Text File

precedence: bulk Subject: Risks Digest 20.05

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Friday 6 November 1998 Volume 20 : Issue 05

FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks) ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. ***** This issue is archived at http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/20.05.html and at ftp.sri.com/risks/ .

Contents: [Huge backlog. I've been traveling too much. PGN] Labor has premature delivery (R Romine) ABC News posts election results before the election! (Martin Minow) Salt Lake ATC center radar blackout affects 200 planes (Richard Schroeppel) AT&T Loses over 400 T3s (Sean_Sosik-Hamor) NYSE stock market crash -- well, the other kind! (Declan McCullagh) Microsoft execs worry about free software movement (Edupage) Microsoft and the Halloween Documents (PGN) Computer keeps 100 pounds per week from pensioners (Peter Leeson) Stores' shoplifting gates can set off pacemakers, defibrillator (Keith Rhodes) Swedish train-ticket reservation system down (Ulf Lindqvist) SAS airline timetables: Internet 1, Hardcopy 0 (Martin Minow) New Swedish law makes most of the Internet illegal (Jacob Palme) Stanford e-mail system passwords stolen (Monty Solomon) Rats take a byte out of Ugandan exam computers (ejm) Grave error! (Dave Stringer-Calvert) Re: SRI voice-mail woes (Peter Kaiser) Re: Another wild bank saga (PGN) Jon Postel (PGN) REVIEW: "Democracy and Technology", Richard E. Sclove (Rob Slade) REVIEW: "Windows NT Server 4 Security Handbook", Hadfield/Hatter/Bixler (Rob Slade) Promoting Formal Methods (Dilia E. Rodriguez) FMICS4 1st CFP (Diego Latella) SAFECOMP 99 - CFP (Pasquini) Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Fri, 06 Nov 98 09:47:59 EST From: rromine@nsf.gov Subject: Labor has premature delivery

Everyone on Wall Street and elsewhere eagerly awaits the official Bureau of Labor Statistics statistics, which were due to be posted on their Web site today. The BLS takes great pains to avoid leaks. However, much to everyone's surprise, some tables appeared YESTERDAY. As a consequence, BLS Commissioner Katharine G. Abraham decided to release the full report yesterday afternoon. The interpretations were favorable, and the stock market had a big gain. Abraham was quoted as saying that even if the early release ``was a computer error, it was a human failure'' in that the system was not set up to prevent it.

A prior early release occurred in January 1997, when the Federal Reserve's Beige Book was released at noon instead of 2 p.m., because no one bothered to tell the Web site administrators that the time had been delayed. [Source: Web Goof Leaks Data, Moves Stocks, By John M. Berry *The Washington Post*, 6 Nov 1998, Page F01; PGN Stark Abstracting]

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 4 Nov 1998 10:15:24 -0800 From: Martin Minow <minow@apple.com> Subject: ABC News posts election results before the election!

According to the Drudge Report <http://www.drudgereport.com>, ABC News posted ``final election results'' on its web site late Monday night, i.e., before the election began. According to an apology from ABC News (also quoted by Drudge) -- and reading between the lines -- they apparently posted test data on their live Internet server. ABC News's web site is <http://www.abcnews.com>. My very brief look at the ABC News site did not turn up any explanation or apology on their site.

Martin Minow, minow@pobox.com

[For example, the dummy data showed incumbent Sen. Alfonse D'Amato (Rep.) besting Charles E. Schumer (Dem) in the New York Senate race, which turned out to be wrong. PGN] [Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com> noted an article by Adam Clayton Powell III on the same story, noting that ABC had the right outcome on 61 out of 70 Senate and Governor races. That article also noted that Fox TV had accidentally put up an advance dummy page for a Yankee-Padre World Series game -- and almost got it correct! PGN]

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1998 12:03:50 -0500 (EST) From: Richard Schroeppel <rcs@VISI.NET> Subject: Salt Lake ATC center radar blackout affects 200 planes

On 4 Nov 1998, the primary and backup radar systems for the Salt Lake Air Traffic Control Center failed for about a minute, leaving about 200 planes ``up in the air'' over Utah, Nevada, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. Handoffs were done manually (actually, orally). [Source: 4 Nov 1998, http://www.nandotimes.com]

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 28 Oct 1998 12:50:40 -0500 From: hamors@aloft.micro.lucent.com (Sean_Sosik-Hamor) Subject: AT&T Loses over 400 T3s

We're not sure when the fault (probably a fiber cut, but that's unconfirmed) actually happened, but Lucent Microelectronics in Allentown, PA lost all network connectivity at approximately noon today. AT&T lost approximately 400 T3s, which caused every single Lucent router nationwide to try to relearn their routes and effectively pegged all routers at 100%.

Because of this, a second outage occurred due to the fact that the routers were too busy relearning their routes to actually pass traffic. This was a nationwide outage for both Lucent and AT&T. As of 01.45pm, Lucent locations in Allentown, PA have isolated all traffic from the backbone, so at least we're back up and running.

Sean

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 26 Oct 1998 16:00:19 -0500 From: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com> Subject: NYSE stock market crash -- well, the other kind!

Trading on the New York Stock Exchange was halted at 1:16 p.m. for just under an hour on 26 Oct 1998, because of "equipment problems". [http://www.wired.com/news/news/business/story/15837.html]

------------------------------

Tue, 3 Nov 1998 14:15:30 -0500 From: Edupage Editors <educause@educause.unc.edu> Subject: Microsoft execs worry about free software movement

An internal Microsoft memo written by one of that company's software engineers indicates that Microsoft is concerned with developing strategies for competing against free programs that have been gaining popularity with software developers, such as the operating system Linux. The memorandum warns that the usual Microsoft marketing strategy known as FUD (an acronym for fear, uncertainty, and doubt) won't work against developers of free software, who are part of the OSS (open-source software) movement that makes source code readily available to anyone for improvement and testing. The memo (http://www.opensource.org/halloween.html) says: "The ability of the OSS process to collect and harness the collective I.Q. of thousands of individuals across the Internet is simply amazing. More importantly, OSS evangelization scales with the size of the Internet much faster than our own evangelization efforts appear to scale." (*The New York Times*, 3 Nov 1998; Edupage, 3 Nov 1998)

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 6 Nov 98 8:47:21 PST From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com> Subject: Microsoft and the Halloween Documents

A second of the so-called Halloween Documents, written by Microsoft people and lightly annotated by Eric Raymond (the first so-called because it was analyzed by Eric over the Halloween weekend), is also available. Analyzing the perceived threats to Microsoft represented by open-source software, the documents are also fascinating testaments to the appeals of open-source software. The first http://www.opensource.org/halloween.html was noted above, with Eric's alternative source as http://www.tuxedo.org/~esr/halloween.html The second is at http://www.opensource.org/halloween2.html

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1998 06:30:55 -0000 From: "Peter Leeson" <Peter@gptsl.globalnet.co.uk> Subject: Computer keeps 100 pounds per week from pensioners

Approximately 200,000 elderly Brits are not receiving their proper state pensions because of a computer glitch, losing up to 100 pounds a week for the past few months. The problem is blamed on the cutover to a new 170-million-pound computer system, and according to a government source is likely to take another five months to fix. [Source: Jon Hibbs, *London Daily Telegraph*, 5 Nov 1998; PGN Abstracting]

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 05 Nov 1998 12:46:51 -0500 From: "Keith A Rhodes"<rhodesk.aimd@gao.gov> Subject: Stores' shoplifting gates can set off pacemakers, defibrillator

Today's *New England Journal of Medicine* notes a case of a 72-year-old man whose defibrillator was affected by interference from a Sensormatic Ultra-Max anti-theft device in a bookstore's shoplifting gate. Fortunately, a nurse caught him, recognized the source of the problem, and pulled him away. The head of The Heart Institute of St. Petersburg, Florida, noted that this is the most popular device -- with 91,000 in use.

Debbie Coller of Sensormatic noted that the FDA advisory panel had found no significant health hazard. "Shoplifting gates have been around for about 25 years," she said. "Heart pacemakers have been around even longer. During that time, 1 billion safe passages already have occurred." [Source: Associated Press item, 4 Nov 1998; PGN Abstracting]

[But RISKS readers may recall that heart-pacemaker interference deaths were reported in 1980 and 1985, and defibrillator interference was discussed in RISKS-19.50.52.53. This not a new problem. PGN]

[An error in the original has been corrected in the archive copy. PGN]

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 29 Oct 1998 14:45:44 +0100 (MET) From: Ulf Lindqvist <ulfl@ce.chalmers.se> Subject: Swedish train-ticket reservation system down

Here is yet another example of a backup system that does not work when needed. [Source *Goteborgs-Posten*, via Tidningarnas Telegrambyra News Service, 29 Oct 1998; Ulf Lindqvist abstracting and translating.]

The central computer for ticket sales and reservations at the Swedish railway company (SJ) was down during the entire day, Wednesday 28 Oct 1998. Phone ticket sales, normally serving 15,000 customers every day, were completely shut down and at local sales offices only fare tickets without reservations could be purchased. The company press information officer explains: ``There was a hardware failure in the mainframe supporting our entire system. This also caused the backup computer to fail.''

Ulf Lindqvist, Computer Engineering, Chalmers University of Technology SE-412 96 Goteborg, SWEDEN +46 31 772 1760 ulfl@ce.chalmers.se

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 29 Oct 1998 15:12:14 -0800 From: Martin Minow <minow@apple.com> Subject: SAS airline timetables: Internet 1, Hardcopy 0

Here's a new variant on a data error: according to a press report, the printed edition of Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) winter timetable is completely wrong -- the printers mistakenly reprinted 350,000 copies of the summer timetable.

Fortunately, the timetable available on the Internet and over the telephone is correct.

Martin Minow <minow@pobox.com>

[Also noted by Debora Weber-Wulff <Debora.Weber_Wulff@te.mah.se>, who is in Sweden on sabbatical. PGN]

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 25 Oct 1998 08:51:12 +0200 From: Jacob Palme <jpalme@dsv.su.se> Subject: New Swedish law makes most of the Internet illegal

[Thanks to Dan Wing of Cisco for forwarding. PGN]

A new Swedish law which makes most of the Internet illegal in Sweden took effect yesterday. The law is named personal information handling law. It makes much of the publication of information about individual persons on the Internet illegal, such as criticism of named persons, publication of lists of references in scientific papers or the sending of e-mail messages outside of Europe.

More about the new law at URL http://www.dsv.su.se/~jpalme/society/personal-register-law.html

(note: The Swedish government will probably not use the law to stop Internet. This law and other laws like it have made me understand that laws are not meant to be obeyed.)

Question: All other EU countries are to enact similar laws. Have other countries interpreted the EU directive in the same way, and developed laws which would make most of the Internet illegal?

Jacob Palme <jpalme@dsv.su.se> (Stockholm University and KTH) for more info see URL: http://www.dsv.su.se/~jpalme

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 4 Nov 1998 03:42:42 -0500 From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com> Subject: Stanford e-mail system passwords stolen

Beginning about three weeks ago, about 4,500 Stanford e-mail users had their passwords captured by a sniffer, planted because not all systems had been properly upgraded with new security features. The sniffer was detected only a few days ago. The attack was apparently carried out from Sweden and Canada. [Source: Reuters item, 3 Nov 1998, special to CNET, http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,28303,00.html; PGN Abstracting]

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1998 21:09:52 GMT From: e_j_m@yahoo.com Subject: Rats take a byte out of Ugandan exam computers

The computer system used to determine thousands of university places (based on national exams) crashed because of rats having chewed through cables. Rats had previously severed phone links to parts of western Uganda and Rwanda. [Source: Reuters item, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9810/13/RB000657.reut.html PGN Abstracting]

Just goes to show that hackers come in all shapes and sizes. :) [ejm]

[The rats were snackers rather than hackers, but they prevented the examiners from separating the knackers from the slackers. PGN]

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 30 Oct 1998 15:04:37 -0800 From: Dave Stringer-Calvert <dave_sc@csl.sri.com> Subject: Grave error!

The risks of Automated Mailing Software....

Embarrassed council officials have apologised for asking the occupant of a village cemetery to fill in a survey. A questionnaire from Rushcliffe Borough Council asked 'The Occupier, Burial Ground' in Flintham, Notts, if he or she had been a victim of crime in the last 12 months or belonged to a Neighbourhood Watch Scheme. The wrongly-addressed letter was among 2,000 sent out to businesses in the area as part of a survey to pinpoint concerns over crime and vandalism. But a council spokesman admitted: 'There is not much chance of a reply being received from the occupant there.' [...] [From Yorkshire Evening Press, 10/30/98]

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 22 Oct 1998 08:38:49 +0200 From: Peter Kaiser <kaiser@acm.org> Subject: Re: SRI voice-mail woes (PGN, RISKS-20.04)

> The absence of both voice-mail and call-forwarding > certainly makes life tough.

But simpler, I should think -- it certainly does in my life. Indeed, on an occasion when several hundred persons (including me) lost computer service at our desktops at work for ten days, work life in our building became extremely simple, if at a rather higher emotional voltage.

At home we used to have an answering machine, but my wife -- more or less a technophobe -- hated it, so I disconnected it. Since then I tell people that our not having an answering machine is a service to our callers, subtly signalling them that we either are away or don't wish to answer the phone, thereby saving them the connection charges.

Pete kaiser@acm.org, pekaiser@access.ch

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 27 Oct 1998 13:12:09 -0400 From: "Peter G. Neumann" <Neumann@CSL.sri.com> Subject: Re: Another wild bank saga (RISKS-20.04)

Yes (as noted by many readers), I was unable to disremember some of the earlier confusion between the British BILLION and the American BILLION. In the olden dayes in England (until a few decades ago), the Brits commonly used the European MILLIARD which is equivalent to the American BILLION, with their BILLION equivalent to the American TRILLION. Apparently the Brits have informally switched in common usage, although the French and Germans still use the MILLIARD. The confusion is commonly resolved by referring to a thousand million or a million million. Perhaps the Euro presents an opportunity to standardize, but I have not heard any such news.

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 20 Oct 1998 07:55:17 -0400 From: "Peter G. Neumann" <Neumann@CSL.sri.com> Subject: Jon Postel

Jon Postel was one of the real pioneers of the ARPAnet/Internet, first at SRI (then Stanford Research Institute) and then at ISI. Recently, he was head of the IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority). Although there are still many network risks remaining, Jon was instrumental in many different ways in making the existing networks as operationally robust as they have become. He will be deeply missed.

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 30 Oct 1998 09:58:02 -0800 From: "Rob Slade" <rslade@sprint.ca> Subject: REVIEW: "Democracy and Technology", Richard E. Sclove

BKDEMTEC.RVW 980816

"Democracy and Technology", Richard E. Sclove, 1995, 0-89862-861-X, U$18.95 %A Richard E. Sclove %C 72 Spring Street, New York, NY 10012 %D 1995 %G 0-89862-861-X %I The Guilford Press %O U$18.95 212-431-9800 fax: 212-966-6708 staff@guilford.com %P 319 p. %T "Democracy and Technology"

"This book promotes the reconstruction of technology along more democratic lines. [...] Insofar as (1) citizens ought to be empowered to participate in shaping their society's basic circumstances and (2) technologies profoundly affect and partly constitute those circumstances, it follows that (3) technological design and practice should be democratized." Personally, I can sympathize with the aims, and even the thesis, that the author proposes for this text. However, he also notes a personal experience that taught him "that even the most well-intentioned, elite study group can be deeply unaware of the extent to which its conclusions embody far-reaching value judgements." What Sclove seems to have missed is the fact that however important your ideas may be, they have to be communicated to those who may have different backgrounds, and also have to be backed up by some kind of evidence. Although the declamations may be impassioned, only the most sympathetic and dedicated reader will be able to plow through the prose; and the arguments, as they proceed, have little support beyond force of personality.

Part one is intended to synthesize modern research in the social dimensions of technology and democratic theory into a rudimentary but comprehensive democratic theory of technology. Chapter one, using a statistical sampling of two communities (one of which is oversimplified into caricature) states that technology affects society, but that society can choose those technologies that it will accept. The idea that technology affects society is re-examined in greater detail and verbiage in chapter two. Democratic decision-making is said to be superior in chapter three, and some objections are replied to. Unfortunately, this entire section is based on only four real examples, and those situations include one failure, one closed and homogeneous community, and two "megaprojects" requiring massive, formal bureaucratic and political decisions. The theory eventually turned out is extremely rudimentary: it states that technology should be democratized, but fails to determine whether it can be.

Part two proposes a set of evaluation points that can be used to review technologies for compatibility with democracy. Chapter four is supposed to look at technologies of community, but concentrates primarily on work situations. In this regard it weakens the arguments of part one in that examples are given of cooperative social structures (successfully) imposed on hierarchical work environments, and democratically designed work technologies subsumed to a centralized corporate structure. When the topic does finally turn to a purer consideration of community it is to dismissively denigrate the possibility of technological support of virtual community. Democratic work is said to be free of routine and inflexible schedules, but chapter five singularly fails to say how this utopian state of affairs is to be accomplished. The first of three discussions of politics, chapter six proposes that technologies that promote distorted ideologies or exacerbate social inequities be avoided. Actually, though, the material hardly touches on any example technologies at all. Two of the points in chapter seven boil down to "smaller is prettier" since technologies with a smaller scope of impact promote local self-governance. The third, however, is rather vague. We are to prefer technologies that promote decentralization and federation, without any real ideas of what those are. (There is also no analysis of the relative importance of self-governance versus federation, a debate that my Canadian heritage finds most compelling.) The first point in chapter eight is that we should not foul our own nests, and I assume that most would agree with that; the only problem being the determination of how strictly to adhere to it. The second, however, seems to be an almost religious insistence on flexibility. For the perpetuation of a species we might note that adaptability is a good thing, but technology can be managed by the species (that is, us) according to changing conditions. Is the slotted screw somehow morally superior to the Robertson because slotted screwdrivers can be used as (rather clumsy) chisels?

Part three is a defence of the democratic politics of technology against traditional economic models. Chapter nine appears to want to eliminate the concept of value from the discussion. Economic theory is not actually challenged in chapter ten. Instead it is turned into a straw-philosophy, "economism," and attacked as unfit for comparison with social justice. I fully agree with the kind of participatory inventiveness that chapter eleven espouses, which used to go by the name of amateur scholarship. It cannot, however, be successfully mandated: it must be self-driven. This has to be obvious from the examples given in the chapter which are almost universally either proper systems analysis stories or failures. Chapter twelve purports to lay out a roadmap for pursuing more democratic technologies, but is weakened by a vast majority of statements that use "could" or "might" rather than "will." Sclove does admit to a number of important social factors that work against his ideals (at least in the United States) in chapter thirteen, but finishes by only hoping that they can be overcome.

This book is forceful, turgid, passionate, dull, and verbose. At first reading, I thought that the nine criteria for evaluation of technologies were the most important part of the work. However, as an exercise I tried reviewing some processes. War and weapons technologies came out surprisingly well, marred only by a tendency to perpetuate authoritarian structures. Guerilla or sectarian violence came out even better. Again, I am in full agreement with the general aims of the book, but have to conclude that a lot more work needs to be done on the specifics.

copyright Robert M. Slade, 1998 BKDEMTEC.RVW 980816

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 2 Nov 1998 11:45:58 -0800 From: "Rob Slade" <rslade@sprint.ca> Subject: REVIEW: "Windows NT Server 4 Security Handbook", Hadfield/Hatter/Bixler

BKNT4SHB.RVW 980814

"Windows NT Server 4 Security Handbook", Lee Hadfield/Dave Hatter/Dave Bixler, 1997, 0-7897-1213-X, U$39.99/C$56.95/UK#36.99 %A Lee Hadfield %A Dave Hatter dhatter@definiti.com %A Dave Bixler dbixler@art-deco.net %C 201 W. 103rd Street, Indianapolis, IN 46290 %D 1997 %G 0-7897-1213-X %I Macmillan Computer Publishing (MCP) %O U$39.99/C$56.95/UK#36.99 800-858-7674 info@mcp.com %P 476 p. %T "Windows NT Server 4 Security Handbook"

Part one is an overview, both of security and Windows NT. Chapter one's presentation of security basics has many good points, but also some unfortunate gaps and errors. The review of security concepts in NT provides a good grounding in how the matter is seen from Microsoft's perspective in chapter two. (It also has a rather interesting quick introduction to firewalls.) The NT architecture overview in chapter three does not really concentrate on security topics. When it does, the coverage of access control is reasonably clear, if not terribly readable.

The Implementation of security, in part two, explains individual functions well but does not provide conceptual frameworks for security operations. Most of the material does provide the ideas behind a feature, but then simply follows through the screens for turning it on. Topics include domains, trust relationships, NTFS (New Technology File System) security, protecting domain resources, and NT Workstation security. Somewhat different is chapter six, which gives a thorough tutorial on internal user authentication procedures.

Part three walks through the implementation of a master domain network. Chapters cover planning, implementation steps, and configuration of trust relationships, but the material is too brief for a realistic guide. Part four looks at security for various related products, such as BackOffice, NetWare, Macintosh, Internet, and UNIX. Again, there are more mentions than working details. Part five first explains and then walks you through implementation for C-2 security configuration.

Of those I have reviewed to date, this book delves deepest into many areas of NT security and protection. However, it still does not draw back the shroud surrounding the NT security model. The explanations of operations are clear and there is much useful information, but still no clear direction to the besieged sysadmin.

copyright Robert M. Slade, 1998 BKNT4SHB.RVW 980814

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 22 Oct 1998 08:15:33 -0400 (EDT) From: "Dilia E. Rodriguez" <rodrigue@AI.RL.AF.MIL> Subject: Promoting Formal Methods

Coming of Age Formal Aspects of Computing at 21 2nd December 1998, British Royal Society

The 21st anniversary of the British Computer Society Formal Aspects of Computing Science Special Interest Group

To mark this coming of age, we have invited four of our distinguished Fellows of the British Royal Society to select highlights of current research achievements, reflect on past lessons learned and look forward to future directions.

Mike Gordon 21 Years of Hardware Verification Tony Hoare Top-down and bottom-up and meeting in the middle Robin Milner Computing is Interaction Gordon Plotkin On Syntax

This 21-year period has seen formal methods mature from inception as a purely academic research area, to establish itself in computer science curricula, and most recently to be practically applied in industry.

The FACS at 21 meeting will take place at The Royal Society, 6 Carlton House Terrace, London, commencing 9.30 am and finishing by 5.00 pm. In addition, there will be an opportunity to attend an evening meal attended by the speakers. (Registration form below.)

For more information contact: Computing Research Centre, School Of Computing and Management Sciences, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, S1 1WB, UK. Tel. +44 (0) 114 225 5555. Current information is available at:

http://www.shu.ac.uk/facs21

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 28 Oct 1998 11:29:56 +0100 (MET) From: Diego Latella <d.latella@cnuce.cnr.it> Subject: FMICS4 1st CFP

ERCIM Working Group on Formal Methods for Industrial Critical Systems Fourth International Workshop Formal Methods for Industrial Critical Systems (PRELIMINARY CFP) July 11-12 1999

http://www.cnuce.pi.cnr.it/cnuweb/research/resgroups/conc-meth/FMICS/WS/Trento99/workshop.html

Deadline for submission: March 1st, 1999, to S. Gnesi, CNR-IEI, Via S. Maria 46, I56126 Pisa - ITALY telephone: +39 050 593489

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 02 Nov 1998 17:22:22 +0100 From: pasquini@infos1.casaccia.enea.it Subject: SAFECOMP 99 - CFP

Safety, Reliability and Security of Computer Systems Toulouse, France, 27-29 September 1999

Submissions by 31 Jan 1999. http://www.laas.fr/safecomp

------------------------------

Date: 23 Sep 1998 (LAST-MODIFIED) From: RISKS-request@csl.sri.com Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

The RISKS Forum is a MODERATED digest. Its Usenet equivalent is comp.risks. => SUBSCRIPTIONS: PLEASE read RISKS as a newsgroup (comp.risks or equivalent) if possible and convenient for you. Alternatively, via majordomo, SEND DIRECT E-MAIL REQUESTS to <risks-request@csl.sri.com> with one-line, SUBSCRIBE (or UNSUBSCRIBE) [with net address if different from FROM:] or INFO [for unabridged version of RISKS information] .MIL users should contact <risks-request@pica.army.mil> (Dennis Rears). .UK users should contact <Lindsay.Marshall@newcastle.ac.uk>. => The INFO file (submissions, default disclaimers, archive sites, copyright policy, PRIVACY digests, etc.) is also obtainable from http://www.CSL.sri.com/risksinfo.html ftp://www.CSL.sri.com/pub/risks.info The full info file will appear now and then in future issues. *** All contributors are assumed to have read the full info file for guidelines. *** => SUBMISSIONS: to risks@CSL.sri.com with meaningful SUBJECT: line. => ARCHIVES are available: ftp://ftp.sri.com/risks or ftp ftp.sri.com<CR>login anonymous<CR>[YourNetAddress]<CR>cd risks [volume-summary issues are in risks-*.00] [back volumes have their own subdirectories, e.g., "cd 19" for volume 19] or http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/VL.IS.html [i.e., VoLume, ISsue]. PostScript copy of PGN's comprehensive historical summary of one liners: illustrative.PS at ftp.sri.com/risks .

------------------------------

End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 20.05 ************************