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precedence: bulk Subject: Risks Digest 20.86

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Thursday 30 March 2000 Volume 20 : Issue 86

FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks) ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. ***** This issue is archived at <URL:http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/20.86.html> and by anonymous ftp at ftp.sri.com, cd risks .

Contents: More NASA woes in stress testing (PGN) Re: Faster, cheaper *not* better (PGN) More details on the Sea Launch failure (Steven Huang) Stephen King eBook cracked (Re: Pack, RISKS-20.85) California privacy legislation (Dan Gillmor) Criminal records in North Carolina (Joe Thompson) Judge issues injunction in software reverse-engineering case (NewsScan) Re: Hackers sued by software-filtering company (PGN, Ross Oliver) German ministry of family et al. and links to porn (Klaus Brunnstein) Privacy problems with HTTP cache-control (Martin Pool) Re: Northwest grounded for 3.5 hours after cable cut (Henry Spencer, Bob Dubery) Northwest Air fallout: MN backhoe affects FL hotel bookings! (William Smith) Re: MIT grade spreadsheet problem (Allan Duncan, Tony Lima, John Pearson) Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

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Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2000 12:12:19 PST From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com> Subject: More NASA woes in stress testing

NASA subjected its $75M 850-pound High Energy Solar Spectroscopic Imager spacecraft to preflight stress testing, and inadvertently managed to shake it for about 200 milliseconds at 20 (instead of 2) times the force of gravity. Computationally it looks like a small off-by-one error, except that it was one order of magnitude. The HESSI was seriously damaged, with two of its four solar panels cracked. However, it may be salvageable, having continued to function through the testing! [PGN-ed from various sources. It may need HESSIan solders to fix it?]

http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/science/DailyNews/hessi000323.html http://www.nytimes.com/library/national/science/032400sci-nasa-satellite.html

[Note: the 2000-pound PC noted in RISKS-20.85 was pounds Sterling. The 850 pounds above is of course weight. English is wonderfully ambiguous. Sorry for the confusion. PGN]

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Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2000 12:19:52 PST From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com> Subject: Re: Faster, cheaper *not* better

One of the problems associated with the hard landing of the Mars Lander is now believed to have been a software flaw: when the landing gear deployed, the software erroneously concluded landing had been achieved and ordered the engines to be shut down prematurely. [See media reports on 29 Mar 2000.] It is once again clear that faster and cheaper are typically not better. Lowest-common-denominator systems are sure-fire candidates for subsequent appearances in RISKS.

Doneel Edelson noted an AP item in *USA Today* on 22 Mar 2000 that discusses some of NASA's problems -- cutting employees too deeply (from 25,000 to 18,500 over 7 years) and losing veteran engineers, failures in communications between technical people and managers, etc. The article also notes that NASA administrator Daniel Goldin contradicted reports that NASA knew of a rocket-engine flaw that resulted in a mission loss.

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Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2000 16:50:30 -0500 From: Steven Huang <sthuang@hns.com> Subject: More details on the Sea Launch failure (RISKS-20.84)

According to a report filed by the Associated Press (http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/space/03/30/sealaunchfailure.ap/index.html), the investigation is identifying a configuration error, causing "a valve to remain open in the second stage pneumatic system", which is "involved in the operation and steering of the engine, and the loss of pressure would have reduced the performance so much that an onboard automatic flight termination system would have been triggered." The error is blamed on a ground-based system.

Steven Huang, MobileSat, Hughes Network Systems, 11717 Exploration Lane Germantown, MD 20876 (240) 453-2357

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Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2000 16:56:33 PST From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com> Subject: Stephen King eBook cracked (Re: Pack, RISKS-20.85)

Pirated PDF versions of Stephen King's "Riding the Bullet" have been circulating on the Internet since 17 Mar 2000. While many ISPs have forced members to remove the decrypted files, they are still available from a Swiss site, providing stark evidence of security weaknesses in PC-based eBook distribution systems. The episode has irked the companies developing such systems, who complain that export restrictions have kept them from using more powerful encryption techniques. [Source: "Cracking the Bullet: Hackers Decrypt PDF Version of Stephen King eBook, by Glenn Sanders and Wade Roush, 23 Mar 2000, full text at http://www.ebooknet.com/story.jsp?id=1671]

[But as RISKS readers know, strong crypto by itself is not enough.]

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Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2000 07:14:16 -0800 From: "Gillmor, Dan" <DGillmor@sjmercury.com> Subject: California privacy legislation

[We have been warning about identity theft for many years. It is now becoming a criminal art form. The following item is from the IP list of David Farber <farber@cis.upenn.edu>. PGN]

http://www.mercurycenter.com/svtech/columns/gillmor/docs/dg032800.htm

NOT too long ago, someone I know well suffered that most modern of crimes, identity theft. A crook got hold of useful information -- including her Social Security number -- and used it to create a fraudulent identity.

The victim discovered the fraud when bills started coming in for things she hadn't bought. Then ``I got letters from lawyers saying they were suing me because I hadn't paid,'' she says. The onus was on her to make things right with credit bureaus, financial institutions and the like -- and the paperwork was massive.

This kind of outrage is all too common. American businesses are all too casual with our Social Security numbers and other information. Greasing the wheels of commerce has been far, far more important than protecting people's privacy. Law enforcement, meanwhile, believes it has better things to do than investigate, much less prosecute, such crimes.

But you can almost feel privacy gaining strength as a public issue. The Internet Age has opened people's eyes, because people are beginning to see the consequences when all kinds of data ends up in databases that are open to anyone with sufficient cash.

Not many legislators -- federal, state or local -- have grasped the growing public angst until recently. One of several in the California Legislature who understood the issue early is state Sen. Debra Bowen, D-Redondo Beach, who has introduced several bills that would go a long way toward protecting you and me from predatory data practices.

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Date: Sun, 26 Mar 2000 20:18:38 -0500 (EST) From: kensey@crowley.orion-com.com (Joe Thompson) Subject: Criminal records in North Carolina

Some time ago I sent in an item (RISKS-20.17) about the new sex offender database in Virginia and how quickly errors were revealed. On a trip this weekend to the North Carolina Renaissance Faire, I was watching TV the evening I checked in and saw ads for "123nc.com". Apparently North Carolina has gone Virginia one better -- the Website allows visitors to search *all* criminal records in the state of North Carolina. The risks are the same kind but much magnified.

It's also worth noting that this site does *not* appear to be a state government operation. -- Joe

Joe Thompson | http://www.orion-com.com/~kensey/ spam+@orion-com.com

[Yes, Virginia, there is a sanity clause (bad pun prompted by the famous letter in the *Herald Tribune* many years ago). Virginia was also the first state to pass UCITA, the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, a horrendously bad piece of legislation. Incidentally, Maryland has just jumped on what we hope will not become a bandwagon. PGN]

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Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2000 08:25:03 -0700 From: "NewsScan" <newsscan@newsscan.com> Subject: Judge issues injunction in software reverse-engineering case

A federal judge in Boston has ordered a halt to distribution of the "cphack" software created by two computer hackers by reverse-engineering the commercially distributed "Cyber Patrol" program that allows parents to shield their children from pornography on the Internet. The judge's order also applies to any mirror Websites where the program has been made available. Peter Junger, a law professor and free speech advocate, calls the ruling "a rather horrifying challenge to people's right to write software" and to figure out how it works by taking it apart and examining it. [*USA Today* 17 Mar 2000; NewsScan Daily, 20 Mar 2000] http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cth570.htm

[Reverse engineering would be effectively outlawed wherever UCITA (noted above) passes. PGN]

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Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2000 12:29:33 PST From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com> Subject: Re: Hackers sued by software-filtering company (RISKS-20.84-85)

However, cphack had been *copyleft* under the Free Software Foundation's GPL General Public License (http://www.gnu.org), which among other things makes redistribution unrestricted.

For background, see Judge Harrington's order: http://www.politechbot.com/cyberpatrol/final-injunction.html Declan McCullagh reportage: http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,35244,00.html http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,35226,00.html http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,35216,00.html

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Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2000 13:58:23 -0800 From: "Ross Oliver" <reo@iwi.com> Subject: Re: Hackers sued by software-filtering company (RISKS-20.84-85)

In RISKS 20.85, Bear Giles writes:

>> To a critical mind, several questions scream out: >> - why are the blacklists encrypted? [...] >> - how would knowing that a site is on the blacklist permit a kid >> to access the blocked site?

Jansson and Skala do use the term "encrypted" to describe how CyberPatrol stores its blocklists. However, after reading the technical details, I think the term "compiled" is more accurate. The file format seems to be optimized for space and efficiency of loading and parsing, with obfuscation as only a side effect.

As to the second question, Jansson and Skala flatly state in their essay: "Now, let's review our goals. First, we want to break the authentication, so let's talk about that." They refer to the authentication for gaining administrative access, which can then be used to bypass the filter. And they proceed to do so, and tell the world how. This is what got CyberPatrol so ticked off. After the excrement hit the ventilating device, they draped themselves in free speech rhetoric and claims of fair use to justify their actions. Had they limited their analysis to the blocklist file format, CyberPatrol might have had much less legal and public relations leverage.

I am not attempting to defend the actions of the filter vendors. However, when dealing with any organization that claims the moral high ground, your credibility can be deeply affected if your actions are perceived to be questionable in any way. This is a common trap for many techno-rebels, especially youthful ones.

It is interesting to note that the major content filter vendors are repositioning themselves toward the business market. This shift could be because businesses have a more money to spend than parents and libraries, and businesses have much more latitude in the workplace to impose arbitrary restrictions.

Ross Oliver <reo@airaffair.com>

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Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2000 13:47:13 +0200 From: Klaus Brunnstein <brunnstein@informatik.uni-hamburg.de> Subject: German ministry of family et al. and links to porn

German tabloids and media discuss links to porno and sex related Websites which could be found on the homepage of the federal ministry of family, elderly people, women and youth. After some public uproar, the Website is closed now. Some media as well as "experts" from parties in the federal parliament tend to assume that these including these links has originated in the ministry itself (which would indeed be a serious case), but almost nobody is aware about how easy it is to hack unprotected Websites (in the absence of proper auditing, nothing is known how the links developed).

This case demonstrates several serious aspects of risks:

* despite assumptions that information flows into even remote corners of the "global village", German media and politicians are not aware of well-reported previous events where Websites of government and other institutions have been hacked (cases such as DoJ and Website hacking during Kosovo war have been reported via Internet :-)

* awareness of Internet InSecurity and demand for protective action seems to develop only after malevolent experience; in this sense, hacking may be understood as contributing to improved security, whereas the simple way to protect oneself from the beginning (e.g. by presenting ones Webpages by burning it into a CDR or protecting ones site by firewalls or "properly administrating Websites) is unattractively easy.

* Media and politicians approach the "Information Society" in too uncritical manner to observe its inherent InSecurity. In related discussions, I am often told (even by people with good knowledge of some Computer Science area :-), that Internet was founded as military technology, so it must be inherently secure. As contradicting facts are available easily (when searched for), the assumption that Internet is a heaven of Knowledge is hardly justified.

Regrettably, the security community contributes to misunderstanding risks by using terms such as "weaknesses" and "exploits" for software which is inherently insecure and unsafe: it is NOT a WEAKNESS which is exploited, but it is the basic nature that software is INSECURE and UNSAFE - at any speed (esp. at GigaBit instructions per second and GigaByte storage and GigaBaud :-) Evidently, it is high time for some "Ralph Nader" to rewrite that famous book "Unsafe at any speed" (then addressing problems in automobile manufacturing) for the carriers of the "Information Society", especially including The Internet.

[More on 30 Mar 2000]

The basic assumption that a ministry responsible for protecting the youth against illicit information (such as porn-related sites) shall guarantee, at least to some degree, the adequacy of the content of its Websites (including essential links against direct access to porno sites) proved to be wrong in the reported case. Indeed, the ministry's Webpage linked to a Website which lead directly (among many hundreds links related to "women interests") to Websites such as callboys.

I am glad to admit that Germany has, so far, not publicly observed any attack on a federal government Website. So, our federal government remains in its innocent status (concerning this aspect :-).

BUT: evidently, Webpage content quality assurance needs development, esp. on government level. One interesting risk now moves its head: how deep shall link levels be controlled for some sort of "coherence" with (at least: not directly contradicting) the intentions of the owner of the original Website? Setting aside the argument that addition of links to referenced Websites may practically not be controlled by the administration of the linking Website, responsibility of Website owners should *at least guarantee* that the *first link* does not point directly to Websites which contradict the intentions and interests of the original Website's owner. In critical cases, one may even require that 2nd-level links must also be assured. When it is true that every Website in The Internet may be reached with at most 7 clicks (as some German "experts" publicly argued), then it seems impracticable to control more than 2 link levels.

Moreover, every government Website should contain a disclaimer that the owner of the Website is not responsible for any link at higher levels, and that the owner's responsibility holds only for the day/time given as actual status ("last updated").

Consequently, "netiquette" must not only address responsible behaviour of customers but also for those offering Internet information.

Klaus Brunnstein (March 30,2000)

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Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2000 15:19:21 +1000 From: Martin Pool <mbp@LINUXCARE.COM> Subject: Privacy problems with HTTP cache-control

[Forwarded to RISKS by Lindsay Marshall, from junkbuster-users. PGN]

executive summary

HTTP cache-control headers such as If-Modified-Since allow servers to track individual users in a manner similar to cookies, but with less constraints. This is a problem for user privacy against which browsers currently provide little protection.

problem statement

Alice is browsing the Web; Bob runs a number of otherwise-unrelated Web servers. Alice makes several requests to Bob's servers over time. Bob would like to tie together as many as possible of the requests made by Alice to learn more about Alice's usage patterns and identity: we call this identifying the request chain. Alice would like to access Bob's servers but not give away this information.

existing approaches

cookies

The standard approach for associating user requests across several responses is the HTTP `Cookie' state-management extension. The Cookie response header allows a server to ask the client to store arbitrary short opaque data, which should be returned for future requests of that server matching particular criteria. Cookies are commonly used to store per-user form defaults, to manage Web application sessions, and to associate requests between executions of the user agent.

The user agent always has the option to just ignore the Set-Cookie response header, but most implementations default to obeying it to preserve functionality. Cookies can optionally specify an expiry time after which they should no longer be used, that they should persist on disk between client session, or that they should be passed only over transmission-level-secure connections.

The privacy implications of cookies have been [1]extensively discussed, and several problems have been found and recitified in the past. One example of privacy compromise through cookies is the use of cookies attached to banner images downloaded from a central banner server: the same cookie is used within images linked from several servers, and so the user can be tracked as they move around.

other approaches

An obvious means to associate requests is by source IP address. Over the short term this will generally work quite well, as a client is likely to use a single IP address during a browsing session. Even then it is complicated by proxies acting for multiple clients, network address translation, or multiuser machines. Over a longer term, the information is convolved by dynamically-assigned IPs, mobile computers moving between networks, dialup pools and the like. Indeed, cookies were proposed in large part to allow legitimate stateful applications to cope with the impossibility of uniquely identifying users by IP address.

the meantime exploit

The fundament of the meantime exploit is that the server wishes to `tag' the client with some information that will later be reported back, allowing the server to identify a chain. Cookies are a good approach to this, but their privacy implications are well known and so Bob requires a more surreptitious approach.

The HTTP cache-control headers are perfect for this: the data is provided by the server, stored but not verified by the client, and then provided verbatim back to the server on the next matching request.

Two headers in particular are useful: Last-Modified and ETag. Both are designed to help the client and server negotiate whether to use a cached copy or fetch the resource again.

The general approach of meantime is that rather than using the headers for their intended purpose, Bob's servers will instead send down a unique tag for the client.

Last-Modified is constrained to be a date, and therefore is somewhat inflexible. Nevertheless, the server can reasonably choose any second since the Unix epoch, which allows it to tag on the order of one billion distinct clients.

ETag allows an arbitrary short string to be stored and passed. It is not so commonly implemented in user agents at the moment, and so not such a good choice.

In both cases the tag will be lost if the client discards the resource from its cache, or if it does not request the exact same resource in the future, or if the request is unconditional. (For example, Netscape sends an unconditional response when the user presses Shift+Reload.) Bob has less control over this than he has with cookies, which can be instructed to persist for an arbitrarily long period.

The date is sent back only for the exact same URL, including any query parameters. By contrast, cookies can be returned for all resources in a site or section of a site. This makes Bob's job a little harder.

Bob therefore should make sure that all pages link to a small common resource: perhaps a one-pixel image. This image is generated by a script that supplies and records a unique timestamp to each client, and records whatever is already present.

For a demonstration, more explanation and details, please see

http://www.linuxcare.com.au/mbp/meantime/

Martin Pool, Linuxcare, Inc. Linuxcare. +61 2 6262 8990 mbp@linuxcare.com, http://www.linuxcare.com/

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Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2000 22:03:26 -0500 (EST) From: Henry Spencer <henry@spsystems.net> Subject: Re: Northwest grounded for 3.5 hours after cable cut (Dixon, R-20.85)

>When will people learn they need to know where their redundancy lies? >Cables run through the same conduit are only partially redundant...

Alas, merely wanting the information is not enough. The wire/fiber providers often are not particularly forthcoming with this information; worse, typically it is subject to change without notice. They have deeply-ingrained organizational beliefs that (a) it's nobody's business but theirs where the wires run, and (b) a wire is a wire and which conduit it goes through doesn't matter. If memory serves, even customers whose contracts explicitly called for routing diversity have been bitten by this.

[Virginia, again. Two adjacent fiber cables were severed in Annandale VA on 14 Jun 1991, taking out 80K circuits. I believe that after the White Plains NY ARPAnet cable cut that cut all 7 links to New England, either AP or UPI (or perhaps even both) had insisted that their connections should be in different conduits. The outage affected AP, UPI, and Pentagon, among others. (See RISKS-11.92). PGN]

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Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2000 07:13:51 +0200 From: "Bob Dubery" <bdubery@netcare.co.za> Subject: Re: Northwest grounded for 3.5 hours after cable cut (Dixon, R-20.85)

A recent edition of *New Scientist* carried a short report on an international telecomm conference. One of the interesting points in that report was that Singapore has an enviably low rate of telephone and data cable outages. The reason? If a cable is cut by a building crew then the foreman gets to spend time in jail.

That's draconian. But cables, and the information that they carry, are now so important to businesses, commerce, and, increasingly, to public safety and transport, that contracts should stipulate penalties to be imposed in the case of cable breaks.

The risk of not doing so is becoming increasingly obvious.

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Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2000 10:48:18 -0500 From: "William P. N. Smith" <wpns@compusmiths.com> Subject: Northwest Air fallout: MN backhoe affects FL hotel bookings!

From the *Orlando Sentinel* (orlandosentinel.com), Northwest Airlines had to book 50 rooms at the Orlando Airport Hyatt Regency when they lost most of their comm lines recently due to backhoe fade. They didn't say if other Northwest counters had to book hotels in other airports, but I can't imagine they didn't.

Yet another example of how interconnected things are, how single points of failure you never knew existed can cause havoc, and how we discover those same single points of failure (the hard way). Don't get me started on how tightly scheduled the airlines, airports, and flight crews are, where a few minutes of delay in one flight can ripple through the system and cause innumerable delays for the rest of the day.

William Smith wpns@compusmiths.com N1JBJ@amsat.org ComputerSmiths Consulting, Inc. www.compusmiths.com

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Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2000 13:05:46 +1100 (EST) From: Allan Duncan <a.duncan@trl.telstra.com.au> Subject: Re: MIT grade spreadsheet problem (Franklin, RISKS-20.85)

The problem of the spread-sheet sort scrambling data has been around for a while. MS Excel, Office 97 and before can do it, but only recently did I catch it in the act and as a result deduce the trigger.

If you have a spread-sheet with some blank entries in the top row, as may well happen if there is no headings row, then the columns with the blank top elements will not be included in the sort.

There may be other requirements as well, but in the case at hand that was the necessary condition.

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Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2000 18:55:55 -0800 From: Tony Lima <TonyLima@ms.spacebbs.com> Subject: Re: MIT grade spreadsheet problem (Franklin, RISKS-20.85)

"When the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail." The real problem here is using spreadsheet software when record integrity is required. That implies use of some sort of decent database program -- which Excel and other spreadsheets are not.

Over the 25 years I've been teaching college, I've experimented with a variety of grading media. On the rare occasions when I teach a class with over 100 students, I use a standard dbf file structure (usually with some version of Foxpro). Otherwise, I use the only tool I've found that meets my criteria of durability, portability and readability: a deck of 3x5 index cards, one card per student. - Tony Lima (professor of economics, Cal. State Hayward)

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Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2000 16:58:09 +1030 From: John Pearson <huiac@camtech.net.au> Subject: Re: MIT grade spreadsheet problem (Franklin, RISKS-20.85)

Am I alone in thinking that this misses the obvious point that the error arose because the coordinator used a spreadsheet to do a database's job? [Evidently not. See Tony Lima's message! PGN]

Application vendors have spent considerable effort adding features to word processors and spreadsheets that extend their areas of application, without necessarily improving the usability and reliability of their product; in this case it sounds like vi, sort and awk may have been more reliable candidates for the job.

This specific risk is one I encountered more than once while working in the public sector; at the time it was tolerated because of the huge disparity between the cost and availability of spreadsheets (typically, bundled with your word processor or the PC itself) and database software (several hundred dollars, often with only rudimentary reporting and presentation capabilities).

Are things still that bad, or are people really that resistant to the idea of using the right tool for the job?

[It's as old as the Code of Hammer-Robbie! PGN]

John P. <huiac@camtech.net.au> <john@huiac.apana.org.au>

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Date: 13 Dec 1999 (LAST-MODIFIED) From: RISKS-request@csl.sri.com Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

The RISKS Forum is a MODERATED digest. Its Usenet equivalent is comp.risks. => SUBSCRIPTIONS: PLEASE read RISKS as a newsgroup (comp.risks or equivalent) if possible and convenient for you. Alternatively, via majordomo, SEND DIRECT E-MAIL REQUESTS to <risks-request@csl.sri.com> with one-line, SUBSCRIBE (or UNSUBSCRIBE) [with net address if different from FROM:] or INFO [for unabridged version of RISKS information] .MIL users should contact <risks-request@pica.army.mil> (Dennis Rears). .UK users should contact <Lindsay.Marshall@newcastle.ac.uk>. => The INFO file (submissions, default disclaimers, archive sites, copyright policy, PRIVACY digests, etc.) is also obtainable from http://www.CSL.sri.com/risksinfo.html ftp://www.CSL.sri.com/pub/risks.info The full info file will appear now and then in future issues. *** All contributors are assumed to have read the full info file for guidelines. *** => SUBMISSIONS: to risks@CSL.sri.com with meaningful SUBJECT: line. => ARCHIVES are available: ftp://ftp.sri.com/risks or ftp ftp.sri.com<CR>login anonymous<CR>[YourNetAddress]<CR>cd risks [volume-summary issues are in risks-*.00] [back volumes have their own subdirectories, e.g., "cd 19" for volume 19] or http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/VL.IS.html [i.e., VoLume, ISsue]. Also, new AUSTRALIAN archives at http://mirror.aarnet.edu.au/risks/ and http://the.wiretapped.net/security/textfiles/risks-digest/ . PostScript copy of PGN's comprehensive historical summary of one liners: illustrative.PS at ftp.sri.com/risks .

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End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 20.86 ************************