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Remains Recovery Efforts

For many families, a serviceman's remains may be the only answers there are to questions about his fate. Crash and grave-site excavation remain a high priority, just behind investigating live- sighting reports because, in the words of Maj. Gen. George Christmas:

[Families] want them to walk out of the jungle and come home, but they will tell you very quickly that "if that can't be the case, please end the uncertainty for me. Give me something so that I can put this to rest, I've been with it so long."

Recoverable Remains

Of the 2,546 unaccounted for servicemen as of 1977, no more than 1,339 were expected to be accounted for, according to a March 1977 DoD briefing of the Woodcock Commission. Of these, the remains of 436 men were determined by their battlefield comrades to not be recoverable; many were lost over water, or disappeared in a fireball when their planes were hit by enemy fire or crashed.

Another 772 were men whose fates DoD did not think the Vietnamese and Lao knew (344 in Category 3 "Doubtful Knowledge," plus 428 in Category 4 "Unknown Knowledge.")

To get the fullest possible accounting, however, American teams need to be on the ground to do the accounting job properly. That was the message Dr. Shields delivered to the Commission in 1977; U.S. teams had not gotten access. Vessey "Sensibility Check"

Another approach to attempt to gauge what remains are recoverable was suggested by Gen. Vessey:

General Vessey: Well, I think that we need to look at what we know about remains. And there are certain things we know. One is that the Vietnamese did have -- did issue instructions to their subordinate military and political authorities for what to do with American casualties, whether they were alive or dead. And if they were dead, what to do with them.

And the DIA has constructed a good briefing on the steps that were in this Vietnamese process, and the first was that they were to -- for example, if there were an air crash they were to find -- the local people were to find the crash, find the pilot if he were alive, capture him; if he wasn't alive, find the remains then bury them on the spot and then report the location of those -- of the grave to the central authorities. And then the central authorities clearly had a system for recovering those remains at a later date, some 2 -- some 1, 2, to 5 years later, and then sending those remains to central storage.

Now there are a wide variety of theories, now, on what that produced in central storage. We have the case of the mortician whose evidence at least is credible in the terms of he said he saw this and that's one set of eyes. It's not clear how many he counted and so forth, but clearly he says he worked on 230 sets of remains himself. So that's quite good evidence.

Now, the question of whether or not there are still hundreds in storage is the basic question. I've taken the four-step DIA model, which some people say produces X hundred still there despite the fact that 500 sets -- or actually about 400 of might-be-Americans have been returned -- that it still produces maybe 500 sets in storage.

So what I did is I took the four-step model and assigned subjective probabilities to each of the four steps, because it's a compound probability problem. I went to the Air Force and I said what percentage of peacetime crashes produce remains, and the answer is 70 percent. So you start out with the .7, and certainly the war-time probably can't be any better than .7.

Then you say well, what's the probability, then, of the people finding the airplane and the remains and recovering them and burying them. Well, if it crashed in a local area I'm sure it's close to .1 -- or it's 1, but if it crashes in a remote area, I don't know what it is. So I said well let's just say .7. Maybe that's good, maybe it's not, but it's not bad for starters.

Then what's the probability of the grave being reported accurately from people who buried the remains without a map reporting its location, and then its surviving the three things that would effect it. That is the Southeast Asian weather and scavenging, which was taking place, we know, and general shifts in the terrain due to other matters.

I don't know what that probability is, but say it's .7. Then what's the probability of going back 2 to 5 years later and finding that grave that was reported -- whose location was reported by people who didn't have a map. Say it's .7. If that -- if all those are .7, then the product of the compound probabilities is about .24, which means about a quarter of the air crashes in North Vietnam would have produced remains in central storage.

If you don't like those probabilities, raise all the other probabilities except the .7, and you still only come up -- if you make them all .9 it doesn't get any better than .5. Now maybe the Vietnamese were better than that. I doubt it. So what I say is the number of remains that some people expect to be in storage is too high. It doesn't stand the sensibility check.

Warehousing Remains

In 1979, a mortician from Vietnam defected. He testified before Congress during the early 1980s that he had processed 452 sets of remains, which he believed were those of U.S. servicemen, during 1975-76 and that the Vietnamese had "warehoused" them. The moritician expressed the belief that the remains were to be used to gain diplomatic and other concessions from the U.S.

The mortician met with Committee investigators in late 1991 for two days of depositions. He testified at length about his previous testimony, including a statement that he had seen Robert Garwood and two other Caucasians whom he believed were Americans in Vietnam during the late 1970's. The mortician stated that he had advised DIA as early as 1982 that he could identify certain remains upon which he had worked by the way they were put into their caskets. He also stated that he could identify other remains by unique factors that related to the bones he had worked on while in Vietnam.

In May, 1992, the DOD provided a briefing for Vietnamese officials in Washington, D.C. concerning the evidence of warehousing remains that had been provided by the mortician. The text of the briefing included the following:

. . . comparison of the number and type of those remains returned to the U.S. in subsequent years with those the mortician saw reveals a significant shortfall . . . we are not able to conclude that all the remains processed or observed by the mortician have been returned to the U.S.

. . .Our forensics experts tell us that approximately 70 percent of U.S. remains returned by your government show evidence of long-term storage. By this, we mean they exhibited minimal bonemass loss, commingling with other remains of individuals lost in widely disparate areas, and coating with preservatives and/or disinfectants. Thus, while your government has returned many sets of remains that exhibit evidence of storage, the information available to us leads to the conclusion that there are still American remains that are readily available or easily retrievable and that could be repatriated to the United States in a very short period of time. By storage, we mean remains kept above or below ground, collected into one or more centralized facilities, or located in documented graves.

It was not until September 1992 that the DIA, after constant urging by the Committee, took the mortician to CIL-HI for him to review the remains there. The Committee has not yet been able to determine from the DIA if the mortician was able to identify any of the CIL- HI remains; the passage of more than a decade could not have made this identification any easier.

Witnesses familiar with current Vietnamese approaches testified that any warehouse now is empty, and that remains probably are in private hands. Ted Schweitzer, the researcher who gained access to Vietnamese archives after their denials of the archives' existence for 20 years, believes:

There is no such warehouse, sir. If at one point in the '70s or early '80s, if there were some remains somewhere in Hanoi, those remains have by now -- as the officials retired who were in the program, as they went back to their provinces, various memorabilia, maybe even remains, [went] back with them.

According to Garnett Bell, a U.S. investigator who has worked throughout Southeast Asia on POW/MIA issues for 27 years: My view, sir, is that there certainly was a warehouse in the Hanoi area at one time. The mortician, I think, after he defected in 1979, testified here in Congress that he processed some 452 [sets of] remains.

The Vietnamese were confronted with that information. They denied it. They indicated that they thought the mortician was fabricating. . . . The Vietnamese, I believe, came to the conclusion that we were confident that the man was telling the truth.

Since the mortician gave his testimony, they have returned to us approximately 450 [sets of] remains. Approximately 260 to 269 [sets of] remains have now been identified. . . and they have also informed us, as well as Mr. [Robert] Wallace from the VFW, that we did have a warehouse but we don't have one now, and what that indicates to me is that they have admitted that the mortician was telling the truth. They're telling us that we have given you those remains back, and the warehouse here in Hanoi is now empty.

Vietnamese Amnesty Program

In early December 1992, Vietnam announced an amnesty program for citizens holding Americans' remains. Vietnamese laws forbid citizens to have possession of American remains, an effort to curtain the rampant dealing in American remains by bones dealers. To encourage those who are holding remains to return them, Vietnam offered to pay a small amount for remains (to cover expenses); after Senators Kerry and Smith visited Hanoi December 17-18, the Government extended the amnesty program the reward signalled.

Early response was encouraging; sets of remains were repatriated by publication time and are awaiting identification by CIL-HI.

Excavations

The slow process of excavating crash and grave sites is the tedious work of archaeology, as U.S. investigators sift through 20 years of soil and debris to find bones, teeth and wreckage. An example of a recent excavation illustrates the work:

Admiral Larson: . . . I've had the opportunity to visit our teams out there in the field. And after watching the excavation in a very difficult mountainside out in the steamy, hot jungles of Laos in a very difficult helicopter landing zone, as many of you have experienced out there in the field, you appreciate the real enormity of the problem, but also the dedication of the fine young Americans that are out there working in the field to try and solve the fullest possible accounting of this difficult issue. . . .

I visited our group out in Laos in the field, where they're living in a very primitive base camp there in the jungle, where they even have to fly in fuel to refuel the helicopters there because there are no facilities whatsoever in this little village, Tchepone, out there on the old Ho Chi Minh trail.

And then, they're doing an excavation with about more than 30 people, working up on the countryside, on the hillside, up in the mountains area just off the trail. Very hot, very steamy. You get leeches. You get dirt. You get a lot of humidity. They're working with local villagers up there. It's a 2-1/2 hour hike from the bottom of the hill up to the site where the villagers are working. We fly our people in by helicopter.

They worked -- I think that last thing was over 20 days. I think it was almost 30 days they were in the field there, working from the base camp, going up there every single day, working from dawn 'til dark, and then returning to the base camp.

Chairman Kerry: And how many people are on the ground in Vietnam and Laos?

Admiral Larson: Our teams have varied in size from a low of about 28 to a high of about 63. It depends on how many teams we actually have. We shoot for about 70. We like to get five or six teams in the field at a time, particularly in Vietnam.

Chairman Kerry: General Needham, if you could relate to the committee -- I was struck. I mean, most people sit in this country and they say, well, why can you not go to the crash site, or why you cannot -- by God, let us just go look.

And I think it is important for people to have an understanding of the logistical difficulties and of the realities out there. I mean, when we are talking about helicopters, we are not even talking about our own right now. And the living conditions are really difficult, to say the least.

I would like you just to share with us your personal sense of that. I know you have spent a lot of time out in the field, and we talked about it when we were over there, and you were suffering from it when we were over there. I wish you would sort of share that.

General Needham: Well, first of all, Senator, let me go back to the numbers. We presently have 40 United States servicemen in Cambodia today. Less than half of those belong to the JTF because the helicopters support is coming from the U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division. And therein lies the support that we get from the CINCPAC components. It's virtually unlimited.

In Laos today we have 30 people, less than half, again, that belong to the Joint Task Force. The majority of the other half belong to the Central Identification Lab.

In areas that we operate on in the three countries, there are a number of considerations that have to go into the operation. First, the weather. The weather is very dependent on what we can do over there.

Secondly, the mountainous terrain that you observed is very difficult to get into. Some of the cases of extremely high altitudes -- for example, a case that you're very much interested in, case 1983, which we will be going into in January, is located at approximately 7,000 feet. There's only about three months of the year that we can get in there.

A helicopter coming in to a landing zone at that location is reduced in what it can carry, and if anything happens, it has very few options. Many of these LZ's are very small; can only take small helicopters that require a large number of runs to get the force in there.

Lastly, I have forgotten over 20 years how hot it is in that country, how difficult the terrain is, how many bugs there are, and how difficult it is to support logistically when we have to carry in everything from water to food. It is extremely tough. Some of the toughest I have seen in terrain that is very hard to explain unless you've actually seen it yourself, yet our people are out there day in and day out, under very trying circumstances, trying to solve these cases.

And, lastly, as the Admiral said, when it comes to excavating a site, it's like looking for a needle in a haystack, and it's very slow, meticulous, tedious work.

Admiral Larson: I might just add, Mr. Chairman, to that. The helicopter landing zone that I landed at this little excavation site, which is about 2,200 feet upon the mountains, at a slope of about 60 degrees, where they were doing the excavation, the villagers and our people had to walk up there and clear the helicopter site out of dense jungle and trees. And the helicopter site was smaller than this space between our two tables here, where we brought the little Squirrel helicopter in and landed, with about four people in it. So, it's very difficult to get there.

Current Operations

The JTF-FA has conducted 35 excavations since it was created in early 1992 (18 in Vietnam, nine in Laos, and eight in Cambodia), plus inspecting crash or grave sites at 149 locations (114 in Vietnam, 27 in Laos, and eight in Cambodia). In all, JTF-FA has recovered the remains believed to be those of 30 American servicemen. Most are awaiting identification by the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii.

Future Plans

In April 1992, JTF-FA had a full schedule of crash-site excavations for the next five years. CINCPAC Admiral Charles Larson ordered that pace increased to take advantage of recent Vietnamese promises to Gen. Vessey and the Senate delegation of better access. In Gen. Vessey's words:

. . . we don't know whether they hold remains or not. What I believe though, now, is that we have in our hands the keys to get to the answer to that question. I just talked to General Needham and said, you know, if you just have a quick-reaction remains team out there with Vietnamese and Americans, when something comes out of the archives that shows that so-and-so was killed and his remains were in the hands of the Vietnamese at a given time, that's the set of remains we ought to start looking for right now.

. . . . I think going back over there and saying you're holding remains and having them say we're not holding remains is a wasted exercise. Whether they are not we don't know, but let's start with what we do know. . . . [this man] is dead, you had his body at one time, what happened to the remains, and start from there. And I think that will get us to the answer. Remains Repatriation Efforts

The Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii (CIL-HI) is responsible for searching for, recovering, and identifying the remains of military personnel killed or missing in action.

CIL-HI'S primary duties are:

. to conduct search and recovery operations in the Pacific for World War II, Korean, and Vietnam War dead;

. to process remains and establish identification through the use of anthropological (physical structure), odontological (dental), and other scientific identification techniques;

. to accumulate and catalog information on American and allied personnel who have been listed MIA or KIA-BNR; and

. to provide emergency support world-wide in searching for, recovering, and identifying the remains of service members killed or missing in current operations.

Since 1973, CIL-HI has identified the remains of 537 U.S. servicemen -- 381 from the Vietnam War, 115 from World War II and Korea, and 41 from other operations. CIL-HI's current staff numbers 87 military personnel, whose focus is primarily field operations and locating records, and 16 civilians, whose focus is on identifying remains.

GAO Investigation of CIL-HI

CIL-HI laboratory was the subject of scathing criticism in the mid- 1980s, when critics charged:

. that CIL-HI's techniques did not meet scientific standards,

. that it lacked capable staff and adequate facilities and equipment, and

. that it used questionable review procedures.

In December, 1991, the Committee asked General Accounting Office (GAO) to determine whether there had been improvements in CIL-HI operations since Congressional hearings during the 1980s sufficient to minimize the possibility of making erroneous identifications; and whether controls in day-to-day management allow CIL-HI to oversee effectively the remains identification process. In response, the GAO determined that, with some exceptions, CIL-HI has taken the steps needed to improve its accuracy and thoroughness.

The GAO was charged with examining operations designed to minimize the chance of making erroneous identifications; and with determining whether controls in day-to-day management are sufficient. As part of GAO's investigation, it sought the technical assistance of outside experts.

Summary of GAO's Findings

The General Accounting Office concluded that, on the whole, CIL-HI effectively instituted the necessary reforms. Specifically, the GAO found that CIL-HI:

. used scientifically accepted techniques;

. appointed a world-renowned, board-certified forensic anthropologist as the laboratory's first scientific director and hired other qualified staff;

. upgraded its facilities and equipment; and

. incorporated extensive review procedures to minimize the possibility of errors in making identifications.

Finally, GAO determined that critics' charges to the contrary, the long tenure of CIL-HI's commander did not affect the scientific judgments of his staff.

GAO noted several problem areas in CIL-HI's operations; DoD pledged to make the recommended corrections by March 1993.

Most troubling to the Committee was the destruction of bone fragments -- mostly splinters -- in 25 cases in the mid-1980s. The incident appeared to be a one-time occurrence, and verbal instructions are to keep all remains, however small or impossible to identify. At the time, technology was incapable of identifying the remains -- and still is -- but GAO, its panel of outside experts, and CIL-HI itself agree that options should be preserved in the hope of future scientific advances. In addition, GAO recommended that CIL-HI develop written guidelines to buttress the standing verbal directions.

Also of concern was the resignation of two top staff members, although a preliminary review suggested that their problems were not with CIL-HI's scientific operation.

Other systemic problems identified by GAO were: . CIL-HI's inadequate and ineffective file locating system that resulted in difficulty finding files and, at times, finding skeletal remains;

. CIL-HI's inadequate tracking system of pre-death information requests that can hinder the identification effort; and

. DoD's lack of guidance on the control of remains sent to family-appointed experts -- a problem that has resulted in the loss of some of those remains.

Outside Experts' Findings

In addition to its own review, GAO convened an external panel of experts to examine the technical integrity of CIL-HI's work. Panel members were selected based upon experience, knowledge, and their lack of connection to recent affiliated work on identifying remains. The panel interviewed CIL-HI staff and others, inspected its facilities, equipment, and file review procedures.

In general, the outside experts lauded CIL-HI's current operation, citing its commitment to "maintaining high standards of professional performance, as manifested by its use of modern facilities, equipment, and analytical methods" and noted that "CIL-HI performs more in-depth analysis to establish identifications than most other forensic laboratories in the world." They offered the following specific suggestions:

. consolidate records and store original documents in a central file;

. maintain radiographs;

. modernize and standardize operating procedures;

. improve the chain of custody of remains, including taking steps to prevent the disappearance of remains by examination by outside experts hired by families to evaluate CIL-HI's work;

. hold unidentified remains, even where identification may be exceedingly improbable, in the hope that advances in technology will improve the chances of identifying them;

. restrict staff comments to those areas where they are experts;

. segregate scientific personnel from the military chain of command in order to resist the possibility of undue influence over the scientific decisions; . require CIL-HI's forensic pathologist to play a larger role in the identification process; and

. grant CIL-HI's laboratory director additional authority over the scientific operation.

On-Going Work at CIL-HI

Much of the frustration that POW/MIA families have with CIL-HI is precisely because of its plodding approach -- that it is at once slow to make identifications and lightning-quick to render them as soon as one tooth, or any other bit of evidence, supports a scientific finding. In fact, the completeness of skeletal remains is rarely as important as locating key portions. As Thomas D. Holland, CIL-HI's physical anthropologist explained:

. . . The majority (70 percent) of remains at CIL-HI fall into the CIL-Portion category, i.e., small fragments of bone unassociated with REFNO [POW/MIA case reference number] or valid name. Most CIL Portions are undiagnostic fragments less than two centimeters in diameter. Other sets of remains are more complete.

It should be remembered, however, that the degree of skeletal completeness is correlated only weakly with identification potential. CIL-HI has in curation at least one skeleton that is approximately 99 percent complete, and yet no identification currently is possible. On the other hand, CIL-HI has effected identification based on single teeth.

Of the larger bone fragments, just 1.3 percent of the sets of remains at CIL-HI in mid-December 1992 were more than three- quarters of a full skeleton; 23.9 percent were less than one- quarter of a full skeleton; the remaining 4.5 percent were between one and three-quarters complete.

In all, CIL-HI presently has 938 sets of remains -- 882 from Southeast Asia and the rest from Korea -- that have not yet been identified. These are not necessarily 938 different individuals, however:

The remains repatriated from North Korea are a good example of why the completeness of a skeleton is not necessarily a good indicator of identification potential. All three of the Korean War skeletons listed as at least 75 percent complete are commingled. In other words, even though the skeleton may have a skull, two arms, two legs, and the axial elements, the arms and legs may not go together, and neither necessarily is associated with the skull returned in the same box. In fact, there is an average of over 1.6 individuals represented in each of the boxes officially repatriated by the North Korean government.

Discussion

The GAO concluded that CIL-HI uses techniques that exceed those used in other modern forensic laboratories. In its view, the operation has minimized the possibility of erroneous identifications and provides sufficient day-to-day management to effectively oversee the remains identification process.

The Committee notes, however, that even a fully professional forensics laboratory is going to have difficult overcoming the obstacles that exist to the rapid and confident identification of war-time remains. The ravages of time, the incompleteness of medical records, and the limits of science dictate that progress, if it is to be as sure as we demand, will also be far slower than we would like.

Conclusion: Conspiracy Theories and Myths

Chairman Kerry: The reason I measure it against you years of service is that the minute somebody draws that kind of conclusion or says there is not evidence, I cannot find the evidence, some people in this country immediately take that person and, rather than look at the evidence objectively or rather than analyze how you may have come to that conclusion, they jump and suggest that you are there for part of a conspiracy because you have not come to the conclusion they want you to come to.

Now how do you feel with that? What is your advice to us as a former battlefield commander and general? How do you speak to that? You are obviously not a traitor to your country , and you are obviously, at least in my judgment, not somebody joining in a conspiracy. But you have sat here, after dedicating years of your life in retirement, to finding answers. And you cannot find credible evidence, correct?

General Vessey: Thus far, we have not. That's right.

Chairman Kerry: So what do you say to those people who throw you in a conspiracy? General Vessey: I guess what I would say, what I've said to those who have confronted me personally, is this is not a religious issue. It's not a religious issue of faith. It is something -- it's a human issue, a material human issue on this earth. And there are facts that will disclose the answer to the questions we are seeking. Let's find the facts and let the facts speak for themselves.

In the meantime, you can have all the hopes that you want. But don't turn it into a religious faith that somebody's alive when we don't know whether or not they're alive.

Cries of "cover-up" or "conspiracy" are used often by people dissatisfied with the U.S. Government's progress on accounting for missing servicemen. The conspiracy charge is an easy one to make, but difficult to prove.

A prominent investigation of whether a conspiracy exists or existed on POW/MIA issues was conducted by Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, whose efforts are praised by the very activists who subscribe to the conspiracy theory. The Tighe Commission found: no evidence that anyone in DIA (or anywhere else in the U.S. government) has intentionally covered up anything about the POW/MIA issue.

Its first conclusion was, "We have found no evidence of cover-up by DIA."

For a conspiracy theory to be valid, it would entail hundreds or even thousands of people from the military services, from the very lowest-rated enlisted person (E-1) through four-star admirals and generals; and in the civilian sector it would encompass civil servants from a GS1 through the Cabinet level. This would have been accumulated since 1973 and by this time would have encompassed in the millions of people that had access to sensitive information on the POW/MIA issue.

Gen. Vessey, a widely praised 46-year veteran, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President's Special Emissary to Vietnam since 1987, and recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom, shares this view:

Senator McCain: In order for there to be a conspiracy or a cover-up of this issue, do you agree with me that it would have required the active participation of hundreds of members of the military?

Vessey: Yes, sir. And I think that's an improbable sort of thing. American soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are not conspirators. It's hard to keep military secrets long enough to get the operation going along without the enemy knowing what's going on. Even at the time when we were at low ebb, we still had 100-and-some-odd people involved, and those rotated. Many of them rotated every two or three years. So I'd say the prospect or probability of a conspiracy being kept without it being blown wide open is almost zero.

Senator McCain: Have you ever seen any evidence of any conspiracy or cover-up?

Vessey: No, sir, I have not.

Senator McCain: Did you when you were in your position as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Vessey: No, sir.

Senator McCain: Or at any other time in your military career?

Vessey: No, sir.

Another witness, the ranking officer in the Hanoi Hilton, was equally incredulous:

Senator McCain: We have had witnesses, Admiral, that there was after that a conspiracy, and that is why I was interested in the part of your statement that you remained involved in this issue for some years afterwards, that there was a conspiracy or a cover-up orchestrated by various administrations in the intervening years. Have you ever seen any evidence of that?

Admiral Stockdale: No.

Senator McCain: Do you believe that it would be possible?

Admiral Stockdale: No, I think . . . to go into it as a venture, you'd be a fool because there are so many possibilities of leaks and so forth.

Nor did Henry Kissinger place any credence in the idea:

There is no excuse, two decades after the fact, for anyone to imply that the last five Presidents from both parties, their White House staffs, Secretaries of State and Defense, and career diplomatic and military services either knowingly or negligently failed to do everything they could to recover and identify all of our prisoners and MIA's.

Howard Baker, formerly President Reagan's White House Chief of Staff and Senate Majority Leader, testified similarly:

I cannot think of a single thing that suggests to me that there was a conspiracy of silence or any active conspiracy or any other kind of conspiracy. . .

Others with long experience found charges of a conspiracy to be baseless as well. Maj. Gen. George Christmas:

Mr. Chairman, my experience is that most people who become well-informed on this issue have no trouble agreeing that the accounting of our missing men means obtaining information from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Those who maintain that there is some secret set of files being kept by misguided U.S. Government personnel intent on maintaining some bizarre cover-up are deluding themselves and the American people. The answers are in Southeast Asia and that is where the U.S. Government is, correctly in my view, putting its emphasis.

General Leonard Perroots:

Senator McCain: In order for a cover-up to be successful as has been alleged, it would have taken the active participation of hundreds if not thousands of military personnel?

General Perroots: Yes, sir.

Maj. Gen. Richard Secord:

Senator McCain: Do you believe that there was any conspiracy to cover up existence of any live Americans either in Laos or anywhere in Southeast Asia?

General Secord: No, sir, I don't. I've never seen any evidence of that.

Senator McCain: Do you believe that it would have been possible, without the knowledge of a number of military officers and enlisted people such as yourself who were in some way in the loop?

General Secord: No. There are so many people in that loop that it would not have been possible, in my opinion.

And witnesses who recently have spent time in the field testified about the possibility of a conspiracy:

Chairman Kerry: I want to ask you a question. You are under oath. You are either ex-service people or people committed to this effort. But there remains at large in this country a body of suspicion about people involved in it, and it comes largely from the way it's been handled and resourced in past years. I ask you this question under oath so that people can have some sense of where you're coming from.

And I want to know whether anyone here has ever seen any evidence or believes that there was a conspiracy to actually tube this or cover it up. Mr. Sydow?

Mr. Sydow: No, sir.

Chairman Kerry: Mr. Sheetz?

Mr. Sheetz: You've always seen me in civilian clothes. I've been in the Navy. I'm still in the Navy Reserves since 1965, so I consider myself sort of also a uniformed person. I've seen nothing to indicate conspiracy or cover-up.

Chairman Kerry: Colonel Cole?

Colonel Cole: Certainly not, sir.

Chairman Kerry: Mr. Gadoury?

Mr. Gadoury: Never.

Chairman Kerry: Mr. DeStatte?

Mr. DeStatte: Never, sir.

Chairman Kerry: Sergeant Deeter?

Sergeant Deeter: No, sir.

Chairman Kerry: Mr. Bell?

Mr. Bell: No, sir, I don't have any indication of a cover-up, but I think we should always stress objectivity in our work.

The Select Committee examined allegations of conspiracy and heard testimony about the allegation. No witness gave credible evidence that a conspiracy ever existed on the POW/MIA issue; nearly all called the notion an impossibility and found it highly unlikely that military personnel would ever be involved.

Myths

Another difficulty in separating fact from fiction in POW/MIA efforts has been the prevalence of myths. The amount of information on the issue overall is monumental and fictitious claims often contain just enough shards of truth to make them believable. Oft-repeated myths have become popular lore in the vast collection of stories about the Vietnam War and the POW/MIA issue in particular.

Island of Syphilitic Souls Theory

One of the stories perennially told in Vietnam and remembered today by many veterans, is about a secret island to which were sent, there to spend the rest of their lives, persons who had contracted a dangerous and incurable sexually-transmitted disease.

The premise was that the consequences of the disease were such that society could not risk the possibility of an epidemic in the United States. The existence and location of the island needed to be kept secret, so the story goes, so people sent to the island were listed as MIA or KIA/BNR.

Logic exposes the story's flaws. Veterans were not routinely given physical examinations immediately before leaving Vietnam or upon arrival to the U.S. -- foiling the island's purpose, because persons contracting a disease would carry it back to the USA undetected. As immediate "social" contact was common for many vets returning from Vietnam, the spread of any disease would have been inevitable -- and yet no such disease has surfaced in the U.S. population (AIDS' origins having been traced elsewhere). Logic notwithstanding, the myth prevails to this day as an explanation for the fate of some unaccounted-for Americans.

Systematic Lie Theory

Other stories are more difficult to disprove, but even their defiance of common sense does not stop their spread, which in turn mainstream media, fuels these rumors. For example, one persistent story is that the U.S. Government has been bringing POW/MIAs back secretly and providing them with new identities such, as is done in the federal witness protection program or, in the alternative, incarcerating them in mental hospitals. The ostensible reason for this secrecy is presumably to avoid contradicting official policy since 1973 that all live POWs were returned home. Another theory argues that since no amputees or mentally deranged people returned at Operation Homecoming, these men have been smuggled back and are kept hidden.

Committee investigators interviewed a newspaper reporter who printed this story as fact, his sources, and others with variations of this story; they found no factual support for it. One supposed "source" summoned to testify, and subpoenaed, was the victim of his ex-wife's fantasies.

"Black Ops" Theory

Another publication printed a suggestion that 2,454 men should be added to the list of 2,265 POW/MIAs -- because the additional 2,454 was the number involved in highly classified operations whose inclusion on the list of missing would have compromised the operations' secrecy.

"Crazies" and Amputees Theory

This belief and the belief about secretly smuggling individuals into the country and providing new identities assumes that no family members or friends who would miss these men or else that they willingly participated in a conspiracy of magnitude -- ideas that flout common sense. It is also belied by the testimony of Admiral James Stockdale, who testified about the return of at least one amputee.

Perhaps the most persistent kind of rumor grows out of events with simple, straightforward explanation:

. The opening of a bigger, permanent office with the standing in the military hierarchy needed to get things done fueled suspicions that the move was designed to silence an investigator. Garnett Bell, a key player before Hanoi agreed to U.S. terms' full-time presence in-country, remained a key player after the office was changed to take advantage of the new opportunities.

. In another case, the illness of a senior Vietnamese diplomat was twisted into accusations that he had been killed trying to defect over the POW/MIA issue and blaming Congressional offices for botching the defection. The diplomat's efforts to correct the story, through a letter to the editor, were then manufactured into a story that the diplomat only wrote the letter because there was a "gun to his head."

The Committee investigated both charges and found them baseless.