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NATO handbook05 uploade March 25, 1993

27. THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT/

Europe's security has substantially improved. The threat of massive military confrontation no longer hangs over it. Nevertheless potential risks to security from instability or tension still exist. Against this background, NATO's Strategic Concept reaffirms the core functions of the Alliance including the maintenance of the transatlantic link and of an overall strategic balance in Europe. The Strategic Concept reflects the broad approach to stability and security outlined above. It recognises that security is based on political, economic, social and environmental considerations as well as defence. It reflects the unpreced- ented opportunity which now exists to achieve the Alli- ance's long-standing objectives by political means, in keeping with the undertakings made in Articles 2 and 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Accordingly, the future security policy of the Alliance can be based on three mutually reinforcing elements, namely: dialogue; cooper- ation; and the maintenance of a collective defence capabil- ity. Each of these elements is designed to ensure that crises affecting European security can be prevented or resolved peacefully.

The military dimension of the Alliance remains an essential factor if these goals are to be achieved. It will continue to reflect a number of fundamental principles:

- The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose.

- Security is indivisible. An attack on one member of the Alliance is an attack upon all. The presence of North American forces in and committed to Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America.

- NATO's security policy is based on collective defence, including an integrated military structure as well as relevant cooperation and coordination agreements.

- The maintenance of an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe will be re- quired for the foreseeable future.

/ The full text of the Alliance's Strategic Concept is reproduced in Appendix II.

In the changed circumstances affecting Europe's secu- rity, NATO forces are being adapted to the new strategic environment and are becoming smaller and more flexible. Conventional forces are being substantially reduced and in many cases so is their level of readiness. They are also being made more mobile, to enable them to react to a wider range of contingencies; and they are being reorgan- ised to ensure that they have the flexibility to contribute to crisis management and to enable them to be built up if necessary for the purposes of defence. Multinational forces will in future play a greater role within NATO's integrated military structure.

Nuclear forces are also being greatly reduced. The withdrawal of short-range land-based nuclear weapons from Europe, announced in September 1991, was com- pleted in July 1992. The overall NATO stockpile of sub- strategic nuclear weapons in Europe is being reduced to about one fifth of the level of the 1990 stockpile. As far as strategic nuclear forces are concerned, far-reaching recip- rocal cuts were proposed by the President of the United States in his State of the Union address at the end of January 1992 and additional proposals were made by President Yeltsin. The fundamental purpose of the Alliance's remaining nuclear forces of either category will continue to be political: to preserve peace and prevent war or any kind of coercion.

The Strategic Concept underlines that Alliance security must take account of the global context. It points out risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital re- sources and actions of terrorism and sabotage, which can affect Alliance security interests. The Concept therefore re- affirms the importance of arrangements existing in the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of its efforts including its responses to such risks. The Alliance will continue to address broader challenges in its consultations and in the appropriate multilateral forums in the widest possible cooperation with other states.

28. DIALOGUE, PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION

The development of dialogue and partnership with its new cooperation partners forms an integral part of NATO's Strategic Concept. The establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council at the end of 1991 thus marked a further advance in the evolution of a new, positive relationship based on constructive dialogue and cooperation.

The creation of the NACC was the culmination of a number of earlier steps taken by the members of the Alliance in the light of the fundamental changes which were taking place in Central and Eastern European coun- tries. At the July 1990 London Summit Meeting the Alliance extended its hand of friendship and established regular diplomatic liaison with them. In Paris, in Novem- ber 1990, the Alliance members and their new partners signed a Joint Declaration stating that they no longer regarded each other as adversaries.

In June 1991, when Alliance Foreign Ministers met in Copenhagen, further steps were taken to develop this partnership. As a result of high level visits, exchanges of views on security and other issues, intensified military contacts and exchanges of expertise in many fields, a new relationship has been built up.

When NATO Heads of State and Government met in Rome in November 1991, they decided to broaden and intensify this dynamic process. In reaching this decision they took account of the growth of democratic institu- tions throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the encour- aging experience of cooperation acquired thus far and the desire shown by their cooperation partners for closer ties.

As a next step they therefore decided to develop the institutional basis for consultation and cooperation on political and security issues. Foreign Ministers of Central and Eastern European governments were invited to attend a meeting with their NATO counterparts to issue a joint political declaration in order to enhance the concept of partnership, and to work out how the process should be further developed. Concrete proposals for periodic meetings and contacts with the North Atlantic Council, the NATO Military Committee and other NATO commit- tees were put forward, in addition to the creation of the NACC.

These steps were designed to enable the member coun- tries of the Alliance to respond effectively to the changed situation in Europe and to contribute positively to the efforts undertaken by their cooperation partners to fulfil their commitments under the CSCE process and to make democratic change irrevocable.

Consisting of Foreign Ministers or Representatives of the 16 NATO countries as well as the Central and Eastern European and Baltic States with which NATO established diplomatic liaison during 1990 and 1991, the NACC held its inaugural meeting on 20 December 1991 with the par- ticipation of 25 countries. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union which took place on the same day, and the subsequent creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), participation in the NACC was expanded to include all the member states of the CIS. Georgia and Albania joined the process in April and June 1992 respec- tively. At the meeting of the NACC held in Oslo in June 1992, Finland also attended as an observer.

Consultations and cooperation in the framework of the NACC focus on security and related issues where Alliance member countries can offer experience and exper- tise, such as defence planning, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, scientific and environmental affairs, civil/military coordination of air traffic manage- ment and the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes. Participation by all these countries in NATO's scientific and environmental programmes is also be- ing enhanced, as well as the dissemination of inform- ation about NATO in the countries concerned, through diplomatic liaison channels and embassies and by other means. NATO governments undertook to provide appro- priate resources to support these activities.

The Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooper- ation issued by the countries represented in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in March 1992, identified a number of topics in the defence-planning field where cooperation and consultation could be of particular rel- evance. These include principles and key aspects of strategy; force and command structures; military exer- cises, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations; national defence programmes and budgets; and training and education methods and concepts in the defence field. A number of activities are taking place in these areas, including joint meetings, military contacts and visits, and participation in courses at the NATO Defense College in Rome and the NATO (SHAPE) School at Oberammergau.

Defence Ministers held their first joint meeting with cooperation partners on 1 April 1992 to discuss current issues and to consider ways of deepening their dialogue and promoting cooperation on issues falling within their competence. It was decided to hold a high level seminar on defence policy and management, covering the role and constitutional position of armed forces in democratic societies as well as strategic concepts and their implement- ation; and a workshop on practical aspects of defence management and the reform and restructuring of armed forces. A further workshop on practices and work meth- ods relating to the environmental clean-up of defence installations was also scheduled.

Other possible areas for cooperation on defence-related issues identified by Defence Ministers include discussion of concepts such as defence sufficiency, stability, flexibil- ity and crisis management; how defence programmes can be planned and managed in democratic societies (eg, accountability, financial planning, programme budgeting and management, research and development, equipment procurement procedures and personnel man- agement); consideration of the legal and constitutional framework regarding the position of military forces in a democracy; democratic control of armed forces; civil- military relations and parliamentary accountability; har- monisation of defence planning and arms control issues; matters relating to training and exercises; defence edu- cation; and other topics including reserve forces, environ- mental concerns, air traffic management, search and rescue activities, humanitarian aid and military medicine. NATO Defence Ministers meeting in Gleneagles in October 1992 also indicated that peace keeping issues would be a further subject of discussion with cooperation partners.

The first meeting of the Military Committee in Co- operation Session took place on 10 April 1992 at Chiefs of Staff level, in accordance with the NACC Work Plan. It represented an important milestone in the partnership process and resulted in a military work plan designed to develop cooperation and to assist cooperation partners with the process of restructuring their armed forces. Fur- ther meetings and other activities, including bilateral visits of military officials to and from cooperation countries, are taking place in this framework.

29. THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

A key component of the new security architecture is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or CSCE (see Part IV).

The Alliance remains deeply committed to strengthen- ing the CSCE process, which has a vital role to play in promoting stability and democracy in Europe. Consulta- tions within the Alliance thus continue to be a source of initiatives for strengthening the CSCE, which has the outstanding advantage of being the only forum that brings together all the countries of Europe as well as Canada and the United States under a common frame- work with respect to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, rule of law, security, and economic liberty. New CSCE institutions and structures, proposed at the NATO Summit in London in July 1990, were created at the Paris CSCE Summit in November 1990. Efforts are now being made to enable them to be consoli- dated and further developed so as to provide the CSCE with the means to ensure full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and other CSCE documents.

The CSCE's capacity as a forum for consultation and cooperation among all participating States is thus being enhanced to ensure that it is capable of effective action in line with its new and increased responsibilities. This applies in particular to the role of the CSCE with regard to questions of human rights and security, including arms control and disarmament, and to its contribution to effective crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes in ways which are consistent with international law and CSCE principles.

A number of specific proposals were made at the NATO Summit Meeting in Rome to translate these objectives into practical realities. These ideas were taken several steps further in December 1991 when NATO Foreign Ministers set out broad policy objectives for the prepara- tion of the 1992 Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting. They in- cluded the establishment of a European security forum, preserving the autonomy and distinct character of the various elements involved in the process but also ensuring coherence between them; and the institution of a perma- nent security dialogue in which legitimate security concerns can be addressed.

30. EUROPE'S SECURITY IDENTITY AND DEFENCE ROLE

Further important elements in the progress towards the new security architecture, subject to decisions concerning their ratification, are the Treaties on Monetary and Political Union signed by the leaders of the European Community in Maastricht in December 1991. The Treaty on Political Union included agreement on the develop- ment of a common foreign and security policy, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence. It included reference to the Western European Union (WEU) (see Part IV) as an integral part of the development of the European Union which would be created by the two Treaties and requested the WEU to elaborate and imple- ment decisions and actions of the European Union which have defence implications.

At the meeting of the WEU Member States which took place in Maastricht at the same time as the meeting of the European Council, a declaration was issued inviting members of the European Union to accede to the WEU or to become observers, and inviting other European mem- bers of NATO to become associate members of the WEU.

The Treaty on Political Union also made provision for a report evaluating the progress made and experience gained in the field of foreign and security policy to be presented to the European Council in 1996.

The Alliance welcomed these steps, recognising that the development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. Moreover these two positive processes are mutu- ally reinforcing. In parallel with them, member countries of the Alliance have agreed to enhance the essential transatlantic link which the Alliance guarantees and to maintain fully the strategic unity and the indivisibility of their security.

The Alliance's Strategic Concept, which is the agreed conceptual basis for the military forces of all the members of the Alliance, facilitates complementarity between the Alliance and the emerging defence component of the

European political unification process. The Alliance mem- ber countries intend to preserve their existing operational coherence since, ultimately, their security depends on it. However, they welcomed the prospect of a gradual rein- forcement of the role of the Western European Union, both as the defence component of the process of European unification and as a means of strengthening the Euro- pean pillar of the Alliance. WEU member states have affirmed that the Alliance will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.

31. ARMS CONTROL

Efforts to bring about more stable international relations at lower levels of military forces and armaments, through effective and verifiable arms control agreements and confidence-building measures, have long been an integral part of NATO's security policy. Meaningful and verifiable arms control agreements, which respect the security con- cerns of all the countries involved in the process, help to improve stability, increase mutual confidence and dimin- ish the risks of conflict. Defence and arms control policies must therefore remain in harmony and their respective roles in safeguarding security must be consistent and mutually reinforcing. The principal criterion for the Alliance in the context of all arms control negotiations is not whether agreements are desirable objectives in their own right, but rather whether or not they maintain stab- ility and enhance the long-term security interests of all participants. To do this successfully agreements have to be clear and precise, verifiable and not open to circumvention.

Arms control deals essentially with two broad catego- ries of proposal: those seeking agreement on measures to build confidence and those which result in reductions and limitations of military manpower and equipment. The Alliance is actively involved in both these areas. Extensive consultation takes place within NATO over the whole range of disarmament and arms control issues so that commonly agreed positions can be reached and national policies coordinated. In addition to the consultation which takes place in the North Atlantic Council and the Political Committees, a number of special bodies have been created to deal with specific arms control issues.

In May 1989, in order to take account of all the complex and interrelated issues arising in the arms control context, the Alliance developed a Comprehensive Con- cept of Arms Control and Disarmament. The Concept provided a framework for the policies of the Alliance in the whole field of arms control. It covered the conclusion and implementation of the INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union in December 1987, which eliminated all United States and Soviet land-based intermediate-range missiles on a global basis. Other objectives of the Comprehensive Concept included:

- a 50 per cent reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union;

- the global elimination of chemical weapons;

- the establishment of a stable and secure level of con- ventional forces by eliminating disparities in the whole of Europe;

- in conjunction with the establishment of a conven- tional balance, tangible and verifiable reductions of land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter-range, leading to equal ceilings.

The negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) among the member countries of NATO and of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, which began in Vienna in March 1989, resulted in the conclusion of the CFE Treaty on 19 November 1990. The Treaty was signed by the 22 states, in the framework of the Confer- ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe, during a Summit Meeting in Paris of all 34 countries then particip- ating in the CSCE process. Also signed at the Paris Summit by all CSCE participants was the Vienna Docu- ment 90, containing a large number of substantial confidence- and security-building measures applicable throughout Europe. In March 1992 this document was subsumed by the Vienna Document 92, in which further measures on openness and transparency were introduced.

As a result of the dramatic political and military de- developments which have taken place since 1989, some of the initial premises for the CFE Treaty changed during the course of the negotiations. Key factors in this respect were the unification of Germany; substantial Soviet troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe; the advent of demo- cratic governments in Central and Eastern Europe; the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact; and comprehensive unilateral reductions in the size of Soviet armed forces as well as those of other countries in the region.

Notwithstanding these changes which inevitably had major implications, particularly in terms of the attribution of national responsibility for implementing the Treaty, the successful outcome of the negotiations and the entry into force of the Treaty are fundamental enhancements of European security. The Treaty is the culmination of efforts initiated by the Alliance in 1986 to reduce the level of armed forces in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. It imposes legally-binding limits on key categories of forces and equipment held individu- ally and collectively. The limits are designed not only to bring about dramatic reductions but also to ensure that no single country is able to maintain military forces at levels which would enable it to hold a dominating military position on the European continent. The main categories of equipment covered by these provisions are those which constitute offensive military capability, namely tanks, artillery, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft and helicopters.

In addition, there are provisions contained in declara- tions forming an integral part of the Treaty on land- based naval aircraft and a no-increase commitment with regard to personnel strengths. The implementation of the Treaty provisions is subject to a precise calendar and a rigid regime of information exchanges and inspections under detailed ``verification'' clauses.

Two further essential elements of the CFE Treaty should be mentioned, namely:

(a) the establishment of a Joint Consultative Group, on

which all the parties to the Treaty are represented, where any issues relating to implementation can be raised and discussed; and

(b) the opening of follow-on (CFE IA) talks on further measures including limitations on personnel strengths. These talks began on 29 November 1990.

The members of the Alliance attach paramount import- ance to the Treaty as the cornerstone of Europe's future military security and stability and, together with their cooperation partners, have called upon all the countries concerned to move forward promptly with its ratification and full implementation. In December 1991 they jointly established a High Level Working Group in which all Central and Eastern European countries are actively par- ticipating, as well as the independent states in the former Soviet Union with territory in the CFE area of application, with a view to facilitating the early entry into force of the Treaty. In February 1992 agreement was reached on a phased approach for bringing the CFE Treaty into force. In May agreement was reached in the High Level Working Group with the eight former Soviet states concerned on the apportionment of rights and obligations assumed by the Soviet Union under the terms of the CFE Treaty. This agreement, which was confirmed at the June 1992 Extra- ordinary Conference in Oslo, provided the basis for the provisional entry into force of the CFE Treaty through- out the area of application on 17 July 1992, allowing its verification procedures to be implemented immediately. Following ratification by all eight states of the former Soviet Union with territory in the area of application of the Treaty, and completion of the ratification process by all 29 signatories, the CFE Treaty formally entered into force on 9 November 1992.

The Alliance also attaches considerable importance to the parallel implementation of the Concluding Act on the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe which establishes the commitments entered into by the parties to the CFE IA follow-on negotiations in accordance with agreements reached on 6 July 1992.

In 1990 the North Atlantic Council established a Verifica- tion Coordinating Committee to coordinate verification efforts among members of the Alliance with regard to arms control and disarmament agreements in general, and particu- larly with regard to the CFE Treaty. The Committee ensures information exchange among Alliance nations on their inspection plans and on any verification-related issues. It also oversees the development and operation of a central verification data base maintained at NATO Headquarters, in which all data relative to inspections are permanently stored. In addition the Committee supervises the inspection support activities of the NATO Military Authorities, such as the development of common field procedures or the conduct of NATO verification courses, providing guidance as necessary. Last but not least, the Committee serves as a forum for consultations among Allies on compliance concerns and related issues.

The Verification Coordinating Committee has also become the forum for consultation, coordination and exchange of experience among Allies on activities related to the implementation of the Stockholm and Vienna 1990 CSCE Documents on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, (subsequently subsumed by the Vienna Docu- ment 1992) such as evaluation visits, inspections or exer- cise observations.

Other important new elements introducing greater open- ness and confidence-building in the military field include agreements achieved in March 1992 on an ``Open Skies'' regime, permitting overflights of national territory on a reciprocal basis.

The CSCE process has a pivotal role in the field of arms control and disarmament. The 1992 CSCE Follow-Up Meeting in Helsinki was therefore seen as a turning point in the arms control and disarmament process in Europe which now involves all CSCE participants. It offered a unique opportunity to move the process forward and, by shaping a new cooperative order, to make it unnecessary for any participating country to fear for its security. The decisions taken at the conclusion of the Helsinki Follow- up Meeting are summarised in Part IV.

In the field of nuclear arms control, the Alliance's objective is to achieve security at the minimum level of nuclear arms sufficient to preserve peace and stability. The early ratification of the START Agreement signed on 31 July 1991, is an important aspect of this. President Bush's initiative of 27 September 1991, which was strongly supported by the Alliance, opened new prospects for nuclear arms reductions. In particular, the decision to eliminate nuclear warheads for ground-launched short- range weapon systems fulfilled the SNF arms control ob- jectives expressed in the London Declaration of July 1990.

In January 1992 the United States President again took the initiative in the field of nuclear arms control in his State of the Union address, proposing further reciprocal cuts in strategic nuclear forces. The initial reactions of the Russian leadership were extremely positive and included additional proposals. Allies also welcomed the announce- ment made in May 1992 that withdrawal of former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons to the territory of Russia for ultimate dismantlement had been completed. They fully supported the Lisbon Agreement of May 1992 between the United States and the four successor states of the former Soviet Union with nuclear weapons on their terri- tory (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine), commit- ting them to joint implementation of the START Treaty. The June 1992 agreement between the United States and Russia to reduce their strategic forces well below the ceilings established in the START Treaty, and to elimi- nate land-based multiple warhead intercontinental ballis- tic missiles, was a further major step.

Despite these many positive developments in the field of arms control, the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery is a matter of serious concern to Alliance governments since it under- mines international security. NATO Foreign Ministers have made clear their preoccupations on this subject repeatedly, emphasizing that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is an essential element of cooperative security and international stability. They have offered to provide assistance in the process of eliminating nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union and have stressed the need for measures to prevent the unauthorised export of nuclear or other destabilizing equipment and technology. Similar concerns about proliferation were voiced by all the mem- bers of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in their statements of December 1991 and June 1992, underlining the importance attached to efforts undertaken in this field. The Alliance welcomed the commitments by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to adhere to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states and urged these states to implement all their commitments as soon as time allowed.

Transfers of conventional armaments which exceed legitimate defensive needs, to other regions where tensions exist, also make the peaceful settlement of disputes less likely. The Alliance therefore has supported the establish- ment by the United Nations of a universal non- discriminatory register of conventional arms transfers as well as steps undertaken to address other aspects of proliferation and further initiatives designed to build confidence and underpin international security. Within the CSCE, NATO Allies have led the way in tabling proposals dealing with non-proliferation in general and transfers of conventional weapons in particular.

An additional essential aim remains the completion of a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons. In June 1992 negotiators in Geneva agreed on the final draft of an agreement, paving the way for approval of the document by the UN General Assembly in October 1992 and the signing of a Treaty in Paris early in 1993. In a related field, the results achieved by the Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the decision taken to explore the feasibility of verification in this area, have been further positive developments.