Text File

Subject: RISKS DIGEST 14.37 REPLY-TO: risks@csl.sri.com

RISKS-LIST: RISKS-FORUM Digest Thursday 4 March 1993 Volume 14 : Issue 37

FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

Contents: Power Outage Locks Up Jail System (Jennifer Smith) Hacker disables cancer database (Jonathan Bowen) Smells like Green Spirit... (Jeffrey S. Sorensen) Evacuation plan, generators fail in World Trade Center blast (Jay Elinsky) Bank account problems (Jeremy Epstein) The White House Communication Project (Shellie Emmons via David Daniels) Re: your permanent record (Richard A. Schumacher) New York Telephone's newest dis-service (Jeffrey S. Sorensen) Phone Company Writes to a Public Telephone (Warren via Mark Brader) Cohen/Radatti on Unix and Viruses (Pete Radatti) London Ambulance Service - the Report (Brian Randell) Bank machine glitch leaves users poorer, but empty-handed (Randal Schwartz) Does Publisher's Clearinghouse Use Information America? (Jane Beckman)

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Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 19:59:44 CST From: Jennifer Smith <jds@hardy.math.okstate.edu> Subject: Power Outage Locks Up Jail System

NEW SOFTWARE FAILS TO FIX JAIL'S COMPUTER SYSTEM, by Judy Kuhlman, Daily Oklahoman, 26 Feb 1993

An attempt by Oklahoma County officials to fix their troubled jail's malfunctioning computer system failed Thursday. Prisoners remained locked inside their cells for the fourth consecutive day in the $54 million, 12-story jail that opened in November 1991, Oklahoma County Sherrif J.D. Sharp said. "Everything is just like it was. The computers are still down. We have an open facility. Some doors are locked open and others are locked closed, both inside and outside the facility," Sharp said. Twenty-two jailers were trapped from 10 am to 6:30 pm Monday inside a jail control room when the controlling computer shut down following a five-minute power outage. Guards since then have been manually opening and closing the prisoners' cell doors, Sharp said. Computer software purchased by jail officials at a cost of $4,836 and installed Thursday did not fix the jail's problems, Capt. James Rouse said. Oklahoma County commissioners had an emergency meeting Wednesday to approve the purchase of that computer diagnostic equipment and to consider additional equipment needed to deal with the county's latest jail crisis. Officials were not certain what caused the computers to shut down, Oklahoma County engineer Ted McCourry said. "We're taking it one step at a time. But every time we round one corner, we run into another problem. Slowly but surely we're getting it back. But we will still need outside help," Rouse said. The technician who built the computer system is supposed to fly into OKlahoma City from Denver today to assess the problem and recommend a solution, Sharp said. "I'm extremely frustrated. I have never seen anything like it. It is a real touchy situation here," Sharp said. Sharp said there was no danger of prisoners escaping. "We have called in extra people and are taking extra precautions which I cannot talk about at this time," Sharp said. Commissioners have also authorized the purchasing agent to immediately go out for bids for a power-surge protector, expected to cost about $80,000, to prevent electrical surges and a battery back-up system for the computers that could cost an estimated $500,000. McCourry said the power-surge protector and back-up system was never included in the original jail plans and specifications. Commissioner Shirley Darrel asked the purchasing agent to find out who took the surge protector out of the specifications and why it was taken out in the first place. Sharp has said the problems might have been averted if the county jail had been provided with a back-up system or a power-surge protector. McCourry said the jail has a back-up generator to supply power in the advent of a power outage. The computer back-up system would act as a third source of power for computers. County Clerk John Garvey has also suggested the sheriff hire a full-time computer expert.

[This is, I believe, the same "escape-proof" jail that had 2 escapees within a month of its becoming operational. Having computer-controlled doors with not even a surge protector, not to mention no one in the state running the system, is unfortunately quite typical. Jennifer Smith jds@math.okstate.edu]

[We previously reported the effects of a failure of automatic jail-doors in El Dorado, California, in 1988. PGN]

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Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 14:16:52 GMT From: Jonathan.Bowen@prg.ox.ac.uk Subject: Hacker disables cancer database

Following is an abridgement [by JB and PGN] of an article that appeared in the Home News section (page 4) of the Guardian newspaper in the UK on 25 Feb 1993:

A schoolboy computer hacker caused chaos when he dialed into a vital database at a Brussels-based centre for cancer research and treatment. Paul Bedworth allegedly ran a rogue program that generated 50,000 phone calls, and caused the computer system at the European Organisation for the Research and Treatment of Cancer to "crash". In the process, Mr. Dedworth, now 19 and a student of artificial intelligence at Edinburgh university, left the centre with a 10,000 pound [c. US$14,000] phone bill. His trial is in progress.

Jonathan Bowen, Oxford University Computing Laboratory

[A Reuters story noted by "Mich Kabay / JINBU Corp." <75300.3232@compuserve.com> says Bedworth also broke into the British Telecom telephone network, a Lloyds Bank computer, and the Financial Times of London. PGN]

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Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1993 14:42:03 GMT From: sorenj@rpi.edu (Jeffrey S. Sorensen) Subject: Smells like Green Spirit... Reply-To: sorensen@spl.ecse.rpi.edu

In the Jan/Feb issue of _Health_ magazine p. 53:

Talk About Paying Through the Nose

Bill-collection agencies in England began lacing their invoices with a product containing androstenone, a chemical secreted from men's armpits and groins that is known to be a sex attractant in some species. In one preliminary study, mailed invoices treated with the product resulted in a 14 percent higher payment rate than untreated bills.

and from the Art of User Interface design:

The Less Care She Got, The Less She Cared

A patient in Manchester Royal Infirmary in England was found unconscious after she mixed up the nurse's call button with the one to give herself more painkiller and pressed the latter button impatiently for several minutes.

Jeffrey Sorensen sorensen@ecse.rpi.edu

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Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 20:43:30 EST From: "Jay Elinsky" <elinsky@watson.ibm.com> Subject: Evacuation plan, generators fail in World Trade Center blast

The New York Times, in its morning-after coverage of yesterday's huge explosion in the World Trade Center garage in downtown Manhattan, reported that the blast destroyed the complex's operations center and severed cooling lines for the emergency generators. The result was that there was no organized leadership in evacuating 50,000 people down the stairwells of the 110-story twin towers, and the ventilation system was unable to suck out smoke. As of tonight, the toll stands at 5 killed, 2 missing, and over 1,000 injured.

The former director of the agency that runs the center said that studies in the mid-80's showed it could withstand a car bomb. "'They said you could sustain a car bomb', he said. 'What they didn't tell us was you couldn't sustain it if it was perfectly placed.'"

Jay Elinsky, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY

[NOTE ADDED 1 MAR 1993: Maybe my submission was a bit hasty. Today's Times says that the Port Authority *did* know in 1985 that a car bomb could disable building systems, but they decided not to implement the recommended changes because of the expense. Jay]

[An old story, eh? Security is almost always considered too expensive until AFTER the disaster. An 3 March 1993 AP report suggests that that the closure would last for at least a month, and the city of NY speculated that the "initial disruption is costing $100 million daily" with second-order costs per day increasing daily. PGN]

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Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 09:39:04 EST From: epstein@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Jeremy Epstein) Subject: Bank account problems

According to a Washington Post article last week, the Resolution Trust Corporation [the federal agency charged with cleaning up failed savings & loans] generated incorrect data on Form 1099s [that's the form that tells the Internal Revenue Service how much interest you earned for the year, so you pay tax on it].

According to the article, there have been some serious glitches, including a woman whose 1099 reported $152,000 in interest, rather than the $3,000 she actually earned. Other statements were off by a factor of 100 or more. According to the article, the IRS was not sent the erroneous figure, although about 2000 customers of the failed Trustbank received incorrect notices.

The error occurred because "of a computer tape mishap" according to an RTC spokesman. No further details on the mishap were provided.

As more and more data is submitted to the IRS electronically, and the IRS does more and more electronic cross-checking, it's easy to see how people could have received automatic dunning notices for underreporting their income, had the erroneous data been sent to the IRS. I wonder whether the IRS's analysis software (or auditors) would have noticed that for many people, the amount of interest reported was highly unlikely given their historical tax data and income.

Jeremy Epstein, Trusted X Research Group, TRW Systems Division Fairfax Virginia +1 703/803-4947 epstein@trwacs.fp.trw.com

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Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 16:25 GMT From: David Daniels <0004381897@mcimail.com> Subject: The White House Communication Project

FYI... HERE'S SOME GRIST FOR THE MILL!

>Date: Tue, 23 Feb 1993 22:55:18 GMT >Sender: Computers and Society ARPA Digest <COMSOC-L@AUVM.BITNET> >From: Shellie Emmons <sme46782@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu> >Organization: University of Illinois >Subject: The White House Communication Project > >I am currently involved in a research project that is trying to aid the >Clinton Administration in making effective use of computer-mediated >communication to stay "in touch" with the public. Our coordinator has >gotten in touch with Jack Gill, Director of Electronic Publishing and >Public Access Electronic Mail for the Clinton Administration, and he >(Gill) has embraced the efforts of the research group to lend a helping >hand to this task. Some questions he has posed to the researchers include >the following: > > (1) When you get thousands of messages a day, how do you > respond effectively? > (2) How do you make a public e-mail system inclusive > and accessible? > (3) What would happen if e-mail became the primary > mode of(mediated) access to government? > >We would appreciate any insights and suggestions of possible solutions to >these questions. > >Shellie Emmons sme46782@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu

[Respond to Shellie. I sent a noted several weeks ago to Jack Gill, but have heard nothing. I presume he is absolutely swamped. PGN]

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Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1993 02:43:22 GMT From: schumach@convex.com (Richard A. Schumacher) Subject: Re: your permanent record

Forwarded to protect another's privacy.

>Some weeks ago, conversation on AFU turned to the existence of >'permanent records' for grade school and high school students. >It turns out that the state of OHIO has been keeping computerized >records of Ohio primary and secondary students. The local paper >has exposed this mess in the past week. I quote from the >_Columbus Dispatch_:

> Virtually all school districts are sending 93 categories of > information about each of Ohio's 1.8 million primary and > secondary school students to 25 regional data centers.

> The information is linked to a student identification > number, which the state says should be the student's social > security number. The computer data include test scores, > disciplinary action, medical details including pregnancy, > race, handicaps and family income. [...] > Princeton [a Cincinnati HS] supplies the state with > statistics that do not identify students, but has never > given information linked to names or identification numbers. > As a result, the state has threatened to cut off the > district's funding, beginning with it's April payment of > about $288,000.

> Princeton and other school are suing the state based on the > Federal Privacy Act. [...] > Many districts don't even tell parents or students they are > sending information about students to the state.

>[many sordid details deleted for brevity]

>Ohio has also kept a database of accusations of child abuse >with 200,000 names on it. Ohio's population is about >11,000,000. It was, until recently, impossible to find out >if you were on the list, and who accused you, and impossible >to get your name removed. If you worry at all about due >process, facing your accuser, etc., don't bother to move here.

>I considered posting this information to COMP.RISKS or >COMP.SECURITY.PRIVACY, but I didn't care to be "Jolted" by the FBI or CIA.

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Date: Mon, 1 Mar 1993 19:50:09 GMT From: sorenj@rpi.edu (Jeffrey S. Sorensen) Subject: New York Telephone's newest dis-service

In the Feb '93 "Hello" notice distributed with our monthly phone bill is an informative little piece about CIRCUIT 9(sm) This service "allows business subscribers to identify a caller's ``billing'' telephone number, even if the number is not published in the telephone directory."

CIRCUIT 9 services are assigned to 910 exchanges in the 212 and 718 area codes, 920 elsewhere in NY State, and 880 in area code 900. Note that the CIRCUIT 9 exchange 880 is actually a fee-per-call 900, which have long had the ability to receive calling number information.

Here's the juicy section:

There are important limitations on the ways in which businesses that obtain your phone number through CIRCUIT 9 Service may use this information. For example, they may use your number to route or screen calls, or to obtain billing information about your account with them.

However, subject to certain exceptions [?!], businesses that obtain your phone number through CIRCUIT 9 Service may not use your number to establish telemarketing lists or to conduct outgoing telemarketing calls without your consent. [!?]

If you believe a business has misused the information they obtained through CIRCUIT 9 Service, you may call a special toll-free number. Call 1-800-729-8924 Monday through Friday 9am to 5pm.

The notice goes on to tell you that you can have these calls blocked by calling you service representative, but doing so will also block exchanges 394, 540, 550, 970, and 976 and the area codes 700 and 900. I guess privacy is an all or nothing...

Further, the notice ends stating "Because CIRCUIT 9 service uses a different technology [?] from Call ID, the restrict options [mandated by the PSC] (per-call and all-call restrict) used to prevent number delivery through Call ID cannot be used to prevent number delivery through CIRCUIT 9 service."

I am beyond confused at this point. What do they mean "certain exceptions?" What constitutes my "consent?" It almost seems NY Tel is admitting they have had an utter disregard for our privacy in the past and are just writing us to say they will continue in the same vein in the future.

I wonder what horrible punishments will rain down upon and business that I report to their 800 number...

Jeffrey Sorensen sorensen@spl.ecse.rpi.edu

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Date: Tue, 2 Mar 1993 01:49:00 -0500 From: msb@sq.com (Mark Brader) Subject: Phone Company Writes to a Public Telephone

warren@itexjct.jct.ac.il writes in comp.dcom.telecom:

> The August 14 edition of Yerushalaim (a Jerusalem local newspaper) > contains a copy of a letter that Bezeq, the Israeli telco, mailed to a > phone booth which it owns. > > The form letter is addressed to "Bezeq, Inc." at the address at which > the phone booth is located (155 Costa Rica Street), and informs the > subscriber that while in the past, its bill was computed by reading a > meter, which made it impossible to obtain a listing of calls made, > this will now be possible (at a fee, of course, something that Bezeq > did not mention to the phone booth). > > The letter-carrier delivered the letter by placing it inside the phone > booth. > > Bezeq responded that the program that sends out mailings will be > corrected. The phone booth was unavailable for comment.

Mark Brader, SoftQuad Inc., Toronto, utzoo!sq!msb, msb@sq.com

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Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 14:16:47 EST From: radatti@cyber.com (Pete Radatti) Subject: Cohen/Radatti on Unix and Viruses

The widely circulated paper by J. David Thompson entitled "Why Unix is Immune to Computer Viruses" has been attracting controversy. Due to this controversy and the concern that this paper may be providing a false sense of security to the Unix community, Doctor Fredrick B. Cohen and Peter V. Radatti have published refuting papers. These papers are too long to post here, however they are available upon request. Make your request by fax, email or post and copies can be returned by fax or post. Email copies are not available.

Address post to: Peter V. Radatti, C/O CyberSoft, 210 West 12th Avenue Conshohocken, PA. 19428 USA

FAX requests to: +1 (215) 825-6785

Email requests to: radatti@cyber.com

Thank You, Peter V. Radatti

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Date: Sat, 27 Feb 1993 10:21:29 GMT From: Brian.Randell@newcastle.ac.uk Subject: London Ambulance Service - the Report

On Friday 26 February the UK national newspaper The Independent covered the just-released report on the London Ambulance Service debacle very fully - it was the main story on the front page (entitled "Report Prompts Departure of Ambulance Boss"), with three more stories taking up a significant fraction of page 3. These are entitled "Manager's `created an atmosphere of mistrust'", "[Secretary of State for Health] Bottomley condemns `catalogue of errors'", and "Father grieved for asthmatic son who died in his arms". The first of these three has the most detail, and is quoted below in its entirety.

Brian Randell

==========

The London Ambulance Service Crisis

MANAGERS "CREATED AN ATMOSPHERE" OF MISTRUST, By Susan Watts, Technology Correspondent, The Independent, 26 February 1993

It would be hard to paint a more damning picture of failed management than that which emerged from the inquiry into the London Ambulance Service yesterday. The report said that the LAS management "created an atmosphere of mistrust" with its over-aggressive style, born in part out of the desperation to put right decades of poor performance.

The LAS made "virtually every mistake in the book" when implementing its "ambitious" (pounds)1.5m computer system, one of the three-strong inquiry team said. The computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system was seen as the only hope the service had to put right its poor response times in dealing with emergency calls. But the software was "not complete, not properly tuned, and not fully tested", the report said.

The inquiry team was set up after the CAD system broke down on 26 and 27 October last year, then collapsed a second time on 4 November, forcing controllers to revert to pen and paper to dispatch ambulances.

Managers took a high risk, "misguided" decision to have the CAD system up and running in one phase. The system was developed and installed in "an impossible timetable", the report said. The final system had known technical problems, and the people who would have to use it were not properly trained to do so. The team concluded that LAS management ignored advice to this effect "from many outside sources".

One of the team members, Paul Williams, said management had concentrated on getting the best price for its computer system rather than one which would be best for the job. He said he would have expected a system of this kind to have cost at least twice as much as the LAS computer. The report said there was "no evidence of key questions being asked about why the [final] bid was substantially lower than other bidders". The report questioned the apparent lack of accountability within the service itself, and upwards to managers at regional level. This was exacerbated by the LAS operating at arm's length from its health authority, which meant it was not subject to checks from regional managers.

The team said that although the computer system did what it was supposed to do, the design had "fatal flaws" that together would lead to all the symptoms of a systems failure. It found that System Options, the software company which supplied the system, had never before dealt with a system this large and complex. "We believe that they [the software supplier] rapidly found themselves in a situation where they were out of their depth.

The team believes that some parts of the failed software system can be salvaged, although chunks of the applications software may need to be substantially rewritten.

The report refutes earlier statements from the LAS that the two disastrous days in October had been exceptionally busy. The number of calls was in fact only a little above average. It was only when ambulances failed to arrive, and duplicate calls came in, when things got out of hand.

LAS board members appeared to have been given a "misleading impression" about progress with the computer system and regional members seemed to have been given even less of an idea what was going on within LAS.

Last year's crisis prompted the resignation of John Wilby, the chief executive of the service. Yesterday, South West Regional Health Authority revealed that it had already decided to remove Mr Wilby from his post, having first raised fears over his performance at a meeting with him six months before the computer breakdown.

Jim Harris, LAS chairman, denied that this might have put pressure on Mr Wilby to produce results. But the report concluded that "an important factor was almost certainly the culture within LAS of `fear of failure'."

Professor Marion Hicks, the health authority's chairman, said Mr Wilby was given a limited time to improve, but by mid-October "the decision had been taken to terminate his contract". This would have gone ahead in November if the LAS board had not been taken over [sic] by events, and Mr Wilby's voluntary resignation.

Non-executive LAS board members who remain are Roddy Braithwaite, Victor Paige, Mary Spinks, Janet Preston and Stephen Miles. The executive committee comprises Martin Gorham (chief executive), Alan Kennedy (acting director of operations), Simon Young (director of finance) and Bernadette el-Hadidy (director of human resources). [Ends]

The front page story leads with a report that the chairman of the LAS, Jim Harris has resigned, and repeats the union claim that up to 20 deaths resulted from ambulance delays, but states that this allegation is hotly denied by management, adding that: "Yesterday's document shies away from linking deaths directly with ambulance delays caused by the computer crash. It said an examination of 26 cases at coroners courts since November 1991 showed that the LAS had not been blamed for a single death. Two cases are outstanding."

Dept. of Computing Science, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, UK Brian.Randell@newcastle.ac.uk +44 91 222 7923 FAX +44 91 222 8232

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Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 12:37:14 -0500 From: Randal Schwartz <merlyn@ora.com> Subject: Bank machine glitch leaves users poorer, but empty-handed

>From The Oregonian, Sunday, 28 Feb 93:

Bank machine glitch leaves users poorer, but empty-handed

For thousands of people last week, automatic tellers charge their accounts without dispensing money

>From staff and wire reports

Customers who used an automatic teller machine in U.S. Bank's Exchange system Thursday morning may want to take a close look at their next monthly statement to make sure everything adds up.

Thousands of Oregon ATM users who tried to withdraw money between 4 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. Thursday came up empty-handed, even though the machine's faulty computer software subtracted the money from their accounts anyway. A U.S. Bank spokeswoman assured that all accounts would be corrected by Tuesday.

Mary Ruble, corporate spokeswoman for the Portland-based company, said the bank has what is called a redundant computer system that keeps track of all transactions and has passed the information to all banks who have customers who have been affected.

Ruble said Saturday that 18,000 transactions in Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Nevada and California were affected Thursday.

"We are aware of the problem but we haven't been able to clear them all up yet," Ruble said."We've shifted people from other responsibilities to speed up the correction process."

John Kresge, vice president and manager of the U_S_ Bank's ATM network, said the problem started when the bank was modifying the software in its main computer in Portland. The computer links U.S. Bank with The Exchange, a huge electronic clearinghouse that coordinates ATM deposits and withdrawals for customers of banks throughout the Northwest.

The glitch affected only non-U.S. Bank customers who tried to make transactions from U.S. Bank's ATM machines, Kresge said. It is not known which banks were affected the most.

To safeguard from any account discrepencies [sic], Ruble recommends that ATM users keep their receipts and compare them with their monthly statements. Problems should be reported to the customers' individual banks.

Kresge said all accounts will be properly credited, whether or not customers noticed the problem.

"I hope there isn't too much anxiety out there," Kresge said. "I am certain each one of those transactions will be reversed. We have an army of people looking at it. They are manually going through all the transactions and making corrections and reversing any charges that may have occurred."

Randal L. Schwartz / Stonehenge Consulting Services (503)777-0095 merlyn@ora.com (semi-permanent)

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Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 18:02:49 PST From: jane@stratus.swdc.stratus.com (Jane Beckman) Subject: Does Publisher's Clearinghouse Use Information America?

I read the article on "Information America" with great interest, as it would explain a great deal of things that have bothered me, wondering how certain individuals got particular information.

In the first instance, we received a phone call from a law enforcement agency looking for a "Mark Frates." This individual has become known to us, as arrest warrants, letters from lawyers, etc. have arrived on a regular basis, to be returned "Not here." Since his last name matches the previous owners' name, we assume he (and his several aliases) is their son. But HOW, I wondered, did they get OUR phone number? We moved into a house formerly owned by his parents, but our phone number was not connected to the Frates. Apparently, someone has used this, or a similar, service, trying to track this guy down.

But the most worrying piece of mail came from the lowly Publisher's Clearing House. It was the standard hype, with "you may be the winner..." and all, but it had a worrying piece of personalization. "Although you have not ordered anything from us since 1982..." In the time in between, my husband had moved five times, and had not even renewed the original subscription. Somehow, Publisher's Clearinghouse had tracked him across the country, and from Washington State to California, through the course of several moves, and had paired him with a magazine subscription from ten years before. Impressive tracking capability for a junk mailer! Especially one who, by implication, must have files on most of the residents of the U.S. Imagine what someone with more interest in you could do...

Jane Beckman [jane@swdc.stratus.com]

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End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 14.37 ************************