Text File

Testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Corso, USA, Ret.

On November 10, 1992, the Committee heard the testimony of Lt. Col. Phillip Corso, USA, Ret., a member of the National Security Council staff during the Eisenhower Administration. Lt. Col. Corso was head of the special projects division of the Far East Command during the Korean War, in the G-2 section, with responsibility for keeping track of North Korean POW camps. During the closing days of the war, Lt. Col. Corso participated in discussions on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war (the "Little Switch" operation), and the full exchange of prisoners ("Big Switch").

Lt. Col. Corso testified that at the end of the exchange of sick and wounded in the Little Switch Operation, he prepared a document showing that all U.S. sick and wounded were not returned, and that about 500 prisoners who were not returned would be in danger of dying if they did not receive treatment. Lt. Col. Corso testified that U.S. officials brought this to the attention of the presiding Chinese general who responded simply by snapping a pencil in two and doing nothing. According to Lt. Col. Corso, the U.S. concluded that approximately 8,000 prisoners who should have come home during Operation Big Switch did not. Lt. Col. Corso drafted statements to be given to the United Nations by Dr. Charles Mayo and Henry Cabot Lodge. As Col. Corso testified: Dr. Charles Mayo gave the statement on bacteriological warfare, and Ambassador Lodge on the United Nations prisoners of war. And we found out that at the time the Chinese, under Russian tutelage, had a detailed, scientific process of Pavlovian type experiments which they were conducting on our prisoners.

We knew about this information, but we were hindered from sending agents to the North to find out more about this because this was handled mostly by OPC, which was a unit of the CIA.

Now, during my tour in Korea, I compiled the evidence, I was receiving this daily, that prisoners had not been returned from North Korea and had been sent, in fact, to the Soviet Union. The war was still going on at the time.

The information that I had was compiled, and I was amazed to hear that there was no evidence in the archives on this. There were actually hundreds of reports. The reports came from prisoner of war interrogation reports of North Koreans, prisoners of war, Chinese prisoners of war, and defectors, and some photographs that we took, our reconnaissance planes took.

These reports were compiled and kept in files, and I'd say offhand there must have been 300 or 400 of these reports easily in my file of knowledge from prisoners of war and so forth that our prisoners had been sent up through Manchuria to Man-chou-li (by train). There they were transported or changed. There they were changed because of the gauge and sent to the Soviet Union. I had very definite information on two train loads. . . from Chinese prisoners of war, North Korean prisoners of war, civilian defectors, and photographs. We had some photographs of the camps.

Lt. Col. Corso estimated that each of the two train loads of U.S. POWs contained about 450 prisoners, for a total of 900 POWs transported to the Soviet Union. He stated that he had some inconclusive information as to the possibility of a third, similar trainload. In all, Lt. Col. Corso said he had 200 to 300 reports about these 900 POWs or related information. Eventually, he was asked to brief President Eisenhower personally on the situation, in a five-minute meeting which took place in mid-1953, or possibly as late as 1954. This meeting took place while Lt. Col. Corso was serving on the staff of the National Security Council. As Lt. Col. Corso testified:

I had a call from my principal, C. D. Jackson, one day, who was special assistant to the President. He said, get over, we have to go see the President. Bring your prisoner of war report. My prisoner of war report that I handed him was one page. I walked in the office. The President was in the Oval Office, the three of us, and I saw him, and he said, I understand you have a report on prisoners of war going to the Soviet Union? I told him, yes, that's what I'm here for.

I compiled this report not only here but from information in Korea, which I said before, that up to 1,200 we suspect, but about 900 certainly did go there. Our information is solid, as solid as intelligence information can be, because that's the nature of intelligence.

I handed [President Eisenhower] the report, and he read it. And he had a very serious look on his face. . . This was not a pleasant meeting. It did not last long. . . He said, Colonel, he said, do you have any recommendations, because in the military, generally the writer of the report has to make a recommendation to his superior who then decides on what to do with it.

I said, yes. The nature of this report-- these men will never come back alive because they will get in the hands of the KGB who will use them for their purposes. Espionage, play-backs, or whatever. This is not uncommon in the intelligence business. Once they fall in their hands, there's little hope of them coming back.

And I told him, Mr. President, you are aware of the system of the KGB, how they use prisoners of war and defectors? And he said, yes, I am. He said, is your recommendation not to make it public? I said, my recommendation is not to make public the part--the KGB operation. It's difficult to understand at its best. It hasn't been revealed. The part on prisoners, that I don't know.

So, the President said, well, I accept your recommendation. . . he said, well, I agree, we cannot give it to the families. Then I said, Mr. President, though, may I send a copy of this report to the Department of Defense? He said, yes.

According to Lt. Col. Corso, the effort to locate and retrieve U.S. POWs held by the Communists during the Korean War were impeded by the U.S. policy of not making strident and confrontational statements directed at the Soviet Union, North Korea and China. Lt. Col. Corso testified that "The big policy was the policy of fear. Fear of general war. That was the policy that was stopping us." Lt. Col. Corso added that the families were not told because:

[Y]ou'd have to tell the families that these boys were going to be tried, used, exploited for NKVD operations which were espionage, sabotage, and take their identities. And that we felt would have been damaging to the families, but it's hard to explain, sir. . . They were going to be exploited in a very sinister way. As far as telling them they were alive, sir, I put in a speech at the United Nations that 1,800 prisoners of war had gone to the Soviet Union, had been transferred to the Soviet Union. Now, there was no mention that they were dead or not dead, but that was put in the statement and released, and he gave me permission to put that in.

According to Lt. Col. Corso, he is the only person alive who participated in the decision not to tell the families the information concerning U.S. POWs in the Soviet Union. The Committee has not been able to find any documentary corroboration of his information.

Testimony of Colonel Delk Simpson

The testimony of Col. Delk Simpson (USAF-Ret.), a former U.S. military attache in Hong Kong, also supported the possibility that large numbers of U.S. prisoners were transferred to Soviet territory during the Korean war period. Col. Simpson testified that he had received and passed on to U.S. Air Force Intelligence headquarters in 1954 an eyewitness account concerning the transportation of approximately 700 American prisoners from Man- chou-li, China into Siberia. According to Col. Simpson's source, a number of the prisoners were black soldiers.

Col. Simpson testified that he has worked since his retirement in 1961 to bring this issue to the attention of the government, including visits to offices in both the executive and legislative branch. Col. Simpson said that he had learned that DIA considered him to be "senile" and that the prisoners he had reported were French from the French-Indochinese War, being taken to Siberia for return to France.

As Col. Simpson testified:

It was not until six months ago that I came to understand the possibility of why I received such official inaction. At that time, I met Colonel Corso, and Colonel Corso told me that in 1953, he was the author of a policy while on the White House staff to abandon all prisoners being held by the Russians. He said the policy was approved by President Eisenhower. Senator, it is incomprehensible to me that anybody would make such a decision to send our boys to a sure death.

Col. Simpson testified that his original source was a Polish man trying to get to Australia, who was afraid the U.S. was going to try to stop him. Col. Simpson promised to keep his name and destination secret. He sent the information as a classified report to the Pentagon, and never received a response.

Testimony of Sgt. Steve E. Kiba

The case of Sgt. Steve E. Kiba demonstrates conclusively that, whether or not prisoners were transferred from North Korea to the former Soviet Union, at least some were transferred to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Sgt. Kiba was interned in China for 32 months as a POW during the Korean War. An Air Force pilot, Sgt. Kiba was transported to Red China about three days after his capture on January 12, 1953, and remained there until his release on August 4, 1955. Throughout his time as a POW in China, he experienced degrading and harsh conditions. As Sgt. Kiba testified:

They were sadistic and barbaric. . . threatened me with all kind of horrendous tortures, and they even did some of them. . . They told me I would never go home unless I cooperated. And they threatened to keep me for life. And they kept some of my friends for life. They're still there.

Sgt. Kiba testified that American POWs were abandoned after the 1953 cease-fire, and that he was one of them, but that others, unlike him, never returned. He stated that either he or others in his crew saw ten to fifteen caucasians whose fates remain undetermined. As he testified:

It is a known fact that we abandoned American servicemen after [World War II, Korea, and Vietnam] and let their families down. I know we abandoned some because I saw some of them.

President Harry Truman was the first President to leave Americans behind. Then President Eisenhower abandoned American POWs after the Korean War in North Korea, Red China and the Soviet Union. In a press conference on April 29, 1959, President Eisenhower acknowledged that not all American POW's were repatriated after the Korean War ceasefire.

According to Sgt. Kiba, the Communists he met while he was in captivity demonstrated to him that they were sadistic and needed no reason to keep Americans, because "a Communist is different." As he testified, "for almost 40 years, I've been trying to inform the American people and the news media of the heinous crime of enslaving the bodies and minds of our courageous fighting men by the godless communists." Mr. Kiba said that in the final analysis, he could understand why he was so badly treated by the Communists, but he could not understand why his own government had asked him to remain silent after his return about the others he had seen in China while he was a POW.

State Department Testimony on North Korea

Until recently, the Government of North Korea has provided little cooperation to the United States in accounting for missing U.S. servicemen despite its obligation to do so under the armistice agreement that ended the Korean War. As a result, no archival research in North Korea has been possible. A series of diplomatic initiatives over the past five years, however, give grounds for hope that progress may be possible in the future. As Charles Kartman, director of the Office of Korean Affairs, U.S. Department of State, told the Committee:

In 1988. . . we announced a modest policy initiative aimed at enhancing the prospects for resolving the problems of the Korean War, by drawing North Korea out of its isolation. As part of that process, we opened a diplomatic channel with the North Koreans throughout respective embassy political counsellors in Beijing. At our first meeting in 1988, and subsequently on many occasions in that channel, we told the North Koreans that in order to improve relations with us they should take steps in several areas, including Korean War POW/MIAs.

In 1990, on Memorial Day. . . North Korea returned five sets of remains to a Congressional delegation headed by Representative Sonny Montgomery. In June 1991, they handed over 11 more sets to Senator Smith, who had participated in arrangements for this action. Senator Smith used this occasion to reinforce our position on the importance of regularizing the process.

On both occasions, the North Koreans made it plain that they hoped to derive some political benefit from their actions. . .

In January of this year, Undersecretary of State Kanton discussed with a high-level North Korean delegation in New York the full range of issues, focused of course on our concerns regarding the North Korean nuclear program, but including the MIA issue. Then in April [1992], North Korean President Kim Il Sung, in an interview with the Washington Times, said that North Korea was prepared to resolve the MIA issue in a humanitarian manner. In May [1992], the North Koreans returned 30 sets of remains in Panmunjon directly to the United Nations Command. The North Koreans said explicitly at the time that they were willing to discuss formal arrangements to return further remains to the United Nations command. . .

We have asked the DPRK to give us any available information on POW's and MIA's. In reply, we have only been told that there is not a single POW in the DPRK. We have raised this issue with both Russia and China repeatedly this year, and will continue to do so with them and with North Korea. . . the best answers will come from a longer-term process, which will bring about not only the return of remains, but also the resolution by other means--archival research for example--of questions surrounding the fate of Korean War MIAs.

Testimony of Mr. Robert Dumas

On November 11, 1992, the Committee received testimony from Mr. Robert Dumas, whose brother, PFC Roger A. Dumas of Company C, 19th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, was captured northeast of Anju, North Korea on or about November 4, 1950. Mr. Dumas testified to his belief that a large number of POWs were retained by the Koreans and are still there, working on collective farms.

Furthermore, Mr. Dumas, who has had personal contact with senior North Korean officials at the United Nations for several years, including the Ambassadors, said that only a comprehensive approach, involving all outstanding issues, could bring results on the POW issue with the North Koreans.

Mr. Dumas testified that he met with the North Korean Ambassador in New York in July 1992 and the Ambassador said,

Bob, all you want is your brother home. That's all. And he said talk to the man in the White House, get somebody to sit down with us, and let's go over the whole thing, the whole category. Let's go over everything, the whole category.

Mr. Dumas then related for the Committee a meeting he attended in New York on December 9, 1987, with the Reverend Jesse Jackson and Ambassador Pak Del Yan of the DPRK. He said that Reverend Jackson opened the discussion with:

Mr. Ambassador, if you have live prisoners in North Korea right now, I will come to North Korea on Christmas Eve and bring some home alive. And in the springtime, if you have any remains, we will go back in the spring and exhume those with an organization of human rights people from our side and your side.

Mr. Dumas continued, "And the first thing the Ambassador said, 'yes, Reverend, that would be good for both our countries.'"

Mr. Dumas interpreted this discussion to be an admission by the North Korean Ambassador that his country continues to hold U.S. POWs. The Committee staff has requested an opportunity to discuss this meeting with Rev. Jackson, but such a discussion has not taken place.

Testimony of Serban Oprica, Former Rumanian Engineer

Mr. Dumas' belief that American POWs are laboring in North Korean collective farms was consistent with the testimony of Serban Oprica, a former Rumanian engineer now living in Hartford Connecticut. Mr. Oprica worked for the Romanian government in North Korea during 1979 and 1980, assisting in the construction of a television production factory in Pyongyang. Mr. Oprica testified that, in late October or early November, 1979, he saw a group of Caucasians whom he believed to be American POWs. The sighting occurred during a bus ride in the countryside. Mr. Oprica testified:

We see a land like a camp where vegetables, and my attention was to--because I saw a person with a European face, with blue eyes very close the bus. And I was very shocked. And everybody on the bus was shocked. And I was looking behind him (and) I saw 7 or 10 peoples with Caucasian face. And behind them, I saw more people working the camp. . . They were dressed with North Korean dress, like Chinese, but they worked in the camp and was dark color.

According to Mr. Oprica, the men were not guarded. In his deposition, he specified that he saw no less than five and as many as fifteen other Caucasians in the immediate vicinity of the bus and as many as 50 others in the distance. All wore the same gray drab clothes and were working in a farm field, without restraints.

Mr. Oprica testified that at another place in North Korea, at a museum, he and his wife saw parts of American soldiers in alcohol, which were used as a means of frightening people. These body parts included limbs, hands, and heads, and were displayed in the vicinity of American armament items, including uniforms and flags.

Mr. Oprica also remembered witnessing an altercation between a Rumanian and a North Korean while he was on an outing to the west coast port city of Nampo. Mr. Oprica remembers hearing the Rumanian angrily accuse the Koreans of holding American POWs from the Korean War. Mr. Oprica said that the Rumanians had spent a longer time in Korea than he had were certain that American POWs were still being held by the North Koreans.

Mr. Oprica was debriefed by U.S. Army intelligence in 1988 in behalf of the DIA, and by the FBI, but he believes that little or nothing was done with the information he provided.

U.S. POWs from World War II

RAND Project / Cole

The RAND research on World War II, conducted by Dr. Paul Cole, focused on the European theater of operations, looking into the question of how many Americans, "liberated" from German POW camps by the Soviets, were not repatriated.

RAND found that 76,854 Americans were estimated to be in German POW camps as of March 15, 1945, but that the total number of American POWs recovered from German POW camps was 91,252, nearly 14,000 more than expected. Moreover, Soviet forces liberated a substantial number of these POWs -- 28,662 according to U.S. records; but only 22,554 according to Soviet records, a difference which Dr. Cole attributed to poor Soviet record keeping.

In the years that followed, several dozen, and possibly as many as several hundred, inquiries were made by the United States government on behalf of U.S. MIAs, usually based on requests from family members. The Soviets responded by creating an American Missing Persons File at its National Archives, which included some of this correspondence, as well as files derived from Missing Air Crew reports and Enemy Evasion Aid reports, some of which covered crewmen who had been repatriated to the United States. As Dr. Cole found:

There is no question that many bomber crews survived after parachuting or crash landing on territory controlled by Soviet forces. Many of these crewmen were repatriated. U.S. and Soviet records suggest, however, that an undetermined number were not. The U.S. Embassy at Moscow's efforts to obtain information about American citizens held on the territory of the USSR were severely limited by the Soviet position that some American citizens were considered by Soviet authorities to be Rumanians, Hungarians, other eastern Europeans, or even citizens of the USSR. In these cases, the Soviet government always refused to give the U.S. Embassy even the slightest bit of information in response to inquiries concerning people the Soviet authorities considered to be non-U.S. citizens.

Dr. Cole found no evidence to support charges that thousands of American POWs liberated from Nazi German POW camps were never repatriated. Moreover, his research raises questions even about the relatively few individuals identified by the Russians as U.S. POWs who were never repatriated by the USSR. As Dr. Cole testified:

Some explanations of what happened to unrepatriated American POWs do not hold up well under scrutiny. In December 1991, the Senate Select Committee on MIA-POW Affairs visited Moscow. During this visit, Gen. Dimitri Volkogonov gave the U.S. delegation a list, containing the names of fourteen Americans who died [who] were alleged to have died in Soviet custody during World War II. There is no information concerning the sources used to compile this list. The list does not correspond to unaccounted-for POW records of the Adjutant General. There is no correlation between this list and the mandate of the Joint U.S.-Russian Commission on MIA-POWs either.

Dr. Cole then reviewed the efforts in the late 1940's and early 1950s, which by 1956 had resulted in the release from Soviet block captivity of nineteen American citizens. There was little subsequent activity in this area until December 5, 1991, when the U.S. submitted data to the Russian government "concerning certain individuals who could have been detained in the Soviet Union in the 1950's." Russian President Yeltsin later advised that "two of the people the U.S. side inquired about . . . were returned to U.S. authorities nearly 36 years ago." Another individual about whom the U.S. requested information had his remains recovered, identified, and buried at his family's request in the United States in 1957. There was no record with respect to the other individuals identified by the U.S.

On July 30, 1992, Gen. Dmitri Volkogonov, chairman of the Russian Delegation to the U.S.-Russian Commission on MIA-POWs, published an article in Izvestia listing the names of 39 American citizens who had been illegally detained by the Soviet government. According to Dr. Cole, however, none of the 39 was an American POW.

In summary, the initial phase of the Rand review, while incomplete and inconclusive, tends to discredit the idea that a substantial number of U.S. POWs were held by the Soviet Union following World War II and not repatriated.

In this regard, Dr. Cole took issue with the authors of Soldiers of Misfortune and Moscow Bound concerning the number of POWs the Red Army "liberated" from German POW camps and failed to repatriate. His conclusions:

The number of American POW's who were not repatriated from German POW camps in World War II appears to be less than 200. Assertions that tens of thousands of American POW's were abandoned are "inconsistent with the historical record."

U.S. and Soviet Archives suggest that fewer than 100 American POW's, perhaps 50 or fewer, were held on the territory of the U.S.S.R. after World War II.

An undetermined number of American air crews--not POWs-- were detained by the U.S.S.R. after making forced landings on territory it controlled. Most, if not all, of these crews were repatriated from the U.S.S.R. Some others may not have been repatriated from Soviet-occupied territory, but answering this question requires further research.

The U.S. government located the graves of hundreds of American servicemen on Soviet-controlled territory. These were not POWs; most were on the territory of Soviet- occupied Germany. Records show few of these remains were recovered from the territory of the U.S.S.R.

Sanders, Sauter, and Brown

John M.G. Brown and James D. Sanders, assisted by Mark A. Sauter, have conducted years of research in U.S. archives, searching for information relating to U.S. and allied POWs who fell into the hands of the Soviet Army as it pursued the rapidly retreating Wehrmacht across Eastern Europe in 1945. Thousands of soldiers were moved by rail, truck and foot eastward, not westward, and most ended their cross-country journey at the port of Odessa, on the Black sea, there to await transport by sea to their homelands. This much is not in dispute. What is in question is how many of these soldiers were not allowed to board ship, but were destined for the vast Gulag of the Russian-Siberian interior. Mr. Sanders and Mr. Brown estimate that between 20,000 and 23,500 were POWs of the Germans and became prisoners of the Soviets.

It is Mr. Brown's theory that Communist mistreatment of POWs--that is, retaining them as hostages for political purposes--can be traced to the behavior of the Bolsheviks. According to Mr. Brown, the Bolsheviks kept at least 60 American soldiers they captured during the Allied intervention of 1918-1919 at Archangel, and a few from the Siberian front. In his view, this was a prelude to the retention by the Soviets of thousands of soldiers taken from the German POW camps after World War II. Mr. Sanders furnished the Committee with a critique of Dr. Cole's research in a letter on November 15. Pertinent excerpts follow:

Let me start by stating that the World War II portion of Dr. Cole's report is hopelessly incompetent. Any investigator/analyst/historian researching a possible Government cover-up of historic proportions, would begin by testing the official Government history against the available data. Dr. Cole, however, failed to do this.

Instead, he relied exclusively on the RAMPs Report (Recovered Allied Military Personnel) to formulate his working hypothesis. Since the RAMPs report, completed in 1946, is the official Government version of the recovery of POWs, a competent historian would first demonstrate that the official history is correct. It is incorrect in virtually all critical areas.

Cole quotes the RAMPs disinformation line that only "76,854 were estimated to be in German POW camps." Here are the correct confirmed American POWs held be the Germans:

European Theater 76,474 Mediterranean Theater 20,171 North African Theater 1,667 total 98,312

Mr. Sanders went on to say that his archival research turned up "Battle Casualties of the Army," which support his figures. He also asserts that his research shows that the U.S. actually expected 106-107,000 POWs to be returned, which included between 8,000 and 9,000 men carried as MIA but not definitely known to be in captivity. On May 19, 1945, a document found by Mr. Sanders-- signed by Gen. Eisenhower--shows that 105,000 returnees were expected.

How many returned? Dr. Cole, using the RAMPs report, says 91,252. Mr. Sanders says that his research shows that the number did not exceed 85,000.

Mr. Sanders letter continued with its summary of his findings:

Between February and April 1945, 5,159 Americans should have been evacuated through Odessa. . . . Only 2,858 were recovered, however. At least 2,301 Americans disappeared. A June 1945, State Department study in the MIS-X files confirms this, stating that 5,200 Americans should have come out through Odessa.

On May 19,1945, Eisenhower informed General George C. Marshall, stating that an estimated 25,000 Americans were still held by the Red Army. It should be noted that this message was sent during the height of the hostage negotiations that were in progress in Halle, Germany. Only 4,165 Americans returned from Soviet control after that date. . . . We lost 2,500 out of Poland and the Ukraine between February and March 1945, and 21,000 along the western front during May 1945, for a total of 23,500.

Cold War Incidents

Joint Staff Report on Cold War POWs

Early in 1992, President Yeltsin said publicly that some American airmen lost during the Cold War period were captured and held prisoner in the Soviet Union. In response, the Joint Staff for POW/MIA matters was tasked to collect all the available information on Cold War losses. Working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the CIA, the DIA, the NSA, and the State Department, the Joint Staff reviewed U.S. Government files for communications between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea concerning the issue. In addition, the Joint Staff worked with service casualty officers at the various services to review what families were told and what information they knew. In all, the Joint Staff found 133 men who were missing or captured by the Soviet bloc during the Cold War. As Captain John P. Gay, director of the Asia/Pacific Division of the J-5, Joint Staff testified:

We defined the parameters of what we wanted to look at, and we opted for 1946 all the way through 1991. . . We collected all the data, generating a computer-based data report. We submitted it to the Secretary of Defense on the 25th of June. We made one minor update to that report since that time. To the best of my knowledge, prior to us collating all this data, there was no Government-wide effort to include all the Cold War data into a single report, from 1946 through 1991. I'm convinced that we made as comprehensive and as complete a look as we possibly could have. . .

In my examination of all the material associated with Cold War losses, I see, saw nothing that would support that any of the 133 missing or captured were held in the Soviet Union, China, or Korea. However, as many of you know, because of the circumstances surrounding some of these incidents, this possibility--and I stress that, possibility--can certainly not be ruled out, because of the circumstances surrounding the crashes.

In summary, the Joint Staff found no evidence that any previously unacknowledged Americans had been captured and imprisoned during the Cold War period by the Soviet Union, China or Korea, but that this possibility could not be ruled out because of the nature and circumstances of some of the incidents involved.

Defense Department View

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Al Ptak testified that U.S. investigative efforts have focused on 10 incidents between 1950 and 1965 in which shootdowns took place, involving 90 crew members who remain unaccounted for:

Despite the lack of conclusive evidence, we do not rule out the possibility that members of these crews may have survived the loss incident long enough to be rescued by Soviet units. U.S. debriefs from the 1950's provide second-hand evidence that individuals matching the descriptions of members of a few of these crews were sighted in Soviet prisons; however, we lack conclusive evidence of such prisoners.

The U.S. has provided the Russians with highly specific data, including the names of the service members involved, the dates of their flights, their last known locations, and their aircraft types, for each of the ten incidents. To date, little information has been received from the Russians in response, despite continuing commitments of cooperation. Beginning in September, 1992, representatives of the Russian Border Guards were included in discussions with the U.S. members of the Commission, and the Commission is continuing to seek information from the archives maintained by them.

Joint Commission Visit to Ukraine

In December, 1992, the Joint Commission visited Kiev, Ukraine. During a meeting with Ukrainian officials, the U.S. side turned over lists of all known citizens of the former Soviet Union captured in Afghanistan and of all known former Soviet citizens who had been resettled in the United States. Ambassador Toon also held a press conference asking Ukrainians to come forward with information concerning U.S. POWs and MIAs. Ukrainian officials stated their willingness to investigate their records and archives and to share any information they find with the United States.

During the visit, an official of the DIA pressed the Ukrainians concerning ten incidents in the Cold War in which Americans were lost and did not return. One of the incidents occurred in 1965, at a location that would be within the Ukrainian national territory. Ukrainian officials uniformly stated that all records had been taken to Moscow on the orders of Soviet officials of the central government. Nevertheless, they promised to research whatever files and archives remained in the Ukraine and to pass on the results.

RAND Project / Cole Testimony

Dr. Cole had this to say about Cold War losses:

During the early period of the Cold War, the U.S. Government in the 1950's systematically collected live sighting reports of American citizens, military and civilian, in Soviet bloc control. This information provided the basis for dozens of U.S. requests for information and protests to the Soviet Government. Between 1945 and 1959, U.S. government protests resulted in the repatriation of at least nine American citizens held in the Soviet Union.

Between 1945 and 1969, at least 23 U.S. military aircraft were shot down by Soviet forces. On at least three occasions, live crew members were repatriated. During the 1950s, the U.S. government believed that some crew members were imprisoned by the Soviet Union and made many protests to the Soviets on their behalf.

Other protests were made on the behalf of American civilians not permitted to leave the Soviet bloc.

The U.S. also kept detailed records on the whereabouts of American defectors in the Soviet bloc, the majority of whom lived in East Germany or Czechoslovakia. Few lived in the Soviet Union, and some U.S. defectors were imprisoned by the Soviets as suspected spies.

Family Members and Task Force Russia

TFR and some members of families who have lost servicemen in Cold War situations take a more positive view on the possibility of survivors. One of the most intriguing and convincing cases that can be made showing Soviet duplicity in retaining members of U.S. air-crews shot down by Soviet fighters during the Cold War involves the USAF RB-50, tail number 47-145A, which was attacked by two MIG- 15s on July 29,1953, over the Sea of Japan. The sons of one of the crew, 1st Lt. Warren Sanderson, have made an intensive search for the truth regarding possible survivors. One of the sons, Bruce W. Sanderson, of Fargo, North Dakota, testified before the Committee.

Bruce Sanderson has enjoyed the full support of and considerable assistance from TFR, including personal attention from Gen. Loeffke and Col. Herrington in his research and visit to Russia, where he participated in interviews with Russian sources and was given access to Russian archives. He has been partially successful in obtaining U.S. Government records involving the case, but the search for relevant documents is incomplete.

Facts that make this case particularly important are:

. The Soviets admitted that they shot the aircraft down.

. Survivors, beyond the sole individual who was rescued by a USN ship, were seen in the water by search and rescue aircraft.

. North Korean patrol boats were seen in the area, moving to and away from the crash-site.

. The co-pilot was rescued 22 hours after the crash, 17 miles from the coast.

Mr. Bruce Sanderson provided the Committee with a possible insight into what might have happened to his father and to other American servicemen who flew missions to collect intelligence along the Soviet frontiers during the Cold War. He told the Committee that he located a Russian citizen who was personally involved in the interrogation of American servicemen in the U.S.S.R. from 1950 to 1954. According to Mr. Sanderson, this is what he was told:

He also reaffirmed the information from the first meeting that all U.S. personnel under Soviet control were photographed, finger-printed, and given Russian names, that these men were then moved frequently from camp to camp. It was common practice to create a false death certificate or record when a prisoner was moved. . .

Jane Reynolds Howard presented testimony concerning her search for the facts concerning her husband's loss over the Baltic Sea. Robert D. Reynolds (USN Class of '45; graduated in June 1944 because of the war) was in a Navy PB4Y2 "Privateer" shot down by four Soviet MIGs on April 8, 1950. U.S. searches found no survivors and all 10 of the crew were presumed dead.

Mrs. Howard testified that she had originally accepted the Navy's account of her husband's death. But 16 months ago, she finally learned, through an article in the Los Angeles Times, that her husband's true mission was not "training," as the Navy had told her at the time. This led her to consider the possibility that Robert Reynolds had been captured and to begin a search for answers.

She traveled to Russia where she was assisted by the TFR during a 10-week visit. There, she conducted an intensive search, including the use of media and photos of her husband as he would appear at age 70. She does not know if her husband survives, but she is absolutely convinced that he was captured by the Soviets.

A third family-member, Mr. Gregg Skavinski of Virginia, testified about the case of his uncle, MSgt William R. Homer, who was aboard a USAF RB-29 when it disappeared over the Sea of Japan on June 13, 1952. The Air Force recorded the loss as an "accident, a non- battle casualty." But Mr. Skavinski testified to information that two radar blips were seen approaching the plane just before it disappeared; that a Russian radio transmission discussed the rescue of a member of the crew; that an empty six-man life raft, that might have been from the RB-29, was sighted; and that Soviets reportedly interrogated an American aviator in Manchuria about Major Sam Bush, the commander of the RB-29. What was the Soviet interest in Major Bush, Mr. Skavinski speculated, if he was at the bottom of the Sea of Japan?

In summary, the book is not closed on the missing from the Cold War. There can be little doubt that much more information lies in the archives and in the recollections of the ex-Soviets who participated in these events. TFR faces a formidable challenge in ferreting out the truth.

The Vietnam War

The Committee examined reports and allegations that U.S. prisoners were interrogated by Soviet military and intelligence officials during the war in Vietnam and also that some U.S. POWs may have been transferred to the Soviet Union during that conflict.

Defense Department Testimony

Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Al Ptak testified concerning efforts by the Commission to determine whether there is evidence that U.S. prisoners were transferred to the Soviet Union during the Vietnam war:

Despite having vigorously examined every lead, to date we have no conclusive evidence supporting claims that U.S. POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union. It is also important to note that some of these key individuals, including the former Soviet Ambassador to Laos, have refused to be interviewed by the Commission.

To date, the Commission has found no documents indicating that any U.S. POWs from the Vietnam War were interned in the Soviet Union, or that Soviet personnel participated in interrogations of U.S. POWS during the Vietnam War.

Assessment of Committee Investigator Committee investigator Al Graham testified that:

As with the Korean War, the Russians are very sensitive to their possible role in the Vietnamese War. Although they claim that they did not take [part] in any interrogations in Vietnam and that no U.S. POWs were transferred from Vietnam to the Soviet Union, there is at least some circumstantial evidence that such interrogations did take place and that at least a few U.S. POWs may have been transferred from Vietnam to the Soviet Union.

If so, there is a good chance that some of them could still be alive. Again, there are possibly several former U.S. POWs who might have cooperated with the Soviets and who might not wish to be found. In such cases, it would probably be worthwhile for representations to be made to the Russian government at the highest level that such individuals would not be persecuted by the U.S. and that on humanitarian grounds, it would be quite useful to be able to resolve these cases.

Testimony of Bui Tin

During its first set of hearings, in November, 1991, the Committee received testimony from Bui Tin, former Senior Colonel in the Vietnamese People's Army. During the latter part of the Vietnam War, Col. Bui Tin had been the official spokesman for the North Vietnamese Army. According to the Colonel:

At that time, I had the right to read all the documents and the secret telegrams from the politburo on this (POW) issue. In addition, I had special authorization from the General Vo Nguyen Giap, then defense minister to go to any camps, to meet with any officers, and to interview any POWs and read their files.

Col. Bui Tin testified that he believed some U.S. prisoners were interrogated in Vietnam by Soviet and Cuban military intelligence officers and that the purpose of this questioning was to obtain information about their knowledge of advanced aircraft technology. He said he never heard that any U.S. POWS were transferred to the Soviet Union.

Other Reports

A number of those who have written books about POW/MIA-related issues, including John M.G. Brown, Thomas Ashworth, Mark Sauter, James Sanders, and Monika Jensen-Stevenson have asserted or speculated that some Americans captured during the Vietnam War were transferred to the Soviet Union. For many, the principal source for this allegation has been Mr. Jerry Mooney, a retired USAF Msgt who served a long career in communications intelligence.

In addition to the testimony of Mr. Mooney, the Committee received several reports that Americans were transferred to the Soviet Union during this period:

. Trung Hieu, a North Vietnamese who has sought political asylum in the United States, was interviewed by Committee staff in June 1992. In an interview, Hieu said that the entire crew of a downed B-52 was turned over to the Soviet Union in 1972; but he backed away from his assertions during his sworn deposition. (Mr. Hieu, by virtue of his occupation as a photographer for the Ministry of Culture, may have had access to reports of this kind, but it is doubtful that he would have had personal knowledge.)

. Terrell "Terry" A. Minarcin was also in communications intelligence in the Air Force. Mr. Minarcin told the Committee that he tracked "special flights" of Soviet aircraft in 1977 that carried American POWs to the Soviet Union.

. Jan Senja, a retired Maj. Gen. in the Czechoslovakian Army, has testified in a deposition and stated in interviews that American POWs were transported to the Soviet Union, transiting Prague. He said he had personal knowledge of the transfer of up to 90 such POWs through Prague. Gen. Senja defected from a high-level position in the Ministry of Defense--where he would have had access to such information--in 1968, and is now an employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The Committee found no information to corroborate the reports of Trung Hieu or Mr. Minarcin.

In December, 1992, during a visit by the Joint Commission to Prague, Ambassador Toon asked Czech officials whether they had heard of the allegations made by Jan Sejna. None of the officials denounced or discredited Sejna. All promised to research their archives, but referred the U.S. delegation to the Ministry of Interior for answers. The Federal Minister of the Interior, Mr. Petr Cermak said that the allegations must be taken seriously, that the communists were capable of anything, and that his Ministry would turn over to the U.S. Government everything it found concerning Czechoslovakia's involvement in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Mooney Testimony

Considering the fact that Jerry Mooney was the principal source cited by those who assert that American POWs were "Moscow Bound," his testimony was remarkably equivocal on the subject. He testified and presented the Committee with a volume of affidavits on January 22, 1992. The most definitive part of his testimony, as it relates specifically to American POWs going to the USSR, was elicited through questioning by Sen. McCain:

Senator McCain: . . . Mr. Mooney, I believe you said on a television program that there were several movements of American POWs to the Soviet Union, is that correct?

Mr. Mooney: I have never said that sir. What I have said is that there was a tentacle Moscow-bound. The men were collected. There was a connection by the "friends." We knew where they were transported within North Vietnam. I have no knowledge of Laos, and we knew where they went. We knew where the "friends'" primary prison camp was and we knew how they were transported from North Vietnam over to Sam Neua, Laos, which we designated as Tentacle MB. I never saw an American prisoner being transported out of Southeast Asia and I have never said that. . .

Senator McCain: My question is, do you have information or do you believe that American POWs were taken to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Mooney: I have no direct information, but considering the Tentacle Moscow-bound nature of Sam Neua, I would consider it a probability and, as I have said many times, they would go only if they were broken.

Senator McCain: So you believe that some Americans were taken to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Mooney: Under those conditions, sir.

Senator McCain: I am not sure I understand your answer.

Mr. Mooney: Well, sir, let me--

Senator McCain: You either believe that some were taken to the Soviet Union or you do not believe some were taken to the Soviet Union, Mr. Mooney. I think it's a pretty straightforward question. Mr. Mooney then explained why he believed that flights of IL-14s carried American POWs from a prison camp northwest of Vinh to Sam Neua. He said the Soviets had no need for POW labor, but "were after minds." The flights to Sam Neua were unusual in the secrecy with which they were conducted; there was no air-to-ground communications. "But," Mr. Mooney said, "we did not know if they went on beyond Sam Neua. We did not know. I have no knowledge of that."

Further discussion of Mr. Mooney's testimony and the Committee's investigation concerning it may be found in the "Intelligence" chapter of this report.