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PRIVATE EFFORTS

Overview

One of the most active grassroots efforts during the past decade has been that of Vietnam War activists. They have pressed successfully on several fronts, and it is these activists, and the families of unaccounted-for servicemen that have kept the POW/MIA issue at the forefront of public attention. At times, private groups have prodded the Government to act, at times (such as at the Committee's formation) they have demanded investigations into the Government's actions. Most of these activities have been both altruistic and effective; some have been well-intentioned, but have not served POW/MIA families; and a few have been outright scams of the most reprehensible kind.

To examine private-sector POW/MIA activities, the Committee documented a wide range of public-awareness campaigns and other activities, investigated recent reconnaissance and rescue operations conducted overseas, reviewed the role of various groups in distributing photographs purporting to depict POWs in Southeast Asia after Operation Homecoming, and reviewed professional fundraising conducted in the name of various POW/MIA organizations.

Public Awareness Campaigns

Many private organizations engage in a range of successful public- awareness campaigns designed to educate the public about the POW/MIA issue. These efforts include rallies, marches, educational forums, newsletters and newspapers, television and radio programs, holiday ceremonies, the sale of memorabilia (such as POW bracelets and t-shirts), the creation of memorials and parks to honor POW/MIAs, foot races, and vigils. Some have funded scholarships for the families of POW/MIAs; others have sponsored legislative initiatives across the country. The accomplishments of these organizations are too extensive to be fully explored in this report, but a summary of the achievements of several organizations is included in this chapter.

Reconnaissance/Rescue Missions

During the Committee's year-long investigation, a reconnaissance and rescue operation known as "Team Falcon," was undertaken by the private sector, ostensibly to locate and rescue American POWs believed to be held in Laos. Lauded at first by activists, it was disavowed by them when it was determined that contributors were misled, money lost, participants duped, and no POW was identified, located or repatriated.

The Committee also examined a reconnaissance and rescue operation known as Skyhook II, led by former Congressman John LeBoutillier. It learned that U.S. Government officials illegally attempted to provide handguns for members of the Lao Resistance associated with Skyhook II. It also found that other U.S. Government officials helped to solicit funds for Skyhook II; and that money raised was funnelled through a Bangkok bank account.

The Committee reviewed certain activities conducted by Lt. Col. James "Bo" Gritz (USA, Ret.) and found that, despite Government attempts to repudiate and minimize its involvement with Gritz, the Government sanctioned, encouraged, funded, approved, and provided logistical support to some of his overseas reconnaissance and rescue operations. Those operations serve as additional evidence of how Government attempts to use the private sector in clandestine overseas operations can go awry.

Photographs

Another activity of great concern to the Committee was the distribution of fraudulent reports of live POWs. These reports, usually attributable to notoriously unreliable agents in Southeast Asia with proven track records of failure, were cited by private groups as evidence of live POWs and incorporated into fundraising appeals. In some cases, fundraisers themselves concocted fantasies loosely based on these agents' reports and peddled them as verified facts. In no instance did any overseas agent locate a live POW or produce reliable evidence that U.S. servicemen are in captivity in Southeast Asia.

The most readily believed stories were accompanied by photographs. The Committee's investigation of several of these photographs revealed evidence of fraud in several instances, including those circulated in 1991 that allegedly depicted Donald Carr, Daniel V. Borah, John L. Robertson, Larry J. Stevens, and Albro Lundy.

Fundraising

The Committee's investigation revealed that millions of dollars have been raised for the POW/MIA cause, but the bulk of the funds are frequently retained by the professional fundraisers hired by certain POW/MIA organizations. Heart-wrenching statements purport to confirm that POWs are alive in Southeast Asia and that their rescue by a private group is imminent are the basis for the appeals -- but donors are virtually precluded from learning how their contributions are spent:

. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has almost no incentive to audit financial reports of non-profit organizations: non- profit status is granted on the condition that the organization give donors basic information about its operations -- but, once obtained, non-profit status also means the IRS won't collect revenue by looking closely enough at the organization to see that it is keeping its promise.

. The Supreme Court has held that certain aspects of charitable fundraising are protected by the First Amendment guarantees. Accordingly, state and federal regulators face substantial barriers to regulating the claims of non- profit organizations that operate both within states and across state lines.

. The emotions surrounding the POW/MIA issue, until recently, have effectively dissuaded Congressional oversight and news coverage of shady operations: it is far easier to tell the story of a POW/MIA family's anguish than to examine the groups who prey on that anguish.

Public-Private Alliances

Lao Resistance

In its efforts to learn more about rumors of live Americans held in captivity in Southeast Asia, the U.S. Government considered working with Lao resistance forces. In August 1981, DIA's assessment of the Lao resistance included the following:

Although the [Lao resistance] is weak, it does offer the potential for supporting U.S. MIA efforts. A recommendation would be to pursue both overt pressure on the LPDR and their Soviet and Vietnamese supporters and covert efforts through [Lao resistance] forces. On balance, unless Hanoi and Vientiane change their established MIA accounting policies dramatically, the potential for success appears greater utilizing a covert action program. However, the "risks" inherent with such a program are also greater.

There is no "one" Lao resistance group/element. The movement is fragmented with the most stable elements being among the northern tribesman and the Lao People's National United Liberation Front (LPNULF), a loose coalition of various resistance elements. Other fragmented resistance elements operating in Laos include the Lao Liberation Movement (LLM) and the "21-18 Group," a formation of political elements. Although total strength of the resistance in Laos is estimated at 6,000- 8,000, it does not pose a near-term threat to the stability of the current regime. The resistance lacks a dependable support base and there is little coordination between resistance groups. Without a significant increase in external aid accompanied by improved discipline and organization, the Lao resistance will remain nothing more than a minor irritant to the Lao People's Democratic Republic and a poor single focus for U.S. MIA efforts.

The resistance movements have gained a limited amount of sympathy and support by propagandizing and recruiting at the village level. They have not yet, however, been able to establish secure bases of operation within Laos. They primarily operate from base camps along the Thai-Lao border and, less commonly, the Lao-China border area. In the northernmost provinces, aid is provided to the Hmong, Yao, and Kmou tribesmen by China. In the panhandle region, Democratic Kampuchean (DK) resistance elements, supported by the Thai, provide nominal aid to La resistance forces. The Thai also provide assistance and direction to select resistance elements in the central area.

Regarding actual MIA-related activity, Lao resistance elements could travel through government controlled areas in search of U.S. crash/grave sites and could provide information concerning the locations of such sites. These operations could be covertly accomplished employing small reconnaissance teams to avoid detection by LPDR or Vietnamese military forces. The small covert team concept appears feasible if the resistance element was strongly motivated and the U.S. interests represented by trusted indigenous personnel.

There is possibility that the LPDR or SRV intelligence services have infiltrated the resistance movement. The likelihood of a penetration is greater among the ethnic Lao resistance elements than with the tribesmen whose ethnic association is closer and whose long-standing animosity toward Lao and Vietnamese is traditional. The non-tribal Lao resistance elements are more susceptible to infiltration due to the fragmented nature of their movements and their varying ethnic, social, and political composition and objectives. These same weaknesses are the primary reason we see no near-term chance of success for unification of the Lao resistance movements.

Although the Committee found no clear evidence that the U.S. Government actually worked directly with Lao resistance forces, the Committee did obtain evidence of indirect efforts by the U.S. Government to fund Lao resistance elements in the hopes that those elements would provide information concerning the possible existence of POWs in Laos. This is ironic because, as set forth later in this chapter, the Committee found evidence that Lao resistance forces have been responsible for the dissemination of false and misleading information concerning the existence of POWs in Southeast Asia.

Questions About U.S. Government Involvement with Private Efforts to Fund Lao Resistance

The Committee received evidence in the form of depositions, documents and affidavits indicating that in 1982, officials of the National Security Council apparently had approved a proposed project intended to raise private funds for POW/MIA-related activities in Laos that ultimately resulted in funds being received by the Lao resistance. It was alleged that Richard T. Childress, a former member of the NSC responsible for Southeast Asia, Ann Mills Griffiths, Executive Director of the National League of Families, and former Congressman John LeBoutillier participated in raising these funds. The project ultimately would become known as Skyhook II.

Both Griffiths and Childress were fully cooperative with the Committee's investigation and both strongly deny any allegation or implication that they helped raise funds for Lao resistance groups.

Griffiths has asserted that:

The truth is that money which went to Thailand was solicited and spent by John LeBoutillier, not by the White House, in his attempt to gain proof of live prisoners...LeBoutillier asked for a valid non-profit group which could accept contributions and disperse them in support of his efforts to seek information and evidence of living U.S. POWs. Since it was not a League project and knowing that Support Our POW/MIAs still retained that status, I contacted Betty Bartels about the possibility...

Betty agreed to receive and disperse the funds, based on LeBoutillier's assurance as a sitting Member of Congress that nothing illegal would be undertaken and that the efforts were not counter to U.S. Government policy or law; however, neither the League nor Betty knew how the funds were spent. In his Jan. 8, 1993 letter to Sens. Kerry and Smith, Childress wrote:

Apparently the press has a staff draft of the SSC report that alleges I, as a member of the NSC staff, supported the Lao resistance and facilitated gun-running. I labeled it as a smear and warned against publication.

As noted in my deposition, which appears to have been ignored in the draft report, to the contrary, I personally intervened with Congressmen Hendon and LeBoutillier in 1982 and indicated the White House could not deal with them if such activities were contemplated. We learned of this through a State Department cable that alleged Congressman LeBoutillier's representatives intended on raising a private army. I asked for and received a letter from Mr. LeBoutillier which was distributed in the government that he and his representatives would desist from such activities. I have never even met Congressman LeBoutillier's "agents," and they attempted to interfere directly in our negotiations with Laos, a matter of record.

Further, I ensured that official U.S. government intelligence activities would not use Lao resistance personnel, discouraged support for the Lao resistance by other groups (again it is a matter of record), deleted known resistance personnel from White House public events, and negotiated a joint communique with the Lao government that the U.S. would respect their independence, neutrality and territorial integrity due to their concerns over the Lao resistance and potential U.S. support. This was done to build the requisite trust between our governments to make POW/MIA cooperation possible.

I covered in my deposition the events surrounding Congressman LeBoutillier's requests of DEA and their subsequent disconnect with him due to some involvement with arms. I did not learn of the arms angle until later when called by Mr. LeBoutillier's attorney, ATF and subsequently DEA. I was informed earlier by DEA that the initiative could not be approved due to DEA budget restrictions. Mr. LeBoutillier asked me about arms on one occasion and I turned him down flat. That too is in my deposition.

I request that this letter be made a part of the record or appropriate corrections be made to reflect what actually transpired. Such blatant inaccuracies and omissions smack of an apparent attempt by someone on the Committee Staff with agendas other than the issue. If true, it will certainly detract from what all hoped would be an objective report on a serious national issue that does not fuel more domestic attacks and allow concentration where it belongs, on Hanoi.

In August 1982, a 501(c)(3) (tax-exempt) POW/MIA organization known as Support Our POW/MIAs, Inc. (SOP), headed by Betty Bartels, began receiving tax-deductible donations, which were then transferred to bank accounts in Southeast Asia and elsewhere for the Skyhook II project. Thereafter, as set forth below, approximately $200,000 was raised from various donors for the Skyhook II effort.

Approximately $156,000 of the donations were wire-transferred by SOP to a Bangkok bank account in the name of Mushtaq Ahmed Diwan upon instructions communicated to SOP by Griffiths. Information provided to the Committee indicates that Diwan is a friend or associate of Col. Al Shinkle (USAF, Ret.) and that the $156,000 transferred to the Diwan account was subsequently provided to Lao resistance forces, presumably to fund efforts on their part to locate, identify and repatriate American POWs.

The chronology of SOP's involvement in the "Diwan Project" is well- documented in contemporaneous notes kept by Betty Bartels. According to those notes, Griffiths telephoned Bartels and requested SOP's federal tax number and the names of the members of SOP's board of directors.

June 22, 1982 . . . Ann wanted to use the [SOP] bank account to deposit some funds, from undisclosed sources, and later cable the funds to a bank account out of the country. Ann requested that I check with our bank how funds could be telegraphed overseas, i.e., by telephone call, in person, by mail, etc.

10 July 1982 I met with Ann Griffiths and Carol Bates in their room in the Stouffers hotel. There was no one else present. I was assured by both Ann and Carol that this project was completely 'legal' and involved nothing that was against the State Dept. policies, DoD policies, etc. . . . I was given permission to discuss this plan with my husband, George Bartels and ask not to discuss it with anyone else. I was again reminded that it was most important this entire matter be kept in strictest confidence; that the National League of Families Boards were not aware of this. Only a U.S. Senator, to remain unnamed, and the White House, Ann, Carol and myself were aware.

Errol Bond, SOP's Vice President and accountant, testified that he:

assumed that Dick Childress was involved because Ann had indicated that it [the Diwan funding] had the blessing of the White House.

Bond further testified that it was his understanding that the approval for the project:

. . . probably came from the President or somebody telling Dick Childress to go ahead.

Thereafter, commencing on August 2, 1982 and continuing through 1985, SOP received checks totaling approximately $200,000 and deposited them into its account at Security Pacific National Bank in Palm Desert, California. During this period, Bartels would telephone Griffiths and advise her of the receipt of the various checks and Griffiths would, by telephone, instruct Betty Bartels to wire-transfer the funds to certain accounts. Pursuant to instructions received from Griffiths, SOP wire-transferred these funds to certain accounts. Most of the money, approximately $156,000, was transferred to an account at Bank of America, Bangkok, in the name of Mushtaq Ahmed Diwan. A smaller portion was transferred to an account at Chemical Bank in New York in the name of Narinder S. Saluja.

Narinder Saluja resides in Bangkok and was interviewed by the Committee via telephone in November 1992. He informed the staff that when monies were deposited in his New York account at Chemical Bank as described above, he would then transfer a like amount in cash to Shinkle in Bangkok. Saluja claims that Shinkle asked him to use his bank account as a conduit for money because Saluja had businesses in New York and Bangkok, enabling him to transfer money overseas quickly.

The Committee received evidence that most of these contributions discussed above were solicited by Bert Hurlbut, a Texas oilman who is convinced that live POWs remained in Southeast Asia. Hurlbut testified that Griffiths asked him in 1982 to raise private funds to try to bring POWs back from Southeast Asia. According to Hurlbut, he agreed to assist and was told that a tax-deductible foundation had been founded in California to handle the money; information about the account came via Griffiths. Hurlbut was led to believe that the project had the blessing of Judge Clark and Richard Childress at the NSC.

The money Hurlbut raised was transferred to the Bangkok account of Mushtaq Ahmed Diwan and then given to Shinkle and Patrick Khamvongsa. According to DIA, Patrick Khamvongsa is a former member of the Royal Lao Air Force with ties to Phoumi Nosavan and other members of the Lao resistance. In 1984, Patrick began to work for Brig. Gen. Heine Aderholt (Ret.).

Evidence and depositions received by the Committee indicate that the funds transferred to the Diwan account went to a Lao resistance group for operations. Bond testified that he learned in 1987 that some of the funds had been used to buy arms and ammunition for the Lao resistance. U.S. intelligence agents contacted Hurlbut about his activities, but he was not asked to cease fundraising for the Lao operations. During that time, Hurlbut was an active member of the World Anti- Communist League and an associate of Gen. John Singlaub (Ret.) during the time Singlaub was actively raising funds and providing equipment to the Lao resistance.

Staff notes from a June 21, 1990 telephone interview with Shinkle in connection with the work of a prior Committee state:

. . . Shinkle was asked if he had ever received any money through a bank account bearing the name Mushtaq Ahmed Diwan. Shinkle stated that he had. He continued by stating that he received approximately $154,000.00 from this account. He believed the exact amount was $153,212.00. The money was obtained through donations by former Congressman John LeBoutillier. The arrangement for the monies to be received in the Diwan account was done by Ann Mills Griffiths and Richard Childress. The account was established by a friend of his who is of Indian origin that he has known for some years. When asked what he spent the money on, Shinkle replied "Field Operations." The money [was] used to buy boots, field packs and other items for resistance groups in Laos. . .

Records of the Diwan bank account show that, during a portion of the relevant period, a total of $578,689.42 was wire-transferred into the account from a variety of sources from various banks throughout the world. Other than as set forth above, the Committee was unable to locate Diwan, or determine either the sources or ultimate recipients of these funds.

In a deposition, Griffiths provided her account of the origins of the Skyhook II project. She stated that in June 1982, LeBoutillier sought to raise funds for a POW intelligence/rescue project which ultimately would become known as Skyhook II. LeBoutillier would discuss his proposed activity with both Griffiths and Childress. Griffiths said she understood that LeBoutillier was interested in obtaining intelligence information on live POWs and that it was his intention to then provide that information to the Government. Griffiths did not dispute the accuracy of Betty Bartels' SOP notes which reflect that officials at the NSC approved of the proposed project and that it was important that the existence of the project be kept secret.

Griffiths agreed to help LeBoutillier by finding an existing charitable organization which would receive tax-deductible donations on behalf of LeBoutillier and then transfer those funds to Southeast Asia for the proposed Skyhook II project. Accordingly, she contacted an acquaintance who was an official of a dormant California 501(c)(3) (tax-exempt) organization known as Save Our POW/MIAs, Inc. Griffiths explained the situation to the official, Betty Bartels, and it was agreed that SOP would receive donations on behalf of LeBoutillier's project and then transfer those monies to bank accounts as directed by Griffiths and/or LeBoutillier. Approximately $200,000 was raised from a handful of private donors who understood that their donations would be used to fund a clandestine POW project in Southeast Asia which had "the blessing of the White House."

Other Efforts Related to Lao Resistance Forces The Committee learned of an attempt by LeBoutillier and others to obtain Government identification, radios and 10 handguns for Skyhook II's contacts within the Lao resistance movement. Following discussions with officials of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the NSC, LeBoutillier purchased the handguns in Virginia in 1984 through an acquaintance. The handguns were intended to be shipped to Thailand for Skyhook II. Prior to purchasing the handguns, LeBoutillier had attempted to secure the assistance of DEA in providing Government identification and radios for Skyhook II's operations in Thailand. Although DEA apparently took preliminary steps towards providing government identification to Skyhook II's agents in Thailand, those efforts and any efforts to provide radios apparently were short lived. In addition, LeBoutillier sought DEA's assistance in transporting the handguns to Thailand.

After learning of the purchases of the handguns, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms conducted an investigation of possible firearms violations. As a result of its investigation, ATF recommended that LeBoutillier be prosecuted for firearms violations related to his straw purchases of the handguns.

In 1986 the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Virginia declined to prosecute, based in part upon the fact that there was evidence that LeBoutillier's activities had been sanctioned by the U.S. Government. The investigation failed to determine what ultimately happened to the handguns.

Recent Reconnaissance and Rescue Missions

From at least the early 1980s, there have been several well- publicized attempts by American citizens to locate and rescue POWs believed to be held captive in Southeast Asia. Set forth below is a description and analysis of two recent such missions. The first was conducted in 1992. The second, conducted by three POW/MIA activists from Florida, took place in 1988.

Team Falcon

Team Falcon, a 1992 reconnaissance and rescue operation, raised more than $60,000 from concerned citizens, including a POW/MIA family member. It was a futile exercise, doomed to fail from its inception because it lacked reliable information about the existence and location of any POWs; second, the participants lacked the technical and logistical resources needed to ensure a mission's success; and because they relied almost exclusively upon an individual, Phoumano Nosavan, who is notorious for providing false information to POW hunters.

In late 1991, Ted Hendrickson and Charley Taylor, members of the Arkansas POW/MIA Verification Task Force, planned a mission to Southeast Asia to locate and rescue three American POWs. Hendrickson and Taylor are retired Vietnam veterans who are receiving 100 percent disability payments from the Veterans Administration for health problems relating to Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. They claimed that the mission was planned because they received "intelligence information" from Howard Funkhouser of Arkansas that purported to identify the location of live American POW/MIA's in Southeast Asia. This information allegedly was supplied to Funkhouser by two Lao Americans, Bo Novilay and Phet Phayboun, yet this remains unclear. Funkhouser has written that even at that time, he maintained his belief that there were no MIAs left alive.

Following a series of meetings in the Fall of 1991, Team Falcon was formed and began soliciting money. Approximately $60,000 is known to have been raised from a variety of private sources. Individual participants in the mission also spent considerable sums of their own money in connection with the effort.

The individuals primarily responsible for raising the money for the operation were Hendrickson, Taylor and Ted McGarry. By alluding to the possibility that they knew where POWs were being held, and withholding details about the mission in the name of "security," these men appealed to the hopes and fears of potential donors. Their urgent, emotional pleas extracted large sums of money with a minimum of explanation or evidence to support their claims. This demonstrates vividly the appeal of purported first hand live sightings.

The U.S. component of Team Falcon consisted of McGarry and Pam Heidinger, who had rented a "safe house" in Jacksonville, Arkansas.

Their function was to maintain lines of communications between Thailand and the U.S. operations and to arrange the logistics of the POWs' entry into the United States following their "rescue." Thousands of dollars were spent on phone bills, rent for the safe house, food, travel, etc. Additionally, the Canadian Vietnam Veterans of Toronto was asked to provide "security" at the airport upon the POWs return from Southeast Asia; 20 Canadian veterans were said to be available on 24 hours notice. Mike Gillhoolley, Chairman of the Toronto group's POW/MIA committee made several trips made between Canada and Arkansas and spent more than $9,000 on the Team Falcon project.

At the end of January, 1992, Hendrickson, Taylor, Ken Carr (MIA Capt. Donald Carr's half-brother) and Baron Harris traveled to Bangkok to begin the mission. They were preceded by Howard Funkhouser and his two Lao-American friends, Bo Novilay and Phet Phayboun. There are conflicting accounts regarding the role these men played, but they returned to the U.S. in mid-February having done little more than paper work in connection with a POW/MIA search effort. Their departure left Team Falcon in need of a translator/interpreter. McGarry contacted Khambang Sibounheuang and asked him to go to Bangkok to meet the members of Team Falcon. Khambang traveled to Bangkok in April 1992.

According to Khambang, he travelled to a village near the Thailand/Laos border to assist Hendrickson and Carr in crossing the border. Khambang did not accompany Hendrickson and Carr into Laos.

Poor planning, expired visas, and a lack of appropriate funding and equipment caused several delays. According to Khambang, members of Team Falcon spent approximately three days in Laos, no time in Vietnam or Cambodia, and two-and-one-half months in Thailand. Taylor claims that Team Falcon members Hendrickson and Carr spent up to 6 days away from the safe house in Thailand, but it is unclear where they were during those days. Team Falcon returned to Arkansas on April 13, 1992.

An "After Action Report" summarizing Team Falcon's activities in Southeast Asia was prepared by Team members in May 1992. This account states, in part:

. . . there are American POW/MIA's from the Vietnam conflict who are still alive in Southeast Asia.

While not imprisoned in the traditional sense -- Team Falcon found no evidence whatsoever of the existence of any current POW camps, cages, caves or other restricted enclosures -- neither are these individuals free to return home. . .

Team Falcon personally investigated over 50 of these reports by actually visiting the alleged sites. We found no evidence, either physical or by interviewing area residents, that any of these sites currently serve as the location of a POW camp or confinement area of any type. . . In fact, we found no evidence whatsoever that there is any POW camp, cage, cave or similar restricted enclosure housing American POW/MIA's anywhere in Southeast Asia at this time.

Based on the accounts of those who either contributed money or participated directly or indirectly in Team Falcon, it would have been impossible for the Team Falcon members to have investigated the alleged POW camp sites, or the location know as "Site 85" as claimed in the Report.

1988 Mission To Southeast Asia

Three POW/MIA activists from Florida, Ron Martin, Tim Williams and Leonard Hood travelled to Thailand in 1988 for the purpose of rescuing certain POW/MIAs from Laos. Martin testified that:

. . . [W]e got some intelligence through activists -- people who had been going back and forth for years and building relationships with Free Lao, mostly, such as Phoumono Nosavan, the son of General Phoumi, people like that. And we had information that Tommy Hart, the son of Vera Hart, and Morgan Donahue and one other person -- we didn't know his name -- were near the border in Savannakhet. So we went over initially expecting to spend 2 weeks. And 2 months later we were still there. . . And we were unsuccessful.

Like others who contacted Phoumono for assistance, Martin and his colleagues paid him for information and assistance in their search for missing American servicemen. Phoumono coordinates teams of armed escorts for cross-border forays. Martin describes these teams as follows:

These guys don't stay in camp. They're not regular troops. When Phoumono puts together a group, he goes to homes. And we picked up a number of them in a van-like vehicle. You go to individual homes. They kiss their wives goodbye. I mean, some of them live in huts and real horrible conditions. And I think they probably paid them maybe 500 bhat [approximately $25] to go. And that's the way a lot of these people --that's the only income they have. . . We crossed the Mekong with about 29 indigenous people. Then we went towards Savannakhet, up and down hills, not on roads. We had no firefights. We ran into no concentration of troops. We stayed hidden mostly during the day. We only went about 70 klicks [approximately 44 miles] into the country. . .

Martin further described the role of the 29 indigenous "troops" hired by Phoumono:

[They were t]o be on call when Phoumono needed them. In other words, when he would say, we're going to go check out a POW camp in the Phong Sali area or something like that, sometimes they would go, sometimes they wouldn't. If they needed money, they would go. If they wanted to feed their family, they would go. Perhaps if they found a job, maybe they'll not go.

During their foray into Laos, Martin's team, along with Phoumono and his 29 "troops," reached the point where the POWs were supposed to have been. When they approached the supposed camp, Phoumono insisted the group leave at once as there were too many enemy troops in the area. Martin testified that he did not see any of the troops but, not anxious for a confrontation, left the area. Martin testified that his share of the expenses for the trip (including travel, food, lodging, and payments to Phoumono) came to approximately $14,000.

Martin's experience is evidence that a cottage industry in POW/MIA hunting has emerged in Southeast Asia as a result of the willingness of U.S. citizens to pay for "intelligence" and "mission support." For a few thousand dollars, people like Phoumono can secure weapons and hire a small force of armed escorts. Martin and others who have dealt with Phoumono have learned that his industry is riddled with deception:

If you want me to tell you after hindsight, I wouldn't believe Phoumono, I wouldn't trust Phoumono with anything, to tell you the truth.

When asked why Phoumono provided false or misleading information, Martin posited:

It's got to be for money. It's the only reason I can guess. Also, I guess it gives him a little power. Money gives him a little power in his own community. That's the only reason I could guess, because with his operation he will certainly never regain Laos or become -- or gain the status of his father, General Phoumi.

James "Bo" Gritz

James "Bo" Gritz' forays into Southeast Asia have been well publicized in the media and in books, and he is regarded by POW/MIA activists to be the inspiration for the "Rambo" movies.

An excerpt from a report prepared in February of 1988 and distributed by the NSC in response to a congressional inquiry follows:

James "Bo" Gritz is a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel who became active in the POW/MIA issue during the late 1970s. At that time, the issue did not have the policy priority it does today. Relying on a variety of supporters, he has attempted to put together several "rescue attempts" in Laos based on unsubstantiated hearsay reports.

In the Spring of 1981, Mr. Gritz received considerable publicity when he disclosed "Operation Velvet Hammer," a POW-rescue venture sponsored by private citizens, and some family members of Americans missing in Southeast Asia. Operation Velvet Hammer was not connected in any way with the U.S. Government. This effort, which was not carried through, involved a "training camp" at a "cheerleading academy" in Florida, among other things. Later, Mr. Gritz was publicly disavowed by his associates and supporters, the media and the National League of Families. The legality of his fundraising was questioned by vulnerable family members, one of whom lost $30,000. After receiving adverse publicity, Mr. Gritz surfaced a letter, which he alleged was from the late Lieutenant General Harold Aaron, USA, former Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, implying a connection between his activities and the Defense Intelligence Agency. An FBI analysis of the letter revealed a number of differences between the signatures on that letter and that of General Aaron, inconsistencies in the language of the letter, and other facts that led to the conclusion that the letter is not authentic. General Aaron was not alive when the letter surfaced.

In October 1981, a low-level Department of Defense organization submitted a proposal for an operation that included Mr. Gritz's participation in a collection capacity. This proposal, submitted by an acquaintance of Mr. Gritz in the organization, never rose above the first level in the approval process. However, in unwarranted anticipation of the concept being approved, the organization prematurely provided Mr. Gritz with initial travel funds and some equipment. following disapproval of the proposal, this organization informed Mr. Gritz that he did not enjoy any official support.

With this exception, there has been no U.S. Government sanction, encouragement, funding or approval of Mr. Gritz's activities by the White House or by any Executive department or agency of the government. In fact, the U.S. Government has attempted in every way to oppose his activities and has advised him that he was operating counter to Government policy. He has attempted to fund his alleged POW rescue operations through use of a now defunct tax-exempt veterans organization, thousands of dollars reportedly donated by a religious organization, and donations from MIA family members and other private American citizens.

In 1983, Mr. Gritz commenced new activities with new supporters, including Hollywood personalities. He made his way to Thailand with a group of veterans and POW/MIA daughters whom he placed in a "command headquarters." From Thailand, he crossed a short way into Laos with a faction of the Lao resistance and some veterans. After confrontation with a rival Lao resistance group, Mr. Gritz's group immediately left Laos. Mr. Gritz and his party were arrested by the Thai Government, declared persona non grata and expelled. Mr. Gritz's allegations that he had evidence that POWs were being held and that the U.S. Government supported his activities were exposed as untrue in hearings conducted by the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs in March 1983.

Following these events, Mr. Gritz produced "evidence" implying to Congress and the public that he had proof that a specific individual was held prisoner. It subsequently was demonstrated that the "evidence" consisted of altered documents. Mr. Gritz was subsequently expelled from the Special Forces Association and was the subject of media scrutiny. . .

Throughout his years of involvement, Mr. Gritz contributed nothing of value to the POW/MIA issue. In fact, his activities have been counterproductive. Supposed MIA remains he turned in were determined to be animal bones. His rescue "missions," based on faulty or fabricated intelligence, have been assessed as being so undermanned and poorly planned that they had virtually no chance for success. His alleged foray into Laos was used as a basis by that country to suspend government-to- government cooperation on this issue for a year. He has distributed leaflets in Southeast Asia that falsely claim Presidential support for his activities and that falsely describe himself as an active duty full Colonel. . . .

In his testimony, Gritz said he was covertly funded by the U.S. Government for certain of his operations. With the consent of the head of a POW/MIA organization known as United Vietnam Veterans Organization (UVVO), Gritz opened a chapter of UVVO and established a UVVO bank account at Tokai Bank in Playa Del Ray, California in or about 1986. Gritz testified:

If I got the word to go on the operation, I said fine. If the money shows up in this UVVO account, then we will go. If it doesn't show up, we don't. And so the money, if it showed up we went.

Where the money came from, I didn't know and didn't care. As a matter of fact, when we trained Afghans we got our checks from Stanford Technology. I didn't know what Stanford Technology was, didn't give a hoot. It was just standard procedure until, when Ollie North's thing started coming around here's Stanford Technology is part of Albert Hakkim's organization. So what does that mean? Well, so we used UVVO as a depository where covert funds could be placed for these operations.

Gritz further testified the covert payments from the Government were received via a Florida bank account and that on one occasion his wife picked up a cash payment of $25,000 at a Washington area supermarket. Gritz' code name for these activities was "Bear" and he testified he was in frequent contact with ISA and CIA about his covert operations. In November 1992, the Committee received declassified documents evidencing that the U.S. Army began using Gritz in mid-1981; however, it appears this was done to track his private activities to ensure they did not interfere with other U.S. initiatives.

Much of Gritz' activities appear to bid for public attention. While first avoiding Committee investigators' requests for a deposition, and then pleading for an extension so he could finish his presidential campaign, Gritz launched a mini call-in campaign by supporters demanding that he be deposed.