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218 (1947)). I can find no reasonably defined relevant category of state law that Congress would have intended to displace. Obvi- ously, Congress did not intend to pre-empt all state laws that govern property ownership. After all, someone must own an interest in ERISA plan benefits. Nor, for similar rea- sons, can one believe that Congress intended to pre-empt state laws concerning testamentary bequests. This is not an area like, say, labor relations, where Congress intended to leave private parties to work out certain matters on their own. See Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U. S. 132, 144­148 (1976). The question, "who owns the property?" needs an answer. Ordinarily, where federal law does not provide a specific answer, state law will have to do so. Nor can I find some appropriately defined forbidden cate- gory by looking to the congressional purpose of establishing uniform laws to regulate the administration of pension funds. Cf. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133 (1990); 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 862 BOGGS v. BOGGS Breyer, J., dissenting Massachusetts v. Morash, supra, at 115. This case does not involve a lawsuit against a fund. I agree with the majority that ERISA would likely pre-empt state law that permitted such a suit. But this is not such a case; nor is there rea- son to believe Louisiana law would produce such a case. (Eskine v. Eskine, 518 So. 2d 505 (La. 1988), which is cited by the majority, involved a governmental plan that was not covered by ERISA. See id., at 506; 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1).) The lawsuit before us concerns benefits that the fund has already distributed; it asks not the fund, but others, for a subsequent accounting. And, as I discuss in Part II­B­3 below, this lawsuit will not interfere with the payment of a survivor annuity to Sandra. See § 1055(a). Under these circumstances, I do not see how allowing the respondents' suit to go forward could interfere with the administration of the BellSouth pension plan according to ERISA's require- ments. Whether or not the children are allowed to seek an accounting, the plan fiduciaries will continue to owe a duty only to plan participants and beneficiaries. See §§ 1103(c)(1), 1104(a)(1). Contrary to the majority's suggestion, Dorothy's children are not the equivalent of plan "participants" or "beneficiaries," see §§ 1002(7), 1002(8), any more than would be a grocery store, a bank, an IRA, or any other recipient of funds that have emerged from a pension plan in the form of a distributed benefit, and no one here claims the contrary. Moreover, the children here are seeking an accounting only after the plan participant has died. But even were that not so, any threat the children's lawsuit could pose to plan admin- istration is far less than that posed by the division of plan assets upon separation or divorce, which is allowed under § 1056(d). See Part II­B­2, infra. Of course, one could look for a still more narrowly defined category, such as the category of "testamentary bequests of ERISA pension benefits by one spouse who dies before the other." But to narrow the category to this extent is to 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 863 Breyer, J., dissenting change the question from one about occupying the field, to one about whether, or the extent to which, Louisiana law frustrates or interferes with an important federal purpose. That question is important. Indeed, the Court, in other cases, has found conflicts between state community property law and federal statutes governing retirement, insurance, and savings funds operated and/or funded by the Federal Government. See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U. S. 581, 587­ 595 (1989); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U. S. 210, 221­236 (1981); Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U. S. 46, 53­61 (1981); His- quierdo, supra, at 582­590; Free v. Bland, 369 U. S. 663 (1962); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U. S. 655, 658­660 (1950). But those cases turned on the particular federal purposes embodied in the particular federal statutes at issue. The question posed here similarly requires an examination of ERISA's specific statutory provisions to see whether they reveal language or an important purpose with which the State's community property laws conflict-either directly, or in the sense that the state laws "frustrate" the achievement of a statutory purpose. See Malone, 435 U. S., at 504. I now turn to that question. B Sandra Boggs, supported by the Acting Solicitor General, points to three statutory provisions with which, she believes, Louisiana law conflicts-an anti-alienation provision, 29 U. S. C. § 1056(d)(1), a provision dealing with an exception to the anti-alienation section for "qualified domestic relations order[s]," § 1056(d)(3)(A), and a provision that concerns joint and survivor pension annuities, § 1055. I shall consider each in turn. 1 ERISA's "anti-alienation" provision, § 1056(d)(1), says that "benefits provided under the [qualified ERISA plan] may not be assigned or alienated." We have stated that this provi- sion reflects "a decision to safeguard a stream of income for 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 864 BOGGS v. BOGGS Breyer, J., dissenting pensioners (and their dependents . . .)." Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat. Pension Fund, 493 U. S. 365, 376 (1990). Sandra Boggs and the Acting Solicitor General claim that Louisiana law interferes with a significant "anti-alienation" objective, both (1) by permitting Dorothy, the nonparticipant spouse, to obtain an undivided interest in the pension of Isaac, the participant spouse; and (2) by permitting Dorothy to transfer that interest on her death to her children, who, as far as ERISA is concerned, are third parties. The first claim-simply attacking Dorothy's possession of an undivided one-half interest in that portion of retirement benefits that accrued during her marriage to Isaac-does not attack any "assign[ment]" of an interest nor any "alien- a[tion]" of an interest, for Dorothy's interest arose not through assignment or alienation, but through the operation of Louisiana's community property law itself. Thus, San- dra's claim must be that community property law's grant of an undivided one-half interest in retirement benefits to a nonparticipant wife or husband itself violates some congres- sional purpose. But what purpose could that be? Congress has recognized that community property law, like any other kind of property law, can create various property interests for nonparticipant spouses. See 29 U. S. C. § 1056(d)(3)(B) (ii)(II). Community property law, like other property law, can provide an appropriate legal framework for resolving disputes about who owns what. § 1056(d)(3). The anti- alienation provision is designed to prevent plan beneficiaries from prematurely divesting themselves of the funds they will need for retirement, not to prevent application of the prop- erty laws that define the legal interest in those funds. One cannot find frustration of an "anti-alienation" purpose simply in the state law's definition of property. The second claim-attacking Dorothy's testamentary transfer to her children-is more plausible. Nonetheless, with one exception discussed below, ERISA does not concern itself with what a pension fund beneficiary, such as Isaac, 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 865 Breyer, J., dissenting does with his pension money at his death. That is not sur- prising, for after the death of a beneficiary the money is no longer needed for that beneficiary's support. And if ERISA does not embody a congressional purpose to restrict what Isaac can do with his pension funds after his death, there is no reason to believe it embodies some similar general pur- pose with respect to Dorothy. Insofar as the pension is com- munity property, it belongs to both Dorothy and Isaac equally; it is just as much hers as his. Why, then, should ERISA restrict her testamentary power in respect to her property any more than it restricts his? I see one possible answer to this question. One might argue that, because Dorothy was the first to die, her testa- mentary transfer gave to third parties (persons to whom ERISA is indifferent) funds that Isaac might otherwise have used during his retirement; and, for that reason, the testa- mentary transfer tends to frustrate the purpose of the "anti- alienation" provision or some more general ERISA purpose. This argument (with one exception, see Part II­B­3, infra) is beside the point, however, for the state-law action here seeks an accounting that will take place after the deaths of both Dorothy and Isaac. Moreover, the argument depends upon doubtful assumptions about Congress' purposes. Con- sider the 96 shares of stock and $150,000 cash that Isaac re- ceived from the plans when he retired. Dorothy's bequest affects those assets-the stock and the cash-not while they remain in BellSouth's pension plan funds, but only after they have emerged from the plan in the form of a distributed pay- ment. As far as ERISA is concerned, Isaac could have used the retirement benefits to pay for a vacation, to buy a house, or to bet at the races, or he could have given the money to his children. ERISA would have left Dorothy similarly free to do what she wished with her share of the stock and the cash, had she been alive at the time of their receipt. That being so, I do not understand why or how ERISA could be concerned about Dorothy's creation of a will, which affected 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 866 BOGGS v. BOGGS Breyer, J., dissenting the retirement assets only after Isaac received them. I rec- ognize that Isaac did not use the $150,000 to buy a new house, or to pay for medical expenses, or to gamble; rather, he put the money into an IRA. But no one has explained why that fact-which in all likelihood reflects the exigencies of tax law, see 26 U. S. C. § 408(e)(1)-should make any differ- ence here. 2 Sandra Boggs and the Acting Solicitor General look for support to another portion of the anti-alienation section-an amendment that was part of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA), Pub. L. 98­397, 98 Stat. 1426-that affects the division of assets upon divorce. That section says that the "anti-alienation" provision, 29 U. S. C. § 1056(d)(1), "shall not apply if the order is determined to be a qualified domestic relations order" (QDRO). § 1056(d)(3)(A). The provision defines QDRO's to include certain court orders that are "made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including a community property law)," § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II), and meet certain other requirements, §§ 1056(d)(3)(B)(i), 1056(d)(3)(C), 1056(d)(3)(D). The Government argues that this provision shows that court orders count as "alienations" prohibited under § 1056(d)(1), and that since the probate court orders effectuating Dorothy's testamentary transfers do not fall within the QDRO exception, the "anti-alienation" section, as amended and taken as a whole, pre-empts Louisiana law. The QDRO provisions, in my view, do not support the Government's argument. The QDRO exception does not purport to interpret the "anti-alienation" provision (quoted supra, at 863). Rather, it simply says that the provision "shall apply to the creation, assignment, or recognition of a right to any benefit payable with respect to a par- ticipant pursuant to a domestic relations order . . . ." § 1056(d)(3)(A). 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 867 Breyer, J., dissenting The section defines "domestic relations order" (not "quali- fied domestic relations order") as a court order, judgment, or decree made pursuant to state domestic relations law, which "relates to the provision of child support, alimony pay- ments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant." § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I). It then exempts "qualified" orders from the scope of the anti-alienation provision. § 1056(d)(3)(A). This language does not tell us what the word "alienation" would cover in its absence. It does not tell us whether the amendment taken as a whole clarified that the anti-alienation provision covers court orders (which would help Sandra) or extended that coverage so that it included domestic relations orders (which would help the children). Hence, the amendment tells us virtually nothing relevant about whether the prohibi- tion on anti-alienation applies to matters not covered by the term "domestic relations orders," such as probate court orders. Second, the amendment, taken as a whole, concerns di- vorce and separation, not probate. See Department of Labor Advisory Opinion 90­46A, issued Dec. 4, 1990 (citing 130 Cong. Rec. 13327 (1984); S. Rep. No. 98­575, pp. 18­19 (1984)) (in enacting REA, Congress focused on marital disso- lution and dependent support). The amendment says that state-court judges cannot award pension-related property to a nonparticipant spouse unless the order doing so meets certain requirements, such as recordkeeping requirements and a prohibition against increasing the amount of bene- fits that an ERISA plan would otherwise have to pay. §§ 1056(d)(3)(C), 1056(d)(3)(D). As I have said, Congress did this by stating that the anti-alienation section covers divorce-related court orders, and then exempting "qualified" orders from the additional coverage just created. The amendment thus regulates transfers between living spouses; 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 868 BOGGS v. BOGGS Breyer, J., dissenting it does not intend to affect testamentary transfers taking place after death. Third, the QDRO provision shows that Congress did not object to court orders that transfer pension benefits from an ERISA plan participant to a former spouse who is alive-at least if those court orders meet certain procedural require- ments. Why then, one might ask, would Congress object to court orders that transfer benefits to a former spouse after her death? Had Dorothy Boggs remained with Isaac for many years and then divorced him, she could have obtained a QDRO that would have declared her community property interest in Isaac's pension benefits, and she could then have left that interest to her children. That being so, it would be anomalous to find a congressional purpose in ERISA-de- spite the absence of express statutory language and any indi- cation that Congress even considered the question-that would in effect deprive Dorothy of her interest because, in- stead of divorcing Isaac, she "stay[ed] with him till her last breath." Tr. of Oral Arg. 15. Finally, the language of § 1056(d), even if taken literally, does not help Sandra significantly, for a probate court order awarding property to an estate or to children cannot easily be squeezed into the definition of "domestic relations order." An order placing property in the estate is not an order that provides property rights to a "spouse, former spouse, child, or dependent," and an order distributing an estate's property to a child is not readily described as an order relating to "marital property rights." See Department of Labor Advi- sory Opinion, supra (probate orders are not "domestic rela- tions orders"). 3 Sandra Boggs and the Acting Solicitor General rely on a third statutory provision, § 1055, which sets forth specific pro- visions concerning the payment of annuities to a plan par- ticipant's surviving spouse. Section 1055(a) says that an ERISA plan must ensure that "the accrued benefit" that is 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 869 Breyer, J., dissenting "payable" to the plan "participant" takes "the form of a qual- ified joint and survivor annuity," § 1055(a)(1). The term "qualified joint and survivor annuity" means an "annuity" to a plan participant for his life, with a surviving spouse, such as Sandra, that is "not less than 50 percent of (and is not greater than 100 percent of) the amount of the annuity which is payable during the joint lives of the participant and the spouse." § 1055(d). The parties have not argued that this provision affects the shares of stock or the $150,000 lump sum. I need not decide whether that is so. That is because, if these assets do count as "accrued benefits" under § 1055(d), the plan would then have had to insist on a waiver from Sandra in order to pay them out in the way that it did-i. e., in a form other than an annuity. Thus, I assume either that the stock and cash were not "accrued benefits" under § 1055(d), or that Sandra waived her rights under § 1055. Either way, § 1055 would not affect the outcome as to the stock and the cash. The $1,800 monthly annuity payments, however, are a dif- ferent matter. They were paid from the BellSouth Manage- ment Pension Plan, a "defined benefit" pension plan, initially to Isaac during his lifetime, and then to his second wife, San- dra, for her life. These annuities do fall within the scope of § 1055. This ERISA provision seeks to guarantee that the person who was a participant's spouse at the time of the par- ticipant's death will receive an annuity as described (unless the spouse has waived the right to receive the survivor annu- ity, §§ 1055(c) (waiver of survivor portion of annuity), 1055(g) (election of cash distribution rather than annuity)). See S. Rep. No. 98­575, at 12; 26 CFR § 1.401(a)­11 (1996). I agree with the majority that Louisiana cannot give Dorothy's children a share of the pension annuity that Sandra is receiv- ing without frustrating the purpose of this provision. This inconsistency does not end the matter, however, for Dorothy's children here sought different relief. Although the children apparently requested a portion of Sandra's 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 870 BOGGS v. BOGGS Breyer, J., dissenting monthly annuity payments in their state-court pleading, Rec- ord 134, they stipulated at oral argument that they are seek- ing only an accounting, Tr. of Oral Arg. 33­34. And accord- ing to Sandra's complaint for declaratory judgment, the children have asked for an "accounting"; the Fifth Circuit, too, spoke only of an "accounting," and did not mention relief in the form of a percentage of Sandra's annuity. See 82 F. 3d, at 94, 97, 98. The difference is important, for, as the children pointed out at oral argument, an accounting would simply declare that, when Dorothy died, she had a community property in- terest in Isaac's pension benefits. And it is possible that Louisiana law would permit Dorothy (or her heirs) to collect not the pension benefits themselves, but other nonpension community assets of equivalent value. See La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 3261 (West 1961) (succession representative has broad power, subject to probate court approval, to liquidate an estate through sale or exchange of estate assets "to pay debts and legacies, or for any other purpose"). Cf. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2801 (West 1991 and Supp. 1997) (judicial parti- tion of assets on divorce); Hare v. Hodgins, 586 So. 2d, at 123 (to equalize allocation of community assets on termination, court may grant "cash or other property in lieu of an actual percentage of the pension payments"); T. L. James, 332 So. 2d, at 851, n. 2 (opinion on rehearing) (same); Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d, at 924 (setting forth formula for calculating a former spouse's share of pension benefits); McClanahan § 12:15, pp. 547­550 (state courts may allocate entire pension to employee spouse and allocate to other spouse other com- munity property equal in value to half of pension). In this case, Isaac apparently retained possession of other, nonpension assets from the Dorothy-Isaac community after Dorothy's death because her will gave him a lifetime usu- fruct in the portion of her estate that she did not bequeath to him outright. (And if Dorothy had not bequeathed that portion of her estate to anyone, it appears that Louisiana law 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 871 Breyer, J., dissenting would automatically have given him a usufruct until his death or remarriage. See La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 890 (West Supp. 1997).) In such a circumstance, Louisiana law might provide an accounting to allow Dorothy's estate, or her heirs, to recover Dorothy's community property share of those nonpension assets from Isaac's estate, or from his heirs, after his death. In applying such a law, a Louisiana court might allocate property so that federally granted prop- erty rights, such as Sandra's right to a survivor annuity, are fully protected. Cf. Bendler v. Marshall, 513 So. 2d 369 (La. App. 1987) (first wife is entitled to reimbursement of her community property share of husband's pension contribu- tions, but not from second, surviving wife; first wife is not entitled to share of second wife's survivor annuity); Succes- sion of McVay, 476 So. 2d, at 1073­1074 (decedent's IRA, which contained community property assets, could not be listed as an asset of his estate because he had designated a beneficiary; however, his estate would be deemed to contain the equivalent cash value). See generally La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 4 (West 1993) ("When no rule for a particular situ- ation can be derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity"). Of course, the lower courts did not describe the precise nature of Dorothy's state-law interest, nor did they explain exactly how the accounting worked. They did no more than deny Sandra's request for a declaratory judgment that ERISA prohibits an accounting. But that may reflect the fact that no one raised a § 1055 argument until after the Court of Appeals panel's decision in this case. We therefore should not grant Sandra her declaratory judgment unless we are certain Louisiana law could not lawfully permit Dorothy to leave her community property interest in the pension assets to her children. And, given the authority just cited, state law might lawfully do so, very roughly in the way the following imaginary example illustrates: 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 872 BOGGS v. BOGGS Breyer, J., dissenting Assume at the time of Dorothy's death Dorothy and Isaac owned the following community property: Pension assets $ 60,000 Stock investments 140,000 Total $200,000 Louisiana law might then provide that Dorothy and Isaac each owned $100,000 worth of community assets. Louisiana law might also provide (or permit a probate court to decide) that the share belonging to Dorothy's estate consisted of $100,000 worth of stock, leaving Isaac with $40,000 in stock and $60,000 in pension assets. If that is so, why should ERISA care? And if Louisiana law should simply postpone the division of the Dorothy-Isaac community's property until after Isaac's death because of his lifetime usufruct, why should ERISA care any more? Moreover, if Isaac be- queathed the entire $140,000 worth of stock to a charity, I assume that the probate court would block most of the be- quest on the ground that $100,000 worth of stock was not Isaac's to give away. I assume it would do the same if he tried to give Sandra the entire $140,000. And I do not see why ERISA would care about the stock (which, after all, belonged to Dorothy) in either case. I cannot understand why Congress would want to pre- empt Louisiana law if (or insofar as) that law provides for an accounting and collection from other property-i. e., prop- erty other than the annuity that § 1055 requires the Bell- South plans to pay to Sandra. The survivor annuity provi- sion assures Sandra that she will receive an annuity for the rest of her life. Louisiana law (on my assumption) would not take from her either that annuity or any other asset that belongs to her. The most one could say is that Sandra will not receive certain other assets-assets that belonged to the Dorothy-Isaac community and that Isaac had no right to give to anyone in the first place. 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 833 (1997) 873 Breyer, J., dissenting Nothing in ERISA suggests that it cares about what hap- pens to those other assets. The survivor annuity provision says nothing about them. Indeed, Isaac, or the Dorothy- Isaac community, might, or might not, have had other assets. Isaac might, or might not, have tried to leave all, or some, of those other assets to Sandra, or to his children, or to charity. ERISA seems to be indifferent to the presence, or absence, of other assets and to what Isaac did or did not try to do with them. After all, if Dorothy had divorced Isaac, ERISA would have permitted state law to give her not only other assets, but also half of the pension itself (which would have left a later-appearing Sandra with a diminished annuity). See § 1056(d)(3)(A). Given Congress' purpose of allowing state courts to give first wives their community property share of pension assets, why would Congress have intended to include a silent implication that strips Dorothy of an asset that may be the bulk of her community property-simply because, instead of divorcing Isaac, she remained his wife until she died? On the assumptions I have made, to find a conflict in this case, one would have to depart from what Congress actually said in ERISA and infer some more abstract general pur- pose, say to help a second wife at the expense of a first wife's state-law-created interest in other property. But should we take anything like this latter approach, there would be no logical stopping place. Confusion and unnecessary interfer- ence with state property laws would become inevitable. Moreover, we should be particularly careful in making as- sumptions about the interaction of § 1055 and Louisiana law, as the courts below did not consider § 1055 as a possible ground for conflict pre-emption. In sum, an annuity goes to Sandra, a surviving spouse; but otherwise Dorothy would remain free not only to have, but to bequeath, her share of the marital estate to her children. This reading of the relevant statutory provisions and pur- poses protects Sandra, limits ERISA's interference with 520US3 Unit: $U64 [09-11-99 18:44:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 874 BOGGS v. BOGGS Breyer, J., dissenting basic state property and family law, and minimizes the ex- tent to which ERISA would interfere with Dorothy's pre- existing property. Cf. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U. S. 704, 717 (1987) (federal statute stripping property owner of right to pass interest by descent or devise constitutes taking under Fifth Amendment); Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U. S. 234, 244­245 (1997) (statutory restriction on class of permissible heirs con- stitutes taking). These general reasons, as well as the specific reasons pro- vided above, convince me that ERISA does not pre-empt the Louisiana law in question. And I would therefore affirm the judgment below. 520US3 Unit: $U65 [09-15-99 13:02:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 875 Syllabus SARATOGA FISHING CO. v. J. M. MARTINAC & CO. et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­1764. Argued February 18, 1997-Decided June 2, 1997 In East River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U. S. 858, this Court held that an admiralty tort plaintiff cannot recover for the physical damage a defective product causes to the "product itself," but can recover for physical damage the product causes to "other property." The parties here agree that the "product itself" consists at least of a ship as built and outfitted by its original manufacturer and sold to an initial user. Respondent J. M. Martinac & Co. built the fishing vessel M/V Saratoga, installing a hydraulic system designed by respondent Marco Seattle Inc. Joseph Madruga, the Initial User, bought the ship new, added extra equipment, used the ship, and resold it to petitioner Saratoga Fishing Co., the Subsequent User, who used it until it caught fire and sank. In this admiralty tort suit against respondents, the Dis- trict Court found that the hydraulic system had been defectively de- signed and awarded Saratoga Fishing damages, including damages for the loss of the equipment added by Madruga. The Ninth Circuit re- versed, holding that the added equipment was part of the ship when it was resold to Saratoga Fishing, and, for that reason, the equipment was part of the defective product that itself caused the harm. Held: Equipment added by the Initial User before he sold the ship to the Subsequent User is "other property," not part of the product that itself caused physical harm. This Court held in East River that an injury to the defective product itself, even though physical, was a kind of "eco- nomic loss," for which tort law did not provide compensation. 476 U. S., at 871. Reasoning that "[c]ontract law, and the law of warranty in par- ticular, is well suited" to setting the responsibilities of a seller of a prod- uct that fails to perform its intended function, id., at 872­873, the Court found that, given the availability of warranties, the courts should not ask tort law to perform a job that contract law might perform better, ibid. The Ninth Circuit's holding that recovery should be denied for added equipment because the Subsequent User could have asked the Initial User for a warranty creates a tort damage immunity beyond that set by any relevant tort precedent. Had the ship remained in the Ini- tial User's hands, the added equipment's loss could have been recovered in tort, and there is no suggestion in state or federal law that these 520US3 Unit: $U65 [09-15-99 13:02:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN 876 SARATOGA FISHING CO. v. J. M. MARTINAC & CO. Opinion of the Court results would change with a subsequent sale. Indeed, other things being equal, a rule that diminishes liability because of resale would di- minish a basic incentive of defective-product tort law: to encourage the manufacture of safer products. East River provides an unsatisfactory answer to the question why a series of resales should progressively im- munize a manufacturer from liability for foreseeable physical damage that would otherwise fall upon it, since the Subsequent User does not contract directly with the manufacturer, and it is likely more difficult for a consumer to offer the appropriate warranty on used products. While nothing prevents a user/reseller from offering a warranty, respondents have not explained why the ordinary rules of a manufacturer's tort lia- bility should be supplanted merely because the user/reseller may in the- ory incur an overlapping contract liability. The holding here does not affect East River's rule that it is not a component part, but the vessel- as placed in the stream of commerce by the manufacturer and its distrib- utors-that is the "product" that itself causes the harm. Nor does the holding impose too great a potential tort liability upon a manufacturer or a distributor. It merely maintains liability, for equipment added after the initial sale, despite the presence of a resale by the Initial User. Pp. 878­885. 69 F. 3d 1432, reversed. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 885. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 885. Keith Zakarin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Forrest Booth. Daniel B. MacLeod argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Duncan Koler.* Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue before us concerns limits upon the damages that a tort plaintiff in admiralty can recover for physical damage to property caused by a defective product. In East River *Steven B. Fisher and Michael H. Williamson filed a brief for All Alas- kan Seafoods, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. Jan S. Amundson, Quentin Riegel, and Gregory S. Gilchrist filed a brief for the National Association of Manufacturers et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. 520US3 Unit: $U65 [09-15-99 13:02:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 875 (1997) 877 Opinion of the Court S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U. S. 858 (1986), the Court held that an admiralty tort plaintiff cannot recover for the physical damage the defective product causes to the "product itself"; but the plaintiff can recover for physi- cal damage the product causes to "other property." In this case all agree that the "product itself" consists at least of a ship as built and outfitted by its original manufacturer and sold to an initial user. This case asks how this corner of tort law treats the physical destruction of extra equipment (a skiff, a fishing net, spare parts) added by the initial user after the first sale and then resold as part of the ship when the ship itself is later resold to a subsequent user. Is that added equipment part of the "product itself," in which case the plaintiff cannot recover in tort for its physical loss? Or is it "other property," in which case the plaintiff can recover? We conclude that it is "other property." Hence (assuming other tort law requirements are satisfied) admiralty's tort rules permit recovery. I This case arises out of an engine room fire and flood that led to the sinking of the fishing vessel M/V Saratoga in Janu- ary 1986. We must assume that a hydraulic system defec- tively designed by respondent Marco Seattle Inc. was one significant cause of the accident. About 15 years before the accident, respondent J. M. Martinac & Co. had built the ship, installed the hydraulic system, and sold the ship new to Jo- seph Madruga. Madruga then added extra equipment-a skiff, a seine net, and various spare parts-and used the ship for tuna fishing. In 1974, Madruga resold the ship to peti- tioner, Saratoga Fishing Co., which continued to use the ship for fishing. In 1987, after the ship caught fire and sank, Saratoga Fishing brought this tort suit in admiralty against Marco Seattle and J. M. Martinac. The District Court found that the hydraulic system had been defectively designed, and it awarded Saratoga Fishing damages (adjusted to reflect Saratoga Fishing's own partial 520US3 Unit: $U65 [09-15-99 13:02:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN 878 SARATOGA FISHING CO. v. J. M. MARTINAC & CO. Opinion of the Court fault). Those damages included damages for the loss of the equipment that Madruga had added after the initial purchase of the ship. The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court should not have awarded damages for the added equipment. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F. 3d 1432, 1445 (1995). A majority noted that the equipment, though added by Ma- druga, was part of the ship when Madruga resold the ship to Saratoga Fishing, and, for that reason, the majority held, the added equipment was part of the defective product that itself caused the harm. Applying East River's distinction be- tween the product that itself caused the harm and "other property," the majority concluded that Saratoga Fishing could not recover in tort for the loss. A dissenting judge believed that the "product itself" was the ship when launched into the stream of commerce by Martinac, its origi- nal builder. Consequently, the added equipment was "other property." We granted certiorari to resolve this uncer- tainty about the proper application of East River. We now agree with the dissenting judge. II The facts before us show: (1) a Component Supplier who (2) provided a defective component (the hydraulic system) to a Manufacturer, who incorporated it into a manufactured product (the ship), which (3) the Manufacturer sold to an Initial User, who (4) after adding equipment and using the ship, resold it to a Subsequent User (Saratoga Fishing). The applicable law is general maritime law, "an amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules," drawn from both state and federal sources. East River, supra, at 865; see also Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U. S. 16, 20 (1963); Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U. S. 625, 630 (1959). The context is purely commercial. The particular question before us requires us to interpret the Court's deci- 520US3 Unit: $U65 [09-15-99 13:02:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 875 (1997) 879 Opinion of the Court sion in East River: Does the term "other property," as used in that case, include the equipment added by the Initial User before he sold the ship to the Subsequent User? We con- clude that it does: When a manufacturer places an item in the stream of commerce by selling it to an Initial User, that item is the "product itself" under East River. Items added to the product by the Initial User are therefore "other prop- erty," and the Initial User's sale of the product to a Subse- quent User does not change these characterizations. East River arose at the intersection of two principles that govern recovery in many commercial cases involving defec- tive products. The first principle is that tort law in this area ordinarily (but with exceptions) permits recovery from a manufacturer and others in the initial chain of distribution for foreseeable physical harm to property caused by product defects. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 101 (5th ed. 1984); East River, 476 U. S., at 867. The second principle is that tort law in this area ordinarily (but with exceptions) does not permit recov- ery for purely economic losses, say, lost profits. See Re- statement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 6, Comment d (Proposed Final Draft, Preliminary Version, Oct. 18, 1996); e. g., Rardin v. T & D Machine Handling, Inc., 890 F. 2d 24, 27­30 (CA7 1989). The Court in East River favored the second principle, for it held that an injury to the defective product itself, even though physical, was a kind of "economic loss," for which tort law did not provide compensation. 476 U. S., at 871. The Court reasoned that the loss of the value of a product that suffers physical harm-say, a product that destroys it- self by exploding-is very much like the loss of the value of a product that does not work properly or does not work at all. See id., at 870. In all such cases, the Court held, "[c]ontract law, and the law of warranty in particular, is well suited" to setting the responsibilities of a seller of a product 520US3 Unit: $U65 [09-15-99 13:02:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN 880 SARATOGA FISHING CO. v. J. M. MARTINAC & CO. Opinion of the Court that fails to perform the function for which it was intended. Id., at 872­873. The commercial buyer and commercial seller can negotiate a contract-a warranty-that will set the terms of compensation for product failure. If the buyer obtains a warranty, he will receive compensation for the product's loss, whether the product explodes or just refuses to start. If the buyer does not obtain a warranty, he will likely receive a lower price in return. Given the availability of warranties, the courts should not ask tort law to perform a job that contract law might perform better. Ibid.; Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18­19, 403 P. 2d 145, 151 (1965) (en banc). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that East River required it to define the defective "product itself" by looking to that which the plaintiff had purchased, for that is the product that, in principle, the plaintiff could have asked the seller to warrant. Since Saratoga Fishing, the Subsequent User, might have asked Madruga, the Initial User, to warrant the M/V Sara- toga, skiff, nets, and all, that product, skiff, nets, and all, is the "product itself" that stands outside the reach of tort recovery. In our view, however, this holding pushes East River's principle beyond the boundary set by the principle's rationale. For one thing, the Ninth Circuit's holding creates a tort damage immunity beyond that set by any relevant tort prec- edent that we have found. State law often distinguishes be- tween items added to or used in conjunction with a defective item purchased from a Manufacturer (or its distributors) and (following East River) permits recovery for the former when physically harmed by a dangerously defective product. Thus the owner of a chicken farm, for example, recovered for chickens killed when the chicken house ventilation system failed, suffocating the 140,000 chickens inside. A. J. Decos- ter Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 333 Md. 245, 634 A. 2d 1330 (1994). A warehouse owner recovered for damage to a building caused by a defective roof. United Air Lines, 520US3 Unit: $U65 [09-15-99 13:02:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 875 (1997) 881 Opinion of the Court Inc. v. CEI Industries of Ill., Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 332, 499 N. E. 2d 558 (1986). And a prior case in admiralty (not un- like the one before us) held that a ship charterer, who adds expensive seismic equipment to the ship, may recover for its loss in a fire caused by a defective engine. Nicor Supply Ships Assocs. v. General Motors Corp., 876 F. 2d 501 (CA5 1989). Indeed, respondents here conceded that, had the ship remained in the hands of the Initial User, the loss of the added equipment could have been recovered in tort. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29­30. We have found no suggestion in state (or in federal) law that these results would change with a subsequent sale-that is, we have found no case, other than the Ninth Circuit case before us, that suggests that the courts would deny recovery to a subsequent chicken farmer, who had later purchased the farm, chickens, coop, ventilation system, and all. Indeed, the denial of recovery for added equipment simply because of a subsequent sale makes the scope of a manufac- turer's liability turn on what seems, in one important re- spect, a fortuity, namely, whether a defective product causes foreseeable physical harm to the added equipment before or after an Initial User (who added the equipment) resells the product to a Subsequent User. One important purpose of defective-product tort law is to encourage the manufacture of safer products. The various tort rules that determine which foreseeable losses are recoverable aim, in part, to pro- vide appropriate safe-product incentives. And a liability rule that diminishes liability simply because of some such resale is a rule that, other things being equal, diminishes that basic incentive. That circumstance requires a justifi- cation. That is to say, why should a series of resales, after replacement and additions of ever more physical items, pro- gressively immunize a manufacturer to an ever greater ex- tent from the liability for foreseeable physical damage that would otherwise fall upon it? 520US3 Unit: $U65 [09-15-99 13:02:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN 882 SARATOGA FISHING CO. v. J. M. MARTINAC & CO. Opinion of the Court The East River answer to this question-because the par- ties can contract for appropriate sharing of the risks of harm-is not as satisfactory in the context of resale after an initial use. That is because, as other courts have suggested, the Subsequent User does not contract directly with the manufacturer (or distributor). Cf. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 117 Idaho 724, 727, 791 P. 2d 1303, 1306 (1990); Tillman v. Vance Equipment Co., 286 Ore. 747, 755­756, 596 P. 2d 1299, 1304 (1979). Moreover, it is likely more difficult for a consumer-a commercial user and reseller-to offer an appropriate warranty on the used product he sells akin to a manufacturer's (or distributor's) warranty of the initial prod- uct. The user/reseller did not make (or initially distribute) the product and, to that extent, he normally would know less about the risks that such a warranty would involve. Cf. Tillman, supra, at 755, 596 P. 2d, at 1303­1304; Peterson, supra, at 726­727, 791 P. 2d, at 1305­1306. That is to say, it would seem more difficult for a reseller to warrant, say, a ship's engine; as time passes, the ship ages, the ship under- goes modification, and it passes through the hands of users and resellers. Of course, nothing prevents a user/reseller from offering a warranty. But neither does anything prevent a Manufac- turer and an Initial User from apportioning through their contract potential loss of any other items-say, added equip- ment or totally separate physical property-that a defective manufactured product, say, an exploding engine, might cause. No court has thought that the mere possibility of such a con- tract term precluded tort recovery for damage to an Initial User's other property. Similarly, in the absence of a show- ing that it is ordinary business practice for user/resellers to offer a warranty comparable to those typically provided by sellers of new products, the argument for extending East River, replacing tort law with contract law, is correspond- ingly weak. That is to say, respondents have not explained why the ordinary rules governing the manufacturer's tort 520US3 Unit: $U65 [09-15-99 13:02:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 875 (1997) 883 Opinion of the Court liability should be supplanted merely because the user/ reseller may in theory incur an overlapping liability in contract. Respondents make two other important arguments. First, they say that our reasoning proves too much. They argue that, if a Subsequent User can recover for damage a defective manufactured product causes to property added by the Initial User, then a user might recover for damage a defective component causes the manufactured product, other than the component itself. Saratoga Fishing, for example, could recover the damage the defective hydraulic system caused to any other part of the ship. But the lower courts, following East River, have held that it is not a component part, but the vessel-as placed in the stream of commerce by the manufacturer and its distributors-that is the "prod- uct" that itself caused the harm. See Shipco 2295, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 825 F. 2d 925, 928 (CA5 1987); see also, e. g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc., 107 Nev. 535, 539­542, 815 P. 2d 601, 604­605 (1991). As the Court said in East River: " `Since all but the very simplest of machines have com- ponent parts, [a contrary] holding would require a find- ing of "property damage" in virtually every case where a product damages itself. Such a holding would elimi- nate the distinction between warranty and strict prod- ucts liability.' " 476 U. S., at 867 (quoting Northern Power & Engineering Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P. 2d 324, 330 (Alaska 1981)). Our holding here, however, does not affect this rule, for the relevant relations among initial users, manufacturers, and component suppliers are typically different from those at issue here. Initial users, when they buy, typically de- pend upon, and likely seek warranties that depend upon, a manufacturer's primary business skill, namely, the assembly of workable product components into a marketable whole. 520US3 Unit: $U65 [09-15-99 13:02:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN 884 SARATOGA FISHING CO. v. J. M. MARTINAC & CO. Opinion of the Court King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F. 2d 1047, 1052 (CA3 1988); Shipco 2295, supra, at 929; National Union Fire Ins., supra, at 541, 815 P. 2d, at 605. Moreover, manufacturers and com- ponent suppliers can allocate through contract potential lia- bility for a manufactured product that does not work, thereby ensuring that component suppliers have appropriate incentives to prevent component defects that might destroy the product. King, supra, at 1054; cf. Shipco 2295, supra, at 930. There is no reason to think that initial users systemati- cally control the manufactured product's quality or, as we have said, systematically allocate responsibility for user- added equipment, in similar ways. Regardless, the case law does suggest a distinction between the components added to a product by a manufacturer before the product's sale to a user, e. g., Airlift Int'l, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 685 F. 2d 267 (CA9 1982); King, supra; Shipco 2295, supra; and those items added by a user to the manufactured product, e. g., Nicor Supply Ships Assocs. v. General Motors Corp., 876 F. 2d 501 (CA5 1989); and we would maintain that distinction. Second, respondents argue that our holding would impose too great a potential tort liability upon a manufacturer or a distributor. But we do not see how that is so. For one thing, a host of other tort principles, such as foreseeability, proximate cause, and the "economic loss" doctrine, already do, and would continue to, limit liability in important ways. For another thing, where such principles are satisfied, liabil- ity would exist anyway had the manufactured product simply remained in the hands of the Initial User. Our holding merely maintains liability, for equipment added after the ini- tial sale, despite the presence of a resale by the Initial User. We conclude that equipment added to a product after the Manufacturer (or distributor selling in the initial distribution chain) has sold the product to an Initial User is not part of the product that itself caused physical harm. Rather, in East River's language, it is "other property." (We are 520US3 Unit: $U65 [09-15-99 13:02:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 875 (1997) 885 Scalia, J., dissenting speaking, of course, of added equipment that itself played no causal role in the accident that caused the physical harm.) Thus the extra skiff, nets, spare parts, and miscellaneous equipment at issue here, added to the ship by a user after an initial sale to that Initial User, are not part of the product (the original ship with the defective hydraulic system) that itself caused the harm. The decision of the Ninth Circuit is Reversed. Justice O'Connor, dissenting. I do not disagree with our decision to grant certiorari in this case, but I agree with Justice Scalia-and for the reasons he states-that we should affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting. In East River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U. S. 858 (1986), we adopted as part of admiralty law the so-called "economic loss" rule, which denies the purchaser of a defective product a tort action against the seller or manu- facturer for purely economic losses sustained as a result of the product's failure. Applying this rule, we held that a plaintiff may not recover in tort when a defective product damages only itself, but may recover for personal injuries and for damage to other property. See id., at 871­875. The present case involves a relative detail of application of the East River holding: whether, and under what circumstances, "other property" can include property added to the defective product, not by the plaintiff-purchaser himself, but by some earlier purchaser in the chain of ownership leading back to the manufacturer. In the context of the present case, the question is whether a skiff, a net, and communications and navigational electronics added by Joseph Madruga to the M/V Saratoga before she was sold to petitioner constitute 520US3 Unit: $U65 [09-15-99 13:02:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN 886 SARATOGA FISHING CO. v. J. M. MARTINAC & CO. Scalia, J., dissenting part of the product itself (for which recovery is not available) or "other property" (for which recovery is available). It would have been better, in my view, not to grant certio- rari in this case. By the time East River was decided, we had a wealth of lower court development to draw upon, in- cluding well-reasoned opinions taking no less than three dis- tinct positions on the economic-loss rule. See id., at 868­ 871. We could be confident in our decision, knowing that it broke little new ground; the rule we adopted had been en- dorsed by a majority of state courts and had been tested for two decades since its enunciation by Chief Justice Traynor in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P. 2d 145 (1965). In the present case, by contrast, the Court sets sail into un- charted seas. Not a single lower court decision (other than the one under review) has addressed the precise question presented: the status as "other property" of additions made by a prior purchaser who was a user. I would feel less un- comfortable about our plying these unknown waters if we were skilled navigators. But unlike state courts, we have little first-hand experience in the development of new common-law rules of tort and contract governing commer- cial transactions. Better to have followed some state-court pilots than to proceed on our own-and even, perhaps, to lead state courts aground. With this disclaimer, and with the admission that I am only modestly more confident of my resolution of this case than I am of the Court's, I proceed (reluctantly) to discussion of the merits. The Court's opinion suggests that this is a rather straight- forward case. The relevant facts-according to the Court- are quite simple, showing: "(1) a Component Supplier who (2) provided a defective component . . . to a Manufacturer, who incorporated it into a manufactured product (the ship), which (3) the Manufacturer sold to an Initial User, who (4) after adding equipment and using the ship, resold it to a Subsequent User." Ante, at 878. What the Court's opinion does not disclose is that Madruga-the Court's "Initial 520US3 Unit: $U65 [09-15-99 13:02:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 875 (1997) 887 Scalia, J., dissenting User"-was perhaps not only a user of the boat but also an entrepreneur in the business of designing, assembling, and distributing what might be described as "fully equipped tuna-fishing machines." The M/V Saratoga was not an iso- lated purchase by tuna-fisherman Madruga from Martinac, but was the third of seven steel-hull tuna seiners Madruga commissioned. She was designed, in part by Madruga, spe- cifically for use as a tuna seiner, and her construction at Mar- tinac's shipyard was supervised personally by Madruga and by an engineer in Madruga's employ. Madruga negotiated over the specifications and equipment for the vessel and or- dered numerous changes to it during the course of construc- tion. When delivered by Martinac, the M/V Saratoga was certainly functional as a boat, but it was not yet capable of performing the task for which it was specially designed. It was arguably still just a component of a larger tuna-fishing machine that would not be complete until Madruga installed the seine, skiff, and electronic equipment; and arguably a component of a tuna-fishing machine that Madruga was in the business of marketing. As respondents point out, there is no finding in the record as to whether Madruga was engaged in the business of sell- ing such products and the issue was never raised or consid- ered. Brief for Respondents 33, n. 28. I assume that the Court disregards this issue (neither resolving it nor remand- ing for its consideration) because the Court deems the ques- tion irrelevant. Under the Court's test, as I understand it, the "product" is fixed when it is sold to an "Initial User," even if that user is also in the business of modifying and reselling the product. In my view, there is little to recom- mend such a rule. The Court is driven to take the position it does by the concern that liability would otherwise turn on "a fortuity, namely, whether a defective product causes . . . harm to the added equipment before or after an Initial User (who added the equipment) resells the product to a Subsequent User." 520US3 Unit: $U65 [09-15-99 13:02:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN 888 SARATOGA FISHING CO. v. J. M. MARTINAC & CO. Scalia, J., dissenting Ante, at 881. But the initial-user rule the Court embraces simply makes liability turn on a different fortuity, namely, whether the person who adds additional equipment to the product uses that product before selling it. If Madruga was engaged in the business of assembling and distributing tuna seiners, why should the fact that he briefly used the vessel before selling it enable petitioner to obtain tort damages that would plainly not be recoverable if Madruga had simply in- stalled the components and sold the vessel? Or put in more commonplace terms: Why should the buyer of a car whose engine catches fire and destroys the entire vehicle be able to recover in a tort action against the manufacturer for the value of the dealer-added hi-fi stereo system if the car was a "demo," but not if the car was brand new? One rule that generally avoids making liability turn on either of the above described "fortuities" is what might be called the "last-402A-seller rule." Under this rule, the "product" would be fixed when it is sold by the last person in the chain of distribution who is, in the words of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1964), "engaged in the business of selling such a product." This would offer at least as much predictability as can be expected from the Court's approach, would ensure that the availability of tort remedies will be uniform with regard to all end-users, and would avoid making liability turn on the seemingly irrele- vant question whether the distributor of the product used it before sale. The last-402A-seller rule is also more consist- ent with one of the principal considerations underlying our decision in East River: the desirability of invoking tort pro- tection only where contract-warranty protection is infeasible. Defining the product as what was sold by the last person engaged in the business of selling such products denies tort recovery for those additions to the originally manufactured product which the purchaser could have covered by war- ranty protection (persons in the business will generally offer 520US3 Unit: $U65 [09-15-99 13:02:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 875 (1997) 889 Scalia, J., dissenting warranties covering the entire product; user-sellers will gen- erally not). The last-402A-seller rule appears to me superior to the initial-user rule adopted by the Court today, but the two are in reality quite similar and will in most cases produce the same result. Each essentially attempts to differentiate be- tween additions made before and after the product has left the market chain of distribution. I doubt, however, whether leaving the market chain of distribution ought to be so mo- mentous an event for the purpose at hand. So long as the plaintiff is a commercial entity (and I understand the rule under consideration to be one applicable only to commercial, as opposed to consumer, transactions, see ante, at 878­879) it seems to me to make no difference whether the purchase was made from a "402A seller" or not. Commercial entities do not typically suffer, at the time they make their purchase, a disparity in bargaining power that makes it impossible for them to obtain warranty protection on the entire product; nor are they unable to insure the product they have pur- chased, including those portions of it added by upstream owners. Our decision in East River suggests that in such circumstances there is inadequate reason to interfere with private ordering by importing tort liability-that is, inade- quate reason to permit the purchaser to recover any tort damages for loss of the product he purchased. See East River, 476 U. S., at 872­873. In recognition of that reality, an impressive line of lower court decisions, applying both federal and state law, has held that the purchaser of a product damaged by a defective com- ponent cannot recover in tort against the manufacturer of the component on the theory that the remainder of the prod- uct is "other property." See, e. g., Pulte Home Corp. v. Os- mose Wood Preserving, Inc., 60 F. 3d 734, 741­742 (CA11 1995) (Florida law); American Eagle Ins. Co. v. United Tech- nologies Corp., 48 F. 3d 142, 144­145 (CA5 1995) (Texas law); 520US3 Unit: $U65 [09-15-99 13:02:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN 890 SARATOGA FISHING CO. v. J. M. MARTINAC & CO. Scalia, J., dissenting Transport Corp. of America, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 30 F. 3d 953, 957 (CA8 1994) (Minnesota law); King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F. 2d 1047, 1051­1053 (CA3 1988) (Pennsylvania law), cert. denied, 488 U. S. 1030 (1989); Shipco 2295, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 825 F. 2d 925, 928­929 (CA5 1987) (federal maritime law), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 1007 (1988). Although the holdings of these cases are not precisely on point (since the plaintiff was the initial purchaser-user of the defective product), the rationale of those decisions is in tension with the Court's holding today, and supports what might be called an "object-of-the-bargain" rule. They rest on the premise that one must look to the product purchased or bargained for by the plaintiff in deter- mining whether additions constitute "other property." See, e. g., King, supra, at 1051 ("In determining whether a prod- uct `injures only itself' for purposes of applying the East River rule . . . [one must] look to the product purchased by the plaintiff"); Shipco 2295, supra, at 928; American Eagle, supra, at 145; Casa Clara Condominium Assn. v. Charley Toppino and Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Fla. 1993) ("The character of a loss determines the appropriate reme- dies, and, to determine the character of a loss, one must look to the product purchased by the plaintiff, not the product sold by the defendant"); see also Fox & Loftus, Riding the Choppy Waters of East River: Economic Loss Doctrine Ten Years Later, 64 Def. Couns. J. 260, 264, n. 29 (1997) (citing numerous other cases and observing that "[t]he trend in de- fining `economic loss' is to focus on what the plaintiff pur- chased rather than what the defendant agreed to provide"). These courts have adopted this purchaser-oriented approach on the belief, which I think correct, that it is in accord with the policy judgments underlying our decision in East River. As the Third Circuit in King explained: "As we read East River, it is the character of the plaintiff's loss that determines the nature of the avail- able remedies. When loss of the benefit of a bargain is 520US3 Unit: $U65 [09-15-99 13:02:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 875 (1997) 891 Scalia, J., dissenting the plaintiff's sole loss, the judgment of the Supreme Court was that the undesirable consequences of afford- ing a tort remedy in addition to a contract-based recov- ery were sufficient to outweigh the limited interest of the plaintiff in having relief beyond that provided by warranty claims. The relevant bargain in this context is that struck by the plaintiff. It is that bargain that determines his or her economic loss and whether he or she has been injured beyond that loss." 855 F. 2d, at 1051. There are undoubtedly other rules that can be-and have been-conceived of. One recent article describes the cur- rent state of the law regarding damage to "other property" on construction projects as follows: "There has been a growing trend in many juris- dictions to interpret `economic loss' broadly to include damage that formerly was considered `other property.' Courts that follow this trend have utilized the follow- ing rationales: "x There is no damage to `other property' where the damage extends only to property within the confines of the bargain. . . . `Other property' does not include dam- age to property if those losses are direct and consequen- tial losses that were within the contemplation of the par- ties and could have been the subject of negotiations between the parties. "x The phrase `other property' does not include the type of property that one would reasonably expect, on a foreseeability test, to be damaged as a direct conse- quence of the failure of the product at issue. "x No `other property' has been damaged, because the allegedly defective product has been incorporated into the structure that has been damaged. "x Losses caused by the inferior quality of the product must be considered `economic' and therefore cannot be 520US3 Unit: $U65 [09-15-99 13:02:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN 892 SARATOGA FISHING CO. v. J. M. MARTINAC & CO. Scalia, J., dissenting considered `property.' " Fox & Loftus, supra, at 265­ 266 (footnotes omitted). And there can of course be combinations of the various rules. For example, one might adopt an "integrated unit" exception to the initial-user rule that the Court announces today. As I have confessed above, I have little confidence in my ability to make the correct policy choice in an area where courts more experienced than we have not yet come to rest. I would have been inclined to let the lower federal courts struggle with this issue somewhat longer, in the hope that there would develop a common-law consensus to which we could refer for our admiralty rule, as we did in East River. Put to a choice, however, I would not select the rule adopted by the Court today. I would adopt the rule proposed by respondents and define the "product" for purposes of East River's economic-loss rule as the object of the purchaser's bargain. That was essentially the approach followed by the Court of Appeals below, and I would accordingly affirm its judgment. I respectfully, and indeed diffidently, dissent. 520US3$66Z 08-04-98 13:40:05 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 893 Syllabus LORDS LANDING VILLAGE CONDOMINIUM COUN- CIL OF UNIT OWNERS v. CONTINENTAL INSURANCE CO. on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 96­1033. Decided June 2, 1997 Petitioner, a condominium owners' association, filed suit in Maryland state court to compel respondent insurer to pay a $1.1 million judgment it had obtained against respondent's insured, the condominium developer, for numerous defects in the complex. Under the insurance policy, only property damage caused by an "accident" was covered. Respondent removed the action to the Federal District Court based on diversity of citizenship. That court granted respondent summary judgment, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that, as a matter of Maryland law, a negligent act does not constitute an "accident." When petitioner sub- sequently learned that Maryland's highest court had recently decided, in Sheets v. Brethren Mutual Ins. Co., 342 Md. 634, 679 A. 2d 540, that a negligent act constitutes an "accident" under a liability insurance pol- icy when the resulting damage took place without the insured's foresight or expectations, it asked the Fourth Circuit to recall or stay its mandate. The court denied the request, finding it "without merit." Held: In these circumstances, it is proper for this Court to grant the cer- tiorari petition, vacate the lower court's judgment, and remand the case (GVR) for further consideration. This order is in keeping with the Court's longstanding practice of vacating a court of appeals' decision based on a state-law construction that appears to contradict a recent decision of the highest state court. Sheets' explicit disapproval of the cases on which the Court of Appeals relied calls into question the cor- rectness of that court's decision, and the ambiguous statement that peti- tioner's request to recall the mandate was "without merit" does not establish that the court actually considered and rejected the Sheets ar- gument. The most likely ground on which the Fourth Circuit rested its denial of petitioner's motion is, as respondent contended, that it lacked authority to recall its mandate. Moreover, this Court has previously issued a GVR order where petitioners notified the Federal Court of Appeals of an intervening State Supreme Court's opinion in a second rehearing petition, which the Court of Appeals denied. See Huddle- ston v. Dwyer, 322 U. S. 232, 235 (per curiam). Certiorari granted; vacated and remanded. 520US3$66J 08-04-98 13:40:05 PAGES OPINPGT 894 LORDS LANDING VILLAGE CONDOMINIUM COUNCIL OF UNIT OWNERS v. CONTINENTAL INS. CO. Per Curiam Per Curiam. In this diversity case, the holding of the federal appellate court below has been called into question by a recent deci- sion of the highest state court in Maryland. We must decide whether it is appropriate, in these circumstances, for this Court to grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the judg- ment of the lower court, and remand the case (GVR) for further consideration. Petitioner, an association of condominium owners, sued respondent in Maryland state court, seeking to compel re- spondent to pay a $1.1 million judgment it had obtained against respondent's insured, the developer of its condomin- ium complex. In a previous action, a jury had held the developer liable for numerous defects in the complex, find- ing that the developer had made misrepresentations and breached various warranty obligations. Respondent had issued a general liability insurance policy covering the de- veloper. The policy provided that respondent would pay " `those sums that [the developer] becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of . . . "property damage" to which this insurance applies.' " App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a. Under the policy, "property damage" was covered only if it was caused by an "accident." Respondent removed the action to the United States Dis- trict Court for the District of Maryland, based on the parties' diversity of citizenship. The District Court granted sum- mary judgment in favor of respondent. On August 6, 1996, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that, as a matter of Maryland law, an "accident" does not include the "natural and ordinary conse- quences of a negligent act." Id., at 4a (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing IA Construction Corp. v. T&T Sur- veying, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1213, 1215 (Md. 1993) (quoting Ed. Winkler & Son, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 51 Md. App. 190, 194­195, 441 A. 2d 1129, 1132 (1982))). Because the damages awarded in the underlying action were for breach 520US3$66J 08-04-98 13:40:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 893 (1997) 895 Per Curiam of warranties and misrepresentations relating to poor work- manship, the Court of Appeals concluded that the damages were not caused by an "accident" within the meaning of re- spondent's insurance policy. The Court of Appeals denied a petition for rehearing on September 3, 1996, and issued the mandate on September 11, 1996. On September 17, 1996, petitioner's counsel learned of Sheets v. Brethren Mutual Ins. Co., 342 Md. 634, 679 A. 2d 540, a recent decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals- the highest court in Maryland. (Although Sheets was handed down on July 26, 1996, 11 days before the Court of Appeals' decision, the parties were not aware of the decision until after the mandate was issued, and therefore had not brought the case to the attention of the Court of Appeals. Pet. for Cert. 11.) Sheets cast doubt on the soundness of the Court of Appeals' decision because it held that "an act of negligence constitutes an `accident' under a liability insur- ance policy when the resulting damage was `an event that takes place without [the insured's] foresight or expectation.' " 342 Md., at 652, 679 A. 2d, at 548 (citation and internal quota- tion marks omitted). The Maryland Court of Appeals also expressly disapproved Ed. Winkler & Son, supra, at 1132, and IA Construction Corp., supra, at 1215, two decisions on which the Court of Appeals had primarily relied. 342 Md., at 654­655, and n. 4, 679 A. 2d, at 549­550, and 550, n. 4. On September 20, 1996, petitioner filed a motion asking the Court of Appeals to recall or stay its mandate based on this development in Maryland law. In its response, respond- ent argued in part that the Court of Appeals lacked author- ity to recall an already issued mandate. In a brief order, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's request, ruling only that "the said petition and motions are without merit." App. to Pet. for Cert. 11a. Petitioner now asks us to grant certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Sheets. Pet. for Cert. 13­14. 520US3$66J 08-04-98 13:40:05 PAGES OPINPGT 896 LORDS LANDING VILLAGE CONDOMINIUM COUNCIL OF UNIT OWNERS v. CONTINENTAL INS. CO. Per Curiam This case fits within the category of cases in which we have held it is proper to issue a GVR order. "Where inter- vening developments, or recent developments that we have reason to believe the court below did not fully consider, re- veal a reasonable probability that the decision below rests upon a premise that the lower court would reject if given the opportunity for further consideration, and where it ap- pears that such a redetermination may determine the ulti- mate outcome of the litigation, a GVR order is . . . potentially appropriate." Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U. S. 163, 167 (1996) (per curiam). The situation here is virtually identical to that in Thomas v. American Home Products, Inc., 519 U. S. 913 (1996), a state-law case from earlier in this Term. There, after the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled against petitioners, the Georgia Supreme Court over- ruled the holding that was the basis for the federal appeals court's holding. Id., at 914 (Scalia, J., concurring). The appellate court nevertheless denied a petition for rehearing, and we GVR'd. As Justice Scalia wrote in concurrence, our order was in keeping with our "longstanding practice" of vacating a court of appeals' decision based on a construc- tion of state law that appears to contradict a recent decision of the highest state court. Id., at 915. "[A] judgment of a federal court ruled by state law and correctly applying that law as authoritatively declared by the state courts when the judgment was rendered, must be reversed on appellate re- view if in the meantime the state courts have disapproved of their former rulings and adopted different ones." Hud- dleston v. Dwyer, 322 U. S. 232, 236 (1944) (per curiam). Given Sheets' explicit disapproval of the cases on which the Court of Appeals based its decision, there is reason to question the correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision. It is true that petitioner brought Sheets to the attention of the Court of Appeals in a motion to stay or recall its mandate and that the Court of Appeals denied this motion. But the Court of Appeals' ambiguous statement that petitioner's re- 520US3$66J 08-04-98 13:40:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 893 (1997) 897 Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting quest was "without merit" does not establish that it actually considered and rejected petitioner's Sheets argument. In opposing petitioner's motion, respondent argued that a court of appeals lacks authority to recall its mandate, and the Court of Appeals may have rested its denial of petitioner's motion on this procedural ground. Respondent does not argue otherwise. Indeed, the procedural ground is by far the most likely, given Sheets' explicit repudiation of the prec- edent on which the Court of Appeals' original judgment hinged. Moreover, we have at least once before issued a GVR order where petitioners notified the Federal Court of Appeals of an intervening State Supreme Court's opinion in a second petition for rehearing, which the Court of Appeals denied. See Huddleston, supra, at 235. In these circumstances, we now grant certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration. Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Breyer joins, dissenting. In Thomas v. American Home Products, Inc., 519 U. S. 913 (1996), the Court granted, vacated, and remanded a de- cision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for reconsideration in the light of a decision of the Georgia Supreme Court that was handed down after the Court of Appeals had denied a petition for rehearing. The lower court there had had no opportunity to consider the impact of the new state-law decision. Here, by contrast, Sheets v. Brethren Mutual Ins. Co., 342 Md. 634, 679 A. 2d 540 (1996), was expressly considered by the court below. Although Sheets was not brought to the attention of the Fourth Circuit until after it had rendered its decision and denied rehearing, petitioner raised it nonethe- less before that court in a motion to recall or stay the man- date. Petitioner's motion did not fall on deaf ears; indeed, the Fourth Circuit went to the unusual lengths of requesting 520US3$66H 08-04-98 13:40:05 PAGES OPINPGT 898 LORDS LANDING VILLAGE CONDOMINIUM COUNCIL OF UNIT OWNERS v. CONTINENTAL INS. CO. Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting a response to the motion and then, after the response was received, issuing a written order rejecting the claim. The only question discussed in that order is whether "Sheets should have required a different disposition of this case than the [original] disposition." App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a. And the court resolved that question, concluding "[w]e are of [the] opinion the said petition and motions are without merit." * Id., at 11a. If this Court has, without any briefs on the merits, con- cluded that the Court of Appeals' refusal to alter its opinion in the light of Sheets was wrong, it should either set the case for argument or summarily reverse. True, this would require the investment of still more time and effort in a case that is in the federal courts only by reason of diversity of citizenship, see Thomas, supra, at 917 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting), but it would have the virtue of explicitly telling the Court of Appeals how to dispose of the case. The Court's decision to grant, vacate, and remand in the light of Sheets, on the contrary, is muddled and cryptic. Surely the judges of the Court of Appeals are, in fairness, entitled to some clearer guidance from this Court than what they are now given. *Although it is possible to construe this statement as being based on the procedural impropriety of raising such an issue on a motion to recall the mandate, such a construction is nowhere suggested in the order, nor is it the natural implication of the language ("without merit") used by the court below. I see no reason for us not to take the Fourth Circuit's order at face value. 520US3 Unit: $U67 [09-11-99 18:57:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 899 Syllabus BRACY v. GRAMLEY, WARDEN certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit No. 96­6133. Argued April 14, 1997-Decided June 9, 1997 Petitioner was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death before then-Judge Thomas J. Maloney, an Illinois judge who was later convicted on federal charges of taking bribes from criminal defendants. In this federal ha- beas petition, petitioner claims that Maloney had an interest in his con- viction to deflect suspicion that the judge was taking bribes in other murder cases during and around the time of petitioner's trial, and that this interest violated the fair-trial guarantee of the Due Process Clause. The District Court denied both the claim and a supplemental discovery motion. In affirming, the Seventh Circuit held, inter alia, that peti- tioner had not shown "good cause" for discovery to prove his claim, as required by Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. Held: Petitioner has made a sufficient factual showing, under Habeas Cor- pus Rule 6(a), to establish "good cause" for discovery on his claim of actual judicial bias in his case. Pp. 904­910. (a) Before addressing whether petitioner is entitled to discovery, his claim's essential elements must be identified. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U. S. 456, 468. Due process requires a fair trial before a judge without actual bias against the defendant or an interest in the outcome of his particular case. Petitioner claims that Maloney's accept- ance of bribes from criminal defendants not only rendered him biased against the State in those cases, but also induced a compensatory bias against defendants who did not bribe him, since he did not want to appear "soft" on criminal defendants. There is no question that, if proved, such compensatory, camouflaging bias in petitioner's own case would violate due process. Pp. 904­905. (b) Petitioner has shown good cause for appropriate discovery to prove his claim. The usual presumption that public officials have prop- erly discharged their official duties has been soundly rebutted here. Maloney's public trial and conviction show that he was thoroughly cor- rupt. A Government proffer in that case details his corruption as both a trial attorney and a judge. Additional evidence supports the claim that Maloney was biased in petitioner's own case. His trial attorney was a former associate of Maloney's in a law practice that was familiar and comfortable with corruption, who announced that he was ready for trial just a few weeks after his appointment and requested no additional 520US3 Unit: $U67 [09-11-99 18:57:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN 900 BRACY v. GRAMLEY Opinion of the Court time before trial to prepare for the penalty phase of the case. Peti- tioner alleges that Maloney appointed the attorney with the understand- ing that he would not object to, or interfere with, a prompt trial, so that petitioner's case could camouflage bribe negotiations being conducted in another murder case. The Government's proffer confirms that petition- er's murder trial was sandwiched tightly between other murder trials that Maloney fixed. Although petitioner may be unable to obtain evi- dence sufficient to support a finding of actual judicial bias in his trial, he has made a sufficient showing to establish "good cause" for discovery. Although, given the facts of this particular case, it would be an abuse of discretion not to permit any discovery, Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a) pro- vides that the scope and extent of discovery is a matter confided to the District Court's discretion. Pp. 906­909. 81 F. 3d 684, reversed and remanded. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Gilbert H. Levy, by appointment of the Court, 519 U. S. 1106, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Martin S. Carlson. Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General of Illinois, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were James E. Ryan, Attorney General, and Arleen C. Anderson and Steven J. Zick, Assistant Attorneys General.* Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner William Bracy was tried, convicted, and sen- tenced to death before then-Judge Thomas J. Maloney for his *Thomas F. Geraghty filed a brief for Concerned Illinois Lawyers and Law Professors as amicus curiae urging reversal. A brief of amicus curiae urging affirmance was filed for the State of California et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. DeNicola, Super- vising Deputy Attorney General, and David F. Glassman, Deputy Attor- ney General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdic- tions as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, Grant Woods of Arizona, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, and W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma. 520US3 Unit: $U67 [09-11-99 18:57:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 899 (1997) 901 Opinion of the Court role in an execution-style triple murder.1 Maloney was later convicted of taking bribes from defendants in criminal cases. Although he was not bribed in this case, he "fixed" other murder cases during and around the time of petitioner's trial. Petitioner contends that Maloney therefore had an interest in a conviction here to deflect suspicion that he was taking bribes in other cases, and that this interest violated the fair- trial guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. We hold that petitioner has made a sufficient fac- tual showing to establish "good cause," as required by Ha- beas Corpus Rule 6(a), for discovery on his claim of actual judicial bias in his case. Maloney was one of many dishonest judges exposed and convicted through "Operation Greylord," a labyrinthine fed- eral investigation of judicial corruption in Chicago. See United States v. Maloney, 71 F. 3d 645 (CA7 1995), cert. denied, 519 U. S. 927 (1996); see generally J. Tuohy & R. Warden, Greylord: Justice, Chicago Style (1989). Maloney served as a judge from 1977 until he retired in 1990, and it appears he has the dubious distinction of being the only Illi- nois judge ever convicted of fixing a murder case.2 Before he was appointed to the bench, Maloney was a criminal de- fense attorney with close ties to organized crime who often 1 People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N. E. 2d 267 (Collins I) (affirming convictions and death sentences), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 935 (1985); People v. Collins, 153 Ill. 2d 130, 606 N. E. 2d 1137 (1992) (Collins II) (affirming denial of petition for postconviction relief), cert. denied, 508 U. S. 915 (1993). Bracy is also under a death sentence for two murders in Arizona. State v. Bracy, 145 Ariz. 520, 703 P. 2d 464 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 1110 (1986); Bracy v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 1031 (1990) (denying petition for writ of certiorari to Arizona Supreme Court to review denial of Bracy's petition for review of state court's denial of petition for postconviction relief); Bracy v. Arizona, 514 U. S. 1130 (1995) (same). 2 Although apparently the first in Illinois, Maloney is not, unfortunately, the first American judge to be convicted of taking bribes in murder cases. See, e. g., Ohio v. McGettrick, 40 Ohio App. 3d 25, 531 N. E. 2d 755 (1988); In re Brennan, 65 N. Y. 2d 564, 483 N. E. 2d 484 (1985). 520US3 Unit: $U67 [09-11-99 18:57:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN 902 BRACY v. GRAMLEY Opinion of the Court paid off judges in criminal cases. App. 54­66; 81 F. 3d 684, 696 (CA7 1996) (Rovner, J., dissenting) ("[B]y the time Malo- ney ascended to the bench in 1977, he was well groomed in the art of judicial corruption"). Once a judge, Maloney ex- ploited many of the relationships and connections he had de- veloped while bribing judges to solicit bribes for himself. For example, Lucius Robinson, a bailiff through whom Malo- ney had bribed judges while in practice, and Robert McGee, one of Maloney's former associates, both served as "bag men," or intermediaries, between Maloney and lawyers look- ing for a fix. Two such lawyers, Robert J. Cooley and Wil- liam A. Swano, were key witnesses against Maloney at his trial. Maloney, supra, at 650­652. Maloney was convicted in Federal District Court of con- spiracy, racketeering, extortion, and obstructing justice in April 1993. Four months later, petitioner filed this habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, claiming, among other things, that he was denied a fair trial because "in order to cover up the fact that [Maloney] accepted bribes from defendants in some cases, [he] was prosecution oriented in other cases." United States ex rel. Collins v. Welborn, 868 F. Supp. 950, 990 (ND Ill. 1994). Petitioner also sought discovery in support of this claim. Specifically, he requested (1) the sealed tran- script of Maloney's trial; (2) reasonable access to the prosecu- tion's materials in Maloney's case; (3) the opportunity to de- pose persons associated with Maloney; and (4) a chance to search Maloney's rulings for a pattern of pro-prosecution bias.3 The District Court rejected petitioner's fair-trial claim and denied his supplemental motion for discovery, con- cluding that "[petitioner's] allegations contain insufficient 3 The Government apparently conducted such research in the Maloney case. See Proffer of the Government's Evidence in Aggravation, App. 67 ("[A] review of computer printouts listing all of [one attorney's] felony cases before Judge Maloney reveals that [the attorney] obtained not guilty results in all six of the cases he had before Judge Maloney"). 520US3 Unit: $U67 [09-11-99 18:57:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 899 (1997) 903 Opinion of the Court specificity or good cause to justify further discovery." Id., at 991. The Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote. The court conceded the "appearance of impropriety" in petition- er's case but reasoned that this appearance did not require a new trial because it "provide[d] only a weak basis for suppos- ing the original trial an unreliable test of the issues pre- sented for decision in it." 81 F. 3d, at 688­689. Next, the court agreed that petitioner's theory-that Maloney's cor- ruption "permeate[d] his judicial conduct"-was "plausible," id., at 689, but found it not "sufficiently compelling [an] em- pirical proposition" to justify presuming actual judicial bias in petitioner's case, id., at 690. Finally, the court held that petitioner had not shown "good cause" for discovery to prove his claim, as required by 28 U. S. C. § 2254 Rule 6(a). 81 F. 3d, at 690. This was because, in the court's view, even if petitioner were to uncover evidence that Maloney sometimes came down hard on defendants who did not bribe him, "it would not show that he followed the practice in this case." Id., at 691 (emphasis added). In any event, the court added, because petitioner had failed to uncover any evidence of ac- tual bias without discovery, "the probability is slight that a program of depositions aimed at crooks and their accomplices . . . will yield such evidence." Ibid.4 We granted certiorari to address whether, on the basis of the showing made in this particular case, petitioner should have been granted discov- ery under Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a) to support his judicial- bias claim. 519 U. S. 1074 (1997). We now reverse. 4 The dissenting judge insisted that petitioner had shown "good cause" for discovery to support his judicial-bias claim, 81 F. 3d, at 696­699 (opin- ion of Rovner, J.), and went on to state that, in her view, petitioner was entitled to relief whether or not he could prove that Maloney's corruption had any impact on his trial, id., at 699­703. The latter conclusion, of course, would render irrelevant the discovery-related question presented in this case. 520US3 Unit: $U67 [09-11-99 18:57:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN 904 BRACY v. GRAMLEY Opinion of the Court A habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in fed- eral court, is not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course. Thus, in Harris v. Nelson, 394 U. S. 286, 295 (1969), we concluded that the "broad discovery provisions" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not apply in habeas proceedings. We held, however, that the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651, gave federal courts the power to "fashion ap- propriate modes of procedure," 394 U. S., at 299, including discovery, to dispose of habeas petitions "as law and justice require," id., at 300. We then recommended that "the rule- making machinery . . . be invoked to formulate rules of prac- tice with respect to federal habeas corpus . . . proceedings." Id., at 300, n. 7. Accordingly, in 1976, we promulgated and Congress adopted the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. Of particular relevance to this case is Rule 6(a), which provides: "A party shall be entitled to invoke the processes of dis- covery available under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce- dure if, and to the extent that, the judge in the exercise of his discretion and for good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not otherwise." Before addressing whether petitioner is entitled to discov- ery under this Rule to support his judicial-bias claim, we must first identify the "essential elements" of that claim. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U. S. 456, 468 (1996). Of course, most questions concerning a judge's qualifications to hear a case are not constitutional ones, because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform standard. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U. S. 813, 828 (1986). Instead, these ques- tions are, in most cases, answered by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar. See, e. g., id., at 820­821; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 523 (1927); 28 U. S. C. §§ 144, 455; ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C(1)(a) (1980). But the floor established by the Due Proc- ess Clause clearly requires a "fair trial in a fair tribunal," 520US3 Unit: $U67 [09-11-99 18:57:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 899 (1997) 905 Opinion of the Court Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 46 (1975), before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case. See, e. g., Aetna, supra, at 821­822; Tumey, supra, at 523. The facts of this case are, happily, not the stuff of typical judicial-disqualification disputes. A judge who accepts bribes from a criminal defendant to fix that defendant's case is "biased" in the most basic sense of that word, but his bias is directed against the State, not the defendant. Petitioner contends, however, that Maloney's taking of bribes from some criminal defendants not only rendered him biased against the State in those cases, but also induced a sort of compensatory bias against defendants who did not bribe Maloney. Maloney was biased in this latter, compensatory sense, petitioner argues, to avoid being seen as uniformly and suspiciously "soft" on criminal defendants. The Court of Appeals, in its opinion, pointed out that this theory is quite speculative; after all, it might be equally likely that a judge who was "on the take" in some criminal cases would be care- ful to at least appear to favor all criminal defendants, so as to avoid apparently wild and unexplainable swings in deci- sions and judicial philosophy. 81 F. 3d, at 689­690.5 In any event, difficulties of proof aside, there is no question that, if it could be proved, such compensatory, camouflaging bias on Maloney's part in petitioner's own case would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We now turn to the question whether petitioner has shown "good 5 At Maloney's trial, however, attorney William Swano provided testi- mony that lends some support to petitioner's compensatory-bias theory. See 81 F. 3d, at 697 (Rovner, J., dissenting). According to Swano, Maloney retaliated against one of Swano's clients in one of the rare cases when Swano failed to offer Maloney a bribe and, in bribe negotiations in a later case, Maloney's bag man Robert McGee admitted as much. Swano testi- fied that he learned that in order " `to practice in front of Judge Maloney . . . we had to pay.' " Ibid. 520US3 Unit: $U67 [09-11-99 18:57:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN 906 BRACY v. GRAMLEY Opinion of the Court cause" for appropriate discovery to prove his judicial-bias claim. In the District Court, petitioner contended that he was "deprived of his right to a fair trial" because "[t]here is cause to believe that Judge Maloney's discretionary rulings in this case may have been influenced by a desire on his part to allay suspicion of his pattern of corruption and dishonesty." App. 5.6 In support, he submitted a copy of Maloney's 1991 indictment, App. 16­35, and a newspaper article describing testimony from Maloney's trial, in which attorney William Swano described an additional, uncharged incident where he bribed Maloney to fix a murder case. App. 12, n. 1, 36­38. In a supplemental motion for discovery, petitioner's co- defendant Roger Collins alleged that "[a] Government wit- ness in the Maloney case has advised . . . that co-defendant Bracy's trial attorney was a former partner of Thomas Malo- ney." App. 51. Collins attached to that motion a copy of the United States' proffer of evidence in aggravation in Ma- loney's case, which describes in considerable detail Maloney's corruption both before and after he became a judge. See App. 54 ("Although [it is] difficult to imagine, Thomas Malo- ney's life of corruption was considerably more expansive than proved at trial"). The United States' proffer asserts, for example, that Maloney fixed serious felony cases regu- larly while a practicing criminal defense attorney; 7 that, as a judge, he continued to corrupt justice through the same 6 We express no opinion on the correctness of the various discretionary rulings cited by petitioner as examples of Maloney's bias. See Brief for Petitioner 5­6. We note, however, that many of these rulings have been twice upheld, and that petitioner's convictions and sentence have been twice affirmed, by the Illinois Supreme Court. See n. 1, supra. 7 The Government introduced evidence that Maloney regularly bribed Judge Maurice Pompey and Cook County Deputy Sheriff Lucius Robinson (who would later serve as Maloney's "bag man"); that on numerous occa- sions, using his organized-crime connections, Maloney fixed cases for his client Michael Bertucci; and that Maloney helped orchestrate the fix in the murder case of underworld hit man Harry Aleman. App. 54­66. 520US3 Unit: $U67 [09-11-99 18:57:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 899 (1997) 907 Opinion of the Court political relationships and organized-crime connections he had exploited as a lawyer; 8 and that at least one attorney from Maloney's former law firm, Robert McGee, was actively involved in assisting Maloney's corruption, both before and after he became a judge, and also bribed Maloney himself, App. 55, 68­72. In addition, the proffer confirms that peti- tioner's murder trial was sandwiched tightly between other murder trials that Maloney fixed.9 As just noted above, petitioner's attorney at trial was a former associate of Maloney's, App. 51, and Maloney ap- pointed him to defend this case in June 1981. The lawyer announced that he was ready for trial just a few weeks later. He did not request additional time to prepare penalty-phase evidence in this death penalty case even when the State an- 8 For example, Lucius Robinson and Robert McGee, who were involved in Maloney's corruption as a lawyer, later facilitated his bribe taking when he became a judge. United States v. Maloney, 71 F. 3d 645, 650­652 (CA7 1995), cert. denied, 519 U. S. 927 (1996); App. 22­24; 54­55. As the Gov- ernment alleged in its proffer: "Maloney was closely tied to the [sic] La Cosa Nostra prior to his appointment to the bench and . . . major organized crime figures looked forward to [his] appointment as an opportunity to have a `good friend' on the bench . . . [and] after his elevation to the bench, Maloney continued his close First Ward/organized crime connections, fix- ing the results of several murder cases of import to organized crime." App. 54­55. 9 Petitioner was tried in July 1981. William Swano testified at Malo- ney's trial that, in October 1980, he bribed Maloney in the murder case of Swano's client, Wilfredo Rosario. Maloney excluded Rosario's confession and, in May 1981, acquitted Rosario after a bench trial. Maloney, supra, at 650; App. 12, n. 1, 53, n. 1. Also in May 1981, Maloney took a bribe to throw the murder case of Lenny Chow, a hit man for a Chinatown crime organization. At a bench trial that August, Maloney admitted a dying declaration, but found it unreliable, and acquitted Chow. Maloney, supra, at 650; App. 20­22, 27. In 1982, Maloney and Swano fixed another murder case in which one Owen Jones was charged with beating a man to death with a lead pipe. Maloney took $4,000­$5,000 from Jones' mother, using his former associate Robert McGee as a "bag man," to acquit Jones on the felony-murder charge, and to convict him of voluntary manslaughter only. Maloney, supra, at 651; App. 20, 22, 28. 520US3 Unit: $U67 [09-11-99 18:57:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN 908 BRACY v. GRAMLEY Opinion of the Court nounced at the outset that, if petitioner were convicted, it would introduce petitioner's then-pending Arizona murder charges as evidence in aggravation. Tr. of Oral Arg. 43.10 At oral argument before this Court, counsel for petitioner suggested, given that at least one of Maloney's former law associates-Robert McGee-was corrupt and involved in bribery, see supra, at 907, that petitioner's trial lawyer might have been appointed with the understanding that he would not object to, or interfere with, a prompt trial, so that petitioner's case could be tried before, and camouflage the bribe negotiations in, the Chow murder case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17­18, 43­44.11 This is, of course, only a theory at this point; it is not supported by any solid evidence of petition- er's trial lawyer's participation in any such plan. It is true, however, that McGee was corrupt and that petitioner's trial coincided with bribe negotiations in the Chow case and closely followed the Rosario murder case, which was also fixed. See n. 9, supra. We conclude that petitioner has shown "good cause" for discovery under Rule 6(a). In Harris, we stated that "where specific allegations before the court show reason to 10 Petitioner's lawyer did request a continuance after petitioner was con- victed, on July 29, 1981, and again on July 30. Maloney denied these re- quests, however, and the sentencing hearing was conducted the next day. See People v. Collins, 106 Ill., at 280­281, 478 N. E. 2d, at 286; 81 F. 3d, at 694­695 ("Defense lawyers know . . . [that] if they wish to gather evi- dence of mitigating circumstances they must do so before the trial ends, because they will have no time to do so after the trial ends. But in this case the defendants' lawyers dropped the ball"); United States ex rel. Col- lins v. Welborn, 868 F. Supp. 950, 986­987 (ND Ill. 1994) (noting that "no witnesses were presented by [petitioner or his codefendant]"). 11 Petitioner's counsel admitted that he "ha[d] not made this exact same argument on a previous occasion, but it is supported by the record." Tr. of Oral Arg. 43. Cf. Reply Brief for Petitioner 6 ("[I]t is impossible to say with confidence that Judge Maloney did not deliberately select a less experienced lawyer to represent Petitioner due to a corrupt motive, such as a desire to insure a guilty verdict and a death sentence in a high pro- file case"). 520US3 Unit: $U67 [09-11-99 18:57:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 899 (1997) 909 Opinion of the Court believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully devel- oped, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry." 394 U. S., at 300. Habeas Corpus Rule 6 is meant to be "consistent" with Harris. Advisory Committee's Note on Habeas Corpus Rule 6, 28 U. S. C., p. 479. Ordinarily, we presume that pub- lic officials have " `properly discharged their official duties.' " Armstrong, 517 U. S., at 464 (quoting United States v. Chem- ical Foundation, Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 14­15 (1926)). Were it possible to indulge this presumption here, we might well agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner's submission and his compensatory-bias theory are too speculative to war- rant discovery. But, unfortunately, the presumption has been soundly rebutted: Maloney was shown to be thoroughly steeped in corruption through his public trial and conviction. We emphasize, though, that petitioner supports his discovery request by pointing not only to Maloney's conviction for bribe taking in other cases, but also to additional evidence, discussed above, that lends support to his claim that Maloney was actually biased in petitioner's own case. That is, he presents "specific allegations" that his trial attorney, a for- mer associate of Maloney's in a law practice that was familiar and comfortable with corruption, may have agreed to take this capital case to trial quickly so that petitioner's convic- tion would deflect any suspicion the rigged Rosario and Chow cases might attract. It may well be, as the Court of Appeals predicted, that petitioner will be unable to obtain evidence sufficient to support a finding of actual judicial bias in the trial of his case, but we hold that he has made a suffi- cient showing, as required by Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a), to establish "good cause" for discovery. Although, given the facts of this particular case, it would be an abuse of discre- tion not to permit any discovery, Rule 6(a) makes it clear that the scope and extent of such discovery is a matter confided to the discretion of the District Court. 520US3 Unit: $U67 [09-11-99 18:57:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN 910 BRACY v. GRAMLEY Opinion of the Court Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is re- versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 520us3$68Z 08-19-98 15:30:26 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 911 Syllabus JOHNSON et al. v. FANKELL certiorari to the supreme court of idaho No. 96­292. Argued February 26, 1997-Decided June 9, 1997 Respondent filed this 42 U. S. C. § 1983 damages action in Idaho state court, alleging that the termination of her state employment by peti- tioner officials deprived her of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court denied petitioners' mo- tion to dismiss, which asserted that they were entitled to qualified im- munity. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed their appeal from that ruling, explaining that the denial was neither an appealable final order under Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1) nor appealable as a matter of fed- eral right under § 1983. Held: Defendants in a state-court § 1983 action do not have a federal right to an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity. Pp. 914­923. (a) State officials performing discretionary functions have a "qualified immunity" defense that, in appropriate circumstances, shields them both from liability for damages under § 1983 and from the burdens of trial. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818. A federal district court order rejecting such a defense on the ground that the defendant's actions-if proved-would have violated clearly established law may be appealed immediately as a "final decision" under the general federal appellate jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1291. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 524­530. Relying on respondent's federal statutory claim and their own federal defense, petitioners submit that the Idaho courts must pro- tect their right to avoid the burdens of trial by allowing the same inter- locutory appeal that would be available in a federal court. Pp. 914­916. (b) This Court rejects petitioners' argument that when the Idaho courts construe their own Rule 11(a)(1), they must accept the federal definition of a "final decision" in cases brought under § 1983. Even if the Idaho Rule and § 1291 contained identical language-and they do not-the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of the Rule would be binding on federal courts, which have no authority to place a different construction upon it. See, e. g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 767. Idaho could voluntarily place the same construction on the Rule as the Mitchell Court placed on § 1291, but this Court cannot command that choice. Pp. 916­918. (c) Also unpersuasive is petitioners' contention that Rule 11(a)(1) is pre-empted by § 1983 to the extent that it does not allow an interlocu- 520us3$68Z 08-19-98 15:30:26 PAGES OPINPGT 912 JOHNSON v. FANKELL Syllabus tory appeal. Petitioners' arguments are not strong enough to overcome two considerable hurdles. First, the normal presumption against pre- emption is buttressed here by the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal rested squarely on a neutral state rule for admin- istering state courts. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U. S. 356, 372. Second, be- cause the qualified immunity defense's ultimate purpose is to protect the State and its officials from overenforcement of federal rights, Rule 11(a)(1)'s application in this context is less an interference with federal interests, as petitioners claim, than a judgment about how best to bal- ance competing state interests. In arguing that pre-emption is neces- sary to avoid different "outcomes" in § 1983 litigation based solely on whether the claim is asserted in state or federal court, petitioners mis- place their reliance on Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S. 131, 138. "[O]ut- com[e]," as used there, referred to the ultimate disposition of the case, whereas the postponement of the appeal until after final judgment will not affect the ultimate outcome of this case if petitioners' qualified im- munity claim is meritorious. Their argument that Rule 11(a)(1) does not adequately protect their right to prevail on the immunity question in advance of trial also fails, given the precise source and scope of the federal right at issue. In contrast to the right to have the trial court rule on the immunity defense's merits, which presumably has its source in § 1983 and is fully protected by Idaho, the right to immediate ap- pellate review of such a ruling in a federal case has its source in § 1291, not § 1983, see Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S. 304, 317, and is a federal procedural right that simply does not apply in a nonfederal forum. Pp. 918­923. Affirmed. Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Michael S. Gilmore, Deputy Attorney General of Idaho, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, David G. High, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Margaret R. Hughes, Deputy Attorney General. W. B. Latta, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Eric Schnapper.* *A brief of amici curiae was filed for the Commonwealth of Kentucky et al. by A. B. Chandler III, Attorney General of Kentucky, Bill Pettus, Assistant Attorney General, Scott White, Assistant Deputy Attorney Gen- eral, and Brent Irvin, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys 520us3$68I 08-19-98 15:30:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 911 (1997) 913 Opinion of the Court Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether defendants in an action brought under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, in state court have a federal right to an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity. We hold that they do not. I Petitioners are officials of the Idaho Liquor Dispensary. Respondent, a former liquor store clerk, brought this action for damages under § 1983 in the District Court for the County of Bonner, Idaho. She alleged that petitioners de- prived her of property without due process of law in viola- tion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu- tion when they terminated her employment. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that they were entitled to qualified immunity. They contended that, at the time of respondent's dismissal, they reasonably believed that she was a probationary employee who had no property inter- est in her job. Accordingly, petitioners argued, her termina- tion did not violate clearly established law. The trial court General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Tom Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Dan Morales of Texas, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Julio A. Brady of the Virgin Islands, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, and James E. Doyle of Wisconsin. 520us3$68I 08-19-98 15:30:26 PAGES OPINPGT 914 JOHNSON v. FANKELL Opinion of the Court denied the motion,1 and petitioners filed a timely notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho. The State Supreme Court entered an order dismissing the appeal. The court explained that an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not appealable under Idaho Appel- late Rule 11(a)(1) "for the reason it is not from a final order or Judgment." App. 67. It also rejected petitioners' argu- ments that the order was appealable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U. S. 299 (1996). Petitioners sought rehearing, again arguing that the order was final within the meaning of the Idaho Appellate Rule, and, in the alternative, that they had a right to appeal as a matter of federal law. The court denied rehearing and dismissed the appeal. Petitioners then filed a petition in this Court seeking either a writ of certiorari or a writ of mandamus. They pointed out that some state courts, unlike the Idaho Supreme Court, allow interlocutory appeals of orders denying quali- fied immunity on the theory that such review is necessary to protect a substantial federal right, see McLin v. Trimble, 795 P. 2d 1035, 1037­1038 (Okla. 1990); Lakewood v. Brace, 919 P. 2d 231, 238­240 (Colo. 1996). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 519 U. S. 947 (1996), and now affirm. II We have recognized a qualified immunity defense for both federal officials sued under the implied cause of action as- serted in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), and state officials sued under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. In both situations, "officials performing discretion- ary function[s] generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly es- tablished statutory or constitutional rights of which a rea- 1 Because affidavits had been filed in support of the motion, the court treated it as a motion for summary judgment. 520us3$68I 08-19-98 15:30:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 911 (1997) 915 Opinion of the Court sonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982). This "qualified immunity" defense is valuable to officials asserting it for two reasons. First, if it is found applicable at any stage of the proceedings, it determines the outcome of the litigation by shielding the official from damages liability. Second, when the complaint fails to allege a violation of clearly established law or when discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue whether the de- fendant committed such a violation, it provides the defendant with an immunity from the burdens of trial as well as a de- fense to liability.2 Indeed, one reason for adopting the ob- jective test announced in Harlow was to "permit the resolu- tion of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment." Ibid. Consistent with that purpose, we held in Mitchell v. For- syth, 472 U. S. 511, 524­530 (1985), that a Federal District Court order rejecting a qualified immunity defense on the ground that the defendant's actions-if proved-would have violated clearly established law may be appealed immedi- ately as a "final decision" within the meaning of the general federal appellate jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1291.3 If this action had been brought in a federal court, therefore, petitioners would have had a right to take an appeal from the trial court's order denying their motion for summary judgment. Relying on the facts (a) that respondent has asserted a federal claim under a federal statute, and (b) that they are 2 Of course, when a case can be dismissed on the pleadings or in an early pretrial stage, qualified immunity also provides officials with the valuable protection from "the burdens of broad-reaching discovery," Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982). 3 While Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511 (1985), involved a Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), action against a federal official, we have also construed § 1291 to authorize similar ap- peals in actions brought against state officials under § 1983. See, e. g., Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S. 304 (1995). 520us3$68I 08-19-98 15:30:26 PAGES OPINPGT 916 JOHNSON v. FANKELL Opinion of the Court asserting a defense provided by federal law, petitioners sub- mit that the Idaho courts must protect their right to avoid the burdens of trial by allowing the same interlocutory ap- peal that would be available in a federal court. They sup- port this submission with two different arguments: First, that when the Idaho courts construe their own rules allowing appeals from final judgments, they must accept the federal definition of finality in cases brought under § 1983; and second, that if those rules do not authorize the appeal, they are pre-empted by federal law. We find neither argument persuasive. III We can easily dispense with petitioners' first contention that Idaho must follow the federal construction of a "final decision." Even if the Idaho and federal statutes contained identical language-and they do not 4-the interpretation of the Idaho statute by the Idaho Supreme Court would be binding on federal courts. Neither this Court nor any other federal tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute different from the one rendered by the high- est court of the State. See, e. g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 767 (1982); Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis., 447 U. S. 207, 226, n. 9 (1980); Commissioner v. Es- tate of Bosch, 387 U. S. 456, 465 (1967). This proposition, fundamental to our system of federalism, is applicable to procedural as well as substantive rules. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470, 477 (1973). The definition of the term "final decision" that we adopted in Mitchell was an application of the "collateral order" doc- trine first recognized in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan 4 "Final decision" is the operative term of § 1291, whereas "[j]udgments, orders and decrees which are final" is the language of Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1). 520us3$68I 08-19-98 15:30:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 911 (1997) 917 Opinion of the Court Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949). In that case, as in all of our cases following it, we were construing the federal statutory language of 28 U. S. C. § 1291.5 While some States have adopted a similar "collateral order" exception when constru- ing their jurisdictional statutes,6 we have never suggested that federal law compelled them to do so. Indeed, a number of States employ collateral order doctrines that reject the limitations this Court has placed on § 1291.7 Idaho could, of 5 Thus, in Mitchell we explained: "In holding these and similar issues of absolute immunity to be appealable under the collateral order doctrine, see Abney v. United States, [431 U. S. 651 (1977)]; Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U. S. 500 (1979); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731 (1982), the Court has recognized that a question of immunity is separate from the merits of the underlying action for purposes of the Cohen test even though a review- ing court must consider the plaintiff's factual allegations in resolving the immunity issue. Accordingly, we hold that a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable `final decision' within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." 472 U. S., at 528­530 (footnote omitted). 6 See, e. g., Richardson v. Chevrefils, 131 N. H. 227, 231, 552 A. 2d 89, 92 (1988) ("Although all of the court's rulings . . . would normally be treated as interlocutory, . . . [w]e have followed Mitchell in accepting the State defendants' appeal from the order denying their motion for summary judg- ment"); Murray v. White, 155 Vt. 621, 626, 587 A. 2d 975, 977­978 (1991) ("In [Mitchell], the Supreme Court held that a trial court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity met these [collateral order] requirements, and we agree with this determination"); Park County v. Cooney, 845 P. 2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1992) ("We believe the state decisions which allow appeal, for the reasons detailed in Mitchell . . . , are better reasoned; and we therefore hold that an order denying dismissal of a claim based on qualified immu- nity is an order appealable to this court"). 7 See, e. g., Goldston v. American Motors Corp., 326 N. C. 723, 727, 392 S. E. 2d 735, 737 (1990) (disqualification of counsel is appealable under state collateral order doctrine notwithstanding Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U. S. 424 (1985)); Hanson v. Federal Signal Corp., 451 Pa. Super. 260, 264­265, 679 A. 2d 785, 787­788 (1996) (same for class certifica- tion denial notwithstanding Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978)). 520us3$68I 08-19-98 15:30:26 PAGES OPINPGT 918 JOHNSON v. FANKELL Opinion of the Court course, place the same construction on its Appellate Rule 11(a)(1) as we have placed on § 1291. But that is clearly a choice for that court to make, not one that we have any authority to command. IV Petitioners also contend that, to the extent that Idaho Ap- pellate Rule 11(a)(1) does not allow an interlocutory appeal, it is pre-empted by § 1983. Relying heavily on Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S. 131 (1988), petitioners first assert that pre- emption is necessary to avoid "different outcomes in § 1983 litigation based solely on whether the claim is asserted in state or federal court," id., at 138. Second, they argue that the state procedure "impermissibly burden[s]" the federal immunity from suit because it does not adequately protect their right to prevail on the immunity question in advance of trial.8 For two reasons, petitioners have a heavy burden of per- suasion in making this argument. First, our normal pre- sumption against pre-emption is buttressed by the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal rested squarely on a neutral state Rule regarding the administra- tion of the state courts.9 As we explained in Howlett v. Rose, 496 U. S. 356, 372 (1990): 8 See Brief for Petitioners 22. 9 Unlike the notice-of-claim rule at issue in Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S., at 140­145, Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1) does not target civil rights claims against the State. See also Howlett v. Rose, 496 U. S. 356, 380­381 (1990). Instead, it generally permits appeals only of "[j]udgments, orders and de- crees which are final," without regard to the identity of the party seeking the appeal or the subject matter of the suit. Petitioners claim that the rule is not neutral because it permits interlocutory appeals in certain lim- ited circumstances but denies an appeal here. But we have never held that a rule must be monolithic to be neutral. Absent evidence that Appel- late Rule 11(a)(1) discriminates against interlocutory appeals of § 1983 qualified immunity determinations by defendants-as compared with other types of appeals-we must deem the state procedure neutral. 520us3$68I 08-19-98 15:30:26 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 911 (1997) 919 Opinion of the Court "When a state court refuses jurisdiction because of a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the courts, we must act with utmost caution before deciding that it is obligated to entertain the claim. See Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1 (1950); Georgia Rail Road & Banking Co. v. Musgrove, 335 U. S. 900 (1949) (per curiam); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117 (1945); Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377 (1929). The requirement that a state court of competent jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the land does not necessarily include within it a require- ment that the State create a court competent to hear the case in which the federal claim is presented. The general rule, `bottomed deeply in belief in the impor- tance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.' Hart, [The Relations Between State and Federal Law], 54 Colum. L. Rev. [489, 508 (1954)]; see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 33 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. [742, 774 (1982)] (opinion of Powell, J.). The States thus have great latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts." A second barrier to petitioners' argument arises from the nature of the interest protected by the defense of qualified immunity. Petitioners' argument for pre-emption is bot- tomed on their claims that the Idaho rules are interfering with their federal rights. While it is true that the defense has its source in a federal statute (§ 1983), the ultimate pur- pose of qualified immunity is to protect the State and its officials from overenforcement of federal rights. The Idaho Supreme Court's application of the State's procedural rules in this context is thus less an interference with federal inter- ests than a judgment about how best to balance the compet- ing state interests of limiting interlocutory appeals and pro- 520us3$68I 08-19-98 15:30:27 PAGES OPINPGT 920 JOHNSON v. FANKELL Opinion of the Court viding state officials with immediate review of the merits of their defense.10 Petitioners' arguments for pre-emption are not strong enough to overcome these considerable hurdles. Contrary to petitioners' assertions, Idaho's decision not to provide ap- pellate review for the vast majority of interlocutory orders- including denials of qualified immunity in § 1983 cases-is not "outcome determinative" in the sense that we used that term when we held that Wisconsin's notice-of-claim statute could not be applied to defeat a federal civil rights action brought in state courts under § 1983. Felder, 487 U. S., at 153. The failure to comply with the Wisconsin statute in Felder re- sulted in a judgment dismissing a complaint that would not have been dismissed-at least not without a judicial determi- nation of the merits of the claim-if the case had been filed in a federal court. One of the primary grounds for our deci- sion was that, because the notice-of-claim requirement would "frequently and predictably produce different outcomes" de- pending on whether § 1983 claims were brought in state or federal court, it was inconsistent with the federal interest in uniformity. Id., at 138.11 10 It does warrant observation that Rule 12(a) of the Idaho Appellate Rules provides that the State Supreme Court may grant permission "to appeal from an interlocutory order or decree . . . which is not otherwise appealable under these rules, but which involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal . . . may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." Presumably, petitioners could have sought review under this permissive provision, and the Idaho Supreme Court might have granted review if, in the view of that court, the officials' claim to immunity was so substantial that the suit should not proceed. 11 See also Brown v. Western R. Co. of Ala., 338 U. S. 294, 296­299 (1949) (Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) pre-empted different state pleading requirements when effect was to defeat plaintiff's cause of ac- tion); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239, 243­244 (1942) (fed- eral Jones Act pre-empted different state burden of proof regarding re- leases when effect was to defeat plaintiff's cause of action). 520us3$68I 08-19-98 15:30:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 911 (1997) 921 Opinion of the Court Petitioners' reliance on Felder is misplaced because "out- come," as we used the term there, referred to the ultimate disposition of the case. If petitioners' claim to qualified im- munity is meritorious, there is no suggestion that the appli- cation of the Idaho rules of procedure will produce a final result different from what a federal ruling would produce. Petitioners were able to argue their immunity from suit claim to the trial court, just as they would to a federal court. And the claim will be reviewable by the Idaho Supreme Court after the trial court enters a final judgment, thus pro- viding petitioners with a further chance to urge their immu- nity. Consequently, the postponement of the appeal until after final judgment will not affect the ultimate outcome of the case. Petitioners' second argument for pre-emption of the state procedural Rule is that the Rule does not adequately protect their right to prevail in advance of trial. In evaluating this contention, it is important to focus on the precise source and scope of the federal right at issue. The right to have the trial court rule on the merits of the qualified immunity de- fense presumably has its source in § 1983, but the right to immediate appellate review of that ruling in a federal case has its source in § 1291. The former right is fully protected by Idaho. The latter right, however, is a federal procedural right that simply does not apply in a nonfederal forum.12 The locus of the right to interlocutory appeal in § 1291, rather than in § 1983 itself, is demonstrated by our holding 12 Petitioners' reliance on Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 342 U. S. 359 (1952), is therefore misplaced. In Dice we held that the FELA pre- empted a state rule denying a right to a jury trial. In that case, however, we made clear that Congress had provided in FELA that the jury trial procedure was to be part of claims brought under the Act. Id., at 363 (citing Bailey v. Central Vermont R. Co., 319 U. S. 350, 354 (1943)). In this case, by contrast, Congress has mentioned nothing about interlocutory appeals in § 1983; rather, the right to an immediate appeal in the federal court system is found in § 1291, which obviously has no application to state courts. 520us3$68I 08-19-98 15:30:27 PAGES OPINPGT 922 JOHNSON v. FANKELL Opinion of the Court in Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S. 304 (1995). In that case, gov- ernment officials asserting qualified immunity claimed enti- tlement to an interlocutory appeal of a District Court order denying their motion for summary judgment on the ground that the record showed a genuine issue of material fact whether the officials actually engaged in the conduct that constituted a clear violation of constitutional law. Id., at 307­308. We concluded that this circumstance was different from that presented in Mitchell, 472 U. S., at 528, in which the subject of the interlocutory appeal was whether a given set of facts showed a violation of clearly established law, and held that although § 1291 did allow an interlocutory appeal in the latter circumstance, such an appeal was not allowed in the former. In so holding, we acknowledged that "whether a district court's denial of summary judgment amounts to (a) a deter- mination about pre-existing `clearly established' law, or (b) a determination about `genuine' issues of fact for trial, it still forces public officials to trial." 515 U. S., at 317. But we concluded that the strong "countervailing considerations" surrounding appropriate interpretation of § 1291 were of sufficient importance to outweigh the officials' interest in avoiding the burdens of litigation. The "countervailing considerations" at issue here are even stronger than those presented in Johnson. When pre- emption of state law is at issue, we must respect the "princi- ples [that] are fundamental to a system of federalism in which the state courts share responsibility for the applica- tion and enforcement of federal law." Howlett, 496 U. S., at 372­373. This respect is at its apex when we confront a claim that federal law requires a State to undertake some- thing as fundamental as restructuring the operation of its courts.13 We therefore cannot agree with petitioners that 13 We have made it quite clear that it is a matter for each State to decide how to structure its judicial system. See, e. g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102, 111 (1996) (States under no obligation to provide appellate re- 520us3$68I 08-19-98 15:30:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 911 (1997) 923 Opinion of the Court § 1983's recognition of the defense of qualified immunity pre- empts a State's consistent application of its neutral pro- cedural rules, even when those rules deny an interlocutory appeal in this context. The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho dismissing petitioners' appeal is therefore affirmed. It is so ordered. view) (citing cases); Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U. S. 293, 299 (1895) ("[T]he right of review in an appellate court is purely a matter of state concern"); McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 688 (1894) ("[W]hether an appeal should be allowed, and if so, under what circumstances or on what conditions, are matters for each State to determine for itself"). 520US3 Unit: $U69 [09-11-99 19:00:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN 924 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus GILBERT, PRESIDENT, EAST STROUDSBURG UNIVERSITY, et al. v. HOMAR certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit No. 96­651. Argued March 24, 1997-Decided June 9, 1997 On August 26, 1992, while employed as a policeman at East Stroudsburg University (ESU), a Pennsylvania state institution, respondent was ar- rested by state police and charged with a drug felony. Petitioners, ESU officials, suspended him without pay, effective immediately, pend- ing their own investigation. Although the criminal charges were dis- missed on September 1, his suspension remained in effect. On Septem- ber 18, he was provided the opportunity to tell his side of the story to ESU officials. Subsequently, he was demoted to groundskeeper. He then filed suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, claiming, inter alia, that petition- ers' failure to provide him with notice and a hearing before suspending him without pay violated due process. The District Court granted peti- tioners summary judgment, but the Third Circuit reversed. Held: In the circumstances here, the State did not violate due process by failing to provide notice and a hearing before suspending a tenured pub- lic employee without pay. Pp. 928­936. (a) In Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, this Court held that before being fired a public employee dismissable only for cause was entitled to a limited pretermination hearing, to be followed by a more comprehensive posttermination hearing. The Third Circuit erred in relying on dictum in Loudermill to conclude that a suspension with- out pay must also be preceded by notice and a hearing. Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular sit- uation demands. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481; FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U. S. 230, 240. Pp. 929­931. (b) Three factors are relevant in determining what process is consti- tutionally due: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335. Respondent asserts an inter- est in an uninterrupted paycheck; but account must be taken of the length and finality of the temporary deprivation of his pay. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 434. So long as a suspended employee receives a sufficiently prompt postsuspension hearing, the lost 520US3 Unit: $U69 [09-11-99 19:00:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 924 (1997) 925 Syllabus income is relatively insubstantial, and fringe benefits such as health and life insurance are often not affected at all. On the other side of the balance, the State has a significant interest in immediately suspending employees charged with felonies who occupy positions of public trust and visibility, such as police officers. While this interest could have been accommodated by suspending respondent with pay, the Constitu- tion does not require the government to give an employee charged with a felony paid leave at taxpayer expense. The remaining Mathews factor is the most important in this case: The purpose of a pre- suspension hearing-to assure that there are reasonable grounds to support the suspension without pay, cf. Loudermill, supra, at 545­546- has already been assured by the arrest and the filing of charges. See FDIC, supra. That there may have been discretion not to suspend does not mean that respondent had to be given the opportunity to persuade officials of his innocence before the decision was made. See id., at 234­ 235. Pp. 931­935. (c) Whether respondent received an adequately prompt post- suspension hearing should be considered by the Third Circuit in the first instance. Pp. 935­936. 89 F. 3d 1009, reversed and remanded. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Gwendolyn T. Mosley, Senior Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the brief were D. Michael Fisher, Attorney General, Calvin R. Koons, Senior Deputy Attorney General, and John G. Knoor III, Chief Deputy Attorney General. Ann Hubbard argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioners. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen- eral Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Waxman, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Preston, David C. Frederick, William Kanter, Jeffrica Jenkins Lee, Lorraine P. Lewis, and Mary S. Mitchelson. James V. Fareri argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Jennifer Harlacher Sibum. Gregory O'Duden argued the cause for the National Treas- ury Employees Union as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 520US3 Unit: $U69 [09-11-99 19:00:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN 926 GILBERT v. HOMAR Opinion of the Court With him on the brief were Elaine Kaplan and Barbara A. Atkin.* Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether a State violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide notice and a hearing before suspending a tenured public employee without pay. I Respondent Richard J. Homar was employed as a police officer at East Stroudsburg University (ESU), a branch of Pennsylvania's State System of Higher Education. On Au- gust 26, 1992, when respondent was at the home of a family friend, he was arrested by the Pennsylvania State Police in a drug raid. Later that day, the state police filed a criminal complaint charging respondent with possession of marijuana, *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ala- bama et al. by Julio A. Brady, Attorney General of the Virgin Islands, W. Bartlett Ary, Assistant Attorney General, and Dan Schweitzer, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of California, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butter- worth of Florida, Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Scott Harsh- barger of Massachusetts, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Charles W. Burson of Tennessee, Dan Morales of Texas, and Jan Graham of Utah; and for the International City-County Management Association et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the National Association of Police Organizations, Inc., by William J. Johnson; for the National Education Association by Robert H. Chanin and John M. West; for the Pennsylvania State Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police, by Gary M. Lightman; and for the Southern States Police Benevolent Association by J. Michael McGuinness. 520US3 Unit: $U69 [09-11-99 19:00:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 924 (1997) 927 Opinion of the Court possession with intent to deliver, and criminal conspiracy to violate the controlled substance law, which is a felony. The state police notified respondent's supervisor, University Po- lice Chief David Marazas, of the arrest and charges. Chief Marazas in turn informed Gerald Levanowitz, ESU's Direc- tor of Human Resources, to whom ESU President James Gil- bert had delegated authority to discipline ESU employees. Levanowitz suspended respondent without pay effective im- mediately. Respondent failed to report to work on the day of his arrest, and learned of his suspension the next day, when he called Chief Marazas to inquire whether he had been suspended. That same day, respondent received a let- ter from Levanowitz confirming that he had been suspended effective August 26 pending an investigation into the crimi- nal charges filed against him. The letter explained that any action taken by ESU would not necessarily coincide with the disposition of the criminal charges. Although the criminal charges were dismissed on Septem- ber 1, respondent's suspension remained in effect while ESU continued with its own investigation. On September 18, Levanowitz and Chief Marazas met with respondent in order to give him an opportunity to tell his side of the story. Re- spondent was informed at the meeting that the state police had given ESU information that was "very serious in na- ture," Record, Doc. No. 26, p. 48, but he was not informed that that included a report of an alleged confession he had made on the day of his arrest; he was consequently unable to respond to damaging statements attributed to him in the police report. In a letter dated September 23, Levanowitz notified re- spondent that he was being demoted to the position of groundskeeper effective the next day, and that he would re- ceive backpay from the date the suspension took effect at the rate of pay of a groundskeeper. (Respondent eventually received backpay for the period of his suspension at the rate of pay of a university police officer.) The letter maintained 520US3 Unit: $U69 [09-11-99 19:00:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN 928 GILBERT v. HOMAR Opinion of the Court that the demotion was being imposed "as a result of admis- sions made by yourself to the Pennsylvania State Police on August 26, 1992 that you maintained associations with indi- viduals whom you knew were dealing in large quantities of marijuana and that you obtained marijuana from one of those individuals for your own use. Your actions constitute a clear and flagrant violation of Sections 200 and 200.2 of the [ESU] Police Department Manual." App. 82a. Upon receipt of this letter, the president of respondent's union requested a meeting with President Gilbert. The requested meeting took place on September 24, at which point respondent had received and read the police report containing the alleged confession. After providing respondent with an oppor- tunity to respond to the charges, Gilbert sustained the demotion. Respondent filed this suit under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against President Gilbert, Chief Marazas, Levanowitz, and a Vice President of ESU, Curtis English, all in both their individual and official capac- ities. He contended, inter alia, that petitioners' failure to provide him with notice and an opportunity to be heard be- fore suspending him without pay violated due process. The District Court entered summary judgment for petitioners. A divided Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's determination that it was permissible for ESU to suspend respondent without pay without first providing a hearing. 89 F. 3d 1009 (CA3 1996). We granted certiorari. 519 U. S. 1052 (1997). II The protections of the Due Process Clause apply to gov- ernment deprivation of those perquisites of government em- ployment in which the employee has a constitutionally pro- tected "property" interest. Although we have previously held that public employees who can be discharged only for cause have a constitutionally protected property interest in 520US3 Unit: $U69 [09-11-99 19:00:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 924 (1997) 929 Opinion of the Court their tenure and cannot be fired without due process, see Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 578 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 602­603 (1972), we have not had occasion to decide whether the protections of the Due Process Clause extend to discipline of tenured public employees short of termination. Petitioners, how- ever, do not contest this preliminary point, and so without deciding it we will, like the District Court, "[a]ssum[e] that the suspension infringed a protected property interest," App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a, and turn at once to petitioners' contention that respondent received all the process he was due. A In Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532 (1985), we concluded that a public employee dismissable only for cause was entitled to a very limited hearing prior to his termination, to be followed by a more comprehensive post- termination hearing. Stressing that the pretermination hearing "should be an initial check against mistaken deci- sions-essentially, a determination of whether there are rea- sonable grounds to believe that the charges against the em- ployee are true and support the proposed action," id., at 545­546, we held that pretermination process need only in- clude oral or written notice of the charges, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity for the em- ployee to tell his side of the story, id., at 546. In the course of our assessment of the governmental interest in immediate termination of a tenured employee, we observed that "in those situations where the employer perceives a significant hazard in keeping the employee on the job, it can avoid the problem by suspending with pay." Id., at 544­545 (empha- sis added; footnote omitted). Relying on this dictum, which it read as "strongly suggest- [ing] that suspension without pay must be preceded by notice and an opportunity to be heard in all instances," 89 F. 3d, at 1015 (emphasis added), and determining on its own that 520US3 Unit: $U69 [09-11-99 19:00:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN 930 GILBERT v. HOMAR Opinion of the Court such a rule would be "eminently sensible," id., at 1016, the Court of Appeals adopted a categorical prohibition: "[A] gov- ernmental employer may not suspend an employee without pay unless that suspension is preceded by some kind of pre- suspension hearing, providing the employee with notice and an opportunity to be heard." Ibid. Respondent (as well as most of his amici) makes no attempt to defend this absolute rule, which spans all types of government employment and all types of unpaid suspensions. Brief for Respondent 8, 12­ 13. This is eminently wise, since under our precedents such an absolute rule is indefensible. It is by now well established that " `due process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances." Cafe- teria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961). "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such proce- dural protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). This Court has recognized, on many occasions, that where a State must act quickly, or where it would be impractical to provide pre- deprivation process, postdeprivation process satisfies the requirements of the Due Process Clause. See, e. g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 53 (1993); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S. 113, 128 (1990) (collect- ing cases); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 64­65 (1979); Dixon v. Love, 431 U. S. 105, 115 (1977); North American Cold Stor- age Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306, 314­320 (1908). Indeed, in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327 (1986), we specifically noted that "we have rejected the proposition that [due process] always requires the State to provide a hearing prior to the initial deprivation of property." 451 U. S., at 540. And in FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U. S. 230 (1988), where we unanimously approved the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo- ration's (FDIC's) suspension, without prior hearing, of an in- dicted private bank employee, we said: "An important gov- 520US3 Unit: $U69 [09-11-99 19:00:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 924 (1997) 931 Opinion of the Court ernment interest, accompanied by a substantial assurance that the deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted, may in limited cases demanding prompt action justify postponing the opportunity to be heard until after the initial depriva- tion." Id., at 240.* The dictum in Loudermill relied upon by the Court of Ap- peals is of course not inconsistent with these precedents. To say that when the government employer perceives a hazard in leaving the employee on the job it "can avoid the problem by suspending with pay" is not to say that that is the only way of avoiding the problem. Whatever implication the phrase "with pay" might have conveyed is far outweighed by the clarity of our precedents which emphasize the flexibility of due process as contrasted with the sweeping and categori- cal rule adopted by the Court of Appeals. B To determine what process is constitutionally due, we have generally balanced three distinct factors: "First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depriva- tion of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute pro- *It is true, as respondent contends, that in Mallen we did not expressly state whether the bank president's suspension was with or without pay. But the opinion in Mallen recites no order from the FDIC, if it had author- ity to issue such an order, that the bank pay its president; only an order that the bank suspend its president's participation in the bank's affairs. Our opinion in Mallen certainly reflects the assumption that the suspen- sion would be without pay. For example, in discussing the private inter- est at stake we considered "the severity of depriving someone of his or her livelihood." 486 U. S., at 243 (citing cases). And, Mallen argued to this Court that "denial of an income stream to underwrite these extraor- dinary expenses can be crucial, not only to Mallen's financial condition in general, but to his ability to pay for his criminal defense." Brief for Appellee in FDIC v. Mallen, O. T. 1987, No. 87­82, pp. 7­8. 520US3 Unit: $U69 [09-11-99 19:00:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN 932 GILBERT v. HOMAR Opinion of the Court cedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's inter- est." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976). See also, e. g., Mallen, supra, at 242; Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 434 (1982). Respondent contends that he has a significant private in- terest in the uninterrupted receipt of his paycheck. But while our opinions have recognized the severity of depriving someone of the means of his livelihood, see, e. g., Mallen, supra, at 243; Loudermill, 470 U. S., at 543, they have also emphasized that in determining what process is due, account must be taken of "the length" and "finality of the depriva- tion," Logan, supra, at 434 (emphasis added). Unlike the employee in Loudermill, who faced termination, respondent faced only a temporary suspension without pay. So long as the suspended employee receives a sufficiently prompt post- suspension hearing, the lost income is relatively insubstan- tial (compared with termination), and fringe benefits such as health and life insurance are often not affected at all, Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18; Record, Doc. No. 19, p. 7. On the other side of the balance, the State has a significant interest in immediately suspending, when felony charges are filed against them, employees who occupy positions of great public trust and high public visibility, such as police officers. Respondent contends that this interest in maintaining public confidence could have been accommodated by suspending him with pay until he had a hearing. We think, however, that the government does not have to give an employee charged with a felony a paid leave at taxpayer expense. If his services to the government are no longer useful once the felony charge has been filed, the Constitution does not re- quire the government to bear the added expense of hiring a replacement while still paying him. ESU's interest in pre- serving public confidence in its police force is at least as sig- nificant as the State's interest in preserving the integrity of the sport of horse racing, see Barry v. Barchi, supra, at 64, 520US3 Unit: $U69 [09-11-99 19:00:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 924 (1997) 933 Opinion of the Court an interest we "deemed sufficiently important . . . to justify a brief period of suspension prior to affording the suspended trainer a hearing," Mallen, 486 U. S., at 241. The last factor in the Mathews balancing, and the factor most important to resolution of this case, is the risk of erro- neous deprivation and the likely value of any additional pro- cedures. Petitioners argue that any presuspension hearing would have been worthless because pursuant to an Execu- tive Order of the Governor of Pennsylvania a state employee is automatically to be suspended without pay "[a]s soon as practicable after [being] formally charged with . . . a felony." 4 Pa. Code § 7.173 (1997). According to petitioners, supervi- sors have no discretion under this rule, and the mandatory suspension without pay lasts until the criminal charges are finally resolved. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. If petitioners' in- terpretation of this order is correct, there is no need for any presuspension process since there would be nothing to con- sider at the hearing except the independently verifiable fact of whether an employee had indeed been formally charged with a felony. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U. S. 624, 627­628 (1977) (per curiam). Cf. Loudermill, supra, at 543. Re- spondent, however, challenges petitioners' reading of the Code, and contends that in any event an order of the Gover- nor of Pennsylvania is a "mere directiv[e] which do[es] not confer a legally enforceable right." Brief for Respondent 20. We need not resolve this disputed issue of state law because even assuming the Code is only advisory (or has no application at all), the State had no constitutional obligation to provide respondent with a presuspension hearing. We noted in Loudermill that the purpose of a pre-termination hearing is to determine "whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action." 470 U. S., at 545­ 546. By parity of reasoning, the purpose of any pre- suspension hearing would be to assure that there are rea- sonable grounds to support the suspension without pay. 520US3 Unit: $U69 [09-11-99 19:00:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN 934 GILBERT v. HOMAR Opinion of the Court Cf. Mallen, 486 U. S., at 240. But here that has already been assured by the arrest and the filing of charges. In Mallen, we concluded that an "ex parte finding of proba- ble cause" such as a grand jury indictment provides adequate assurance that the suspension is not unjustified. Id., at 240­ 241. The same is true when an employee is arrested and then formally charged with a felony. First, as with an in- dictment, the arrest and formal charges imposed upon re- spondent "by an independent body demonstrat[e] that the suspension is not arbitrary." Id., at 244. Second, like an indictment, the imposition of felony charges "itself is an ob- jective fact that will in most cases raise serious public con- cern." Id., at 244­245. It is true, as respondent argues, that there is more reason to believe an employee has com- mitted a felony when he is indicted rather than merely ar- rested and formally charged; but for present purposes arrest and charge give reason enough. They serve to assure that the state employer's decision to suspend the employee is not "baseless or unwarranted," id., at 240, in that an independent third party has determined that there is probable cause to believe the employee committed a serious crime. Respondent further contends that since (as we have agreed to assume) Levanowitz had discretion not to suspend despite the arrest and filing of charges, he had to be given an opportunity to persuade Levanowitz of his innocence before the decision was made. We disagree. In Mallen, despite the fact that the FDIC had discretion whether to suspend an indicted bank employee, see 64 Stat. 879, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1818(g)(1); Mallen, supra, at 234­235, and n. 5, we nevertheless did not believe that a presuspen- sion hearing was necessary to protect the private interest. Unlike in the case of a termination, where we have recog- nized that "the only meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker is likely to be before the ter- mination takes effect," Loudermill, supra, at 543, in the case of a suspension there will be ample opportunity to invoke 520US3 Unit: $U69 [09-11-99 19:00:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 924 (1997) 935 Opinion of the Court discretion later-and a short delay actually benefits the em- ployee by allowing state officials to obtain more accurate in- formation about the arrest and charges. Respondent "has an interest in seeing that a decision concerning his or her continued suspension is not made with excessive haste." Mallen, 486 U. S., at 243. If the State is forced to act too quickly, the decisionmaker "may give greater weight to the public interest and leave the suspension in place." Ibid. C Much of respondent's argument is dedicated to the proposi- tion that he had a due process right to a presuspension hear- ing because the suspension was open-ended and he "theoreti- cally may not have had the opportunity to be heard for weeks, months, or even years after his initial suspension without pay." Brief for Respondent 23. But, as respond- ent himself asserts in his attempt to downplay the govern- mental interest, "[b]ecause the employee is entitled, in any event, to a prompt post-suspension opportunity to be heard, the period of the suspension should be short and the amount of pay during the suspension minimal." Id., at 24­25. Whether respondent was provided an adequately prompt post-suspension hearing in the present case is a separate question. Although the charges against respondent were dropped on September 1 (petitioners apparently learned of this on September 2), he did not receive any sort of hearing until September 18. Once the charges were dropped, the risk of erroneous deprivation increased substantially, and, as petitioners conceded at oral argument, there was likely value in holding a prompt hearing, Tr. of Oral Arg. 19. Cf. Mal- len, supra, at 243 (holding that 90 days before the agency hears and decides the propriety of a suspension does not ex- ceed the permissible limits where coupled with factors that minimize the risk of an erroneous deprivation). Because neither the Court of Appeals nor the District Court ad- dressed whether, under the particular facts of this case, peti- 520US3 Unit: $U69 [09-11-99 19:00:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN 936 GILBERT v. HOMAR Opinion of the Court tioners violated due process by failing to provide a suffi- ciently prompt postsuspension hearing, we will not consider this issue in the first instance, but remand for consideration by the Court of Appeals. * * * The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 520US3 Unit: $U70 [09-17-99 06:56:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 937 Per Curiam VEY v. CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, et al. on motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis No. 96­8796. Decided June 9, 1997 Pro se petitioner seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis so that she may file a petition for certiorari from a Third Circuit decision dismissing her appeal as frivolous. In the past 61 2 years, she has filed 26 submis- sions in this Court, all of which have been denied; and eight weeks ago, the Clerk of the Court was instructed not to accept any further petitions for extraordinary writs from her absent the required fees, see In re Vey, ante, p. 303. Held: Petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is denied. For the reasons stated in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (per curiam), she is barred from filing any further certiorari petitions in noncriminal matters unless she first complies with this Court's Rules. Motion denied. Per Curiam. Pro se petitioner Eileen Vey seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis so that she may file a petition for certiorari from a decision of the Third Circuit dismissing her appeal as frivolous under 28 U. S. C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (1994 ed., Supp. II). Her underlying claims below, various alleged civil rights and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act vio- lations by the President of the United States, the First Lady, and numerous Senators, judges (including The Chief Jus- tice), foreign officials, and private citizens, are patently friv- olous. In the past 61 2 years, she has filed 26 submissions in this Court, all of which have been denied. Just eight weeks ago, we went even further, instructing the Clerk of the Court not to accept any further petitions for extraordinary writs from her unless she first paid the required fees. See In re Vey, ante, p. 303 (per curiam). Since that order has proved insufficient to deter petitioner's abusive conduct, we again 520US3 Unit: $U70 [09-17-99 06:56:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN 938 VEY v. CLINTON Stevens, J., dissenting deny her motion to proceed in forma pauperis and now in- struct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for cer- tiorari from petitioner in noncriminal matters unless she first complies with this Court's Rules. Petitioner is allowed until June 30, 1997, within which to pay the docketing fees re- quired by Rule 38 and to submit her petition in compliance with Rule 33.1. We enter the order barring future in forma pauperis filings for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). It is so ordered. The Chief Justice took no part in the decision of this case. Justice Stevens, dissenting. For reasons previously stated, see Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting), and cases cited, I respectfully dissent. 520us3$71Z 08-19-98 18:13:07 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 939 Syllabus HUGHES AIRCRAFT CO. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. SCHUMER certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­1340. Argued February 25, 1997-Decided June 16, 1997 In 1989, respondent Schumer filed an action against petitioner Hughes Aircraft Company under the qui tam provision of the False Claims Act (FCA), which permits, in certain circumstances, suits by private parties on behalf of the United States against anyone submitting a false claim to the Government. Hughes' allegedly false claims were submitted be- tween 1982 and 1984. Prior to 1986, qui tam suits were barred if the information on which they were based was already in the Government's possession. A 1986 amendment, however, permits qui tam suits based on information in the Government's possession, except where the suit is based on publicly disclosed information and was not brought by an origi- nal source of the information. Hughes moved to dismiss, contending, inter alia, that the 1986 amendment was not retroactive, and that the qui tam provision in effect when Hughes engaged in its allegedly wrong- ful conduct precluded the suit because it was based on information that Hughes had already disclosed to the Government. The District Court denied the motion, but ultimately granted Hughes summary judgment on the merits. Schumer appealed that judgment, and Hughes cross- appealed from the denial of the motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit rejected the cross-appeal, holding that the 1986 amendment should be applied retroactively to suits based on pre-1986 conduct because the amendment involved only the courts' subject-matter jurisdiction to hear qui tam claims and did not affect qui tam defendants' substantive liabil- ity. Finding, further, that the action was not barred under the 1986 amendment, the court reversed in part and remanded for further consid- eration on the merits. Held: Because the 1986 amendment does not apply retroactively to qui tam suits regarding allegedly false claims submitted prior to its enact- ment, this action should have been dismissed, as required by the pre- 1986 version of the FCA. Pp. 945­952. (a) This Court applies the time-honored presumption against retroac- tive legislation unless Congress has clearly manifested its intent to the contrary. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 268. Noth- ing in the 1986 amendment evidences a clear intent by Congress that it be applied retroactively. Thus, under Landgraf's analysis, if the 520us3$71Z 08-19-98 18:13:07 PAGES OPINPGT 940 HUGHES AIRCRAFT CO. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. SCHUMER Syllabus amendment has a retroactive effect, then it will not apply to the conduct alleged here, which occurred before its effective date. P. 946. (b) Schumer's contention that the 1986 amendment lacks retroactive effect is rejected. His argument that the amendment does not impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed because it has been unlawful to knowingly submit a false claim to the United States since 1863 was made, and rejected, in Landgraf. 511 U. S., at 281­282. He is also mistaken in contending that the amendment does not change the substance of the extant cause of action. By eliminating a defense to a qui tam suit-prior disclosure to the Government-the amendment attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past. Id., at 269. Nor is it the case that the amendment does not create a new cause of action. As Schumer himself recognizes, it extended an FCA cause to private parties in circum- stances where the action was previously foreclosed. This extension is not insignificant. Qui tam relators are motivated primarily by pros- pects of monetary reward rather than the public good and, thus, are less likely than is the Government to forgo an action involving a technical violation but no harm to the public fisc. The amendment essentially creates a new cause of action, not just an increased likelihood that an existing cause of action will be pursued. See, e. g., Winfree v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 227 U. S. 296, 302. Before the amendment, Schumer's action was completely barred because of Hughes' disclosure. The amendment would revive that action, subjecting Hughes to previously foreclosed qui tam litigation. Finally, Schumer errs in contending that the amendment is jurisdictional and, hence, an exception to the general Landgraf presumption against retroactivity. Statutes merely address- ing where a suit may be brought may not meet the conditions for the Landgraf presumption, for they regulate only the secondary conduct of the litigation and not the underlying primary conduct of the parties. However, the amendment speaks to the parties' substantive rights by creating jurisdiction where none previously existed; it is therefore sub- ject to the presumption against retroactivity. Pp. 946­952. 63 F. 3d 1512, vacated and remanded. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Kenneth W. Starr argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Christopher Landau, John J. Hig- gins, John T. Kuelbs, and Daniel R. Allemeier. Laurence Gold argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were David Silberman and Leon Dayan. 520us3$71Z 08-19-98 18:13:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 939 (1997) 941 Opinion of the Court Deputy Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen- eral Preston, Malcolm L. Stewart, Michael F. Hertz, Doug- las Letter, and Joan Hartman.* Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. The qui tam provision of the False Claims Act (FCA or Act), 31 U. S. C. § 3730(b), permits, in certain circumstances, suits by private parties on behalf of the United States against anyone submitting a false claim to the Government. Prior to 1986, such suits were barred if the information on which they were based was already in the Government's pos- session. At issue in this case is whether a 1986 amendment to the FCA partially removing that bar applies retroactively to qui tam suits regarding allegedly false claims submitted prior to its enactment and, if so, whether this particular ac- tion meets the requirements of the amended Act. We hold *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc., by Mac S. Dunaway and Gary E. Cross; for the Association of American Medical Colleges et al. by John T. Boese, Richard A. Sauber, Kirk B. Johnson, Michael L. Ile, John E. Steiner, Jr., and Joseph A. Keyes, Jr.; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Clarence T. Kipps, Jr., Alan I. Horowitz, Peter B. Hutt II, Alvaro I. Anillo, Stephen A. Bokat, Robin S. Conrad, and Franklin W. Losey; for FMC Corp. by Allan J. Joseph, Mar- tin Quinn, and David F. Innis; for Lockheed Martin Corp. by James J. Gallagher, Mark R. Troy, Barbara J. Bacon, and Lester W. Schiefelbein, Jr.; for Northrop Grumman Corp. by Brad D. Brian, Kristin A. Linsley, and Daniel P. Collins; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Stuart M. Gerson, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the National Employment Lawyers Association by James B. Helmer, Jr., Frederick M. Morgan, Jr., and Julie Webster Popham; for the National Health Law Program, Inc., by William J. Blechman; for the Project on Government Oversight by Charles Tiefer; and for Taxpayers Against Fraud, The False Claims Act Legal Center, by Priscilla R. Budeiri. 520us3$71N 08-19-98 18:13:07 PAGES OPINPGT 942 HUGHES AIRCRAFT CO. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. SCHUMER Opinion of the Court that the 1986 amendment does not apply to this action and therefore that this action should have been dismissed, as required by the 1982 version of the Act. I In December 1981, the Northrop Corporation awarded petitioner Hughes Aircraft Company a subcontract to design and develop a radar system for the B­2 bomber, which Nor- throp was then constructing under contract with the Air Force. Both Northrop's subcontract with Hughes and the Air Force's contract with Northrop were "cost-plus" con- tracts, which provided that the subcontractor and the con- tractor, respectively, were to be reimbursed for all costs properly incurred plus a reasonable profit. Several months after Hughes was awarded the B­2 subcontract, the McDonnell-Douglas Corporation awarded Hughes a "fixed- price" subcontract to design and develop an upgraded radar system for the F­15 fighter aircraft, which McDonnell- Douglas was then building for the Air Force. (Under the fixed-price contract, Hughes was to receive a set price, re- gardless of costs.) When it became apparent to Hughes that the projects overlapped in significant respects, Hughes adopted two internal "commonality agreements" allocating between its F­15 and B­2 divisions various costs that were common to the two projects. After costs in the B­2 program escalated, Northrop re- quested a Government audit of Hughes' accounting practices to ascertain whether Hughes had improperly shifted costs from the fixed-price F­15 subcontract to the cost-plus B­2 subcontract. The Air Force initially concluded, in a June 1986 preliminary classified audit report, that Hughes had im- properly billed the B­2 program for certain development costs that should have been charged solely to the F­15 pro- gram. Between October 1986 and September 1988, the De- fense Contract Audit Agency prepared a series of unclas- sified audit reports similarly concluding that Hughes had 520us3$71N 08-19-98 18:13:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 939 (1997) 943 Opinion of the Court misallocated costs between the two programs, and also con- cluding that Hughes had not adequately disclosed the com- pany's commonality accounting practices in a Cost Account- ing Standards report it had submitted to the Government in 1984. Based on those audits, the Government directed Northrop to withhold $15.4 million in B­2 contract payments from Hughes.1 On January 20, 1989, respondent William J. Schumer, for- merly the Division Contracts Manager for Hughes' B­2 Divi- sion, commenced this action against Hughes pursuant to 31 U. S. C. § 3730(b), the qui tam provision of the FCA that au- thorizes private individuals, "relators," to bring claims on behalf of the United States against any person who know- ingly presented false or fraudulent claims to the United States in violation of § 3729. Schumer's complaint alleged that Hughes knowingly mischarged Northrop-and through it the United States-for certain radar development costs that should have been allocated to the fixed-price F­15 sub- contract with McDonnell-Douglas instead of to the cost-plus B­2 subcontract with Northrop. App. 72­80. Schumer's amended complaint alleged that Hughes' accounting prac- tices resulted in a $50 million net overcharge, and sought treble damages in the amount of $150 million. Id., at 102.2 Hughes moved to dismiss Schumer's action, contending that the 1986 FCA amendment was not retroactive and that 1 The Government ultimately reversed its preliminary determination, concluding that the commonality agreements had actually benefited the Government by charging costs to the fixed-price F­15 program that other- wise would have been borne solely by the cost-plus B­2 program. Ac- cordingly, the Government withdrew its earlier finding of noncompliance, determined that any noncompliance with accounting disclosure require- ments was immaterial, and directed that Hughes be paid the $15.4 million previously withheld on the B­2 project. App. 136­137; App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a. 2 The Government chose not to intervene in the action, as it was entitled to do under 31 U. S. C. § 3730(b)(2), nor did it move to dismiss the action, as it was likewise entitled to do, see § 3730(c)(2)(A). 520us3$71N 08-19-98 18:13:07 PAGES OPINPGT 944 HUGHES AIRCRAFT CO. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. SCHUMER Opinion of the Court the qui tam provision in effect when Hughes engaged in its allegedly wrongful conduct precluded qui tam suits based on information already possessed by the Government. See 31 U. S. C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982 ed.). Hughes argued in the alter- native that the suit was barred even under the 1986 version of the Act because it was "based upon the public disclosure of allegations . . . in a[n] . . . administrative . . . audit," within the meaning of 31 U. S. C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).3 The District Court denied Hughes' motion. Hughes then moved for summary judgment on the merits, contending that it had fully disclosed the basis of its cost accounting system to all of its customers and had complied with all applicable contractual and regulatory requirements relating to cost allocation. After full briefing, the District Court concluded that Hughes had allocated some costs be- tween the F­15 and B­2 programs consistent with disclo- sures Hughes made to Northrop, App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a, had allocated other costs to the fixed-price F­15 contract that could have been charged to the cost-plus B­2 contract alone (thereby benefiting the Government), id., at 50a, and had properly disclosed the contents of the commonality agreements to Northrop and the Air Force, id., at 46a­48a, 56a. Accordingly, the District Court held that "Schumer has not shown that Hughes violated the False Claims Act." Id., at 64a. Schumer appealed from the grant of summary judgment against him, and Hughes cross-appealed from the denial of its motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit rejected Hughes' cross-appeal, holding that the 1986 amendment removing certain defenses to qui tam suits should be applied retroac- tively to suits based on pre-1986 conduct because the amend- ment involved only the "subject matter jurisdiction" of 3 Hughes also raised several constitutional challenges to the qui tam provisions of the Act that are not presently before us. See 519 U. S. 926 (1996) (limiting grant of certiorari to the nonconstitutional questions pre- sented by the petition). 520us3$71N 08-19-98 18:13:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 939 (1997) 945 Opinion of the Court courts to hear qui tam claims and did not affect the substan- tive liability of qui tam defendants. 63 F. 3d 1512, 1517 (1995). The court further determined that the action was not barred under the 1986 version of the Act because no "public disclosure" of information possessed by the Govern- ment had been made. Id., at 1518. Finally, the court re- versed in part and remanded for further consideration on the merits, holding that a material factual dispute existed as to whether Hughes had made misleading and incomplete disclo- sures about its commonality agreements, whether or not the allegedly incomplete disclosures resulted in any harm to the public fisc. Id., at 1522­1525. We granted the petition for certiorari to consider whether the 1986 amendment is applicable to pre-1986 conduct and, if so, whether the Government's release of its audits to Hughes employees constituted a public disclosure bar under the 1986 amendment and whether harm to the public fisc is an essen- tial element of a qui tam action under the amended Act. 519 U. S. 926 (1996). Because we conclude that the lower courts should not have applied the 1986 amendment and therefore that this action should have been dismissed, we express no opinion as to the Ninth Circuit's "public disclosure" and "pub- lic fisc" holdings, or as to the merits of respondent's factual contentions. II The allegedly false claims at issue in this case were sub- mitted by Hughes between 1982 and 1984. At that time, the FCA required a district court to "dismiss [a qui tam] action . . . based on evidence or information the Government had when the action was brought." 31 U. S. C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982 ed.). The Ninth Circuit accepted, and respondent does not dispute, that because "the government was aware of [re- spondent's] allegations before he filed his suit, the [1982 provision] would bar his claim," were it applicable. 63 F. 3d, at 1517. 520us3$71N 08-19-98 18:13:07 PAGES OPINPGT 946 HUGHES AIRCRAFT CO. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. SCHUMER Opinion of the Court Congress amended the FCA in 1986, however, to permit qui tam suits based on information in the Government's pos- session, except where the suit was based on information that had been publicly disclosed and was not brought by an origi- nal source of the information. See 31 U. S. C. § 3730(e)(4) (A). Because the 1986 amendment became effective before this suit was commenced, respondent contends that it, rather than the 1982 qui tam provision, controls. We disagree. We have frequently noted, and just recently reaffirmed, that there is a "presumption against retroactive legislation [that] is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence." Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 265 (1994). "The `princi- ple that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be as- sessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal.' " Ibid. (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U. S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Accordingly, we apply this time-honored presumption unless Congress has clearly manifested its intent to the contrary. 511 U. S., at 268. Nothing in the 1986 amendment evidences a clear intent by Congress that it be applied retroactively, and no one suggests otherwise. Thus, under the analysis the Court adopted in Landgraf, if the 1986 amendment has a retroac- tive effect, then we presume it will not apply to the conduct alleged in this case, which occurred prior to its effective date.4 Respondent argues that the 1986 amendment has no retro- active effect because it does not fit within Justice Story's "influential definition" of impermissibly retroactive legisla- tion, which we quoted with approval in Landgraf: 4 Because both the allegedly false claim submission and the disclosure to the Government of information about that submission occurred prior to the effective date of the 1986 amendments, we need not address which of these two events constitutes the relevant conduct for purposes of our retroactivity analysis. 520us3$71N 08-19-98 18:13:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 939 (1997) 947 Opinion of the Court " `[E]very statute, which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new dis- ability, in respect to transactions or considerations al- ready past, must be deemed retrospective.' " 511 U. S., at 269 (quoting Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767 (No. 13,156) (CC NH 1814) (Story, J.)). To the extent respondent contends that only statutes with one of these effects are subject to our presumption against retroactivity, he simply misreads our opinion in Landgraf. The language upon which he relies does not purport to define the outer limit of impermissible retroactivity. Rather, our opinion in Landgraf, like that of Justice Story, merely de- scribed that any such effect constituted a sufficient, rather than a necessary, condition for invoking the presumption against retroactivity. Indeed, we recognized that the Court has used various formulations to describe the "functional conceptio[n] of legislative `retroactivity,' " and made no sug- gestion that Justice Story's formulation was the exclusive definition of presumptively impermissible retroactive legisla- tion. 511 U. S., at 269. In any event, even applying Justice Story's formulation, we reject respondent's contention that the 1986 amendment lacks retroactive effect. Respondent first argues that the 1986 amendment does not " `impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed' " because, since 1863, "the FCA has made it unlawful to knowingly submit a false claim for payment to the United States." Brief for Respondent 15 (quoting Landgraf, supra, at 280). The same argument was made, and rejected, in Landgraf. There, we noted that the provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 authorizing com- pensatory damages "does not make unlawful conduct that was lawful when it occurred," but we "[n]onetheless" held that "the new compensatory damages provision would oper- ate `retrospectively' if it were applied to conduct occurring 520us3$71N 08-19-98 18:13:07 PAGES OPINPGT 948 HUGHES AIRCRAFT CO. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. SCHUMER Opinion of the Court before" its effective date. 511 U. S., at 281­282; see also Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U. S. 298, 303 (1994) (holding that an increase in monetary liability could not be applied retroactively even though the "normative scope of Title VII's prohibition on workplace discrimination" was not altered). Respondent next contends that "the 1986 Amendments to the qui tam bar do not create a new cause of action where there was none before, change the substance of the extant cause of action, or alter a defendant's exposure for a false claim by even a single penny [and] thus d[o] not `increase a party's liability for past conduct.' " Brief for Respondent 15 (quoting Landgraf, supra, at 280). See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13­14. Again, respondent is mis- taken. While we acknowledge that the monetary liability faced by an FCA defendant is the same whether the action is brought by the Government or by a qui tam relator, the 1986 amendment eliminates a defense to a qui tam suit- prior disclosure to the Government-and therefore changes the substance of the existing cause of action for qui tam defendants by " `attach[ing] a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.' " Landgraf, supra, at 269 (quoting Wheeler, supra, at 767); see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14, n. 6 ("[P]roof that the government had the information when suit was brought was . . . a jurisdictional defense to an action brought by a qui tam relator" (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Col- lins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 49 (1990) ("A law that abol- ishes an affirmative defense" violates the Ex Post Facto Clause); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167, 169­170 (1925) ("[A]ny statute . . . which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto"). Nor is it the case that the 1986 amendment does not "cre- ate a new cause of action." As respondent himself recog- nizes, "as a result of the 1986 Amendments, the federal 520us3$71N 08-19-98 18:13:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 939 (1997) 949 Opinion of the Court courts are open to an FCA action brought by a private rela- tor on behalf of the United States," whereas "[p]rior to 1986, once the United States learned of a false claim, only the Gov- ernment could assert its rights under the FCA against the false claimant." Brief for Respondent 16; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14 (recognizing that the 1986 amendment "expanded the circumstances under which qui tam relators may pursue actions to enforce" a false claimant's liability to the Government). The extension of an FCA cause of action to private parties in circumstances where the action was previously foreclosed is not insignificant. As a class of plaintiffs, qui tam relators are different in kind than the Government. They are moti- vated primarily by prospects of monetary reward rather than the public good. As we have previously recognized: " `[Qui tam statutes are] passed upon the theory, based on experience as old as modern civilization, that one of the least expensive and most effective means of prevent- ing frauds on the Treasury is to make the perpetrators of them liable to actions by private persons acting, if you please, under the strong stimulus of personal ill will or the hope of gain. Prosecutions conducted by such means compare with the ordinary methods as the enter- prising privateer does to the slow-going public vessel.' " United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537, 541, n. 5 (1943) (quoting United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (Ore. 1885)). Qui tam relators are thus less likely than is the Government to forgo an action arguably based on a mere technical non- compliance with reporting requirements that involved no harm to the public fisc.5 5 That a qui tam suit is brought by a private party "on behalf of the United States," see Brief for Respondent 17, does not alter the fact that a relator's interests and the Government's do not necessarily coincide. Moreover, as the statute specifies, qui tam actions are brought both 520us3$71N 08-19-98 18:13:08 PAGES OPINPGT 950 HUGHES AIRCRAFT CO. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. SCHUMER Opinion of the Court In permitting actions by an expanded universe of plaintiffs with different incentives, the 1986 amendment essentially creates a new cause of action, not just an increased likelihood that an existing cause of action will be pursued. See, e. g., Winfree v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 227 U. S. 296, 302 (1913). Prior to the 1986 amendment, respondent's qui tam action was completely barred because of Hughes' disclosure to the Government of information about its claim submissions. The 1986 amendment would revive that action, subjecting Hughes to previously foreclosed qui tam litigation, much like extending a statute of limitations after the pre-existing pe- riod of limitations has expired impermissibly revives a mori- bund cause of action, see, e. g., Chenault v. U. S. Postal Serv- ice, 37 F. 3d 535, 537, 539 (CA9 1994) (relying on Landgraf in concluding that "a newly enacted statute that lengthens the applicable statute of limitations may not be applied retro- actively to revive a plaintiff's claim that was otherwise barred under the old statutory scheme because to do so would alter the substantive rights of a party and increase a party's liability" (internal quotation marks omitted)). This is true even if a cause of action remained open to some other party. It is simply not the case that, as respondent asserts, the elimination of a prior defense to qui tam actions does not "create a new cause of action" or "change the substance of the extant cause of action." Finally, respondent contends that the 1986 amendment is jurisdictional, and hence that it is an exception to the general Landgraf presumption against retroactivity. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit went further, holding that, absent a clear statement of congressional intent, there is a strong presump- tion in favor of retroactivity for jurisdictional statutes. 63 F. 3d, at 1517. The Ninth Circuit simply misread our deci- sion in Landgraf, for the only "presumption" mentioned in that opinion is a general presumption against retroactivity. "for the person and for the United States Government." 31 U. S. C. § 3730(b)(1) (emphasis added). 520us3$71N 08-19-98 18:13:08 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 520 U. S. 939 (1997) 951 Opinion of the Court The fact that courts often apply newly enacted jurisdiction- allocating statutes to pending cases merely evidences certain limited circumstances failing to meet the conditions for our generally applicable presumption against retroactivity, not an exception to the rule itself, as the United States recog- nizes. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 15, and n. 8. As we stated in Landgraf: "Application of a new jurisdictional rule usually `takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribu- nal that is to hear the case.' Present law normally gov- erns in such situations because jurisdictional statutes `speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties.' " 511 U. S., at 274 (empha- sis added; citations omitted). Statutes merely addressing which court shall have jurisdic- tion to entertain a particular cause of action can fairly be said merely to regulate the secondary conduct of litigation and not the underlying primary conduct of the parties. Cf. id., at 275; id., at 291 (Scalia, J., concurring). Such statutes affect only where a suit may be brought, not whether it may be brought at all. The 1986 amendment, however, does not merely allocate jurisdiction among forums. Rather, it cre- ates jurisdiction where none previously existed; it thus speaks not just to the power of a particular court but to the substantive rights of the parties as well. Such a statute, even though phrased in "jurisdictional" terms, is as much subject to our presumption against retroactivity as any other. III In sum, whether we consider the relevant conduct to be Hughes' disclosure to the Government or its submission of the allegedly false claim, disclosure of information about the claim to the Government constituted a full defense to a qui tam action prior to 1986. If applied in this case, the legal effect of the 1986 amendment would be to deprive Hughes of 520us3$71N 08-19-98 18:13:08 PAGES OPINPGT 952 HUGHES AIRCRAFT CO. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. SCHUMER Opinion of the Court that defense. Given the absence of a clear statutory expres- sion of congressional intent to apply the 1986 amendment to conduct completed before its enactment, we apply our pre- sumption against retroactivity and hold that, under the rele- vant 1982 version of the FCA, the District Court was obliged to dismiss this action because it was "based on evidence or information the Government had when the action was brought." 31 U. S. C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982 ed.). We therefore vacate the judgment below, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 520US3 Unit: $U72 [09-11-99 19:07:54] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 953 Syllabus ASSOCIATES COMMERCIAL CORP. v. RASH et ux. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit No. 96­454. Argued April 16, 1997-Decided June 16, 1997 Petitioner Associates Commercial Corporation (ACC) holds a loan and lien on a tractor truck purchased by respondent Elray Rash for use in his freight-hauling business. Elray and Jean Rash, also a respondent, filed a joint petition and repayment plan under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code (Code), listing ACC as a secured creditor. Under the Code, ACC's claim for the $41,171 balance owed on the truck was secured only to the extent of the value of the collateral; its claim over and above that value was unsecured. See 11 U. S. C. § 506(a). The Rashes could gain con- firmation of their Chapter 13 plan only if ACC accepted it, if the Rashes surrendered the truck to ACC, or if the Rashes invoked the so-called "cram down" provision. See § 1325(a)(5). The cram down option allows the debtor to keep the collateral over the objection of the credi- tor; the creditor retains the lien securing the claim, see § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i), and the debtor is required to provide the creditor with payments, over the life of the plan, that will total the present value of the collateral, see § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). The value of the allowed secured claim is gov- erned by § 506(a) of the Code. The Rashes invoked the cram down power, proposing to keep the truck for use in the freight-hauling busi- ness. ACC objected to the plan, sought to repossess the truck, and disputed the value the Rashes had assigned to the truck. At an eviden- tiary hearing held to resolve the dispute, ACC maintained that the proper valuation was the price the Rashes would have to pay to pur- chase a like vehicle (the replacement-value standard), estimated to be $41,000. The Rashes, however, maintained that the proper valuation was the net amount ACC would realize upon foreclosure and sale of the collateral (the foreclosure-value standard), estimated to be $31,875. The Bankruptcy Court adopted the Rashes' valuation figure and ap- proved the plan. The District Court and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Held: Under § 506(a), the value of property retained because the debtor has exercised Chapter 13's "cram down" option is the cost the debtor would incur to obtain a like asset for the same proposed use. Pp. 960­965. (a) The words "the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property" contained in the first sentence of § 506(a) do not call for the foreclosure-value standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit. Even read in 520US3 Unit: $U72 [09-11-99 19:07:54] PAGES PGT: OPIN 954 ASSOCIATES COMMERCIAL CORP. v. RASH Syllabus isolation, the phrase imparts no valuation standard. The first sentence, read as a whole, instructs that a secured creditor's claim is to be divided into secured and unsecured portions. The sentence tells a court what it must evaluate, but it is not enlightening on how to value collateral. Section 506(a)'s second sentence, however, speaks to the how question, providing that "[s]uch value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property." By deriving a foreclosure-value standard from § 506(a)'s first sentence, the Fifth Circuit rendered inconsequential the sentence that expressly addresses how "value shall be determined." The "proposed disposition or use" of the collateral is of paramount importance to the valuation question. Such "disposition or use" turns on which alternative the debtor chooses when a secured creditor refuses to accept the debtor's Chapter 13 plan-in one case the collateral will be surrendered to the creditor, and in the other, the collateral will be retained and used by the debtor. Applying a foreclosure-value standard attributes no sig- nificance to the different consequences of the debtor's choice. A replacement-value standard, on the other hand, distinguishes retention from surrender and renders meaningful the key statutory words "dispo- sition or use." Surrender and retention are not equivalent acts. When a debtor surrenders the property, a creditor obtains it immediately, and is free to sell it and reinvest the proceeds. If a debtor keeps the prop- erty and continues to use it, the creditor obtains at once neither the property nor its value, and is exposed to double risks against which the Code affords incomplete protection: The debtor may again default and the property may deteriorate from extended use. Of prime signifi- cance, the replacement-value standard accurately gauges the debtor's "use" of the property. The debtor in this case elected to use the collat- eral to generate an income stream. That actual use, rather than a fore- closure sale that will not take place, is the proper guide under a pre- scription hinged to the property's "disposition or use." Pp. 960­963. (b) The Fifth Circuit considered the replacement-value standard dis- respectful of Texas law, which permits the secured creditor to sell the collateral, thereby obtaining only its net foreclosure. In allowing Chap- ter 13 debtors to retain and use collateral over the objection of secured creditors, however, the Bankruptcy Code has reshaped debtor and credi- tor rights in marked departure from state law. It no more disrupts state law to make "disposition or use" the guide for valuation than to authorize the rearrangement of rights the cram down power en- tails. There is also no warrant in the Code for a valuation standard that uses the midpoint between foreclosure and replacement values. Pp. 964­965. 90 F. 3d 1036, reversed and remanded. 520US3 Unit: $U72 [09-11-99 19:07:54] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 953 (1997) 955 Opinion of the Court Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in all but n. 4 of which Scalia, J., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 966. Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Shalom L. Kohn, David M. Schiff- man, Ben L. Aderholt, and Raymond J. Blackwood. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen- eral Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, and Gary D. Gray. John J. Durkay argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.* Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. We resolve in this case a dispute concerning the proper application of § 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code when a bank- rupt debtor has exercised the "cram down" option for which Code § 1325(a)(5)(B) provides. Specifically, when a debtor, over a secured creditor's objection, seeks to retain and use the creditor's collateral in a Chapter 13 plan, is the value of the collateral to be determined by (1) what the secured credi- tor could obtain through foreclosure sale of the property (the "foreclosure-value" standard); (2) what the debtor would have to pay for comparable property (the "replacement- *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for NationsBank, N. A., et al. by John H. Culver III; and for the Washington Legal Founda- tion by David R. Kuney, Daniel J. Popeo, and Penelope K. Shapiro. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the National Association of Chapter 13 Trustees by Henry E. Hildebrand and Christo- pher M. Minton; for the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, Inc., by Norma L. Hammes and James J. Gold; and for Donald and Madelaine Taffi by A. Lavar Taylor. Jan T. Chilton and Phillip D. Brady filed a brief for the American Auto- mobile Manufacturers Association, Inc., et al. as amici curiae. Justice Scalia joins all but footnote 4 of this opinion. 520US3 Unit: $U72 [09-11-99 19:07:54] PAGES PGT: OPIN 956 ASSOCIATES COMMERCIAL CORP. v. RASH Opinion of the Court value" standard); or (3) the midpoint between these two measurements? We hold that § 506(a) directs application of the replacement-value standard. I In 1989, respondent Elray Rash purchased for $73,700 a Kenworth tractor truck for use in his freight-hauling busi- ness. Rash made a downpayment on the truck, agreed to pay the seller the remainder in 60 monthly installments, and pledged the truck as collateral on the unpaid balance. The seller assigned the loan, and its lien on the truck, to peti- tioner Associates Commercial Corporation (ACC). In March 1992, Elray and Jean Rash filed a joint petition and a repayment plan under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code (Code), 11 U. S. C. §§ 1301­1330. At the time of the bankruptcy filing, the balance owed to ACC on the truck loan was $41,171. Because it held a valid lien on the truck, ACC was listed in the bankruptcy petition as a creditor holding a secured claim. Under the Code, ACC's claim for the balance owed on the truck was secured only to the extent of the value of the collateral; its claim over and above the value of the truck was unsecured. See 11 U. S. C. § 506(a). To qualify for confirmation under Chapter 13, the Rashes' plan had to satisfy the requirements set forth in § 1325(a) of the Code. The Rashes' treatment of ACC's secured claim, in particular, is governed by subsection (a)(5).1 Under this 1 Section 1325(a)(5) states: "(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if- . . . . . "(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan- "(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan; "(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim; and "(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim; or 520US3 Unit: $U72 [09-11-99 19:07:54] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 953 (1997) 957 Opinion of the Court provision, a plan's proposed treatment of secured claims can be confirmed if one of three conditions is satisfied: The se- cured creditor accepts the plan, see 11 U. S. C. § 1325(a)(5) (A); the debtor surrenders the property securing the claim to the creditor, see § 1325(a)(5)(C); or the debtor invokes the so-called "cram down" power, see § 1325(a)(5)(B). Under the cram down option, the debtor is permitted to keep the prop- erty over the objection of the creditor; the creditor retains the lien securing the claim, see § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i), and the debtor is required to provide the creditor with payments, over the life of the plan, that will total the present value of the allowed secured claim, i. e., the present value of the collateral, see § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). The value of the allowed secured claim is governed by § 506(a) of the Code. The Rashes' Chapter 13 plan invoked the cram down power. It proposed that the Rashes retain the truck for use in the freight-hauling business and pay ACC, over 58 months, an amount equal to the present value of the truck. That value, the Rashes' petition alleged, was $28,500. ACC ob- jected to the plan and asked the Bankruptcy Court to lift the automatic stay so ACC could repossess the truck. ACC also filed a proof of claim alleging that its claim was fully secured in the amount of $41,171. The Rashes filed an ob- jection to ACC's claim. The Bankruptcy Court held an evidentiary hearing to re- solve the dispute over the truck's value. At the hearing, ACC and the Rashes urged different valuation benchmarks. ACC maintained that the proper valuation was the price the Rashes would have to pay to purchase a like vehicle, an amount ACC's expert estimated to be $41,000. The Rashes, however, maintained that the proper valuation was the net amount ACC would realize upon foreclosure and sale of the collateral, an amount their expert estimated to be $31,875. "(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder." 520US3 Unit: $U72 [09-11-99 19:07:54] PAGES PGT: OPIN 958 ASSOCIATES COMMERCIAL CORP. v. RASH Opinion of the Court The Bankruptcy Court agreed with the Rashes and fixed the amount of ACC's secured claim at $31,875; that sum, the court found, was the net amount ACC would realize if it ex- ercised its right to repossess and sell the truck. See In re Rash, 149 B. R. 430, 431­432 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Tex. 1993). The Bankruptcy Court thereafter approved the plan, and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas affirmed. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re- versed. In re Rash, 31 F. 3d 325 (1994). On rehearing en banc, however, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court, holding that ACC's allowed secured claim was limited to $31,875, the net foreclosure value of the truck. In re Rash, 90 F. 3d 1036 (1996). In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit highlighted, first, a conflict it perceived between the method of valuation ACC advanced, and the law of Texas defining the rights of secured creditors. See id., at 1041­1042 (citing Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §§ 9.504(a), (c), 9.505 (1991)). In the Fifth Circuit's view, valuing collateral in a federal bankruptcy pro- ceeding under a replacement-value standard-thereby set- ting an amount generally higher than what a secured credi- tor could realize pursuing its state-law foreclosure remedy- would "chang[e] the extent to which ACC is secured from what obtained under state law prior to the bankruptcy fil- ing." 90 F. 3d, at 1041. Such a departure from state law, the Fifth Circuit said, should be resisted by the federal forum unless "clearly compel[led]" by the Code. Id., at 1042. The Fifth Circuit then determined that the Code provision governing valuation of security interests, § 506(a), does not compel a replacement-value approach. Instead, the court reasoned, the first sentence of § 506(a) requires that collat- eral be valued from the creditor's perspective. See id., at 1044. And because "the creditor's interest is in the nature of a security interest, giving the creditor the right to repos- 520US3 Unit: $U72 [09-11-99 19:07:54] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 953 (1997) 959 Opinion of the Court sess and sell the collateral and nothing more[,] . . . the valu- ation should start with what the creditor could realize by exercising that right." Ibid. This foreclosure-value stand- ard, the Fifth Circuit found, was consistent with the other relevant provisions of the Code, economic analysis, and the legislative history of the pertinent provisions. See id., at 1045­1059. Judge Smith, joined by five other judges, dis- sented, urging that the Code dictates a replacement-value standard. See id., at 1061­1075. Courts of Appeals have adopted three different standards for valuing a security interest in a bankruptcy proceeding when the debtor invokes the cram down power to retain the collateral over the creditor's objection. In contrast to the Fifth Circuit's foreclosure-value standard, a number of Cir- cuits have followed a replacement-value approach. See, e. g., In re Taffi, 96 F. 3d 1190, 1191­1192 (CA9 1996) (en banc), cert. pending sub nom. Taffi v. United States, No. 96­ 881; 2 In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc., 50 F. 3d 72, 74­75 (CA1 1995); In re Trimble, 50 F. 3d 530, 531­532 (CA8 1995). Other courts have settled on the midpoint between foreclosure value and replacement value. See In re Hos- kins, 102 F. 3d 311, 316 (CA7 1996); cf. In re Valenti, 105 F. 3d 55, 62 (CA2 1997) (bankruptcy courts have discretion to value at midpoint between replacement value and foreclo- sure value). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict among the Courts of Appeals, see 519 U. S. 1086 (1997), and we now reverse the Fifth Circuit's judgment. 2 In In re Taffi, the Ninth Circuit contrasted replacement value with fair-market value and adopted the latter standard, apparently viewing the two standards as incompatible. See 96 F. 3d, at 1192. By using the term "replacement value," we do not suggest that a creditor is entitled to re- cover what it would cost the debtor to purchase the collateral brand new. Rather, our use of the term replacement value is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's understanding of the meaning of fair-market value; by replace- ment value, we mean the price a willing buyer in the debtor's trade, busi- ness, or situation would pay a willing seller to obtain property of like age and condition. See also infra, at 965, n. 6. 520US3 Unit: $U72 [09-11-99 19:07:54] PAGES PGT: OPIN 960 ASSOCIATES COMMERCIAL CORP. v. RASH Opinion of the Court II The Code provision central to the resolution of this case is § 506(a), which states: "An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such credi- tor's interest in the estate's interest in such property, . . . and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest . . . is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be de- termined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property . . . ." 11 U. S. C. § 506(a). Over ACC's objection, the Rashes' repayment plan proposed, pursuant to § 1325(a)(5)(B), continued use of the property in question, i. e., the truck, in the debtor's trade or business. In such a "cram down" case, we hold, the value of the prop- erty (and thus the amount of the secured claim under § 506(a)) is the price a willing buyer in the debtor's trade, business, or situation would pay to obtain like property from a willing seller. Rejecting this replacement-value standard, and selecting instead the typically lower foreclosure-value standard, the Fifth Circuit trained its attention on the first sentence of § 506(a). In particular, the Fifth Circuit relied on these first sentence words: A claim is secured "to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property." See 90 F. 3d, at 1044 (emphasis added) (cit- ing § 506(a)). The Fifth Circuit read this phrase to instruct that the "starting point for the valuation [is] what the credi- tor could realize if it sold the estate's interest in the property according to the security agreement," namely, through "re- possess[ing] and sell[ing] the collateral." Ibid. We do not find in the § 506(a) first sentence words-"the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property"- 520US3 Unit: $U72 [09-11-99 19:07:54] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 953 (1997) 961 Opinion of the Court the foreclosure-value meaning advanced by the Fifth Circuit. Even read in isolation, the phrase imparts no valuation standard: A direction simply to consider the "value of such creditor's interest" does not expressly reveal how that inter- est is to be valued. Reading the first sentence of § 506(a) as a whole, we are satisfied that the phrase the Fifth Circuit considered key is not an instruction to equate a "creditor's interest" with the net value a creditor could realize through a foreclosure sale. The first sentence, in its entirety, tells us that a secured cred- itor's claim is to be divided into secured and unsecured por- tions, with the secured portion of the claim limited to the value of the collateral. See United States v. Ron Pair En- terprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 238­239 (1989); 4 L. King, Col- lier on Bankruptcy ¶ 506.02[1][a], p. 506­6 (15th ed. rev. 1996). To separate the secured from the unsecured portion of a claim, a court must compare the creditor's claim to the value of "such property," i. e., the collateral. That compari- son is sometimes complicated. A debtor may own only a part interest in the property pledged as collateral, in which case the court will be required to ascertain the "estate's in- terest" in the collateral. Or, a creditor may hold a junior or subordinate lien, which would require the court to ascertain the creditor's interest in the collateral. The § 506(a) phrase referring to the "creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property" thus recognizes that a court may encounter, and in such instances must evaluate, limited or partial inter- ests in collateral. The full first sentence of § 506(a), in short, tells a court what it must evaluate, but it does not say more; it is not enlightening on how to value collateral. The second sentence of § 506(a) does speak to the how question. "Such value," that sentence provides, "shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property." § 506(a). By deriving a foreclosure-value standard from § 506(a)'s first sentence, the Fifth Circuit rendered inconsequential the 520US3 Unit: $U72 [09-11-99 19:07:54] PAGES PGT: OPIN 962 ASSOCIATES COMMERCIAL CORP. v. RASH Opinion of the Court sentence that expressly addresses how "value shall be determined." As we comprehend § 506(a), the "proposed disposition or use" of the collateral is of paramount importance to the valu- ation question. If a secured creditor does not accept a debt- or's Chapter 13 plan, the debtor has two options for handling allowed secured claims: surrender the collateral to the credi- tor, see § 1325(a)(5)(C); or, under the cram down option, keep the collateral over the creditor's objection and provide the creditor, over the life of the plan, with the equivalent of the present value of the collateral, see § 1325(a)(5)(B). The "disposition or use" of the collateral thus turns on the alter- native the debtor chooses-in one case the collateral will be surrendered to the creditor, and in the other, the collat- eral will be retained and used by the debtor. Applying a foreclosure-value standard when the cram down option is invoked attributes no significance to the different conse- quences of the debtor's choice to surrender the property or retain it. A replacement-value standard, on the other hand, distinguishes retention from surrender and renders mean- ingful the key words "disposition or use." Tying valuation to the actual "disposition or use" of the property points away from a foreclosure-value standard when a Chapter 13 debtor, invoking cram down power, re- tains and uses the property. Under that option, foreclosure is averted by the debtor's choice and over the creditor's ob- jection. From the creditor's perspective as well as the debt- or's, surrender and retention are not equivalent acts. When a debtor surrenders the property, a creditor obtains it immediately, and is free to sell it and reinvest the proceeds. We recall here that ACC sought that very advantage. See supra, at 957. If a debtor keeps the property and continues to use it, the creditor obtains at once neither the property nor its value and is exposed to double risks: The debtor may again default and the property may deteriorate from ex- tended use. Adjustments in the interest rate and secured 520US3 Unit: $U72 [09-11-99 19:07:54] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 953 (1997) 963 Opinion of the Court creditor demands for more "adequate protection," 11 U. S. C. § 361, do not fully offset these risks. See 90 F. 3d, at 1066 (Smith, J., dissenting) ("vast majority of reorganizations fail . . . leaving creditors with only a fraction of the compensation due them"; where, as here, "collateral depreciates rapidly, the secured creditor may receive far less in a failed reorgani- zation than in a prompt foreclosure" (internal cross-reference omitted)); accord, In re Taffi, 96 F. 3d, at 1192­1193.3 Of prime significance, the replacement-value standard ac- curately gauges the debtor's "use" of the property. It val- ues "the creditor's interest in the collateral in light of the proposed [repayment plan] reality: no foreclosure sale and economic benefit for the debtor derived from the collateral equal to . . . its [replacement] value." In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, 50 F. 3d, at 75. The debtor in this case elected to use the collateral to generate an income stream. That actual use, rather than a foreclosure sale that will not take place, is the proper guide under a prescription hinged to the property's "disposition or use." See ibid.4 3 On this matter, amici curiae supporting ACC contended: " `Adequate protection' payments under 11 U. S. C. §§ 361, 362(d)(1) typically are based on the assumption that the collateral will be subject to only ordinary de- preciation. Hence, even when such payments are made, they frequently fail to compensate adequately for the usually more rapid depreciation of assets retained by the debtor." Brief for American Automobile Manufac- turers Association, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 21, n. 9. 4 We give no weight to the legislative history of § 506(a), noting that it is unedifying, offering snippets that might support either standard of valuation. The Senate Report simply repeated the phrase contained in the second sentence of § 506(a). See S. Rep. No. 95­989, p. 68 (1978). The House Report, in the Fifth Circuit's view, rejected a " `replacement cost' " valuation. See In re Rash, 90 F. 3d 1036, 1056 (CA5 1996) (quoting H. Rep. No. 95­595, p. 124 (1977)). That Report, however, appears to use the term "replacement cost" to mean the cost of buying new property to replace property in which a creditor had a security interest. See ibid. In any event, House Report excerpts are not enlightening, for the provi- sion pivotal here-the second sentence of § 506(a)-did not appear in the bill addressed by the House Report. The key sentence originated in the 520US3 Unit: $U72 [09-11-99 19:07:54] PAGES PGT: OPIN 964 ASSOCIATES COMMERCIAL CORP. v. RASH Opinion of the Court The Fifth Circuit considered the replacement-value stand- ard disrespectful of state law, which permits the secured creditor to sell the collateral, thereby obtaining its net fore- closure value "and nothing more." See 90 F. 3d, at 1044. In allowing Chapter 13 debtors to retain and use collateral over the objection of secured creditors, however, the Code has reshaped debtor and creditor rights in marked departure from state law. See, e. g., Uniform Commercial Code §§ 9­ 504, 9­505, 3B U. L. A. 127, 352 (1992). The Code's cram down option displaces a secured creditor's state-law right to obtain immediate foreclosure upon a debtor's default. That change, ordered by federal law, is attended by a direction that courts look to the "proposed disposition or use" of the collateral in determining its value. It no more disrupts state law to make "disposition or use" the guide for valuation than to authorize the rearrangement of rights the cram down power entails. Nor are we persuaded that the split-the-difference ap- proach adopted by the Seventh Circuit provides the ap- propriate solution. See In re Hoskins, 102 F. 3d, at 316. Whatever the attractiveness of a standard that picks the midpoint between foreclosure and replacement values, there is no warrant for it in the Code.5 Section 506(a) calls for the value the property possesses in light of the "disposition or use" in fact "proposed," not the various dispositions or uses that might have been proposed. Cf. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 511 U. S. 531, 540 (1994) (court-made rule defining, for purposes of Code's fraudulent transfer provi- Senate version of the bill, compare H. R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 506(a) (1977), with S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 506(a) (1977), and was included in the final text of the statute after the House-Senate conference, see 124 Cong. Rec. 33997 (1978). 5 As our reading of § 506(a) makes plain, we also reject a ruleless ap- proach allowing use of different valuation standards based on the facts and circumstances of individual cases. Cf. In re Valenti, 105 F. 3d 55, 62­63 (CA2 1997) (permissible for bankruptcy courts to determine valua- tion standard case-by-case). 520US3 Unit: $U72 [09-11-99 19:07:54] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 953 (1997) 965 Opinion of the Court sion, "reasonably equivalent value" to mean 70% of fair mar- ket value "represent[s] [a] policy determinatio[n] that the Bankruptcy Code gives us no apparent authority to make"). The Seventh Circuit rested on the "economics of the situa- tion," In re Hoskins, 102 F. 3d, at 316, only after concluding that the statute suggests no particular valuation method. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that "a simple rule of valuation is needed" to serve the interests of predictability and uniformity. Id., at 314. We conclude, however, that § 506(a) supplies a governing instruction less complex than the Seventh Circuit's "make two valuations, then split the difference" formulation. In sum, under § 506(a), the value of property retained be- cause the debtor has exercised the § 1325(a)(5)(B) "cram down" option is the cost the debtor would incur to obtain a like asset for the same "proposed . . . use." 6 * * * For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 6 Our recognition that the replacement-value standard, not the foreclosure-value standard, governs in cram down cases leaves to bank- ruptcy courts, as triers of fact, identification of the best way of ascertain- ing replacement value on the basis of the evidence presented. Whether replacement value is the equivalent of retail value, wholesale value, or some other value will depend on the type of debtor and the nature of the property. We note, however, that replacement value, in this context, should not include certain items. For example, where the proper measure of the replacement value of a vehicle is its retail value, an adjustment to that value may be necessary: A creditor should not receive portions of the retail price, if any, that reflect the value of items the debtor does not receive when he retains his vehicle, items such as warranties, inventory storage, and reconditioning. Cf. 90 F. 3d, at 1051­1052. Nor should the creditor gain from modifications to the property-e. g., the addition of ac- cessories to a vehicle-to which a creditor's lien would not extend under state law. 520US3 Unit: $U72 [09-11-99 19:07:54] PAGES PGT: OPIN 966 ASSOCIATES COMMERCIAL CORP. v. RASH Stevens, J., dissenting Justice Stevens, dissenting. Although the meaning of 11 U. S. C. § 506(a) is not entirely clear, I think its text points to foreclosure as the proper method of valuation in this case. The first sentence in § 506(a) tells courts to determine the value of the "creditor's interest in the estate's interest" in the property. 11 U. S. C. § 506(a) (emphasis added). This language suggests that the value should be determined from the creditor's perspective, i. e., what the collateral is worth, on the open market, in the creditor's hands, rather than in the hands of another party. The second sentence explains that "[s]uch value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property." Ibid. In this context, the "purpose of the valuation" is determined by 11 U. S. C. § 1325(a)(5)(B). Commonly known as the Bank- ruptcy Code's "cram down" provision, this section authorizes the debtor to keep secured property over the creditor's ob- jections in a Chapter 13 reorganization, but, if he elects to do so, directs the debtor to pay the creditor the "value" of the secured claim. The "purpose" of this provision, and hence of the valuation under § 506(a), is to put the creditor in the same shoes as if he were able to exercise his lien and foreclose.* *The Court states that "surrender and retention are not equivalent acts" from the creditor's perspective because he does not receive the prop- erty and is exposed to the risk of default and deterioration. Ante, at 962. I disagree. That the creditor does not receive the property is irrelevant because, as § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) directs, he receives the present value of his security interest. Present value includes both the underlying value and the time value of that interest. The time-value component similarly viti- ates the risk concern. Higher risk uses of money must pay a higher pre- mium to offset the same opportunity cost. In this case, for instance, the creditor was receiving nine percent interest, see In re Rash, 90 F. 3d 1036, 1039 (CA5 1996) (en banc), well over the prevailing rate for an essentially risk-free loan, such as a United States Treasury Bond. Finally, the con- cern with deterioration is addressed by another provision of the Code, 11 U. S. C. § 361, which authorizes the creditor to demand "adequate protec- 520US3 Unit: $U72 [09-11-99 19:07:54] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 953 (1997) 967 Stevens, J., dissenting It is crucial to keep in mind that § 506(a) is a provision that applies throughout the various chapters of the Bankruptcy Code; it is, in other words, a "utility" provision that operates in many different contexts. Even if the words "proposed disposition or use" did not gain special meaning in the cram down context, this would not render them surplusage be- cause they have operational significance in their many other Code applications. In this context, I also think the foreclo- sure standard best comports with economic reality. Allow- ing any more than the foreclosure value simply grants a general windfall to undersecured creditors at the expense of unsecured creditors. Cf. In re Hoskins, 102 F. 3d 311, 320 (CA7 1996) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in judgment). As Judge Easterbrook explained in rejecting the split-the- difference approach as a general rule, see id., at 318­320, a foreclosure-value standard is also consistent with the larger statutory scheme by keeping the respective recoveries of secured and unsecured creditors the same throughout the various bankruptcy chapters. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. tion," including increased payments, to offset any derogation of his secu- rity interest during a cram down. 520US3 Unit: $U73 [09-11-99 19:09:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN 968 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus MAZUREK, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MONTANA v. ARMSTRONG et al. on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 96­1104. Decided June 16, 1997 Respondents, licensed physicians and a physician assistant practicing in Montana, challenged a state law restricting the performance of abor- tions to licensed physicians. In denying their motion for preliminary injunction, the Federal District Court found that they had not estab- lished any likelihood of prevailing on their claim that the law imposed an undue burden under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833. The Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment, holding that respondents had met the Circuit's threshold requirement for a pre- liminary injunction by showing a fair chance of success on the merits. On remand, the District Court entered an injunction pending appeal and postponed hearing the merits of the preliminary injunction motion pending the disposition of petitioner's certiorari petition. As a conse- quence, the physician-only requirement is unenforceable at the present time against the only nonphysician licensed to perform abortions in Montana. Held: The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. Since the physician-only requirement at issue in Casey did not pose a "substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion," it was not an undue burden on the right to abortion. 505 U. S., at 884­885. This precise passage was quoted by the District Court when it concluded that there was insufficient evidence to find a substantial obstacle in Montana. The Ninth Circuit never contested that conclusion, finding instead that the law's purpose made it arguably invalid. However, there is no evidence of a vitiating legislative purpose here. The Court of Appeals' decision is also contradicted by this Court's repeated statements that the per- formance of abortions may be restricted to physicians. See, e. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 165. Since the Ninth Circuit's decision is clearly erroneous under this Court's precedents, and since its judgment has produced immediate consequences for Montana-in the form of an in- junction against the law's implementation-and has raised a real threat of such consequences for the six other States in the Circuit that have physician-only requirements, summary reversal is appropriate. Certiorari granted; 94 F. 3d 566, reversed and remanded. 520US3 Unit: $U73 [09-11-99 19:09:17] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 968 (1997) 969 Per Curiam Per Curiam. In 1995, the Montana Legislature enacted a statute re- stricting the performance of abortions to licensed physicians. 1995 Mont. Laws, ch. 321, § 2 (codified at Mont. Code Ann. § 50­20­109 (1995)). Similar rules exist in 40 other States in the Nation.1 The Montana law was challenged almost im- 1 See Ala. Admin. Code Rules 420­5­1­.01(2)(k), 420­5­1­.03(2)(a) (Supp. 1990) (limiting performance of abortions to "physicians duly licensed in the State of Alabama," which in turn requires meeting the criteria in Ala. Code § 34­24­70 (Supp. 1996)); Alaska Stat. Ann. §§ 08.64.200, 18.16.010(a)(1) (1996); Ark. Code Ann. § 5­61­101(a) (1993); id., § 17­95­403 (1995); Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 123405 (West 1996) (as inter- preted under prior statutory designation in 74 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 101 (1991)); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12­36­107 (1991 and Supp. 1996); id., §§ 18­6­ 101(1), 18­6­102 (1986); Conn. Agencies Regs. § 19­13­D54(a) (1997) (limit- ing performance of abortions to "person[s] licensed to practice medicine and surgery in the State of Connecticut," which in turn requires meeting the criteria in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20­10 (Supp. 1997)); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 24, §§ 1720, 1790(a) (Supp. 1996); Fla. Stat. §§ 390.001(1)(a), 390.001(3) (1993); id., §§ 458.311, 459.0055 (1991 and Supp. 1997); Ga. Code Ann. § 16­ 12­141(a) (1996); id., § 43­34­27 (1994); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 453­4, 453­ 16(a)(1) (1993); Idaho Code § 18­608 (1997); id., §§ 54­1803(3), 54­1803(4) (1994); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 225, § 60/11 (1993); id., ch. 720, §§ 510/2(2), 510/ 3.1 (1993); Ind. Code §§ 16­18­2­202, 16­18­2­282, 16­34­2­1(1)(A) (1993); id., § 25­22.5­3­1 (1995); Iowa Code § 148.3 (Supp. 1997); id., § 707.7 (Supp. 1997); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 311.571, 311.750 (Michie 1995); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37:1272 (West Supp. 1997); id., §§ 40:1299.35.1, 40:1299.35.2(A) (West 1992); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 22, § 1598(3)(A) (1992); id., Tit. 32, §§ 2571, 3271 (Supp. 1996); Md. Health Code Ann. § 20­208 (1996); Md. Health Occ. Code Ann. § 14­307 (Supp. 1995); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 112, §§ 2, 12K, 12L, 12M (1996); Minn. Stat. §§ 145.412, subd. 1(1), 147.02 (1989) (limiting per- formance of abortions to licensed physicians and "physician[s] in training under the supervision of . . . licensed physician[s]"); Miss. Code Ann. § 73­ 25­3 (1995); id., § 97­3­3(1) (1994) (as interpreted in Spears v. State, 278 So. 2d 443 (Miss. 1973)); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 188.015(5), 188.020 (1996); id., § 334.031 (1989); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28­335 (1995); id., § 71­1,104 (Supp. 1996); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 442.250(1)(a) (1991); id., § 630.160 (1995); N. J. Admin. Code § 13:35­4.2(b) (1997) (limiting performance of abortions to "physician[s] licensed to practice medicine and surgery in the State of New 520US3 Unit: $U73 [09-11-99 19:09:17] PAGES PGT: OPIN 970 MAZUREK v. ARMSTRONG Per Curiam mediately by respondents, who are a group of licensed physi- cians and one physician-assistant practicing in Montana. The District Court denied respondents' motion for a prelimi- nary injunction, finding that they had not established any likelihood of prevailing on their claim that the law imposed an "undue burden" within the meaning of Planned Parent- hood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992). 906 F. Supp. 561, 567 (Mont. 1995). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment, holding that respondents had shown a "fair chance of success on the merits" of their claim, and thus had met the threshold requirement for preliminary injunctive relief under Circuit precedent. 94 F. 3d 566, 567­568 (1996). The case was re- manded to the District Court with instructions to reconsider the "balance of hardships" and determine whether entry of a preliminary injunction was ultimately warranted. Ibid. Jersey," which in turn requires meeting the criteria in N. J. Stat. Ann. §§ 45:9­6, 45:9­7 (West 1991), and N. J. Stat. Ann. § 45:9­8 (West Supp. 1997)); N. M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30­5­1(C), 30­5­3 (1994) (as interpreted in N. M. Op. Atty. Gen. 90­19 (1990)); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 61­6­11 (1996); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14­45.1(a) (1993); id., § 90­9 (Supp. 1996); N. D. Cent. Code § 14­02.1­04(1) (1991); id., § 43­17­18 (1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.11 (1996); id., §§ 4731.091, 4731.41 (1994); Okla. Stat., Tit. 59, § 493.1 (Supp. 1997); id., Tit. 63, § 1­731(A) (1997); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3203, 3204(a) (1983 and Supp. 1997); 63 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 271.6, 422.28 (1996); R. I. Code R. 14.000.009, 600.1 (1996) (limiting performance of abortions to "physicians licensed under the [applicable provisions of Rhode Island law]," which in turn requires meeting the criteria in R. I. Gen. Laws § 5­37­2 (1995)); S. C. Code Ann. § 40­47­90 (Supp. 1996) (as implemented by S. C. Code Ann. Regs. §§ 81­80, 81­81, 81­90 (Supp. 1996)); S. C. Code Ann. §§ 44­41­10(b), 44­41­20 (1985); S. D. Codified Laws § 34­23A­1(4) (Supp. 1997); id., §§ 34­23A­3, 34­23A­4, 34­23A­5 (1994); id., § 36­4­11 (Supp. 1997); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 245.010(b) (1992); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 4495b, § 3.04 (Vernon Supp. 1997); Utah Code Ann. §§ 58­67­302, 58­68­302 (Supp. 1996); id., § 76­7­302(1) (1995); Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2­71, 18.2­72, 18.2­73, 18.2­74 (1996); id., § 54.1­2930 (1994); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9.02.110, 9.02.120, 9.02.170(4) (Supp. 1997); id., §§ 18.57.020, 18.71.050 (Supp. 1997); Wis. Stat. § 448.01(5) (1988); id., § 940.15(5) (1996); Wyo. Stat. § 33­26­303 (Supp. 1996); id., § 35­6­111 (1994). 520US3 Unit: $U73 [09-11-99 19:09:17] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 968 (1997) 971 Per Curiam The District Court has not yet reconsidered the merits of the preliminary injunction motion, but it has entered (based on the parties' stipulations) an injunction pending appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c), and has postponed its hearing on the preliminary injunction motion until our disposition of petitioner's certiorari petition. Order Granting Injunction Pending Appeal, No. CV 95­083­ GF­PGH (Mont., Nov. 5, 1996), App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a­ 32a. As a consequence, Montana's physician-only require- ment is unenforceable at the present time against respondent Susan Cahill, who is the only nonphysician licensed to per- form abortions in Montana. The Court of Appeals' conclusion that respondents had es- tablished a "fair chance of success on the merits" of their constitutional challenge is inconsistent with our treatment of the physician-only requirement at issue in Casey. That requirement involved only the provision of information to patients, and not the actual performance of abortions, yet we nonetheless held-overruling our prior holding in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 448 (1983)-that the limitation to physicians was valid. Casey, supra, at 884­885. We found that "[s]ince there is no evidence on this record that requiring a doctor to give the information as provided by the statute would amount in practical terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion, . . . it is not an undue burden." 505 U. S., at 884­885 (emphasis added). The District Court, quoting this precise passage, held: "There exists insufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion [that] the requirement that a licensed physician perform an abortion would amount, `in practical terms, to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.' Accordingly, it is unlikely that [re- spondents] will prevail upon their suggestion that the re- quirement constitutes an `undue burden' within the meaning of Casey." 906 F. Supp., at 567 (quoting Casey, supra, at 884 (emphasis added)). 520US3 Unit: $U73 [09-11-99 19:09:17] PAGES PGT: OPIN 972 MAZUREK v. ARMSTRONG Per Curiam The Court of Appeals never contested this District Court conclusion that there was "insufficient evidence" in the rec- ord that the requirement posed a " `substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.' " Instead, it held that the physician-only requirement was arguably invalid because its purpose, according to the Court of Appeals, may have been to create a substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions. 94 F. 3d, at 567. But even assuming the correctness of the Court of Appeals' implicit premise-that a legislative pur- pose to interfere with the constitutionally protected right to abortion without the effect of interfering with that right (here it is uncontested that there was insufficient evidence of a "substantial obstacle" to abortion) could render the Mon- tana law invalid-there is no basis for finding a vitiating leg- islative purpose here. We do not assume unconstitutional legislative intent even when statutes produce harmful re- sults, see, e. g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 246 (1976); much less do we assume it when the results are harm- less. One searches the Court of Appeals' opinion in vain for any mention of any evidence suggesting an unlawful motive on the part of the Montana Legislature. If the motion at issue here were a defendant's motion for summary judgment, and if the plaintiff's only basis for proceeding with the suit were a claim of improper legislative purpose, one would de- mand some evidence of that improper purpose in order to avoid a nonsuit. And what is at issue here is not even a defendant's motion for summary judgment, but a plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief, as to which the requirement for substantial proof is much higher. "It frequently is observed that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion." 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948, pp. 129­130 (2d ed. 1995) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). 520US3 Unit: $U73 [09-11-99 19:09:17] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 968 (1997) 973 Per Curiam Respondents claim in this Court that the Montana law must have had an invalid purpose because "all health evi- dence contradicts the claim that there is any health basis" for the law. Brief in Opposition 7. Respondents contend that "the only extant study comparing the complication rates for first-trimester abortions performed by [physician- assistants] with those for first-trimester abortions performed by physicians found no significant difference." Ibid. But this line of argument is squarely foreclosed by Casey itself. In the course of upholding the physician-only requirement at issue in that case, we emphasized that "[o]ur cases reflect the fact that the Constitution gives the States broad latitude to decide that particular functions may be performed only by licensed professionals, even if an objective assessment might suggest that those same tasks could be performed by others." 505 U. S., at 885 (emphasis added). Respondents fall back on the fact that an antiabortion group drafted the Montana law. But that says nothing significant about the legisla- ture's purpose in passing it. Today's dissent, for its part, claims that "there is substan- tial evidence indicating that the sole purpose of the statute was to target a particular licensed professional" (respondent Susan Cahill). Post, at 979­980. It is true that the law "targeted" Cahill in the sense that she was the only nonphy- sician performing abortions at the time it was passed. But it is difficult to see how that helps rather than harms re- spondents' case. The dissent does not claim that this was an unconstitutional bill of attainder, nor was that the basis on which the Court of Appeals relied. (Such a contention would be implausible as applied to a provision so common- place as to exist in 40 other States, see n. 1, supra.) And the basis on which the Court of Appeals did rely (that the purpose of the law may have been to create a "substantial obstacle" to abortion) is positively contradicted by the fact that only a single practitioner is affected. That is especially so since under the old scheme Cahill could only perform 520US3 Unit: $U73 [09-11-99 19:09:17] PAGES PGT: OPIN 974 MAZUREK v. ARMSTRONG Per Curiam abortions with a licensed physician (who also performs abor- tions) present, see Brief in Opposition 4, meaning that no woman seeking an abortion would be required by the new law to travel to a different facility than was previously avail- able. All this strongly supports the District Court's finding, after hearing testimony, that there was insufficient evidence that the law created a "substantial obstacle" to abortion. And there is simply no evidence that the legislature intended the law to do what it plainly did not do.2 The Court of Appeals' decision is also contradicted by our repeated statements in past cases-none of which was so much as cited by the Court of Appeals, despite the District Court's discussion of two of them-that the performance of abortions may be restricted to physicians. We first ex- pressed this view (although it was not necessary to our hold- ing) in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 165 (1973), saying that "[t]he State may define the term `physician,' . . . to mean only a physician currently licensed by the State, and may pro- scribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician as so defined." We reiterated this view in Connecticut v. Men- illo, 423 U. S. 9, 11 (1975) (per curiam), where, in the course of holding that the Federal Constitution posed no bar to the conviction of a person with no medical training for the per- formance of an abortion, we said that "prosecutions for abor- tions conducted by nonphysicians infringe upon no realm of personal privacy secured by the Constitution against state interference." Finally, in Akron, in the course of striking down a requirement that licensed physicians rather than other medical personnel provide specified information to pa- tients (the holding overruled in Casey), we emphasized that our prior cases "left no doubt that, to ensure the safety of 2 Since the record does not support a conclusion that "the legislature's predominant motive," post, at 980, was to create a "substantial obstacle" to abortion, it is quite unnecessary to address "whether the Court of Appeals misread this Court's opinions in Miller [v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900 (1995),] and Shaw," post, at 981. 520US3 Unit: $U73 [09-11-99 19:09:17] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 968 (1997) 975 Per Curiam the abortion procedure, the States may mandate that only physicians perform abortions." 462 U. S., at 447 (citing Roe, supra, at 165, and Menillo, supra, at 11). Respondents urge us to ignore the error in the Court of Appeals' judgment because the case comes to us prior to the entry of a final judgment in the lower courts. It is true that we are ordinarily reluctant to exercise our certiorari jurisdiction in that circumstance. See, e. g., Hamilton- Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers & Co., 240 U. S. 251, 258 (1916). But our cases make clear that there is no absolute bar to review of nonfinal judgments of the lower federal courts, see, e. g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 98 (1976); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 377 (1945); see also R. Stern, E. Gressman, S. Shapiro, & K. Gel- ler, Supreme Court Practice § 4.18 (7th ed. 1993) (citing cases), and we conclude here that reversal of the Court of Appeals' judgment in a summary disposition is appropriate, for two reasons. First, as already noted, the Court of Ap- peals' decision is clearly erroneous under our precedents.3 Second, the lower court's judgment has produced immediate consequences for Montana-in the form of a Rule 62(c) in- junction against implementation of its law pending the Dis- trict Court's resolution of respondents' motion for a prelimi- nary injunction-and has created a real threat of such consequences for the six other States in the Ninth Circuit that have physician-only requirements.4 Indeed, plaintiffs 3 The dissent says that the Court of Appeals did not resolve any impor- tant issue of law in this case, but instead merely remanded to the District Court after "determin[ing] that a further inquiry into the facts [was] ap- propriate." Post, at 981. We disagree. The Court of Appeals expressly found, and it was necessary to its disposition, that respondents had shown a "fair chance of success" on their claim of undue burden. 94 F. 3d 566, 567­568 (CA9 1996). As already explained, that determination of law is inconsistent with our precedents. 4 See Alaska Stat. Ann. §§ 08.64.200, 18.16.010(a)(1) (1996); Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 123405 (West 1996) (as interpreted under prior statutory designation in 74 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 101 (1991)); 520US3 Unit: $U73 [09-11-99 19:09:17] PAGES PGT: OPIN 976 MAZUREK v. ARMSTRONG Per Curiam in the Ninth Circuit seeking to challenge those States' laws may well be able to meet the threshold "fair chance of suc- cess" requirement for a preliminary injunction merely by al- leging an improper purpose for the physician-only rule, since, as noted above, the Court of Appeals did not appear to rely on any evidence suggesting an unlawful motive on the part of the Montana Legislature.5 For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition for certio- rari, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and re- mand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 453­4, 453­16(a)(1) (1993); Idaho Code § 18­608 (1997); id., §§ 54­1803(3), 54­1803(4) (1994); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 442.250(1)(a) (1991); id., § 630.160 (1995); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9.02.110, 9.02.120, 9.02.170(4) (Supp. 1997); id., §§ 18.57.020, 18.71.050 (Supp. 1997). 5 The dissent contends that some States which restrict the performance of abortions to licensed physicians may define "licensed physician" to in- clude "physician-assistant" when the latter works under the former's su- pervision; thus, the dissent says, the Court of Appeals' decision may not in fact be inconsistent with the physician-only regimes of other States. Post, at 980­981. But the provisions of state law to which the dissent points reflect the general definition of what qualifies as the "authorized practice" of medicine, without making any specific reference to abortion. See, e. g., Fla. Stat. §§ 458.303(1)(a), 458.327(1), 458.347 (1991 and Supp. 1997); post, at 980­981, n. 7 (citing statutes). Thus, for example, under Florida law, the performance of an abortion by a physician-assistant would not constitute "practic[ing] medicine . . . without a license" for purposes of the felony defined in Fla. Stat. Ann. § 458.327(1) (Supp. 1997), but there is no reason to think it would not violate the more specific prohibition on the performance of abortions by persons other than "a doctor of medicine or osteopathic medicine licensed by the state under chapter 458 or chapter 459," Fla. Stat. §§ 390.001(1)(a), 390.001(3) (1993). A formal opinion by the Attorney General of California has reached precisely this conclusion under that State's law: "[W]e cannot accept the notion that the Legislature meant to gainsay th[e] carefully tailored and highly specific determination [that abortions should be performed by licensed physicians] when it . . . adopted the general language of the Physician Assistant Practice Act." 74 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 101, 108 (1991). 520US3 Unit: $U73 [09-11-99 19:09:17] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 968 (1997) 977 Stevens, J., dissenting Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join, dissenting. The Court may ultimately prove to be correct in its conclu- sion that the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the Dis- trict Court's refusal to preliminarily enjoin that portion of the statute disqualifying Susan Cahill from performing abor- tions in Montana. Nevertheless, I do not agree that this decision has sufficient importance to justify review of the merits at this preliminary stage of the proceeding. The background of the litigation and a comment on the Court of Appeals' discussion of legislative motive will help to explain why I am not persuaded that the Court's summary disposi- tion is appropriate. Since 1977, respondent Cahill, a licensed physician's as- sistant, has been performing first-trimester abortions in Kalispell, Montana, under the supervision of Dr. James Armstrong. She is the only nonphysician in Montana who performs abortions. Since 1974, Montana law has provided that an abortion could be performed only by a licensed physician. See Mont. Code Ann. § 50­20­109(1)(a) (1995). Because the term "li- censed physician," as used in that statute, was construed to include licensed physician assistants working under the di- rect supervision of a physician pursuant to a state approved plan,1 it did not disqualify Cahill from continuing her work with Dr. Armstrong. 1 See Doe v. Esch, No. CV­93­060­GF­PGH (Nov. 26, 1993), App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a (enjoining State from enforcing the licensed physician provision against a physician assistant, supervised by a licensed physician, who has received approval from the State Board of Medical Examiners to conduct abortions); see also Mont. Code Ann. § 37­20­403 (1993) (recogniz- ing physician assistant as agent of the supervising physician); id., § 37­20­ 303 (1995) (authorizing Board of Medical Examiners to approve physi- cian assistant utilization plans detailing range of physician assistants' practice); 906 F. Supp. 561, 564 (Mont. 1995) (noting that the Montana 520US3 Unit: $U73 [09-11-99 19:09:17] PAGES PGT: OPIN 978 MAZUREK v. ARMSTRONG Stevens, J., dissenting In 1995, the Montana Legislature enacted the statute at issue in this litigation. This statute banned physician assist- ants from performing abortions, provided that second- trimester abortions could only be performed in licensed hospitals, and prohibited any form of advertising of abor- tion services. See 1995 Mont. Laws, ch. 321. The record strongly indicates that the physician assistant provision was aimed at excluding one specific person-respondent Cahill- from the category of persons who could perform abortions. Although this is not apparent on the face of the statute, the parties agree that because Cahill is the only physician assist- ant who performs abortions in the State of Montana, she is the only person affected by the ban. Furthermore, the legislative hearings preceding the enactment of the statute contain numerous references to Cahill by name,2 and the in- junction against enforcement of this provision of the statute pending the appeal applies only to Cahill.3 The likelihood that the legislature may have enacted the statute for the sole purpose of targeting Cahill is suggested by the fact that the other two provisions in the 1995 Act- the hospitalization requirement and the advertising ban- were clearly invalid because they were reenactments of two provisions that already had been held unconstitutional in Board of Medical Examiners construed its authority to include approval of Cahill's utilization plan allowing her to perform first-trimester abortions). 2 See Minutes of Committee on Public Health, Welfare & Safety, Mon- tana Senate, 54th Legislature (Mar. 10, 1995), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a­60a. 3 "1. The injunction shall apply only to Plaintiff Susan Cahill and will allow her to practice under those terms in effect prior to October 1, 1995. Plaintiff Cahill must be supervised by a licensed physician and shall oper- ate under the physician assistant-certified utilization plan previously ap- proved by the Montana State Board of Medical Examiners that includes the performance of abortions pursuant to the provisions of Mont. Code Ann. Title 37, chapter 20. No other physician assistants-certified will be allowed to perform abortions in Montana under the terms of this stipula- tion or the Court's order." App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a. 520US3 Unit: $U73 [09-11-99 19:09:17] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 968 (1997) 979 Stevens, J., dissenting earlier litigation,4 and that the State, in this litigation, con- ceded to be unconstitutional.5 This history, together with Cahill's claim that the same antiabortion groups who had re- peatedly targeted Cahill and Armstrong's practice were the proponents of the 1995 legislation, provided the basis for Ca- hill's argument that the statute was invalid as a bill of attain- der, as well as an undue burden on the right to an abortion. The discussion of legislative motive in the opinion of the Court of Appeals was a response to two decisions of this Court that suggest that such an inquiry is sometimes proper. In determining whether the "requirements serve no purpose other than to make abortions more difficult," within the meaning of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 901 (1992), the Court of Appeals looked to our recent decisions in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900 (1995), and Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899 (1996).6 Today, the Court ignores those cases, but concludes that the record is barren of evidence of any improper motive. As the discus- sion above indicates, this is not quite accurate; there is sub- stantial evidence indicating that the sole purpose of the stat- 4 In Doe v. Esch, supra, the court enjoined enforcement of the hospital- ization requirement, and in Doe v. Deschamps, 461 F. Supp. 682 (Mont. 1976), the court held that the advertising and solicitation prohibition were unconstitutional. 5 Respondents challenged these two provisions-along with the ban on performance of abortions by physician assistants, and the State did not contest that it was bound by the prior judgments from enforcing these prohibitions. See 906 F. Supp., at 563. 6 The Court of Appeals reasoned: "Legislative purpose to accomplish a constitutionally forbidden result may be found when that purpose was `the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision.' Miller[, 515 U. S., at 916]. Such a forbidden purpose may be gleaned both from the structure of the legislation and from examination of the process that led to its enactment. Shaw[, 517 U. S., at 905­907]. A determination of pur- pose in the present case, then, may properly require an assessment of the totality of circumstances surrounding the enactment of Chapter 321, and whether that statute in fact can be regarded as serving a legitimate health function." 94 F. 3d 566, 567 (CA9 1996). 520US3 Unit: $U73 [09-11-99 19:09:17] PAGES PGT: OPIN 980 MAZUREK v. ARMSTRONG Stevens, J., dissenting ute was to target a particular licensed professional. The statute removed the only physician assistant in the State who could perform abortions, yet there was no evidence that her practice posed any greater health risks than those per- formed by doctors with the assistance of unlicensed person- nel. When one looks at the totality of circumstances sur- rounding the legislation, there is evidence from which one could conclude that the legislature's predominant motive was to make abortions more difficult. In any event, the Court of Appeals did not reach the con- stitutional issue that is presented by this litigation. The Court of Appeals simply remanded this action to the District Court because it found that the District Court had unduly confined its analysis of what constitutes an impermissible purpose. Although the parties stipulated to the entry of a limited injunction pending appeal that temporarily protects Cahill and no one else, there is no indication yet from either the District Court or the Court of Appeals that either a permanent or preliminary injunction will ever be entered against enforcement of the physician-only provision of the statute. As I read the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the District Court, this case involves an extremely narrow issue concerning the State's power to reduce by one the small number of professionals in Montana who can lawfully per- form abortions in that State. I do not perceive the slightest threat to the 40 "physician only" laws cited at the outset of the Court's opinion, particularly since some of these States might allow licensed assistants to perform abortions under the supervision of a physician as was the practice in Montana prior to 1995.7 Because physician assistants working under 7 Some of the States that have physician-only laws also have statutes that broadly define the medical duties that physicians can delegate to phy- sician assistants. See, e. g., Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 20­12a, 20­12d (Supp. 1997); Fla. Stat. § 458.347 (Supp. 1997); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 225, §§ 95/1, 95/ 4(3) (1993 and Supp. 1997); Ind. Code §§ 25­27.5­5­2, 25­27.5­6­3 (1995); 520US3 Unit: $U73 [09-11-99 19:09:17] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 968 (1997) 981 Stevens, J., dissenting the supervision of a physician might be included in the defi- nition of "physician," it is not clear at this stage that the Court of Appeals' decision challenges any of this Court's statements (for the most part dicta), ante, at 974­975, that a State may restrict the performance of abortions to physi- cians. I think the Court would be well advised to await fur- ther developments in the case before intervening. Surely, the Court of Appeals' determination that a further inquiry into the facts is appropriate before making a final decision on the motion for a preliminary injunction does not provide a proper basis for summary action in this Court. Having decided to take the case, however, it does seem to me that the Court should provide some enlightenment as to whether the Court of Appeals misread this Court's opinions in Miller and Shaw v. Hunt. In my judgment, the petition for certiorari should be denied. Iowa Code §§ 148C.1, 148C.4 (1989); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 37:1360.22(5), 37:1360.28, 37:1360.31.A(1), 37:1360.31.B (West Supp. 1997); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 32, § 3270­A (Supp. 1996); Mass. Gen. Laws § 112:9E (1996); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71­1,107.17 (1996); R. I. Gen. Laws § 5­54­8 (1995). My re- search indicates that Montana and California are the only States that ex- plicitly prohibit physician assistants from performing abortions. See 74 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 101 (1991) (declining to construe the physician assistant statute to allow physician assistants to perform abortions). 09-18-99 14:08:01 520ordnot1 Reporter's Note The next page is purposely numbered 1101. The numbers between 981 and 1101 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish the orders with permanent page numbers, thus making the official cita- tions available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United States Reports. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS FOR MARCH 3 THROUGH JUNE 18, 1997 March 3, 1997 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 95­1028. United States v. Fadem et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of United States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347 (1997). Reported below: 52 F. 3d 202. Miscellaneous Orders No. D­1752. In re Disbarment of Frieze. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1004.] No. D­1756. In re Disbarment of Allen. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1005.] No. D­1786. In re Disbarment of Maroney. John W. Ma- roney, of Portland, Ore., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­61. Joseph et al. v. Quaglino Tobacco & Candy Co. et al. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied. No. M­62. Dunbar v. Iowa. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time under this Court's Rule 14.5 denied. No. 96­79. Boggs v. Boggs et al. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 957.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to file a supplemental brief as amicus curiae after argu- ment granted. No. 96­272. Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1002.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for divided argument granted. 1101 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1102 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 3, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­318. Richardson et al. v. McKnight. C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1002.] Motion of the Acting Solici- tor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 96­491. Inter-Modal Rail Employees Assn. et al. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1003.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as ami- cus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 96­651. Gilbert, President, East Stroudsburg Uni- versity, et al. v. Homar. C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1052.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 96­5955. Richards v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. [Cer- tiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1052.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus cu- riae and for divided argument granted. No. 96­511. Reno, Attorney General of the United States, et al. v. American Civil Liberties Union et al. D. C. E. D. Pa. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 519 U. S. 1025.] Motion of appellees for divided argument denied. No. 96­542. McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama. C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1025.] Motion of Southern States Police Benevolent Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus cu- riae and for divided argument denied. No. 96­1324. Zarnes v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner to expedite consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. No. 96­7773. In re Bonner. Petition for writ of habeas cor- pus denied. No. 96­7613. In re Snipe; and No. 96­7730. In re Williams. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1103 520 U. S. March 3, 1997 Certiorari Granted No. 96­795. Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. Na- tional Labor Relations Board. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1483. Certiorari Denied No. 95­746. Linscomb v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 F. 3d 1386. No. 95­8279. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 254. No. 96­845. Anderson et al. v. Clow et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1399. No. 96­846. CEMEX, S. A. v. United States et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1164. No. 96­895. Franklin et al. v. Hiser. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1287. No. 96­922. Merchants Bank of California, N. A. v. Mar- dula. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 43 Cal. App. 4th 790, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 63. No. 96­943. Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California (Butler et al., Real Parties in Interest). C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­968. CIGNA HealthCare of Connecticut, Inc. v. Napoletano et al. Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 238 Conn. 216, 680 A. 2d 127. No. 96­985. Chamorro-Torres v. Immigration and Natu- ralization Service. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1015. Robokoff et al. v. Women's Choice of Ber- gen County. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1018. Wilson, By and Through Wilson as Conser- vator of the Person and Estate of Wilson, et al. v. Brother Records, Inc., et al. Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 141 N. H. 322, 682 A. 2d 714. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1104 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 3, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1024. Ohio Association of Independent Schools et al. v. Goff et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 92 F. 3d 419. No. 96­1032. Cincinnati Enquirer, a Division of Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. v. United States Dis- trict Court for the Southern District of Ohio et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 198. No. 96­1046. Shaper v. Tracy, Tax Commissioner of Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 Ohio St. 3d 241, 667 N. E. 2d 368. No. 96­1047. County of Nassau et al. v. American Feder- ation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL­ CIO (AFSCME), et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 96 F. 3d 644. No. 96­1048. Zielinski v. Oak Forest Police Pension Board. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 281 Ill. App. 3d 1137, 701 N. E. 2d 839. No. 96­1074. Davis v. Hanover Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1333. No. 96­1083. Life College, Inc. v. Mangum, Director, Nonpublic Postsecondary Education Commission, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1156. No. 96­1113. Rosati v. Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 946. No. 96­1119. Boyle v. Colorado Board of Medical Exam- iners. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 924 P. 2d 1113. No. 96­1147. Lark v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 671 So. 2d 824. No. 96­1164. LaPlant v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 204 Wis. 2d 412, 555 N. W. 2d 389. No. 96­1169. Du Vall v. United States et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1442. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1105 520 U. S. March 3, 1997 No. 96­1176. DiSanto v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1238. No. 96­1192. Falcon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 54. No. 96­5938. Trevino-Martinez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 65. No. 96­6227. Woods et al. v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 51. No. 96­6570. Osume v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1148. No. 96­6608. Dexter v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 286. No. 96­6899. Clarke v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1214. No. 96­7245. Block v. Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Depart- ment of Correction, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7246. Myers v. Shumacher et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1158. No. 96­7249. Ford v. Wilson. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 245. No. 96­7255. Gilliam v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 172 Ill. 2d 484, 670 N. E. 2d 606. No. 96­7260. Slagel v. Shell Oil Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1154. No. 96­7262. Philippeaux v. North Central Bronx Hospi- tal et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 353. No. 96­7267. Hualde-Redin et al. v. First Federal Sav- ings Bank. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 50 F. 3d 1. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1106 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 3, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7270. Elliott v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 344 N. C. 242, 475 S. E. 2d 202. No. 96­7278. Taylor v. Love, Superintendent, State Cor- rectional Institution at Huntingdon, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7280. Stephen v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7288. Harrington v. California Committee of Bar Examiners. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7291. Sing Cho Ng v. Quiet Forest II Homeowners Assn. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1321. No. 96­7293. Azubuko v. Montgomery, Clerk-Magistrate, District Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk County. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7294. Levine v. Goord, Commissioner, New York Department of Correctional Services. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 504. No. 96­7296. Nickel v. Hannigan, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 403. No. 96­7297. Bonner v. Alabama Department of Human Resources et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 86 F. 3d 1170. No. 96­7304. Tatum v. Law Offices of Linnie L. Darden III et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7306. Mulligan v. Barnett Bank of Central Florida, N. A. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 678 So. 2d 339. No. 96­7307. Wolf v. Federal Republic of Germany et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 536. No. 96­7308. Timmons v. Turner, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1140. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1107 520 U. S. March 3, 1997 No. 96­7310. Vrettos v. Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 949. No. 96­7313. Willis v. Parrish et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1469. No. 96­7317. Carter v. Hopkins, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 666. No. 96­7318. Carter v. Neustrup. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7319. Arigoni v. Massachusetts et al. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 Mass. App. 1129, 666 N. E. 2d 1331. No. 96­7320. Ellison v. Forrest City, Arkansas, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7322. Gallego v. Wilson et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7323. Day v. Painter, Sheriff, Midland County, Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1135. No. 96­7324. Hendrickson v. Minnesota et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7326. Scott v. Nachman. Cir. Ct., City of Newport News, Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7327. Holcomb v. Thompson, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1330. No. 96­7359. Drinkard v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 751. No. 96­7398. Hopper v. Goosbly et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7410. Reyna v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 50. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1108 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 3, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7414. Phidd v. Connecticut. App. Ct. Conn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 42 Conn. App. 17, 681 A. 2d 310. No. 96­7443. Jackson v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Po- tosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7444. Mixon v. Johnson, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7459. Adkins v. Gilmore, Attorney General of Virginia, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1446. No. 96­7489. Johnson v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 276 Ill. App. 3d 1144, 697 N. E. 2d 25. No. 96­7527. McKinley v. District of Columbia Depart- ment of Human Services. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7528. Moretz v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7540. Asonye v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7548. Ontiveros v. Dorsey, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1150. No. 96­7552. Oliver v. Fuch et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 947. No. 96­7578. Glenn v. Bartlett, Superintendent, Elmira Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 98 F. 3d 721. No. 96­7579. Barnett v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 8th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7580. Gray v. Nielson. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1157. No. 96­7581. Huff v. Chapleau, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1341. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1109 520 U. S. March 3, 1997 No. 96­7590. Caffrey v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7603. Marozsan v. United States et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 1284. No. 96­7605. Sawyers v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 649. No. 96­7611. Mack v. Caspari, Superintendent, Missouri Eastern Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 637. No. 96­7622. Cardenas Cuellar v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1179. No. 96­7623. Chatriand v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 965. No. 96­7648. McDonnell v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1459. No. 96­7653. Genins v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7666. Nelson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1455. No. 96­7669. Wood-Ede v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 58. No. 96­7672. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 623. No. 96­7673. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 359. No. 96­7677. Doherty v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1159. No. 96­7687. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 698. No. 96­7688. Shaffer v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 114. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1110 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 3, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7690. Swaney v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 957. No. 96­7693. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 375. No. 96­7698. Johnson v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7700. McKinney v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 974. No. 96­7705. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1014. No. 96­7706. Sandoval et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1148. No. 96­7710. Dempsey v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 129. No. 96­7711. Greschner v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1151. No. 96­7725. Matthews v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­850. City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen, Trustee of the William A. Bowen Trust Agreement. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Motion of Florida League of Cities, Inc., et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 675 So. 2d 626. No. 96­860. Roe v. Kentucky Bar Assn. Sup. Ct. Ky. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to file redacted appendices to petition for writ of certiorari granted. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1027. Michigan v. Fernengel. Ct. App. Mich. Mo- tion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 216 Mich. App. 420, 549 N. W. 2d 361. Rehearing Denied No. 95­8502. Tidik v. Tidik, 519 U. S. 1076; No. 96­409. Drobny et ux. v. United States, 519 U. S. 1055; 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1111 520 U. S. March 3, 17, 1997 No. 96­423. Coulter et al. v. Metropolitan Life Insur- ance Co., Inc., et al., 519 U. S. 1040; No. 96­809. Goulding v. United States, 519 U. S. 1059; No. 96­835. Bell v. United States Postal Service, 519 U. S. 1078; No. 96­5170. Morris et ux. v. United States et al., 519 U. S. 883; No. 96­6427. Cooper v. Malone et al., 519 U. S. 1062; No. 96­6517. Parker v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction, 519 U. S. 1064; No. 96­6617. Bast v. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 519 U. S. 1081; No. 96­6668. Womble v. North Carolina, 519 U. S. 1095; No. 96­6737. Wronke v. Canady, 519 U. S. 1096; No. 96­6813. Fox v. United States, 519 U. S. 1068; and No. 96­6932. In re Delespine, 519 U. S. 1054. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 95­6649. Jones v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida De- partment of Corrections, 516 U. S. 1057. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. Assignment Order An order of The Chief Justice designating and assigning Justice White (retired) to perform judicial duties in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit during the period March 10 through March 11, 1997, and for such time as may be required to complete unfinished business, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 294(a), is ordered entered on the minutes of this Court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 295. March 17, 1997 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 95­1546. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., aka SMC Corp., et al. v. Festo Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., ante, p. 17. Reported below: 72 F. 3d 857. No. 96­874. Honeywell, Inc. v. Litton Systems, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1112 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 17, 1997 520 U. S. remanded for further consideration in light of Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., ante, p. 17. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1559. No. 96­939. Brandt, as Chapter 7 Trustee of the Estate of Southeast Banking Corp., et al. v. Federal Deposit In- surance Corporation, as Receiver for Southeast Bank, N. A., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment va- cated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U. S. 213 (1997). Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1199. Miscellaneous Orders No. A­598. Geske & Sons, Inc. v. National Labor Rela- tions Board. C. A. 7th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Thomas and referred to the Court, denied. No. D­1764. In re Disbarment of Mincey. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1075.] No. D­1765. In re Disbarment of Fiore. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1075.] No. D­1766. In re Disbarment of Pitt. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1075.] No. D­1778. In re Disbarment of Rudd. Jeffrey D. Rudd, of Roanoke, Va., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to the practice of law before this Court. The rule to show cause, issued on February 18, 1997 [519 U. S. 1105], is discharged. No. D­1787. In re Disbarment of Levy. Gerald Levy, of Parsippany, N. J., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1788. In re Disbarment of Auriemma. Robert C. Auriemma, of Towaco, N. J., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1113 520 U. S. March 17, 1997 No. D­1789. In re Disbarment of Denker. Aaron David Denker, of Mt. Laurel, N. J., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­32. Billy-Eko v. United States. Motion for recon- sideration of order denying motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time [519 U. S. 991] denied. No. M­63. Pringle v. Davis et al.; and No. M­64. Milnes v. Fletcher Pacific Construction Co. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. 96­511. Reno, Attorney General of the United States, et al. v. American Civil Liberties Union et al. D. C. E. D. Pa. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 519 U. S. 1025.] Motion of James J. Clancy for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 96­651. Gilbert, President, East Stroudsburg Uni- versity, et al. v. Homar. C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1052.] Motion of National Treasury Employees Union for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted to be divided as follows: respondent, 20 minutes; National Treasury Employees Union, 10 minutes. No. 96­1037. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. Ct. Civ. App. Okla.; No. 96­1059. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians et al. v. Wilson, Governor of California, et al. C. A. 9th Cir.; and No. 96­1102. South Carolina et al. v. Environmental Technology Council. C. A. 4th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United States. No. 96­1330. Black v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner to expedite consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. No. 96­6673. Steven L. et al. v. Board of Education of Downers Grove Grade School District No. 58. C. A. 7th Cir.; 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1114 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 17, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7348. Veale et ux. v. Citibank, F. S. B. C. A. 11th Cir.; and No. 96­7397. Guerriero v. Lufthansa German Airlines, Inc. App. Ct. Mass. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until April 7, 1997, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 96­6867. O'Dell v. Netherland, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1050.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Robert S. Smith, Esq., of New York, N. Y., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case. No. 96­7185. Bates v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. [Cer- tiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1108.] Motion for appointment of coun- sel granted, and it is ordered that C. Richard Oren, Esq., of Roch- ester, Ind., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case. No. 96­7824. In re Ijemba; and No. 96­7899. In re Williams. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied. No. 96­7382. In re Martin; and No. 96­7495. In re Atkins. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. Certiorari Granted No. 96­188. General Electric Co. et al. v. Joiner et ux. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 524. No. 96­670. Foster, Governor of Louisiana, et al. v. Love et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 1026. No. 96­779. Arkansas Educational Television Commis- sion v. Forbes. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 497. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1115 520 U. S. March 17, 1997 Certiorari Denied No. 95­1096. Micron Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 F. 3d 1211. No. 96­235. California Franchise Tax Board v. MacFar- lane. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 1041. No. 96­684. Jones v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 1398. No. 96­766. Argent Chemical Laboratories, Inc. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 572. No. 96­812. Hines v. Franklin Homes, Inc., et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 680 So. 2d 1033. No. 96­815. D'Amelia v. Doe. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 1204. No. 96­851. Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1098. No. 96­856. Yee v. Hughes Aircraft Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1195. No. 96­868. Conley v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 157. No. 96­900. Viswanathan v. Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 43. No. 96­904. Zimmerman et al. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., et al. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 128 Idaho 851, 920 P. 2d 67. No. 96­908. Fort Stewart Association of Educators v. Weston et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1330. No. 96­915. Associated Industries of Florida, Inc., et al. v. Agency for Health Care Administration et 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1116 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 17, 1997 520 U. S. al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 678 So. 2d 1239. No. 96­924. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 789. No. 96­928. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 1012. No. 96­942. First Security Bank et al. v. Federal De- posit Insurance Corporation et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 130. No. 96­945. Crosby v. Hospital Authority of Valdosta and Lowndes County, dba South Georgia Medical Center, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 1515. No. 96­959. Texas v. Clark. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 929 S. W. 2d 5. No. 96­962. Price et al. v. City of Charlotte; and No. 96­1141. City of Charlotte v. Price et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 1241. No. 96­1007. Oliver, Administratrix of the Estate of Oliver, Deceased, et al. v. Oshkosh Truck Corp. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 992. No. 96­1013. Buster et al. v. Thomas, Head & Greisen Employees Trust et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1449. No. 96­1017. Weaver v. Department of Justice. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1207. No. 96­1038. Fischer et al. v. Philadelphia Electric Co. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1533. No. 96­1040. Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 728. No. 96­1054. Sanders v. Arneson Products, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 1351. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1117 520 U. S. March 17, 1997 No. 96­1055. Paragon Properties Co. v. City of Novi. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 452 Mich. 568, 550 N. W. 2d 772. No. 96­1056. Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church et al. v. Sawyer et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 118. No. 96­1061. Madril v. Gallego. Ct. App. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­1063. Pettco Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. White et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1353. No. 96­1066. Begier v. Begier. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1069. Healow v. Anesthesia Partners, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1192. No. 96­1070. Feltner v. MCA Television, Ltd. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 766. No. 96­1072. Robb v. Mississippi Bar. Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 684 So. 2d 615. No. 96­1079. Trevino v. Gates et al.; and No. 96­1229. Gates et al. v. Trevino. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 911. No. 96­1084. Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, J. V., et al.; and DiGiovanni v. Traylor Brothers, Inc. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 603 (first judgment) and 624 (second judgment). No. 96­1085. McLemore et al. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1439. No. 96­1092. Crawford et al. v. Lungren, Attorney Gen- eral of California, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 380. No. 96­1096. Baheth et al. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., nka Regions Bank, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 953. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1118 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 17, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1097. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California et al. v. Canseco et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 600. No. 96­1103. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., dba Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Johnson et ux., as Representatives of the Estate of Johnson, Deceased. Ct. App. Okla. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­1105. Guice et al. v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 N. Y. 2d 31, 674 N. E. 2d 282. No. 96­1106. Kuhn v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1110. Schroering v. Courier-Journal & Louis- ville Times Co. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1111. City and County of San Francisco et al. v. Carpenter et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 627. No. 96­1115. Vergara v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­1117. United Mine Workers of America 1992 Ben- efit Plan et al. v. Leckie Smokeless Coal Co. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 573. No. 96­1121. Bryan v. East Stroudsburg University. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 689. No. 96­1122. Hartman et al. v. Northern Services, Inc., nka Health Services Management, Inc., et al. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1123. McClain v. Rho et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1124. Smith et ux. v. Roman et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1125. In re Broadbelt, Judge, Municipal Court of New Jersey. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 146 N. J. 501, 683 A. 2d 543. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1119 520 U. S. March 17, 1997 No. 96­1127. United States v. Exxon Corp. and Subsidi- aries. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 968. No. 96­1129. Moschetti v. Maryland. Cir. Ct. Howard County, Md. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1130. Vinci v. Waste Management, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 1372. No. 96­1131. Volberg v. Pataki, Governor of New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 507. No. 96­1135. City of Detroit Pension Fund et al. v. Pru- dential Securities, Inc. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 26. No. 96­1136. Helton v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 624 N. E. 2d 499. No. 96­1137. Tanca v. Nordberg, Commissioner, Massa- chusetts Department of Employment and Training. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 680. No. 96­1138. United States ex rel. Sylvester v. Nor- throp Grumman Corp. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 91 F. 3d 155. No. 96­1144. Davis v. Service Employees International Union, AFL­CIO, CLC, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1333. No. 96­1145. Ugwu v. Arkansas. Ct. App. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 Ark. App. xxiii. No. 96­1155. Overfield v. Bonsignore et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1144. No. 96­1158. Suan See Chong et al. v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 671. No. 96­1170. Mothershed v. Durbin et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1120 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 17, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1185. McGillivray v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1159. No. 96­1194. Jones v. Forest Industries Insurance Ex- change. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 142 Ore. App. 311, 920 P. 2d 182. No. 96­1200. Spinden v. GS Roofing Products Co., Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 421. No. 96­1209. Campbell v. Towse, Mayor, City of Alton, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 820. No. 96­1217. Flores v. FMC Corp. et al. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1220. Morewitz v. Ashmore. Sup. Ct. Va. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 252 Va. 141, 475 S. E. 2d 271. No. 96­1225. Markson et ux. v. A & W Investors Group, Inc. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1226. Shaffett v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1148. No. 96­1232. Califorrniaa v. Clinton, President of the United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1235. Ilic v. Liquid Air Corp. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 555. No. 96­1237. Patrick v. United States et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1139. No. 96­1244. Beyong Chul Choi v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 92. No. 96­1250. Fort v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 540. No. 96­1255. Rheinstrom v. Robinson, Administrator, Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commis- sion. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1262. Volpe v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 115. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1121 520 U. S. March 17, 1997 No. 96­1266. Antonio Perez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1285. Denman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 399. No. 96­1292. Thanh Hai Vominh v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 19. No. 96­1298. Smallwood v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1136. No. 96­1302. Main v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­1306. Emery v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1140. No. 96­1311. Severa v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 953. No. 96­6318. Rucci v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 543 Pa. 261, 670 A. 2d 1129. No. 96­6561. Harvey v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 224 App. Div. 2d 713, 638 N. Y. S. 2d 963. No. 96­6616. Beasley v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 544 Pa. 554, 678 A. 2d 773. No. 96­6653. Oboh v. United States; and No. 96­6658. Bowen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1082. No. 96­6714. Bermudez-Reyes et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1149. No. 96­6758. Mordan v. United States; and No. 96­6921. Tauil-Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 576. No. 96­6759. Fletcher v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 48. No. 96­6780. Goins v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1122 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 17, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­6898. Akamiokhor v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1468. No. 96­6967. Sadowski v. National Credit Union Adminis- tration et al. (two judgments). C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 948. No. 96­6990. Nelson v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 636. No. 96­7011. Foster v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 679 So. 2d 747. No. 96­7022. Washington v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 945. No. 96­7063. Valdez-Mejia v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1352. No. 96­7089. Heatwole v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 344 N. C. 1, 473 S. E. 2d 310. No. 96­7186. Fullwood v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 343 N. C. 725, 472 S. E. 2d 883. No. 96­7254. Emerson v. Gilmore, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 898. No. 96­7273. Smith v. Pick 'n Save et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 133. No. 96­7301. Williams v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 173 Ill. 2d 48, 670 N. E. 2d 638. No. 96­7334. Scott v. Dime Savings Bank of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 107. No. 96­7340. Rosenbalm v. DeMorales, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7344. Sheets v. Moore. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 164. No. 96­7346. Saiyed v. Washington. Super. Ct. Wash., King County. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1123 520 U. S. March 17, 1997 No. 96­7347. Ruthers v. Gulch, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 617. No. 96­7349. Southern v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7350. Smith v. White et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1186. No. 96­7355. Finberg v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board of Pennsylvania et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7356. George v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 323 S. C. 496, 476 S. E. 2d 903. No. 96­7367. Mitchell v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 708. No. 96­7385. Lux et ux. v. County of Spotsylvania et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 131. No. 96­7386. Wall v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 132. No. 96­7388. Pigram v. Thymes et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7389. Hays v. Alabama et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 1492. No. 96­7391. Bishop v. Bishop. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 278 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 699 N. E. 2d 600. No. 96­7401. Ferrell v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 680 So. 2d 390. No. 96­7405. Herman v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 171. No. 96­7408. Brayall et vir v. Dart Industries et al. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1124 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 17, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7409. Sisco v. Ault, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7418. Marchman v. Cole. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 277 Ill. App. 3d 1099, 698 N. E. 2d 717. No. 96­7419. Todd v. Newberry, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7420. Johnson v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1339. No. 96­7434. Wiggins v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 278 Ill. App. 3d 1142, 699 N. E. 2d 610. No. 96­7440. Turner v. Kuykendall. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 648. No. 96­7442. Johnson v. Miller, Superintendent, Correc- tional Industrial Complex, Pendleton, Indiana. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 420. No. 96­7445. Jae v. Coyne. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1433. No. 96­7447. Artis v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 687 A. 2d 194. No. 96­7450. Lidman v. Department of State et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 947. No. 96­7451. Jackson v. Champion, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1453. No. 96­7453. Tobie v. Department of the Interior et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1158. No. 96­7456. Ledet v. United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­7465. Finks v. Ames Department Stores, Inc. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1125 520 U. S. March 17, 1997 No. 96­7468. Green v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 221 Ga. App. 436, 472 S. E. 2d 1. No. 96­7470. Dodd v. Oliver et al. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­7472. Douglas v. Sylvester et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1446. No. 96­7476. Vann v. Darden. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7478. Thompson v. Trusty, Judge, District Court of Kentucky, Kenton County. Cir. Ct. Kenton County, Ky. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7480. Bunnell v. Shell Oil Station et al. Ct. App. Ohio, Warren County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7481. Hawkins v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7482. Henderson v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1721. No. 96­7483. Dyer v. Stevens et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1138. No. 96­7485. Howard v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1134. No. 96­7486. Fitzpatrick v. Boyer et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7487. Morgan, aka Holliday v. Singletary, Secre- tary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1200. No. 96­7488. Mmubango v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7492. Grace et al. v. Burrill et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 503. No. 96­7497. Burks v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1126 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 17, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7500. Wafer v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7501. Wafer v. Gay et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 48. No. 96­7502. Spiegelman v. Reprise Records et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 685. No. 96­7507. Zaragoza v. Cianchetti, Judge, Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 966. No. 96­7508. Atkins v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1122, 923 P. 2d 1119. No. 96­7510. Grant v. McCoy, Superintendent, Cayuga Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 104 F. 3d 353. No. 96­7514. Crawford v. Hawaii. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1318. No. 96­7523. Edwards v. Andrews, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 640. No. 96­7524. French v. Pepe, Superintendent, Massachu- setts Correctional Institution, Norfolk. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7534. Wesley v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 503, 916 P. 2d 793. No. 96­7536. Abernathy v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7538. Burnett v. Willette. Ct. App. Mich. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7543. Brewer v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7604. Laureano v. Keane, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 353. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1127 520 U. S. March 17, 1997 No. 96­7609. Tadros v. Brooklyn Developmental Center et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 505. No. 96­7614. Spruill v. Gillis, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Coal Township. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7638. Standifird v. Richardson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 87 F. 3d 1322. No. 96­7645. Cuong Duy Nguyen v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 102 F. 3d 550. No. 96­7649. Nicolau v. New York State Department of Social Services. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 504. No. 96­7650. Jones v. Toombs, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7657. Watts v. Railroad Retirement Board. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1152. No. 96­7658. Wooten v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 344 N. C. 316, 474 S. E. 2d 360. No. 96­7659. Azubuko v. First National Bank of Boston et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1169. No. 96­7663. Bouie v. Peterson, Archivist of the United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 135. No. 96­7674. Harris v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7695. Propes v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 673 N. E. 2d 534. No. 96­7697. Brown v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 682 So. 2d 340. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1128 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 17, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7702. Boykins v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 133. No. 96­7708. Rowe v. Board of Education of the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee, et al. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 938 S. W. 2d 351. No. 96­7718. Edelbacher v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7719. Dies v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1461. No. 96­7721. Smart v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1379. No. 96­7722. Ryion v. United States; No. 96­7736. Bruce v. United States; No. 96­7745. Bruce v. United States; and No. 96­7767. Riales v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 957. No. 96­7723. Martineau v. City of Cypress et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1158. No. 96­7724. Khanna v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 550. No. 96­7728. Monaco et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 707. No. 96­7733. Alexander v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 24. No. 96­7735. Craig v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 141. No. 96­7738. Carrasco Ramos v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 655. No. 96­7739. Bowman v. Gammon, Superintendent, Mob- erly Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 1339. No. 96­7741. Berard v. Gorczyk, Commissioner, Vermont Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1129 520 U. S. March 17, 1997 No. 96­7743. Torres v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 360. No. 96­7744. Williams v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 710. No. 96­7750. Farmer v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 131. No. 96­7752. Gallagher v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 329. No. 96­7755. Davis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 141. No. 96­7756. Fernandez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7757. Porter v. West, Secretary of the Army. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1142. No. 96­7759. Grant v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 695. No. 96­7762. Hendrickson v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 349. No. 96­7763. Gray v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 769. No. 96­7764. DeGerolamo v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 182 and 100 F. 3d 14. No. 96­7766. Prou v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 106. No. 96­7770. Webber v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 709. No. 96­7771. Trevino v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7776. Jarrett v. United States; and No. 96­7786. Glover v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 234. No. 96­7781. Bustamante v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 969. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1130 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 17, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7784. Carpenter v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 409. No. 96­7785. Atlas v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 447. No. 96­7788. Leal v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1339. No. 96­7789. Malkiewicz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 655. No. 96­7794. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 125. No. 96­7795. Ogbuehi v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 692. No. 96­7797. Animashaum v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 387. No. 96­7800. Tillman v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 115. No. 96­7801. Miller v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 553. No. 96­7803. Keys v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1135. No. 96­7805. Cottrell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 654. No. 96­7806. Adkins v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7808. Woodall v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 684 A. 2d 1258. No. 96­7809. Renfroe v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1186. No. 96­7810. Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 553. No. 96­7811. Ochoa v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 142. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1131 520 U. S. March 17, 1997 No. 96­7812. Ramos v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 654. No. 96­7813. Philips v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 968. No. 96­7814. Sindram v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7816. Pacheco-Maldonado v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 551. No. 96­7817. Peters v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1139. No. 96­7819. Alston v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1335. No. 96­7821. Timber et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 709. No. 96­7825. Ivy v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 135. No. 96­7828. Morrison v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 619. No. 96­7834. Crite v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7835. Pielech et al. v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 423 Mass. 534, 668 N. E. 2d 1298. No. 96­7836. Moore v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 672. No. 96­7837. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 58. No. 96­7838. Marks, aka Bush, aka Young, aka Hansen v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1462. No. 96­7846. Douglas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 1315. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1132 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 17, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7847. Eckerson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 333. No. 96­7855. Mollenhour v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 506. No. 96­7857. Brekke et vir v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1043. No. 96­7859. Powell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 555. No. 96­7860. Riddick v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7861. Wooten v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 555. No. 96­7863. McKoy v. Morris, Warden. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 947. No. 96­7867. Mason v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1520. No. 96­7868. Jones v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 671. No. 96­7870. Hayes v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 429. No. 96­7876. Baramdyka v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 840. No. 96­7880. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 354. No. 96­7881. Morales v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 551. No. 96­7884. Withers v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 1142. No. 96­7886. Hill v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 706. No. 96­7887. Gonzalez v. Kuhlmann, Superintendent, Sullivan Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1392. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1133 520 U. S. March 17, 1997 No. 96­7889. DeWitte et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 155. No. 96­7894. Clark v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1144. No. 96­7897. Burdex v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 882. No. 96­7903. Velazquez-Overa v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 418. No. 96­7908. Hooper v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 696. No. 96­7910. Hall v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 121. No. 96­7912. Osias v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 360. No. 96­7913. Alvarado Orozco v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 141. No. 96­7915. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 114. No. 96­7939. Houston v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1562. No. 96­7948. Galvan v. Hurley, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 704. No. 96­7949. Hunter v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 82. No. 95­576. Williams et al. v. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 10 Cal. 4th 1009, 898 P. 2d 402. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas join, dissenting. The issue in this case is the constitutionality of an injunction against abortion protesters. The injunction limits their First Amendment activities to a sidewalk separated from the clinic that is the object of their protest by a busy four-lane avenue. The case has made its way back here after we set aside the Supreme 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1134 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Scalia, J., dissenting 520 U. S. Court of California's earlier judgment approving the injunction, 7 Cal. 4th 860, 873 P. 2d 1224 (1994), and remanded the case so that the court could reconsider its holding in light of our decision in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753 (1994). 513 U. S. 956 (1994). On remand, the Supreme Court of Califor- nia concluded that the provision in question "is equally valid under the new standard set forth in Madsen," and therefore "reaf- firm[ed] the judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood." 10 Cal. 4th 1009, 1012, 898 P. 2d 402, 404 (1995). That was in my view patent error, and has been confirmed as such by Schenck v. Pro- Choice Network of Western N. Y., 519 U. S. 357 (1997). I think it important to the dignity of this Court and the integrity of its processes to set aside what can only be regarded as an intentional evasion of its decrees. I would grant the petition for certiorari, summarily reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Califor- nia, and remand for further proceedings. This case-unlike Schenck-is not one in which the record re- veals instances of serious unlawful conduct by clinic protesters. The following was the testimony of Janice Schoenfeld, the "escort coordinator" of the clinic, at the hearing on the application for a permanent injunction: "Q. Did you ever see any of this group of defendants pre- vent somebody from getting in the front door of the clinic? "A. No. "Q. Did you ever see them manhandle any of your clients? "A. No. "Q. Was anybody, to the best of your knowledge, that wanted to get an abortion, prevented from getting an abortion? "A. No. "Q. Did you ever attempt to make a citizen's arrest of any of the defendants? "A. No, I did not. "Q. Do you know if any of them were ever arrested? "A. Not at the Vallejo clinic, that I know of. Some have been in other Operation Rescue activity. . . . . . "Q. Did you ever see any of the defendants prevent any cars from parking in the parking lot? "A. Not prevent them from parking, no." Tr. 54­55. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1135 1133 Scalia, J., dissenting This is a record so devoid of threatening physical confrontation it would make an old-fashioned union organizer blush. Yet the trial court entered-and the Supreme Court of California approved- an injunction severely curtailing the speech rights of clinic pro- testers in a public forum. The basis for that injunction-and for the Supreme Court of California's initial approval of it-was the perceived government interest in preventing "increased stress and anxiety" among abor- tion patients. 7 Cal. 4th, at 872­876, 873 P. 2d, at 1230­1233 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the Supreme Court of California explained, "emotionally jarring confrontations with anti-abortion pickets or sidewalk `counselors' may pose seri- ous health risks." Id., at 874, 873 P. 2d, at 1232. The "substan- tial governmental interest in protecting the patients' physical and emotional health and safety" justified restricting the abortion op- ponents to areas far removed from the clinic. Id., at 876, 873 P. 2d, at 1233. This holding was no longer supportable after we vacated the Supreme Court of California's judgment in light of Madsen, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Madsen, in disallow- ing an injunction which prevented abortion opponents from ap- proaching persons seeking services at an abortion clinic, said: "Absent evidence that the protesters' speech is independently proscribable (i. e., `fighting words' or threats), or is so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of phys- ical harm, this provision cannot stand." 512 U. S., at 774 (citation omitted). Despite this holding, the Supreme Court of California, on remand, did not abandon but reaffirmed its assertion that avoiding upset to the clinic's clients justified keeping the protesters at a distance. 10 Cal. 4th, at 1021, 898 P. 2d, at 410. When the defendants again petitioned us for certiorari, we held the case pending our decision in Schenck. Whatever glimmer of hope Madsen might have left regarding the legitimacy of the Supreme Court of California's "emotional upset" justification was entirely snuffed by Schenck, in which we reiterated, in the most unmistakable terms, that there is no legiti- mate government interest in protecting the "right of the people approaching and entering [clinics] to be left alone" on the public streets, 519 U. S., at 383. Schenck would require, without further 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1136 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Scalia, J., dissenting 520 U. S. analysis, a reversal of the judgment here, but for one additional factor: In its second opinion in this case-after our remand in light of Madsen-the California Supreme Court for the first time discerned a second state interest in support of the injunction: an interest in "ensuring unfettered access" to the clinic, 10 Cal. 4th, at 1022, 898 P. 2d, at 410. This, it should be noted with suspicion, is an interest which the court had expressly disclaimed in its first opinion, saying that "the critical issue [is] not access, but health and safety." 7 Cal. 4th, at 879, n. 10, 873 P. 2d 1235, n. 10. It is not normally our practice to scrutinize the record support for the grounds asserted by state courts or lower federal courts as a basis for rejecting constitutional claims. We have, however, sometimes been disposed to do so when the abridgment of First Amendment rights was at issue. See, e. g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 915, and n. 50 (1982); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 235 (1963). And we should in my view always be disposed to do so when the grounds are newly minted after a remand, contradict what was said before the re- mand, and bear indication of an attempt to evade the conse- quences of our holding prompting the remand. That is the case here; and an examination of the record for support of the newly minted ground discloses that it does not exist. The trial court made many findings regarding activities tending to cause, not blocking of the entrances to the clinic parking lot, but "increased stress and anxiety" to clinic patrons and staff: protesters "confront and intimidate women seeking [respondent's] services," "force . . . `counseling' upon [respondent's] staff and clients," "have called staff `murderers' or asked them not to `kill babies' in the presence of small children," "have pursued [respond- ent's] clients to their cars or public transportation in an effort to distribute literature and the plastic fetuses," and "bring small children to the area who run up and down the public sidewalk in front of plaintiff's premises." App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a­43a. The trial court also made findings regarding the impact of these activities on respondent, its patrons, and its staff: "[Respondent] must escort its clients through picket lines and [petitioners'] `picketers/counselors' in its parking lot," and "[t]he conduct of [petitioners] and their picketers/counselors have [sic] caused some of the women seeking counselling or services from plaintiff to become emotionally distraught." Ibid. But the only finding re- motely related to access to the clinic is the following: Protesters "stand directly in front of [respondent's] office door and interfer 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1137 1133 Scalia, J., dissenting [sic] with or obstruct entrance to and from [respondent's] clinic." Id., at 42a. This finding (which, by the way, has no support in the record if it is interpreted to mean physical obstruction 1) per- tains to behavior at the entrance to the clinic-which is some 100 feet inside the parking lot, from which the injunction (without objection) excludes the protesters entirely. It obviously cannot support excluding protesters from the public sidewalk adjoining the entrances to the parking lot, where it has never been so much as suggested that any blocking of access occurred. The Supreme Court of California's opinion misrepresents this, saying that "the trial court found here, that petitioners had significantly blocked driveways . . . ." 10 Cal. 4th, at 1023, 898 P. 2d, at 411. The only authority cited for this proposition is that portion of the court's own pre-Madsen opinion which recites (inter alia) the trial court's finding that protesters "pursued patients to their cars . . . to distribute literature." 7 Cal. 4th, at 867, 873 P. 2d, at 1227. This obviously does not establish (or even suggest) that petitioners "blocked driveways." 2 1 There was no testimony that petitioners had blocked the entrance, but only statements that they had stood very close to the entrance, trying to pass literature or other material to those going in. See Tr. 17­18 (testimony of Janice Schoenfeld at hearing on preliminary injunction) ("I did not say they blocked the door. I said they stand very close to the door") ("Q. Has any one of your clients ever been prevented from entering the clinic? A. No"); id., at 54 (testimony of Schoenfeld at hearing on permanent injunction) ("Q. Did you ever see any of this group of defendants prevent somebody from getting in the front door of the clinic? A. No"); id., at 65 (testimony of Marsha Anderson at hearing on permanent injunction) ("Q. Did you ob- serve any of your patrons being denied entrance into the clinic by any of the defendants? A. I know they progressed to the front door, interrupted them, but not prohibited them"). Of course if, as the trial court believed, subjecting abortion clients to "emotional upset" was unlawful, forcing clients to expose themselves to such unlawful activity in order to enter or exit the clinic would constitute "interfer[ing] with" their access-and that is evi- dently what the trial court had in mind. 2 In a separate portion of its opinion, the Supreme Court of California stated (without any citation of record support) that "[o]ne of the tactics of the sidewalk picketers was to walk slowly across the driveway entrance, thereby delaying cars attempting to turn into the parking lot from the street." 10 Cal. 4th, at 1012, 898 P. 2d, at 404. Apart from the fact that the trial court made no such finding in connection with its entry of the injunction, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a­43a, "delaying" the entry of cars into the lot as an incidental result of lawful picket activity is by no means equivalent to "blocking driveways." 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1138 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Scalia, J., dissenting 520 U. S. Of course, even if there had been a finding of interference with free access to the parking lot, the challenged injunction would require further findings to establish that no restraint short of total exclusion of free speech from the public sidewalk-such as limiting the number of protesters-could have eliminated the in- terference. Cf. Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U. S. 821, 823 (1994) (injunction imposing numerical limit on picketers). A con- clusion that complete exclusion of protesters was necessary in this case would be difficult to square with the history of what happened: The trial court initially issued a temporary restraining order drafted by respondent, which permitted two picketers on the sidewalk in front of the clinic. App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a­66a. Shortly thereafter, it issued a preliminary injunction increasing to four the number of picketers allowed on that sidewalk. Id., at 67a­68a. Despite this apparent sign of success-and without any request by respondent for more restrictive relief-11 months later the trial court imposed the permanent injunction at issue here, banning all picketing in front of the clinic. The reason, of course, was that (as the Supreme Court of California concluded the first time around) the trial court was not concerned about "impeding access"; it was concerned about preventing "stress and anxiety." Since the trial court did not find that the challenged injunction provision was necessary to secure access, the Supreme Court of California took it upon itself to provide the requisite finding. "[T]he evidence at trial," the court proclaimed, "indicated that picketers had not followed the preliminary injunction . . . ." 10 Cal. 4th, at 1024, 898 P. 2d, at 411­412. For this the court offers no support other than citation of its earlier opinion in this case, 7 Cal. 4th, at 866­867, n. 2, 873 P. 2d, at 1227, n. 2, which in turn relies upon nothing more probative than the following testimony of Janice Schoenfeld: "Q. Have you observed picket activity since the injunction? "A. Yes, but they followed the injunction usually, except for picketers. "MS. RYER: Thank you. I have nothing further. Thank you. "THE COURT: You say that they followed the injunction? "THE WITNESS: They followed the injunction, yes, since the injunction." Tr. 52­53. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1139 520 U. S. March 17, 1997 Even if the record did establish some violation of the preliminary injunction, it would still not establish a violation related to access, supporting the proposition that banishment to the other side of the avenue was "the only practicable means of ensuring unfet- tered access," 10 Cal. 4th, at 1022, 898 P. 2d, at 410. As far as appears, any failure to "follo[w] the injunction" might have related to one of the many prohibitions that had nothing to do with obstructing access. Indeed, the odds are in favor of that, since almost all of the prohibitions in the preliminary injunction were of that character. The record simply does not contain the facts necessary to support the challenged provision in the name of protection of access. * * * This case having been held pending the issuance of our opinion in Schenck; and Schenck having come out four-square against the principal theory relied upon by the Supreme Court of California; it is quite impossible to understand why any disposition short of a reversal and remand would be appropriate. If we were pre- pared to take at face value the court's post-Madsen-invented "ob- struction of entrances" justification, then there was no reason to hold the case in the first place. The hold was correct, and today's denial of certiorari smiles upon injustice to these petitioners and disregard of the processes of this Court. I dissent. No. 96­853. Mustang Fuel Corp. et al. v. Hatch et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1382. No. 96­1041. McVicar, Warden v. Griffin. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 880. No. 96­1043. Gilmore, Warden v. Emerson. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 898. No. 96­1051. Illinois v. Nitz. Sup. Ct. Ill. Motion of re- spondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 173 Ill. 2d 151, 670 N. E. 2d 672. No. 96­1090. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Sirbaugh. Cir. Ct. Berkeley County, W. Va. Motion of Association of American 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1140 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 17, 1997 520 U. S. Railroads for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­1109. Davis v. AT&T Communications, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1353. No. 96­1112. Martech USA, Inc. v. Hoeflich. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Motion of Insurance Company of North America for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­1173. Beeman et al. v. Cohen. C. A. 9th Cir. Mo- tion of Community College League of California et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 92 F. 3d 968. Rehearing Denied No. 96­796. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. v. Bickel et al., 519 U. S. 1093; No. 96­5996. Moore v. Roberts, Superintendent, Missis- sippi State Penitentiary, et al., 519 U. S. 1093; No. 96­6205. Westley v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, 519 U. S. 1094; No. 96­6287. Belcher v. Lesley et al., 519 U. S. 1031; No. 96­6589. Tumlin v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. et al., 519 U. S. 1080; No. 96­6678. Stephen v. Prunty, Warden, 519 U. S. 1095; No. 96­6787. Struve v. Park Place Apartments, 519 U. S. 1097; No. 96­6864. Brown v. Turpin, Warden, 519 U. S. 1098; and No. 96­6904. Penland v. North Carolina, 519 U. S. 1098. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 94­9848. Gresham v. Transportation Communications International Union et al., 516 U. S. 860; No. 96­594. Mudie v. Miltland Raleigh-Durham, 519 U. S. 1041; and No. 96­6581. Lurie v. Caesar's Tahoe, Inc., et al., 519 U. S. 1045. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1141 520 U. S. March 17, 24, 1997 No. 96­675. Guilbeau et ux. v. W. W. Henry Co. et al., 519 U. S. 1091. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted. Petition for rehearing denied. March 24, 1997 Affirmed on Appeal No. 96­1034. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States et al.; and No. 96­1108. Spice Entertainment Cos., Inc. v. Reno, Attorney General, et al. Affirmed on appeals from D. C. Del. Reported below: 945 F. Supp. 772. Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 96­7621. Calamia v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of peti- tioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certio- rari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U. S. 433 (1997). Reported below: 686 So. 2d 1337. Miscellaneous Orders No. D­1790. In re Disbarment of Friedman. Bruce Mi- chael Friedman, of Los Angeles, Cal., is suspended from the prac- tice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be dis- barred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­65. Hartnett v. Stein, dba Western Contruction Co.; and No. M­66. Tidik v. Kaufman et al. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. 95­974. Arizonans for Official English et al. v. Arizona et al., ante, p. 43. In this case, the parties shall bear their own costs. No. 96­454. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash et ux. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1086.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argu- ment as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 96­552. Agostini et al. v. Felton et al.; and 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1142 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 24, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­553. Chancellor, Board of Education of the City of New York, et al. v. Felton et al. C. A. 2d Cir. [Certio- rari granted, 519 U. S. 1086.] Motion of Sarah Peter et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. No. 96­663. Klehr et ux. v. A. O. Smith Corp. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1073.] Motion of Plain- tiffs' Executive Committee MDL No. 1069 et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. No. 96­7879. Jahannes v. Reid. Ct. App. Ga. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Peti- tioner is allowed until April 14, 1997, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 96­7595. In re Serra. Petition for writ of mandamus denied. No. 96­8357 (A­674). In re Medina. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. No. 96­8358 (A­675). In re Medina. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied. Certiorari Granted No. 96­653. Baker et al. v. General Motors Corp. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 811. Certiorari Denied No. 96­690. North Belle Vernon Borough et al. v. Liv- ingstone et vir. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 515. No. 96­978. Wilson v. Drake et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1073. No. 96­998. Reliable Business Computers v. Heurtebise. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 452 Mich. 405, 550 N. W. 2d 243. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1143 520 U. S. March 24, 1997 No. 96­1116. Aircraft Braking Systems Corp. v. Local 856, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 155. No. 96­1139. Morrow v. Winslow, Judge, District Court of Tulsa County, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1386. No. 96­1140. Tarapacki v. New Jersey ReInsurance Co. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1142. Cole et ux. v. Huntsville Memorial Hospi- tal et al. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 920 S. W. 2d 364. No. 96­1146. Vemco, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1449. No. 96­1161. Barakat v. Life Insurance Company of Vir- ginia. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1520. No. 96­1198. Foltice v. Guardsman Products, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 933. No. 96­1202. Von Grabe v. Ziff Davis Publishing Co. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1221. Jordan v. Governing Board of the Marin Community College District. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1222. Caudle et al. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. et al. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 281 Ill. App. 3d 1151, 701 N. E. 2d 844. No. 96­1247. Richardson v. Bakery, Confectionary & To- bacco Workers, Local No. 26. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1197. No. 96­1256. Kraytsberg v. Kraytsberg. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 Mass. App. 1118, 664 N. E. 2d 486. No. 96­1259. Missouri v. Futo. Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 932 S. W. 2d 808. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1144 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 24, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1264. Hough v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 856. No. 96­1269. Gaither v. Reno, Attorney General. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 124. No. 96­1315. Millus v. Newsday, Inc., et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 N. Y. 2d 840, 675 N. E. 2d 461. No. 96­1317. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 969. No. 96­1331. Smith v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1453. No. 96­1336. McMullin v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 130. No. 96­1373. Sanguandikul v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 114. No. 96­6752. Aranda-Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 977. No. 96­6912. Velasco v. Horgan et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 520. No. 96­6993. Spike v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1743. No. 96­7004. Zamora v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1752. No. 96­7007. Washington v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1749. No. 96­7023. Iko v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1723. No. 96­7027. Mathewson v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1730. No. 96­7028. Lane v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1726. No. 96­7041. Cardwell v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1708. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1145 520 U. S. March 24, 1997 No. 96­7049. Florio v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1716. No. 96­7050. Garcia v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1717. No. 96­7051. Giseburt v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1718. No. 96­7052. Hiltunen v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1722. No. 96­7060. Despain v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1712. No. 96­7067. Kelly v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­7074. Sparks v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1743. No. 96­7103. Monroe, aka Gray v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7106. Fitzgerald v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1716. No. 96­7195. Williams v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 684 So. 2d 1179. No. 96­7281. Smith v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1743. No. 96­7330. Daws v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1712. No. 96­7369. May v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1730. No. 96­7423. Reeves v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1738. No. 96­7504. Lafever v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1726. No. 96­7506. Madanat v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 947. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1146 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 24, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7511. Wheeler v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1750. No. 96­7525. Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corporation et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1041. No. 96­7535. Bentsen v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1706. No. 96­7542. Barrett v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1705. No. 96­7549. Tierney v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7550. Williams v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7553. Perry v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 344 Md. 204, 686 A. 2d 274. No. 96­7555. Sidles v. Lewis et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 964. No. 96­7556. Russell v. Robertson County, Tennessee, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1139. No. 96­7562. Payne v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 683 So. 2d 458. No. 96­7566. Hampton v. Killinger, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 138. No. 96­7568. Grant v. Rivers, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7571. Wilson v. Anderson, Superintendent, Mis- sissippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 550. No. 96­7572. Warren v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­7576. Lovett v. Minnesota Department of Cor- rections et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1147 520 U. S. March 24, 1997 No. 96­7582. Johnson v. Iowa. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7585. Nelson v. DeTella, Warden, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7592. Thomas v. Tusan, Judge, Superior Court of Georgia, Fulton County, et al. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7593. Somers v. Northwest Iowa Mental Health Center et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 649. No. 96­7597. Blair v. Calderon, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7599. McCain v. Gramley, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 288. No. 96­7602. Ali v. Gomez, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7606. Remeta v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 513. No. 96­7607. Trowery v. Gale et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7608. Tolliver v. Myers, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7617. Trobaugh v. Iowa. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7652. Patterson v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7720. Harden v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 344 N. C. 542, 476 S. E. 2d 658. No. 96­7737. Allen v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 281 Ill. App. 3d 1147, 701 N. E. 2d 843. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1148 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 24, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7742. Bianchi v. Wood, Superintendent, Washing- ton State Penitentiary. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7778. McNamara v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 111 Md. App. 745. No. 96­7791. Bumpass v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 551. No. 96­7832. Singleton v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1742. No. 96­7841. Thomas v. West, Secretary of the Army. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 670. No. 96­7843. Wharton v. Johnson et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7854. Easter v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De- partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 523. No. 96­7864. Kelly v. Merit Systems Protection Board. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 715. No. 96­7904. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7907. Garin v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 687. No. 96­7916. Johnson v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 683 A. 2d 1087. No. 96­7917. Licciardi v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1462. No. 96­7919. Marshall v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 278 Ill. App. 3d 1136, 699 N. E. 2d 608. No. 96­7923. Koch v. Stewart, Director, Arizona Depart- ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1146. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1149 520 U. S. March 24, 1997 No. 96­7925. Badley v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 131. No. 96­7927. Scroger v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1256. No. 96­7931. Aguilar-Higuerra v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 964. No. 96­7935. Black v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 686 A. 2d 1061. No. 96­7938. Holman v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 111 Md. App. 741. No. 96­7947. Schweihs v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 424. No. 96­7954. Sotelo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 782. No. 96­7957. Veatch v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 160. No. 96­7958. Wyatt v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 241. No. 96­7964. Bentley v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 964. No. 96­7965. Golden v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 142. No. 96­7969. McTeer v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 121. No. 96­7970. Jones et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7972. Isom v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 920. No. 96­7973. Via v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 122. No. 96­7979. Rivas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 170. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1150 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 24, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7985. Luchkowec v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 956. No. 96­7990. Scott v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 122. No. 96­7991. Sutton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 696. No. 96­7992. Rodriguez Salinas v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 706. No. 96­7993. Pacheco-Chong v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 706. No. 96­7994. Silver v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 122. No. 96­8001. Williams v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1052. No. 96­8003. Ballistrea v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 827. No. 96­8008. Mans v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1139. No. 96­8009. Nowaczyk v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1333. No. 96­8013. Bemis v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1456. No. 96­8016. Halpin v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 310. No. 96­8019. Fashina v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1471. No. 96­8021. Garza-Nevarez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1134. No. 96­8027. Carrington v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1. No. 96­8029. Visintine v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1151 520 U. S. March 24, 1997 No. 96­8033. Phillips v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 125. No. 96­8036. Howell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1214. No. 96­8053. Tokars v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1520. No. 96­1149. Trustees of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund of Philadelphia and Vicinity et al. v. Federal Express Corp. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of National Coordinating Committee for Multiemployer Plans for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1432. No. 96­1307. Duncan, Warden v. Baylor. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1321. No. 96­1330. Black v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari before judgment denied. No. 96­8320 (A­670). Medina v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 690 So. 2d 1241. No. 96­8321 (A­671). Medina v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 690 So. 2d 1255. No. 96­8359 (A­676). Medina v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Ap- plication for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 109 F. 3d 1556. Rehearing Denied No. 96­6659. Scott v. Recession Hearing Official et al., 519 U. S. 1095; No. 96­6684. Bast v. Glasberg et al., 519 U. S. 1095; No. 96­6973. Fleming v. United States, 519 U. S. 1083; No. 96­7290. Foster v. Giant Food, Inc., 519 U. S. 1153; 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1152 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 24, 28, 31, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7343. Schwarz v. Clinton et al., 519 U. S. 1135; No. 96­7539. In re Visintine, 519 U. S. 1107; and No. 96­7570. Foster v. United States Marshals Service, 519 U. S. 1154. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 96­6786. Burton v. Burton, 519 U. S. 1082. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. March 28, 1997 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 96­1216. Jane Phillips Episcopal Memorial Medical Center et al. v. Rishell, Curator of the Person and Es- tate of Lacey, an Incapacitated Person. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari dismissed only as to Jane Phillips Episcopal Memorial Medical Center under this Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1407. March 31, 1997 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 96­1327. Baskin v. Bath Township Board of Zoning Appeals et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 702. Certiorari Granted-Reversed. (See No. 96­858, ante, p. 292.) Miscellaneous Orders No. D­1769. In re Disbarment of Davison. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1104.] No. D­1771. In re Disbarment of Lynn. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1104.] No. D­1774. In re Disbarment of McDonald. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1105.] No. D­1791. In re Disbarment of Growney. William Ed- ward Growney, of Pacifica, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1153 520 U. S. March 31, 1997 No. D­1792. In re Disbarment of Sands. Henry William Sands, of Los Angeles, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1793. In re Disbarment of Boehme. Harry Boehme, Jr., of Miami, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1794. In re Disbarment of Echols. Hugh T. Echols, of Houston, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1796. In re Disbarment of Hamilton. Jim D. Ham- ilton, of Houston, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.* No. M­67. Williams v. Borg & Warner Automotive Elec- tronics & Mechanical Systems Corp.; No. M­68. Babigian v. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States, et al.; and No. M­69. Rowls v. Runyon, Postmaster General. Mo- tions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. 95­728. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., ante, p. 17. In this case, the parties shall bear their own costs. No. 95­1081. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., et al. v. Direc- tor, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Depart- ment of Labor, et al., 519 U. S. 248. Motion of respondent Maggie Yates for attorney's fees and expenses denied without *[Reporter's Note: This order was vacated on April 14, 1997, see post, p. 1164.] 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1154 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 31, 1997 520 U. S. prejudice to refiling in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. No. 95­1918. Arkansas v. Farm Credit Services of Cen- tral Arkansas et al. C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1085.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 96­552. Agostini et al. v. Felton et al.; and No. 96­553. Chancellor, Board of Education of the City of New York, et al. v. Felton et al. C. A. 2d Cir. [Certio- rari granted, 519 U. S. 1086.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor Gen- eral for divided argument granted. No. 96­663. Klehr et ux. v. A. O. Smith Corp. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1073.] Motion of Ameri- can Council of Life Insurance et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae denied. No. 96­5955. Richards v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. [Cer- tiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1052.] Motion of Wayne County, Michi- gan, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied. No. 96­1177. In re Constant; and No. 96­1178. In re Constant. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. Certiorari Granted No. 96­957. Jefferson, Individually and as Administra- tor of the Estate of Jefferson, Deceased, et al. v. City of Tarrant, Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari granted lim- ited to the following question: "Whether, when a decedent's death is alleged to have resulted from a deprivation of federal rights occurring in Alabama, the Alabama Wrongful Death Act, Ala. Code § 6­5­410 (1993), governs the recovery by the representa- tive of the decedent's estate under 42 U. S. C. § 1983?" Reported below: 682 So. 2d 29. No. 96­6839. Almendarez-Torres v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau- peris granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 113 F. 3d 515. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1155 520 U. S. March 31, 1997 Certiorari Denied No. 96­859. Stevedoring Services of America et al. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, De- partment of Labor, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 895. No. 96­1052. Tak How Investment Ltd. v. Nowak, Adminis- trator of the Estate of Nowak, Deceased, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 708. No. 96­1093. Cryo-Trans, Inc. v. General American Transportation Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 766. No. 96­1098. Topp v. Idaho State Bar. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 Idaho 414, 925 P. 2d 1113. No. 96­1156. Presbytery of New Jersey of the Ortho- dox Presbyterian Church et al. v. Whitman, Governor of New Jersey, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 99 F. 3d 101. No. 96­1165. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., et al. v. Kahn, Director, New Orleans Department of Finance. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 698. No. 96­1180. Royal King Fisheries et al. v. Fuszek. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 514. No. 96­1181. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. City of Philadelphia et al. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 676 A. 2d 1298. No. 96­1182. Anderson v. Holifield et ux. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1190. Kern v. City of Rochester et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 38. No. 96­1193. Beards et vir v. Bible Way Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith of Washington, D. C., et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 680 A. 2d 419. No. 96­1195. H&D Entertainment, Inc., et al. v. Fleet National Bank et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 96 F. 3d 532. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1156 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 31, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1197. Goehring et al. v. Del Junco et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1294. No. 96­1199. Muller, a Minor Child, by His Parents and Next Friends, Muller et al. v. Jefferson Lighthouse School et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1530. No. 96­1208. Meehan v. Town of East Lyme et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 352. No. 96­1214. Crane v. Olsten Staffing Services et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 686 So. 2d 757. No. 96­1218. Lafayette Morehouse, Inc., et al. v. County of Contra Costa. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 45 Cal. 4th 1335, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 647. No. 96­1219. Michigan Document Services, Inc., et al. v. Princeton University Press et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1381. No. 96­1239. Nunes v. Florida Bar. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 679 So. 2d 744. No. 96­1282. Daniels v. United States Postal Service. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1207. No. 96­1305. Hampton v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 281 Ill. App. 3d 1140, 701 N. E. 2d 840. No. 96­1308. Lovell v. Hurford et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 656. No. 96­1313. Dodson v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 37. No. 96­1333. Young v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1350. Farley v. Cessna Aircraft Co. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 690. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1157 520 U. S. March 31, 1997 No. 96­1353. Glover et al. v. Durham. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 862. No. 96­6869. Abdul-Salaam v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 544 Pa. 514, 678 A. 2d 342. No. 96­6887. Samuel v. Duncan, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1194. No. 96­6914. Ulloa v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 949. No. 96­6927. Hill v. McKee et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 834. No. 96­7217. Losada v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1149. No. 96­7276. Miller v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 173 Ill. 2d 167, 670 N. E. 2d 721. No. 96­7422. Marshall v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 13 Cal. 4th 799, 919 P. 2d 1280. No. 96­7454. Uwagbale v. Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7628. Ricotta v. Ricotta. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7636. Rose v. Woods et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 53. No. 96­7643. James v. McClain et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7647. Muse v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 125. No. 96­7651. Stone v. Byrd et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 652. No. 96­7655. Judy v. Hinckley et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7656. Azubuko v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1146. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:11] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1158 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 31, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7660. Cole v. Dickman, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 702. No. 96­7665. Lowell v. Prunty, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 1358. No. 96­7671. Williams v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. (two judgments). C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7675. Frederick v. Columbia Correctional Insti- tution et al. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 Wis. 2d 109, 552 N. W. 2d 897. No. 96­7676. Edmond v. Martin et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 952. No. 96­7682. Fox v. Love, Superintendent, State Correc- tional Institution at Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7689. Cliff v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 230 App. Div. 2d 865, 646 N. Y. S. 2d 834. No. 96­7694. Porter v. Senkowski, Superintendent, Clin- ton Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7696. Parsons v. BASF Corp. et al. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 676 So. 2d 1199. No. 96­7699. Madrid v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7707. Pickens v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 708. No. 96­7712. Goonewardena v. University of Minnesota et al. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7713. Norwood v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 344 N. C. 511, 476 S. E. 2d 349. No. 96­7714. Johnson v. En Vogue et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1342. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1159 520 U. S. March 31, 1997 No. 96­7715. Ligons v. Moore et al. Ct. App. Minn. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7716. Dobos v. Civil Service Commission of the County of Los Angeles. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7717. Durham v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 682 So. 2d 1099. No. 96­7780. Lorenz v. Martin Marietta Corp., Inc. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7827. Morris v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7839. Totoro v. H. A. DeHart & Son, Inc., et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7845. Gonzales v. Thomas, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 978. No. 96­7877. Lutalo v. Walker, Superintendent, Marion Correctional Institution, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1335. No. 96­7891. Huie v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 698. No. 96­7893. Foster v. Wolf, Judge, District of Columbia Superior Court. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7911. Scott v. Angelone, Director, Virginia De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 120. No. 96­7920. Jae v. Kessler et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 690. No. 96­7928. Pollard v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 370. No. 96­7956. Agcaoili v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1160 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 31, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7966. Gomes v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1473, 930 P. 2d 701. No. 96­7974. Brandenburg v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1456. No. 96­7980. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 127. No. 96­8000. Sullivan v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 686. No. 96­8002. Tavares v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 995. No. 96­8017. Glant v. Florida Bar. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 684 So. 2d 723. No. 96­8020. Farrugia v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 156. No. 96­8037. Devin v. Barnett, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1206. No. 96­8039. Ortiz v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 370. No. 96­8041. Beaty v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1347. No. 96­8043. Smith v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 202. No. 96­8044. Leiphardt v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 1390. No. 96­8049. Gomez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­8057. Curry v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 121. No. 96­8059. Barnes v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1263. No. 96­8060. Alexander v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1131. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1161 520 U. S. March 31, 1997 No. 96­8062. Safford v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 136. No. 96­8063. Peterson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 375. No. 96­8065. Rogers v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 355. No. 96­8066. Dominguez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 126. No. 96­8067. Goggins v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 116. No. 96­8069. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1455. No. 96­8071. Lawuary v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 135. No. 96­8074. Reed v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 82. No. 96­8079. Bueno-Sierra v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 375. No. 96­8082. Brumfield v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 145. No. 96­8083. Rodriguez-Meraz v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 414. No. 96­8091. Escobar-Garcia v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 652. No. 96­8092. Davis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 671. No. 96­8097. Luck v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1457. No. 96­8098. McClain v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 957. No. 96­8115. Clemons v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 282 Ill. App. 3d 1100, 707 N. E. 2d 294. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1162 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 31, April 2, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8116. Young v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 1407. No. 96­8122. Mays v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 142. No. 96­8132. Juvenile Male v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 126. No. 96­723. Lucky Stores, Inc. v. Holihan. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Equal Employment Advisory Council for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 362. No. 96­1004. Sheppard v. Diaz. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 1502. No. 96­8058. Palmer v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 683 A. 2d 61. Rehearing Denied No. 96­791. Davis v. Wonderland Greyhound Park, Inc., et al., 519 U. S. 1109; No. 96­5594. Calder v. Armstrong et al., 519 U. S. 1078; No. 96­6604. Crawford v. Bexar County Tax Office et al., 519 U. S. 1080; No. 96­6712. Perryman v. Prado, Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, 519 U. S. 1066; No. 96­6821. Pioterek v. Labor and Industry Review Commission et al., 519 U. S. 1097; No. 96­6832. Colligan v. Trans World Airlines, 519 U. S. 1097; and No. 96­7261. Olsen v. Florida, 519 U. S. 1133. Petitions for rehearing denied. April 2, 1997 Certiorari Denied No. 96­8463 (A­704). Herman v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1163 520 U. S. April 2, 3, 8, 11, 1997 to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. April 3, 1997 Certiorari Denied No. 96­8486 (A­710). Spence v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8487 (A­711). Spence v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. April 8, 1997 Miscellaneous Order No. 96­8400 (A­695). Buchanan v. Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending the disposition by this Court of the petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay shall continue pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court. April 11, 1997 Miscellaneous Orders* No. 96­454. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash et ux. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1086.] Motion of National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, Inc., for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument denied. *For the Court's orders prescribing amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, see post, p. 1287; amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see post, p. 1307; amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, see post, p. 1315; and amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, see post, p. 1325. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1164 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 520 U. S. April 14, 1997 Miscellaneous Orders. (See also No. 96­8005, ante, p. 303.) No. D­1796. In re Disbarment of Hamilton. Due to mis- taken identity, the order entered March 31, 1997 [ante, p. 1153], is vacated, and the rule to show cause is discharged. No. A­687. Banks v. Randolph. Super. Ct. D. C. Applica- tion for stay, addressed to Justice O'Connor and referred to the Court, denied. No. M­70. Adams et ux. v. Moore et al.; No. M­71. Harrington v. Attorney General of North Carolina; No. M­72. Al-Hakim v. Florida et al.; and No. M­73. Bartlett v. United States. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. 95­1455. Reno, Attorney General v. Bossier Parish School Board et al.; and No. 95­1508. Price et al. v. Bossier Parish School Board et al. D. C. D. C. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 517 U. S. 1232.] Motion of Harris County, Texas, et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae denied. No. 96­7826. McCrea v. Andrews Federal Credit Union. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div.; No. 96­7872. Graham-Weber v. County of Essex et al. C. A. 3d Cir.; and No. 96­7960. Marmolejo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until May 5, 1997, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. No. 96­8233. In re Stone. Petition for writ of habeas cor- pus denied. No. 96­8119. In re Eidson. Petition for writ of prohibition denied. Certiorari Granted No. 96­910. City of Chicago et al. v. International Col- lege of Surgeons et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 981. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1165 520 U. S. April 14, 1997 No. 96­976. Hudson et al. v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1026. No. 96­7171. Spencer v. Kemna, Superintendent, West- ern Missouri Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 1114. Certiorari Denied No. 96­388. Skinner v. City of Miami. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 F. 3d 344. No. 96­889. Prince George's County et al. v. Alexander et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 312. No. 96­930. Midwest Investments et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 630. No. 96­986. Beller v. United States; and No. 96­7338. Coffman v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 330. No. 96­1044. CEDC Federal Credit Union v. National Credit Union Administration. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 351. No. 96­1080. Clement v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1101. Silmon v. First Bancorp of Louisiana, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1444. No. 96­1143. Coker v. Douglas et al. Ct. App. Tex., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1171. Smith v. Alabama Aviation and Technical College et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 683 So. 2d 431. No. 96­1174. Nielsen v. International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 2569, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1107. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1166 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 14, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1201. Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Com- mittee v. Beasley, Governor of South Carolina, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 134. No. 96­1207. Miller et al. v. Schoemehl et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 449. No. 96­1216. Wellshear v. Rishell, Curator of the Per- son and Estate of Lacey, an Incapacitated Person. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1407. No. 96­1224. Meyers v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1452. No. 96­1227. Red Rock Commodities, Ltd., et al. v. ABN­ AMRO Bank, N. A. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1394. No. 96­1233. THORN Americas, Inc., fka Rent-A-Center, Inc., et al. v. Fogie et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 645. No. 96­1234. Raynor, a Minor, by Her Father, Raynor, et al. v. Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 110 Md. App. 165, 676 A. 2d 978. No. 96­1243. Carlen v. Department of Health Services of Suffolk County, New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 351. No. 96­1246. Easterday v. Gilbert, Sheriff, Okaloosa County, Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 101 F. 3d 709. No. 96­1251. Brock v. Caterpillar, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 220. No. 96­1253. Weaver v. Weaver. Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 Kan. App. 2d ­­­, 923 P. 2d 523. No. 96­1257. Bonnell v. Amtex, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1154. No. 96­1258. Atlas Turner, Inc. v. Straub et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 407. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1167 520 U. S. April 14, 1997 No. 96­1261. Atlantic Coast Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Shaw et ux. Ct. App. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 322 S. C. 139, 470 S. E. 2d 382. No. 96­1263. OI­NEG TV Products, Inc. v. Durko; and No. 96­1273. Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers International AFL­CIO, CLC, No. 243 v. Durko. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 112. No. 96­1265. Arizona v. Mendoza Duarte. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1270. Tei Fu Chen et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1495. No. 96­1272. Kahn v. Emerson Electric Co. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1166. No. 96­1277. Branch v. Tower Air, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1278. Clark et ux. v. City of Hermosa Beach et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 48 Cal. App. 4th 1152, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 223. No. 96­1281. Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc. v. Hilton Inns, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 651. No. 96­1284. Carman v. Texas (two judgments). Ct. App. Tex., 7th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1288. Maccaferri Gabions, Inc. v. Wilkinson & Jenkins Construction Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 1431. No. 96­1296. Horton v. Union Recovery Limited Part- nership. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 252 Va. 418, 477 S. E. 2d 521. No. 96­1301. Jensen v. Gould. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1309. Zafiratos v. Monroe Township et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 694. No. 96­1319. Merit Contracting, Inc. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 248. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1168 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 14, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1320. Emerick v. United Technologies Corp. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 353. No. 96­1325. Mount Juneau Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. City and Borough of Juneau et al. Sup. Ct. Alaska. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 923 P. 2d 768. No. 96­1334. Mattox et vir v. Dallas Board of Adjust- ments. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 953. No. 96­1338. Prestonwood Golf Club Corp., dba Preston- wood Country Club v. Niederlitz et ux. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 954. No. 96­1340. Green et vir v. Dolsky et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 546 Pa. 400, 685 A. 2d 110. No. 96­1344. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis In- dian Reservation et al. v. Washington et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 334. No. 96­1348. Steamship Mutual Underwriting Assn. (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Baris et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 367. No. 96­1349. Simmons v. Burns, Commissioner, Connecti- cut Department of Transportation. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­1351. Laws, Trustee v. United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, N. A. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 98 F. 3d 1047. No. 96­1354. Catz v. McDonald, Trial Commissioner, Do- mestic Relations Division of the Superior Court in and for the County of Pima, Arizona (Chalker, Real Party in Interest), et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1360. Clements v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1362. Clorox Co. v. Haile. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­1368. Van Scoy et al. v. Shell Oil Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1348. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1169 520 U. S. April 14, 1997 No. 96­1369. Van Scoy v. Shell Oil Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1348. No. 96­1372. Stahl v. Director, Central Intelligence Agency. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1354. No. 96­1376. Lorenz et al. v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 928 P. 2d 1274. No. 96­1385. House the Homeless, Inc., et al. v. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 176. No. 96­1387. Crawford, Individually and on Behalf of Her Deceased Husband, Crawford, et al. v. Martin- Marietta Technologies, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 550. No. 96­1401. Dimensions Medical Center, Ltd. v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board et al. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 282 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 707 N. E. 2d 291. No. 96­1402. Clay v. Council of the District of Colum- bia. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 683 A. 2d 1385. No. 96­1410. Anderson et al. v. Las Vegas Tribe of Pai- ute Indians et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 103 F. 3d 137. No. 96­1413. Leidner v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1423. No. 96­1414. Paladin v. Finnerty et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 356. No. 96­1416. Wright v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1419. Feldman, aka Fleming, aka Givner v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 149. No. 96­1420. Cvijanovic v. Loral Corp. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1438. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1170 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 14, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1431. Day v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 682 A. 2d 1125. No. 96­1435. Pickett v. American Breeders Service. Cir. Ct. Frederick County, Md. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1436. De Wiest v. Dehaene et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 370. No. 96­1438. Jenkins v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 430. No. 96­1439. Lynch et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 357. No. 96­1445. Dolan v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1140. No. 96­1446. Ahern v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1187. No. 96­1449. Patrick v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1140. No. 96­1453. Scanlin v. Cooper et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1434. No. 96­1492. Edwards v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1364. No. 96­6978. Santos v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 761. No. 96­7196. Davis v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 684 So. 2d 643. No. 96­7233. Bowers et al. v. Saturn General Motors Corp. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1152. No. 96­7257. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 309. No. 96­7269. Forsman v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 151. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1171 520 U. S. April 14, 1997 No. 96­7353. Jewitt v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­7411. Smith v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security (two judgments). C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 948. No. 96­7439. Stowe v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 494. No. 96­7491. Goff v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 931 S. W. 2d 537. No. 96­7532. Windsor v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 683 So. 2d 1042. No. 96­7575. Jackson v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 684 A. 2d 745. No. 96­7701. Clark v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 668 N. E. 2d 1206. No. 96­7709. Dudley v. Johnson. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1134. No. 96­7727. Leding v. Oklahoma et al. Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7729. Parker v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Po- tosi Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 458. No. 96­7747. Hicks v. Prince Graves Homes. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 118. No. 96­7748. Fidis v. Lakeside Medical Center. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1154. No. 96­7749. Formica v. Town of Huntington, New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 350. No. 96­7751. Hogan v. Hanks, Superintendent, Wabash Valley Correctional Institute, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 189. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1172 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 14, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7753. Davis v. Hudgins et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1308. No. 96­7754. Hawkins v. Uzzell. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 278 Ill. App. 3d 1124, 699 N. E. 2d 602. No. 96­7760. Flowers v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7761. House v. United States District Court for the Central District of California. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7765. Ainsworth v. State Bar of California et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7769. Wilkinson v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 683 So. 2d 496. No. 96­7772. Bridgewater v. Hardison, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 961. No. 96­7774. Burnett v. Eastern Upper Peninsula Men- tal Health Center et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7775. Jasper v. Hedgepeth. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­7777. Joseph v. Hardison et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 961. No. 96­7779. Moore v. Perrin et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 683 So. 2d 484. No. 96­7782. Green v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7783. Eddmonds v. Washington, Director, Illinois Department of Corrections. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 1307. No. 96­7787. Hickmon v. Barnett. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certio- rari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1173 520 U. S. April 14, 1997 No. 96­7790. McReynolds v. Gangel-Jacob, Justice, Ap- pellate Division, Supreme Court of New York, First Judi- cial Department. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7792. Tyler v. Schriro, Director, Missouri De- partment of Corrections, et al. Cir. Ct. Washington County, Mo. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7793. Ponder v. Dye et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­7798. Cockrell v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 933 S. W. 2d 73. No. 96­7799. Adams v. Duncan, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 961. No. 96­7802. Powell v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7804. Carraway v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7807. Beldotti v. Massachusetts. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 Mass. App. 185, 669 N. E. 2d 222. No. 96­7818. Rose v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 53. No. 96­7823. Woratzeck v. Stewart, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 329. No. 96­7829. Marquez v. Dorsey, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 967. No. 96­7830. Jones v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­7831. Smart v. Board of Trustees of the Univer- sity of Illinois et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7844. Ferrell v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 686 So. 2d 1324. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1174 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 14, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7848. Hearn v. Veasy et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 422. No. 96­7849. Harris v. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 983 F. 2d 1066. No. 96­7850. Davis v. Price, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1441. No. 96­7851. Cole v. Irvin et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1450. No. 96­7852. Craig v. Lee Rosenbaum & Associates, P. C., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7853. Clark v. Sikes, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7856. Glendora v. Cablevision Systems et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 503. No. 96­7858. Risley v. Faunce, Administrator, Bayside State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 103 F. 3d 113. No. 96­7862. Reyes v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 545 Pa. 374, 681 A. 2d 724. No. 96­7865. Maxwell v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 173 Ill. 2d 102, 670 N. E. 2d 679. No. 96­7866. Marshall v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 554. No. 96­7869. Covelli v. Crystal, Connecticut Commis- sioner of Revenue Services. Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 239 Conn. 257, 683 A. 2d 737. No. 96­7871. Fletcher v. Schindler Elevator Corp. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7874. Carter v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Paulding County. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1175 520 U. S. April 14, 1997 No. 96­7878. Maxwell v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 7th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7882. Carner v. Townsend et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 128. No. 96­7883. Barrett v. Artuz, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7885. Turner v. Territory of Guam. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 408. No. 96­7888. Garrett v. Moore McCormack Resources et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 361. No. 96­7900. Washington v. City of Jacksonville, Flor- ida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1468. No. 96­7902. Walker v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1195. No. 96­7926. Seiler v. Thalacker, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 536. No. 96­7929. Perez v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1132. No. 96­7932. Schwarz v. Office of Government Ethics. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7940. Hamilton v. Koons Sterling Ford. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7943. Schwarz v. Commission on Civil Rights. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 1272. No. 96­7945. Schwarz v. Woodruff, Inc. Ct. App. Utah. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7946. Schwarz v. Woodruff, Inc., et al. Ct. App. Utah. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1176 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 14, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7952. Runnels v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7953. Rhoden v. Morgan, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1452. No. 96­7955. Butler v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1148. No. 96­7961. McColm v. Jordan et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7975. Alexander v. Prewitt et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1152. No. 96­7996. Moore v. Nebraska. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 250 Neb. 805 and 251 Neb. 162, 553 N. W. 2d 120. No. 96­8006. Fierro Ruiz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 697. No. 96­8015. Golden v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8018. Espinoza v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 640. No. 96­8022. Gregory v. Massachusetts. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 Mass. App. 1109, 671 N. E. 2d 223. No. 96­8034. Goodroad v. Delano et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 363. No. 96­8054. Yount v. Frank, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8056. Seamon v. Rokosik et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 403. No. 96­8070. Raymond T. et al. v. Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1177 520 U. S. April 14, 1997 No. 96­8073. Crosby v. Mazurkiewicz et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8075. Kierstead v. Suter et al. (two judgments). C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8084. Reagans v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8089. Hawkins v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8100. Saulsgiver v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 115. No. 96­8102. Weekly v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 274 Ill. App. 3d 1111, 691 N. E. 2d 1200. No. 96­8106. Jacobson v. Stevens et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 969. No. 96­8108. Clark v. LeCureux, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1341. No. 96­8109. Altschul v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­8110. Crutcher v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1457. No. 96­8117. White v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8123. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 690. No. 96­8128. Craven v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 695. No. 96­8139. Nesbitt v. Meyer et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1130. No. 96­8152. Porter v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 660. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1178 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 14, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8153. Spears v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 122. No. 96­8154. Clark v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­8156. Jackson v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8158. Rogers v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8159. Tucker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 369. No. 96­8162. Chavez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 370. No. 96­8163. Bishop v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 141. No. 96­8165. Bradshaw v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 204. No. 96­8168. Morales v. Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8169. McCauley-Bey v. Bowersox, Superintend- ent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1104. No. 96­8171. Durant v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 141. No. 96­8173. Gant v. Drug Enforcement Agency et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 117. No. 96­8178. Dockett v. Hofbauer, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8179. Godwin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1155. No. 96­8181. Dittrich v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 84. No. 96­8183. Fisher v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 127. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1179 520 U. S. April 14, 1997 No. 96­8185. Franks v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 654. No. 96­8186. Cunningham v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 370. No. 96­8187. Penny v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­8191. Stapley v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8193. King v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 651. No. 96­8194. Lawal v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 239. No. 96­8197. Brown et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 1390. No. 96­8199. Harvey v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1347. No. 96­8200. Edmonds v. United States Postal Service. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 715. No. 96­8201. Campbell v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 392. No. 96­8202. Hammond v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 387. No. 96­8203. Ware v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 340. No. 96­8205. Hawkins v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 973. No. 96­8206. Berger v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 67. No. 96­8209. Jones v. Groose, Superintendent, Jefferson City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8214. Baker v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 330. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1180 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 14, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8215. Ball v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 344 N. C. 290, 474 S. E. 2d 345. No. 96­8216. Pena-Castrejon v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 667. No. 96­8218. Mullanix v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 323. No. 96­8219. Lyons v. Hofbauer, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8221. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1342. No. 96­8222. McCroy v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 239. No. 96­8224. Espinoza v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 653. No. 96­8225. Gethers v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 684 A. 2d 1266. No. 96­8227. Colonel v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 656. No. 96­8228. Adams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 120. No. 96­8231. Breedlove v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 366. No. 96­8236. Knight v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 307. No. 96­8238. Lynch v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 369. No. 96­8243. Barlow v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 654. No. 96­8245. Griffin v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1341. No. 96­8248. Green v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1131. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1181 520 U. S. April 14, 1997 No. 96­8253. West v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1449. No. 96­8254. Young v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 470. No. 96­8256. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 869. No. 96­8259. Arroyo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 654. No. 96­8261. Portillo et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 394. No. 96­8263. White v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 507. No. 96­8266. Chorney v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1128. No. 96­8297. Ingram v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 971. No. 96­828. Dry Creek Rancheria v. Bridget and Lucy R., Minors, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Motion of re- spondents Bridget and Lucy R. for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Motion of respondents Richard A. and Cindy R. for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507. No. 96­1075. Ernst & Young LLP v. McGann et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of American Institute of Certified Public Ac- countants for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 390. No. 96­1339. Caltex Petroleum Corp. et al. v. Baris et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of American Petroleum Institute for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 367. No. 96­1365. Miller et al. v. Brown et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of American Hospital Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1324. 520ORD Unit: $PT1 [09-21-99 07:12:12] PGT: ORD1BV (Bound Volume) 1182 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 14, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1249. Louisiana v. Divers. Sup. Ct. La. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 681 So. 2d 320. Rehearing Denied No. 96­652. Kuchinskas et al. v. Broward County, 519 U. S. 1148; No. 96­884. Takahashi v. Livingston Union School Dis- trict et al., 519 U. S. 1112; No. 96­891. Jordan v. Kenton County Board of Educa- tion et al., 519 U. S. 1142; No. 96­905. City of Tulsa v. Spradling et al., 519 U. S. 1149; No. 96­909. Cherry v. Rocking Horse Ridge Estates Assn. et al., 519 U. S. 1113; No. 96­933. Seeger v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, 519 U. S. 1114; No. 96­1045. Gill v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 519 U. S. 1150; No. 96­1068. Castro v. United States, 519 U. S. 1118; No. 96­1074. Davis v. Hanover Insurance Co. et al., ante, p. 1104; No. 96­1086. Randall v. United States, 519 U. S. 1150; No. 96­6108. Tucker v. Department of Education et al., 519 U. S. 1013; No. 96­6514. Ivy v. Miller, Superintendent, Boonville Correctional Center, 519 U. S. 1064; No. 96­6862. Freeman v. Young, Executive Director, Al- abama Board of Pardons and Paroles, et al., 519 U. S. 1121; No. 96­6918. Veale v. New Hampshire, 519 U. S. 1122; No. 96­6969. Shoobs v. Zaveletta et al., 519 U. S. 1123; No. 96­7044. Tucker v. Coggins/Continental Granite Co., Inc., 519 U. S. 1125; No. 96­7053. Gravely v. United States, 519 U. S. 1099; No. 96­7114. Garner v. Pennington et al., 519 U. S. 1128; No. 96­7152. Cooper v. Missouri Parole Board et al., 519 U. S. 1129; No. 96­7191. Karim-Panahi v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 519 U. S. 1131; No. 96­7202. Wells v. Gomez, Director, California De- partment of Corrections, et al., 519 U. S. 1152; 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1183 520 U. S. April 14, 18, 19, 21, 1997 No. 96­7207. Boulineau v. West, Secretary of the Army, et al., 519 U. S. 1152; No. 96­7208. Baticados v. White, Warden, et al., 519 U. S. 1152; No. 96­7228. Smith v. Pennsylvania, 519 U. S. 1153; No. 96­7247. Williams v. United States, 519 U. S. 1133; No. 96­7433. In re Stearman, 519 U. S. 1107; and No. 96­7493. Luongo v. United States, 519 U. S. 1118. Pe- titions for rehearing denied. No. 94­8262. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U. S. 1045; and No. 96­696. Culp v. Hood et al., 519 U. S. 1042. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied. April 18, 1997 Miscellaneous Order No. A­741. Horn, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Depart- ment of Corrections, et al. v. White, as Next Friend to Heidnik. Application to stay enforcement of order directing stay of execution, presented to Justice Souter, and by him referred to the Court, granted, and it is ordered that the order staying the execution entered by the United States District Court on April 18, 1997, is vacated. Justice Stevens, Justice Sou- ter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer would deny the application to stay. April 19, 1997 Miscellaneous Order No. A­743. Horn, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Depart- ment of Corrections, et al. v. White, as Next Friend to Heidnik. Application to vacate the stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Souter, and by him referred to the Court, dismissed. April 21, 1997 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 96­1297. United States v. Hughes Aircraft Co. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., ante, p. 17. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1566. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1184 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 21, 1997 520 U. S. Miscellaneous Orders No. D­1759. In re Disbarment of Plust. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1037.] No. D­1762. In re Disbarment of Payne. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1053.] No. D­1763. In re Disbarment of Ellis. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1075.] No. D­1767. In re Disbarment of Donnellon. Disbar- ment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1088.] No. D­1797. In re Disbarment of Reed. Norman Joseph Reed, of Las Vegas, Nev., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1798. In re Disbarment of Sloboda. Joseph Domi- nic Sloboda, of Miami Beach, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1799. In re Disbarment of Bendet. Mark Bendet, of Paterson, N. J., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1800. In re Disbarment of Frye. John Rich Frye, Jr., of Corpus Christi, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1801. In re Disbarment of Schwartz. Martin Louis Schwartz, of Chicago, Ill., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requir- ing him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1802. In re Disbarment of Boyle. Charles W. Boyle, of Atlanta, Ga., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1185 520 U. S. April 21, 1997 and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­74. Stevenson-Bey v. Lungren, Attorney Gen- eral of California, et al. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied. No. 96­1126. Iolab Corp. v. Hunter. Sup. Ct. Mo. The So- licitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States. No. 96­8408. In re Farmer. Petition for writ of habeas cor- pus denied. No. 96­8352. In re Kirby. Petition for writ of mandamus denied. Certiorari Granted No. 96­1291. Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question 3 presented by the petition. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 551. Certiorari Denied No. 96­989. Castillo v. United States; No. 96­1028. Whitecliff v. United States; No. 96­7227. Branch et al. v. United States; and No. 96­7265. Fatta v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 699. No. 96­1107. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tex- aco Inc. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 825. No. 96­1114. Wootton, Trustee v. Lemons. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 953. No. 96­1128. Alliance Against IFQs et al. v. Secretary of Commerce et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 84 F. 3d 343. No. 96­1152. Shelton et al. v. Barnes, Receiver for American Capital Investments, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1133. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1186 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 21, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1157. Lucas et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1401. No. 96­1172. Milton S. Kronheim & Co., Inc. v. District of Columbia et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 91 F. 3d 193. No. 96­1241. Saffle, Director, Oklahoma State Peniten- tiary, et al. v. Battle et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 967. No. 96­1293. McKenzie v. Renberg's, Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1478. No. 96­1295. Sunburst Products, Inc., dba Freestyle U. S. A. v. Cyrk Inc. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1358. No. 96­1303. City of Danville, Kentucky v. Kentucky River Authority et al. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 932 S. W. 2d 374. No. 96­1312. Kearns v. General Motors Corp. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1553. No. 96­1314. Englander et ux. v. Mills et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1028. No. 96­1316. W. W. W. Enterprises, Inc., dba Williamson of Homestead v. Pidal. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1351 and 1353. No. 96­1321. Brown University et al. v. Cohen et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 155. No. 96­1322. Futterman v. Nasset et al. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1335. Smith v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 226 App. Div. 2d 168, 641 N. Y. S. 2d 8. No. 96­1342. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Lun- dell Manufacturing Co., Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 351. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1187 520 U. S. April 21, 1997 No. 96­1345. Carpenters 46 Northern California Coun- ties Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee v. El- dredge. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1366. No. 96­1356. Platt et al. v. Indiana et al. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 664 N. E. 2d 357. No. 96­1374. Shaller et ux. v. Walker et al. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 110 Md. App. 753. No. 96­1380. Murray v. Babbitt, Secretary of the In- terior. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 386. No. 96­1406. Henderson v. DeTella, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 942. No. 96­1418. Garner v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 80 Wash. App. 1084. No. 96­1427. DiCicco v. Bonsey et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 640. No. 96­1468. Bell et al. v. DiMario, Public Printer of the United States, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1488. Worthington v. Glickman, Secretary of Ag- riculture. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 158. No. 96­1500. Wright v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1325. No. 96­1510. McQueen v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 700. No. 96­1529. Furukawa v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1147. No. 96­7238. Miles v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 545 Pa. 500, 681 A. 2d 1295. No. 96­7518. Kinder v. Potts et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1179. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1188 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 21, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7526. Holt v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 648. No. 96­7554. Palomo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 699. No. 96­7565. Williams et ux. v. United States et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7625. Rodgers v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 247. No. 96­7842. Woolley v. United States et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7890. Azubuko v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Group et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7892. Azubuko v. Board of Directors, British Airways. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 106. No. 96­7896. Carlson v. Kristi Micander, P. C., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 126. No. 96­7898. Bingman v. Ward et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 653. No. 96­7905. Tyler v. Ulrich, Chief Judge, Court of Ap- peals of Missouri, Western District, et al. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7906. Hussein v. Pierre Hotel. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 350. No. 96­7909. Farmer v. McDaniel, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1548. No. 96­7914. Roy v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 681 So. 2d 1230. No. 96­7918. Newman v. Associated Press, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 504. No. 96­7922. Martin v. Idaho. Ct. App. Idaho. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1189 520 U. S. April 21, 1997 No. 96­7933. Mason v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7936. Watkins v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7937. Wilkins v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7941. Howard v. Walt Disney Co. et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7942. Cohea v. State Bar of California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7944. Schwarz et al. v. Brown et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1149. No. 96­7950. Hearn v. Robertson et al. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 453 Mich. 877, 554 N. W. 2d 2. No. 96­7951. Hayward v. Murray et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1438. No. 96­7971. Linza v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­7978. Sprague v. Kobayashi America, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 964. No. 96­7987. Love v. Rouse Company of Missouri Inc. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7988. Mackey v. Stalder, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 396. No. 96­8010. Lowe v. Gibson et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 144. No. 96­8040. Buford v. James T. Strickland Youth Cen- ter et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1154. No. 96­8042. Alford v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1190 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 21, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8077. Medina v. New Jersey. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 147 N. J. 43, 685 A. 2d 1242. No. 96­8095. Mines v. Pennsylvania. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 680 A. 2d 1227. No. 96­8111. Carter v. Artuz, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1393. No. 96­8129. Vartinelli v. Hutchinson et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 131. No. 96­8130. Zankich v. Maricopa County, Arizona, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1160. No. 96­8155. Krier v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­8172. Hale v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1454. No. 96­8177. Hargrove v. Colony of Stone Mountain et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 556. No. 96­8182. Fett v. Angelone, Director, Virginia De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 117. No. 96­8192. Staup v. First Union National Bank of Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 687 So. 2d 1306. No. 96­8208. Kiser v. Connecticut. App. Ct. Conn. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 43 Conn. App. 339, 683 A. 2d 1021. No. 96­8212. Slaby v. District of Columbia Rental Hous- ing Commission. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 685 A. 2d 1166. No. 96­8217. Pizzo v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8235. Mundy v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 686 So. 2d 586. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1191 520 U. S. April 21, 1997 No. 96­8237. Jefferson v. Office of Personnel Manage- ment. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1360. No. 96­8251. Ponce-Bran v. Trustees of California State University and Colleges. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 Cal. App. 4th 1656, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358. No. 96­8267. Pino-Lara v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 357. No. 96­8268. So v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 667. No. 96­8274. Cox v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 111 Md. App. 737. No. 96­8275. Ricardo Ruiz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 698. No. 96­8276. Short v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1449. No. 96­8291. Walker v. United States; and No. 96­8332. Cook v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 368. No. 96­8293. Linville v. Linville. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 110 Md. App. 749. No. 96­8294. Keirsey v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 Md. App. 551, 665 A. 2d 700. No. 96­8300. Parton v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 361. No. 96­8303. Pullock v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 699. No. 96­8304. Bain v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 368. No. 96­8309. Kaisserman v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 667. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1192 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 21, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8313. Dickerson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 1373. No. 96­8314. Henton v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 333. No. 96­8317. O'Connell v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 360. No. 96­8333. Cunningham v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 553. No. 96­8336. Jimenez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 366. No. 96­8337. McDougall v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 360. No. 96­8339. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 133. No. 96­8342. Tucker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 369. No. 96­8346. Williams v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 12. No. 96­8350. Leppert v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1347. No. 96­8355. Ballard v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8364. Barcella v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 964. No. 96­8367. Steele v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 388. No. 96­8369. Vega v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 1301. No. 96­8371. Pillette v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 652. No. 96­8376. Horton v. United States; and No. 96­8393. Gillespie v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1450. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1193 520 U. S. April 21, 1997 No. 96­8377. Gorham v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 923. No. 96­8383. Hicks v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 837. No. 96­8388. Smith v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 143. No. 96­8389. Carter et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1131. No. 96­8398. Clovis v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 387. No. 96­8399. Chandler v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 874. No. 96­8406. Bracey v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 359. No. 96­1289. Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univer- sity of California. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Jus- tice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1386. No. 96­1290. Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. American Tele- phone & Telegraph Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 581 and 103 F. 3d 125. Rehearing Denied No. 95­746. Linscomb v. United States, ante, p. 1103; No. 96­1169. Du Vall v. United States et al., ante, p. 1104; No. 96­6844. Tucker Bey v. United States, 519 U. S. 1098; No. 96­6924. Brooks v. Sheppard Air Force Base, 519 U. S. 1082; No. 96­7204. White v. Adams County Detention Facility et al., 519 U. S. 1152; No. 96­7235. Jones v. Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County, 519 U. S. 1153; No. 96­7291. Sing Cho Ng v. Quiet Forest II Homeowners Assn. et al., ante, p. 1106; No. 96­7292. Azubuko v. Board of Trustees, Framingham State College, 519 U. S. 1134; 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1194 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 21, 23, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7306. Mulligan v. Barnett Bank of Central Florida, N. A., ante, p. 1106; No. 96­7323. Day v. Painter, Sheriff, Midland County, Texas, ante, p. 1107; No. 96­7440. Turner v. Kuykendall, ante, p. 1124; No. 96­7567. In re Gallardo, 519 U. S. 1107; No. 96­7590. Caffrey v. Washington, ante, p. 1109; No. 96­7650. Jones v. Toombs, Warden, ante, p. 1127; No. 96­7673. Anderson v. United States, ante, p. 1109; No. 96­7773. In re Bonner, ante, p. 1102; and No. 96­7828. Morrison v. United States, ante, p. 1131. Petitions for rehearing denied. April 23, 1997 Miscellaneous Orders No. A­751. Brown v. Cain, Warden. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. No. 96­1683. In re Calderon, Warden. Motion of peti- tioner to expedite consideration of petition for writ of manda- mus denied. Probable Jurisdiction Noted No. 96­1671. Raines, Director, Office of Management and Budget, et al. v. Byrd et al. Appeal from D. C. D. C. Motion of the parties to expedite consideration of the appeal granted. Probable jurisdiction noted. The parties' briefs are to be filed with the Clerk of this Court and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, May 9, 1997. Reply briefs, if any, may be filed with the Clerk of this Court and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, May 21, 1997. Briefs may be submitted in compliance with this Court's Rule 33.2 to be replaced as soon as possible with briefs prepared under Rule 33.1. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Oral argument is set for Tuesday, May 27, 1997, at 10 a.m. Reported below: 956 F. Supp. 25. Certiorari Denied No. 96­8028. Baldree v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 659. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1195 520 U. S. April 23, 28, 1997 No. 96­8624 (A­728). Brown v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 744. April 28, 1997 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 96­8081. Allen v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U. S. 348 (1996). Reported below: 923 P. 2d 613. Miscellaneous Orders No. D­1768. In re Disbarment of Kaufman. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1104.] No. D­1770. In re Disbarment of Henry. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1104.] No. D­1773. In re Disbarment of Takacs. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1105.] No. D­1775. In re Disbarment of Weisman. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1105.] No. D­1780. In re Disbarment of Mazzei. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1146.] No. D­1781. In re Disbarment of Hamilton. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1146.] No. D­1785. In re Disbarment of Muhammad. Disbar- ment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1147.] No. 96­1366. In re Johnson et al. Petition for writ of man- damus denied. Certiorari Granted No. 96­1060. Miller v. Albright, Secretary of State. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.* Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1467. *[Reporter's Note: For amendment of this order, see post, p. 1208.] 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1196 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 28, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8400. Buchanan v. Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the peti- tion. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 344. Certiorari Denied No. 96­1082. Algernon Blair, Inc., et al. v. Walters. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 344 N. C. 628, 476 S. E. 2d 105. No. 96­1148. Outlaws Club et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 643. No. 96­1160. Richardson v. Albertson's, Inc. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1197. No. 96­1168. Dangerfield v. Star Editorial, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1458. No. 96­1211. City of Flint v. Middleton et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 396. No. 96­1212. Peitzmeier et ux. v. Hennessy Industries, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 293. No. 96­1213. In re Jaques. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1254. Paul v. Cribb et ux. Ct. App. S. C. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­1280. Women Prisoners of the District of Colum- bia Department of Corrections et al. v. District of Co- lumbia et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 910. No. 96­1283. Paolo Gucci Design Studio, Ltd. v. Sinatra, Trustee of the Substantively Consolidated Estates of Gucci, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 73 and 105 F. 3d 837. No. 96­1343. Section 28 Partnership, Ltd. v. Martin County. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 676 So. 2d 532. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1197 520 U. S. April 28, 1997 No. 96­1347. Vickery v. Jones et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 1334. No. 96­1352. Willoughby v. Potomac Electric Power Co. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 999. No. 96­1364. Shea & Gould et al. v. Durkin, Trustee of the Benchmark Irrevocable Trust. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1510. No. 96­1367. Taylor Equipment, Inc., dba Midcon Equip- ment Co. v. John Deere Co. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1028. No. 96­1371. Lewis et al. v. Iowa District Court for Des Moines County. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 555 N. W. 2d 216. No. 96­1382. Connell et al. v. Douglass et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 650. No. 96­1384. Murphy, Cook County Public Guardian, as Guardian of the Estate and Person of Wellman, De- ceased v. Young, Interested Person and Executor of the Estate of Wellman, Deceased. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 174 Ill. 2d 335, 673 N. E. 2d 272. No. 96­1386. Lichtman v. Lichtman et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1391. Blouin v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 127. No. 96­1396. Nesson v. Nesson. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­1408. Burick v. Broward County, Florida, et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 683 So. 2d 566. No. 96­1411. United Companies Lending Corp. v. McGehee et ux. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 686 So. 2d 1171. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1198 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 28, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1421. Triem v. Alaska Bar Assn. Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 929 P. 2d 634. No. 96­1464. CAT Contracting, Inc., et al. v. Insituform Technologies, Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1098. No. 96­1490. Sundwall v. Connecticut et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 356. No. 96­1495. Denouden v. University of Washington et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1541. Allen et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 961. No. 96­1543. Pappas v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­1547. Malik v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 659. No. 96­6673. Steven L. et al. v. Board of Education of Downers Grove Grade School District No. 58. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 464. No. 96­7119. Moreno Ramos v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 934 S. W. 2d 358. No. 96­7321. Davis v. Burks et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1338. No. 96­7348. Veale et ux. v. Citibank, F. S. B. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 577. No. 96­7397. Guerriero v. Lufthansa German Airlines, Inc. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 Mass. App. 1105, 669 N. E. 2d 233. No. 96­7598. Jones v. Nevada; No. 96­7683. Everhart v. Nevada; No. 96­7684. Gauthier v. Nevada; No. 96­7685. Dortch v. Nevada; No. 96­7997. Macalino v. Nevada; No. 96­8031. Wood v. Nevada; and No. 96­8196. Bonta v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1724 (Jones), 1715 (Everhart), 1718 (Gauthier), 1713 (Dortch), 1729 (Macalino), 1751 (Wood), and 1707 (Bonta). 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1199 520 U. S. April 28, 1997 No. 96­7631. Sims v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 681 So. 2d 1112. No. 96­7962. Cohea v. Barrios et al.; and Cohea v. White, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7963. Bailey et al. v. Turner, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 128. No. 96­7968. Seals v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 684 So. 2d 368. No. 96­7977. Brown v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 686 So. 2d 409. No. 96­7981. Phillips v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 554. No. 96­7982. Ogden v. New Mexico. Sup. Ct. N. M. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­7986. McColm v. Nelson. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7995. Knotts v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 686 So. 2d 486. No. 96­7998. Startup v. Minard et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8004. Wallis v. Hernando County, Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 680 So. 2d 426. No. 96­8007. Allah v. California et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1345. No. 96­8024. Pagan v. Warner et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1142. No. 96­8025. Pastorius v. Romer, Governor of Colorado, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1465. No. 96­8026. Stoker v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 701. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1200 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 28, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8030. Vrettos v. United Machine Specialties Corp. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8032. Carter v. Siegler et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8035. Faust v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 675. No. 96­8038. Charm v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 924 P. 2d 754. No. 96­8045. Nadal v. City of Yonkers et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 356. No. 96­8046. McReynolds v. Venkataraghaven et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8047. Jenkins v. Oakley et al. Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 122 N. M. 279, 923 P. 2d 1164. No. 96­8048. English v. Louisiana Department of Cor- rections. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 683 So. 2d 290. No. 96­8050. Green v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 934 S. W. 2d 92. No. 96­8051. Ebenhart v. Howard Community Services et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8052. Tucker v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 324 S. C. 155, 478 S. E. 2d 260. No. 96­8055. Broussard v. Evans et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 127. No. 96­8064. Williamson v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 681 So. 2d 688. No. 96­8068. Wolfe v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8078. Robertson v. Thornell et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1144. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1201 520 U. S. April 28, 1997 No. 96­8087. Wright v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­8090. Hartman v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 344 N. C. 445, 476 S. E. 2d 328. No. 96­8103. Wilson v. Saba, Sheriff, Dougherty County, Georgia, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1201. No. 96­8107. Mangrum v. Taylor. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8180. Falconer v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 282 Ill. App. 3d 785, 668 N. E. 2d 1095. No. 96­8204. O'Neill v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 684 So. 2d 720. No. 96­8220. Melius v. Wood, Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Corrections. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 662. No. 96­8223. Manussier v. Washington. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 Wash. 2d 652, 921 P. 2d 473. No. 96­8246. Henry v. South Carolina et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 41. No. 96­8247. Downey et ux. v. Krempin et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 687 So. 2d 1303. No. 96­8265. Taylor v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8270. Sullivan v. Colorado. Dist. Ct. Colo., Elbert County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8271. Franklin v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1717. No. 96­8272. Reed v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 957. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1202 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 28, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8277. Ross v. Groose, Superintendent, Jefferson City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8296. Maravilla v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1146. No. 96­8344. Willis v. DeTella, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8360. Cooper v. Gammon, Superintendent, Mob- erly Correctional Center. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8362. Arnold v. Board of Commissioners of Ef- fingham County et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8382. Holman v. United States Parole Commis- sion; and Todd v. United States Parole Commission. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 656 (first judgment); 106 F. 3d 397 (second judgment). No. 96­8391. Betancourt-Arestuche v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8407. Ezeoke v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 953. No. 96­8416. El Muhammad, aka Crawford v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 155. No. 96­8417. Mason v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 957. No. 96­8421. Allen v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 765. No. 96­8424. Bailey v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­8425. Pierson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 545. No. 96­8427. Perales-Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 141. No. 96­8430. Jones v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1263. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1203 520 U. S. April 28, 1997 No. 96­8431. Jones v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 1180. No. 96­8433. Mundy v. Wright, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 359. No. 96­8435. Mormon v. United States; and No. 96­8494. Green v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 656. No. 96­8437. Schroeder v. United States; and No. 96­8441. Mussari v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 787. No. 96­8439. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 1184. No. 96­8445. McCoy v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 649. No. 96­8447. Nelson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 1344. No. 96­8456. Humphries v. United States; and No. 96­8459. Gray v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 359. No. 96­8458. Fitzgerald v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 392. No. 96­8472. Beard v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 555. No. 96­8479. Smith v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­8493. Hill v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 112. No. 96­8506. Diaz v. Mitchell, Superintendent, Eastern New York Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 355. No. 96­8708. Hill v. Hopper, Commissioner, Alabama De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 1088. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1204 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 April 28, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1179. Indicated Expansion Shippers v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consider- ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1239. No. 96­1184. Kamilewicz et al. v. Bank of Boston Corp. et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of law teachers for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 506. No. 96­1332. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. et al. v. Lang et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Motion of Association of American Railroads for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 686 So. 2d 1115. No. 96­1355. Calderon, Warden v. Bean. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1126. No. 96­1357. Smith, Personal Representative of Smith, Deceased v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 101 F. 3d 239. No. 96­1428. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., et al. v. Schmoke, Mayor of Baltimore, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Motions of Wash- ington Legal Foundation, Ronald Rotunda and John Nowak, and Association of National Advertisers, Inc., for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 325. No. 96­1429. Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Schmoke, Mayor of Baltimore, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of Washington Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 332. Rehearing Denied No. 96­6863. Banks v. Thomas, Warden, et al., 519 U. S. 1121; No. 96­6981. Peterson v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 519 U. S. 1123; 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1205 520 U. S. April 28, May 1, 6, 12, 1997 No. 96­7659. Azubuko v. First National Bank of Boston et al., ante, p. 1127; No. 96­7704. Welky v. Makowski, Warden, et al., 519 U. S. 1156; and No. 96­8029. Visintine v. United States, ante, p. 1150. Pe- titions for rehearing denied. May 1, 1997 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 96­1552. Upjohn Co. v. Ambrosini et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Re- ported below: 101 F. 3d 129. Miscellaneous Order* No. 96­8858 (A­777). In re Hill. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Certiorari Denied No. 96­8857 (A­776). Hill v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 695 So. 2d 1223. May 6, 1997 Miscellaneous Order No. 96­8891 (A­788). In re Washington. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. May 12, 1997 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 96­7167. Larson v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer- *For revisions to the Rules of this Court effective this date, see 519 U. S. 1160. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1206 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 12, 1997 520 U. S. tiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Richards v. Wisconsin, ante, p. 385. Re- ported below: 203 Wis. 2d 270, 551 N. W. 2d 870. Miscellaneous Orders No. A­702. Lui Kin-Hong v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Application for stay of mandate, addressed to Justice Breyer and referred to the Court, denied. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joins, dissenting. The United Kingdom seeks to extradite petitioner to Hong Kong, where he will be charged with bribery. The District Court granted petitioner's request for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom does not now permit his extradition to Hong Kong because his trial and any subsequent punishment would likely take place under the authority of the People's Republic of China, a nation with whom the United States does not have an applicable extradition treaty. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed. Lui now asks this Court for a stay pending a petition for certiorari. The petition for certiorari that Lui intends to file would likely raise three questions. First, the treaty with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 28 U. S. T. 227, as amended, June 25, 1985, T. I. A. S. No. 12050 (Treaty), grants the United Kingdom the power to seek the extradition of a fugitive offender. See Treaty, Art. I. This Court has defined "extradi- tion" to mean "the surrender by one nation to another . . . which, being competent to try and to punish him, demands the surren- der." Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. S. 270, 289 (1902). Since Hong Kong will revert to the People's Republic of China on July 1, 1997, and, as the Government admits, no trial could be held before that date, does the United Kingdom have the "competen[ce] to try and to punish" Lui? And, if not, can it now seek his extradition? Second, the Treaty provides that no person extradited shall "be extradited by [the requesting party] to a third State." Treaty, Art. XII. Does this provision prohibit Lui's extradition? Third, under the terms of 18 U. S. C. §§ 3184 and 3186, does the Executive Branch have the exclusive power to interpret these provisions of the Treaty? 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1207 520 U. S. May 12, 1997 In essence, petitioner says that the United States intends to extradite him, not to the United Kingdom or to a crown colony of the United Kingdom, for trial, but rather to the People's Repub- lic of China. In my view, the papers accompanying his motion for stay raise questions about the lawfulness of doing so, at least to the point where I would issue the stay, pending a response from the Solicitor General. For that reason I dissent from the Court's denial of petitioner's application. No. D­1772. In re Disbarment of Sturgis. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1105.] No. D­1776. In re Disbarment of Hansen. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1105.] No. D­1777. In re Disbarment of Witchell. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1105.] No. D­1779. In re Disbarment of Gregory. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1146.] No. D­1782. In re Disbarment of Olson. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1146.] No. D­1783. In re Disbarment of Passman. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1146.] No. D­1784. In re Disbarment of Levinson. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1147.] No. D­1786. In re Disbarment of Maroney. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1101.] No. D­1787. In re Disbarment of Levy. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1112.] No. D­1789. In re Disbarment of Denker. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1113.] No. D­1790. In re Disbarment of Friedman. Bruce Mi- chael Friedman, of Los Angeles, Cal., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to the practice of law before this Court. The rule to show cause, issued on March 24, 1997 [ante, p. 1141], is discharged. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1208 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 12, 1997 520 U. S. No. D­1803. In re Disbarment of Schwartz. Fred A. Schwartz, of Miami, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1804. In re Disbarment of Cooley. Donald R. Cooley, of Springfield, Mo., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1805. In re Disbarment of Schlottman. Brent Alan Schlottman, of Chandler, Ariz., is suspended from the prac- tice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be dis- barred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­75. Milton v. World Savings and Loan Assn.; No. M­76. Maudal v. Texas Instruments Corp. et al.; and No. M­77. Spears v. DSM Copolymer, Inc. Motions to di- rect the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. 96­1060. Miller v. Albright, Secretary of State. C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1195.] The order granting the petition for writ of certiorari is amended to read: Certiorari granted limited to the following question: "Is the dis- tinction in 8 U. S. C. § 1409 between `illegitimate' children of United States citizen mothers and `illegitimate' children of United States citizen fathers a violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution?" No. 96­1405. Smiths Industries Medical Systems, Inc. v. Kernats, a Minor, by Kernats, Her Mother and Next Friend, et al. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States. No. 96­8443. In re Short; No. 96­8601. In re Williams; and No. 96­8639. In re Rodriguez. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1209 520 U. S. May 12, 1997 No. 96­8012. In re Koger. Petition for writ of mandamus denied. No. 96­8105. In re Johnson; and No. 96­8361. In re Alexander. Petitions for writs of man- damus and/or prohibition denied. Certiorari Granted No. 96­370. Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pen- sion Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corporation of California, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 73 F. 3d 971. No. 96­1370. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Fink, Trustee. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 334. No. 96­7151. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted.* Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1371. Certiorari Denied No. 95­1962. Republican Party of Alaska v. O'Cal- laghan et al. Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 914 P. 2d 1250. No. 96­1067. White Wing Development, Inc., dba White Wing Associates v. County of Solano et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1183. Finalco, Inc. v. Roosevelt. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 311 and 98 F. 3d 1169. No. 96­1204. Pease v. Yellowstone County. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1169. No. 96­1205. Barnes, Administrator of the Estate of Pierpoint, Deceased v. Pierpoint et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 813. No. 96­1223. Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 991. *[Reporter's Note: For amendment of this order, see post, p. 1226.] 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1210 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 12, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1236. Krygoski Construction Co., Inc. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1537. No. 96­1238. Selland v. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 950. No. 96­1245. Brandt, as Trustee of the Chapter 7 Es- tate of Southeast Banking Corp. v. First Union Corp. et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 750. No. 96­1248. Maryland v. Stanberry. Ct. App. Md. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 343 Md. 720, 684 A. 2d 823. No. 96­1271. Guinn et al. v. Kopf. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1419. No. 96­1286. Hagelin et al. v. Federal Election Commis- sion et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 553. No. 96­1300. Southwest Airlines Co. v. Fennessy. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 1359. No. 96­1304. Karcher v. Emerson Electric Co.; and No. 96­1506. Emerson Electric Co. v. Karcher. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 502. No. 96­1363. Jones v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1381. Construction Industry Training Council of Washington v. Seattle Building and Construction Trades Council et al. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 Wash. 2d 787, 920 P. 2d 581. No. 96­1388. Huff v. First National Bank of Centre Hall, nka Northwest Savings Bank. Super. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 450 Pa. Super. 722, 676 A. 2d 289. No. 96­1390. Evans, by Her Mother and Next Friend, Evans v. Avery et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 100 F. 3d 1033. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1211 520 U. S. May 12, 1997 No. 96­1398. Barkley Seed, Inc., dba Pacific Southwest Seed & Grain, Inc. v. Botelho Shipping Corp. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 961. No. 96­1399. United States ex rel. Haycock v. Hughes Aircraft Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1148. No. 96­1403. National Railroad Passenger Corporation et al. v. Van Holt et vir. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 283 Ill. App. 3d 62, 669 N. E. 2d 1288. No. 96­1407. Coleman v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 956. No. 96­1409. Area G Home & Landowners Organization, Inc., et al. v. Municipality of Anchorage, Alaska. Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 927 P. 2d 728. No. 96­1422. J. W., for Herself and as Next Friend of Doe, Her Minor Daughter v. Bryan Independent School District. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 651. No. 96­1423. Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P. C. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 78. No. 96­1424. Marisol A., by Her Next Friend, Forbes, et al. v. Giuliani, Mayor of New York City, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 524. No. 96­1434. Szmalec v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 927 S. W. 2d 213. No. 96­1437. City of New York et al. v. Ivani Contract- ing Corp. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 257. No. 96­1441. West American Insurance Co. v. Freeman. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1443. Nagle v. Bailey. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1565. No. 96­1450. Shinn et al., on Behalf of Shinn v. College Station Independent School District et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 783. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1212 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 12, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1451. Collagen Corp. v. Green et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 546 Pa. 400, 685 A. 2d 110. No. 96­1455. Saculla v. Wisconsin Medical Examining Board et al. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 Wis. 2d 111, 555 N. W. 2d 409. No. 96­1457. Hacklander-Ready v. Wisconsin ex rel. Sprague et al. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 Wis. 2d 110, 555 N. W. 2d 409. No. 96­1458. Verdin et al. v. Louisiana Land & Explora- tion Co. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 681 So. 2d 63. No. 96­1460. WJM Realty, Inc. v. State Roads Commission of the Maryland Highway Administration. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 111 Md. App. 752. No. 96­1467. Administracion Nacional de Telecomuni- caciones (Antel) v. New Valley Corp. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 947. No. 96­1474. Mastaw v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. Cir. Ct. Roanoke County, Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1484. Fjetland et al. v. Lone Star Northwest et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 962. No. 96­1502. Stanescu et ux. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1393. No. 96­1509. D'Ambrosio v. Shoppers Food Warehouse. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1536. Saltaris v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1462. No. 96­1540. Kennedy v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 387. No. 96­1549. Saunders v. United States et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1213 520 U. S. May 12, 1997 No. 96­1554. Persyn et al. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 424. No. 96­1555. Arbeiter et al. v. New York. App. Term, Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 169 Misc. 2d 771, 650 N. Y. S. 2d 915. No. 96­1560. Fulfree v. Manchester et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 503. No. 96­1561. DelCourt v. Silverman et al. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 919 S. W. 2d 777. No. 96­1564. Dickey v. City of Hartsville et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1446. No. 96­1599. Showers v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 452 Pa. Super. 135, 681 A. 2d 746. No. 96­1600. Cottrill v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 M. J. 485. No. 96­1601. Curtis v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 M. J. 480. No. 96­1604. Cooke et ux. v. Dinapoli, Trustee, et al. App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 Conn. App. 419, 682 A. 2d 603. No. 96­6841. McCullah v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 1087. No. 96­7329. Durham v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7430. Mathis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1577. No. 96­7589. Cohen v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 69. No. 96­7703. Carter v. Amtrak National Railroad Pas- senger Corporation. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7732. Badru v. United States; and No. 96­7734. Badru v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1471. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1214 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 12, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7815. Posey v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 222 Ga. App. 405, 474 S. E. 2d 206. No. 96­7820. Trillo v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1748. No. 96­7822. Wilder et al. v. Massachusetts Depart- ment of Correction et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 824. No. 96­7840. Jenson v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1724. No. 96­7879. Jahannes v. Reid. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 222 Ga. App. XXIX. No. 96­8023. Fitzgerald v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1716. No. 96­8076. Mitchell v. Parker, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 699. No. 96­8085. Radcliffe v. Hawaii. Sup. Ct. Haw. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 83 Haw. 545, 928 P. 2d 39. No. 96­8086. Tuerk v. Otis Elevator Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 692. No. 96­8093. Oliver v. Rossen et al. Ct. App. Ohio, Cuya- hoga County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8094. Miller v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1732. No. 96­8096. Multani v. United States et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 233 App. Div. 2d 965, 649 N. Y. S. 2d 311. No. 96­8099. Farmer v. New Jersey. Sup. Ct. N. J. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 147 N. J. 43, 685 A. 2d 1242. No. 96­8104. Vrettos v. Stage House Inn et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8112. Booker v. Worsham et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 652. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1215 520 U. S. May 12, 1997 No. 96­8113. Brown v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 11th Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8118. White v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8120. Cross v. Cross. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 40 Mass. App. 1133, 667 N. E. 2d 920. No. 96­8121. Jones v. Senkowski, Superintendent, Clin- ton Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8126. Kent v. Harvard et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 109 F. 3d 772. No. 96­8127. Mallard v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8131. Tolbert v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1445. No. 96­8133. Jackson v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 684 So. 2d 1213. No. 96­8134. Davis v. Zavaras, Executive Director, Colo- rado Department of Corrections. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 750. No. 96­8135. Williams v. Mobley et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 364. No. 96­8136. Walsh v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8137. Thomas v. Owens, Judge, District Court of Oklahoma, Oklahoma County, et al. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8138. Turner v. Denmark et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 710. No. 96­8141. Arteaga v. Hill, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8142. Pate v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1216 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 12, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8143. Rieflin v. Iowa. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 558 N. W. 2d 149. No. 96­8146. Arteaga v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8147. Fields v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 923 P. 2d 624. No. 96­8150. Schwarz v. Department of Justice. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8151. Lowe v. Boone. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8157. Lowe v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8160. Woods v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 275 Ill. App. 3d 1134, 692 N. E. 2d 876. No. 96­8161. Thongvanh v. Ault, Warden, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8164. Petrick v. Reynolds, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 414. No. 96­8166. Ross v. Groose, Superintendent, Jefferson City Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8167. Jackson v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 13 Cal. 4th 1164, 920 P. 2d 1254. No. 96­8174. Hamilton v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 681 So. 2d 1217. No. 96­8175. Henry v. Williamson et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 363. No. 96­8176. Hill v. CSC Credit Services, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1443. No. 96­8188. Young v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1217 520 U. S. May 12, 1997 No. 96­8189. Yarborough v. Keane, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 894. No. 96­8190. Thornton v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 187 Ariz. 325, 929 P. 2d 676. No. 96­8195. Robinson v. City of Cleveland Heights, Ohio, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8198. Baldwin v. George et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 689. No. 96­8207. Sanders v. Edwards, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8210. Jenkins v. United States Postal Service. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1342. No. 96­8211. Reid v. Oklahoma. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 628. No. 96­8213. Burnett v. Chippewa County Bar Assn. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8229. Broussard v. Burkett. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­8249. Dawson v. Richmond Heights Local School District. Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8257. Witter v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 908, 921 P. 2d 886. No. 96­8279. Vaden, aka Ingram v. Powell, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8285. Eldridge v. Quick et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8287. Glendora v. Hostetter et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 353. No. 96­8295. Lohse v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 669. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1218 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 12, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8330. Elam v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8348. Bardin v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8351. Le Grand v. Goord, Commissioner, New York State Department of Correctional Services, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8353. Branch v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 685 So. 2d 1250. No. 96­8366. Shepherd v. Olk Long, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8374. Giebel v. Montana System of Higher Edu- cation et al. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 280 Mont. 500, 929 P. 2d 252. No. 96­8396. Brock v. Unknown. Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8403. Myers v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 76. No. 96­8404. Nettles v. Gomez, Director, California De- partment of Corrections. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 408. No. 96­8409. Harris v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8411. Martin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1144. No. 96­8423. Blackburn v. United States; and No. 96­8473. Hilton v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 87. No. 96­8438. Pizzo v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 688 So. 2d 494. No. 96­8448. Nevius v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 281 Ill. App. 3d 1152, 701 N. E. 2d 845. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:50] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1219 520 U. S. May 12, 1997 No. 96­8451. Kroemer v. Irvin, Superintendent, Wende Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8453. Courtney v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 103 F. 3d 129. No. 96­8460. Moore v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 935 S. W. 2d 124. No. 96­8461. Blandino v. Lippold et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8462. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 671. No. 96­8466. Fett v. Morris et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 647. No. 96­8475. Carson v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8477. Cornish v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 302. No. 96­8481. Juvenile Male v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 18. No. 96­8482. Merritt v. Bureau of Prisons et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 1407. No. 96­8485. Sims v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 125. No. 96­8488. Butler v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 1191. No. 96­8490. Walker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 343. No. 96­8492. Debowale v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 380. No. 96­8495. Cohen v. County of Sarpy, Nebraska, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:51] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1220 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 12, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8496. Tripati v. Arizona. Super. Ct. Ariz., Maricopa County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8497. Williams v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 1093. No. 96­8507. Bernard v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 667. No. 96­8508. Crotts et ux. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 649. No. 96­8509. Rivera Contreras v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 667. No. 96­8510. Rushing v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 935 S. W. 2d 30. No. 96­8511. Owens v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 559. No. 96­8513. Warner v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 650. No. 96­8514. Thompson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 649. No. 96­8518. Bell v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 870. No. 96­8519. Baker v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 660. No. 96­8520. Coleman v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1174. No. 96­8522. Wright, aka Farrow v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 394. No. 96­8525. Alvarez Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 141. No. 96­8526. Stewart v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 655. No. 96­8527. Kehm v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 410. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:51] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1221 520 U. S. May 12, 1997 No. 96­8528. Kanahele v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 142. No. 96­8529. Juvenile Male v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 18. No. 96­8533. Rothschild v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 653. No. 96­8537. LaPlante v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 330. No. 96­8540. Myles v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­8541. Cajina v. United States; and No. 96­8542. Cajina v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 364. No. 96­8545. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 9. No. 96­8546. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 115. No. 96­8547. Windom v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 523. No. 96­8549. Correia v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8552. Rafael Medrano v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8554. Schroeder et ux. v. Internal Revenue Service. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 662. No. 96­8555. Patton v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 688 A. 2d 408. No. 96­8556. Southall v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 332. No. 96­8558. Garner v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 131. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:51] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1222 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 12, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8559. Grade v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­8560. Clayton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 648. No. 96­8565. Allbright v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 F. 3d 1241. No. 96­8567. Washington v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8570. Harris v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 426. No. 96­8572. Hansen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1457. No. 96­8574. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8578. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 659. No. 96­8581. Rowbal v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 667. No. 96­8583. Solan v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 969. No. 96­8585. Ford v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 392. No. 96­8586. Harris v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 418. No. 96­8587. Hutchinson v. United States; and No. 96­8588. Griffin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1501. No. 96­8600. Williams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 394. No. 96­8602. Baker v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1241. No. 96­8603. Tucker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 369. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:51] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1223 520 U. S. May 12, 1997 No. 96­8604. Parker v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 72. No. 96­8608. Hampton v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 207 Wis. 2d 369, 558 N. W. 2d 884. No. 96­8609. Bautista de la Cruz v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 667. No. 96­8612. Myers v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 227. No. 96­8613. Lamb v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 957. No. 96­8614. McNeil v. Aguilos et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 3. No. 96­8617. Cuartas v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 356. No. 96­8620. Rhoades v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 410. No. 96­8622. Porter v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8631. Martinez-Cano v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 18. No. 96­8633. Kincaid v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 410. No. 96­8635. Irvin v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­8645. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 864. No. 96­8647. Talamasey v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 670. No. 96­8663. Juvenile Male v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 630. No. 96­8670. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 1180. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:51] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1224 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 12, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­954. Amoco Production Co. et al. v. Public Serv- ice Company of Colorado et al.; and No. 96­1230. Williams Natural Gas Co. et al. v. Amoco Production Co. et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 1478. No. 96­1186. Associated Gas Distributors et al. v. Fed- eral Energy Regulatory Commission; No. 96­1187. American Public Gas Assn. et al. v. Fed- eral Energy Regulatory Commission; No. 96­1188. New York Public Service Commission et al. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission et al.; and No. 96­1189. Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co. v. Fed- eral Energy Regulatory Commission. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 1105. No. 96­967. New York v. Owens. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 227 App. Div. 2d 256, 642 N. Y. S. 2d 874. No. 96­1461. Ohio Adult Parole Authority et al. v. Lyons. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 1063. No. 96­1378. Barnabei v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Motions of National Legal Aid and Defender Association et al. and Vir- ginia College of Criminal Defense Attorneys for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 252 Va. 161, 477 S. E. 2d 270. No. 96­1393. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. et al. v. Harper. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Motion of Association of Amer- ican Railroads for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 282 Ill. App. 3d 19, 667 N. E. 2d 1382. Rehearing Denied No. 96­1096. Baheth et al. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., nka Regions Bank, et al., ante, p. 1117; 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:51] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1225 520 U. S. May 12, 13, 1997 No. 96­1144. Davis v. Service Employees International Union, AFL­CIO, CLC, et al., ante, p. 1119; No. 96­1161. Barakat v. Life Insurance Company of Vir- ginia, ante, p. 1143; No. 96­1217. Flores v. FMC Corp. et al., ante, p. 1120; No. 96­1220. Morewitz v. Ashmore, ante, p. 1120; No. 96­1247. Richardson v. Bakery, Confectionary & To- bacco Workers, Local No. 26, ante, p. 1143; No. 96­1331. Smith v. United States, ante, p. 1144; No. 96­6580. Lewis Lang v. Reynolds et al., 519 U. S. 1120; No. 96­6680. Ashton v. United States et al., 519 U. S. 1095; No. 96­7040. Maxberry v. Paramount Communications et al., 519 U. S. 1125; No. 96­7195. Williams v. Mississippi, ante, p. 1145; No. 96­7205. Burnett v. Bulson; and Burnett v. Riggle et al., 519 U. S. 1152; No. 96­7293. Azubuko v. Montgomery, Clerk-Magistrate, District Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk County, ante, p. 1106; No. 96­7334. Scott v. Dime Savings Bank of New York, ante, p. 1122; No. 96­7408. Brayall et vir v. Dart Industries et al., ante, p. 1123; No. 96­7538. Burnett v. Willette, ante, p. 1126; No. 96­7606. Remeta v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, ante, p. 1147; No. 96­7656. Azubuko v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, ante, p. 1157; No. 96­7781. Bustamante v. United States, ante, p. 1129; No. 96­7788. Leal v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Se- curity, ante, p. 1130; and No. 96­7841. Thomas v. West, Secretary of the Army, ante, p. 1148. Petitions for rehearing denied. May 13, 1997 Miscellaneous Orders No. A­807. Westley v. Texas. Application for stay of exe- cution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:51] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1226 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 13, 19, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7151. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. [Cer- tiorari granted, ante, p. 1209.] The order granting the petition for writ of certiorari is amended to read: Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to the following question: "Whether petitioner was prop- erly charged and convicted for the murder of her four-year-old stepdaughter under the Assimilative Crimes Statute, 18 U. S. C. § 13, and the Louisiana child murder statute, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30(A)(5) (West 1986), and if not, whether the sentence was proper?" May 19, 1997 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 96­538. Frost et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Johnson v. United States, ante, p. 461. Reported below: 61 F. 3d 1518 and 77 F. 3d 1319. No. 96­1089. United States v. Keys. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Johnson v. United States, ante, p. 461. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 874. No. 96­1323. City of Santa Ana v. Hernandez et al.; and No. 96­1516. Hernandez et al. v. City of Santa Ana. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452 (1997). Reported below: 94 F. 3d 651. No. 96­6348. McKinney v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Johnson v. United States, ante, p. 461. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 105. Miscellaneous Orders No. A­416. Wright v. United States. Application for bail, addressed to The Chief Justice and referred to the Court, denied. No. M­79. Russell v. City of Bryan. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:51] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1227 520 U. S. May 19, 1997 No. 65, Orig. Texas v. New Mexico. Motion of the River Master for fees and expenses granted, and the River Master is awarded $2,758 for the period January 1 through March 31, 1997, to be paid equally by the parties. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 519 U. S. 979.] No. 96­7171. Spencer v. Kemna, Superintendent, West- ern Missouri Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1165.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that John William Simon, Esq., of Jefferson City, Mo., be appointed to serve as counsel for peti- tioner in this case. No. 96­8400. Buchanan v. Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certio- rari granted, ante, p. 1196.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Gerald T. Zerkin, Esq., of Rich- mond, Va., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case. No. 96­8242. In re Spychala; No. 96­8252. In re White; and No. 96­8667. In re Grubbs. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. No. 96­8996 (A­815). In re Callins. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. No. 96­9000 (A­816). In re Lackey. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Certiorari Granted No. 96­1133. United States v. Scheffer. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 44 M. J. 442. No. 96­1462. Lunding et ux. v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari granted. Re- ported below: 89 N. Y. 2d 283, 675 N. E. 2d 816. No. 96­1482. Lexecon Inc. et al. v. Milberg Weiss Ber- shad Hynes & Lerach et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:51] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1228 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 19, 1997 520 U. S. granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 1524. Certiorari Denied No. 96­560. Barrick v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 677. No. 96­781. Carter v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 854. No. 96­969. Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semicon- ductor Corp. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 90 F. 3d 1558. No. 96­979. Nikolits, Property Appraiser of Palm Beach County v. Parrish et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1088. No. 96­1240. Leahy et al. v. City of Chicago. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 228. No. 96­1260. Holt v. KMI-Continental, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 123. No. 96­1268. City and County of Denver, Colorado v. Sonnenfeld et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 100 F. 3d 744. No. 96­1275. California v. Opuku-Boateng. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1461. No. 96­1276. Bradley et al. v. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1338. No. 96­1287. Imparato v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 95 F. 3d 1126. No. 96­1318. Ocala Star-Banner Corp. et al. v. McNely. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1068. No. 96­1328. Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 35. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:51] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1229 520 U. S. May 19, 1997 No. 96­1358. Ochoa v. Federal Communications Commis- sion et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 646. No. 96­1404. Lewis et vir v. Alamance County. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 600. No. 96­1452. Colorado et al. v. Sanchez et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1303. No. 96­1454. Rosenstiel et al. v. Rodriguez, Chair, Min- nesota Ethical Practices Board. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1544. No. 96­1456. Lundquist v. Premier Financial Services- Texas, L. P. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 551. No. 96­1459. Peden et al. v. Kansas et al. Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 261 Kan. 239, 930 P. 2d 1. No. 96­1465. Union Pacific Railroad Co. et al. v. Com- source Independent Food Service Cos., Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 438. No. 96­1466. Cosentino et al. v. Kelly, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 71. No. 96­1471. Morgan v. Texas Utilities Electric Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 656. No. 96­1472. Holt v. JTM Industries, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1224. No. 96­1475. Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exchange. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 907. No. 96­1477. Tatreau v. Minnesota Board of Medical Practice. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1478. Wood, Administrator of the Estate of Bourgeois, Deceased v. Garner Food Services, Inc., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 1523. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:51] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1230 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 19, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1483. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Amer- ica, Inc., et al. v. Applied Materials, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1563. No. 96­1485. Grossbaum et al. v. Indianapolis-Marion County Building Authority et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 1287. No. 96­1486. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. D'Am- brosio, Executrix of the Estate of D'Ambrosio, Deceased. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 309. No. 96­1489. Vance v. Peters, Director, Illinois Depart- ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 987. No. 96­1501. Moriel v. Prunty, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 706. No. 96­1503. McLeod v. Oregon Lithoprint, Inc., dba News-Register Publishing Co., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 376. No. 96­1512. South Carolina v. Fowler. Ct. App. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 322 S. C. 263, 471 S. E. 2d 706. No. 96­1514. Conte v. Joe Conte Toyota, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 654. No. 96­1519. Wilson, Governor of California, et al. v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of California et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 828. No. 96­1525. Czerkies v. United States Postal Service et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1142. No. 96­1530. Hashemi v. American Express Travel Re- lated Services Co., Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 1122. No. 96­1544. Overseas Bulktank Corp. et al. v. Rose. Ct. App. La., 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:51] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1231 520 U. S. May 19, 1997 No. 96­1638. Scott v. District of Columbia et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 748. No. 96­1664. Tin Yat Chin v. Department of Justice. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1167. No. 96­1686. Fuentes v. United States; and No. 96­8671. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 98. No. 96­6929. Hart v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1186. No. 96­7082. Boyd v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 719. No. 96­7325. Embrey v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7740. Akujorobi v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 709. No. 96­7924. Rios v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 546 Pa. 271, 684 A. 2d 1025. No. 96­8144. Shatner v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 174 Ill. 2d 133, 673 N. E. 2d 258. No. 96­8148. Haynes v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 174 Ill. 2d 204, 673 N. E. 2d 318. No. 96­8230. Barlow v. Herron, Sheriff, Randolph County. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 389. No. 96­8232. Soto-Fong v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 187 Ariz. 186, 928 P. 2d 610. No. 96­8234. Lynch v. Boone, Sheriff, Cass County, Texas, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 653. No. 96­8239. MacKenzie v. Creager. Sup. Ct. Wash. Cer- tiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:51] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1232 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 19, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8241. Mitchell v. Albuquerque Board of Educa- tion et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 145. No. 96­8255. Young v. Stine, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8258. Carson et ux. v. Coast Village Property Owners Corp. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 142 Ore. App. 597, 922 P. 2d 730. No. 96­8260. Wright v. Tennessee et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8262. Tuller v. Neal, Superintendent, Colorado State Penitentiary, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 670. No. 96­8264. Johnson v. Lamont et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1346. No. 96­8269. Schmidt v. Martin et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8273. Sisk v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 2d Dist. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8278. White v. O'Connor, Magistrate Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 109 F. 3d 767. No. 96­8281. Tolbert v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 116 Ohio App. 3d 86, 686 N. E. 2d 1375. No. 96­8282. Williams v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 669 N. E. 2d 1372. No. 96­8283. Gerald v. Morton, Administrator, New Jer- sey State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8284. Dye v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8286. Dingle v. Artuz, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:51] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1233 520 U. S. May 19, 1997 No. 96­8288. Arteaga v. Superior Court of California, Santa Clara County. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8289. Arteaga v. Court of Appeal of California, Sixth Appellate District. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8290. Cook v. Crogan, County Probation Officer, San Diego County, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8292. Multani v. Ross University et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 233 App. Div. 2d 197, 650 N. Y. S. 2d 527. No. 96­8298. Seward v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8301. Farrell v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Sandusky County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8305. Alessi v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 363. No. 96­8306. Molina Lopez v. Arizona. Super. Ct. Ariz., Pima County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8315. Foster v. Old Town Trolley et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8316. El-Badrawi v. Dickson Supply Co. et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8319. Brancato v. Fischer. Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 937 S. W. 2d 379. No. 96­8338. Montez v. Oregon. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 324 Ore. 343, 927 P. 2d 64. No. 96­8397. Singh v. General Accounting Office et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 427. No. 96­8402. Nicolaus v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1102. No. 96­8414. Martin v. Rivers, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 12. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:51] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1234 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 19, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8480. Leff v. Institute of Specialized Medicine et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8498. Reynolds v. Los Angeles County Depart- ment of Children's Services. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8564. Barbara v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1456. No. 96­8590. Howard v. Caspari, Superintendent, Mis- souri Eastern Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 895. No. 96­8618. Burgess v. Easley Municipal Election Com- mission. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 325 S. C. 6, 478 S. E. 2d 680. No. 96­8625. Coleman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 654. No. 96­8627. Nagi v. C. E. Fleming Corp. et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8655. Gibbs v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 649. No. 96­8656. Girard v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1347. No. 96­8658. Howard v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1192. No. 96­8659. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 418. No. 96­8662. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 F. 3d 1100. No. 96­8669. Mott v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P. 2d 1046. No. 96­8676. Williams v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 411. No. 96­8679. Akpaeti v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 415 and 416. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:51] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1235 520 U. S. May 19, 1997 No. 96­8683. Humphrey et ux. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 65. No. 96­8684. Pierre v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 418. No. 96­8685. Churn v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 402. No. 96­8686. Causey v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 144. No. 96­8687. Gales v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 709. No. 96­8689. Giacomel v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 331. No. 96­8691. Irons v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 333. No. 96­8692. Jackson v. Barry, Mayor of the District of Columbia, et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8695. Williams v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8697. Trowbridge v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 110 F. 3d 71. No. 96­8701. Brewster et al. v. United States; No. 96­8718. Lindsey v. United States; and No. 96­8727. Buggs v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 415. No. 96­8702. David v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 414. No. 96­8703. Howard v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 13. No. 96­8705. Goins v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 9. No. 96­8706. Hansen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 417. 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:51] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1236 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 19, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8710. Stewart v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 398. No. 96­8711. O'Neal v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 9. No. 96­8715. Nelson v. Internal Revenue Service. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 963. No. 96­8716. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 121. No. 96­8717. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 333. No. 96­8725. Jones v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 872. No. 96­8726. Beltran v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 397. No. 96­8729. Fulbright v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 443. No. 96­8735. Brown v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 23. No. 96­8737. Wright v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 394. No. 96­8738. Triplett v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 1074. No. 96­8741. Thompson v. True, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 414. No. 96­8745. Escobar v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 948. No. 96­8747. Gonzales v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 54. No. 96­8754. Warren v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 392. No. 96­1412. Speckard, Superintendent, Groveland Cor- rectional Facility, et al. v. Ayala. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion 520ORD Unit: $PT2 [09-21-99 12:31:51] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1237 520 U. S. May 19, 20, 1997 of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 91 and 102 F. 3d 649. No. 96­1580. Shay et al. v. Howard et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motions of Crowley Maritime Corp. and American Academy of Actuaries for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 1484. Rehearing Denied No. 96­925. McKinney et ux. v. Baldwin, 519 U. S. 1114; No. 96­6761. Hart/Cross v. United States, 519 U. S. 1120; No. 96­6963. In re Minniecheske, 519 U. S. 1054; No. 96­7139. Hamm v. United States, 519 U. S. 1129; No. 96­7453. Tobie v. Department of the Interior et al., ante, p. 1124; No. 96­7941. Howard v. Walt Disney Co. et al., ante, p. 1189; and No. 96­8158. Rogers v. United States, ante, p. 1178. Peti- tions for rehearing denied. No. 96­5268. Glock v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 519 U. S. 888. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. May 20, 1997 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 96­8452. Labastida v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1502, 931 P. 2d 1334. Miscellaneous Order No. A­830. Stewart, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections v. Martinez-Villareal. Application to vacate the stay of execution of sentence of death granted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on May 19, 1997, presented to Justice O'Connor, and by her referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari Denied No. 96­9068 (A­823). Martinez-Villareal v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1238 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 20, 27, 1997 520 U. S. without an affidavit of indigency executed by petitioner granted. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice O'Connor, and by her referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. May 27, 1997 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 95­1385. Wood, Superintendent, Walla Walla State Penitentiary, et al. v. Gotcher. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer- tiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Edwards v. Balisok, ante, p. 641. Re- ported below: 66 F. 3d 1097. Miscellaneous Orders No. A­793. Einaugler v. Supreme Court of New York et al. Application for stay of mandate, addressed to Justice Souter and referred to the Court, denied. No. M­78. Nowicki v. Bruff et al. Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied. No. 95­1726. United States v. LaBonte et al. C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, 518 U. S. 1016.] Motion of respondent Stephen Dyer to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted denied. No. 96­871. State Oil Co. v. Khan et al. C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1107.] Motions of Association of the Bar of the City of New York and Business Roundtable for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as ami- cus curiae and for divided argument granted. No. 96­1252. Professional Medical Insurance Co. et al. v. Murff. C. A. 8th Cir. Motions of International Association of Insurance Receivers and Transit Casualty Co. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. No. 96­1346. Paradies et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioners for leave to amend petition for writ of certiorari granted. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1239 520 U. S. May 27, 1997 No. 96­8809. In re Wright. Petition for writ of habeas cor- pus denied. No. 96­1675. In re Gelb; and No. 96­8392. In re Anderson. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. Certiorari Granted No. 96­1487. United States v. Bajakajian. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 334. No. 96­1279. Rogers v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to the following question: "Whether a district court's failure to instruct the jury on an element of an offense is harmless error where, at trial, the defendant admitted that element?" Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1519. No. 96­7901. Trest v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 1005. Certiorari Denied No. 96­752. Aramony et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 1369. No. 96­1163. Mallott & Peterson et al. v. Stadtmiller et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1170. No. 96­1242. Armstrong et al. v. Executive Office of the President et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 90 F. 3d 553. No. 96­1310. Salazar-Haro v. Immigration and Natural- ization Service. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 309. No. 96­1324. Zarnes v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­1415. Suffolk Parents of Handicapped Adults et al. v. Wingate, Commissioner, Suffolk County Depart- ment of Social Services, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 818. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1240 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 27, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1426. Hutton, Personal Representative of the Estate of Hutton v. Three Rivers Area Hospital. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 956. No. 96­1504. Hubbard v. Kentucky Education Profes- sional Standards Board. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1505. Buss v. Painesville Township. Ct. App. Ohio, Lake County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1507. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, an Instrumen- tality of the Republic of Bolivia v. Transaero, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 538. No. 96­1508. Prickett et al. v. Norfolk Southern Rail- way Co. et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 691 So. 2d 1055. No. 96­1513. Grant v. Mississippi et al. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 686 So. 2d 1078. No. 96­1517. Fidel et al. v. National Union Fire Insur- ance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 664. No. 96­1520. Muse et al. v. International Business Ma- chines Corp. et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 103 F. 3d 490. No. 96­1521. Williams v. Avnet, Inc., et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 346. No. 96­1522. Duffey, Director, United States Informa- tion Agency v. Hartman et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 1232. No. 96­1523. Foster v. City of Southfield et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 400. No. 96­1524. Grooms et al. v. Glaze et al. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 324 S. C. 249, 478 S. E. 2d 841. No. 96­1527. Patel et al. v. Penman et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 868. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1241 520 U. S. May 27, 1997 No. 96­1528. Loving v. Pirelli Cable Corp. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1433. No. 96­1532. New Jersey Carpenters Apprentice Train- ing and Education Fund v. Borough of Kenilworth. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 147 N. J. 171, 685 A. 2d 1309. No. 96­1533. Saulsberry v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 691 So. 2d 1021. No. 96­1535. Ronwin v. Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 557 N. W. 2d 515. No. 96­1546. Continental Trend Resources, Inc., et al. v. OXY USA Inc. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 634. No. 96­1548. Hutton v. Howard. Ct. App. Okla. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­1565. Orback et al. v. Hewlett-Packard Co. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 429. No. 96­1583. Van Harken et al. v. City of Chicago. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 1346. No. 96­1603. Cornforth v. Howard, Special Judge, Dis- trict Court of Oklahoma, Oklahoma County. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1349. No. 96­1637. Wolfe v. DeBose et al. Sup. Ct. Colo. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 928 P. 2d 1315. No. 96­1676. Bennallack v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 409. No. 96­1682. Stelmokas, aka Stelmokevicius v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 302. No. 96­1700. Abidekun v. New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 352. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1242 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 27, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1702. Harvey v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 393. No. 96­6825. Campbell v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 125. No. 96­7332. West v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1385. No. 96­7640. Morales-Lopez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 698. No. 96­7641. Johnson v. Gomez, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 964. No. 96­7872. Graham-Weber v. County of Essex et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 112. No. 96­7895. Bascue v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1461. No. 96­7930. Chandler v. Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8240. Johnson v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 326 Ark. 430, 934 S. W. 2d 179. No. 96­8244. Dever et al. v. Turner, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1138. No. 96­8250. Feltrop v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Po- tosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 1178. No. 96­8299. Sacerio v. School Board of Dade County. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 681 So. 2d 1151. No. 96­8307. Rivers v. Farcas, Stewart, Brownie, Hand- son & Bliss. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8318. Pledger v. Arkansas Regional Blood Serv- ice. Ct. App. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 Ark. App. xxv. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1243 520 U. S. May 27, 1997 No. 96­8322. Hill v. Pennsylvania. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8323. Hill v. Raup et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8324. Hill v. Acker. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8325. Hill v. Beck et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8326. Hill v. Gates et al. (two judgments). C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8327. Hill v. McClure, Judge, United States Dis- trict Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8328. Hill v. Kemp et al. (two judgments). C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8329. Harrison v. Barbour, Superintendent, Twin Rivers Corrections Center, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1345. No. 96­8331. Cohea v. White, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8340. Klyng v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8343. Tosh v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Depart- ment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8345. Wambach v. Creecy et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 360. No. 96­8347. Page v. Saunders, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1448. No. 96­8349. Miller v. State Industrial Insurance Sys- tem of Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1112, 923 P. 2d 577. No. 96­8354. Carey v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1244 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 27, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8356. Abele v. Swigert. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8363. Cannon v. Simms et al. Super. Ct. Bibb County, Ga. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8365. Craig v. Blackburn et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8370. Whiterock v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 775, 918 P. 2d 1309. No. 96­8372. Tremblay v. Smith et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­8373. Werner, aka Thomas v. McCotter, Execu- tive Director, Utah Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 414. No. 96­8375. Gary v. Turpin, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ga. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­8378. Hoekstra, By and Through Her Parents, Hoekstra et al. v. Independent School District No. 283. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 624. No. 96­8381. Clayton v. Clayton. Ct. App. Ind. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 662 N. E. 2d 1014. No. 96­8384. Howard v. Howard. Ct. App. Ohio, Lucas County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8385. Echols v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 326 Ark. 917, 936 S. W. 2d 509. No. 96­8386. Bernys v. Wing et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8387. Spicer v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8390. Brown v. Bonaccorso et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 F. 3d 650. No. 96­8394. Altschul v. Texas (four judgments). Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1245 520 U. S. May 27, 1997 No. 96­8395. Ashing v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 282 Ill. App. 3d 1122, 707 N. E. 2d 304. No. 96­8410. Darwall v. Michigan. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8412. Belton v. Department of Veterans Affairs et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 14. No. 96­8419. Ballod v. Pennsylvania et al. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 676 A. 2d 1333. No. 96­8428. Judd v. University of New Mexico et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8434. Kabakow v. American Savings Bank et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 1157. No. 96­8446. James v. Court of Common Pleas of South Carolina, Sumter County, et al. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8457. Evans v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1172, 926 P. 2d 265. No. 96­8467. Drummond v. Maryland. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1129. No. 96­8484. Vieux v. Massachusetts. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 41 Mass. App. 526, 671 N. E. 2d 989. No. 96­8504. Altschul v. Texas (two judgments). Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8521. Sweeney v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8539. McRae v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 424. No. 96­8550. Mallia v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 89 N. Y. 2d 1013, 680 N. E. 2d 625. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1246 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 27, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8657. Higgason v. Swihart et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8720. McBride v. Thompson, Superintendent, Ore- gon State Penitentiary. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1146. No. 96­8728. Gray v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 956. No. 96­8731. Eaton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 868. No. 96­8734. Stewart v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 1377. No. 96­8744. Goldy v. Morton, Administrator, New Jer- sey State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8752. Beasley et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 1440. No. 96­8758. Perdue v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 24. No. 96­8759. Watkins v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 398. No. 96­8763. Ibida v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 393. No. 96­8765. Joiner v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 961. No. 96­8766. Ivory v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 403. No. 96­8768. Kirkland v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 1403 and 107 F. 3d 923. No. 96­8771. Stewart v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 716. No. 96­8775. Crowe v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 392. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1247 520 U. S. May 27, 1997 No. 96­8776. Gelis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 709. No. 96­8777. Cannon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 671. No. 96­8779. Ogletree v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 25. No. 96­8781. Somers v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 133. No. 96­8784. Kimble, aka Kimball v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8785. Lawanson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 380. No. 96­8787. Molina v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 1118. No. 96­8789. Ball v. Booker, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 362. No. 96­8792. Thornton v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 411. No. 96­8794. Vines v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 691 A. 2d 165. No. 96­8795. Wimbush v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 968. No. 96­8799. Diallo v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­8801. Dobyns et al. v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 679 A. 2d 487. No. 96­8802. Edwards v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 344. No. 96­8806. Rogers v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 361. No. 96­8807. Duncan v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 555. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1248 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 May 27, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8808. Figueroa v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 874. No. 96­8812. Jacquot v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 26. No. 96­8816. Murphy v. Perrill, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 880. No. 96­8826. Vasquez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 369. No. 96­8828. Smith v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 531. No. 96­8829. Petersen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 24. No. 96­8831. Chiquito v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 311. No. 96­8836. Bowler v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8838. Cocivera v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 566. No. 96­8842. Cargle v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 13. No. 96­1496. Tidewater Marine Western, Inc., et al. v. California Labor Commissioner et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Mo- tion of Maritime Law Association of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 14 Cal. 4th 557, 927 P. 2d 296. No. 96­1553. Ernst & Young v. Simpson. C. A. 6th Cir. Motions of 16 law firms and Arthur Anderson LLP et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 436. No. 96­1605. Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose et al. Sup. Ct. Colo. Motion of National Baptist Convention of America, Inc., et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 928 P. 2d 1315. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1249 520 U. S. May 27, 28, 29, June 2, 1997 Rehearing Denied No. 96­1308. Lovell v. Hurford et al., ante, p. 1156; No. 96­7470. Dodd v. Oliver et al., ante, p. 1125; No. 96­7514. Crawford v. Hawaii, ante, p. 1126; No. 96­7824. In re Ijemba, ante, p. 1114; No. 96­7825. Ivy v. United States, ante, p. 1131; No. 96­7956. Agcaoili v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, ante, p. 1159; and No. 96­8185. Franks v. United States, ante, p. 1179. Peti- tions for rehearing denied. No. 96­5454. Mason v. Norwest Bank South Dakota, N. A., et al., 519 U. S. 910. Petition for rehearing denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. May 28, 1997 Miscellaneous Order. (See also No. 96­9124, infra.) No. 96­9158 (A­860). In re Madden. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Certiorari Denied No. 96­9124 (A­853). Madden v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Combined petition for writ of certiorari, petition for writ of ha- beas corpus, and petition for an appropriate writ denied. May 29, 1997 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 96­7563. Russell v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer- tiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. June 2, 1997 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded. (See also No. 96­ 1033, ante, p. 893.) No. 96­540. United States v. Dunn. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1250 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 June 2, 1997 520 U. S. consideration in light of United States v. LaBonte, ante, p. 751. Reported below: 80 F. 3d 402. Miscellaneous Orders No. 96­859. Stevedoring Services of America et al. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, De- partment of Labor, et al., ante, p. 1155. Motion of respond- ent Charles S. Sproull for attorney's fees denied without prejudice to refiling in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. No. 96­8882. In re Nordquest; and No. 96­8932. In re Forest. Petitions for writs of habeas cor- pus denied. No. 96­1658. In re Universal Computer Systems, Inc., et al.; and No. 96­8850. In re McCall. Petitions for writs of manda- mus denied. No. 96­8465. In re Higgins. Petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied. Certiorari Granted No. 96­1337. County of Sacramento et al. v. Lewis et al., Personal Representatives of the Estate of Lewis, De- ceased. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 434. No. 96­1375. St. Paul-Ramsey Medical Center, Inc. v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 57. No. 96­1470. Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research International, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Motions of Costco Cos., Inc., et al. and American Free Trade Association for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1109. Certiorari Denied No. 95­8469. Britt v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 584. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1251 520 U. S. June 2, 1997 No. 95­8791. Novey v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 F. 3d 1483. No. 95­9335. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 584. No. 95­9361. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 F. 3d 1156. No. 96­1203. Weaver v. United States Information Agency et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1429. No. 96­1206. McGuire v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 671. No. 96­1359. City of New York et al. v. Bery et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 689. No. 96­1361. Grijalva v. Department of the Interior. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 374. No. 96­1377. Aetna Health Plans of California, Inc., et al. v. Ardary et al.; and No. 96­1526. Inland Healthcare Group v. Ardary et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 496. No. 96­1444. Arias v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 Cal. 4th 92, 913 P. 2d 980. No. 96­1531. Leak et al. v. Grant Medical Center et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 129. No. 96­1534. Sweeney v. Schmoke, Mayor of Baltimore, et al. Cir. Ct. Baltimore County, Md. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1545. Lane v. Ministry of Defense, State of Is- rael. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 665. No. 96­1558. Urban Search Management et al. v. Tyus et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 256. No. 96­1562. Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 194. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1252 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 June 2, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1567. Jackson v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 672 So. 2d 215. No. 96­1573. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 276. No. 96­1575. deLone v. Morris et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 386. No. 96­1576. Wessels v. Iowa. Ct. App. Iowa. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1582. Oregon Taxpayers United PAC v. Keisling, Oregon Secretary of State. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 143 Ore. App. 537, 924 P. 2d 853. No. 96­1597. Dostert v. Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia et al. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1640. Basic Energy Corp. v. Chiles, Governor of Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 418. No. 96­1643. Daniell v. Old Line Life Insurance Com- pany of America et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 695. No. 96­1656. Mullinax v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 327 Ark. 41, 938 S. W. 2d 801. No. 96­1663. Pierson v. Wilshire Terrace Corp. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1677. Jenkins v. United States Postal Service. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 376. No. 96­1679. Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc. v. Purtle. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 797. No. 96­1690. Pfluger v. Illinois Department of Profes- sional Regulation. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 283 Ill. App. 3d 1119, 708 N. E. 2d 854. No. 96­1716. Kumpan v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 963. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1253 520 U. S. June 2, 1997 No. 96­1736. Muchnick v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 740. No. 96­1751. Pritchard v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 M. J. 126. No. 96­1754. Green v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 656. No. 96­1767. Roe v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 1140. No. 96­5777. Caldwell v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 427. No. 96­5865. Adams v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 841. No. 96­6001. Fountain v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 946. No. 96­6496. Saunders v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1188. No. 96­6518. Von Hoff v. United States; No. 96­6776. Hoelzer v. United States; and No. 96­7731. Bates v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1441. No. 96­6810. McQuilkin v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 723. No. 96­7264. Lippitt v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1454. No. 96­7618. Borkowski v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1461. No. 96­7639. Roane v. United States; No. 96­7686. Johnson v. United States; and No. 96­7692. Tipton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 90 F. 3d 861. No. 96­7796. Soria v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 933 S. W. 2d 46. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1254 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 June 2, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7873. Holman v. Page, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 481. No. 96­7921. Lufkin v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 134. No. 96­7959. Swiger v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Tuscarawas County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­7989. Iyamu v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 554. No. 96­8011. Nicoletti v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1199. No. 96­8061. Rhodes v. Brigano, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 803. No. 96­8072. Muhaymin, aka Mosby v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1278. No. 96­8101. Villareal v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8302. Smulls v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 935 S. W. 2d 9. No. 96­8401. Baba v. 1133 Building Corp. et al.; and Baba v. Evans et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 210 App. Div. 2d 6, 619 N. Y. S. 2d 41 (first judgment); 213 App. Div. 2d 248, 624 N. Y. S. 2d 18 (second judgment). No. 96­8415. McReynolds v. Kaye, Chief Judge, Court of Appeals of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8418. Pugh v. Morales, Attorney General of Texas, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 331. No. 96­8420. Casteel v. Pieschek, Sheriff of Brown County Jail, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8429. McReynolds v. Murphy, Presiding Justice, Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Judicial Department. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1255 520 U. S. June 2, 1997 No. 96­8440. McReynolds v. Mark, Justice, Family Court of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8442. Levy v. Fresh Fields Market, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1130. No. 96­8444. Richards v. Brown et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 89 F. 3d 835. No. 96­8449. Neese v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8450. Monroe v. Anderson, Superintendent, Mis- sissippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8454. Elison et ux. v. Bank of New York. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8455. Etemad v. California Department of Water Resources Control Board. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 15. No. 96­8464. Lambert v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 675 N. E. 2d 1060. No. 96­8468. Easterwood v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8469. Hawkins v. Michigan Department of Cor- rections. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8471. Six v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 94 F. 3d 469. No. 96­8474. Houser v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8476. Belton v. Dow Chemical Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 137. No. 96­8483. Taplin v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1256 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 June 2, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8491. Gangi v. Baybank, FSB, et al. Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8500. Thornton v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8502. Allen v. Westwinds Apartments. Ct. App. S. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8503. Carr v. Raney, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8532. Jenkins et al. v. Oakley et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1149. No. 96­8538. Noe v. Anderson, Superintendent, Missis- sippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 396. No. 96­8557. Herman v. Ratelle, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8582. Felder v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 686 So. 2d 1305. No. 96­8595. McDonald v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 687 So. 2d 1304. No. 96­8629. Maghe v. Koch et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 21. No. 96­8636. Lowe v. Pogue. Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8644. Tidik v. Ritsema et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8648. Turnpaugh v. LeCureux, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 871. No. 96­8650. Williams v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 112 Nev. 1750. No. 96­8664. Hadley v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1257 520 U. S. June 2, 1997 No. 96­8666. Harris v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8688. Doggins v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8690. St. Joseph v. Borg, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 408. No. 96­8693. Nelson v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8704. Ellis v. Pinkins, Chief Deputy Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 337. No. 96­8709. Reese v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 94 F. 3d 1177. No. 96­8714. Nicholas v. Pataki, Governor of New York, et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 233 App. Div. 2d 657, 650 N. Y. S. 2d 317. No. 96­8736. Watson v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 284 Ill. App. 3d 1153, 708 N. E. 2d 1289. No. 96­8749. Jordan v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., Southern Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 937 S. W. 2d 262. No. 96­8750. McQueen v. Parker, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1302. No. 96­8753. Harris v. Chapman et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 499. No. 96­8756. Schwartz v. Emhart Glass Machinery, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8770. Antonelli v. Fugett et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 110. No. 96­8786. James v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 397. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1258 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 June 2, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8810. Bizberg-Gogol, aka Zion v. Federal Bureau of Investigation. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 949 F. 2d 1161. No. 96­8813. Littlefield v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 527. No. 96­8815. McDonald v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 1320. No. 96­8824. Leeper v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1457. No. 96­8830. Prescott v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 5. No. 96­8844. Gallares v. Runyon, Postmaster General, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 138. No. 96­8847. Hardy v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 284 Ill. App. 3d 1119, 708 N. E. 2d 1275. No. 96­8849. Mangone v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 29. No. 96­8853. Heimermann v. Vander Ark, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8855. Batson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 392. No. 96­8861. Rose v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 1408. No. 96­8863. Carroll v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 740. No. 96­8865. Davis v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 660. No. 96­8866. Ferret-Castellanos v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 339. No. 96­8867. Hicks v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 187. No. 96­8877. Kraft v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1336. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1259 520 U. S. June 2, 1997 No. 96­1610. Clark, Executrix of the Estate of Clark, Deceased v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 646. No. 96­8334. Bethley v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 685 So. 2d 1063. Statement of Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join, respecting the denial of certiorari. It is well settled that our decision to deny a petition for writ of certiorari does not in any sense constitute a ruling on the merits of the case in which the writ is sought. United States v. Carver, 260 U. S. 482, 490 (1923). See Singleton v. Commis- sioner, 439 U. S. 940, 942 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari); Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U. S. 912, 919 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J., respecting denial of certiorari). That is certainly true of our decision to deny certiorari in this case. It is worth noting the existence of an arguable jurisdictional bar to our review. Our consideration of state-court decisions is confined to "[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had." 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a). Petitioner has been neither convicted of nor sentenced for any crime. As we have indicated, "in the context of a criminal prosecution, finality is normally de- fined by the imposition of the sentence." Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U. S. 619, 620 (1981). See Baltimore Radio, 338 U. S., at 918 (noting one reason for denial of certiorari is that "judgment of the lower court may not be final"). No. 96­8707. Thompson v. Calderon, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent to strike amici curiae brief of Richard Gilbert et al. denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 109 F. 3d 1358. Rehearing Denied No. 96­1357. Smith, Personal Representative of Smith, Deceased v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya et al., ante, p. 1204; No. 96­1380. Murray v. Babbitt, Secretary of the Inte- rior, ante, p. 1187; 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1260 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 June 2, 3, 4, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­7790. McReynolds v. Gangel-Jacob, Justice, Ap- pellate Division, Supreme Court of New York, First Ju- dicial Department, ante, p. 1173; No. 96­7823. Woratzeck v. Stewart, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, ante, p. 1173; No. 96­7871. Fletcher v. Schindler Elevator Corp. et al., ante, p. 1174; No. 96­7900. Washington v. City of Jacksonville, Flor- ida, et al., ante, p. 1175; No. 96­8106. Jacobson v. Stevens et al., ante, p. 1177; No. 96­8173. Gant v. Drug Enforcement Agency et al., ante, p. 1178; and No. 96­8217. Pizzo v. Cain, Warden, et al., ante, p. 1190. Petitions for rehearing denied. June 3, 1997 Miscellaneous Order No. A­875. Harris v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. Appli- cation for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of this application. Certiorari Denied No. 96­8892 (A­811). Behringer v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Di- vision. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. June 4, 1997 Dismissal Under Rule 46 No. 96­1126. Iolab Corp. v. Hunter. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certio- rari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 927 S. W. 2d 848. Miscellaneous Order No. 96­9244 (A­881). In re Losada. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1261 520 U. S. June 4, 9, 1997 by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Certiorari Denied No. 96­9138 (A­854). Johnson-Bey v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. No. 96­9243 (A­876). Losada v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. June 9, 1997 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 96­896. Jefferson County, Alabama v. Acker et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Central Ark., ante, p. 821. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1561. No. 96­936. City of Anaheim v. California Credit Union League. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Central Ark., ante, p. 821. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 30. Miscellaneous Orders. (See also No. 96­8796, ante, p. 937.) No. A­792. Smith v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Stevens and referred to the Court, denied. No. A­802 (96­1843). Smith v. United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Ap- plication for stay, addressed to Justice Stevens and referred to the Court, denied. No. D­1391. In re Disbarment of Castro. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 511 U. S. 1104.] No. D­1788. In re Disbarment of Auriemma. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1112.] 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1262 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 June 9, 1997 520 U. S. No. D­1791. In re Disbarment of Growney. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1152.] No. D­1792. In re Disbarment of Sands. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1153.] No. D­1793. In re Disbarment of Boehme. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1153.] No. D­1794. In re Disbarment of Echols. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1153.] No. D­1806. In re Disbarment of Morath. Thomas D. Morath, of New York, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1807. In re Disbarment of Calvert. Stephen Brad- ford Calvert, of Stuart, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1808. In re Disbarment of Kirk. Raymond D. Kirk, of Lexington, Ky., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1809. In re Disbarment of Landan. Henry Sinclair Landan, of Chicago, Ill., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D­1810. In re Disbarment of Lash. Michael Lewis Lash, of New Orleans, La., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. 96­8961. In re Richards. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1263 520 U. S. June 9, 1997 Certiorari Granted No. 96­568. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 83 F. 3d 118. No. 96­1579. Brogan v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari granted. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 35. No. 96­1400. California et al. v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motions of National Trust for His- toric Preservation et al. and Columbus-America Discovery Group for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 379. No. 96­1569. Bogan et al. v. Scott-Harris. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari granted. In addition to the questions presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the following question: "Are individual members of a local legislative body enti- tled to absolute immunity from liability under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for actions taken in a legislative capacity?" Reported below: 134 F. 3d 427. No. 96­1581. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of Montana Association of Counties for Reservation Counties for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1439. Certiorari Denied No. 95­1763. J. M. Martinac & Co. et al. v. Saratoga Fish- ing Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 F. 3d 1432. No. 96­176. Pressley, Personal Representative for the Estate of Pressley, Deceased v. Pressley. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 82 F. 3d 126. No. 96­1397. Village of Airmont v. LeBlanc-Sternberg et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 355. No. 96­1417. Cargill, Inc. v. Parsley Dairy Farm et al.; andNo. 96­1624. Parsley Dairy Farm et al. v. Cargill, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 551. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1264 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 June 9, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1425. Terry et al. v. Reno, Attorney General, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1412. No. 96­1433. Barry, Mayor of the District of Columbia, et al. v. LaShawn A., by Her Next Friend, Moore, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 923. No. 96­1499. C. O. N. T. R. O. L. et al. v. Neilsen et al. Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 916 S. W. 2d 677. No. 96­1515. Christensen et al. v. Griffes, Vermont Com- missioner of Motor Vehicles. Sup. Ct. Vt. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 166 Vt. 21, 686 A. 2d 964. No. 96­1563. SC Testing Technology, Inc., et al. v. Maine Department of Environmental Protection et al. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 688 A. 2d 421. No. 96­1568. Tee et al. v. UAL Corp. et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 91 F. 3d 163. No. 96­1572. HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital v. American National Red Cross, dba American Red Cross South Carolina Blood Services Region. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1005. No. 96­1585. Edmundson, Administrator of the Estate of Turnage, Deceased, et al. v. Keesler et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 117. No. 96­1586. Kruger et ux. v. Sonic Restaurants, Inc. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 670. No. 96­1588. Clark v. Burns et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 659. No. 96­1589. Colford v. Chubb Life Insurance Company of America. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 687 A. 2d 609. No. 96­1592. Olkey et al. v. Hyperion 1999 Term Trust, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 2. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1265 520 U. S. June 9, 1997 No. 96­1593. Hinchliffe v. Pennsylvania. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 677 A. 2d 406. No. 96­1594. Hays et al. v. City of Urbana. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 102. No. 96­1608. Trimiew v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 253 Va. 22, 480 S. E. 2d 104. No. 96­1609. Labour v. American States Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1145. No. 96­1615. Scruggs v. Wilson et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 685 So. 2d 1206. No. 96­1616. Leija et vir, as Next Friends of Leija, a Minor v. Canutillo Independent School District. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 393. No. 96­1620. Schundler, Mayor of Jersey City, et al. v. American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 1435. No. 96­1632. PSI Repair Services, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 811. No. 96­1634. Asam v. Devereaux, Chairman, Disciplinary Board, Alabama State Bar, et al. Ct. Civ. App. Ala. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 686 So. 2d 1222. No. 96­1635. Asam v. Norris et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 691 So. 2d 1056. No. 96­1645. Floyd Auten Electric, Inc. v. Berry Con- struction, Inc., et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­1665. Santiago, Personal Representative of the Estate of Santiago, Deceased v. Ware et al. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 Wis. 2d 292, 556 N. W. 2d 356. No. 96­1669. Paddock Publications, Inc., dba The Daily Herald v. Chicago Tribune Co. et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 42. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1266 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 June 9, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1705. Orton v. Securities and Exchange Commis- sion. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 968. No. 96­1711. Stanley et al. v. Boles. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1723. Smith et ux. v. Noyes. Sup. Ct. N. H. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­1739. Schulz et al. v. New York State Unified Court System et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 104 F. 3d 356. No. 96­1771. Collins v. Maine. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­1774. Carpenter v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 M. J. 372. No. 96­1775. Durst-Lee v. Merit Systems Protection Board. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 714. No. 96­7768. Whitehead v. United States; and No. 96­7967. Pretty v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1213. No. 96­8114. Britz v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 174 Ill. 2d 163, 673 N. E. 2d 300. No. 96­8124. Letsinger v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 140. No. 96­8125. Lombard v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 1. No. 96­8505. Harris v. Gomez, Director, California De- partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8512. Sikora v. Doe et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8515. Woodard v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 234 App. Div. 2d 613, 652 N. Y. S. 2d 64. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1267 520 U. S. June 9, 1997 No. 96­8517. Rahman v. Phillip et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 356. No. 96­8523. Sharp v. Ray. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 130. No. 96­8524. Rodriguez v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 694. No. 96­8530. Noe v. Anderson, Superintendent, Missis- sippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 396. No. 96­8534. Sidles v. United States District Court for the District of Arizona. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8535. Siddiqui v. New York. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 386. No. 96­8536. Buell v. Gelman. App. Term, Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8543. Collyer v. Darling et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 211. No. 96­8544. Boliek v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 96 F. 3d 1070. No. 96­8551. Lowe v. Zimmerman et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8561. Clemy P. et al. v. Montgomery County De- partment of Social Services. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 344 Md. 458, 687 A. 2d 681. No. 96­8562. Ruthruff v. Johnson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8563. Ridgeway v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8566. Watts v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1282. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1268 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 June 9, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8568. Vela v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8571. Gray v. Wood, Superintendent, Washington State Penitentiary, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 F. 3d 1318. No. 96­8575. Johnson v. Gibbons. Ct. App. D. C. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8576. Lowe v. Fields et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8579. Altschul v. Logue, Judge. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8584. Harmon v. Sikes, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 555. No. 96­8591. Cornett v. Longois et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 396. No. 96­8592. Bernys v. Wing et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8593. Wong et al. v. Han Kuk Chun et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1296. No. 96­8594. Norbury v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8599. Vidal v. Florida. Cir. Ct. Fla., Dade County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8606. Sharp v. Allstate Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 957. No. 96­8607. Humphries v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 325 S. C. 28, 479 S. E. 2d 52. No. 96­8610. Fletcher v. Harrison, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8630. Jackson v. Byrd, Superintendent, State Cor- rectional Institution at Muncy, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 145. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1269 520 U. S. June 9, 1997 No. 96­8638. Robinson v. Barbour, Superintendent, Twin Rivers Corrections Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1460. No. 96­8649. Walker v. Kentucky Department of Cor- rections. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8660. Nelson v. Strawn et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 867. No. 96­8674. Mickens v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 252 Va. 315, 478 S. E. 2d 302. No. 96­8724. Mundy v. Dupree et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 862. No. 96­8746. Garza v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8780. Ornelas v. Johnson, Director, Texas De- partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8798. Dominguez v. Henry, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 877. No. 96­8821. Kidd v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 175 Ill. 2d 1, 675 N. E. 2d 910. No. 96­8825. McAffee v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 652. No. 96­8860. Ukandu v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 692. No. 96­8864. Trotter v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 285 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 709 N. E. 2d 313. No. 96­8871. Rodea v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 1401. No. 96­8878. McMullen v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1155. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1270 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 June 9, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8885. Paulus v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 957. No. 96­8887. Aybar v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 684. No. 96­8888. Zackary v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 23 and 25. No. 96­8889. Tarrant v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8895. Triplett v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 1074. No. 96­8898. Childress v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 707. No. 96­8902. Henson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 864. No. 96­8903. Hart v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8906. Cobb v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 1380. No. 96­8907. Colley v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 25. No. 96­8910. Velazquez-Medina v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 340. No. 96­8913. Myers v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 936. No. 96­8914. Keshishian v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 18. No. 96­8917. Okoli v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 397. No. 96­8920. Freisinger v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 363. No. 96­8921. Durham v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 404. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1271 520 U. S. June 9, 1997 No. 96­8933. Fanelli v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 863. No. 96­8934. Patterson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 393. No. 96­8935. Loaisiga v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 484. No. 96­8936. Van Zant v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 110 F. 3d 65. No. 96­8949. Tilley v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 331. No. 96­8950. Lanier v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 121. No. 96­8951. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 342. No. 96­8954. Murry v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 12. No. 96­8955. Miles v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 18. No. 95­1913. Thiokol Corp. et al. v. Revenue Division, De- partment of Treasury of Michigan, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consid- eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 76 F. 3d 751. No. 96­1681. Morgan, Superintendent, Knox County Schools v. Chris L., a Minor, by Next Friend, Mike L. C. A. 6th Cir. Motions of Georgia School Boards Association, Inc., and National School Boards Association for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 401. Rehearing Denied No. 96­900. Viswanathan v. Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina et al., ante, p. 1115; No. 96­7765. Ainsworth v. State Bar of California et al., ante, p. 1172; and No. 96­8154. Clark v. United States, ante, p. 1178. Peti- tions for rehearing denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1272 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 June 11, 16, 1997 520 U. S. June 11, 1997 Miscellaneous Order No. 96­9321 (A­894). In re Behringer. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. June 16, 1997 Certiorari Granted-Reversed and Remanded. (See No. 96­ 1104, ante, p. 968.) Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded No. 96­6114. Collins v. Welborn, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re- manded for further consideration in light of Bracy v. Gramley, ante, p. 899. Reported below: 81 F. 3d 684. No. 96­8184. Daniel v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Mo- tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur- ther consideration in light of Old Chief v. United States, 519 U. S. 172 (1997). Reported below: 103 F. 3d 131. Miscellaneous Orders No. D­1797. In re Disbarment of Reed. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1184.] No. D­1799. In re Disbarment of Bendet. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1184.] No. D­1800. In re Disbarment of Frye. Disbarment en- tered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1184.] No. D­1801. In re Disbarment of Schwartz. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1184.] No. D­1802. In re Disbarment of Boyle. Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1184.] No. D­1811. In re Disbarment of Watkins. Brian R. Wat- kins, of Lincoln, Neb., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re- 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1273 520 U. S. June 16, 1997 quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. M­81. Kovacs v. Mental Health Services of Orange County, Florida; No. M­82. Grassia v. Luongo et al.; and No. M­86. Benjamin et al. v. Aroostock Medical Center et al. Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied. No. 120, Orig. New Jersey v. New York. Report of the Spe- cial Master and Supplement received and ordered filed. Excep- tions to the Report may be filed within 45 days. Replies, if any, may be filed within 30 days. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 519 U. S. 1038.] No. 96­8637. In re Robinson; and No. 96­8643. In re Tyler. Petitions for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition denied. Certiorari Granted No. 96­827. Crawford-El v. Britton. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 813. No. 96­1590. Federal Election Commission v. Akins et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 731. No. 96­8653. Gray v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer- tiorari granted. Reported below: 344 Md. 417, 687 A. 2d 660. Certiorari Denied No. 96­1150. May v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1189. No. 96­1167. Jain v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 436. No. 96­1252. Professional Medical Insurance Co. et al. v. Murff. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 289. No. 96­1274. Digital Equipment Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Washington. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 Wash. 2d 177, 916 P. 2d 933. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1274 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 June 16, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1329. Lightman et al. v. Zenith Insurance Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1348. No. 96­1341. Bonds et al. v. District of Columbia et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 801. No. 96­1432. Yourdon, Inc. v. Bridges et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 56. No. 96­1442. Southern Company Services, Inc. v. Pritch- ard. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1130 and 102 F. 3d 1118. No. 96­1463. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Padilla et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 117. No. 96­1481. Leavitt, Governor of Utah, et al. v. Jane L. et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 1112. No. 96­1537. Swint et al. v. Chambers County Commission et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 672. No. 96­1606. Kingston Constructors, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 14 Cal. 4th 939, 928 P. 2d 581. No. 96­1612. Harper, Judge, Court of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Su- preme Court of Ohio, et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 77 Ohio St. 3d 211, 673 N. E. 2d 1253. No. 96­1619. Bureau Veritas v. Carbotrade S. p. A., on Its Own Behalf and as Assignee of Essex Cement Co., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 86. No. 96­1621. King v. Fielder et ux. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 17. No. 96­1622. Knapp v. Northwestern University et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 473. No. 96­1623. Gates et al. v. Shinn et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 463. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1275 520 U. S. June 16, 1997 No. 96­1625. Delk et al. v. Ford Motor Co. et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 182. No. 96­1626. Asam v. Ryan, Acting Judge, Circuit Court of Dallas County. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 106 F. 3d 417. No. 96­1629. Peeler v. Spartan Radiocasting, Inc., et al. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 324 S. C. 261, 478 S. E. 2d 282. No. 96­1630. Beiswenger Enterprises Corp. v. Carletta et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 1032. No. 96­1631. Dorf & Stanton Communications, Inc., et al. v. Molson Breweries et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 919. No. 96­1636. Lebbos v. Massachusetts State Bar. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 423 Mass. 753, 672 N. E. 2d 517. No. 96­1644. Green v. Umana. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 279 Ill. App. 3d 1117, 701 N. E. 2d 574. No. 96­1646. Giorgio et ux. v. Tennessee et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1185. No. 96­1649. Keaton et al. v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Fayette County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 113 Ohio App. 3d 696, 681 N. E. 2d 1375. No. 96­1650. Scheetz, Trustee of the Seville Corporate Park Subdivision Trust U/A Dated December 1, 1988 v. Vil- lage of Seville. Ct. App. Ohio, Medina County. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1659. Doody v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 Ariz. 363, 930 P. 2d 440. No. 96­1660. Dunlap v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 Ariz. 441, 930 P. 2d 518. No. 96­1662. Daniels v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co. Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 935 S. W. 2d 690. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1276 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 June 16, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­1666. Kucej v. Connecticut Statewide Grievance Committee. Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 239 Conn. 449, 686 A. 2d 110. No. 96­1667. Gates v. County of San Luis Obispo et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1673. Pallan v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1692. Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp. et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 625. No. 96­1697. Gates v. County of San Luis Obispo et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1699. David et al. v. Mosley et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 117. No. 96­1715. Arizona v. Richcreek. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 187 Ariz. 501, 930 P. 2d 1304. No. 96­1728. In re Keathley. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1741. Huck, Derivatively on Behalf of Sea Air Shuttle Corp. v. Dawson et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 45. No. 96­1757. Holtzman v. Mullon, Director of Veterans Administration Medical Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 959. No. 96­1761. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum et al. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 282 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 707 N. E. 2d 299. No. 96­1776. Brasten v. Zindell et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 6. No. 96­1790. Ortega Venegas v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 122. No. 96­1796. Medley v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1142. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1277 520 U. S. June 16, 1997 No. 96­1803. Hollar, Judge, Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands v. Government of the Virgin Islands et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 384. No. 96­1808. Owens v. Department of the Interior. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 333. No. 96­1812. Garcia v. Runyon, Postmaster General, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 397. No. 96­1857. Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 976. No. 96­8145. Sloan et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1378. No. 96­8149. Dickerson v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8226. Cummings-El v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 684 So. 2d 729. No. 96­8573. Hover v. Florida Power & Light Co. et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 708. No. 96­8596. Plyler v. Moore, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 365. No. 96­8597. Simpson v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 325 S. C. 37, 479 S. E. 2d 57. No. 96­8605. Peck v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8611. Isles v. Cosby et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 98 F. 3d 1333. No. 96­8615. Rhine v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8616. Cohea v. Mueller, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 407. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1278 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 June 16, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8619. Abellan v. Fairmont Hotel. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 85 F. 3d 634. No. 96­8621. Song v. Countryman et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 666. No. 96­8623. Burchill v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 453 Pa. Super. 678, 683 A. 2d 308. No. 96­8628. Klingensmith v. Roy et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 7. No. 96­8632. Morris v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio- rari denied. Reported below: 940 S. W. 2d 610. No. 96­8634. Lagana, aka Ragusa v. Dillon et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 355. No. 96­8640. Scott v. Sutor et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8642. Wiford v. Boone, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 414. No. 96­8646. Willoughby v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8651. Tapia v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 113 Nev. 1656, 970 P. 2d 1137. No. 96­8652. Ward v. Georgetown University et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 924. No. 96­8654. England v. Stepanik, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Dallas, Pennsylvania. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8661. Kutnyak v. Walters, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Mercer, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8665. Hill v. Gates et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1279 520 U. S. June 16, 1997 No. 96­8668. Hart v. California et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 665. No. 96­8673. Marshall v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de- nied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1153. No. 96­8675. Moffitt v. City of Charlotte et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 647. No. 96­8677. Burnett v. Chippewa County Sheriff's De- partment. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8678. Basey v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart- ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 95 F. 3d 52. No. 96­8680. Chalet v. Morton, Administrator, New Jer- sey State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8681. Bergne v. United States District Court for the Central District of California. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio- rari denied. No. 96­8682. Huerta v. County of Los Angeles et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8696. Tebbetts v. Whitson et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 670. No. 96­8698. Woolley v. Pennsylvania et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8699. Oberuch v. Arizona et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8700. Arteaga v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8723. McCoy v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 661 N. E. 2d 911. No. 96­8740. Walker v. White, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1280 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 June 16, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8751. Chambers v. Wilson et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 26. No. 96­8778. Sinks v. Shanks, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 145. No. 96­8820. Jackson v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 113 Nev. 1630, 970 P. 2d 1110. No. 96­8827. Vines v. Buchler et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 110. No. 96­8859. Tavakoli-Nouri v. Clinton, President of the United States, et al. (two judgments). C. A. 3d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. No. 96­8879. Kealoha v. Hawaii. Sup. Ct. Haw. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 84 Haw. 85, 929 P. 2d 98. No. 96­8919. Dancer v. Merit Systems Protection Board. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 426. No. 96­8937. Veatch v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 670. No. 96­8940. Skinner v. Runyon, Postmaster General. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 1131. No. 96­8948. Vaccaro v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 864. No. 96­8952. Levesque v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 111 F. 3d 122. No. 96­8953. Langdon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 96­8957. Spear v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 416. No. 96­8960. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 332. No. 96­8962. Omori v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 18. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1281 520 U. S. June 16, 1997 No. 96­8974. Feichtinger v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 1188. No. 96­8980. Bisson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 1461. No. 96­8981. Bell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 871. No. 96­8985. Gonzalez-Quezada v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 1386. No. 96­8987. Graves et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 868. No. 96­8990. Allen v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 695. No. 96­8992. Johnson et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 393. No. 96­8994. McHan v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 101 F. 3d 1027. No. 96­8997. Panchal et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 342. No. 96­8998. Spearman v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 F. 3d 1452. No. 96­9002. Guzman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 103 F. 3d 127. No. 96­9005. Cisneros v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 339. No. 96­9006. Callum v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 878. No. 96­9007. Workman v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 110 F. 3d 915. No. 96­9010. Escobar Velasquez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 110 F. 3d 71. No. 96­9016. 1­95­CV­553­P1 v. 1­95­CV­553­D1 et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1282 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 June 16, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­9022. Negrete-Diaz v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 340. No. 96­9023. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 339. No. 96­9025. Joyce v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 22. No. 96­9027. Chesney v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 F. 3d 564. No. 96­9029. Banks v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 96­9032. Moore v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 108 F. 3d 330. No. 96­9034. Diggs v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 111 F. 3d 963. No. 96­9039. Ruelas v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 F. 3d 1416. No. 96­9053. Karafa v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 22. No. 96­9054. Jones v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 104 F. 3d 193. No. 96­9059. Kimble v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer- tiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 712. No. 96­1476. Allstate Life Insurance Co. v. Hibma et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Motions of American Council of Life Insurance et al. and Association of California Life and Health Insurance Cos. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. No. 96­1655. Smith, as Assignee of the Interest of Orig- inal Plaintiff, Faulkenberry v. Elkins et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of International Biochemicals Group, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Re- ported below: 105 F. 3d 655. No. 96­8641. Pandey v. Graham et al. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consider- 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) ORDERS 1283 520 U. S. June 16, 1997 ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 41 Mass. App. 1120, 673 N. E. 2d 96. No. 96­8894. Robinson v. Clinton, President of the United States, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Rehearing Denied No. 95­1100. Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown et al., ante, p. 397; No. 95­1535. Newton v. Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants, Supreme Court of Georgia, 517 U. S. 1209; No. 96­1427. DiCicco v. Bonsey et al., ante, p. 1187; No. 96­1561. DelCourt v. Silverman et al., ante, p. 1213; No. 96­6887. Samuel v. Duncan, Warden, et al., ante, p. 1157; No. 96­7144. Wolfgram v. State Bar of California et al., 519 U. S. 1129; No. 96­7233. Bowers et al. v. Saturn General Motors Corp., ante, p. 1170; No. 96­7450. Lidman v. Department of State et al., ante, p. 1124; No. 96­7671. Williams v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. (two judgments), ante, p. 1158; No. 96­7757. Porter v. West, Secretary of the Army, ante, p. 1129; No. 96­7774. Burnett v. Eastern Upper Peninsula Men- tal Health Center et al., ante, p. 1172; No. 96­7906. Hussein v. Pierre Hotel, ante, p. 1188; No. 96­7955. Butler v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., ante, p. 1176; No. 96­7961. McColm v. Jordan et al., ante, p. 1176; No. 96­8111. Carter v. Artuz, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility, ante, p. 1190; No. 96­8150. Schwarz v. Department of Justice, ante, p. 1216; No. 96­8177. Hargrove v. Colony of Stone Mountain et al., ante, p. 1190; No. 96­8209. Jones v. Groose, Superintendent, Jefferson City Correctional Center, ante, p. 1179; 520ORD Unit: $PT3 [09-21-99 12:32:27] PGT: ORDBV (Bound Volume) 1284 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 June 16, 18, 1997 520 U. S. No. 96­8247. Downey et ux. v. Krempin et al., ante, p. 1201; No. 96­8344. Willis v. DeTella, Warden, ante, p. 1202; No. 96­8360. Cooper v. Gammon, Superintendent, Mob- erly Correctional Center, ante, p. 1202; and No. 96­8361. In re Alexander, ante, p. 1209. Petitions for rehearing denied. June 18, 1997 Miscellaneous Order No. 96­9394 (A­910). In re Tristan Montoya. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. 520rul3bk1 07-20-99 17:32:03 PGT * RULES AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE The following amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Proce- dure were prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States on April 11, 1997, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2075, and were reported to Congress by The Chief Justice on the same date. For the letter of transmittal, see post, p. 1286. The Judicial Conference report referred to in that letter is not reproduced herein. Note that under 28 U. S. C. § 2075, such amendments shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which they are transmitted to Congress unless otherwise provided by law. For earlier publication of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and amendments thereto, see, e. g., 461 U. S. 973, 471 U. S. 1147, 480 U. S. 1077, 490 U. S. 1119, 500 U. S. 1017, 507 U. S. 1075, 511 U. S. 1169, 514 U. S. 1145, and 517 U. S. 1263. 1285 520rul3bk2 07-20-99 17:32:03 PGT * RULES LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL Supreme Court of the United States washington, d. c. April 11, 1997 To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled: By direction of the Supreme Court of the United States, I have the honor to submit to the Congress the amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure that have been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to Section 2075 of Title 28, United States Code. Accompanying these rules are excerpts from the report of the Judicial Conference of the United States containing the Advisory Committee Notes submitted to the Court for its consideration pursuant to Section 331 of Title 28, United States Code. Sincerely, (Signed) William H. Rehnquist Chief Justice of the United States 1286 520rul3bk3 07-20-99 17:32:03 PGT * RULES SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES april 11, 1997 Ordered: 1. That the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure be, and they hereby are, amended by including therein amend- ments to Bankruptcy Rules 1010, 1019, 2002, 2007.1, 3014, 3017, 3018, 3021, 8001, 8002, 9011, and 9035, and new Rules 1020, 3017.1, 8020, and 9015. [See infra, pp. 1289­1303.] 2. That the foregoing amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure shall take effect on December 1, 1997, and shall govern all proceedings in bankruptcy cases there- after commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all pro- ceedings in bankruptcy cases then pending. 3. That The Chief Justice be, and hereby is, authorized to transmit to the Congress the foregoing amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure in accordance with the provisions of Section 2075 of Title 28, United States Code. 1287 520rul3bk4 07-20-99 17:32:03 PGT * RULES AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE Rule 1010. Service of involuntary petition and summons; petition commencing ancillary case. On the filing of an involuntary petition or a petition com- mencing a case ancillary to a foreign proceeding the clerk shall forthwith issue a summons for service. When an invol- untary petition is filed, service shall be made on the debtor. When a petition commencing an ancillary case is filed, serv- ice shall be made on the parties against whom relief is sought pursuant to § 304(b) of the Code and on any other parties as the court may direct. The summons shall be served with a copy of the petition in the manner provided for service of a summons and complaint by Rule 7004(a) or (b). If service cannot be so made, the court may order that the summons and petition be served by mailing copies to the party's last known address, and by at least one publication in a manner and form directed by the court. The summons and petition may be served on the party anywhere. Rule 7004(e) and Rule 4(l) F. R. Civ. P. apply when service is made or at- tempted under this rule. Rule 1019. Conversion of Chapter 11 reorganization case, Chapter 12 family farmer's debt adjustment case, or Chapter 13 individual's debt adjustment case to Chap- ter 7 liquidation case. When a chapter 11, chapter 12, or chapter 13 case has been converted or reconverted to a chapter 7 case: . . . . . (3) Claims filed before conversion.-All claims actually filed by a creditor before conversion of the case are deemed filed in the chapter 7 case. . . . . . 1289 520rul3bk4 07-20-99 17:32:03 PGT * RULES 1290 RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE (5) Filing final report and schedule of postpetition debts. (A) Conversion of Chapter 11 or Chapter 12 case.- Unless the court directs otherwise, if a chapter 11 or chapter 12 case is converted to chapter 7, the debtor in possession or, if the debtor is not a debtor in possession, the trustee serving at the time of conversion, shall: (i) not later than 15 days after conversion of the case, file a schedule of unpaid debts incurred after the filing of the petition and before conversion of the case, including the name and address of each holder of a claim; and (ii) not later than 30 days after conversion of the case, file and transmit to the United States trustee a final report and account; (B) Conversion of Chapter 13 case.-Unless the court directs otherwise, if a chapter 13 case is converted to chapter 7, (i) the debtor, not later than 15 days after conver- sion of the case, shall file a schedule of unpaid debts incurred after the filing of the petition and before conversion of the case, including the name and ad- dress of each holder of a claim; and (ii) the trustee, not later than 30 days after con- version of the case, shall file and transmit to the United States trustee a final report and account; (C) Conversion after confirmation of a plan.-Un- less the court orders otherwise, if a chapter 11, chapter 12, or chapter 13 case is converted to chapter 7 after confirmation of a plan, the debtor shall file: (i) a schedule of property not listed in the final report and account acquired after the filing of the petition but before conversion, except if the case is converted from chapter 13 to chapter 7 and § 348(f)(2) does not apply; (ii) a schedule of unpaid debts not listed in the final report and account incurred after confirmation but before the conversion; and 520rul3bk4 07-20-99 17:32:03 PGT * RULES RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 1291 (iii) a schedule of executory contracts and unex- pired leases entered into or assumed after the filing of the petition but before conversion. (D) Transmission to United States trustee.-The clerk shall forthwith transmit to the United States trustee a copy of every schedule filed pursuant to Rule 1019(5). . . . . . Rule 1020. Election to be considered a small business in a Chapter 11 reorganization case. In a chapter 11 reorganization case, a debtor that is a small business may elect to be considered a small business by filing a written statement of election not later than 60 days after the date of the order for relief. Rule 2002. Notices to creditors, equity security holders, United States, and United States trustee. (a) Twenty-day notices to parties in interest.-Except as provided in subdivisions (h), (i), and (l) of this rule, the clerk, or some other person as the court may direct, shall give the debtor, the trustee, all creditors and indenture trustees at least 20 days' notice by mail of: (1) the meeting of creditors under § 341 or § 1104(b) of the Code; . . . . . (n) Caption.-The caption of every notice given under this rule shall comply with Rule 1005. The caption of every no- tice required to be given by the debtor to a creditor shall include the information required to be in the notice by § 342(c) of the Code. . . . . . Rule 2007.1. Appointment of trustee or examiner in a Chapter 11 reorganization case. (a) Order to appoint trustee or examiner.-In a chapter 11 reorganization case, a motion for an order to appoint a trustee or an examiner under § 1104(a) or § 1104(c) of the Code shall be made in accordance with Rule 9014. 520rul3bk4 07-20-99 17:32:03 PGT * RULES 1292 RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE (b) Election of trustee. (1) Request for an election.-A request to convene a meet- ing of creditors for the purpose of electing a trustee in a chapter 11 reorganization case shall be filed and transmitted to the United States trustee in accordance with Rule 5005 within the time prescribed by § 1104(b) of the Code. Pend- ing court approval of the person elected, any person ap- pointed by the United States trustee under § 1104(d) and ap- proved in accordance with subdivision (c) of this rule shall serve as trustee. (2) Manner of election and notice.-An election of a trustee under § 1104(b) of the Code shall be conducted in the manner provided in Rules 2003(b)(3) and 2006. Notice of the meeting of creditors convened under § 1104(b) shall be given as provided in Rule 2002. The United States trustee shall preside at the meeting. A proxy for the purpose of voting in the election may be solicited only by a committee of creditors appointed under § 1102 of the Code or by any other party entitled to solicit a proxy pursuant to Rule 2006. (3) Report of election and resolution of disputes. (A) Report of undisputed election.-If the election is not disputed, the United States trustee shall promptly file a report of the election, including the name and ad- dress of the person elected and a statement that the election is undisputed. The United States trustee shall file with the report an application for approval of the appointment in accordance with subdivision (c) of this rule. The report constitutes appointment of the elected person to serve as trustee, subject to court approval, as of the date of entry of the order approving the appointment. (B) Disputed election.-If the election is disputed, the United States trustee shall promptly file a report stat- ing that the election is disputed, informing the court of the nature of the dispute, and listing the name and ad- dress of any candidate elected under any alternative presented by the dispute. The report shall be accompa- nied by a verified statement by each candidate elected 520rul3bk4 07-20-99 17:32:03 PGT * RULES RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 1293 under each alternative presented by the dispute, setting forth the person's connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, and any per- son employed in the office of the United States trustee. Not later than the date on which the report of the dis- puted election is filed, the United States trustee shall mail a copy of the report and each verified statement to any party in interest that has made a request to convene a meeting under § 1104(b) or to receive a copy of the report, and to any committee appointed under § 1102 of the Code. Unless a motion for the resolution of the dis- pute is filed not later than 10 days after the United States trustee files the report, any person appointed by the United States trustee under § 1104(d) and approved in accordance with subdivision (c) of this rule shall serve as trustee. If a motion for the resolution of the dis- pute is timely filed, and the court determines the result of the election and approves the person elected, the re- port will constitute appointment of the elected person as of the date of entry of the order approving the appointment. (c) Approval of appointment.-An order approving the appointment of a trustee elected under § 1104(b) or appointed under § 1104(d), or the appointment of an examiner under § 1104(d) of the Code, shall be made on application of the United States trustee. The application shall state the name of the person appointed and, to the best of the applicant's knowledge, all the person's connections with the debtor, creditors, any other parties in interest, their respective at- torneys and accountants, the United States trustee, and per- sons employed in the office of the United States trustee. Unless the person has been elected under § 1104(b), the appli- cation shall state the names of the parties in interest with whom the United States trustee consulted regarding the ap- pointment. The application shall be accompanied by a veri- fied statement of the person appointed setting forth the per- son's connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party 520rul3bk4 07-20-99 17:32:03 PGT * RULES 1294 RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, and any person employed in the office of the United States trustee. Rule 3014. Election under § 1111(b) by secured creditor in Chapter 9 municipality or Chapter 11 reorganization case. An election of application of § 1111(b)(2) of the Code by a class of secured creditors in a chapter 9 or 11 case may be made at any time prior to the conclusion of the hearing on the disclosure statement or within such later time as the court may fix. If the disclosure statement is conditionally approved pursuant to Rule 3017.1, and a final hearing on the disclosure statement is not held, the election of application of § 1111(b)(2) may be made not later than the date fixed pursuant to Rule 3017.1(a)(2) or another date the court may fix. The election shall be in writing and signed unless made at the hearing on the disclosure statement. The election, if made by the majorities required by § 1111(b)(1)(A)(i), shall be binding on all members of the class with respect to the plan. Rule 3017. Court consideration of disclosure statement in Chapter 9 municipality and Chapter 11 reorganiza- tion cases. (a) Hearing on disclosure statement and objections.-Ex- cept as provided in Rule 3017.1, after a disclosure statement is filed in accordance with Rule 3016(b), the court shall hold a hearing on at least 25 days' notice to the debtor, creditors, equity security holders and other parties in interest as pro- vided in Rule 2002 to consider the disclosure statement and any objections or modifications thereto. The plan and the disclosure statement shall be mailed with the notice of the hearing only to the debtor, any trustee or committee ap- pointed under the Code, the Securities and Exchange Com- mission, and any party in interest who requests in writing a copy of the statement or plan. Objections to the disclosure statement shall be filed and served on the debtor, the 520rul3bk4 07-20-99 17:32:03 PGT * RULES RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 1295 trustee, any committee appointed under the Code, and any other entity designated by the court, at any time before the disclosure statement is approved or by an earlier date as the court may fix. In a chapter 11 reorganization case, every notice, plan, disclosure statement, and objection required to be served or mailed pursuant to this subdivision shall be transmitted to the United States trustee within the time provided in this subdivision. (b) Determination on disclosure statement.-Following the hearing the court shall determine whether the disclosure statement should be approved. (c) Dates fixed for voting on plan and confirmation.-On or before approval of the disclosure statement, the court shall fix a time within which the holders of claims and inter- ests may accept or reject the plan and may fix a date for the hearing on confirmation. (d) Transmission and notice to United States trustee, creditors, and equity security holders.-Upon approval of a disclosure statement,-except to the extent that the court orders otherwise with respect to one or more unimpaired classes of creditors or equity security holders-the debtor in possession, trustee, proponent of the plan, or clerk as the court orders shall mail to all creditors and equity security holders, and in a chapter 11 reorganization case shall trans- mit to the United States trustee, (1) the plan or a court-approved summary of the plan; (2) the disclosure statement approved by the court; (3) notice of the time within which acceptances and rejections of the plan may be filed; and (4) any other information as the court may direct, in- cluding any court opinion approving the disclosure state- ment or a court-approved summary of the opinion. In addition, notice of the time fixed for filing objections and the hearing on confirmation shall be mailed to all credi- tors and equity security holders in accordance with Rule 2002(b), and a form of ballot conforming to the appropriate Official Form shall be mailed to creditors and equity security holders entitled to vote on the plan. If the court opinion is 520rul3bk4 07-20-99 17:32:03 PGT * RULES 1296 RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE not transmitted or only a summary of the plan is transmitted, the court opinion or the plan shall be provided on request of a party in interest at the plan proponent's expense. If the court orders that the disclosure statement and the plan or a summary of the plan shall not be mailed to any unimpaired class, notice that the class is designated in the plan as unim- paired and notice of the name and address of the person from whom the plan or summary of the plan and disclosure state- ment may be obtained upon request and at the plan propo- nent's expense, shall be mailed to members of the unimpaired class together with the notice of the time fixed for filing ob- jections to and the hearing on confirmation. For the pur- poses of this subdivision, creditors and equity security hold- ers shall include holders of stock, bonds, debentures, notes, and other securities of record on the date the order approv- ing the disclosure statement is entered or another date fixed by the court, for cause, after notice and a hearing. (e) Transmission to beneficial holders of securities.-At the hearing held pursuant to subdivision (a) of this rule, the court shall consider the procedures for transmitting the doc- uments and information required by subdivision (d) of this rule to beneficial holders of stock, bonds, debentures, notes, and other securities, determine the adequacy of the proce- dures, and enter any orders the court deems appropriate. Rule 3017.1. Court consideration of disclosure statement in a small business case. (a) Conditional approval of disclosure statement.-If the debtor is a small business and has made a timely election to be considered a small business in a chapter 11 case, the court may, on application of the plan proponent, conditionally ap- prove a disclosure statement filed in accordance with Rule 3016(b). On or before conditional approval of the disclosure statement, the court shall: (1) fix a time within which the holders of claims and interests may accept or reject the plan; (2) fix a time for filing objections to the disclosure statement; 520rul3bk4 07-20-99 17:32:03 PGT * RULES RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 1297 (3) fix a date for the hearing on final approval of the disclosure statement to be held if a timely objection is filed; and (4) fix a date for the hearing on confirmation. (b) Application of Rule 3017.-Rule 3017(a), (b), (c), and (e) do not apply to a conditionally approved disclosure state- ment. Rule 3017(d) applies to a conditionally approved dis- closure statement, except that conditional approval is consid- ered approval of the disclosure statement for the purpose of applying Rule 3017(d). (c) Final approval. (1) Notice.-Notice of the time fixed for filing objections and the hearing to consider final approval of the disclosure statement shall be given in accordance with Rule 2002 and may be combined with notice of the hearing on confirmation of the plan. (2) Objections.-Objections to the disclosure statement shall be filed, transmitted to the United States trustee, and served on the debtor, the trustee, any committee appointed under the Code and any other entity designated by the court at any time before final approval of the disclosure statement or by an earlier date as the court may fix. (3) Hearing.-If a timely objection to the disclosure state- ment is filed, the court shall hold a hearing to consider final approval before or combined with the hearing on confirma- tion of the plan. Rule 3018. Acceptance or rejection of plan in a Chapter 9 municipality or a Chapter 11 reorganization case. (a) Entities entitled to accept or reject plan; time for ac- ceptance or rejection.-A plan may be accepted or rejected in accordance with § 1126 of the Code within the time fixed by the court pursuant to Rule 3017. Subject to subdivision (b) of this rule, an equity security holder or creditor whose claim is based on a security of record shall not be entitled to accept or reject a plan unless the equity security holder or creditor is the holder of record of the security on the date the order approving the disclosure statement is entered or 520rul3bk4 07-20-99 17:32:03 PGT * RULES 1298 RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE on another date fixed by the court, for cause, after notice and a hearing. For cause shown, the court after notice and hearing may permit a creditor or equity security holder to change or withdraw an acceptance or rejection. Notwith- standing objection to a claim or interest, the court after no- tice and hearing may temporarily allow the claim or interest in an amount which the court deems proper for the purpose of accepting or rejecting a plan. . . . . . Rule 3021. Distribution under plan. After confirmation of a plan, distribution shall be made to creditors whose claims have been allowed, to interest holders whose interests have not been disallowed, and to indenture trustees who have filed claims pursuant to Rule 3003(c)(5) that have been allowed. For the purpose of this rule, credi- tors include holders of bonds, debentures, notes, and other debt securities, and interest holders include the holders of stock and other equity securities, of record at the time of commencement of distribution unless a different time is fixed by the plan or the order confirming the plan. Rule 8001. Manner of taking appeal; voluntary dismissal. (a) Appeal as of right; how taken.-An appeal from a judgment, order, or decree of a bankruptcy judge to a dis- trict court or bankruptcy appellate panel as permitted by 28 U. S. C. § 158(a)(1) or (a)(2) shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk within the time allowed by Rule 8002. An appellant's failure to take any step other than timely filing a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the district court or bankruptcy appellate panel deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal. The notice of appeal shall (1) conform substantially to the appropriate Official Form, (2) contain the names of all parties to the judgment, order, or decree appealed from and the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of their respective attor- neys, and (3) be accompanied by the prescribed fee. Each appellant shall file a sufficient number of copies of the notice 520rul3bk4 07-20-99 17:32:03 PGT * RULES RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 1299 of appeal to enable the clerk to comply promptly with Rule 8004. (b) Appeal by leave; how taken.-An appeal from an inter- locutory judgment, order, or decree of a bankruptcy judge as permitted by 28 U. S. C. § 158(a)(3) shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal, as prescribed in subdivision (a) of this rule, accompanied by a motion for leave to appeal prepared in ac- cordance with Rule 8003 and with proof of service in accord- ance with Rule 8008. . . . . . (e) Election to have appeal heard by district court instead of bankruptcy appellate panel.-An election to have an ap- peal heard by the district court under 28 U. S. C. § 158(c)(1) may be made only by a statement of election contained in a separate writing filed within the time prescribed by 28 U. S. C. § 158(c)(1). Rule 8002. Time for filing notice of appeal. . . . . . (c) Extension of time for appeal. (1) The bankruptcy judge may extend the time for filing the notice of appeal by any party, unless the judg- ment, order, or decree appealed from: (A) grants relief from an automatic stay under § 362, § 922, § 1201, or § 1301; (B) authorizes the sale or lease of property or the use of cash collateral under § 363; (C) authorizes the obtaining of credit under § 364; (D) authorizes the assumption or assignment of an executory contract or unexpired lease under § 365; (E) approves a disclosure statement under § 1125; or(F) confirms a plan under §943, §1129, §1225, or § 1325 of the Code. (2) A request to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal must be made by written motion filed before the 520rul3bk4 07-20-99 17:32:03 PGT * RULES 1300 RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE time for filing a notice of appeal has expired, except that such a motion filed not later than 20 days after the expi- ration of the time for filing a notice of appeal may be granted upon a showing of excusable neglect. An ex- tension of time for filing a notice of appeal may not ex- ceed 20 days from the expiration of the time for filing a notice of appeal otherwise prescribed by this rule or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever is later. Rule 8020. Damages and costs for frivolous appeal. If a district court or bankruptcy appellate panel deter- mines that an appeal from an order, judgment, or decree of a bankruptcy judge is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the district court or bankruptcy appellate panel and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee. Rule 9011. Signing of papers; representations to the court; sanctions; verification and copies of papers. (a) Signature.-Every petition, pleading, written motion, and other paper, except a list, schedule, or statement, or amendments thereto, shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign all papers. Each paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number, if any. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party. (b) Representations to the court.-By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a petition, pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,- 520rul3bk4 07-20-99 17:32:03 PGT * RULES RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 1301 (1) it is not being presented for any improper pur- pose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivo- lous argument for the extension, modification, or rever- sal of existing law or the establishment of new law; (3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable op- portunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are rea- sonably based on a lack of information or belief. (c) Sanctions.-If, after notice and a reasonable opportu- nity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation. (1) How initiated. (A) By motion.-A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from other motions or re- quests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 7004. The motion for sanctions may not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, de- fense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected, except that this limitation shall not apply if the conduct alleged is the filing of a petition in violation of subdivision (b). If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the mo- tion the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees in- curred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held 520rul3bk4 07-20-99 17:32:03 PGT * RULES 1302 RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE jointly responsible for violations committed by its part- ners, associates, and employees. (B) On court's initiative.-On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto. (2) Nature of sanction; limitations.-A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation. (A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2). (B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned. (3) Order.-When imposing sanctions, the court shall de- scribe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed. (d) Inapplicability to discovery.-Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply to disclosures and discov- ery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 7026 through 7037. (e) Verification.-Except as otherwise specifically pro- vided by these rules, papers filed in a case under the Code need not be verified. Whenever verification is required by these rules, an unsworn declaration as provided in 28 U. S. C. § 1746 satisfies the requirement of verification. 520rul3bk4 07-20-99 17:32:03 PGT * RULES RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 1303 ( f ) Copies of signed or verified papers.-When these rules require copies of a signed or verified paper, it shall suffice if the original is signed or verified and the copies are conformed to the original. Rule 9015. Jury trials. (a) Applicability of certain federal rules of civil proce- dure.-Rules 38, 39, and 47­51 F. R. Civ. P., and Rule 81(c) F. R. Civ. P. insofar as it applies to jury trials, apply in cases and proceedings, except that a demand made pursuant to Rule 38(b) F. R. Civ. P. shall be filed in accordance with Rule 5005. (b) Consent to have trial conducted by bankruptcy judge.-If the right to a jury trial applies, a timely demand has been filed pursuant to Rule 38(b) F. R. Civ. P., and the bankruptcy judge has been specially designated to conduct the jury trial, the parties may consent to have a jury trial conducted by a bankruptcy judge under 28 U. S. C. § 157(e) by jointly or separately filing a statement of consent within any applicable time limits specified by local rule. Rule 9035. Applicability of rules in judicial districts in Alabama and North Carolina. In any case under the Code that is filed in or transferred to a district in the State of Alabama or the State of North Carolina and in which a United States trustee is not author- ized to act, these rules apply to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any federal statute effective in the case. 520rul3cv1 07-20-99 17:36:03 PGT * RULES AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE The following amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States on April 11, 1997, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2072, and were reported to Congress by The Chief Justice on the same date. For the letter of transmittal, see post, p. 1306. The Judicial Conference report referred to in that letter is not reproduced herein. Note that under 28 U. S. C. § 2074, such amendments shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which they are transmitted to Congress unless otherwise provided by law. For earlier publication of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and amendments thereto, see 308 U. S. 645, 308 U. S. 642, 329 U. S. 839, 335 U. S. 919, 341 U. S. 959, 368 U. S. 1009, 374 U. S. 861, 383 U. S. 1029, 389 U. S. 1121, 398 U. S. 977, 401 U. S. 1017, 419 U. S. 1133, 446 U. S. 995, 456 U. S. 1013, 461 U. S. 1095, 471 U. S. 1153, 480 U. S. 953, 485 U. S. 1043, 500 U. S. 963, 507 U. S. 1089, 514 U. S. 1151, and 517 U. S. 1279. 1305 520rul3cv2 07-20-99 17:36:03 PGT * RULES LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL Supreme Court of the United States washington, d. c. April 11, 1997 To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled: By direction of the Supreme Court of the United States, I have the honor to submit to the Congress the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that have been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to Section 2072 of Title 28, United States Code. Accompanying these rules are excerpts from the report of the Judicial Conference of the United States containing the Advisory Committee Notes submitted to the Court for its consideration pursuant to Section 331 of Title 28, United States Code. Sincerely, (Signed) William H. Rehnquist Chief Justice of the United States 1306 520rul3cv3 07-20-99 17:36:03 PGT * RULES SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES april 11, 1997 Ordered: 1. That the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts be, and they hereby are, amended by including therein amendments to Civil Rules 9 and 73, and abrogation of Rules 74, 75, and 76, and amend- ments to Forms 33 and 34. [See infra, pp. 1309­1311.] 2. That the foregoing amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall take effect on December 1, 1997, and shall govern all proceedings in civil cases thereafter com- menced and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings in civil cases then pending. 3. That The Chief Justice be, and hereby is, authorized to transmit to the Congress the foregoing amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in accordance with the provisions of Section 2072 of Title 28, United States Code. 1307 520rul3cv4 07-20-99 17:36:03 PGT * RULES AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 9. Pleading special matters. . . . . . (h) Admiralty and maritime claims.-A pleading or count setting forth a claim for relief within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction that is also within the jurisdiction of the district court on some other ground may contain a statement identifying the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim for the purposes of Rules 14(c), 38(e), 82, and the Sup- plemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. If the claim is cognizable only in admiralty, it is an admiralty or maritime claim for those purposes whether so identified or not. The amendment of a pleading to add or withdraw an identifying statement is governed by the principles of Rule 15. A case that includes an admiralty or maritime claim within this subdivision is an admiralty case within 28 U. S. C. § 1292(a)(3). Rule 73. Magistrate judges; trial by consent and appeal. (a) Powers; procedure.-. . . A record of the proceedings shall be made in accordance with the requirements of Title 28, U. S. C. § 636(c)(5). . . . . . (c) Appeal.-In accordance with Title 28, U. S. C. § 636(c)(3), appeal from a judgment entered upon direction of a magistrate judge in proceedings under this rule will lie to the court of appeals as it would from a judgment of the district court. [ (d) Optional appeal route.] (Abrogated.) [Rule 74. Method of appeal from magistrate judge to dis- trict judge under Title 28, U. S. C. § 636(c)(4) and Rule 73(d).] (Abrogated.) 1309 520rul3cv4 07-20-99 17:36:03 PGT * RULES 1310 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE [Rule 75. Proceedings on appeal from magistrate judge to district judge under Rule 73(d).] (Abrogated.) [Rule 76. Judgment of the district judge on the appeal under Rule 73(d) and costs.] (Abrogated.) 520rul3cv4 07-20-99 17:36:03 PGT * RULES RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1311 APPENDIX OF FORMS Form 33. Notice of Availability of Magistrate Judge to Exercise Jurisdiction . . . . . An appeal from a judgment entered by a magistrate judge may be taken directly to the United States court of appeals for this judicial circuit in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of a district court. Copies of the Form for the "Consent to Jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge" are available from the clerk of the court. Form 34. Consent to Exercise of Jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge . . . . . CONSENT TO JURISDICTION BY A UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE In accordance with the provisions of Title 28, U. S. C. § 636(c), the undersigned party or parties to the above-captioned civil matter hereby voluntarily consent to have a United States magistrate judge conduct any and all further proceedings in the case, including trial, and order the entry of a final judgment. Date Signature Note: Return this form to the Clerk of the Court if you consent to jurisdic- tion by a magistrate judge. Do not send a copy of this form to any district judge or magistrate judge. 520rul3cr1 07-20-99 17:37:13 PGT * RULES AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE The following amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States on April 11, 1997, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2072, and were reported to Congress by The Chief Justice on the same date. For the letter of transmittal, see post, p. 1314. The Judicial Conference report referred to in that letter is not reproduced herein. Note that under 28 U. S. C. § 2074, such amendments shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which they are transmitted to Congress unless otherwise provided by law. For earlier publication of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendments thereto, see 327 U. S. 821, 335 U. S. 917, 949, 346 U. S. 941, 350 U. S. 1017, 383 U. S. 1087, 389 U. S. 1125, 401 U. S. 1025, 406 U. S. 979, 415 U. S. 1056, 416 U. S. 1001, 419 U. S. 1136, 425 U. S. 1157, 441 U. S. 985, 456 U. S. 1021, 461 U. S. 1117, 471 U. S. 1167, 480 U. S. 1041, 485 U. S. 1057, 490 U. S. 1135, 495 U. S. 967, 500 U. S. 991, 507 U. S. 1161, 511 U. S. 1175, 514 U. S. 1159, and 517 U. S. 1285. 1313 520rul3cr2 07-20-99 17:37:13 PGT * RULES LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL Supreme Court of the United States washington, d. c. April 11, 1997 To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled: By direction of the Supreme Court of the United States, I have the honor to submit to the Congress the amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that have been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to Section 2072 of Title 28, United States Code. Accompanying these rules are excerpts from the report of the Judicial Conference of the United States containing the Advisory Committee Notes submitted to the Court for its consideration pursuant to Section 331 of Title 28, United States Code. Sincerely, (Signed) William H. Rehnquist Chief Justice of the United States 1314 520rul3cr3 07-20-99 17:37:13 PGT * RULES SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES april 11, 1997 Ordered: 1. That the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts be, and they hereby are, amended by including therein amendments to Criminal Rules 16 and 58. [See infra, pp. 1317­1321.] 2. That the foregoing amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure shall take effect on December 1, 1997, and shall govern all proceedings in criminal cases thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceed- ings in criminal cases then pending. 3. That The Chief Justice be, and hereby is, authorized to transmit to the Congress the foregoing amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in accordance with the provisions of Section 2072 of Title 28, United States Code. 1315 520rul3cr4 07-20-99 17:37:13 PGT * RULES AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 16. Discovery and inspection. (a) Governmental disclosure of evidence. (1) Information subject to disclosure. . . . . . (E) Expert witnesses.-At the defendant's re- quest, the government shall disclose to the defend- ant a written summary of testimony that the gov- ernment intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case- in-chief at trial. If the government requests dis- covery under subdivision (b)(1)(C)(ii) of this rule and the defendant complies, the government shall, at the defendant's request, disclose to the defendant a written summary of testimony the government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 as evi- dence at trial on the issue of the defendant's mental condition. The summary provided under this sub- division shall describe the witnesses' opinions, the bases and the reasons for those opinions, and the witnesses' qualifications. (2) Information not subject to disclosure.-Except as provided in paragraphs (A), (B), (D), and (E) of subdivi- sion (a)(1), this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal gov- ernment documents made by the attorney for the gov- ernment or any other government agent investigating or prosecuting the case. Nor does the rule authorize the discovery or inspection of statements made by gov- 1317 520rul3cr4 07-20-99 17:37:13 PGT * RULES 1318 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ernment witnesses or prospective government wit- nesses except as provided in 18 U. S. C. § 3500. . . . . . (b) The defendant's disclosure of evidence. (1) Information subject to disclosure. . . . . . (C) Expert witnesses.-Under the following circumstances, the defendant shall, at the gov- ernment's request, disclose to the government a written summary of testimony that the defendant intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as evidence at trial: (i) if the defendant requests disclosure under subdivision (a)(1)(E) of this rule and the government complies, or (ii) if the defendant has given notice under Rule 12.2(b) of an intent to present expert testimony on the defendant's mental condition. This summary shall describe the witnesses' opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, and the witnesses' qualifications. . . . . . Rule 58. Procedure for misdemeanors and other petty offenses. (a) Scope. (1) In general.-This rule governs the procedure and practice for the conduct of proceedings involving mis- demeanors and other petty offenses, and for appeals to district judges in such cases tried by United States magistrate judges. . . . . . (b) Pretrial procedures. . . . . . (2) Initial appearance.-At the defendant's initial appearance on a misdemeanor or other petty offense charge, the court shall inform the defendant of: . . . . . 520rul3cr4 07-20-99 17:37:13 PGT * RULES RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1319 (C) the right to request the appointment of coun- sel if the defendant is unable to obtain counsel, un- less the charge is a petty offense for which an appointment of counsel is not required; . . . . . (E) the right to trial, judgment, and sentencing before a district judge, unless: (i) the charge is a Class B misdemeanor motor- vehicle offense, a Class C misdemeanor, or an infrac- tion; or (ii) the defendant consents to trial, judgment, and sentencing before a magistrate judge; (F) the right to trial by jury before either a United States magistrate judge or a district judge, unless the charge is a petty offense; and (G) the right to a preliminary examination in accordance with 18 U. S. C. § 3060, and the general circumstances under which the defendant may se- cure pretrial release, if the defendant is held in cus- tody and charged with a misdemeanor other than a petty offense. (3) Consent and arraignment. (A) Plea before a United States magistrate judge.-A magistrate judge shall take the defend- ant's plea in a Class B misdemeanor charging a motor-vehicle offense, a Class C misdemeanor, or an infraction. In every other misdemeanor case, a magistrate judge may take the plea only if the defendant consents either in writing or orally on the record to be tried before the magistrate judge and specifically waives trial before a district judge. The defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or with the consent of the magistrate judge, nolo contendere. (B) Failure to consent.-In a misdemeanor case-other than a Class B misdemeanor charging a motor-vehicle offense, a Class C misdemeanor, or an infraction-magistrate judge shall order the de- 520rul3cr4 07-20-99 17:37:13 PGT * RULES 1320 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE fendant to appear before a district judge for further proceedings on notice, unless the defendant con- sents to trial before the magistrate judge. . . . . . (g) Appeal. (1) Decision, order, judgment or sentence by a dis- trict judge.-An appeal from a decision, order, judgment or conviction or sentence by a district judge shall be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Appel- late Procedure. (2) Decision, order, judgment or sentence by a United States magistrate judge. (A) Interlocutory appeal.-A decision or order by a magistrate judge which, if made by a district judge, could be appealed by the government or de- fendant under any provision of law, shall be subject to an appeal to a district judge provided such appeal is taken within 10 days of the entry of the decision or order. An appeal shall be taken by filing with the clerk of court a statement specifying the deci- sion or order from which an appeal is taken and by serving a copy of the statement upon the adverse party, personally or by mail, and by filing a copy with the magistrate judge. (B) Appeal from conviction or sentence.-An ap- peal from a judgment of conviction or sentence by a magistrate judge to a district judge shall be taken within 10 days after entry of the judgment. An appeal shall be taken by filing with the clerk of court a statement specifying the judgment from which an appeal is taken, and by serving a copy of the statement upon the United States Attorney, personally or by mail, and by filing a copy with the magistrate judge. . . . . . (D) Scope of appeal.-The defendant shall not be entitled to a trial de novo by a district judge. The 520rul3cr4 07-20-99 17:37:13 PGT * RULES RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1321 scope of appeal shall be the same as an appeal from a judgment of a district court to a court of appeals. . . . . . 520rul3ev1 08-17-98 14:47:24 PGT * RULES AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE The following amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence were pre- scribed by the Supreme Court of the United States on April 11, 1997, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2072, and were reported to Congress by The Chief Justice on the same date. For the letter of transmittal, see post, p. 1324. The Judicial Conference report referred to in that letter is not reproduced herein. Note that under 28 U. S. C. § 2074, such amendments shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which they are transmitted to Congress unless otherwise provided by law. For earlier reference to the Federal Rules of Evidence, see 409 U. S. 1132. For earlier publication of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and amendments thereto, see 441 U. S. 1005, 480 U. S. 1023, 485 U. S. 1049, 493 U. S. 1173, 500 U. S. 1001, 507 U. S. 1187, and 511 U. S. 1187. 1323 520rul3ev2 08-17-98 14:47:24 PGT * RULES LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL Supreme Court of the United States washington, d. c. April 11, 1997 To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled: By direction of the Supreme Court of the United States, I have the honor to submit to the Congress the amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence that have been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to Section 2072 of Title 28, United States Code. Accompanying these rules are excerpts from the report of the Judicial Conference of the United States containing the Advisory Committee Notes submitted to the Court for its consideration pursuant to Section 331 of Title 28, United States Code. Sincerely, (Signed) William H. Rehnquist Chief Justice of the United States 1324 520rul3ev3 08-17-98 14:47:24 PGT * RULES SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES april 11, 1997 Ordered: 1. That the Federal Rules of Evidence be, and they hereby are, amended by including therein amendments to Evidence Rules 407, 801, 803(24), 804(b)(5), and 806, and new Rules 804(b)(6) and 807. [See infra, pp. 1327­1329.] 2. That the foregoing amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence shall take effect on December 1, 1997, and shall govern in all proceedings thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings then pending. 3. That The Chief Justice be, and hereby is, authorized to transmit to the Congress the foregoing amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence in accordance with the provi- sions of Section 2072 of Title 28, United States Code. 1325 520rul3ev4 08-17-98 14:47:24 PGT * RULES AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 407. Subsequent remedial measures. When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negli- gence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction. . . . . . Rule 801. Definitions. . . . . . (d) Statements which are not hearsay. . . . . . (2) Admission by party-opponent.-The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own state- ment, in either an individual or a representative capacity or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The contents of the statement shall be considered but are not alone sufficient to estab- lish the declarant's authority under subdivision (C), the agency or employment relationship and scope thereof under subdivision (D), or the existence of the conspiracy and the participation therein of the 1327 520rul3ev4 08-17-98 14:47:24 PGT * RULES 1328 RULES OF EVIDENCE declarant and the party against whom the state- ment is offered under subdivision (E). Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. . . . . . (24) [Transferred to Rule 807.] Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. . . . . . (b) Hearsay exceptions. . . . . . (5) [Transferred to Rule 807.] (6) Forfeiture by wrongdoing.-A statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness. Rule 806. Attacking and supporting credibility of declarant. When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissi- ble for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to ex- amine the declarant on the statement as if under cross- examination. Rule 807. Residual exception. A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustwor- thiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court de- 520rul3ev4 08-17-98 14:47:24 PGT * RULES RULES OF EVIDENCE 1329 termines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to pre- pare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the state- ment and the particulars of it, including the name and ad- dress of the declarant. 520IND Unit: $UBV [08-03-99 14:38:50] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume) I N D E X ABORTIONS. See Constitutional Law, VIII. ADMIRALTY. Tort damages-Defective equipment added after initial sale.-Equip- ment added to a ship by an initial user before ship is resold is not part of product that itself caused physical harm, for which no admiralty tort damages can be recovered, but is "other property," for which such dam- ages can be recovered. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J. M. Martinac & Co., p. 875. ALABAMA. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 1; Supreme Court, 7. AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL ACTS. See False Claims Act. APPEALS. Denial of qualified immunity-Interlocutory appeal.-State officials who are defendants in a state-court action for damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 do not have a federal right to an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity. Johnson v. Fankell, p. 911. APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE. See Constitutional Law, I. ARIZONA. See Constitutional Law, II. ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS. See Constitutional Law, V. BALLOTS FOR ELECTED OFFICES. See Constitutional Law, V. BANKRUPTCY. Chapter 13-"Cram down" option-Value of retained property.-Under § 506 of Bankruptcy Code, value of property retained in a Chapter 13 plan because debtor has exercised "cram down" option is collateral's re- placement, not foreclosure, value. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, p. 953. BENEFIT PLANS. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 2. CABLE TELEVISION CONSUMER PROTECTION AND COMPETI- TION ACT OF 1992. See Constitutional Law, VI. 1331 520IND Unit: $UBV [08-03-99 14:38:50] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume) 1332 INDEX CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC OFFICE. See Constitutional Law, IX, 1. CAPITAL MURDER. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 1; Habeas Cor- pus, 1. CASE OR CONTROVERSY. See Constitutional Law, II. CERTIORARI. See Supreme Court, 5, 6, 7. CHAPTER 13. See Bankruptcy. CHARITABLE ESTATE TAX DEDUCTION. See Taxes, 1. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS. See Social Secu- rity Act. CIVILIAN JUDGES ON MILITARY COURTS. See Constitutional Law, I. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871. See also Appeals. 1. Section 1983-County sheriff's wrongdoing-County's liability.- Monroe County, Alabama, is not liable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for its sheriff's alleged wrongdoing in suppressing exculpatory evidence that cleared McMillian of capital murder, because Alabama sheriffs, when executing their law enforcement duties, are policymakers for State, not county. McMillian v. Monroe County, p. 781. 2. Section 1983-Municipal liability-Judgment based on sheriff's hiring decision.-A county is not liable under § 1983 for its sheriff's iso- lated decision to hire a deputy without adequately screening his criminal record absent a showing that sheriff consciously disregarded a high risk that deputy would use excessive force. Board of Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, p. 397. 3. Section 1983-Prison disciplinary proceeding.-Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, precludes respondent's claim for declaratory relief and dam- ages-based on allegations that procedures used in his prison discipli- nary proceeding violated due process-from being cognizable under § 1983. Edwards v. Balisok, p. 641. CLASS ACTIONS. See Supreme Court, 7. COAST GUARD COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS. See Constitu- tional Law, I. COMMERCE CLAUSE. See Constitutional Law, III. COMMUNITY PROPERTY. See Employee Retirement Income Secu- rity Act of 1974, 3. 520IND Unit: $UBV [08-03-99 14:38:50] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1333 CONCURRENT SENTENCES. See Criminal Law, 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. I. Appointments Clause. Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals-Appointment of civilian judges.-Title 49 U. S. C. § 323(a) authorizes Secretary of Transportation to appoint civilian judges to Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, and that authorization is constitutional under Appointments Clause. Edmond v. United States, p. 651. II. Case or Controversy. Mootness-State law-English as official language.-Because this case was moot once initiating plaintiff left state employment, Ninth Circuit erred in considering whether Arizona State Constitution, which re- quires state business to be conducted exclusively in English, violates First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. Arizonans for Official English v. Ari- zona, p. 43. III. Commerce Clause. State property tax-Discrimination against charitable institutions operated principally for nonresidents.-An otherwise generally appli- cable state property tax violates Commerce Clause if its exemption for property owned by charitable institutions excludes organizations operated principally for nonresidents' benefit. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, p. 564. IV. Due Process. 1. Liberty interest-State preparole program-Procedural protec- tions.-Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Supervision Program for re- ducing overcrowding in its prisons was sufficiently like parole that a pro- gram participant was entitled to procedural protections of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, before he could be removed from program. Young v. Harper, p. 143. 2. Public employee's suspension-Notice and hearing requirement.- A State does not violate Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by failing to provide notice and a hearing before suspending a tenured public employee without pay. Gilbert v. Homar, p. 924. V. Freedom of Association. Elections-Multiple-party candidacies for elected office.-Minnesota laws forbidding an individual from appearing on an electoral ballot as candidate of more than one party, thus prohibiting multiple-party, or fusion, candidacies for elected office, do not violate First and Fourteenth Amendments. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, p. 351. 520IND Unit: $UBV [08-03-99 14:38:50] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume) 1334 INDEX CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued. VI. Freedom of Speech. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992- "Must-carry" provisions.-Because record supports Congress' judgment that Act's "must-carry" provisions are narrowly tailored to further im- portant Government interests, they satisfy First Amendment. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, p. 180. VII. Immunity from Suit. Separation of powers-Private action against President-Deferral of litigation.-Constitution does not afford President temporary immu- nity from civil damages litigation arising out of his unofficial conduct be- fore he took office, and separation of powers doctrine does not require federal courts to stay such litigation until President leaves office. Clinton v. Jones, p. 681. VIII. Right to Abortion. 1. Montana parental notification law-Judicial bypass provision.- Ninth Circuit's holding that Montana's Parental Notice of Abortion Act is unconstitutional because its judicial bypass provision does not suffi- ciently protect minors' right to have abortions is in direct conflict with this Court's precedents. Lambert v. Wicklund, p. 292. 2. Physician-only state law-Preliminary injunction.-Summary re- versal of Ninth Circuit's decision finding threshold showing for pre- liminary injunction against Montana's physician-only abortion law is ap- propriate where decision conflicts with this Court's precedents and law is unenforceable at present. Mazurek v. Armstrong, p. 968. IX. Searches and Seizures. 1. Candidates for state office-Drug tests.-Georgia's requirement that candidates for state office pass a drug test does not fit within suspicionless searches permitted under Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Chand- ler v. Miller, p. 305. 2. Knock and announce requirement-Felony drug investigations.- Fourth Amendment does not permit a blanket exception to "knock and announce" requirement for felony drug investigations, but facts in this case support police officers' decision not to knock and announce before entering petitioner's motel room. Richards v. Wisconsin, p. 385. COUNTY SHERIFFS AS POLICYMAKERS. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 1. "CRAM DOWN" OPTION. See Bankruptcy. 520IND Unit: $UBV [08-03-99 14:38:50] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1335 CRIMINAL LAW. See also Constitutional Law, IX, 2; Habeas Cor- pus; United States Sentencing Guidelines. 1. Drug-related firearms use-Mandatory prison term.-Plain lan- guage of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c) forbids a federal district court to direct that that section's mandatory 5-year prison term for drug-related firearms use run concurrently with any other prison term, whether state or federal. United States v. Gonzales, p. 1. 2. Perjury-Materiality.-A trial court's decision in a perjury case that materiality was an issue for judge, rather than jury, was not a plain error affecting substantial rights that can be noticed under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) even though no objection has been made. John- son v. United States, p. 461. 3. Plea agreement-Withdrawal before sentencing.-Where a federal court accepts a defendant's guilty plea, pursuant to a plea agreement, but defers decision on whether to accept plea agreement, defendant must have a fair and just reason under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e) to withdraw plea before sentencing. United States v. Hyde, p. 670. 4. Sexual assault by state judge-Deprivation of victims' liberty in- terest.-In reversing a state judge's 18 U. S. C. § 242 convictions for sex- ually assaulting women in violation of their due process right to liberty, Sixth Circuit erred in ruling that such a "right" must first be identified by this Court in a "fundamentally similar" case. United States v. La- nier, p. 259. DEFERRING LITIGATION AGAINST PRESIDENT. See Constitu- tional Law, VII. DEVELOPMENT OF PROPERTY. See Justiciability. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INTERSTATE COMMERCE. See Con- stitutional Law, III. DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING. See Voting Rights Act of 1965. DIVERSITY SUITS. See Supreme Court, 5. DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS. See Patent Law. DRUG-RELATED CRIMES. See Constitutional Law, IX, 2; United States Sentencing Guidelines. DRUG-RELATED FIREARMS USE. See Criminal Law, 1. DRUG TESTING. See Constitutional Law, IX, 1. DUE PROCESS. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 3; Constitutional Law, IV; Criminal Law, 4; Habeas Corpus, 2. 520IND Unit: $UBV [08-03-99 14:38:50] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume) 1336 INDEX ELECTORAL BALLOTS. See Constitutional Law, V. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974. 1. ERISA-funded medical centers-Imposition of state gross receipts tax.-Section 514(a) of ERISA does not preclude New York from impos- ing a tax, called Health Facility Assessment, on ERISA-funded centers. De Buono v. NYSA­ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, p. 806. 2. Interference with attainment of rights under plan.-Section 510 of ERISA, which prohibits discharge of a plan participant in order to interfer with attainment of any right to which participant may become entitled under plan, is not limited to interference with vested rights. Inter-Modal Rail Employees Assn. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., p. 510. 3. Pre-emption of state law-Testamentary transfer of pension bene- fits.-ERISA pre-empts a Louisiana law allowing a nonparticipant spouse to transfer by testamentary instrument a community property interest in undistributed pension plan benefits. Boggs v. Boggs, p. 833. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES. See Constitutional Law, II; IV, 2; Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 2. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973. Federal reclamation project-Standing to challenge biological opin- ion.-Petitioners, irrigation districts receiving water from a federal rec- lamation project and operators of ranches in those districts, had stand- ing to challenge a biological opinion, issued by Fish and Wildlife Service in accordance with Act, concerning project's operation and impact on en- dangered fish species. Bennett v. Spear, p. 154. ENGLISH AS OFFICIAL LANGUAGE. See Constitutional Law, II. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW. See Endangered Species Act of 1973. EQUIVALENT PRODUCTS. See Patent Law. ESTATE TAXES. See Taxes, 1. EVIDENCE SUPPRESSION. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 1. EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 2. FAIR TRIAL. See Habeas Corpus, 2. FALSE CLAIMS ACT. Retroactive application of amendment.-A 1986 amendment to Act does not apply retroactively to qui tam suits regarding allegedly false claims submitted prior to its enactment. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, p. 939. 520IND Unit: $UBV [08-03-99 14:38:50] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1337 FEDERAL QUESTIONS. See Supreme Court, 7. FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE. Amendments to Rules, p. 1285. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. Amendments to Rules, p. 1305. FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. See also Criminal Law, 2, 3. Amendments to Rules, p. 1313. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE. Amendments to Rules, p. 1323. FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS. See Appeals; Supreme Court, 5. FEDERAL TAXES. See Taxes, 1. FIREARMS USE. See Criminal Law, 1. FIRST AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, II; V; VI. FIRST-DEGREE MURDER. See Habeas Corpus, 1. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE. See Endangered Species Act of 1973. FLORIDA. See Habeas Corpus, 1. FORCIBLE ENTRIES. See Constitutional Law, IX, 2. FORECLOSURE VALUE OF PROPERTY. See Bankruptcy. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, IV; V; IX; Criminal Law, 4. FOURTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, IX. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION. See Constitutional Law, V. FREEDOM OF SPEECH. See Constitutional Law, II; VI. FUSION CANDIDACIES FOR ELECTED OFFICE. See Constitu- tional Law, V. GEORGIA. See Constitutional Law, IX, 1. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES. See Constitutional Law, II. GROSS RECEIPTS TAXES. See Employee Retirement Income Secu- rity Act of 1974, 1. 520IND Unit: $UBV [08-03-99 14:38:50] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume) 1338 INDEX GVR ORDER. See Supreme Court, 5. HABEAS CORPUS. 1. New rule-Capital murder-Sentencing.-The rule announced in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U. S. 1079 (per curiam)-that if a sentencing judge in a "weighing" State is required to give deference to a jury's ad- visory sentencing recommendation, neither jury nor judge is constitution- ally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances-is a "new rule" as defined in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, and thus, a state prisoner whose first-degree murder conviction became final before Espinosa was decided is foreclosed from relying on that decision in a federal habeas proceeding. Lambrix v. Singletary, p. 518. 2. Rule 6(a)-Good cause-Denial of a fair trial.-Petitioner had good cause, under Habeas Rule 6(a), to conduct discovery to prove that he was denied a fair trial under Due Process Clause by a judge who wanted him convicted to hide fact that judge was taking bribes in other murder cases. Bracy v. Gramley, p. 899. HEALTH FACILITY ASSESSMENT. See Employee Retirement In- come Security Act of 1974, 1. IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. See Appeals; Constitutional Law, VII. INDIAN COURTS. See Jurisdiction. INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS UNDER FEDERAL STATUTES. See Social Security Act. IN FORMA PAUPERIS. See Supreme Court, 6. INFRINGEMENT ON PATENTS. See Patent Law. INJUNCTIONS. See Constitutional Law, VIII, 2. INSTRUMENTALITIES OF UNITED STATES. See Taxes, 2. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS. See Appeals. INTERSTATE COMMERCE. See Constitutional Law, III. INVENTIONS. See Patent Law. IRRIGATION PROJECTS. See Endangered Species Act of 1973. JONES ACT. Seaman-Painter on a tug.-Record in this case would not permit a reasonable jury to conclude that respondent was a seaman under Jones Act when he was injured while painting one of petitioner's tugs. Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, p. 548. 520IND Unit: $UBV [08-03-99 14:38:50] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1339 JUDICIAL BIAS. See Habeas Corpus, 2. JUDICIAL BYPASS OF PARENTAL NOTIFICATION LAWS. See Con- stitutional Law, VIII, 1. JURISDICTION. Tribal courts-Personal injury actions-Defendants are not tribal members.-When an accident occurs on a public highway maintained by a State under a federally granted right-of-way over Indian reservation land, a tort suit against allegedly negligent nonmembers may not be brought in tribal court absent congressional authorization. Strate v. A­1 Contractors, p. 438. JUSTICIABILITY. See also Constitutional Law, II. Ripeness for adjudication-Regulatory taking of property.-Petition- er's claim-that respondent land use agency's denial of her request to build on her lot constitutes a taking of land without just compensation-is ripe for adjudication despite her failure to try to sell development rights that run with land. Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, p. 725. KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE RULE. See Constitutional Law, IX, 2. LIBERTY INTEREST. See Constitutional Law, IV, 1; Criminal Law, 4. LOUISIANA. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 3. MARITAL ESTATE TAX DEDUCTION. See Taxes, 1. MARITIME EMPLOYEE. See Jones Act. MARYLAND. See Supreme Court, 5. MAXIMUM TERM OF IMPRISONMENT. See United States Sen- tencing Guidelines. MEDICAL CENTERS. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 1. MINNESOTA. See Constitutional Law, V. MISSISSIPPI. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 1. MONTANA. See Constitutional Law, VIII. MOOTNESS. See Constitutional Law, II. MULTIPLE-PARTY CANDIDACIES FOR ELECTED OFFICE. See Constitutional Law, V. 520IND Unit: $UBV [08-03-99 14:38:50] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume) 1340 INDEX MUNICIPALITY LIABILITY. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 2. MURDER. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 1; Habeas Corpus. MUST-CARRY REQUIREMENTS FOR CABLE TELEVISION. See Constitutional Law, VI. NEW RULES. See Habeas Corpus, 1. NEW YORK. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 1. OKLAHOMA. See Constitutional Law, IV, 1. PARENTAL NOTICE OF ABORTION ACT. See Constitutional Law, VIII, 1. PARENTS AND CHILDREN. See Constitutional Law, VIII, 1; Social Security Act. PAROLE. See Constitutional Law, IV, 1. PATENT LAW. Infringement-"Doctrine of equivalents."-Doctrine-under which a product or process that does not literally infringe upon a patent claim's express terms may be found to infringe if there is equivalence between elements of accused product or process and claimed elements of patented invention-is affirmed substantially as it was set out in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U. S. 605. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., p. 17. PENSION BENEFITS. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 2, 3. PERJURY. See Criminal Law, 2. PERSONAL INJURY LAWSUITS. See Jurisdiction. PHYSICIAN-ONLY ABORTION LAWS. See Constitutional Law, VIII, 2. PLAIN ERROR. See Criminal Law, 2. PLEA AGREEMENTS. See Criminal Law, 3. POLICYMAKERS. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 1. PRECLEARANCE OF VOTING CHANGES. See Voting Rights Act of 1965. PRE-EMPTION OF STATE LAW. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 3. 520IND Unit: $UBV [08-03-99 14:38:50] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1341 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS. See Constitutional Law, VIII, 2. PREPAROLE PROGRAMS. See Constitutional Law, IV, 1. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. See Constitutional Law, VII. PRISON DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 3. PRISON TERMS. See Criminal Law, 1. PRIVATE ACTIONS AGAINST PRESIDENT. See Constitutional Law, VII. PRODUCT LIABILITY. See Admiralty. PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT. See Justiciability. PROPERTY TAXES. See Constitutional Law, III. PUBLIC EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES. See Constitutional Law, IV, 2. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY. See Appeals. QUI TAM SUITS. See False Claims Act. REAL ESTATE TAXES. See Constitutional Law, III. RECLAMATION PROJECTS. See Endangered Species Act of 1973. REGULATORY TAKING OF PROPERTY. See Justiciability. REPETITIOUS FILINGS. See Supreme Court, 6. REPLACEMENT VALUE OF PROPERTY. See Bankruptcy. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL ACTS. See False Claims Act. RIGHT TO ABORTION. See Constitutional Law, VIII. RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL. See Habeas Corpus, 2. RIGHT TO FILE SUIT. See Social Security Act. RIGHT TO LIBERTY. See Constitutional Law, IV, 1; Criminal Law, 4. RIGHT TO NOTICE AND A HEARING. See Constitutional Law, IV, 2. RIGHT TO VOTE. See Voting Rights Act of 1965. 520IND Unit: $UBV [08-03-99 14:38:50] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume) 1342 INDEX RIPENESS FOR ADJUDICATION. See Justiciability. SEAMAN. See Jones Act. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. See Constitutional Law, IX. SECRETARY OF TREASURY. See Constitutional Law, I. SECTION 1983. See Appeals; Civil Rights Act of 1871. SENTENCING. See Criminal Law, 1, 3; Habeas Corpus, 1; United States Sentencing Guidelines. SEPARATION OF POWERS. See Constitutional Law, VII. SEXUAL ASSAULT BY STATE OFFICIAL. See Criminal Law, 4. SHERIFFS AS POLICYMAKERS. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 1. SHIPS' DEFECTIVE EQUIPMENT. See Admiralty. SOCIAL SECURITY ACT. State child support enforcement programs-Federal right to enforce program requirements.-Title IV­D of Act, which sets forth require- ments for federally funded state child support enforcement programs, does not give individuals a federal right to force a state agency to sub- stantially comply with those requirements. Blessing v. Freestone, p. 329. STANDING TO SUE. See Endangered Species Act of 1973. STATE TAXES. See Constitutional Law, III; Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 1; Taxes. STATUTORY SENTENCE ENHANCEMENTS. See United States Sentencing Guidelines. SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 1. SUPREME COURT. 1. Amendments to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, p. 1285. 2. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, p. 1305. 3. Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, p. 1313. 4. Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence, p. 1323. 5. Diversity suit-Order granting certiorari petition, vacating judg- ment, and remanding (GVR).-In this diversity case, where soundness of Fourth Circuit's holding has been called into question by Maryland's high court, it is appropriate for this Court to issue a GVR order. Lords 520IND Unit: $UBV [08-03-99 14:38:50] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume) INDEX 1343 SUPREME COURT-Continued. Landing Village Condominium Council of Unit Owners v. Continental Ins. Co., p. 893. 6. In forma pauperis-Repetitious filings.-Abusive filer is denied in forma pauperis status on this and further noncriminal certiorari peti- tions. In re Vey, p. 303; Vey v. Clinton, p. 937. 7. Writ of certiorari-Dismissal.-Because Alabama Supreme Court did not address federal issue on which certiorari was granted-whether trial court's approval of a class and a settlement agreement without afford- ing class members right to exclude themselves violated due process- and it is now apparent that petitioners have failed to establish that they properly presented issue to that court, writ is dismissed as improvidently granted. Adams v. Robertson, p. 83. SUSPENSION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES. See Constitutional Law, IV, 2. SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES. See Constitutional Law, IX, 1. TAKING OF PROPERTY. See Justiciability. TAXES. See also Constitutional Law, III; Employee Retirement In- come Security Act of 1974, 1. 1. Federal estate taxes-Reduction of marital and charitable deduc- tions.-Court of Appeals' decision that taxpayer did not have to reduce estate tax deduction for marital or charitable bequests to extent adminis- tration expenses were paid from income generated during administration by assets allocated to those bequests is affirmed. Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, p. 93. 2. Tax Injunction Act-Application to instrumentalities of United States.-United States instrumentalities do not, by virtue of that designa- tion alone, have same right as United States to avoid Act's restriction on federal courts' power to prevent collection or enforcement of state taxes. Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Central Ark., p. 821. TAX INJUNCTION ACT. See Taxes, 2. TELEVISION. See Constitutional Law, VI. TEMPORARY IMMUNITY. See Constitutional Law, VII. TESTAMENTARY TRANSFERS. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 3. TREASURY SECRETARY. See Constitutional Law, I. TRIBAL COURTS. See Jurisdiction. UNANNOUNCED ENTRIES. See Constitutional Law, IX, 2. 520IND Unit: $UBV [08-03-99 14:38:50] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume) 1344 INDEX UNITED STATES INSTRUMENTALITIES. See Taxes, 2. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES. Imposition of maximum term-Consideration of statutory sentence enhancement.-An amendment to Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.1 commen- tary, precluding a District Court from considering a statutory sentence enhancement in imposing "maximum term" on a career drug- or violent- crime offender, is inconsistent with 28 U. S. C. § 994(h)'s plain language, which directs Sentencing Commission to assure that Guidelines specify a prison sentence "at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of adult offenders who commit their third felony drug offense or violent crime." United States v. LaBonte, p. 751. VALUATION OF PROPERTY. See Bankruptcy. VESTING. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 2. VIOLENT CRIMES. See United States Sentencing Guidelines. VOTER REGISTRATION ACT OF 1993. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 1. VOTING DISCRIMINATION. See Voting Rights Act of 1965. VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965. 1. Preclearance-Changes in voting registration system.-Mississippi must preclear under § 5 of Act changes it made in its voter registration system in order to comply with National Voter Registration Act of 1993. Young v. Fordice, p. 273. 2. Violation of § 2 as reason to deny § 5 preclearance.-Preclearance under § 5 of Act may not be denied solely on basis that a new voting standard, practice, or procedure violates § 2 of Act, but § 2 evidence may be relevant to § 5 inquiry. Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., p. 471. WATER PROJECTS. See Endangered Species Act of 1973. WELFARE BENEFIT PLANS. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 2. WORDS AND PHRASES. 1. "At or near the maximum term authorized for categories of adult offenders who commit their third felony drug offense or violent crime." 28 U. S. C. § 994(h). United States v. LaBonte, p. 751. 2. "The sentence . . . under this subsection [shall not] run concur- rently with any other term of imprisonment." 18 U. S. C. § 924(c). United States v. Gonzales, p. 1. WRITS OF CERTIORARI. See Supreme Court, 5, 6, 7.