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Inter-Agency Group

As part of its review of Executive branch policy-making on POW/MIA issues, the Committee examined the origins and operations of a group that is little known to many Americans, but a group that has been the focus of POW/MIA policy-making for more than a decade: the Inter-Agency Group on POW/MIA Affairs(IAG).

The IAG's members include representatives from the Department of State (State), the Defense Department's International Security Agency (DoD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Chiefs), the National Security Council (NSC), and the National League of Families (League). The Select Committee sought to determine:

. the IAG's precise role in formulating and implementing POW/MIA policies;

. the IAG's operating procedures;

. the effects on the IAG of the participation of a non- governmental organization; and

. the extent to which IAG deliberations are accountable to Congressional and public review -- or should be.

History of Inter-Agency Groups

Inter-agency groups are common in the Executive branch of the U.S. Government. Since many problems involve overlapping jurisdictions or responsibilities, inter-agency groups have emerged as a means to coordinate policy and improve communication among agencies. They often pass recommendations up the line to "Senior Agency Groups" or "SIGs," to Deputy level meetings, and, if appropriate, to the Cabinet/Presidential level.

Several witnesses at the Committee's Dec. 1, 1992 hearing on the Inter-Agency Group testified that such bodies are useful in dealing with issues. Richard T. Childress, former Director of Asian Affairs in the Reagan Administration NSC, commented that

Every important issue of priority in any administration has an inter-agency body that meets . . .to receive briefings, develop or implement policy, review progress, or complain to each other about how one participant or another is wonderful or defective in the overall task.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Carl Ford agreed:

. . . if there hadn't been an IAG, I would have been forcefully advocating that one be formed.

Creation of the IAG on POW/MIA Affairs

The Inter-Agency Group on POW/MIA policy is unusual, however, because of its longevity. Most such groups have a much shorter lifespan and "go from issue to issue," Ford said, citing IAGs which coordinated policy during the Persian Gulf and Korean Wars.

The IAG was established in January 1980 "to review and assess current events and policies [and] to consider future direction/policy to resolve the POW/MIA problem." It offered a means of dealing with most key players: DoD, State, the League, and Congress. One early product was a revised statement of U.S. policy toward the live-sighting reports pouring out of Vietnam and Laos with the increased flow of refugees.

A year later, under the Reagan Administration, the DoD referred to the IAG as an "ad hoc PW/MIA inter-agency group, in which the DoD was actively participating." Sometime thereafter the membership of the IAG changed to omit the Congressional component. It was unclear why that change was made, and the practice was not followed; the U.S. - Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA's has "exactly that arrangement," with "staffers from the committee and staffers from the executive branch working together. . . doing the investigations together. . . " and that "the . . . Commission [in] which the Congress and Executive branch have worked together, has worked very well."

Public Accountability

The IAG has been the focal point of U.S. policy formulation on the POW/MIA issue for 12 years. The IAG as it now operates "oversees the overall U.S. Government effort." Further, it "cuts across all the departments in the executive branch that have a role [in the POW/MIA issue]." Its participants argue that the various agencies, departments, constituencies, issues, and policy matters involved make it necessary and all confirmed the centrality of the IAG to the effective pursuit of U.S. policy on this issue.

Despite its central role, penetrating the IAG's working has been difficult, and even such a basic question as how often it meets is not readily or fully answered by its present members. Still- classified documents suggest there were at least as many meetings in 1992 as in 1991, but Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kenneth Quinn, the IAG's current chairman, only could estimate that number (to be about 17).

Other documentation of the IAG's working was elusive, a situation that generates natural concern:

When you are dealing with an issue that is as volatile as this, and you have got as many people crying conspiracy as you have, and then you have . . . this sort of entity . . . making decisions which has a special interest group, a non-governmental entity represented on it which has been the subject of criticism. . . do you not feel that you are just contributing to the problems of this issue by not having a record of openness?

The IAG members' response cited the importance of the coordinating body, without addressing the central point about its secrecy.

During the first years of the IAG's existence, the chairmanship rotated among the executive agencies represented, as intended at its inception. In the early 1980's, however, because the issue is primarily a foreign policy matter, the Reagan Administration decided to maintain State Department representative as chair. From 1981 to 1989 chairmen were successively Ambassadors Daniel O'Donahue, John Monjo, and David Lambertson.

In October, the Committee wrote to IAG Chairman Quinn, requesting all records of IAG meetings -- agendas, background papers, minutes, etc. -- from 1981 to the present. He responded that records before 1991 were difficult to locate and later testified that "there was no record from [before] 1991." The requested documents were delivered in classified form in late November and State later notified the Committee that it would not declassify five memoranda. Rules about the treatment of classified materials precludes the Committee from characterizing these memoranda, but investigators with the appropriate clearance have reviewed them.

During the Committee's hearing, Senators questioned the IAG's failure to keep regular minutes of its meetings. In the IAG's early days, there were informal notes of its meetings, Childress testified, but when the IAG "got rolling," its members considered keeping minutes a waste of time. Common understanding of tasks and frequent telephonic communication made formal minutes unnecessary, he said.

In this connection Ford noted that because actions flowing from IAG deliberations are taken by departments, the "records of the IAG are really found" in departmental records. In his words,

. . . if we came back from an IAG and tried to write up what had happened, it would have already changed before it could have made any impact. . . .where you find the paper is when the IAG would get to a point where it was important that our superiors knew . . . what was going on, had to make a decision, and at that point a decision memorandum from Defense, and, I'm sure, State and the NSC would go forward to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State [and] the President on these issues.

In fact, Ford said it was not his organization's practice to take notes at IAG meetings. In other words, a paper trail was left by the agency taking action -- not the group recommending that it do so.

Current IAG Practices

In its hearing, The Select Committee learned that the IAG on POW/MIA matters still meets at least twice a month. The agenda for the meetings is set by consultation among participants, and each agency prepares in advance for meetings. Regular attendees are representatives from the Joint Chiefs, DoD's OSD/ISA, NSC, State, and the League. In addition, the head of the Special Office on POW/MIA Affairs within DIA is normally present in an advisory capacity.

According to testimony before the Select Committee, the IAG works by consensus. Participants provide in advance some idea of their concerns for the meeting, and the meeting deals with those concerns in a fairly informal manner. None of the witnesses specifically answered whether the IAG normally conducts formal votes on issues; it appears that general agreement is reached by informal discussion. Ford explained that repeated telephone calls among the participants made the IAG's deliberation an on-going process. The Committee questions the practice of at once conducting closed-door meetings while -- at the same time -- discussing the meetings' substance by phone. The purpose of secret meetings should be either (1) to discuss classified information inappropriate for discussion by phone, or (2) to discuss policies which require the coordination of several participants.

Policies Affected by the IAG on POW/MIA Affairs

The IAG affects a broad range of issues, characterized by League representative Ann Mills Griffiths as:

a wide variety of POW/MIA related actions, such as intelligence collection and analysis, diplomatic initiatives, communication with family members, Congressional endeavors, and public awareness activities.

A frequent subject appears to be the "Road Map," the still classified declaration of U.S. policy of April 1991 that the U.S. relies upon to measure Vietnam's cooperation on POW/MIA and other matters as it moves toward normalization of relations. Other POW/MIA-related topics have included the Orderly Departure Program, by which the Vietnamese permit their citizens to emigrate through normal channels rather than by fleeing in boats or overland, and potential private assistance to the Vietnamese in humanitarian areas such as prosthetics for the war-disabled. Because of the significant Vietnamese influence in Southeast Asia, and its implications for other nations of the region, the progress of relations between the United States and Vietnam involves broad diplomatic issues. Not least of these is a final, internationally acceptable peace in Cambodia, which is reportedly an element in the "Road Map."

A survey of conversations between the U.S. and Vietnam from 1982 to 1992 suggests that IAG membership was a fair indicator of involvement in the conduct of bilateral relations. Griffiths participated in at least 20 of the 25 official and semi-official meetings with the Vietnamese examined. In view of Griffiths' membership on the Inter-Agency Group, it can be argued that she can not conduct an unofficial conversation on the POW/MIA subject.

Griffiths identified intelligence management as an issue in which the IAG has been active. Because of the close connection between the policy and intelligence functions in the POW/MIA issue, two related questions arise:

. How often has the Inter-Agency Group gotten involved in examining live-sighting reports during or prior to the analysis of intelligence information? The IAG apparently reviewed live-sighting reports for a year in 1986-1987, as appears in the "SI report. Childress told the Committee that the IAG injected itself in the live-sighting review process for two reasons. First, during the period in question, DIA was being criticized for the way it handled live-sighting reports and the IAG wanted to better measure DIA's performance. Part of that effort involved conducting final reviews of DIA's decisions. The IAG also sought to provide protection, where appropriate, to the DIA's efforts.

. A related question is whether the IAG was involved in work with casualty files. For example, the Committee found that Ford was involved in a late November 1992 meeting that reached a final determination about several casualty cases. One explanation of this kind of interaction of policy-making and intelligence analysis, put forth by Childress, is that the whole (addressed by policy-makers) is the sum of its parts (resolving individual cases or changing their category, such as from MIA to KIA/BNR). Another is the link the IAG can provide between DIA and service casualty officers, ensuring family members learn quickly about new developments. The League's Influence over Government Policy

An early example of League influence in POW/MIA matters is its efforts to work with members of Lao resistance forces in the early 1980s. The timing of this episode was important to League involvement on the IAG.

Throughout the 1970s, the POW/MIA issue received a low priority despite public statements of concern; in 1979, the national intelligence priority assigned the POW/MIA issue was at the lowest U.S. national priority -- Priority 7.

In 1979, with the increase in refugees from Vietnam following Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and the onset of open border fighting between Vietnam and China, there came a not unexpected increase in both refugees and reports. Many of these reports were "first hand live sightings" and they energized the National League of Families into pushing for greater emphasis on the PW/MIA issue.

DIA faced the increased workload and political pressure with a staff of only eight; a team of field interviewers was organized as a short term measure to handle to increased reporting.

The reports came not only from Vietnam, they also came from Laos, one asserting that U.S. POWs had been moved from North Vietnam to northern Laos and then southward to the area in Khammouane Province. This was one basis for a still classified covert foray from Thailand into Laos in the spring of 1981. The operation failed to locate any POWs. The source of that original report stated to other American PW/MIA operatives later that summer that he had no information on any live POWs, challenging the credibility of the report and suggesting that it was fabricated in order to win U.S. support for the Lao resistance.

Other reports about live POWs in Laos arrived but were often not what they first appeared to be. One National League of Families associate, Robert Schwab, was operating in Thailand at this time, searching for POW/MIA information. Information Schwab forwarded to the League (which in turn provided it to DIA) included new assertions of live POWs in Khammouane Province who had been the target of a rescue attempt by the Lao Resistance in 1979. His source was the Lao Resistance.

Numerous documents detailed the League's position that these first- hand live sighting reports demonstrated the likelihood that there were still live POWs in Indochina and demanded immediate attention.

When Robert Garwood returned from Vietnam in early 1979, the POW/MIA issue regained national attention and a top-level inter- agency group was formed. The National Security Council staff member responsible for the area coordinated issuance of a White House statement on the increased volume of reports from refugees.

By 1981, the number of reports of live POWs was increasing. The principal office receiving such reports was the Joint Casualty Resolution Center field element in Thailand, under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Paul Mather. The office had several field interviewers but was soon swamped by the quantity of information it received. Few reports could be given the detail they deserved.

While DIA and the JCRC were focusing on live-sighting and dog-tag reports, reports of human POW remains received little attention. A spate of activity began in the early summer of 1981 with the arrival in Thailand of four skulls. Schwab advised DIA he would get information from Ann Mills Griffiths on July 13, 1981, about the possible recovery of four skulls by the Lao resistance in southern Laos. DIA was already aware of the report, having been advised by Griffiths on July 10th that a resistance group with four skulls had been taken into custody by the Thai.

The U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand viewed this sudden flurry of reports about remains and the heavy involvement of Schwab and ABC News as an orchestrated ." . . major media event. . . " The Embassy added ." . . both Schwab and the ABC rep clearly implied initially that they would make it known that we were being less than cooperative on this issue if we didn't agree to their condition." The remains came into U.S. custody within three hours of the time the Embassy first learned of the skulls' existence.

On July 28, 1981, a meeting of State, DoD and NSC staff, chaired by then-Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, John Holdridge, discussed the issues of working with the Lao resistance forces in order to get the remains of American servicemen, and the U.S. policy not to pay for remains.

On-going negotiations were also discussed, with John Negroponte and Richard Armitage mentioned as potential emissaries to the Vietnamese Ambassador at the United Nations in New York. A high level mission to Vietnam was also considered.

On July 30, 1981, Admiral Paulson requested the appropriate DIA element research the Lao resistance forces to help answer the question ." . . as to whether it may be more profitable (strictly in terms of accounting for U.S. MIAs) for the U.S. to deal with the Lao resistance forces or attempt to continue to secure a full accounting from the LPDR." The assessment was also to consider the possibility of penetration by Lao or Vietnamese hostile intelligence services or even allied resistance groups such as those under former South Vietnamese Army Colonel Vo Dai Ton.

League employees and JCRC were not the only persons searching for POW/MIA information from Laos and Thailand. Early in August 1981, staff members of Soldier of Fortune magazine contacted JCRC coincidental with SOF's own effort to establish Camp Liberty, a base for Chinese trained Hmong resistance forces in northern Laos. During this period, SOF had contacts from time to time with the various private Americans operating in Thailand and collecting POW/MIA information. SOF also learned quickly that a major POW/MIA information peddler, Phoumi Nosovan, operated from the area of Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, and that he was notoriously unreliable and someone to avoid.

DIA found itself under more pressure due to the escalating issue of first hand live sightings and the DIA Director's new stance on the issue. Congressman Charles E. Bennett had written to Lieutenant General Tighe on July 24th to obtain General Tighe's clarification of his statement that "American servicemen are alive and being held against their will in Indochina." Rear Admiral Burkhalter, DIA's Chief of Staff, reiterated General Tighe's official DIA position that "of all of the live sighting reports of American prisoners in Southeast Asia, which have been investigated by DIA, none could be verified." Admiral Burkhalter clarified the General's remark as his personal opinion but not DIA's official position.

In fact, DIA had received information about three purported Americans seen in Hanoi (one of whom was Garwood) by a North Vietnamese defector, the same source as the highly credible information about Vietnam's warehousing of approximately 400 human remains in Hanoi.

Also, just two months earlier, in May, 1981, Rear Admiral Jerry O. Tuttle, DIA's Assistant Vice Director for Collection Management, faced with a request from the U.S. Marine Corp's trial counsel at the court martial of PFC Robert Garwood, decided to stonewall. The trial counsel had requested that DIA declassify information from the North Vietnamese mortician concerning three Americans he had seen in Hanoi. Implicitly, such information might have been helpful in Garwood's court martial, but Admiral Tuttle followed General Tighe's standing decision to classify all live sighting reports of Americans received after August 1, 1979, and denied the request.

As the skeletal remains were being processed by JCRC for shipment to the CIL, DIA completed its assessment of the Lao resistance forces. Their conclusion was that the resistance effort was fragmented and with little coordination between groups. It was not seen as a threat to the Lao government and was ." . . a poor single focus for the U.S. MIA efforts."

Nevertheless, the DIA analysts concluded the Lao resistance could travel through Lao government control areas to search for grave sites using small covert reconnaissance teams. Such an effort would be feasible ." . . if the resistance element was strongly motivated and the U.S. interests represented by trusted indigenous personnel." Lao tribesmen could also assist in searching for crash and grave sites.

As to hostile intelligence, there was ." . . a possibility that the LPDR or SRV intelligence services have infiltrated the resistance movement." The group least likely to be penetrated was non-Lao. DIA concluded with a recommendation ." . . to pursue both overt pressure on the LPDR and their Soviet and Vietnamese supporters and covert efforts through Lao resistance forces. . . the potential for success appears greater utilizing a covert action program. However, the "risks" inherent with such a program are also greater."

In its more formal assessment, DIA analysts clearly favored two major resistance groups; the Hmong in northern Laos and the Lao People's United National Liberation Front headed by Phoumi Nosovan.

The DIA assessment was completed just as a message arrived at DIA from the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok. It provided the most recent information on the Lao resistance and the operations by the Thai Government's Special Group 917 which had coordinated a meeting of Lao resistance groups on June 1, 1981, in Udorn, Thailand. Splintered and with close links to the Khmer Rouge, Chinese and Thai, one acknowledged resistance contact was former Lao General Phoumi Nosovan.

On August 31, 1981, Paulson forwarded DIA's formal assessment to the State ." . . for consideration and possible use in the development of new approaches/initiates in support of U.S. Government PW/MIA efforts. With the assessment, Paulson forwarded what he described as "a summary of recovered American remains reportedly obtained by resistance elements. . . " Two Americans, Vincent Donahue and Robert Schwab, were private citizens who, in addition to JCRC, had recovered remains since December 1979 which, on the surface, would support DIA's carefully worded endorsement for the resistance option.

On September 16, 1981, Paulson submitted CIL-HI's analysis of human remains obtained by U.S. citizens from the Lao resistance. All turned out to be Mongoloid remains and not remains of the Americans lost in the incidents to which they purportedly related.

Robert Schwab had turned over approximately two pounds of bone fragments to JCRC on July 13th. He described receiving them from Lao resistance associates who stated they came from a C-130 downed in southern Laos on December 21, 1972. Brooks turned over three skulls plus fragmented remains from four individuals to JCRC on August 13. They, too, had reportedly come from a member of the Lao resistance. Both turn overs and their linkage to the Lao resistance were described as receiving considerable network coverage, creating a favorable climate for the July 28 meeting about whether to support the Lao resistance.

The CIL analysis was sufficiently noteworthy for DIA analyst S. Ferro to submit a current intelligence item drawing attention to the CIL's conclusion the remains were Southeast Asian Mongoloid rather than American. Ferro attributed the incident to another "example of the manner in which the communist government and other groups in Southeast Asia have attempted to manipulate the PW/MIA issue to their advantage." Nevertheless, there was no hint that any members of the fragmented Lao resistance, or any private Americans working with them, were part of the manipulation.

Discussion of League's Role

The IAG appears to be singular in its longevity and the close connection between private interests and U.S. Government actions that the League's membership on the IAG effectuates. This unorthodox situation has only a tenuous parallel in the occasional use of private consultants, whose involvement is almost always peripheral. The League's central role -- often as the driver of Government policies -- raises serious questions about whether it has unduly influenced U.S. policy, and whether official Government bodies have unduly interfered in the operations of a private group.

Certainly the presence of an unelected, unappointed citizen -- with access to both classified material, including intelligence, and a special exemption to privacy rights guaranteed to individual next- of-kin and not to any group purporting to represent them -- to the processes by which the intelligence is analyzed and evaluated, during the time it is being analyzed, is unique.

This involvement is widely criticized by some activists, including some families. It is a criticism publicly levelled by Col. Millard Peck when he resigned as head of the Special Office for POW/MIA affairs in March, 1991. And it was critically mentioned in a DIA Inspector General's report of March, 1983.

. . . Ms. Griffiths was to have visual access to . . . selected case files and reports, [but] her access to (and retention) of PW/MIA data became so pervasive . . . that the PW/MIA staff gave her and her assistant director weekly briefings on various topics of their choosing. . . [Later] Ms. Griffiths would exercise her contacts in J- 5 [Joint Chiefs] who would order up DIA information for her. More recently, her entree to PW/MIA intelligence has been principally through a staffer on the NSC, who . . . apparently supplies her with whatever she desires. She presently sits on the IAG on PW/MIAs, which deals with policy matters at the national level. . . While her direct access to DIA intelligence had been largely suppressed . . . she still had access through the IAG and her contact at NSC.

Griffiths' complete access to the DIA's PW/MIA office, including an ability to assign tasks to intelligence analysts, the report added, had a "chilling effect" on them.

There are acknowledged benefits to Griffiths' involvement as well. Witnesses noted that her involvement had "been useful to the U.S. Government in that much of the acrimony of the post-war years had subsided." Rear Admiral Allan G. Paulson, then Director of the PW/MIA office, found Griffiths' security clearance and involvement to have been a "net advantage to DIA and the Government for the reason addressed in the commentary [improved relations between the Government and the families]."

At a public hearing on the IAG, Griffiths' IAG colleagues generally defended the League's participation -- as represented specifically by Griffiths -- as productive and helpful. Ford responded to Committee questions concerning her involvement with high praise:

." . . the National League of Families, represented by its Executive Director, Ann Mills Griffiths, has been the heart and soul of the IAG since its inception. . . . much of what the IAG has accomplished would not have been possible without Ann's tireless efforts over many years.

Similarly, Childress said:

An inter-agency group without the League represented would lead to a higher level of destructive "group think." Being an NSC staff member I was able to interface with all relevant departments and agencies at all levels, both here and in Asia. To institutionalize the effort, it was necessary. The League representative on the IAG, Ann Mills Griffiths, due to her 20-plus years of experience and continuity on the issue, now through five administrations, was the only other participant in the IAG who could reach out easily to all levels. . . .

without the National League of Families, POW/MIA would not be a national priority today, there would be no IAG, no DIA POW/MIA division, no Presidential Emissary. . .

Discussion

It is difficult to say whether statements from interested parties constitute a definitive answer to the questions raised by the central involvement of an unelected, unappointed private citizen with sensitive and significant negotiations, and in forming the policies that undergird those negotiations. Throughout the Committee's investigation, it has heard private comments of officials at all levels of Government that refute the praise accorded Griffiths in public comments. It has heard tales of political terror from those who have crossed her, as well as stories of productive works.

Griffiths' long involvement in the POW/MIA issue makes her an unusually influential figure without formal membership in the IAG; whether different policies would have been developed had she not participated will never be known.

The Committee finds wisdom in the principle of Government's maintaining an arm's-length relationship with private organizations, no matter how noble the issue and efforts of the organization. To be accountable to the American public, a proper relationship should delineate Government from private-sector efforts. Therefore, the committee recommends that the role of the IAG, and its present composition, be re-evaluated by all involved agencies and Congressional oversight committees, with a bias against its continued joint operation with a private organization.

Investigation of Offers

"I would not have been surprised at all if they had, three months later, [after the Paris Peace Accords], told us that they had just discovered 50 prisoners and wanted $2 billion for them. But that did not happen.

This opinion, voiced by Henry Kissinger during his deposition to the Select Committee in 1992, reflects a suspicion maintained over 20 years by some POW/MIA families and others that POWs both remained in captivity after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords and would be the subject of Government to Government contact leading to a "buy back" of American POWs. The Committee has found no convincing evidence of any such offer being made. There were, however, two incidents which require further explanation and prove illustrative of the problems relating to this issue.

The 1981 Alleged Offer

The Committee received information that President Reagan had received an "offer" in early 1981 transmitted through a third country (Canada and/or China) of an offer by the government of Vietnam to sell live POWs to the U.S. for $4.5 billion dollars. The source of this information was a Secret Service agent who allegedly was present and overheard part of a meeting in the White House where this matter was discussed.

The agent reportedly overheard President Reagan discussing this offer with Vice-President George Bush, Richard Allen (National Security Adviser) and William Casey (CIA Director). The conversation reportedly took place in the Roosevelt Room, as the four were walking from the Oval Office to a meeting in an adjoining conference room. The agent reported that James Baker (Chief of Staff), Michael Deaver (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Edwin Meese (Attorney General) were waiting in the area of the conference room for the meeting to begin, but he was unsure whether these individuals would have heard any of the conversation.

The Committee treated this report seriously and first attempted to depose the Secret Service agent. Objections were raised by the Department of the Treasury and the Secret Service claiming that such a deposition would forever impair the ability of the Secret Service to guard the President.

The attorney for the agent, J. Thomas Burch (Chairman of National Vietnam Veterans Coalition), explained that the agent would not testify without permission of his agency or a subpoena from the Committee. As an interim alternative to taking the deposition of the Secret Service agent, the Committee told the Administration that it would attempt to substantiate the source's story through the deposition of other potential witnesses.

The Committee deposed several of the individuals reported to be in the general area where the conversation allegedly took place, but none of these individuals said they could recall such a conversation. Of those reported to have actually participated in the conversation, only Mr. Richard Allen was deposed.

Mr. Allen testified as follows:

Q: Changing to another subject, soon after taking office, did the Reagan Administration become involved in an offer made by the Vietnamese government for the return of live Prisoners of War, if you can recall?

A: Very shortly after they came over?

Q: Well, at any time while you were National Security Adviser. I don't want to limit it.

A: The figure of $4 billion seems to stick in my mind, and I can't remember whether that was during my time in all of this or not.

I do recall having once written in my life, either in notes or in a memorandum that it was certainly worth talking about, $4 billion for the return of POWs and MIAs, and that under any. . . I might be able to find those papers. . .

Q: Okay, do you recall whether the $4 billion was for live American prisoners?

A: Yes, I do. If it was for $4 billion, it was indeed live prisoners. . .

. . . First of all, my reaction (was that) $4 billion for live hostages sounded somewhat preposterous to me at first. I was obviously for getting into a discussion, at least getting into a discussion about it.

Mr. Allen sent a letter to the Committee on July 21, 1992, clarifying his testimony. He said he had located a copy of his notes (which he attached) of a meeting on September 24, 1986 at which Capt. Red McDaniel, John M.G. Brown, John Malloy, Mike Milne, J. Thomas Burch, and Bruce Rehmer told Allen of the alleged meeting in 1981. Rep. Billy Hendon also appeared in Allen's notes as someone he had discussed the alleged meeting with. In summary, Allen wrote:

It appears that my uncertainty during the deposition was justified, and that there never was a 1981 meeting about the return of POWs/MIAs for $4 billion.

It becomes clear that my recollection of having written these notes referred to events of 1986, not 1981. During the meeting with Capt. "Red" McDaniel and others, I recall having been surprised by their view that some sort of "cover-up" or "conspiracy" had taken place, and I now recall advising them there were no such meetings in the Roosevelt Room. President Reagan rarely came to the Roosevelt Room, and for very sensitive matters such as a discussion of this quality, it would have taken place only in the Oval Office.

Contact was also made with the Government of Canada as well as several lower level employees of the Department of State and the CIA who should have known about this incident if it occurred. None of the deposed individuals (with the exception of Allen previously noted) confirmed that such an offer was ever made. An extensive review of all pertinent documents from the State Department, CIA and NSC failed to disclose any evidence of this offer.

The Committee regrets that the Secret Service agent was unwilling, out of concern for his job, to testify concerning his report. Faced with this unwillingness, the Committee was divided about whether to compel the agent's testimony by issuing a subpoena. Some Members agreed with the Administration that compelling the testimony of a Secret Service agent concerning a conversation involving the President would set a harmful precedent, and felt that the agent's report was, at best, uncorroborated by the testimony of any other witness. Other Members felt that the agent had waived his claim to special consideration by talking to others about what he had reportedly heard, and that his testimony might contribute significantly to the Committee's investigation. After a lengthy debate, the Committee voted 7-4, with one Senator absent, not to subpoena the testimony of the Secret Service agent.

The Committee notes that, during its investigation, information was uncovered indicating that Mr. Allen had a discussion with Vice- President Bush in January, 1986 concerning his recollection of the alleged offer. This conversation was allegedly the result of an early January, 1986 meeting involving President Reagan, the Vice- President, then Congressman Bob Smith and former Congressman Bill Hendon. During the meeting, the Congressmen inquired about a possible offer involving live POWs in 1981. Both President Reagan and Vice-President Bush told Congressman Smith that no such offer concerning live POWs had been made. Notes from then Vice-President Bush and from former Congressman Hendon's office confirm that a conversation was reported to have taken place between Mr. Bush and Mr. Allen concerning the alleged offer.

The Third Country (ASEAN) Offer

I. Irving Davidson (a civilian with NSC contacts) reported in 1984 that, according to his contacts with highly placed officials of an ASEAN nation, it appeared that individuals in the government of North Vietnam had indicated that the Vietnamese would welcome an approach by the U.S. to discuss the POW issue. The early reports relating to this subject indicated that the discussions were to cover the sale of both warehoused remains and live POWs ("breathers").

In late 1984, a high-ranking retired general, who was a member of the National Security Council of the ASEAN nation, discussed this matter with Richard Childress of the NSC who, with the concurrence of Robert McFarlane (National Security Adviser to President Reagan), traveled to Vietnam to investigate this report. Declassified documents indicate that Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz informed Secretary of State George Shultz of a plan to pay for remains and "possible live POWs" in a January, 1985 memorandum marked "super-sensitive." The memo stated that Mr. Childress intended to fund the initiative with either CIA or private funds. Mr. Childress later reported that he had followed up the possible offer, but that it led to a discussion only of remains. The Committee did not consider the matter satisfactorily resolved by the reports filed and viewed that open questions remained as to what had actually occurred.

In 1992, the Chief Counsel to the Select Committee and a Committee Investigator travelled to the ASEAN nation to investigate the alleged 1984 live American offer. Committee investigators met with Government officials and with the General and his brother, the individuals allegedly knowledgeable of the earlier offer. Their stories proved inconsistent. The general's brother remembered offers for live POWs having been made, while the general stated the offers were for remains only. More specifically, the general said that the Vietnamese wanted several hundred million dollars in return for the remains of 50 Americans. The general also said that, at some point, Mr. Davidson had called him to say that the "deal was off because of leaks." Both men indicated that if the Committee desired, the North Vietnamese channel could be reopened for the continued discussion of purchasing remains. The Committee indicated that the U.S. Government was always interested in recovering remains of missing servicemen but that the U.S. Government position remained that no payment would be made for the remains. Subsequently, the U.S. Embassy in the ASEAN country contacted the individual who had initially travelled to North Vietnam to discuss the remains/live POW subject. According to the Embassy's report, the individual says that although the Vietnamese official with whom he dealt did not say specifically that there were live POWs, he did say that his government did not control all lower level Vietnamese officials, and that Vietnam needed financial assistance if it were to find missing Americans or their remains.

In summary, the Committee could not conclusively determine whether individuals in the government of North Vietnam discussed the possibility of there being live POWs in 1984; the Select Committee does find that the sale of remains was discussed.