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_______________________________________________________________________________ Title: Government Management Issues Subtitle:

Report No.: GAO/OCG-93-3TR Date: December 1992 _______________________________________________________________________________ Author: United States General Accounting Office Office of the Comptroller General

Addressee: Transition Series

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CONTENTS

The State Of Management In The Federal Government - Changing The Way The Government Manages Learning From The Experience Of Other Governments Creating A Framework For Addressing Management Problems - Clarifying Accountability And Managing For Results - Focusing On The Long Term - Realigning The Machinery Of Government Related GAO Products - Management Reform - Reviews Of Central Management Agencies - Assessments Of Increased Management Flexibility Transition Series - Economics - Management - Program Areas

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Office of the Comptroller General Washington, DC 20548

December 1992

The Speaker of the House of Representatives The Majority Leader of the Senate

In response to your request, this transition series report on government management addresses important policy and management issues facing the Congress and the new administration. This report assesses the incentives and constraints that managers face in their efforts to achieve program results. In that context, it sets the stage for our related transition series reports dealing with financial and information management, program evaluation, and public service issues.

Efforts are under way in state governments, other countries, and some federal agencies to address similar problems. Taken together, these efforts have laid the groundwork for broader action on the part of the federal government. What is needed now is specific action. This report outlines the key elements of a management improvement framework that should be considered at the federal level.

The GAO products upon which this report is based are listed at the end of the report.

We are also sending copies of this report to the President-elect, the Republican leadership of the Congress, the appropriate congressional committees, the Director-designate of the Office of Management and Budget, and other appropriate officials.

Signed: Charles A. Bowsher

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THE STATE OF MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The state of management in the federal government is not good. Too many principles, structures, and processes that may have worked well years ago no longer allow the government to respond quickly and effectively to a rapidly changing world.

For too long, progress in changing the situation has been slow. Incremental improvements have occurred. But time and again over the past decade, our management reviews of large federal agencies and departments have shown that the processes and systems fundamental to a well-run organization are often not present. Most agencies have not created a strategic vision of their futures, most lack good systems to collect and use financial and program information to gauge operational success and accountability, and many do not have the people with the necessary skills to accomplish their missions.

These elements are essential for any organization to succeed. But they usually do not command the attention of senior political officials coming into the government. After all, these elements do not appear to be directly related to the development of an administration's policies or programs and therefore do not seem important to achieve a political agenda. However, many of our audit reports demonstrate the effects of leaders' inattention to these elements--waste, inefficiency, and even scandal. Political leaders then have to spend too much time and energy reacting to surprises resulting from management failures rather than pursuing the mission of their agencies and their policy agenda. For example, our work has shown that lack of attention to these critical elements has led to the following types of problems:

-- In 1989, a series of major, well-publicized problems involving widespread waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement began unfolding at the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Poorly designed programs and controls made it relatively easy for developers and lenders to exploit the Department's programs, costing the government billions of dollars.

-- The Department of Defense's (DOD) acquisition programs are vulnerable to influence peddling. This was the focus of the "Ill Wind" investigation, which involved more than 250 subpoenas for documents and evidence on the activities of over 50 private consultants and more than a dozen defense companies and industry executives, as well as DOD officials. Convictions resulted, but the system and controls still need to be improved.

-- Defaults in the Guaranteed Student Loan Program skyrocketed to $3.6 billion in 1991. The program is plagued by inordinately complex and cumbersome practices, lacks sufficient oversight, and places most of the financial risk on the federal government. Even if the program's structure were to be reformed, serious weaknesses in the Department of Education's financial and management systems would make it difficult to manage its multibillion-dollar programs and could overwhelm the effects of any potential reform measures.

-- Widespread weaknesses in financial controls at DOD have permitted the expenditure of about $40 billion for unneeded purchases and have significantly increased the risk of waste, loss, and theft. DOD continues to make unneeded purchases because its information systems are so poor that, in many cases, it does not know what items it already has in stock.

-- The $110 billion Medicare program has lost billions of dollars to waste, fraud, and abuse in recent years. The Department of Health and Human Services does not properly manage its contractors' efforts to recover improper expenditures. Also, loose controls over who can bill Medicare have made the pursuit of fraudulent providers difficult. In addition, too little money is earmarked by the Congress to do the job right. For example, contractors paid an estimated $2 billion in claims that should have been paid by other health insurers, but recovering these funds would require additional staff, which in turn would require cutting spending elsewhere.

-- The Department of Veterans Affairs has not integrated its currently separate information systems into one that is capable of sharing and accessing data across all program areas. Nor has it reengineered its administrative processes as it has modernized its computer systems. For example, it recently spent $94 million to modernize its benefit delivery process but shortened the process by only 6 to 12 days out of 151 days, on average. As a result, the Department's planned purchase of additional computer hardware and software may be premature.

-- The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), which is responsible for managing and selling assets totaling over $400 billion for an estimated 725 failed thrifts, has been unable to effectively execute sales strategies for a large portion of the real property it holds because it cannot track the status of many of its assets even though it spent $27 million on a computerized tracking system. Some properties have been sold for significantly less than their appraised value, and others cannot be sold because RTC and prospective buyers do not know whether the properties have clear titles.

-- Federal hiring mechanisms are burdensome and complex, making it difficult to get qualified people. For example, the examination process introduced in 1990 for job applicants for over 90 entry-level positions imposed procedures that effectively broke the link between an agency's recruiting and hiring functions for all but the top academic achievers. As a result, there is no guarantee that agencies can hire many of the candidates they interview on college campuses. Applicants may get job offers from agencies for which they have no desire to work.

Because the government has not addressed many of its fundamental management problems, we are issuing specific transition reports on financial management, information management, program evaluation, and public service issues.

_Financial Management Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-4TR, Dec. 1992) discusses widespread financial management weaknesses that are preventing our leaders from running the federal government effectively. At present, the federal government runs the world's largest financial operation without having the reliable information needed for making informed decisions. It spends about $1.5 trillion annually using unreliable systems and ineffective controls. And it manages hundreds of programs, many of them individually larger than our nation's biggest publicly owned corporations, without adequate knowledge of their financial condition and of the results achieved. This devastating legacy is the product of decades of neglect.

_Information Management and Technology Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-5TR, Dec. 1992) points out that the federal government spends over $20 billion annually on new technology--and tens of billions more on running current systems. Yet agency after agency still lacks critical information needed to analyze programmatic issues, manage agency resources, control expenditures, and demonstrate measurable results. Causes contributing to these problems include (1) the inattention of top federal executives to the strategic role of information technology in reengineering business practices; (2) the lack of authority and resources given to information resource managers to help their agencies modernize and simplify work practices, define information needs, and ensure the most effective use of information resources; and (3) the demand for certainty in the system development process--prescribed by the federal acquisition management and budget process--which leads project managers to downplay risks and problems.

_Program Evaluation Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-6TR, Dec. 1992) discusses the consequences of the continuing decline in the capacity for effective program evaluation in the executive branch. It shows that agencies lack information on the effectiveness of their programs; lack data on the targeting and outreach of their programs; and need to improve their capacity to make sound decisions on the use of data for policy-making.

_The Public Service_ (GAO/OCG-93-7TR, Dec. 1992) discusses what the government must do to attract and retain high-quality people, meet the public's performance expectations, and regain a positive public image. It must (1) modernize its practices for recruiting, hiring, and structuring benefits; (2) examine complex and restrictive laws, regulations, and processes that have hampered its ability to manage its workforce; (3) fully implement pay reform to make federal salaries ultimately competitive with the private sector's; and (4) rebuild a positive public image by aggressively implementing strong ethics programs.

This report assesses the incentives and constraints that managers face in their efforts to achieve results. Too often, managers face conflicting priorities and constraints that discourage good management. Consequently, they spend too much time responding to these constraints and not enough time delivering quality program results.

=============================================================================== CHANGING THE WAY THE GOVERNMENT MANAGES

Over the past decade, many private sector organizations recognized that they would have to change their cultures and processes to survive in a rapidly changing world. As a result, they have decentralized authority, flattened organizational structures, increased employees' involvement in and control over the workplace, and focused more on the needs of their customers. These trends are improving quality and quickening response to customers' needs.

The federal government is obviously not going out of business, but its ability and capacity to serve the public have clearly diminished. We must change the way we manage the government if we are to improve its efficiency and effectiveness and restore public confidence. But making the changes will not be easy because the federal government poses the following unique challenges:

-- The federal government is overwhelmingly large. It employs over 3.1 million civilians in 14 executive departments and more than 60 independent agencies and government corporations. It spends about $1.5 trillion a year--more than the entire Gross Domestic Product of Germany, which has the third largest economy in the world.

-- The political environment and the operating cultures in many agencies resist efforts to define clear missions for specific programs. For many programs, missions are ambiguous--as the slogan "ameliorate poverty" suggests--and for others, multiple objectives, often without priorities, can challenge federal managers.

-- The federal government does not directly control many of the services that it delivers. Although its agencies provide many services directly--veteran's health care and social security checks, for example--it relies more frequently on states, localities, nonprofit agencies, and profit-making contractors to deliver its services. The federal government grants over $180 billion a year to third parties and contracts for another $190 billion in goods and services.

-- The federal government, unlike a number of other countries' governments, relies heavily on noncareer executives to manage its programs. About 500 full-time positions in the executive branch are appointed by the President and require confirmation by the Senate, and another 2,600 positions may be appointed by the White House and the heads of departments or agencies.

The unique challenges posed by our government should not, however, be an excuse for inaction. Several countries have initiated strategies to change their organizational cultures and introduced incentives to create a results-oriented environment and improve the management of their governments. So have some states. Through our analysis of these initiatives and our management reviews of major federal departments and agencies over the past decade, we have identified some fundamental obstacles that cut across agencies and departments and must be overcome if we are to better manage our government. These obstacles include

-- diffuse accountability for achieving results,

-- incentives that encourage short-term responses to long-term problems, and

-- antiquated government machinery.

The remainder of this report (1) presents the approaches that other governments have used to address these same obstacles and (2) offers a framework for action within which the federal government can also begin to manage for results. We must overcome these obstacles if we are to improve the government's efficiency and effectiveness and restore public confidence.

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LEARNING FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The U.S. government is not alone in attempting to address major management problems. Governments in countries such as Australia, Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and Sweden began in the mid-1980s to rethink how their public sectors operated and to create a more results-oriented environment. Furthermore, governments in some states--such as Florida, Minnesota, Oregon, and Texas--have recently begun to do the same. While these governments may not all have succeeded in making sweeping changes, their experience is instructive and applicable to the federal government.

Much like the federal government, a number of these national and state governments were dissatisfied with their public service in the mid-1980s. Some faced economic crises that led to major cuts in public spending, and their leaders were committed to changing the way government worked. They started by assessing their operating environments and came to a variety of conclusions along similar lines:

-- Public servants were by and large committed and hard working; the problem was the system in which they had to work.

-- Bureaucratic constraints rather than missions drove management behavior.

-- Management cultures tolerated few or no mistakes; elaborate check-and-control systems that had been instituted to prevent mistakes stifled innovation.

-- Managers lacked control over any savings they generated; hence, they had few incentives to be efficient.

-- Large and inefficient bureaucracies adversely affected global competitiveness.

In general, these governments tried to change incentives for individual managers and organizational cultures across their entire public service. All of them emphasized achieving results by introducing quasimarket mechanisms and incentives similar to those used in the private sector, including competition, a focus on the customer, a focus on quality, and clear standards and accountability. The following points demonstrate the range of strategies employed.

To clarify accountability, they

-- recast their budget focus from accounting for inputs to emphasizing programs, outputs, and results. Quality results were shaped by program customers' needs.

-- separated policy-making functions from program administration within departments.

-- used written individual and organizational performance agreements between the department and agency heads responsible for program administration to better define and clarify program missions and intended results.

-- made organizational changes between departments to reduce conflicts in program missions and to consolidate similar functions.

To create a longer-term focus in addressing management issues, they

-- broke out agencies' operating budgets separately and created a 3-year rolling budget so that agencies would know what their next year's operating budgets would be. Although funds continued to be appropriated annually, their version of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was committed to supporting the next year's funding levels.

-- gave top agency managers performance agreements of up to 5 years.

To provide incentives and tools to be more results oriented, they

-- changed the roles of their central agencies from controllers to facilitators. To different degrees, program agencies were empowered to take lead responsibility for control in specific areas. These governments' versions of OMB, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and the General Services Administration (GSA) transformed their own roles to provide oversight and guidance. As service providers, they became more customer oriented.

-- increased managers' control over operating budgets by allowing them to

-- simplify and streamline appropriation accounts and budget execution procedures;

-- hire and fire staff and set their own pay levels and rewards for staff; and

-- buy their own equipment and negotiate rents outside of their responsible central agency if they could save money by doing so.

-- introduced incentives to manage efficiently by

-- requiring efficiency savings but permitting agencies to retain a share of the savings beyond the agreed-upon targets;

-- introducing the concept of risk management, which weighs the costs and benefits of administrative controls; and

-- increasing the use of internal and external user charges.

The results of these initiatives have not been comprehensively assessed because many of the initiatives are still in early phases. However, in our view, initial results are encouraging. The public service in these countries' governments, as well as in some state governments, has been energized to act, and government operations have changed substantially. Officials from these governments told us there was little likelihood of returning to past practices. And reports from these governments seem to confirm that point of view, as the following examples show:

-- A 1991 review of Great Britain's management improvements concluded, "There are . . . extended opening hours to meet customer needs. New products and services are being introduced. Facilities for clients are being improved and services are generally being delivered faster and more accurately. Waiting times have been reduced." And this was all done while reducing agencies' operating budgets.

-- A 1990 review concluded that Australia's improvement efforts had not only achieved financial savings but had also improved public sector management by introducing a more flexible budget framework and creating a management focus on results. Australia is currently assessing the impact of its efforts on service to the public.

-- A 1992 study concluded that Minnesota had improved the provision of central services for staffing, purchasing, and information resource management by giving departmental managers the flexibility to design individual strategies to improve service levels or decrease service costs. The strategies incorporated concepts such as customer focus, employee involvement, strategic planning, and managerial discretion. Satisfaction surveys of the central divisions' customers revealed significant improvements in the timeliness and quality of the services received.

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CREATING A FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The creation of a results-oriented environment in the governments of some other countries and of some states has been directed primarily from the top by a committed cadre of managers. These managers have focused on changing the culture, incentives, and systems that managers used in their day-to-day work. Similarly, in the federal government, many policymakers and managers have been working hard for long periods to improve the basic systems necessary to overcome the management problems facing federal agencies. But we have not changed our government's culture and incentives enough to create a results-oriented environment.

Nonetheless, some progress has been made. In the past few years, federal agencies have given increasing emphasis to changing their organizational cultures to become more customer and quality oriented. Many components of federal agencies have been using total quality management (TQM) techniques to stimulate cultural change. TQM is an approach aimed at improving the quality of services by focusing on the needs of customers and achieving continuous improvement.

A significant number of federal organizations are voluntarily implementing TQM. About 68 percent of the federal components that we surveyed in mid-1992 reported that they were in various phases of implementing TQM--most in the early phases. Although TQM is being initiated on a fairly wide scale, the depth of employee involvement is still shallow; about 13 percent were involved at the time of our survey. We also found that, as their TQM efforts developed and matured, organizations reported fewer barriers and more employee involvement. More importantly, the level of reported benefits attributed to TQM efforts--improved customer service, timeliness, and reduction in costs--increased substantially for federal installations as their implementation of TQM progressed.

However, the pace and scope of management improvement efforts need to be accelerated and expanded if there is to be any real improvement in the delivery of services to the public. How can this be accomplished? It will not be easy or quick. But progress can be made within a three-part framework that would place greater emphasis on achieving results by (1) clarifying accountability, (2) emphasizing a long-term focus, and (3) realigning the machinery of government.

=============================================================================== CLARIFYING ACCOUNTABILITY AND MANAGING FOR RESULTS

The first step is to clarify accountability and manage for results.

_______________________________________________________________________________ Developing Strategic Plans

Agencies need to develop long-term strategies targeted to achieving programmatic outcomes. Agencies also must develop measures of performance and publicly report results.

OMB has been encouraging agencies to develop programmatic missions, goals, and objectives and link them to performance through its implementation of the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act. As part of this effort, it has called on agencies to experiment with and develop program measures and related cost information and report this information in their annual financial statements. An extensive study of users' needs by the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board has shown a desire for more information on both the accomplishments and costs of government programs.

However, given the frequent turnover in top management in federal agencies and the long-term nature of creating useful performance measures, it is appropriate to create a legislative framework. For example, using the CFO Act as a foundation, steps could be taken to improve accountability for program results. In establishing the requisite framework, several principles should be kept in mind:

-- Agencies need to articulate their missions in the context of statutory objectives and, with regard to services, customers' expectations. These objectives need to be written in terms that can be used to judge progress toward achieving them. Every effort should be made to reach agreement among the Congress, OMB, and the executive agencies on realistic, outcome-oriented goals, recognizing that agreement will not always be possible.

-- Agencies need to develop implementation plans for their goals and objectives as well as specific measures of progress toward achieving them. Measurable interim targets should be set for agencies' operations so that assessments of progress can begin.

-- Agencies need to report annually on their progress. The Congress must be actively involved in overseeing agencies' performance in key areas. If the Congress does not take performance results seriously, neither will the agencies.

The Congress recently considered legislation that encompasses this framework for accountability. This legislation would require all agencies to develop strategic plans, set agreed-upon goals and objectives, and measure their progress toward these goals and objectives. [ Footnote 1: S. 20, "Government Performance and Results Act of 1992," 102nd Congress, cosponsored by Senators William V. Roth, John Glenn, and William S. Cohen. ] It would also allow pilot agencies to test whether increased managerial flexibilities--such as exemptions from restrictions on funding transfers among certain budget object classifications--are appropriate incentives for encouraging managers to focus on programmatic results. Action on this type of legislation should be high on the agenda of the 103rd Congress.

_______________________________________________________________________________ Improving Financial and Program Information

Reliable financial and program data need to be available. A central first step toward improving decision-making and accountability is to effectively implement the CFO Act. This act provides an important blueprint for improving financial accountability for results by requiring the development of needed systems, the hiring of qualified people, and the linking of accounting and budgeting information.

Concerted action is required by both the executive and legislative branches to ensure that good financial management becomes a reality. This will entail

-- ensuring strong leadership and commitment to financial management within the agencies and OMB;

-- improving the accuracy of data and the soundness of internal controls in agencies;

-- expanding financial auditing in agencies;

-- strengthening the qualifications of financial management personnel;

-- reengineering the government's financial management processes to integrate accounting, budgeting, and program activities and information; and

-- developing useful and relevant financial reports that emphasize accountability and operating performance.

Likewise, a commitment by both the executive and legislative branches to improving information technology is crucial. Agencies need to adopt a management philosophy that emphasizes the continuous streamlining of business processes, which should precede the development and acquisition of automated systems. Adoption of this philosophy implies the appointment of top-level executives who are familiar with the uses of information technology in simplifying business practices and who can devote full attention to this issue. Even though agency budgets are tight, the information management function must be supported with adequate staff resources because the potential long-term paybacks for the agency make this a key area for added investments. In addition, given the existing constraints in the budget and acquisition processes, experimentation may be appropriate to develop a broad-based agreement on new management models needed to build an effective information technology infrastructure in federal agencies.

_______________________________________________________________________________ Creating a Results-Oriented Environment

Several pilot programs have been established in various federal agencies to create a more results-oriented environment. For example, OMB and the Railroad Retirement Board agreed on a prototype of a performance agreement with specific measures of results as a tool for increasing the Board's accountability. And the Defense Business Operations Fund is attempting to focus the Defense Department's delivery of support services more effectively on customers and plans to allocate funds on the basis of performance.

Other smaller-scale initiatives are under way to reduce controls in areas such as human resource management, procurement, and budget to create a results-oriented environment in several agencies. As noted earlier, proposed legislation would foster a series of pilot programs through which agencies would obtain waivers from central management agency regulations but not from statutory provisions. If successful after 3 years, agencies would be granted permanent waivers. We believe that this flexible, incremental approach has merit.

Managers must be given the incentives and tools to create a results-oriented work environment. Without incentives and tools to manage for results, managers have little control over their operations. Consequently, they focus more on complying with the accountability controls placed on them (which often have multiple objectives) than on achieving their agencies' overall missions. These controls affect their hiring, promoting, and rewarding; create a rule-intensive procurement and contracting maze; and rigidly regulate funds. As in the financial and information technology areas, creating a consensus for change will be important. There are no easy answers; therefore, it will be important for all parties involved to have the willingness and flexibility to experiment with different approaches.

=============================================================================== FOCUSING ON THE LONG TERM

A fundamental cause for inaction is anchored in the short-term mentality created by the political appointment process, the budget process, and underinvestment in the public service.

_______________________________________________________________________________ Developing Continuity in Leadership

Leadership issues need to move to the forefront, and developing continuity is important. The following actions can create the right environment:

-- Ensure that people with the appropriate skills and experience are selected for top management positions.

Governmentwide, these positions would include the deputy director for management and the controller in OMB, the deputy secretaries responsible for overall management of cabinet departments, and the chief financial officers and senior information management officials in government agencies. The Senate, through its confirmation process, has an important role in ensuring the qualifications of nominees for such positions.

-- Ensure that these people will make a sustained commitment to addressing long-term management problems in addition to focusing on policy issues. This includes encouraging them to stay in office for longer periods and planning for good succession, when needed.

-- Continue improvements that are already under way, such as staffing OMB's management function, implementing the CFO Act in agencies, and developing strategic plans in departments and agencies. To support these efforts, the Congress can ensure that funds are available to carry out these actions.

In general, the accountability of top political appointees has been a concern. In a number of other countries, fewer political appointees are found in the upper levels of government, and individual and organizational performance agreements are being used to clarify accountability and responsibilities. While such agreements may not be directly transferable to the U.S. government, the President and the Director of OMB should consider using written organizational performance agreements between department and agency heads to better define and clarify program missions, intended results, and the facts that will be used to measure continuous improvements.

Currently, the performance management systems in agencies tend, for the most part, to assess the activities of career individuals and are not results oriented. For example, in cases where performance agreements are used as a tool to manage the performance of individuals, the results expected of career senior executives are tied to measures of program performance in only about one-third of the largest agencies. In addition, political appointees are not required to have performance agreements; currently, their relationship with the President and other senior political appointees is much less formal.

_______________________________________________________________________________ Revising the Budget Process

The way the federal government manages and the way it budgets are interrelated. The budget process should be reassessed as part of any overall effort to create a longer-term focus on management. The following changes should be part of that assessment:

-- Require the use of accrual concepts, where appropriate, to heighten the recognition of the effects of long-term costs. As mentioned earlier, the existing cash-based budget structure fosters a short-term focus. Expanding the use of accrual concepts, where appropriate, would ensure that the full costs of current decisions are recognized. For example, the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 recast the budgetary treatment of loan and loan guarantee programs to fully recognize their subsidy costs.

-- Create a longer-term framework for budget policy decisions by highlighting the differences between spending that contributes to long-term economic growth and spending for current consumption. The current budget process does not formally recognize the different long-term economic effects of various programs. Decisionmakers need to be able to see the distinctions between investment programs and current consumption programs when making choices. In addition, more reliable information on the rates of return among alternative types of investment programs is needed.

-- The budget needs to focus decisionmakers on the results of their choices among competing objectives. Considerable performance information is currently provided in agency budget justifications, but little is known about how reported performance relates to objectives and spending. Carefully chosen pilot projects may be appropriate to develop these links. For selected programs, budget information could be reported on a program basis along with the program's strategic goals and related performance information.

_______________________________________________________________________________ Strengthening the Public Service

Human resource issues need to be dealt with seriously if the public service is to provide the leadership necessary to address the management problems facing the government. Both financial investments and steps such as the following are essential to improve the public service:

-- Rebuild a positive public image for the public service to restore the public's confidence in government and to make it an attractive career choice.

-- Modernize the government's employment policies, in general, to recognize and accommodate the dramatic demographic changes--primarily the growth in the number of women employees--that have occurred in the nation's workforce.

-- Enhance the government's ability to effectively manage its workforce by giving agencies more flexibility to manage the performance of their employees.

-- Ensure full implementation of the Federal Employees Pay Comparability (Pay Reform) Act of 1990 to help make the government a more attractive employer and, thereby, enhance agencies' abilities to recruit and retain the quality employees needed to carry out the agencies' responsibilities.

=============================================================================== REALIGNING THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT

The roles of the central management agencies should be reassessed and the organizational structures of individual agencies should be reevaluated.

_______________________________________________________________________________ Reorienting the Central Management Agencies

In recent years, the central management agencies--OMB, GSA, and OPM--have gradually shifted from controlling agencies to helping them take the lead in a series of areas. This trend needs to be accelerated.

Decreasing central management controls and giving line managers the authority to act within an overall framework of results-oriented objectives have been significant management trends in private corporations and in the governments of some states and other countries during the past decade. Some of these governments consciously set out to devolve certain functions traditionally held by their central management agencies to line agencies. They have, for example, broadened the authority of individual agencies to classify personnel positions, recruit staff, acquire office space, and determine appropriation draw-down rates. Broadening agencies' authority to act within a defined framework seemed, in the other governments we studied, to give managers the incentive to focus on results instead of complying with top-down constraints.

In the last decade, the federal government's central management agencies have begun to serve a support role and to delegate authority to act in certain areas. As noted earlier, credit for this is partly attributable to OMB's creation of a deputy director for management position. OMB's management staff has increased its emphasis on assisting--rather than directing--agencies in resolving their management problems.

The increased willingness to delegate to agencies the authority to act is partly attributable to OMB's support for the TQM movement. The increased willingness also may be attributable to OMB's efforts to promote the development and use of performance measures. Because these two efforts are creating an environment in which central management agencies can focus on results and reduce controls on the use of inputs, it will be critical not to lose the widespread momentum behind TQM and performance measurement as new staff take over the top leadership positions in these agencies in early 1993.

In addition, the Pay Reform Act of 1990 gave agencies a wider range of tools to pay and reward staff. Likewise, GSA has delegated limited authority to agencies to manage their properties and leases. GSA and OPM should be encouraged to continue these efforts to broaden agencies' authority to act and identify opportunities to expand these efforts. Our transition series report _General Services Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-28TR, Dec. 1992) provides a context for the directions that GSA might take to focus more on policy and less on delivering direct services.

_______________________________________________________________________________ Reexamining Agencies' Organizational Structures

Agencies' organizational structures influence the environment in which agencies' managers must operate. These structures should be reexamined to determine whether they impede a results orientation. We have traced major management problems in specific agencies--such as the Customs Service and the Departments of Agriculture and Veterans Affairs--to outdated organizational structures.

For example, the Department of Agriculture has an extensive and costly field structure of 11,000 field offices, many of which date from the 1930s--before highways, computers, and universal telephone coverage facilitated communication. In the past 60 years, Agriculture's responsibilities have changed radically, and the number of farmers has decreased significantly. But the Department's field structure has not changed, in part because of political pressures. As a result, it has many underused field offices that could be consolidated to create annual savings of more than $100 million.

But the need to address organizational issues does not rest solely with individual agencies. For example, the jurisdictions of some congressional committees overlap and create conflicting priorities within some agencies. A joint congressional study committee has recently been chartered to examine the scope of committee jurisdictions. Likewise, in the executive branch, duplicative organizations in areas such as competitiveness, the drug war, and law enforcement have frequently been targeted for restructuring to be more results oriented. Efforts that go beyond a single agency will take substantial dedication to resolve. Several executive branch reorganization bills, or study commissions, were proposed in the 102nd Congress, but no action was taken. Under the new administration, efforts to restructure the executive branch will need to be rejuvenated in order to better focus the resources of government on accomplishing specific missions.

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RELATED GAO PRODUCTS -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

=============================================================================== MANAGEMENT REFORM

_Quality Management: Survey of Federal Organizations_ (GAO/GGD-93-9BR, Oct. 1, 1992).

_Performance Measurement: An Important Tool in Managing for Results_ (GAO/T-GGD-92-35, May 5, 1992).

_Service to the Public: How Effective and Responsive Is the Government?_ (GAO/T-HRD-91-26, May 8, 1991).

_How to Enhance Congressional Oversight_ (GAO/T-GGD-90-40, May 8, 1990).

_Managing the Cost of Government: Proposals for Reforming Federal Budgeting Practices_ (GAO/AFMD-90-1, Oct. 1989).

_Managing the Cost of Government: Building an Effective Financial Management Structure_ (GAO/AFMD-85-35, Feb. 1985).

_Selected Government-wide Management Improvement Efforts--1970 to 1980_ (GAO/GGD-83-69, Aug. 8, 1983).

=============================================================================== REVIEWS OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT AGENCIES

_Managing the Government: Revised Approach Could Improve OMB's Effectiveness_ (GAO/GGD-89-65, May 4, 1989).

_General Services Administration: Sustained Attention Required to Improve Performance_ (GAO/GGD-90-14, Nov. 6, 1989).

_General Services Administration: Status of Management Improvement Efforts_ (GAO/GGD-91-59, Apr. 3, 1991).

_Managing Human Resources: Greater OPM Leadership Needed to Address Critical Challenges_ (GAO/GGD-89-19, Jan. 19, 1989).

_Procurement: Assessment of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy_ (GAO/NSIAD-88-35, Nov. 20, 1987).

=============================================================================== ASSESSMENTS OF INCREASED MANAGEMENT FLEXIBILITY

_Federal Personnel: Special Authorities Under the Demonstration Project at Commerce_ (GAO/GGD-92-124BR, July 13, 1992).

_Federal Workforce: Information on the National Bureau of Standards Personnel Demonstration Project_ (GAO/GGD-88-59FS, Apr. 5, 1988).

_Federal Personnel: Observations on the Navy's Managing To Payroll Program_ (GAO/GGD-90-47, Mar. 27, 1990).

_Forest Service: Evaluation of "End-Results" Budgeting Test_ (GAO/AFMD-88-45, Mar. 31, 1988).

_______________________________________________________________________________

TRANSITION SERIES -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

=============================================================================== ECONOMICS

_Budget Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-1TR).

_Investment_ (GAO/OCG-93-2TR).

=============================================================================== MANAGEMENT

_Government Management Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-3TR).

_Financial Management Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-4TR).

_Information Management and Technology Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-5TR).

_Program Evaluation Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-6TR).

_The Public Service_ (GAO/OCG-93-7TR).

=============================================================================== PROGRAM AREAS

_Health Care Reform _ (GAO/OCG-93-8TR).

_National Security Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-9TR).

_Financial Services Industry Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-10TR).

_International Trade Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-11TR).

_Commerce Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-12TR).

_Energy Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-13TR).

_Transportation Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-14TR).

_Food and Agriculture Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-15TR).

_Environmental Protection Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-16TR).

_Natural Resources Management Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-17TR).

_Education Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-18TR).

_Labor Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-19TR).

_Health and Human Services Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-20TR).

_Veterans Affairs Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-21TR).

_Housing and Community Development Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-22TR).

_Justice Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-23TR).

_Internal Revenue Service Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-24TR).

_Foreign Economic Assistance Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-25TR).

_Foreign Affairs Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-26TR).

_NASA Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-27TR).

_General Services Issues_ (GAO/OCG-93-28TR).