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Other Analyses

The investigators pursued other lines of analysis as a compliment to the cluster map and to check it. One of these analyses, contained in a Memorandum to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, was a cluster analysis of the source files that the Defense Department termed "unresolved live-sightings." At the time of the analysis, about 110 eyewitness accounts remained unresolved. The plot of these files failed to show cluster patterns. Statistical analysis indicated that over half of these files were sightings of persons who stayed behind by their own choice and were not in captivity. A substantial portion of those files were sighting prior to Operation Homecoming.

Other lines of analysis included a statistical comparison of wartime and post-war fabrication in the data. During the war, the Defense Department determined that only about 14 percent of the reporting was fabricated. Beginning in 1973, the rate jumped to about 85 percent of the reporting, within a month. This analysis was performed on Louts 123 and graphed.

Source Analysis versus Content Analysis

Vice Chairman Bob Smith outlined the philosophy behind this aspect of the Committee's investigation in his opening statement at the August 4, 1992 hearing:

Eight years ago, when I first came to Congress, I got involved in the POW/MIA issue. That involvement mostly consisted of meetings with DIA personnel and listening to briefings on sources. The meetings always dealt with the sources of information.

Source analysis as it was presented usually meant taking interviews, talking with other refugees about a source, conducting various background checks, and sometimes giving polygraph tests.

But the focus was clearly on the source more than what he said. The analysts always concluded that a source fabricated his story based on source analysis.

My colleagues and I felt that something was missing. We never saw raw data, had no personal contact and saw no messages.

What I now realize is that there is a second way of analyzing information called content analysis. The two other approaches complement each other in establishing the accuracy of information.

Minority View

Everyone agrees that bad intelligence sources produce bad results. Therefore, if all the sightings of U.S. POWs in captivity since Operation Homecoming are erroneous, then these reports are irrelevant. But this is not the case. Even the DIA accepts that a number of the intelligence sources are credible, such as the source known as the "mortician."

The minority could not accept at face value many of DIA's final evaluations of sources. For example, the minority would not accept DIA's resolution that a live sighting was not credible when the source passed multiple polygraphs and every item of his account had been verified. Some investigators contend that it is reasonable to draw a conclusion that a source of this quality provided credible information.

More than any other document, the Brooks Memorandum of September 1985 led the minority to accept a broader, more thorough, and more all-encompassing approach to the analysis of the intelligence. Use of a cluster-map analysis enabled Committee investigators to:

. assess together both the hearsay and the first-hand live- sighting reports;

. mesh technical intelligence information with human source reporting;

. discover patterns and relationships in the intelligence not evident in DIA files; and

. establish a baseline to check the validity of the source evaluations done by DIA.

One of the clearest differences between the two approaches is seen in the results. In every instance that DIA found the source of a live-sighting report after 1973 to be credible, the DIA analysts left the resolution of the sighting open-ended, or decided that the source had to have been mistaken as to the identity of the persons seen, regardless of what the source said. In the former case, no additional analysis was evident. In the latter, none was needed.

The minority assessed that credible sources produced believable reports and credible information. Additional analysis could lead to additional results. By using cluster and other forms of pattern analysis, the minority learned, for example:

. the existence of logistic and administrative relationships among camps in northwestern Laos and among camps in northwestern Vietnam that are not reflected in DIA documents;

. evidence of a possible second set of camps in Vietnam from which no prisoners returned; and

. differences in the policies, the patterns, and the characteristics of POW incarceration in Vietnam and in Laos.

Most importantly, the cluster-map analysis created a context for interpreting and understanding the limited amounts of signals intelligence of POW movements is Laos and Vietnam, and for the photography of alleged distress signals. In every instance, the signal intercepts and the alleged distress signals coincided with a cluster of live-sighting report posted to the map. This integration had never been done before.

In conclusion, the minority believes that, based on this analysis, the intelligence indicates a strong possibility that Americans remained alive until 1989; however, we cannot prove it.

Majority View of the Committee

Ten senators concluded that while cluster analysis can possibly assist in raising legitimate questions, without adequate sources and fundamental report verification, the analysis is meaningless. Plotting ten or twenty flags representing individual reports in the close proximity on a map means very little if the reports themselves are not valid. While it may raise questions depending on the validity of the reports, it cannot in and of itself be taken as evidence of someone being alive.

In the view of the majority of senators, the plot presented by some staff investigators is fundamentally flawed because the items posted have not passed a validity test. Any meaning a cluster might purport to present is clouded when such plots include reports that are known fabrications, possible fabrications, and in some cases are characterized by a generalized reporting which in many cases lacks precise geographic location or other factual specificity.

As DIA pointed out to the Committee, the map-plot presented by some investigators included only 215 first-hand live-sighting reports, 70 percent of which the Department of Defense has judged and an inter-agency review board has approved as being complete fabrications. In addition, DIA emphasized that the other plotted reports, many of which have only limited analytic value because they lack specifics on the time and/or place of sighting.

DIA View

DIA asserts that notwithstanding the limited value of plotting non- valid or unverified reports, they have used cluster analysis as a "tool." During the hearings on August 4th, referred to above, Major Jeannie Schiff (USAF) testified as follows:

DIA has analyzed clusters since the mid-1980s. In fact, when a new source report is received at DIA it is standard procedure to look at all previous first-hand and hearsay reports in the same geographic area and to look at any report that contains similar information regardless of source or location.

DIA briefed the results of cluster analysis to Members of Congress in 1987...

After careful analysis, we did not find a single report or group of reports within any of the... areas identified by the Senate (Committee staff) which could confirm that a U.S. POW was held against his will after the war.

DIA asserts that the Brooks Memorandum is in error. DIA maintains that, contrary to Brooks' finding ('basic analytical techniques, such as plotting all sightings on a map to look for patterns and concentrations, have never been utilized"), their analysis invoke a computer-generated plot which is more thorough than any hand plotting by analysts. DIA adds that Brooks was never responsible for the day-to-day management of the POW office and even that limited command lasted only a few weeks.

Analysis of Clusters

During public hearings on Aug. 4 and 5, 1992, the Committee reviewed the DIA's overall handling of live-sighting reports and discussed, in depth, "clusters" of reports, totalling 155, in four particular areas: 1) the Hanoi Ministry of Defense area; 2) the Son La region of northwestern Vietnam; 3) northeast Laos (Viengxay area) and 4) the part of northwestern Laos known as the Oudomsai region.

Hanoi Ministry of Defense (Vietnam)

One cluster of 22 firsthand and 48 hearsay reports centers around a secure area in downtown Hanoi that houses the top military and intelligence offices of the Vietnamese Government. During questioning, Senator Smith cited six unresolved reports, and one previously resolved report, that mention, to one degree or another, an underground detention facility in the area, including several that refer to a prison beneath the Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum. The reports allege that American POWs had been held during certain periods in such a facility after the war.

In response, Mr. Robert DeStatte, a senior DIA analyst, pointed out discrepancies among the reports with respect to the location of the alleged detention facility and cited conversations with area residents who denied seeing any U.S. prisoners after the time of Operation Homecoming. He also expressed skepticism about the existence of an underground prison because the high water table in Hanoi would, in his judgment, make the construction of extensive underground facilities impossible.

Under questioning, DIA officials said that they had not asked the Vietnamese for permission to inspect all of the buildings cited by sources as containing a prison, nor had they examined aerial photography for evidence of construction of a prison beneath the Ho Chi Minh Memorial.

A delegation of Committee Members visited the area of the Defense Ministry on November 16, 1992 and found two underground bomb shelters, but no evidence that there is or has been an underground detention facility at the location. Nonetheless, the statements by DeStatte at the Committee's August hearing proved to be inaccurate.

During the Select Committee's final week of hearings in early December, 1992, Vice-Chairman Bob Smith noted that:

Our intelligence agencies have confirmed the existence of, and I quote, "a below-grade infrastructure far more elaborate than one would find at a mausoleum." We have also heard from the Russian Ambassador that there is a restricted underground area beneath the Ho Chi Minh mausoleum...there is a very large underground area beneath Ho Chi Minh's mausoleum and the Citadel that certainly would have been large enough and secure enough to detain any number of American POWs in the 1980's.

During the hearing on December 4, 1992, DeStatte responded:

...whether one can build an underground facility there or not, you'd have to check with qualified engineers. It would be my guess that if you're willing to devote the resources and the money, that you can build an underground facility anywhere.

...(but) if the stories of an underground prison were true, then we should be able to replicate those stories, to corroborate them by interviewing other persons who are familiar with the same area, the same events, the same time periods.

...our investigators have spoken with many persons who could have corroborated the stories if those stories were true. In the end, we're left with a large number of credible witnesses whose testimony has refuted the unsubstantiated stories of the few...

Mr. DeStatte also cited the statement Russian Ambassador to Vietnam Rashid Camadolin to the press on Aug. 15, 1992 in which he stated that there is a restricted underground area beneath the mausoleum in which there is a cooling device and a triple generator for protection against power outages. According to Mr. DeStatte, the Russian Ambassador dismissed the possibility that US POWs were ever held in the area. During the same hearing, Select Committee Chairman John Kerry mentioned that:

When we were on our trip (to Vietnam) last week, we were given access to classified information. Through both technical and classified sources, we have learned at least to the satisfaction of those on the trip, that in fact there is no underground "prison" or facility in that particular location.

Viengxay (Laos)

Vienxgay is located in a remote area of northeastern Laos and served as wartime headquarters for the Laotion Communist forces, also known as the Pathet Loa or LPF. During the war, LPF leaders lived in caves in the area as a protection against American bombing raids. There is also evidence that some U.S. POWs were held prisoner in the caves during the war.

Committee investigators identified 35 post-war reports of Americans in captivity in the Viengxay area, of which 13 are first-hand. Many of the reports come from individuals who claim to have worked as guards or as prison trustees in the area in which the Americans were allegedly held captive. The reports were spaced throughout the 1970's and early 80's, with the most recent dating from 1986. The reports generally cite a small number of American prisoners (no more than a dozen), held separate from other prisoners, although three reports from the 1980's cited more than 200 prisoners.

According to the DIA, the LPF did capture some American prisoners and detain them at Vienxgay during at least the early part of the war. None of these prisoners returned at Operation Homecoming. In May of 1973, the plane of civilian pilot Emmet Kay went down in Laos. Mr. Kay was captured and sent to Hanoi but then returned to Vienxgay where he was held captive in a cave until his release in September, 1974. Beginning in 1975, large numbers of Soviet agricultural and medical advisers began operating in the area. Sightings of the Russians and of Emmet Kay may, according to DIA, account for some of the subsequent live-sighting reports. DIA has interviewed 157 refugees who formerly resided in the region who deny that any other U.S. POWs were held in the area after 1973. The DIA dismissed as completely unrealistic the three reports of more than 200 U.S. POWs being held captive in the mid-1980's.

Son La Area (Vietnam)

The Son La area is a large and relatively remote area of northern Vietnam, bordered on the south by Laos and extending almost to China. It includes a series of prisons and is about 100 kilometers west of the Yen Bai prison, which is where Robert Garwood spent most of his time. A number of the resolved sightings from the Son La area have been correlated by DIA to Robert Garwood. Between 1976 and 1978, the North Vietnamese Army operated a series of detention camps for former South Vietnamese military personnel (ARVN) in the area.

Committee investigators identified 19 reported sightings of Americans in captivity in and around the Son La area. Of these reports, 9 were first-hand and 10 hearsay. Thirteen of the sightings were in the mid to late 1970's. Most involve brief, apparently accidental, sightings of a group of alleged prisoners held separate from the rest of the prison population. For example, in separate reports in 1976, one U.S. person was reportedly seen cutting bamboo, a group of 60-70 U.S. POWs were allegedly seen on a soccer field, and six POWs were apparently seen working. In 1977, there was a hearsay report that American prisoners were about to be moved, a report that 24 foreigners were seen under guard and a reported sighting of 40-50 Americans in a camp. In 1978 and 1979, there were another four reports of sightings of relatively large (30-50) groups of POWs in the area. Towards the end of 1979, China invaded this part of Vietnam and the reported sightings of large numbers of Americans stopped. Subsequent reports, all hearsay, involve the alleged sighting only of individual or small numbers of Americans.

Mr. Sheetz of DIA testified that the U.S. Government had received a total of 30 reports about the possible presence of U.S. POWs from individuals who had been under detention in the Son La area during the late 1970's, aside from the many reports correlated to Robert Garwood. Of the 30 reports, 18 were thought to be fabrications and 12 had been correlated to other types of individuals--such as Swedish development workers or Soviet advisers.

Mr. Gary Sydow, Chief of the Analysis Branch of the DIA's POW/MIA Office, testified that DIA does not believe there is any evidence that American POWs were ever held in the ARVN detention camp system in the Son La area. According to Mr. Sydow, "We've learned a lot about this system. But to hunt for PW's, this is not a place I would look." DIA officials also testified that they had interviewed more than 3700 former inmates of the prison system and been told by only a very small number about the possible presence of Americans other than Robert Garwood. According to Mr. DeStatte:

There was a tremendous flow of information there. None of these camps existed in isolation, and while...there was a small number of people who said that there was a number of PW's, of Americans other than Robert Garwood, I would point out that a tremendous number--a tremendously larger number of people were in that same system who were exposed to the same information flow. They say no.

The DIA officials did testify, however, that a 1979 reported sighting of 40-50 Caucasians, while under guard, bathing in a stream alongside a road in Son La province remains under active investigation.

Oudomsai (Laos)

The Oudamsai region is a very remote area of northern Laos in which few, if any, American operations occurred during the war. Committee staff investigators identified 30 reported sightings of American POWs in the area following the end of Operation Homecoming. Of these, six are first-hand, the rest hearsay. The reports generally relate to the detention of small numbers of Americans in caves or camps, separate from those holding Lao prisoners, in or near the five prisons in the region. Sources of the reports were usually Lao prisoners out on work detail or individuals providing services to the prisons. The reported sightings extend in time from 1973 until 1989. The reports during the 1970's generally referred to less than 10 American prisoners, three reports from 1986 to 1989 cited between 16 and 21 prisoners.

Mr. Warren Gray, Chief of the Current Operations Branch of the DIA's POW/MIA Office, testified that there is no evidence that Americans were held in the Oudomsai region or elsewhere in Laos after Operation Homecoming. According to interviews with more than 1000 Lao refugees conducted by the DIA and other U.S. agencies, there were no U.S. POWs in the Oudomsai region. The refugees did say, however, that there were large numbers of Soviet advisers, usually travelling with an armed escort because of the presence of Lao resistance forces in the area. Several of the alleged sightings of U.S. POWs were attributed by DIA to sightings of the Soviet advisers.

Asked to summarize the DIA's view of sightings in the Oudomsai region, Mr. Gray said:

There are several points that should be made with regard to Oudomsai, Luang Prabang, and Phong Saly, the three areas for which this cluster (of reports) was brought together. First of all...the Lao resistance has complete access to all three provinces. They were well-attuned to the fact that there are reward offers of millions of dollars if they bring out live POWs.

They have been looking for live POWs on a daily basis. Early on, the Lao resistance turned in some hearsay reporting. They made up some of the reporting on their own and we said through their channels, knock it off. If you have valid information, we want it, otherwise do not use the POW issue for monetary gain . . . . because it's not going to be accepted.

But the resistance has access to those areas. We have access to the resistance leaders. They have told us to a person that if they get POW information, we'll be the first to know. They've had no valid POW information from any of these three provinces.

Summary

The question of methodology with respect to evaluating live- sighting reports was revisited on December 4, 1992, during the Committee's final hearing, in the following exchange between Mr. Robert Sheetz of DIA and Vice-Chairman Bob Smith:

Mr. Sheetz:...it's not enough just to take individual reports and throw them up on the map. You've got to look at them in the context of all that you know. This is another way of talking about doing all-source analysis...evaluating each report in terms of what you know about the area and how the report fits in.

Senator Smith: But, Bob, nobody is representing anything differently than that on the map...

Obviously, a firsthand report is better than a hearsay report in terms of the source. But in terms of the plotting, if 10 different hearsay reports, all independent, plot in the same grid coordinates it ought to send a signal out (that) you ought to take another look at it...

what is being misrepresented here is that somehow every one of these reports are valid. Nobody has said that. We just simply took the grid coordinates that were in your information and put them up there just to see where they came. And that is the way they clustered. Many of them will be bogus, as you have said.

But the point is...if you missed something in the past because it was not done, then it is worth a second look. And I think we ought to be...working together to go through those ones.

Other Live-Sighting Reports

In addition to the examples mentioned above, there were other reports which the Comittee focused on in Vietnam. An ethnic Chinese refugee left Vietnam in 1979 and related a story which DIA deemed credible.

While employed as a mortician in Hanoi, responsible for treating the stored remains of American MIAs, the refugee stated that he saw two unidentified Caucasians as late as 1979, whom he believed were "progressive" Americans who remained after the Vietnam War under the custody of the Vietnamese Government. The "mortician" has passed a polygraph examination to this effect and was deposed by the Committee during its investigation.

Another example in Vietnam on which the Committee focused were the live-sighting reports by former Marine PFC Robert Garwood, who remained in Vietnam until 1979. During a week-long deposition, Garwood told the Committee that he had seen what he believed were live American POWs between 1973 and 1978. Most notably, Garwood stated that he had seen American POWs in a prison camp at Thach Ba Lake in 1977 and in a box car at a railway crossing in 1976. Although the DIA stated as recently as June 1992 that no such prison ever existed at Thach Ba Lake, the Committee notes that the presence of this prison was confirmed by the Vietnamese to the Chairman and Vice Chairman in December 1992. Whether Americans ever were held in this facility and were moved through a railway crossing, as Garwood claims, remains under investigation.

Current Status of Live-Sighting Investigations

In April, November and December 1992, Members of the Select Committee traveled to Vietnam and Laos for discussions with officials in those countries on several subjects, including cooperation in the investigation of live-sighting reports.

In Laos, the Committee has found recent improvements in cooperation, although investigations are hindered by the hazardous geography and inclement weather that characterizes the Laotian countryside.

During meetings in Vietnam, the Select Committee repeatedly pressed officials (1) to accelerate the pace of jointly run live sighting investigations, particularly those identified as priorities by American officials, with the hope that all unresolved priority reports could be investigated by the end of the Committee's tenure; and (2) to permit what have become known as "short notice live sighting investigations." A "short notice" investigation occurs when US investigators present Vietnamese officials with the details of a live sighting report and receive permission to conduct an immediate on-site investigation. The primary advantage of a "short notice" investigation is that it reduces the risk that the investigation will be compromised through the "coaching" of local residents or by the removal or alteration of physical evidence.

The degree of Vietnamese cooperation on live-sighting investigations has improved considerably, in part as a result of the Committee delegation visits. At the time of the Committee's visit in November, eighteen "priority" first-hand live sighting reports concerning Vietnam remained uninvestigated. The schedule then in place called for completion of the 18 investigations sometime in the spring of 1993. During meetings in Hanoi between November 15-17, 1992, however, the Select Committee obtained a promise from Vietnamese officials to accelerate the pace so that investigation of the 18 remaining priority cases would be completed by early December.

In fact, the Committee delegation was able to participate personally in the investigation of six of the eighteen priority cases. Under the leadership of the DIA, and with the cooperation of the Vietnamese, Committee Members and staff conducted on-site inquiries into live-sighting reports involving:

. the Citadel, a secure military compound in Hanoi analogous to the U.S. Pentagon (two reports emanating from the Citadel were investigated);

. the X-4 Prison in Ho Chi Minh City, analogous to the U.S. FBI;

. the Rach Gia Prison in Ha Tien Province;

. a mountaintop in Chau Doc Province; and

. the An Diem Prison in Da Nang.

In each location, the team of Members, staff and DIA investigators searched for corroboration of details of the relevant live sighting report by surveying the physical layout and appearance of the area and by interviewing local residents. All six live sighting reports proved to be inconsistent with the information obtained during the on-site investigations, and none turned up evidence that live Americans remain in captivity in Vietnam.

Since the conclusion of the Committee's visit, the pace of investigations has continued and all of the priority investigations in Vietnam have now been completed. Unfortunately, none of these priority live sighting reports has been found to be valid.

The "short notice" live sighting investigations provide a useful gauge of the level of the Government of Vietnam's cooperation on the POW/MIA issue. These investigations often require a substantial intrusion into government operations or into the privacy of Vietnamese citizens. Despite this, the Vietnamese have been extremely cooperative recently in responding to US requests for short notice investigations. As of early December 1992, US investigators had conducted 16 short notice live sighting investigations in Vietnam.

Despite the heightened cooperation of the Vietnamese, and despite the increased focus of US officials upon the investigation of live sighting reports, the caseload for future investigatory action remains. This was illustrated by a discussion involving Senator Tom Daschle, Admiral Charles Larson, Commander CINCPAC, and Major General George Christmas, Commander of CINCPAC Operations during the Select Committee's hearing on December 4, 1992:

Sen. Daschle: We talked about trying to complete the [priority] live sighting investigations by ... the end of next week, December 10th. Are we going to be able to maintain that schedule? To what degree are you satisfied, if we can meet that schedule, that we [will] have exhausted our live sighting investigations?

Admiral Larson: Senator, I don't think we'll ever exhaust the live sighting investigations. They keep coming in. We still have 99 unresolved cases, so they come in as we resolve them. We've picked out the priority ones. DIA has assessed those as priority, have given them to us, and we pursue those as fast as we can in the field. And I think the last one is up by the Chinese border now, the folks are up there today working on that one.

Sen. Daschle: We had about eight or nine, I think, when we left [Vietnam in November 1992], and you say now those priority cases are all --

Admiral Larson: This is the last one.

General Needham: Yes, sir. ...[T]he last report I have is we were down to one, and that one was up on the Chinese border ... and they're up there right now, in fact, may have actually finished it. But it's one that takes a couple of days to get up there and a couple of days to get back.

General Christmas: But as an example, we have 24 more cases that have just arrived in Bangkok.

Sen. Daschle: 24 more live sighting cases?

General Christmas: That's correct. And we will begin -- eight of those are reinvestigations, but we will begin a program then tomove on with those 24. So it's very dynamic.

Sen. Daschle: Now are those live sightings that have just recently occurred, or are they old live sightings that are being turned over to you for the first time?

Admiral Larson: Most of these are old live sightings that have been screened and presented to us for either investigation or re-investigation. Most of the ones I screened were probably four or five -- some of them were probably four or five years old, but they're not all current that are happening right now.

In early January 1993, the caseload of live-sighting investigations to be done totalled 40; JTF-FA teams returned to Southeast Asia to undertake these and other investigations on Jan. 2, 1993.

Example : Pleiku, November 1992

Another live-sighting investigation was conducted by a committee staff investigator and a member of Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) November 21-25, 1992, following the departure of the committee delegation. The investigation began in Ho Chi Minh City and ended in Pleiku, Gia Lai-Kontum Province.

Acting on information provided by a Chinese-Vietnamese resident, Mr. Luu, of Tacoma, Washington, the investigation team was composed of Gary Flanagan of JTF-FA, Ho Xuan Dich, Director of the Vietnam Office for Seeking Missing Persons, and Col. William E. LeGro, Committee investigator.

Mr. Luu had provided Col. LeGro with the name and address of a Vietnamese resident of Ho Chi Minh City who had information about "William George Morgan," allegedly an American POW living freely, or being held, in the central highlands of Vietnam. The team found the source, Mr. Toan, at home in his coffee-house. As it developed, Mr. Toan had no personal knowledge about "Morgan", but agreed to lead us to someone who did. He also produced three bundles of human remains (bones and skulls), which appeared to be Mongoloid, rather than Caucasian. They were later collected by the Vietnamese for joint forensic examination.

Mr. Toan accompanied the team to Xuan Loc, a 90-minute drive east of Ho Chi Minh City. Here they interviewed Mr. Bao who also had no personal information about "Morgan," but offered to guide us to a man who did. Mr. Bao also offered three bundles of bones which also appeared upon casual inspection to be Mongoloid.

The following morning, the team picked up Mr. Bao in Xuan Loc and continued east and north on National Route 1, reaching Tuy Hoa by dark. The journey resumed the next dawn and by mid-morning the team was passing through the village of Ha Tam, between An Khe and Mang Yang on National Route 19. Here Mr. Bao directed a halt in front of a small, thatched shelter and introduced the team to Mr. Anh, who told them that the source of information was Mr. Long in Pleiku and that he would guide them to Mr. Long.

The meeting with Mr. Long is described in the live-sighting report follows:

At 1200 hours on 24 November, the team arrived in Pleiku town. At 1210 the team arrived at 83 Nguyen Viet Xuan Street, which is located on the south side, and uphill from, Route 19 on the way into the main section of Pleiku town. The team stayed close to Mr. Bao and Mr. Anh when they exited the vehicle and walked to the residence of Mr. Long. Mr. Bao knocked on the door, and a Vietnamese male answered the door. Another man then came to the door, and Mr. Anh said that it was Mr. Long. Mr. Long invited us in and we entered the building.

The living area of the residence smelled strongly of alcohol and the man who identified himself as Mr. Ho Xuan Long appeared to have been drinking heavily. Mr. Long identified himself as a 40-year-old ethnic Vietnamese. After introducing the team, we informed Mr. Long that we had been following information leads about an American living in the Central Highlands in a remote region. During the introduction, team members noticed that Mr. Long's left arm was heavily bandaged. Subsequently, during the interview, Mr. Long occasionally appeared to be in severe pain. The team explained that Mr. Toan in Ho Chi Minh City had led us to Mr. Bao in Xuan Loc, and that Mr. Bao had led us to Mr. Anh in Ha Tam, and that Mr. Anh, in turn, had led us to Mr. Long's residence in Pleiku. The team then asked Mr. Long if he had any information on live Americans.

Mr. Long expressed some initial surprise that a joint U.S./SRV team would be visiting him and then said that he had gone with "some others" to a very remote area where an American was living. Mr. Long said that 12 or 13 other men had gone to a border defense post with him. At this point, the team asked Mr. Long who the other men were and who did the men meet with at the border defense post. Mr. Long responded in vague terms and said that the group of men had gone to the border defense post "to the west" of Pleiku at a location about ten kilometers from the Cambodian border. Mr. Long said that it took the group two days to travel to the border defense post. Mr. Long then said that he himself had never seen an American alive in that region, but he knew that the American was alive. The team asked Mr. Long how he knew the American was alive, and Mr. Long responded that he just knew the American was alive because he had heard others talking about the American. The team asked Mr. Long to identify anyone who knew of the live American, and Mr. Long refused to answer. After Mr. Long refused to answer several questions from the team members, Mr. Long responded that he would not answer any more questions. The team asked Mr. Long to reconsider, and Mr. Long changed his story. Mr. Long said that he knew that the American was alive because he had gone to a Montagnard village where all of the villagers talk about the American. The team asked Mr. Long for details about the village and the villagers. Mr. Long refused to answer.

At this point, Mr. Dich and Mr. Manh of the VNOSMP tried to impress upon Mr. Long the importance of his responding to questions from the joint team. Mr. Dich and Mr. Manh re-introduced the American members of the team, then re- introduced the Vietnamese members of the team. After re- explaining the purpose of the team's visit, Mr. Manh asked Mr. Long if he had ever seen the American living in the highlands. Mr. Manh also asked for details about the border defense post, its numerical designator, and who was in charge of the border defense post. Mr. Long refused to answer.

Mr. Bao and Mr. Anh, who were present, but had remained silent up to this point, then asked for Mr. Long's assistance. Both Mr. Bao and Mr. Mr. Anh appealed to Mr. Long to find a way to lead the team to the location where the American was living. Mr. Bao and Mr. Anh also appealed to Mr. Long to do so as a humanitarian act and not for monetary gain. Mr. Long refused to respond to their requests. Instead, Mr. Long said that he was afraid to answer. The team informed Mr. Long that if he would describe precisely where the remote location was, the team would proceed there immediately, regardless of what type of transportation was required. Mr. Bao and Mr. Anh both asked Mr. Long to find a way to tell the team what he knew. Mr. Long said he was sorry but he would need time to think about it. Mr. Dich then asked Mr. Long if the border defense post in question was Border Defense Post 93. Mr. Dich also asked Mr. Long if the man in charge of the border defense post was Mr. Bien. Mr. Long said that he would not answer those questions. Mr. Dich them told Mr. Long that the team would leave him alone to think about the situation and would return in the evening to talk some more. Both Mr. Dich and Mr. Manh assured Mr. Long that he had nothing to fear so long as he told the truth. The team left Mr. Long's residence after notifying him that we would return at 1800 hours the same day. The interview continued, with Mr. Long becoming increasingly evasive and nervous. Finally, Mr. Long departed from his assertion that he had seen the American:

Mr. Long, noticeably shaking, said the[n] he knew a man at a border defense post near the location where the American was kept hidden. Mr. Long repeated that he could only go to the location alone. Mr. Dich and Mr. Manh both encouraged Mr. Long to cooperate and tell the team what he knew. At this point, Mr. Long said that the only reason he only knew the story of the American living in the central highlands was because he had met a man named Huy Luu in Ho Chi Minh City at a coffee house operated by a young man named Toan. Mr. Long quickly changed the subject and said that he knew of approximately 20 sets of remains of U.S. servicemen. To substantiate this, Mr. Long went to a room at the rear of his residence and then returned with the photocopy of an identification card. . . .

The team consulted field listings of unaccounted for U.S. personnel and informed Mr. Long that the identification data on the card did not correspond to any known Americans missing in Vietnam.

The team then questioned Mr. Long about his knowledge of remains alleged to [be] the remains of U.S. servicemen. Mr. Long said that he knew of approximately 20 such remains. When asked where the remains were and who had custody of them, Mr. Long said that he only knew of the remains because the local people who had them in their custody had approached him and asked him to help them. Mr. Long said that each of the remains was available for a price of $5,000 (USD) in gold or that all 20 of the remains could be purchased for $100,000.

The team agreed that Mr. Long was evasive and probably had no information on any living American in the highlands. Mr. Dich informed Mr. Long that the People's Committee would meet with him later that evening to decide on what to do about Mr. Long's dealings in false information about Americans. This meeting took place, but the American members of the team were not invited to attend.

The following morning Mr. Flanagan and Col. LeGro attended a meeting with the People's Committee and heard from Major Hien, the commander of the border post in question. Information presented at this meeting appeared to show that the story of the American in the highlands was a venerable rumor, probably founded in the Caucasian resemblance of an old, blind tribesman who lived in a village southwest of Pleiku. It was quite apparent that Mr. Long was attempting to make his living trafficking in POW information and remains, but it was unclear whether he was a leading figure in this enterprise or part-agent/part-victim. Mr. Luu's role was also in question, as were the involvements of Toan, Bao, and Anh.

Discussion

As long as live-sighting reports remain under investigation, they constitute a measure of potential evidence that US POWs may have been left behind and survived in captivity, at least for a time. It is also possible that one or more of DIA's past report evaluations is incorrect. As rigorous as the current analytical process appears to be, it remains dependent at times on deductions that, although highly logical, are still less than 100% certain. Examples of this are cases where DIA has correlated sightings to Soviet advisers because advisers were present in an area or discounted reports because multiple other refugees from a particular area have reported seeing no U.S. POWs. The existence of a small degree of uncertainty is inevitable in making such judgments and a small degree of uncertainty is all that is -- or should be -- required to ensure that the live-sighting followup process continues to be taken very seriously and that evaluations be done with enormous care.

Arriving at a firm judgment about the overall significance of live- sighting reports is complicated by several factors. Many such reports are obvious fabrications. Others are so vague as to make meaningful follow-up impossible. Nailing down specific information about incidents that may have occurred ten or fifteen or more years ago is, at best, extremely difficult. And as mentioned above, analytical judgments, even when professionally arrived at, often retain an element of subjectivity.

Another complicating factor in assessing live-sighting reports is the frequent need for foreign country cooperation. In that sense, the U.S. Government's official investigators are caught in what is perhaps the ultimate "Catch-22". If an apparently credible report should be received concerning the possible presence of Americans in Vietnam or Laos, cooperation from the governments of those countries may well be required to check the report out. But the very process of asking permission jeopardizes the credibility of the investigation. As a result, the DIA supplements its official requests with other means of gathering information, but these other methods may be relatively slow and uncertain. One routine but increasingly available method of gaining information consists simply of talking to average Vietnamese in their own cities and villages. The presence of full time American investigators in Hanoi and hopefully, in Laos and Cambodia, as well, should augment the amount of information collected by this method.

The Committee notes that political changes particularly in Cambodia, but also in Vietnam and Laos, have greatly expanded the number of Caucasians living or traveling freely in southeast Asia. This creates a likelihood that there will be a rising number of well-intentioned, but inaccurate, reports concerning possible American POWs. It is important that procedures be established so that the limited resources of DIA investigators are not squandered on reports that obviously do not pertain to possible U.S. POW/MIAs.

It is DIA's judgment that the live-sighting reports they have received and evaluated do not constitute "evidence" that any U.S. POWs remained in captivity in southeast Asia after the war, although the possibility that this did occur cannot be ruled out. There was considerable discussion by Committee Members during the course of its investigation about DIA's use of the term "evidence" in that statement. Some Members felt that the number and detail of live-sighting reports clearly constituted "evidence" that Americans were left behind, even if serious questions about the validity of individual reports had been raised. Other Members agreed with DIA that a large number of reports does not necessarily signify anything if there are strong reasons to discount each of the reports. No Committee Member would argue that existing reports constitute hard proof that American POWs remained behind or are still being held captive in southeast Asia.

The Committee investigation also found that:

. There is no evidence that officials or investigators from DIA have concealed or covered up information concerning the possible presence of live Americans in Southeast Asia.

. The current DIA staff, especially those based in southeast Asia, deserve credit for an enormous and steadily increasing amount of work performed under very difficult and uncomfortable conditions.

. In order to ensure objectivity, there must be a continued and conscious effort on the part of DIA leadership to maintain an attitude among analysts that presumes the possible survival of U.S. POWs in southeast Asia to the present day.

. The DIA should routinely review its analytical methods for the purpose of ensuring the most rigorous possible, all-source, evaluation of live-sighting reports, including hearsay reports where feasible.

. Continued emphasis should be placed on establishing a strong, on the ground, live-sighting investigatory capability in Laos and Cambodia and on expanding that capability within Vietnam.

. The highest priority should continue to be given to credible reports that live Americans are currently being held.

Pilot Distress Symbols

The purpose of this part of the investigation was to determine the possibility that a number of symbols and markings, identified through the use of overhead reconnaissance photography, might have been attempts by American POWs to communicate their location to U.S. intelligence collectors. These possible distress symbols, several of which match pilot distress symbols used during the war, span a period from 1973 to 1988, and as late as June 1992.

The Committee also undertook an examination into actions taken by the Government to investigate those symbols. U.S. investigators did not act on one provocative symbol, even after four U.S. Senators travelled to a remote area of Laos to investigate it themselves. It was not until the Committee scheduled a public hearing on it six months later that U.S. investigators began their work. In contrast, while it took the U.S. six months to request permission to visit the site, the Government of Laos granted permission in just two days.

Background

As part of their overall training, U.S. Air Force pilots received survival training. The Air Force's Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Agency (JSSA) developed and conducted much of the training program. Some of the survival training during the Vietnam War-era was conducted at Fairchild Air Force Base. Another part, focused specifically on jungle survival, was conducted at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. The length of the courses varied. Depending on the year in which the training was conducted, the Fairchild phase could have been 12-20 days in length and the Clark phase might have been 3-5 days long. Although the program was conducted by the Air Force, some Army, Navy and Marine Corps personnel also participated. Many subjects were taught during these programs, but training that focused on ground to air signaling was of particular interest to the Committee.

Ground to air signals could consist of pyrotechnic signals, sea dye marker, mirrors, or signals based on sticks, rocks or soil which would be arranged in patterns clearly recognizable from the air. Pilots were taught to use shadows to enhance and add a three- dimensional effect to the letters.

Specific letters used for the ground symbols were determined by the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), the military regional command responsible for the conduct of the war in Southeast Asia. The signals were changed periodically so that the secrecy of their meaning could be maintained. It appears that the practice of using letters for ground-to-air signalling started in 1966 and the style of the letters evolved throughout the war with the directive to add appendages to the letters taking effect in October 1971.

The preferred means of signalling, of course, was by a survival radio. Voice communications over these radios relied upon special authentication procedures. Normally, this would be a four digit number or "authenticator number." Once a downed pilot established communications on a survival radio, he would use the authenticator number to verify his identity with the search or rescue aircraft. This method of authentication would make it more difficult for enemy forces to mimic a downed pilot and lure unsuspecting allied aircraft into a trap. Ground-to-air signalling was an essential part of pilot survival training.

Military Escape and Evasion Program

During the war years, the Services gave many pilots who flew in Southeast Asia individual authenticator numbers to identify themselves by radio or other means in the event of their shootdown or capture. Combat squadrons also gave their flyers primary and back-up Escape and Evasion (E&E) signals to use to identify their location, as either an evader or a POW. Some Army Special Forces troops were also given E&E distress signals for their use. These distress signals were classified and changes periodically. Pilot authenticator numbers were also classified. During the years of the Southeast Asian conflict, both national level and Service intelligence organizations were required to be alert for any Escape and Evasion (E&E) symbols marked on the ground, as part of the overall effort to recover downed pilots or identify possible detention sites for POWs. A number of Search and Rescue operations were mounted during the war, based on the detection of E&E symbols.

Investigation Procedures

The Committee held Hearings on this issue on October 15, followed on the 16th by a closed hearing on a 1981 covert operation, which was triggered largely by a possible distress signal. A number of depositions and interviews of DIA, CIA and JSSA personnel, related to the Symbols investigation were also completed. The investigation focused on identifying all possible symbols detected by overhead photography, all contemporaneous written documentation and analysis pertaining to such symbols, and on what efforts were taken by DIA to investigate the origin of the symbols. Most documentation has been declassified and line drawings of the possible symbols were prepared by CIA and DIA.