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GAUGING COOPERATION OF GOVERNMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

It is not possible to account for the Americans who are missing from the war in Southeast Asia without cooperation from the governments of the region, especially Vietnam. Over the years, our government has requested this cooperation in four forms.

. First, we have requested all information about live American prisoners, former prisoners or deserters.

. Second, we have asked for the return of any recovered or recoverable remains of missing American servicemen.

. Third, we have sought access to files, records, documents and other materials that are relevant to the fates of missing Americans.

. Finally, we have asked for permission to visit certain locations within these countries to investigate live-sighting reports and search for actual or suspected airplane crash sites.

Vietnam

The U.S. has long believed that Vietnam knows a great deal more about the fate of missing Americans than they have acknowledged. This view was based on our belief that the North Vietnamese maintained detailed records of U.S. servicemen who came within their prison system during the war, including many lost in North Vietnamese-controlled areas of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. U.S. intelligence agencies are convinced, moreover, that the Government of Vietnam at one time recovered and stored an unknown quantity of remains of American servicemen, apparently for release at politically strategic points in time.

The level of U.S.-Vietnamese cooperation in accounting for missing Americans has varied over the years depending on bilateral and global political conditions and on the degree of emphasis placed on the issue by U.S. officials. At the time the Select Committee was created, there was considerable progress being made in the investigation of discrepancy cases, and an agreement had been reached with Vietnam to allow an official DoD investigating presence to be established in Hanoi.

Over the past year, Committee members have visited Vietnam on four occasions to press for further cooperation. Those visits, coupled with ongoing efforts from the Executive branch, have yielded substantial results. Below is a discussion of the evolution of U.S.-Vietnamese cooperation on the issue, from the end of the war to the present.

From Operation Homecoming until 1982

Article 8 of the Paris Peace Accords required the exchange of prisoners of war, the exchange of information about the missing in action and the return of all the recoverable remains of those missing men or prisoners who had died. Although the agreement did not extend technically to Cambodia or Laos, the U.S. negotiators were assured that North Vietnam would cooperate in efforts to repatriate American prisoners captured in Laos.

As described elsewhere in this report, the atmosphere of reconciliation produced by the peace agreement did not last long. The North Vietnamese continued to funnel arms to their allies in the south; the U.S. continued to bomb Cambodia and, at times, Laos; the South Vietnamese did not cooperate in releasing civilian prisoners; and the Viet Cong continued doing all it could to increase its military and political strength. Amidst this atmosphere of contention and accusation, efforts to account for Americans missing in North Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia did not get off the ground.

A total of 591 American prisoners were repatriated in Operation Homecoming, a lower-than-anticipated number that disappointed the nation. U.S. officials had hoped for the return of more than 80 others who were listed by the DIA as prisoners of war, and at least some of the many hundreds who were listed as missing in action.

From the end of Operation Homecoming to the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, the United States Government pressed the North Vietnamese to cooperate in accounting for our missing, but succeeded only in obtaining the remains of 23 servicemen. The United States focused its appeals to North Vietnam on what later came to be called "discrepancy cases." These were men for whom we had information that they had survived their incidents of loss and were known or appeared to have been captured by the enemy, and for whom we had received from Hanoi neither their remains nor information about their fates. Even before Operation Homecoming was complete, Dr. Kissinger raised a number of these cases directly with the North Vietnamese in Hanoi. The North Vietnamese were unresponsive to U.S. requests.

The responsibility for carrying out the technical work involved in accounting for missing Americans was assigned to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), established in January 1973. Working under difficult and sometimes hostile conditions, JCRC teams were able to recover some American remains from old battlefields in South Vietnam. Among the last American servicemen to be killed by hostile fire in Vietnam was a member of a JCRC field team who was shot and killed by the Viet Cong on Dec. 15, 1973. All JCRC field activity ended with his death; diplomatic efforts to obtain an accounting through the Four-Party Joint Military Team ran into a brick wall as a result of the overall problems of implementing the agreement; and virtually all official U.S. contact with Vietnam was terminated after the fall of Saigon and the unification of Vietnam under the North's control.

In November 1975, the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, chaired by Representative G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery, sought to meet with Vietnamese officials for discussions about unaccounted-for Americans. To accommodate Hanoi's insistence that such POW/MIA questions be part of broader discussions on a range of U.S./Vietnamese bilateral issues, the Montgomery Committee agreed to include members of other committees in its delegation.

In a Nov. 14, 1975 meeting with Montgomery Committee members, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had recommended that the members discuss the "MIA issue in the context of normalization rather than in a framework of the Paris accords, which the North Vietnamese had violated."

Vietnam agreed to meet with the Montgomery Committee, and on Dec. 6, 1975, members of the Committee accompanied by four members of other committees met with North Vietnamese Ambassador Vo Van Sung in Paris.

During their meeting, which included discussions of trade and aid, Ambassador Sung claimed that Vietnam had released all prisoners of war, and had organized efforts to collect information about missing Americans who had been killed in action. Sung committed his government to the repatriation of the remains of three American pilots as a first step towards better understanding between Vietnam and the U.S. Sung made clear, however, that the construction of a warmer relationship between the United States and Vietnam would require reciprocal actions on the part of the U.S. A meeting in Hanoi was scheduled for four days later.

On Dec. 18, 1975, four members of the Montgomery Committee traveled to Hanoi with a letter from President Ford which described the President's views on reciprocity and offered the assurance that the U.S. would be forward-looking in its relations with the new governments of Indochina.

Three sets of remains were turned over to the delegation in Hanoi. Meetings were held with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and Vice Foreign Minister Phan Hein. The Vietnamese reiterated their contention that all American POWs had been released. The Congressmen appealed for documented evidence on the missing, and for the recovery of the remains of two Marines who had been killed at the end of the war. The Vietnamese promised to supply information about the two Marines.

The North Vietnamese officials then raised the question of promised reconstruction aid from the U.S. and their understanding of such as referred to in President Nixon's February 1, 1973 letter to Pham Van Dong. The Congressmen stated their view that grant assistance from the U.S. to Vietnam was highly unlikely.

In March 1976, the Select Committee met with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and unanimously recommended to him that the Department of State begin direct negotiations with the Vietnamese in an effort to resolve POW/MIA questions. That same month, the U.S. sent a communication to Hanoi requesting preliminary talks. This and other appeals by the Montgomery Committee for additional meetings with Vietnamese officials were rebuffed by Hanoi.

In 1977, the Carter Administration, acting on the recommendations of the Montgomery Committee, explored the possibility of obtaining additional POW/MIA information through improved overall relations between the United States and Vietnam.

In February 1977, President Carter appointed a commission headed by United Autoworkers President Leonard Woodcock and assigned it the task of seeking additional information from Vietnam and Laos. The Commission was to listen and report back on matters of interest to the governments of those countries.

The Woodcock Commission visited Laos and Cambodia in March 1977. In both countries, the delegation received assurances of cooperation on POW/MIA matters, coupled with expressions of interest in the possibility of economic aid. In Vietnam, the Commission received the remains of 12 U.S. airmen and was informed that a specialized office would be established by the government to receive information on missing Americans.

The Woodcock Commission recommended the resumption of regular talks between the U.S. and North Vietnam, and encouraged the normalization of diplomatic relations as a means for obtaining a fuller accounting of missing Americans.

In May 1977, U.S. and Vietnamese representatives held two days of talks in Paris, during which the U.S. offered to normalize relations without any conditions. The Vietnamese refused, arguing that normalization of relations should be contingent on the payment of U.S. reconstruction aid. In July 1977, Vietnam joined the United Nations with U.S. support.

In 1978, Vietnamese officials met with JCRC officials in Hawaii as part of a general move toward better relations. Apparently because the Carter Administration appeared intent on improving relations with Vietnam, Vietnam repatriated more than 40 sets of remains during the Administration's first two years.

The Carter Administration scrapped further consideration of improved relations with Vietnam following its invasion of Cambodia in late 1978. This brought progress in obtaining an accounting for missing Americans to an abrupt halt. Meanwhile, continued violence in the region accelerated the exodus of refugees, and with them, reports that American prisoners had been seen alive in Southeast Asia after the war.

Reagan Administration Initiatives (1982-1987)

In 1982, the Reagan Administration began to revive efforts to account for missing. In February 1982, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage led a delegation to Hanoi for POW/MIA discussions with a Vietnamese delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Dinh Ngo Liem.

In the course of these discussions, Vietnam agreed to further technical meetings among officials of the JCRC and Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii (CIL-HI) and personnel from Vietnam's Office for Seeking Missing Persons (VNOSMP). Vietnam further agreed to consider four such meetings a year, and to dispatch a working-level team to JCRC/CIL-HI. Lastly, Vietnam agreed to consider a U.S. proposal to begin joint U.S./Vietnam crash-site searches for information about missing Americans.

In September 1982, a delegation from the National League of Families visited Hanoi. The delegation, led by the League's Chairman, George Brooks, gained an agreement from Vietnam to hold four government-to-government technical meetings a year on POW/MIA questions.

Four sets of remains were repatriated by Vietnam and identified as those of Americans in 1982.

In July 1983, Vietnam suspended technical meetings in reaction to what Hanoi termed "hostile statements" by senior U.S. officials. This was a reference to Secretary of State George Shultz' comments at an ASEAN meeting in Bangkok that Vietnam was holding more than 400 sets of U.S. remains.

In October 1983, Dr. Richard Childress, the National Security Council's Director for Asian Affairs, and the League's Executive Director, Ann Mills Griffiths met in New York with Vietnam's Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach. In the course of the ensuing informal discussions, Thach agreed that Vietnam's cooperation on POW/MIA questions would be undertaken on a humanitarian basis and would not be linked to diplomatic or economic considerations. He further agreed to receive a senior U.S. delegation in Hanoi to discuss expanding U.S./Vietnamese cooperation to resolve the POW/MIA issue.

Eight sets of remains were repatriated by Vietnam and identified as American in 1983.

In January 1984, the following joint communique was issued by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Kampuchea:

With the spirit of friendship between the American people and the three Indochinese peoples which was strengthened in the struggle against the war of aggression waged by the U.S. leaders in Indochina, on the basis of humanitarianism, and understanding the American people, each country of Indochina will try to inform one another about the Americans missing during the war in Laos, Vietnam and Kampuchea.

A delegation led by Armitage traveled to Hanoi in February 1984. Prior to the delegation's departure, Vietnam and the U.S. released the following statement:

By mutual agreement, the governments of the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam believe that the issue of Americans missing in Vietnam is a humanitarian one to be dealt with through mutual cooperation and good will.

Vietnam's commitment to treat the resolution of POW/MIA questions as a humanitarian issue appeared to allow the U.S. to pursue cooperation with Vietnam without having to deal constantly with the entanglements of economic aid and diplomatic recognition. This expressed lack of linkage has done a great deal since 1984 to facilitate our dialogue with Vietnam, even though Vietnam's call for "mutual cooperation and good will" carries with it an implication of anticipated progress in these and perhaps other areas.

The February 1984 delegation led by Richard Armitage obtained a formal agreement from Vietnam to accelerate accounting efforts; to focus initial efforts on easily accessible discrepancy cases in the Hanoi/Haiphong area and on easily recoverable remains; to provide new information on several missing Americans; and to resume technical meetings in the near future.

Later in the year, Vietnam's cooperation as outlined in the February agreement stopped. Hanoi cited U.S. "hostile rhetoric" over Vietnam's continued occupation of Cambodia, and the sale of U.S. radar equipment to China as reasons for the setback.

In October, Childress again traveled to New York for meetings with Thach, who repeated Vietnam's promise to accelerate resolution of discrepancy cases in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. He further agreed to focus on resolving cases of Americans listed by the former Viet Cong as died in captivity; to send teams into the countryside to investigate first-hand live-sighting reports; and to continue Vietnam's overall commitment to resolve the POW/MIA issue as a humanitarian endeavor.

Six sets of remains were repatriated by Vietnam and identified as those of Americans in 1984.

Childress, Griffiths and Thach next met in New York in March 1985 to discuss a U.S. initiative to expand joint efforts in a comprehensive two-year plan. Thach promised his Government would consider the two-year plan. He also agreed to expand the number of technical meetings from four to six, or more if necessary; to expedite the return of remains promised in February to the U.S. technical team; and to reaffirm Vietnam's focus on Hanoi/Haiphong discrepancy cases.

Later that month the remains of six Americans were repatriated, including two Americans who were on the PRG list addressed in Thach's October 1984 commitment.

In July 1985, following discussions with Childress, Griffiths and Thach agreed to renew negotiations with senior U.S. officials with the intention of resolving the POW/MIA issue within two years.

Childress led a U.S. delegation to Hanoi in August 1985 for meetings with Acting Foreign Minister Vo Dong Giang. The U.S. proposed a comprehensive two-year work plan to resolve the issue, which included the establishment of a U.S. technical presence in Hanoi. The technical office was rejected by Hanoi because the U.S rejected Vietnam's proposal to open a reciprocal office in Washington. Vietnam offered a counter-proposal to the U.S. which included language unrelated to POW/MIA questions.

Both sides agreed to meet again in New York in September to resolve differences in the two-year plans. In those follow-up discussions, the U.S. accepted in principle Vietnam's unilateral, two-year plan with modifications. Vietnam agreed to conduct a joint crash site investigation, and pledged the repatriation of additional American remains. The U.S. noted that Vietnam's cooperation on POW/MIA questions would facilitate an improvement in relations following the achievement of a peace settlement in Cambodia.

In 1985, 38 sets of remains were repatriated by Vietnam and identified as those of Americans. This was the largest single turnover of remains since the end of the war.

In January 1986, Childress and Armitage led a delegation to Hanoi which included Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz and Griffiths. Their meetings with Thach produced an agreement for cooperative, multiple field activities, and Vietnam's reaffirmation of its commitment to investigate live-sighting reports and to all earlier agreements.

Vietnam's failure to implement its previous agreements with the U.S. prompted another Childress-led delegation to New York in May 1986 to meet with Vietnam's Deputy Foreign Minister Hoang Bich Son, and a subsequent meeting in Hanoi with Thach in July 1986.

In New York, Childress received assurances that Vietnam would resume a schedule of technical level activities in keeping with prior commitments, and a promise that Vietnam would increase the personnel and other resources committed to VNOSMP, Vietnam's MIA Office.

The July discussions in Hanoi produced the usual reaffirmations of accelerated cooperation and humanitarian purpose. Additionally, Vietnam undertook to:

. Hold "very productive" technical level meetings in August and October;

. Allow consultations between American and Vietnamese forensic specialists in Vietnam;

. Provide in writing the results of its unilateral investigations of live sighting reports (few details of which had theretofore been provided to the U.S.);

. Allow U.S. experts to accompany Vietnamese officials on investigations in accessible areas; discuss with the U.S. specific crash sites for joint excavation; and

. Send another delegation to JCRC and CIL-HI.

By the fall of 1986, it had become abundantly clear to the U.S. that Vietnam's agreements and reaffirmations did not translate into measurable action. U.S. appeals to Vietnam to match deeds with words were met with repeated assurances of Vietnam's good faith, but did little to produce the level of cooperation necessary to resolve the POW/MIA issue in the agreed-upon, two-year time frame.

In 1986, 13 sets of remains were repatriated by Vietnam and identified as those of Americans.

Gen. Vessey's Contributions, 1987-1991

In April 1987, after months of internal discussion, the Reagan Administration attempted to overcome the prevailing absence of meaningful Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIA questions by appointing General John W. Vessey to be the President's Special Emissary to Vietnam for POW/MIA Affairs.

Vessey retired after serving 46 years; his last post was as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He returned from retirement at President Reagan's request and was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1992 for his efforts on behalf of unaccounted- for servicemen.

Childress led a U.S. delegation to Hanoi in May 1987 to elicit Vietnam's agreement to receive the President's emissary. After difficult negotiations, and a recitation of Hanoi's grievances with the United States, Vietnam agreed to accept General Vessey.

As described by Vessey, President Reagan's instructions were to negotiate with the Vietnamese to establish a mechanism with which to pursue the fullest possible accounting of missing Americans. The first priority was to ascertain whether any Americans remained in captivity in Southeast Asia.

The President added to Vessey's portfolio three humanitarian objectives: the release of former South Vietnamese political and military officials from so-called "re-education camps"; the implementation of the Orderly Departure Program to reunite Vietnamese with their families in the United States and to gaining permissions for the emigration of Amerasian children to the United States. Vessey also was authorized by the President to consider Vietnam's humanitarian concerns and to recommend limited U.S. initiatives to address some of those concerns.

Due to the dedication and skill of Vessey, enormous progress has been made toward these objectives. Today, the re-education camps are empty, the Orderly Departure Program is approaching its successful completion, and there is a mechanism in place in Vietnam which should ultimately provide the United States with the necessary information to achieve the fullest possible accounting for our missing men.

Vessey's first mission to Vietnam occurred in August 1987. The first priority of his discussions with Thach was to extract a recognition from the Vietnamese of discrepancy cases was required thorough investigation of discrepancy cases was required if the U.S. was to accept Vietnam's assurances that it held no American prisoners.

Vessey succeeded in gaining Vietnam's acceptance of the view that resolving discrepancy cases was essential to the accounting process. His initial negotiations with Thach produced Vietnam's agreement to renew cooperation on POW/MIA questions by focusing on discrepancy cases and on those cases of Americans who were listed as having died in captivity in the South.

It was further agreed that the focus of discrepancy case investigations would be on 70 cases which Vessey termed "most compelling." Vietnam agreed to specific measures to accelerate progress toward accounting for our missing, and to subsequent meetings of U.S. and Vietnamese experts to facilitate this progress.

Additionally, both the U.S. and Vietnam affirmed that cooperation on POW/MIA and on other humanitarian issues would be pursued separately from other bilateral matters. The U.S. agreed to address certain humanitarian concerns of Vietnam, and to send a team of experts to Vietnam to collect information such as prosthetics requirements and capabilities on the problems of Vietnam's disabled.

In September 1987, Vessey led a delegation to New York for follow up discussions with Vietnam's Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien. Vietnam's cooperation still lagged behind its formal assurances, and in December Childress traveled to New York to meet with members of Vietnam's delegation to the United Nations to urge more rapid cooperation. Vietnam agreed to hold technical talks in January 1988.

In 1987, 8 sets of remains were repatriated by Vietnam and identified as those of Americans.

Vessey met again with Minister Thach in New York in June 1988. Along with promises to accelerate cooperation and reaffirmations of earlier agreements, Thach agreed in principle to permit joint field surveys and excavations.

In the following months, Vietnam's cooperation with U.S. efforts improved substantially. Joint field operations were increased, and a large number of remains were repatriated.

In 1988, 62 sets of remains were repatriated by Vietnam and identified as those of Americans.

After reappointment by President Bush as Special Emissary, Vessey led a delegation to Hanoi in October 1989. In addition to seeking expanded joint field operations, Vessey's negotiations prioritized the United States' need for information from Vietnam's war archives.

Thach agreed in the October discussions to search for additional data regarding discrepancy cases, and to accept for investigation new discrepancy cases, including those involving Americans who were lost in areas of Laos controlled by North Vietnam during the war. Additionally, Thach agreed to expand cooperation in the field, recognizing the U.S. need for specific data and access to eyewitnesses.

Vietnam's familiar reluctance to implement its public and private assurances with the agreed-upon actions prompted a December 1989 meeting between Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Lambertson and Vietnam's U.N. Ambassador Trinh Xuan Lang, during which Lang reaffirmed Vietnam's promise to increase cooperation.

In 1989, 33 sets of remains were repatriated by Vietnam and identified as those of Americans.

In September 1990, Vessey and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon met with Vietnam's Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai for discussions on Cambodia and the need to resolve the POW/MIA issue.

Later that month, Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, met in New York with Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach. Baker stressed to Thach the importance the U.S. attached to resolving the POW/MIA issue and appealed to Thach for Vietnam's full implementation of the commitments it had undertaken on POW/MIA cooperation, recognizing that once a Cambodian settlement was achieved, Hanoi's cooperation on POW/MIA questions would govern the speed with which the U.S. and Vietnam improved their relations.

The following month, Thach and his delegation came to Washington for discussions with Vessey. This was the first visit by a senior Vietnamese official since the war and was intended to symbolize the promise of improved relations portended by cooperation on the POW/MIA issue.

U.S. officials had long suspected that Vietnam's war-time records included substantial information about the fate of missing Americans. Accordingly, Vessey's efforts were increasingly focused on securing U.S. access to Vietnamese military archives which contained this information.

Vessey's discussions with Thach in Washington yielded Vietnam's agreement to form a joint research "information seeking" team with the U.S. to locate and make available Vietnamese historical documents which contained information relevant to POW/MIA cases.

Also during the Washington meeting, Vessey resurrected the U.S. proposal to establish a POW/MIA office in Hanoi. He stressed that the U.S. would have to be assured that a resident U.S. team in Hanoi would have sufficient work to justify its presence; this would include access to archival information.

Thach's interest in establishing a U.S. POW/MIA office in Hanoi was immediately apparent. Not only in discussions with Vessey, but in subsequent discussions with members of Congress and other interested Americans, Thach frequently stressed his desire that the office be opened quickly.

The question of an official U.S. presence in Hanoi had become more than a mechanism to hasten resolution of the POW/MIA issue. Thach, who was Vietnam's leading proponent of rapprochement with the U.S., perceived the opening of a U.S. POW/MIA Office in Hanoi as evidence of progress toward normalization of relations.

Despite its Foreign Minister's interest, Vietnam did not move quickly to ensure U.S. confidence that its POW/MIA team would have the access to documentary evidence required. Progress stalled over Vietnam's insistence that U.S. access to military documents would compromise Vietnam's national security. Accordingly, only Vietnamese personnel would search the archives, after which they would share with the U.S. their summary notes of any information related to U.S. POW/MIA cases they discovered. This arrangement was not satisfactory to the U.S.

In 1990, 17 sets of remains were repatriated by Vietnam and identified as those of Americans.

1991: The Pace of Activity Quickens

In April 1991, Senator John McCain traveled to Vietnam for meetings with President Do Muoi and Foreign Minister Thach in an effort to advance the establishment of a U.S. POW/MIA office there. McCain sought Vietnam's agreement to allow U.S. investigators the kind of access to archival information which would meet both Vietnamese and U.S. concerns. McCain was also authorized by the Bush Administration to discuss in general terms a forthcoming U.S. proposal for bilateral cooperation leading to the full normalization of relations, which came to be referred to informally as the "Road Map."

Thach was initially reluctant to modify Vietnamese strictures on access to their archives, but near the end of their discussions Thach asked McCain to offer his assurances to Vessey that American investigators would be granted the level of access that the U.S. had requested.

In April 1991, Assistant Secretary of State Solomon outlined to U.N. Ambassador Lang the United States' road-map proposal for improved relations. In general terms, the Road Map provides in four phases for the normalization of economic and diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam conditioned on Vietnam's cooperation in the achievement and implementation of a settlement to the Cambodian civil war and the fullest possible accounting of American POW/MIAs.

Vietnam never formally accepted nor rejected this outline of reciprocal steps toward full normalization of relations, although Vietnamese officials have often expressed resentment at its terms. Nevertheless, Vietnam appears to recognize that U.S. terms for normalization are unlikely to be improved (from their perspective).

Since the Road Map proposal was put forward, Vietnam has fully met the standard of cooperation requested with respect to the peace plan in Cambodia. Although serious problems exist with respect to the implementation of that plan, the responsibility for these problems does not rest with Vietnam.

Vietnam's cooperation on the POW/MIA issue over the last 20 months is not as satisfactory as its constructive cooperation in the Cambodia settlement. However, when judged as a whole, the steps Hanoi has taken since April 1991 depict dramatic, albeit irregular, progress in joint efforts to account for missing Americans.

Unfortunately, the number of Americans accounted for has fallen dramatically during the same period. The impetus for Vietnam's cooperation has come from several sources. Vessey has provided the Vietnamese with a respected and influential contact within the U.S. government.

. The Bush Administration's Road Map establishes a clear linkage between increasing levels of Vietnamese cooperation and American response.

. The disintegration of the Soviet empire has deprived Vietnam of many external sources of economic assistance and political comfort. Vietnam's relations with China, which have been tense traditionally, have worsened over territorial disputes. With its Soviet allies gone, Vietnam now lacks a counterweight to Chinese influence.

. The rapid economic growth of other Southeast Asian nations has given younger Vietnamese leaders a strong incentive to establish their own contacts with the West.

. The formation of the Select Committee has demonstrated anew the high priority attached to the POW/MIA issue by the American people and Government.

Obviously, the Committee does not know precisely how all of these matters have been factored into the calculations of the Vietnamese Government, but the overall trends offer hope for better cooperation on POW/MIA issues.

Shortly after Solomon discussed the Road Map with Lang, Vessey led another U.S. delegation to Hanoi. In the course of their discussions, Thach reiterated Vietnam's humanitarian purpose: an implicit, though not formal, rejection of the Road Map's linkage of normalization to POW/MIA accounting.

The most important accomplishment of the April 1991 Vessey trip was an agreement to establish a U.S. POW/MIA office in Hanoi. Although the office was originally intended to be temporary, it remains in full operation today, staffed by the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA). The office, informally referred to as the "Ranch," coordinates archival research, helps to plan field investigations, and serves as a base of operations for live- sighting investigations.

Although establishment of the Ranch was a step forward in U.S.- Vietnamese cooperation, U.S. investigators did not gain promised access to archival information on a timely or regular basis for many months. In July 1991, prospects for further cooperation appeared to suffer a setback when Thach was relieved of his ministerial portfolio and his seat in the Politburo. As previously observed, Thach was considered to be Vietnam's leading senior advocate of better relations with the U.S. His removal was seen by some observers to be at least partly attributable to dissatisfaction inside the Politburo with the pace of progress toward lifting the U.S. trade embargo against Vietnam.

In August 1991, Vietnam's Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai met with Solomon in Bangkok. Mai argued that Vietnam and the U.S. had resolved already the discrepancy cases, presumably clearing the way for rapid progress towards normal relations. Solomon responded by suggesting that greater progress on these cases was still expected by the U.S.

In September 1991, the United States announced a grant of $1.3 million to assist the war-disabled in Vietnam.

In October 1991, Vessey returned to Hanoi for a meeting with the newly-appointed Prime Minister, Vo Van Kiet, and newly-appointed Foreign Minister, Nguyen Manh Cam. During the meeting, the Prime Minister pledged "unconditional cooperation" to resolve the POW/MIA issue, which gave U.S. officials encouragement that Vietnam had not forsaken such cooperation in the new internal political environment in Hanoi.

Also in October, Secretary Baker announced that the U.S. was prepared to take some steps toward normalization with Vietnam in light of Vietnam's support for the Cambodia peace plan. In December, the U.S. Government lifted its ban on organized travel to Vietnam by Americans and began implementing other steps within Phase I of the Road Map.

About this time, U.S. investigators in Vietnam received part of an 84-page military record documenting U.S. air losses in Military Region Four. The U.S. made frequent appeals for the rest of this valuable document. Vietnamese officials assured the U.S. that they would turn over the complete document, but did not do so.

In 1991, three sets of remains were repatriated by Vietnam and identified as those of Americans.