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precedence: bulk Subject: Risks Digest 19.92

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Tuesday 18 August 1998 Volume 19 : Issue 92

FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks) ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. ***** This issue is archived at http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/19.92.html and at ftp.sri.com/risks/ .

Contents: Computer flaw makes water undrinkable (David Ratner) The Bloatware Debate (Edupage) Y2K: Warehousing systems (David Alan Gilbert) L.A. school district accused of software piracy (Edupage) Cryptanalysis of Frog, an AES Candidate (Bruce Schneier) A legal way to export crypto code: in English (Jay Ball) Risks of agents (Paul van Keep) Geocities: privacy, promises, and regulation (PGN) Tracking activity on the Web (Edupage) Microsoft self-extracting files risks (Conrad W. Clark) Re: Win98 H24 problem, not Yx (Scot E. Wilcoxon) Re: Global War[m|n|p|r]ing? (Aaron M. Renn, Scot E. Wilcoxon) Re: Software flaw exposes e-mail programs ... (Andrew Koenig) Re: Unix passwords no longer safe (Eric Maiwald, Simon Waters) Re: USS Yorktown: WinNT --not?-- the fault (Mike Williams, Victor Yodaiken, Fred Cohen) Re: Yorktown dead in water after divide by 0 (Henry Spencer) Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

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Date: Mon, 17 Aug 1998 13:13:00 -0700 From: David.Ratner@software.com (David Ratner) Subject: Computer flaw makes water undrinkable

A computer glitch in Lewiston, Maine, shut down the chlorination system and caused the chlorine content of the city water to drop below the safety threshold, affecting 40,000 residents. This occurred during the night, and was not discovered until a routine check 14 hours later. Notices were then sent out to 9,000 homes advising people ``to boil the water before drinking.'' It took 30 hours to solve the problem. The city has now installed an automatic system to notify an on-call supervisor in case this recurs. [Source: *USA Today*, Tech Report, Glitches of the Week, updated 17 Aug 1998, <http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/nb/nb1.htm>; PGN Abstracting]

How many other computer systems that require 24x7 service don't have 24x7 monitoring?

David Ratner, Software.Com, Inc. david.ratner@software.com 805-957-1790 x629

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Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1998 13:09:11 -0400 From: Edupage Editors <educause@educause.unc.edu> Subject: The Bloatware Debate

A 100-company survey by Standish Group International found that 45% of a software application's features are never used, 19% rarely used, 16 % sometime used, 13% often used, and 7% always used; yet, in spite of the fact that most of an application is seldom used, software gets bigger all the time. For example, Windows went from 3M lines of code (Windows 3.1) to 14M lines (Windows 95) to 18M (Windows 98). Booze, Allen & Hamilton chief information officer Roger Walters is one of the people complaining now about this "bloatware" phenomenon: "My problem is, I'm forced to upgrade all the time -- not for functionality I want, but for features someone wanted for me." But industry analyst Jeffrey Tarter defends the software makers by noting: "I can't think of a single lite version of any product that has ever succeeded. It may be inelegant and sluglike, but bloatware sells." (*Computerworld*, 10 Aug 1998; Edupage, 13 August 1998)

[The corporate motto must be ``Don't rock the bloat.''? PGN]

[Incidentally we are very grateful to John Gehl and Suzanne Douglas for their efforts in producing Edupage. To subscribe to Edupage directly rather than relying on RISKS to cull a few RISK-relevant items, send e-mail to listproc@educause.unc.edu with the message: subscribe edupage <your name> ]

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Date: Mon, 17 Aug 1998 10:07:26 +0100 From: David Alan Gilbert <dg@cogency.co.uk> Subject: Y2K: Warehousing systems

One UK Sunday paper carried an article yesterday saying that a major supermarket had sent an entire consignment of corned beef to be skipped because a non-Y2K warehousing system had decided that its expiry date of something like 2001 was actually 1901 and it was about time that it was binned.

Dr. David Alan Gilbert, dg @ cogency.co.uk - +44-(0)161-428-9444 Home: gro.gilbert @ treblig.org

[RISKS-6.43 had a meaty case of the Xtra supermarket being meted out a $1000 fine for having meat on the rack an extra day, as the result of a computer program mishandling the labels over the 1988 leap day. PGN]

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Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1998 13:09:11 -0400 From: Edupage Editors <educause@educause.unc.edu> Subject: L.A. school district accused of software piracy

It may cost the Los Angeles Unified School District as much as $5 million to amend for the software piracy accusations brought by the Business Software Alliance against an adult vocational school under the district's jurisdiction. The Business Software Alliance says it found 1,400 copies of unlicensed software at the school, including copies of Microsoft Word and Adobe Word. The business group wants the school district to replace the pirated copies with licensed ones. One educational technology consultant, Jamieson A. McKensie, thinks the piracy problem is widespread in schools: "In many places, people think 'the software is for kids; it's a good cause and there's nothing illegal about it.'" Microsoft spokeswoman Sarah B. Alexander says the problem is that often people who would not dream of stealing other things believe it's legitimate to use software without paying for it: "How do they justify it? Just because it's easier to make a copy of software than a desk or a book." (*The New York Times*, 12 Aug 1998; Edupage, 13 August 1998)

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Date: Sun, 16 Aug 1998 17:39:44 GMT From: schneier@counterpane.com (Bruce Schneier) Subject: Cryptanalysis of Frog, an AES Candidate

Results Announcement: D. Wagner, N. Ferguson, and B. Schneier, "Cryptanalysis of Frog," Counterpane Systems Report, Aug 1998.

Abstract:

We examine some attacks on the FROG cipher. First we give a differential attack which uses about $2^{58}$ chosen plaintexts and very little time for the analysis; it works for about $2^{-33.0}$ of the keyspace. Then we describe a linear attack which uses $2^{56}$ known texts and works for $2^{-31.8}$ of the keyspace. The linear attack can also be converted to a ciphertext-only attack using $2^{64}$ known ciphertexts. Also, the decryption function of FROG is a lot weaker than the encryption function. We show a differential attack on the decryption function that requires $2^{36}$ chosen ciphertexts and works on $2^{-29.3}$ of the keyspace. Using our best attack an attacker with a sufficient number of cryptanalytical targets can expect to recover his first key after $2^{56.7}$ work. Taken together, these observations suggest that FROG is not a very strong candidate for the AES.

This paper is available at http://www.counterpane.com/publish.html, and will be made available at the AES Workshop next week.

Bruce

[That is, it SHOULD NOT BE a strong candidate, assuming strong crypto is really the desideratum. Bruce's message once again reminds us how important extensive scrutiny is when it comes to cryptography! PGN]

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Date: Sat, 15 Aug 1998 15:10:35 -0400 From: jay ball <jay@invengen.com> Subject: A legal way to export crypto code: in English

"Judge Gwin of the Federal District Court of the Northern District of Ohio has recently held that software is not protected by the First Amendment because it is a ``functional device'' like a telephone circuit." as said by Peter Junger, a lawyer suing for the fight to export crypto as "free-speech".

So, Leevi Marttila has written a program that translates C to English and back. http://personal.sip.fi/~lm/c2txt2c/ is the location of the program. Now, the question is, is this translation free speech? You can read blowfish at http://personal.sip.fi/~lm/c2txt2c/blowfish.txt and see that it quite readable as a story, even funny if you remember that it came from C code. So, are the adventures of William, Edward, Richard, Michael, & Charles free speech? If so, you can export it?

Or, are the adventures themselves an encrypted message and the translator a piece of crypto software?

Jay Ball jay@invengen.com

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Date: Fri, 14 Aug 1998 13:08:39 ECT From: paul@sumatra.nl (Paul van Keep) Subject: Risks of agents

This abstract was forwarded to me and seems very appropriate for risks.

> 98-612 WHY THE WIRED ECONOMY IS DOOMED --agents without a conscience > [From New Scientist, 4 July 1998--Walter Derzko] > > Intelligent software agents that don't care about the consequences of their > actions will subject the world to frequent and severe bouts of boom and > bust, according to two research groups in the US. As we use the Internet > more and more for home shopping and banking, the use of agents to get > us the best prices will lead to economic turmoil.

The experiments seem to indicate that delays (friction) are an essential part of an efficient economic model. For instance: if we'd manage to remove all friction from stock market trading, i.e. everyone trades on the basis of the same information at the same time, the whole thing would come crashing down or at least start swinging madly up and down.

Paul van Keep

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Date: Mon, 17 Aug 98 14:27:02 PDT From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com> Subject: Geocities: privacy, promises, and regulation

The Federal Trade Commission is finally beginning to confront the privacy problem. It has charged Geocities with misleading its 2 million customers by secretly selling their personal information to marketers, despite the previously professed policy of not doing so without permission. In response, Geocities has now posted on its Web site what is presumed to be its actually practiced privacy policy. [Source: Reuters item, 14 Aug 1998]

As long-time RISKS readers well understand, this is an area in which vigilance and aggressive action are very important. As usual in matters relating to your identity, CAVEAT EMPTOR!

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Date: Sun, 16 Aug 1998 19:24:54 -0400 From: Edupage Editors <educause@educause.unc.edu> Subject: Tracking activity on the Web

Lycos, Geocities, and NBC's Videoseekers are among the major Web sites that will participate in a new service, called Engage, that was developed to track what people are looking at on the Internet, so that advertisers can target their marketing efforts. David S. Wetherell, the chief executive of CMG Information Services, the company behind Engage, gives this example of how the service would be used: "If someone comes to your bookstore for the first time, you can find out if they are interested in mountain climbing, organic gardening and tennis; you can present them books related to their interests immediately." Mr. Wetherell adds: "We took the highest road you could possibly take with respect to privacy. We think you can learn a lot more about someone from their behavior than from their name and address." The system will keep information on age, sex, income, zip code and number of children; it will not collect information on sexual or health related topics and will not store individual names, addresses, and birthdays. Privacy consultant Jason Catlett says: "Engage has done many good things to protect privacy, but my worry is that they are firing the starting gun in the race for the bottom. The worst actors will be left to use the most sophisticated surveillance techniques as they please." (*The New York Times*, 16 Aug 1998; Edupage, 16 August 1998)

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Date: Fri, 14 Aug 1998 21:07:21 +0300 From: "Conrad W. Clark" <cwclark@barent6.mldnet.com> Subject: Microsoft self-extracting files risks

Here's the scenario:

I need the new perl for Win32 (Activeperl 5xx) It requires an update to Win 95 for the DCOM components to 1.2. I download the file from the Microsoft site, and the file is advertised as (as I recall) 1.4 meg. I receive a 764K file, but my browser (Opera 3.2) marked it as completely received. It's a self-extracting file to update DCOM (it says so itself), so I execute it. It executes! The Typical forms (do you want to install this - really, and licensing text) come up, with English heading, except that the contents are garbage. I click yes anyway, since I'm in physically in an Eastern European country at this time I figured "Bob" or some other "wizard" had intervened to help me by munging the fonts. The installer couldn't find any space on my drive. I had space on my drive.

So this file is bad. Don't self extracting files have checksums???? Don't they check themselves???? I know PKZIP and WINZIP do.

It gets better.

I next try to download the same file from an official MS mirror site in Sweden. All of the mirror sites list the file at 3.5MB. Being foolhardy, and having backups on a Jaz drive I downloaded it again. It is 1.200 MB! It executed and installed. Perl (which I trust) says so.

So Microsoft downloads DO NOT:

* Perform file integrity checks before executing. * Have reliable information as to file size. * Certainly are not validated with digital signatures or other "way advanced" stuff.

AND THE DOWNLOAD SCRIPT AT MICROSOFT PERMITS TRANSMISSION INTERRUPTIONS TO OCCUR WITH CONSEQUENT FILE CORRUPTION, WITH NO NOTIFICATION TO THE CLIENT DURING THE TRANSMISSION OR DURING EXECUTION OF THE UPDATE!!!

I have the original corrupted file (my path e:/barf/dcom95.exe). If Microsoft isn't interested that's another risk altogether.

Conrad

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Date: Mon, 17 Aug 1998 22:40:30 -0500 From: "Scot E. Wilcoxon" <sewilco@fieldday.mn.org> Subject: Re: Win98 H24 problem, not Yx (RISKS-19.91)

At about the same time that my alert appeared in RISKS-19.91, Microsoft and others confirmed Windows 98 has a problem with midnight incorrectly altering the date. Further testing found that the problem actually occurs when midnight occurs during Win98 start up. There is about a five-second window for the problem during a midnight boot.

As the problem can happen any day, this is not a Year 2000 problem. Microsoft estimates this only affects about one in five or six million users.

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Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1998 16:23:32 -0400 (EDT) From: "Aaron M. Renn" <arenn@urbanophile.com> Subject: Re: Global War[m|n|p|r]ing?

You may be interested in knowing that Wentz and Schabel's corrections (of satellite records showing a global cooling trend) required some corrections. They did not take into account the east-west orbital drift of the satellites, only orbital decay. Also, they applied an average orbital decay value to all satellites instead of making a precise adjustment for each satellite when calculating their figures. The satellite researchers at NASA applied the corrected corrections to their data and still show a slight downward temperature drift. An overview of the results are available at:

http://science.nasa.gov/newhome/headlines/notebook/essd13aug98_1.htm

This page also mentions the fact that weather balloon data corroborates the satellite information, something the original posting omitted.

The global warming phenomenon is by no means universally accepted by science, despite claims of "rampant evidence". The use of ozone layer results to discredit satellite cooling data is a logical fallacy which adds no hard evidence to support the global warming theory. A somewhat stronger form of that paragraph's thesis might have read "global cooling and ozone depletion data are both collected from satellites. The ozone depletion data was wrong, therefore the global cooling data is wrong". This is a false analogy. If valid, it would impinge on _any_ scientific research because virtually all methods of data collection have had errors in the past. Also, use of the term "faith" implies that those who believe the satellite cooling data are engaging in a religious instead of a scientific belief. The use of such loaded words is a well known propaganda technique.

The risk? Logical fallacies or propaganda are often employed in debate, even over scientific issues. One should be careful to analyze all arguments to discover them.

To learn more about logical fallacies, I suggest Stephen's Downes' guide to logical fallacies at:

http://www.assiniboinec.mb.ca/user/downes/fallacy/index.htm

To learn more about techniques of propaganda, see Aaron Delwiche's propaganda page at:

http://carmen.artsci.washington.edu/propaganda/contents.htm

Aaron M. Renn <arenn@urbanophile.com> http://www.urbanophile.com/arenn/

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Date: Tue, 18 Aug 1998 08:27:06 -0500 (CDT) From: "Scot E. Wilcoxon" <sewilco@fieldday.mn.org> Subject: Re: Global War[m|n|p|r]ing?

In RISKS-19.91, PGN pointed out the study in *Nature* that reported the realization that orbital decay caused global temperatures to be calculated as being slightly cooler than actual temperatures.

The scientists operating the global temperature satellite experiment have thanked the author of the *Nature* article for pointing out this geometry problem. They also pointed out that the *Nature* article gave an estimated temperature based on an average of all eight satellites rather than being calculated for each individual satellite, and there were two other effects due to an east-west drift which could now be quantified. The adjusted global temperature change for 79-97 is now a cooling of 0.01 degrees C per decade.

http://science.nasa.gov/newhome/headlines/notebook/essd13aug98_1.htm

Scot E. Wilcoxon sewilco@fieldday.mn.org

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Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1998 16:28:31 -0400 (EDT) From: Andrew Koenig <ark@research.att.com> Subject: Re: Software flaw exposes e-mail programs ... (Haahr, RISKS-19.90)

> What all the reports I've read appear to be missing is that bugs like this > are almost inevitable in C or C++, [...]

Here, ``bugs like this'' refers to overflowing static buffers. Such bugs are *not* inevitable in C++ programs. Class libraries have been available for a decade or so that make it easy to write C++ programs that do not have any fixed upper bounds on buffer sizes.

What I find remarkable is that in all that time, more programmers have not started using such libraries as a matter of course. But then I also find it remarkable how many drivers do not wear seat belts.

I don't think, though, that drivers' failure to wear seat belts is an acceptable argument against the use of automobiles. Nor do I think that programmers' failure to use the tools that are available in one language is an acceptable reason to argue for switching to another.

Andrew Koenig <ark@research.att.com> http://www.research.att.com/info/ark

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Date: Thu, 13 Aug 98 18:59:41 EDT From: emaiwald@shell.fred.net Subject: Re: Unix passwords no longer safe (Ishikawa, RISKS-19.91)

> Now we can target the root account for compromise attempt.

I think we have already passed this point. I did a recent test against Windows NT passwords using L0phtCrack running on a Pentium II 200MHz. We were able to do an exhaustive attempt against all 8 letter passwords in 32 hours and an exhaustive attempt against all 8 letter + number passwords in 310 hours. That is not targeting a single password but going over the whole SAM file.

> It is time to retire [fixed passwords]. PGN]

I began making this point to my clients as well. My point is just that no matter what your security policy requires regarding passwords (8, 10, 12 characters), if I can get your password file I own you.

It is not now (and never has been) appropriate to rely on a single protection mechanism. Hopefully this is finally dawning on the world at large.

Eric Maiwald, CISSP, Director Security Services, Fortrex Technologies, Inc. North Potomac, MD 301-977-6966 emaiwald@fred.net

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Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1998 21:05:54 +0100 From: "Simon Waters" <Simon@wretched.demon.co.uk> Subject: Re: Unix passwords no longer safe (Ishikawa, RISKS-19.91)

>Crack is meant to plug such holes.

Readers might gain the impression that Crack is intended to be used to reveal weak passwords and improve security as a result.

Whilst it certainly can be used like that the advice given by Mr Muffet (at least in version 4) was to take other measures to improve UNIX password security. The risk being someone else with a better dictionary or more computer time will break the weak passwords first and compromise the system.

Anyone thinking of running Crack would be well advised to read the accompanying documentation.

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Date: Fri, 14 Aug 1998 12:07:06 +0100 From: "Mike Williams" <mikew@harlequin.co.uk> Subject: Re: USS Yorktown: WinNT --not?-- the fault (Fraser, RISKS-19.90)

Having had to work with fp exceptions recently there are some interesting implications that can be read from this story.

First, it is possible to make some assumptions on the hardware used to host the system. I would guess that the NT system is most likely either an Intel or Alpha system since MIPs and PPC are no longer in the picture. The Intel FPU by default masks all fp exceptions, such as divide by zero, so the program does not crash and can continue with close to expected results. In contrast the Alpha FPU does not mask fp exceptions by default and the same program that would continue on Intel will come to a grinding halt on the first divide by zero.

Next, it is possible to have some ideas about the development of the system that crashed. In the development of any system it can be very useful to have fp exceptions unmasked as they can be useful in catching 'extreme' fp calculations (sqrt of a -ve number, etc.) due to logic bugs as well as straight compiler bugs (fairly esoteric but seen). However, for a full release you would either mask the exceptions to prevent the crash, or install an exception handler for each exception not masked. This would be true for Intel or Alpha hardware.

So, if it was NT that blue screened for division by zero bad karma to MS for releasing an OS that neither masks or handles such exceptions. Alternatively, the hosted application while not screening a 0.0 before a division (slapped wrists) also had unmasked exceptions for whatever reason in its release version.

Personally, and for no particular reason except I got caught by this once, I think it is a mixed mode failure. I would guess that the application was originally developed and tested on Intel machines with the default fp exception masking, but that the delivered release version was ported (read re-compiled) to an Alpha machine with no fp masking by default. Cue crash on first fp divide by zero.

Masking fp exceptions and taking the solutions the FPU provides (such as infinity arithmetic) is not portable, the Intel and Alpha FPUs can have different masked exception solutions. IIRC the Alpha returns a 0.0 while Intel returns 1.INF (an signed infinity). Life can get interesting when you do a magnitude check on the result of the expression.

The risk? Assuming all NT machine environments are the same when developing for them.

Mike Williams, Harlequin Group plc, Wilmslow Road, Alderley Edge, Cheshire SK9 7QD http://www.harlequin.co.uk (+44/0) 1625 588010/588049

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Date: 14 Aug 1998 04:01:06 GMT From: yodaiken@chelm.cs.nmt.edu () Subject: Re: USS Yorktown: WinNT --not?-- the fault (Myers, RISKS-19.91)

I'm amazed at the number of terrible technical decisions that are now driven by MS marketing -- or more correctly -- herd purchasing. The Navy basing ship control (and future battlefield command and control) on NT is perhaps the most outrageous, example, but this phenomenon is pervasive. In the last 3 months:

1. A famous research lab I won't name is building a major NT based cluster despite the known low MTB-BSD numbers (mean time between blue screen of death) that will most likely keep the machine from ever running. 2. A systems architect at a European bank explained to me that his managers repeatedly disregard costing analysis in requiring NT based systems. 3. A researcher in real-time systems told me that he was interested in working with our group, but we had to port our work to NT because his government funding agency required all "deliverables" in NT. 4. Our state universities are purchasing a student information database and, I'm told, there is considerable pressure to adopt an in development NT solution over existing, known to be reliable, alternatives.

It's remarkable to see what should be extremely conservative and cost conscious institutions making the decision to place their hopes on untested application software that will run on a undelivered OS (NT 5) promised by a company with a track record of delivering buggy operating systems. At least when IBM dominated corporate/government purchasing it was a safe choice.

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Date: Sat, 15 Aug 1998 14:17:07 -0700 (PDT) From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net> Subject: Re: USS Yorktown: WinNT --not?-- the fault (Ward, RISKS-19.91)

Shifting the blame does not end there. For example, the day the e-mail overflow affecting Microsoft and Netscape systems was widely published in the national news, Microsoft announced a 'fix' which made the news while Netscape said it would take a week. The 'fix' identified by Microsoft, however, was not to that bug. It was to a different bug.

Shifty business indeed. Fred Cohen, Fred Cohen & Associates: http://all.net - fc@all.net - tel/fax:925-454-0171

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Date: Mon, 17 Aug 1998 12:11:12 -0400 (EDT) From: Henry Spencer <henry@spsystems.net> Subject: Re: Yorktown dead in water after divide by 0 (Bradshaw, RISKS-19.89)

>The Yorktown problems are particularly worrying because they're very >reminiscent of problems the British navy suffered a hundred years or so ago.

Unfortunately, the basic thinking of the US military today is very prone to this sort of problem. One of the defense-reform advocates (Spinney, I think, but the particular book isn't handy to check) has observed that much of the apparent irrationality of US military technology procurement in recent times can be explained as the result of three unwritten basic assumptions, all of which are badly flawed. The third assumption is roughly "modern warfare is fundamentally a predictable, orderly process which is amenable to centralized planning and control".

(Since I suppose folks will ask :-), the first two are "technology has changed everything, so the lessons of the past no longer apply" and "numbers and weapon lethality are the only factors which significantly influence the outcomes of battles".)

Predictable, orderly processes don't need decentralized emergency backups and underlings trained to take the initiative when needed. Such a conclusion is obviously ridiculous in warfare... but unwritten assumptions are much the most insidious kind, because they creep into system designs without anyone realizing it.

> People need to be trained in the use of those backup systems [...]

As has been noted in connection with airliners, there is a difficult problem of keeping the operators skilled in manual control when they seldom exercise it in normal operation. It might be better to make partially-manual control the norm, and reserve full automation as the emergency backup.

(I believe I've seen mention of experimental automated systems for space-shuttle plumbing which plan actions but delegate execution to humans, on the grounds that it's the only way to keep the humans current on what's happening so that they can take over quickly if necessary.)

Henry Spencer henry@spsystems.net (henry@zoo.toronto.edu)

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Date: 31 Mar 1998 (LAST-MODIFIED) From: RISKS-request@csl.sri.com Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

The RISKS Forum is a MODERATED digest. Its Usenet equivalent is comp.risks. => SUBSCRIPTIONS: PLEASE read RISKS as a newsgroup (comp.risks or equivalent) if possible and convenient for you. Alternatively, via majordomo, SEND DIRECT E-MAIL REQUESTS to <risks-request@csl.sri.com> with one-line, SUBSCRIBE (or UNSUBSCRIBE) [with net address if different from FROM:] or INFO [for unabridged version of RISKS information] .MIL users should contact <risks-request@pica.army.mil> (Dennis Rears). .UK users should contact <Lindsay.Marshall@newcastle.ac.uk>. => The INFO file (submissions, default disclaimers, archive sites, copyright policy, PRIVACY digests, etc.) is also obtainable from http://www.CSL.sri.com/risksinfo.html ftp://www.CSL.sri.com/pub/risks.info The full info file will appear now and then in future issues. *** All contributors are assumed to have read the full info file for guidelines. *** => SUBMISSIONS: to risks@CSL.sri.com with meaningful SUBJECT: line. => ARCHIVES are available: ftp://ftp.sri.com/risks or ftp ftp.sri.com<CR>login anonymous<CR>[YourNetAddress]<CR>cd risks [volume-summary issues are in risks-*.00] [back volumes have their own subdirectories, e.g., "cd 18" for volume 18] or http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/VL.IS.html [i.e., VoLume, ISsue]. The ftp.sri.com site risks directory also contains the most recent PostScript copy of PGN's comprehensive historical summary of one liners: get illustrative.PS

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End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 19.92 ************************