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Discussion

Orchestrated Confusion -- the DRV and Pathet Lao

Throughout the period between January 27 and the completion of Operation Homecoming, there was both official and public confusion about who controlled U.S. prisoners captured in Laos. As has been stated, it does not appear that the prisoners on the DRV/Laos list were ever under the control of the LPF. Rather, they were captured in Laos by the North Vietnamese and, with one exception, transferred expeditiously out of Laos to North Vietnam. The U.S. POWs thought to be held in caves in northern Laos were not released, nor was any accounting given for MIAs in Laos.

Confusion about this issue of control was apparent not only to the public, but to some officials, as well. For example, the U.S. delegation to the FPJMC, which was responsible for implementing the accords, believed at least until mid-March that the prisoners on the February 1 list were actually being held in Laos by the LPF. The official military history of the U.S. delegation to the FPJMC, written in 1974, refers to the American success in obtaining the release of "the prisoners held by the Pathet Lao."

From the very beginning of negotiations, the DRV sought to maintain the fiction that its troops were not in Laos and that it could not take any action that affected Laos without consulting the Pathet Lao. And yet, according to U.S. officials, the LPF was almost wholly dependent on, and controlled by, the DRV. Ambassador Sullivan, for example, estimated that the total number of armed LPF forces did not exceed 500. Ambassador Godley testified that "anything that Le Duc Tho said about Laos would be law in the Pathet Lao areas."

Dr. Kissinger told the Committee that:

our perception of the Pathet Lao was that they were stooges of Hanoi, that they had no independence whatsoever, that they were totally controlled by the communists in Hanoi. . . we had every confidence that Hanoi could make the Pathet Lao do what they wanted.

Ambassador Sullivan also ridiculed the controversial LPF spokesman, Soth Petrasy, as a "figurehead and a nonentity who had no communications himself with anything going on in the military zone." Despite this, the U.S. found itself negotiating with Soth Petrasy for the release of prisoners he had insisted that the LPF had, only to be put off first with pleas for delay and ultimately confounded by statements that the prisoners did not exist.

During the period immediately prior to the signing of the peace agreement, and throughout the 60 plus days leading up to the end of Operation Homecoming, the DRV and LPF played an elaborate game at American expense. The North Vietnamese made a show of "consulting" with the LPF about U.S. prisoners who were jailed in the DRV's own capital of Hanoi. The DRV promised Dr. Kissinger that it could guarantee the release of U.S. prisoners held captive by the LPF, but failed to do so. The LPF insisted it was not bound by North Vietnamese commitments, although it was clearly dependent on the DRV in almost every way. And time and again, LPF spokesmen teased U.S. public and official opinion by discussing the prisoners they claimed to be holding.

U.S. officials tried to break through the charade, but were left, ultimately, trying to work around it. The U.S. was handicapped by its reluctance to set a precedent by accepting as reality the fact that North Vietnam could exercise what amounted to sovereignty in parts of Laos and Cambodia. The charade reached its apparent climax on March 28, 1973 when American officials accepted the prisoners on the DRV/Laos list not from their North Vietnamese jailers, but from the Pathet Lao.

The problem of who controlled Laos continued during the post- Homecoming period when the Administration's focus shifted from the possible repatriation of live prisoners to obtaining an accounting for the missing. The dominance of North Vietnamese troops in Laos meant that the DRV would logically know more than the LPF about MIAs lost in that country. But since the DRV wouldn't admit to knowledge about what happened in Laos, that avenue of inquiry was foreclosed. Meanwhile, as described above, efforts to obtain information directly from the Pathet Lao bore no fruit.

Within a year, the combination of DRV duplicity, LPF intransigence and American frustration caused DIA to sum up the situation in a memorandum which concluded that: "One can only speculate about the current fate of the Americans who were known to have been held captive by the Pathet Lao in previous years."

What Could the Administration Have Done?

Diplomatic Efforts

The obvious and most difficult question facing U.S. decisionmakers during the 60 day period following the signing of the PPA was what to do about apparent North Vietnamese violations. With respect to the military issues of ceasefire, withdrawal of advisers, withdrawal from Cambodia and Laos and arms supply, all sides violated the agreement to some extent. But with respect to U.S. POWs, the issue boiled down to whether the American side could force or persuade the North Vietnamese to do more than it was apparently willing to do to meets its obligations.

As documented above, top-level Nixon Administration officials were advised by DIA and others throughout the 60-day period of the possibility that there were live American POWs in Indochina who were not on either the January 27 lists or the February 1 DRV/Laos list. The area of greatest concern was Laos, but there were a substantial number of discrepancy cases in North and South Vietnam, as well.

At the time the agreement was signed, Administration officials were unrestrained in expressions of American resolve to obtain full compliance on POW/MIAs. Dr. Kissinger said the U.S. would "brutally enforce" the return of prisoners. Our delegation to the FPJMC in Saigon considered the release of U.S. POWs "the major emotional motivating force for. . . Americans. It was probably also the only issue over which the United States could justify a renewal of bombing raids or other measures involving military force, should the North Vietnamese clearly demonstrate their intent to violate the provisions. . . "

Despite this, and despite the fact that air strikes were considered and ordered on ceasefire and infiltration-related issues, nothing in the records reviewed by the Select Committee indicates that the President or Dr. Kissinger seriously considered overt military action on the POW/MIA issue at any time after the signing of the PPA.

A number of diplomatic actions were taken during the 60 day period, but with marginal success. For example:

. the U.S. delayed delivery of President Nixon's letter on reconstruction aid until the DRV came up with a list of prisoners from Laos; the list was delivered but it was disappointingly short and incomplete;

. the U.S. threatened to cancel Dr. Kissinger's trip to Hanoi because of the incomplete nature of the lists, but did not do so;

. during the Hanoi trip, Dr. Kissinger demanded an accounting of discrepancy cases, but the demand was ignored;

. on March 20, the U.S. again protested to the DRV about the failure to obtain an adequate list of prisoners from Laos, and threatened "grave consequences" if the failure persisted; once again, the protest was in vain; and

. U.S. diplomatic approaches to the Pathet Lao throughout February, March and thereafter led nowhere.

Military Options

In mid-March, U.S. concern about continued DRV use of the Ho Chi Minh trail caused the Administration to consider a two to three day period of bombing in southern Laos. This course of action was recommended to the President by the WSAG group and by Dr. Kissinger. In his testimony, Dr. Kissinger says that the President ultimately decided against this course of action and sought, instead, another round of talks with Le Duc Tho.

The issue arose again in mid-April when DRV forces continued to operate in northern Laos in violation of the PPA and the Laos ceasefire agreement. This time, the U.S. went ahead with two days of B-52 bombing raids inside Laos. This step led to an agreement between the U.S. and the DRV to negotiate PPA compliance issues in May and June, 1973. In Cambodia, meanwhile, heavy U.S. bombing raids continued until Congress prohibited further funding for them, effective August 15, 1973.

Although the U.S. did not threaten or carry out air strikes over the POW/MIA issue, it did on two occasions briefly suspend troop withdrawals. The first instance was on February 26th when the DRV failed to produce the list of POWs due to be released the following day. Dr. Kissinger described the Administration's response this way:

We responded very sharply by suspending American troop withdrawals and mine-clearing operations in North Vietnamese harbors. Secretary of State Rogers declined to attend any sessions at the International Conference in Paris. A terse message was sent to Hanoi simply informing it of our actions. In addition, White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler was instructed to read at his noon briefing a tough statement making clear that the release of American prisoners was an unconditional obligation of North Vietnam not linked to any other provision of the Agreement. A day later, I told Ziegler that I was certain the pressures would work (in a conversation that also clearly indicates my plan to leave government soon): "A year from now when I'm out of here, they're really going to put it to us. Not for that reason but a year from now, they're going to be tigers but now they're not ready." The POWs were released on schedule.

On March 22, 1973, after the North Vietnamese threatened not to go forward with the release of prisoners on the DRV/Laos list, and after DIA reported that the LPF might well be holding other POWs, the U.S. again decided to halt the withdrawal of American troops. Initially, the U.S. demand was that the DRV guarantee the return of the U.S. prisoners on the DRV/Laos list and all others held by the Pathet Lao. This decision was modified the following day to make full U.S. withdrawal contingent only upon the release of prisoners from the January 27 and February 1 lists. Again, the DRV essentially acceded to the U.S. demand.

Just prior to the completion of Operation Homecoming, Defense Department staff produced for Secretary Elliot Richardson a series of recommended options, including military options, intended to increase pressure for the return of possible U.S. POWs in Laos. The strongest options, including air strikes against Hanoi and Laos, were not passed on by the Secretary to Dr. Kissinger. Secretary Richardson did recommend consideration, however, of the movement of a new carrier task force into the waters off Vietnam's coast and the commencement of military air reconnaissance missions over Laos. Neither step was carried out.

Restraints on the Use of Force. Despite the Administration's strong concerns about the completeness of the POW release, there were a number of factors arguing against a decision to suspend troop withdrawals or move beyond that to the resumed use of military force.

First, and foremost, the signing of the Accords and the commencement of the ceasefire on January 27, 1973 had been welcomed with enthusiasm by the American people and were viewed as marking an end to U.S. involvement in a tragic and unpopular war. Any action by the Administration to disrupt implementation of the peace agreement would carry risks and might, unless clearly and convincingly explained, prove unsustainable in the face of the American public's desire for an end to the war. Nevertheless, the U.S. did temporarily suspend troop withdrawals for short periods of time without engendering public opposition.

Second, the Administration was concerned that any military action taken during the 60-day period following the signing of the Accords would imperil the release of the POWs whose names had been included on North Vietnam's lists but who had not yet been released. This appears to be the primary reason that President Nixon did not agree to the WSAG's recommendation to bomb Laos in mid-March.

Third, the Administration could not be sure that resuming military hostilities would lead to the release of additional U.S. POWs. The available intelligence information was not sufficient to say with certainty that any particular individual was alive and being held in a particular location. This argued against rescue missions or other military actions aimed at the release of specific POWs. More general military actions, such as bombing Hanoi or the Ho Chi Minh Trail, might have been more likely to create new POWs than to gain the release of existing ones.

Balancing. Ambassador Lord told the Select Committee of his belief that the Administration's decision not to use force or to attach stronger conditions to troop withdrawals because of the POW issue reflected a balancing of concerns about the possibility that live POWs were being left behind against concerns resulting from the deterrents to military action discussed above. As Ambassador Lord testified:

The President in the end decided not to scuttle the agreement and resume the war over the MIA question. It was a very difficult decision. I believed then it was a correct one. I believe that still. . .

Although we had strongly suggestive intelligence that the lists [were] incomplete, the American society would have blown apart if the President overturned the agreement and resumed the fighting. It is doubtful that Congress would have supported such a policy. Indeed, it would probably have prevented it. Our remaining prisoners who were on the lists would not have returned. More Americans and Vietnamese allies would have been killed and captured.

Admiral Moorer echoed Ambassador Lord's testimony. Asked why the United States completed the withdrawal of its troops without insisting that the Pathet Lao first release the U.S. POWs they were believed to be holding, Admiral Moorer stated:

When this started and the POWs [on North Vietnam's lists] came back and so on, and there was a very euphoric reception, and the President gave a party on the White House grounds, and all the wives of POWs came and so on, and press release after press release were that we were withdrawing the troops, at that point, no President could have said, "Oops, we're not going to withdraw the troops because these people won't agree with us. They're not carrying out their part." At that point in history, we didn't have the stomach for doing what you're asking me why we didn't do it. . .

Don't forget, [the President] was getting tremendous pressure from the Congress, the public, and the New York Times, and the Washington Post, everyone you could think of. They had had a belly-full of this whole war. I think we almost would have had a rebellion if we had turned around and started fighting like hell in Laos again. That's my explanation of it.

During his testimony before the Select Committee, Dr. Kissinger blamed Congressional opposition to further U.S. involvement in the war for the Administration's inability to obtain DRV compliance with the POW/MIA and others provisions of the peace agreement:

In theory, we had three sources of leverage available; bombing the north, offering economic aid to Hanoi and giving military and economic aid to Saigon to deprive Hanoi of the hope of military victory. The Congress took all three levers away, denying us both the carrot and the stick. When the Congress eliminated our leverage, we were trapped in the classic nightmare of every statesman. We had nothing to back up our tough words, but more tough words. Under such conditions, we had no bargaining position left. . .

the Paris Peace Accords contained clear and binding commitments that all prisoners throughout Indochina would be accounted for and returned. If the Vietnamese violated these provisions, it was not because of any omission by responsible U.S. officials, even less any cooperation with them, but because we were stripped of the weapons we might have used to impose that commitment.

Former President Nixon views are similar:

As it became clear to the North Vietnamese that the Congress would not permit a resumption of the bombing to enforce the Paris Accords, their incentive for complying with the agreement regarding MIAs and POWs as well as other provisions was completely destroyed. The return of all our POWs and an accounting of all our MIAs was difficult to achieve because of the intransigence of the North Vietnamese and the substantial sentiment in the country and in Congress for an unconditional withdrawal from Vietnam in advance of any North Vietnamese commitment to return our prisoners and account for our missing. . .

Former Defense Secretary Elliot Richardson, on the other hand, expressed puzzlement and skepticism about the Administration's failure to act on the limited military options his Department had recommended immediately prior to the conclusion of Operation Homecoming:

I don't believe that a degree of uncertainty as to the numbers or the firmness of the information, given the totality of the information, should have affected what we did up to at least the resumption of bombing or the use of force, and the recommendations in this memorandum represent in substance the most effective combination of measures that Larry Eagleburger and Colonel Secord and Admiral Bigley and those of us who reviewed this memorandum could come up with. . .

I think if I had been involved at that time, I would have argued for some use of force. After all, you don't have to restart the whole war to authorize some air strikes as a way of conveying that we meant business. But those are tough calls. . . I can't even give you conjectural explanation as to the failure to follow up the recommendations in my memorandum to Kissinger. . . I can only say that had I known the steps called for in the memorandum to Kissinger were not being pursued, if they weren't, I think I would have raised hell about it. . .

The Congress

During the Committee's hearings, it was contended by Dr. Kissinger and some Members of the Committee that Congressional attitudes would have precluded any Administration effort to respond forcefully to the DRV's failure to provide an accounting for missing American servicemen. These Members of the Committee believe that their contention is supported by the Senate's rejection on May 31, 1973 of an amendment offered by U.S. Sen. Robert Dole. The Dole amendment would have permitted the continued U.S. bombing of Laos and Cambodia if "the President finds and forthwith so reports to the Congress that the Government of North Vietnam is not making an accounting, to the best of its ability, of all missing in action personnel of the United States in Southeast Asia or is otherwise not complying with the provisions of article 8" of the Paris Peace Agreement.

Other Members of the Committee believe that the amendment offered by Senator Dole, which was an amendment to another amendment offered by Senator Mark Hatfield, was aimed far more at authorizing President Nixon to continue prosecuting the war in Southeast Asia than at gaining an accounting for missing Americans.

Former President's Nixon view is that:

The responsibility for denying to our Administration the means to force the North Vietnamese to comply with the agreements concerning the accounting for MIAs lies squarely on those who opposed the use of military force to bring the war to a conclusion and who later sabotaged our efforts to enforce the peace agreement by drastically reducing American aid to South Vietnam and prohibiting the resumption of the bombing in order to enforce the Accords.

During the Committee's hearings on the Paris Peace Accords, Senator Dole testified that:

When you line up the culprits who got us where we are today, the Senate itself should enjoy a prominent place at the front of the line. . .It was the Senate who sent Henry Kissinger to a gunfight at the OK corral, but gave him only blanks.

Watergate

A final, highly important factor inhibiting President Nixon's ability to respond forcefully to DRV violations of the PPA was the emerging Watergate scandal. Several witnesses told the Select Committee that, by early spring 1973, much of the President's time and attention was devoted to this subject. In Admiral Moorer's words, for example, "Watergate was bubbling like mad." And Dr. Kissinger's memoirs include numerous references to the President's lack of focus during this period:

It was a different Nixon in March 1973. He approached the problem of the violations in a curiously desultory fashion. He drifted. . . Nixon clearly did not want to add turmoil over Indochina to his mounting domestic perplexities.

The normal Nixon would have been enraged beyond containment at being strung along like this, but Watergate Nixon continued to dither. . .

Nixon was simply unable to concentrate his energies and mind on Vietnam. The records show that he was engaged in incessant meetings and telephone calls on Watergate. The ill omens did not cease, the most extraordinary being an intelligence report I received while en route to Paris (in May, 1973). It was a North Vietnamese account that described how the Viet Cong leaders were briefing their subordinates in the field. The report confirmed our knowledge of Hanoi's buildup, referring to a "general offensive" that was in preparation. But it was being postponed, the briefing stated, to give Watergate an opportunity to complete the paralysis of our Presidency and the demoralization of our South Vietnamese ally. It accurately predicted that the wounded President now lacked the authority to retaliate against North Vietnamese transgressions.

Nixon could have taken his case to the American people, arguing that we could not abandon what 50,000 Americans had died to preserve. A Nixon re-elected by one of the largest majorities in history might well have prevailed, as he had so many times before. In the swamp of Watergate, the President's political strength drained away and this option did not exist at all.

The executive paralysis stemming from Watergate had several effects. It meant that the President had less time to focus on complicated political/military issues such as responding to the possibility that prisoners might be left behind in Laos. (Indeed, a transcript of the Oval Office tapes for the critical date of March 23, 1973 indicates that the President spent a significant part of that day discussing Watergate with his closest aides.)

Watergate almost certainly diminished the President's willingness to undertake difficult and controversial initiatives, while also reducing the likelihood that his actions would be accepted at face value and supported either by Congress or the public.

Finally, the Watergate scandal disrupted the focus and attention not only of the President, but of key federal agencies, as well. During the first six months of 1973, for example, four different men served as Secretary of Defense or Acting Secretary of Defense and three as Director of Central Intelligence. This left the POW/MIA issue at Defense primarily in the hands of Deputy Secretary Clements who was among those most skeptical of the possibility that any live U.S. POWs remained after Operation Homecoming. As for the CIA, James Schlesinger, who was the DCI from January through May, 1973, told the Committee that he was not involved in the POW/MIA issue during that time. Rather, he spent literally "90 percent" of his brief tenure as DCI trying to determine the extent of his agency's possible involvement in Watergate.

Pro and Con/Were POWs Left Behind?

The range of information available to the Committee about the possibility that American POWs were left behind after Operation Homecoming goes beyond that gathered during the Committee's investigation of negotiations surrounding the Paris Peace Accords. Thus, no judgment on this critical point is made in this section of the Select Committee's report. It seems useful, however, to summarize briefly the information obtained and the testimony received on this subject, including the opinions of expert witnesses.

Indications That Americans May Have Been Left Behind

As discussed elsewhere in this report, the United States had hard evidence that some Americans who were held captive by the North Vietnamese or the Pathet Lao did not appear on the DRV's December, 1970 list of prisoners. This evidence was publicized widely by Nixon Administration officials, especially Secretary Laird, and was raised directly with the DRV both during the public peace negotiations and by Dr. Kissinger during his February, 1973 visit to Hanoi.

The possibility of live U.S. prisoners being held back, especially in Laos, was taken seriously enough by high-level Administration officials to justify a short-lived decision to halt troop withdrawals required by the peace agreement, and led to recommendations from the Department of Defense for military action.

Notwithstanding the evidence that some individuals who had certainly or probably been held captive were not being returned, the United States did not have hard, current information that particular Americans were being held in particular locations.

Witness Assessments

The witnesses who appeared before the Select Committee during its investigation of issues related to the Paris Peace Accords included those best informed and best positioned to make judgments about the degree of likelihood that live American POWs may have been left behind after Operation Homecoming.

In some cases, these individuals based their judgments entirely on their recollection of contemporaneous knowledge, while others relied on a combination of memory and exposure to information and documents only recently released.

Dr. Henry Kissinger, for example, told the Committee that "I think it's improbable that any (U.S. POWs) are alive today. I honestly did not think there were any alive in Vietnam when the war ended. I have always kept open the possibility in my mind that there were some. . . in Laos."

Dr. Roger Shields' reply to the question of whether any Americans were left behind was: "I do not know and I did not know in April, 1973."

Former CIA Director and Defense Secretary James Schlesinger's judgment was that: "I have a high-probability assessment that people were left behind in Laos, and a medium-probability assessment with regard to Vietnam."

Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird told the Committee that "it was my gut feeling that there were more" U.S. POWs than those admitted to by North Vietnam.

Major General Richard Secord expressed the view that Americans had been kept behind in Laos:

Gen. Secord: . . .I had a lot of years of experience with Laotian matters. . . I served in the Central Intelligence Agency in the field in Laos for 1966, '67 and '68 and was back there again briefly in '69 and then I was the Laos desk officer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense International Security Affairs for awhile in '72, and then by the time you're talking about here, I guess I was the head of the Southeast Asian branch. . .

. . . what was going on with respect to the POWs is we were tracking as carefully as we could all the intelligence information on POWs, especially after it became clear that there was going to be a Paris accord. . . .

Sen. Smith: So, based on your tracking, then, there were confirmed POWs in Laos during the war?

Gen. Secord: Indeed. You've mentioned some of their names this morning. . .

Sen. Smith: When you say POWs in Laos, a number, you are obviously referring to a larger number than the nine.

Gen. Secord: In addition to those nine. . .

Sen. Smith: And did all of those people come home that you were tracking?

Gen. Secord: None of them that I know of have been located or even heard from since the Paris accords, but we did know to, I think, a reasonable level of certitude, that there were more. . .

Sen. Smith: Do you believe that there were people there after Operation Homecoming, based on what you knew?

Gen. Secord: Well, yes, of course I believed there were people after Operation Homecoming.

Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Clements, however, testified to his belief around the time of Operation Homecoming that unreturned U.S. POWS were "in all probability dead." This belief grew stronger during the remainder of his service with the Department of Defense due to DIA's failure in Mr. Clements' opinion to uncover even "one iota's evidence that there was a single POW in Vietnam or anywhere in the Southeast Asian theater of operation."

Finally, Ambassador Winston Lord wrote in a letter to the Select Committee on October 27, 1992 that:

President Nixon did not knowingly leave American prisoners behind when he implemented the Paris Agreement. . . The discrepancies with our intelligence were very disturbing, but we had no conclusive proof that any prisoners were being left behind.

Laos: Complicating Factors

Three hundred and fifty Americans remained unaccounted for in Laos after Operation Homecoming. Of these, the DIA had informed policymakers in February and March, 1973 that approximately 215 disappeared under circumstances where some accounting for their death or survival should be possible. Of these 215, there is evidence that a small number of specific individuals did survive their incidents, and that some number of other individuals, not clearly identified, also survived.

One of the great tragedies and frustrations of the POW/MIA story is that so few of those lost in Laos ever returned. The Committee's analysis of why this occurred would not be complete without consideration of the special challenges faced by any U.S. airman downed in that country. In that connection, William Sullivan, who served as Ambassador in Laos from 1964 to 1969, made these observations to the Committee:

A lot of the casualties taken in Laos were taken in that Ho Chi Minh trail area by these young fellows who went in on what I always regarded as suicide missions. . .

I would say that the chances of anyone surviving as a POW, in my judgment, pretty nil, although some were sent back up the Ho Chi Minh Trail. . .

In that brutal environment, anybody captured there was pretty soon disposed of with a bullet in the head. So that would account for in my judgment the high ratio of nonreturnees from people who might have been captured in the area. The second area we had were air missions in Laos and air missions going toward North Vietnam. . .

the pilots. . . were usually shot down in very terrible jungle. They were usually captured, depending to some degree on the season, because if it was the dry season, the North Vietnamese regulars might have been in there. If it was the rainy season, they would be captured by their irregular forces, highly undisciplined forces and my guess that a lot of them even after capture were either tortured to death, starved to death, treated in such a way that they developed dysentery and died. . .

And I think that accounts in some measure for the high ratio of people who didn't return after either we got a beeper from them and knew they were on the ground or we even had a sighting and knew they were on the ground. . .

I was in Paris when the Vietnamese finally disclosed that the number from Laos was ten. . . and there was enormous disappointment. Admiral Moorer, had a figure and I can't remember where he got it, but it was somewhere around 40 that he was anticipating, so we thought there was a shortfall even given. . . the filter of all these considerations I've just made, we felt there was a shortfall of possibly somewhere around 30. But the measure of hope and the quality of hope we had for anybody who got knocked down in Laos was not terribly high.

Dr. Roger Shields explained his uncertainty about the possibility that any Americans might have remained behind after Operation Homecoming by emphasizing the limited extent of U.S. knowledge about Americans taken captive in Laos. According to Dr. Shields:

the Dept. of Defense carried only four individuals as prisoner in Laos who were not released during Homecoming. . .

One of these individuals I think we entered into a prisoner status mistakenly. That's George Clark. . .

Another one, a civilian, Eugene DeBruin, was last heard from directly as he escaped. He never returned to U.S. control. And I think that the intelligence groups feel they have very good information that he died. So that would leave two individuals carried as prisoner in Laos, and the evidence of their capture and imprisonment is undeniable. . . David Hrdlicka and Charles Shelton.

After their capture, though, information was very, very sparse and was very negative about their continued survival. . .

The DIA believed, as I recall, that three other individuals may have been captured, although the services carried these men as missing. And of these men, the remains of one were found associated with the wreckage of his aircraft. . .

No one who was actually held in Laos ever wrote a letter. . .

Photos of David Hrdlicka and EuGene DeBruin in captivity came into our possession and a short broadcast made by David Hrdlicka was also heard. And all of this occurred very substantially a long time before Operation Homecoming.

Now, Secretary Schlesinger testified this week that our intelligence information regarding Laos was good. . . if that is true, then it is clear that very few men, and perhaps even none as some people believe, and I don't include myself in it, were taken prisoner in Laos.

Now this supposition is supported, to some extent, by the far greater number of combat rescues which occurred in Laos than in North Vietnam. . . we actually recovered more men from Laos through rescues or returnees than we had out of North Vietnam. And I think that says something about the status of the missing in action, because they were the more difficult cases, where our rescue aircraft were not able to get in. . .

most of the intelligence about suspected prison camps or U.S. prisoners in Laos, received while I was in the Pentagon, was very vague and impossible to verify. And the fact remains that we knew, and I believe know today, very little specifically about our men missing in Laos.

Questions of Continued Links between U.S. Aid and POW/MIAs

The Committee looked into questions which have been raised over the years concerning the extent of any linkage between United States economic assistance to Vietnam and U.S. efforts to obtain the fullest possible accounting of missing servicemen.

As noted earlier, there were indications that the North Vietnamese were linking these issues during the peace negotiations. After the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, Vietnam continued to attempt to use their obligations under the accords to provide information on POW/MIAs as leverage to extort U.S. economic assistance. The U.S. steadfastly rejected the Vietnamese position.

Documents to support the contention that the Vietnamese have consistently linked the issues of U.S. aid and accounting for POW/MIAs were compiled by the Committee's Vice Chairman and were included in the official record of the Committee's hearing on September 21, 1992.

Conclusions

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the primary purposes of the Committee's investigation of the Paris Peace Accords were to 1) uncover information bearing on the possibility that U.S. POWs were left behind in Southeast Asia after Operation Homecoming; and 2) determine whether there were factors involved in the negotiation of the agreement, in the agreement itself, or in subsequent public characterizations of the agreement that affected our ability to obtain the fullest possible accounting of our POW/MIAs or that otherwise contributed to the ongoing controversy over the POW/MIA issue.

Nothing in this chapter, or in this report, should be interpreted in any way as diminishing the historical responsibility that the Government of North Vietnam bears for its failure to live up to the POW/MIA provisions of the peace agreement. If American prisoners were, in fact, held back after the war, the responsibility for that and for failing to provide an accounting for the missing rests with those in power in Hanoi and in Laos, not with American negotiators or the opponents or proponents of U.S. involvement in the war.

The Committee believes that its investigation has contributed significantly to the public record of the negotiating history of the POW/MIA provisions of the Paris Peace Accords, and of the complications that arose during efforts to implement those provisions both before and after the completion of Operation Homecoming. That record indicates that there existed a higher degree of concern within the Administration about the possibility that prisoners were being left behind in Laos than had been known previously, and that various options for responding to that concern were discussed at the highest levels of government.

The Committee notes that Administration statements at the time the agreement was signed may have understated the foreseeable problems that would arise during implementation and that this may have raised public and family expectations too high; and that statements made after the agreement was signed may have understated U.S. concerns about the possibility that live prisoners remained, thereby contributing in subsequent years to public suspicion and distrust. However, the Committee believes that the phrasing of these statements was intended to avoid raising what were believed to be false hopes among POW/MIA families, rather than to mislead the American people.