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Activities in Moscow

Joint U.S.-Russia Commission

U.S. Delegation to the Commission

Malcolm Toon, the Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1976 to 1979, is chairman of the U.S. delegations. The other members of the American delegation are:

KERRY, John (Senator, D-Mass); SMITH, Robert (Senator, R-N.H.); MILLER, John (Congressman,R-Wash); PETERSON, Pete (Congressman,D-Fl.); KAUZLARICH, Richard (Department of State); QUINN, Kenneth (Department of State); PTAK, Al, (Department of Defense); CLIFT, Dennis (Department of Defense); PETERSON, Trudy (National Archives;Ad Hoc mbr.); ROSS, Edward (Department of Defense,Exec.Sec).

Russian Delegation to the Commission

Col. General Dmitri Volkogonov, is chairman of the Russian delegation. Dr. Vladimir Kozlov, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Archives, has served as the Deputy Chairman. Other members of the Russian delegation are:

AMBARTSUMOV, Yevgeniy (Act.Chm. Int'l Affairs Comm,SS) ARZHANNIKOV, Nikolay Mikhaylovich (DC,Human Rights,SS) VENKOV, Igor Nikolayevich (Col.Dir.Hist.& Mem.Ctr. GS) KALININ, Yuriy Ivanovich (Col.Min.of Internal Affairs) KOVALEV, Sergey Adamovich (Chm.Human Rights Comm, SS) KRAYUSHKIN, Anatoliy Afanasyevich (BG,Min.of Security) LEZHIKOV, Gennadiy Lukyanovich (Col.Dir.MVD Info.Ctr.) MAZUROV, Vyacheslav Petrovich (Col.Foreign Intel Serv) MIRONOV, Vladimir Fedorovich (Consultant,Min of Jus.) PODRAZHANETS, Iosif Nikolayevich (Acting Chief,No.Amer DirMFA)

Plenary Meetings

The Joint Commission's inaugural meeting was held in Moscow from March 26-28.

This was followed by a "Working Group" delegation led by Mr. Ed Ross which met in Moscow from May 27th to 29th. At this session, Gen. Volkogonov gave the American side free rein to contact and interview as they saw fit. This resulted in about a dozen interviews with former colonels and generals who had served in Vietnam. At this time, Gen. Volkogonov provided the American side with 21 documents which primarily dealt with World War II and the Cold War periods.

A full Joint Committee meeting was held between September 21-24 with Ambassador Toon and Gen. Volkogonov in attendance. At that time, Gen. Volkogonov explained President Yeltsin's statement before the U.S. Congress on the possibility of live Americans in Russia as being based on the revelation of Mr. Hamilton in a Soviet psychiatric hospital. Gen. Volkogonov later admitted that the David Markin story also played a role. During this Joint meeting, ten archival directors gave their reports. They all claimed not to have found any information indicating U.S. soldiers were sent to the USSR from Korea or Vietnam or that Soviets took part in interrogating American POWs from these wars. When it was pointed out that oral interviews were not consistent with President Yeltsin's statements, Gen. Volkogonov pledged to continue the interviews of former Soviet military personnel with Vietnam and Korean experience. Gen. Volkogonov also admitted at this time that he had not been through the GRU or KGB archives.

December 1992 Meeting

During the Joint Commission's Plenary session in December, Gen. Volkogonov, stated three Russian positions:

No Americans are detained against their will in Russia and that is believed to be the case throughout the former Soviet Union;

The Russian side has established the fate of over 23,000 U.S. personnel held after World War II and considers this issue now closed;

The Russian side considers the remaining work of the Commission to be the resolution of questions concerning the Cold War era.

The Russian side of the Commission provided a number of documents to the U.S. side, including a list of cases of persons who had been in Russia but were later returned; a document listing four POW camps in Korea during the war and the number of persons held in each; a list of 109 Americans who did not return from the Korean War but who Russian research indicated were not in Russia; and a document containing data on the Cold War incidents.

Gen. Volkogonov stated categorically that there has never been a KGB General named Gregoriyev. Thus, any report attributed to this man is false. Volkogonov reviewed the many files that had been researched in response to U.S. requests, including more than 40,000 files of the Ministry of Public Health. None of these investigations has produced information that U.S. persons were held in Russia.

Ambassador Toon agreed that the World War II issue could be considered finished, although not all U.S. members of the Commission agreed. For example, the Commissioner from the National Archives raised several outstanding issues from World War II, which the Russians have not satisfactorily addressed.

After a U.S. Commissioner referred to "strong evidence" that American POWs had been taken to the Soviet Union during the Korean War, the Russian side said they found no evidence in their archival research that this had taken place.

In working group interviews, two retired Russian Colonels, veterans of the Korean War, indicated that it was plausible that a limited number of American specialists had been taken from Korea to Russia in connection with efforts to defeat radars used by U.S. F-86 Sabre Jets during the war. They did not, however, state categorically that U.S. personnel had been taken to Russia. One retired Colonel indicated that Russian archives still hold all the answers to U.S. questions.

Gen. Volkogonov told the U.S. Commissioners that answers to POW issues connected with the Korean War would be found in the War Museum in Korea, which he had visited six years earlier, and in China. He also stated that political turbulence in Russia was overtaking the work of the Commission and that there continued to be opposition within the Russian Government to its work. He restated President Yeltsin's support for the Committee, however, and proposed another meeting in the spring of 1993. The two agenda items he raised are the Cold War incidents and investigation of remains recently found on Sakhalin Island. He proposed that the Joint Commission publish a booklet on its work and on its findings, with supporting documentation.

Task Force Russia

Task Force Russia (TFR) was formed on June 29, 1992. Its basic mission has been to field a Task Force capable of collecting, analyzing and using information provided from Russian archives and citizens to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American POW/MIA personnel. The Task Force has a complement of 40 people based in Moscow and Washington, D.C.

Personnel. Col. Ed Pusey was named the first chief of TFR's Moscow office on September 1, 1992. He presently supervises a staff of 8- 10 people including a Deputy, an historian, an archivist, three field interviewers, an interpreter, an administrative NCO, an administrative clerk and a secretary. The Senate Select Committee representative also works out of the TFR Moscow Office which is presently located on the 5th floor of the Old Embassy Building.

Mission. The principal mission of the TFR Moscow Office staff is to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American POW/MIA personnel in Russia through the collection and analysis of information provided by and obtained from Russian archives and citizens.

Objectives.

. Organize an effective research, interview and analytical team in Moscow;

. Develop a prioritized research-interview plan supporting TFR's requirements and priorities;

. Continue archival research and personal interviews in full cooperation with the Russian side of the Joint U.S.-Russian Commission on POW/MIA;

. Satisfy Russian concerns, particularly those of the military and security services pertaining to the mission and personnel makeup of TFR;

. Assist Russian counterparts, whenever possible, in overcoming shortages in personnel, funding, equipment, and information (when lacking) related to mission accomplishments;

. Reduce perceived barriers between General Volkogonov's commission and the MOD, General Staff, GRU, KGB and other governmental entities pursuant to TFR's requirements;

. Obtain Russian agency acquiescence in TFR's mission;

. Maintain and improve upon the positive development of the US- Russian relationship in POW/MIA affairs as well as for the long term with emphasis on the Russian military;

. Satisfy the priorities up and down both U.S. and Russian "chain of command;"

. Develop and maintain cooperative work relationship with AmEmb and DAO Moscow;

. Provide respectable work environment and personal care for TFR's Moscow Office personnel.

Russian Joint Office. The United States requested that a physical joint office be established for the purpose of conducting interviews. The proposal was formally raised at the Joint Commission meeting on May 28th. On June 8th, Gen. Volkogonov announced that the POW/MIA Team consisting of Al Graham, Col William Saxe, and Mr. James Connell, would be permitted to conduct interviews at the Joint Office which was to be located at Ilyinka, 12, near Staraya Ploshchad [Old Square] the former headquarters of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Joint Interview Program in Russia

Background. Committee investigator Al Graham was posted to Moscow in May, 1992 to represent the Senate Select Committee and work under the aegis of the Joint Commission on POW/MIA affairs. One of his principal tasks while in Russia was, in conjunction with TFR- Moscow team members, to arrange for and conduct interviews with Russian officials, Russian citizens and retired officers who may have served in Southeast Asia during the Korean and Vietnamese Wars and therefore might be knowledgeable about possible U.S. POW/MIAs. Often, as a consequence of these interviews, other leads were developed.

The majority of interviews have been conducted at Ilyinka 12, the former headquarters of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Committee investigator found that some interviewees were intimidated by this location and somewhat reluctant to reveal all they knew, and many believed the room and telephone to be under surveillance by Russian authorities. Since mid-to-late October 1992, some interviews were held elsewhere to respond to these problems.

Initial interviews were scheduled in early June. Interviewees, at that time, were drawn from the Soviet Vietnamese Veterans Association and a few parliamentarians. Others later learned of and responded to the inquiry as a result of media appeals on Kiev and Moscow TV, and Ambassador Toon and Gen. Volkogonov's TV broadcast on June 28, 1992. Advertisements were also placed in a number of newspapers. Other interviewees were developed from citizens writing, calling or walking in either the American Embassy or the Joint Office at Ilyinka 12.

The interview program has been the major source of forward progress. Russian authorities have provided the Committee with a substantial number of archival documents, mostly concerning World War II. However, this archival effort has yielded very little to date that is verifiable on American POWs during World War II and virtually nothing new about Korea, Vietnam and the Cold War.

By contrast, the interview results moved the Russians to admit that they were involved in interrogating American POWs in Korea and Vietnam. Moreover, although the Committee has no direct evidence to prove it, there appears to be a strong possibility that at least a handful of U.S. POWs, possibly more, were transferred to Soviet territory during the Korean War.

Based on the Committee's experiences with the Russians to date, the investigators believe the Russian side will likely stick to its current line until the body of evidence gathered through a vigorous interview program forces the government and security services to reevaluate their position.

Interviews with Russian Officials. These included interviews with Russian active-duty servicemen, GULAG officials, Security service personnel, doctors, archivists, historians, linguists, and parliamentarians.

Interviews with Russian Citizens. These consist primarily of interviews with retired military officers, foreign service officers and correspondents who served in Southeast Asia, as well as with former prisoners who served in the GULAG and ordinary citizens who had knowledge of possible Americans on Russian territory.

Retired Military Officers: The first interviews were conducted by Committee staff investigator Bob Taylor during his trip to Moscow on February 17th, 1992 with Senators Kerry and Smith and his subsequent visit on March 26-27, 1992 during the Joint Commission meetings. On those occasions, he succeeded in interviewing mostly retired senior Soviet officers who had served in Vietnam. The story that emerges from these interviews was that Soviet soldiers were forbidden to have any contact with American POWs, were not armed and did not take part in interrogations of American prisoners. However, this testimony was contradicted by one former colonel who said that the non-contact rule was not strictly practiced and others who admitted that they knew of a Soviet officer sitting behind a screen during an interrogation of an American. These sources added that questions to ask POWs were passed to the Vietnamese from higher Soviet commands. The Committee was also told that there was a Soviet Analytical Team in Hanoi which exploited the information learned from the interrogations.

Col. Gen. Vladimir Abramov, former Commander of the Soviet force in Vietnam, told the Committee in March that the Vietnamese provided him with a report on every American pilot captured. He said, however, that his office kept no files or records on the individual POWs. This information, however, may have been forwarded to Moscow, he thought.

During a second interview with Gen. Abramov on June 1, 1992, the General denied having told investigators during the earlier meeting that he had received a report on every American pilot captured in Vietnam. He also denied saying that a high-placed Vietnamese friend told him at a May 1975 reception in Vietnam that there were still American servicemen being held in Vietnam as that time.

Perhaps the clearest case in which Russian testimony changed during the course of the investigation came during a re-interview with Col. (ret) Gavriil Korotkov, who was stationed in Khabarovsk from 1950-54 and reported directly to the Commander of the Far East Military District. During the first interview with him, conducted on August 19th, 1992, he told five Joint Commission representatives that Soviet military specialists had been given approval to interrogate American servicemen in Korea and that some of the senior, more experienced Americans as well as those with specific specialties were selected for transfer to the USSR for further interrogation. He asserted that the Soviet Naval Base at Posyet served as the transit point for the movement of Americans North [by rail or plane] to Khabarovsk. Col. Korotkov further maintained that the number of Americans processed through Khabarovsk was in the hundreds and that they were kept under KGB control during and after the interrogations.

He claimed not to know their fate after the interrogations. Col. Korotkov said he personally interrogated two American POWs on Russian soil. One was a Lt. Col. Black. Efforts were made, according to Col. Korotkov, to recruit and gain cooperation of Americans. He stated that interrogation reports were sent to the Far East Military District Headquarters, the 7th Directorate of the Main Political Directorate and the GRU. He further maintained that Col. Gen. Shtykov, the Soviet Ambassador to North Korea at the time, prepared reports for Stalin's eyes only.

In a follow-up interview on September 29th, 1992, Col. Korotkov modified his previous statements. He now denied that American Korean War POWs were ever interrogated by Soviets in Khabarovsk. He categorically denied ever interrogating an American POW named Black but did admit to interrogating two American POWs in North Korea. He also asserted that there were between 10 and 25 Soviet interrogators involved in this process, indicating that a large number of American POWs may have been interrogated during the Korean War. Although not completely ruling out the fact that these interrogations may have taken place on Russian soil, he now maintained that the interrogation center existed for at least 18 months and was located at a non-demarcated juncture along the North Korean, Chinese and Soviet borders. He also declared that a 150 question questionnaire used to interrogate American Korean-war POWs was prepared in Khabarovsk. Col. Korotkov added that similar type questionnaires were used to interrogate American POWs during Vietnam. A possible explanation for the modifications in Col. Korotkov's statements is that he received a call the night before the interview from an official of the Foreign Intelligence Service (formerly the KGB).

On December 16, 1992, Col. Korotkov testified at a meeting of the Joint Commission that approximately 100 U.S. POWs were interrogated by Soviets during the Korean war era and that possibly "tens" of these were taken by the special forces to the Soviet Union. Col. Korotkov said that the Soviets tried "to get first-hand information from them and then to turn them."

According to Col. Korotkov, the Soviets employed fear, pressure and appeals to material interests in their effort to "turn" prisoners. He also said that it was common for the American prisoners to change their names and that it is likely some died in the Soviet Union under names different than their own.

Col. Korotkov characterized the Korean-era U.S. POWs with whom he came in contact as "great patriots" and said:

They were assured, cocky, convinced that someone would come and get them. Among the (Soviet) specialists, we discussed how difficult it was to work with the Americans. The tone of our conversation was that American were self-assured, they never gave up hope.

Additional testimony on these subjects was received from a number of other retired Soviet officers:

. Col. Aleksandr Semyonovich Orlov (Ret.), who was brought forward on the initiative of the Russian side of the Joint Commission. Col. Orlov said he had no knowledge of American POWs having been taken to the USSR. He did say, however, that he had received special MVD[KGB] permission to interview a certain LTC Black in Pyongyang in July, 1951 primarily for propaganda purposes. Col. Orlov acknowledged that questionnaires were routinely used in obtaining information from American POWs in Korea but that the interrogations were principally carried out by the North Koreans.

. Col. (ret.) Viktor Aleksandrovich Bushuyev, former intelligence analyst in North Korea with the 64th Air Defense Corps, told investigators that the Soviets had access to the interrogations of hundreds of American pilots. He claimed not to know if the Soviet officials had taken part in the actual interrogations.

. Col. (ret.) Georgiy Kuzmich Plotnikov, assistant Soviet military advisor to North Korea for 7 years, testified that a high-ranking North Korean officer told him in 1953 that some American POWs were sent to the Soviet Union. Moreover, he asserts that he personally interrogated a captured American captain from the 24th Infantry Regiment at a small POW camp on the Yalu River in 1952. Col. Plotnikov said that he conducted the interrogation while dressed in a North Korean major's uniform.

. Col. (ret.) Valeriy Ivanovich Ukolov, said in an interview that he witnessed an American pilot being captured in the Russian town of Port Arthur in the summer of 1952.

. Col. (ret.) Leonid Ivanovich Ambrosov, Chief of Staff of an anti-aircraft battalion in Vietnam from September 1965 to August 1966, stated that he had no knowledge of Russian participation in the questioning of American prisoners. He did say that the Russians may have provided some questions to the North Vietnamese to be asked of captured Americans. He does not know what happened to the resulting interrogation reports.

Walk-ins: A number of individuals have come voluntarily to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Information provided by these individuals have included an account of an alleged American POW, David Markin, whose case is discussed later in this report. Other information has been provided by naturalized American citizens and by Russian citizens who had previously spent time in the GULAG. In addition, three Vietnamese nationals living in Moscow handed over dog tags, ID cards, photographs, bone fragments and body parts of alleged Americans. Two of the three did this out of humanitarian concern, while the third claimed to know where the remains of at least 20 Americans were located in Vietnam and asked $75,000 for each set of remains. All of this material was turned over to American experts for verification and analysis.

Write-ins: Since June, 1992, approximately two dozen letters or telegrams have been received from citizens of the former Soviet Union. Many of the writers claim to have knowledge about Americans in Soviet prison camps or psychiatric hospitals. Others claim to have information about grave sites where Americans are allegedly buried. The writers are being contacted by members of the Commission for the purpose of obtaining additional data. Several have asked for guarantees or assurances from the highest authorities against recriminations before they speak with the Committee.

Recently, the flow of letters to the Commission has slowed to a trickle. This may be because publicity on the POW/MIA issue has died down or that all letters sent to the Joint Commission on American POW/MIAs are now initially screened by the Office of the President for Letters and Appointments.

Call-ins: Most of the call-ins received so far resulted from television programs on which Ambassador Toon, Gen. Volkogonov, and Committee representatives appeared. After the Toon-Volkogonov appearance on June 28, 1992, six people called the Ilyinka-12 "Hot Line." Likewise, several people called this number after Ambassador Toon's press conference in Khabarovsk on September 25, 1992. Committee representative Graham, TFR Moscow officer director Pusey and other POW/MIA team members have frequently appeared on TV in Moscow and other cities throughout the former Soviet Union asking those with information to call Ilyinka 12 or the Embassy. Newspaper advertisements have also resulted in call-ins with information.

Summary of Requests to the Russians

Correspondence Files

Correspondence has been sent to the Russian side of the Joint Commission since early September 1992. These letters serve two general purposes. The first is to provide the Russian side with specific data from the U.S. side on individual servicemen or the circumstances surrounding Cold War incidents. The second is to request meetings, interviews with particular people or types of people, and access to archives. To date, requests for interviews with specific individuals have met with little or no success.

Archival Research

Structure of Russian Archives. The Archives in the former Soviet Union and Russia are not under the same kind of unified control that we have at the Federal level in the United States. Archives of the Soviet government could be found in a large number of archival institutions, and many of the main ministries kept their archives indefinitely in their own facilities and under separate departmental control.

The Soviet Union did have an archival agency which was supposed to have administrative control over archival institutions throughout the USSR. This agency was called the Main Archival Directorate or "Glavarkhiv." Even this body, however, did not secure control over the archives of such major ministries as the KGB, Foreign Affairs and Defense. After the August 1991 coup, President Yeltsin was quick to see the importance of securing the archival records and removed the leadership of "Glavarkhiv." In its place, he established the Committee of Archival Affairs of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, called "Roskomarkhiv," with control over various archival institutions, including the older bodies of imperial and pre-revolutionary archives. Some ministries, however, have remained outside its ambit and others have been slow to transfer records.

Visits and Trips to Archives. The U.S. members of the Joint Commission have made a series of visits to Russian archives to enable staff to better understand the structure of the archival system and to appraise the prospects for finding material relevant to the POW/MIA search.

It has become apparent to the American team that the archival institutions now coming under the administrative umbrella of Roskomarkhiv are more forthcoming and willing to cooperate than the officials who were responsible for the ministerial archives in the security and defense establishments. These older archives contain substantial amounts of material that might be relevant to the movement of American POWs from German camps into Soviet hands and Soviet territory in the closing days and the aftermath of World War II.

Archival Research Agreements. To ensure progress on all fronts, the Commission staff decided to seek the Russian archivists' help in exploiting these earlier records by entering into research agreements whereby staff archivists would be paid for working extra hours on the POW/MIA project. By late November, four research agreements had been approved and two of them were operative. These agreements cover the Central State Military Archives, the Central Historical Documentary Collection, the Military-Medical Museum and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All of the research agreements are for initial trial periods of either 60 or 90 days, after which the American side will evaluate results to determine whether continuation of the effort is justified.

Documents Requested

Among the kinds of documents that the U.S. has requested are:

World War II. Lists of Americans liberated from German POW camps and transported into Soviet territory, especially records that indicate medical treatment or death and burial, and records that indicate sentences for crimes, charges and conviction, and transportation to camps on Soviet territory.

Cold War. Reports of aircraft shootdown incidents, including rescue and retrieval operations, reports of sightings, interrogations, and treatment of air crews, recordings and films of shootdowns, log books plus any reports that may be discovered in files of political and diplomatic reaction to such incidents.

For the entire Cold War period, the U.S. has also sought, so far without success, access to records of psychiatric hospitals (or any hospitals under control of the KGB, MVD and predecessors) and those of prison and labor camps. In addition, there is a project underway to compare fingerprints from the FBI collection with those in the collection of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. With respect to the fingerprint files, high hopes have been reduced by the perception that in both collections such files are regularly purged of older records on actuarial terms. The U.S. seeks to have access to the records of the Border Guards for the entire Cold War period because such units may have played a significant role in shootdown incidents during the Cold War period.

Korean War. Any documents that indicate the role of Soviet civilian or military officials in the control, interrogation, or transportation of U.S. POWs wherever located, or in the shootdowns of U.S. aircraft during that conflict, or any documents in Russian files that contain information about control, interrogation, or transportation of U.S. POWs in North Korea or China.

Vietnam War. Any documents that indicate the role of Soviet military or civilian officials in the control, interrogation, or transportation of U.S. POWs wherever located, or in the shootdown of American aircraft during that conflict, or any documents in Russian files that contain information about control, interrogation, or transportation of U.S. POWs in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia or China.

Documents Received

Russian researchers have discovered relevant materials on the POW/MIA issue which they have released to the American side. Early in the process, Gen. Volkogonov and his aides released batches of materials during Joint Commission meetings. More recently, the flow of documents has increased and become more regular.

Documents received thus far from the Russians are too numerous and varied to be summarized effectively in this report. They are listed, analyzed and described in the series of reports printed bi- weekly by the U.S. Army's Task Force Russia, copies of which may be obtained by Members of Congress from the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs. In very general terms, the documents have concerned Americans of other than military origin who were caught up in the throes of World War II or who deserted or otherwise sought political refuge in the Soviet Union, as well as some lists of U.S. military men and some diplomatic exchanges concerning repatriation efforts or shootdowns. Little of this information has been new to the U.S. side.

Some documents, however, have provided new and useful information. For example, interrogation reports on American POWs which the Russians professed to have received from the Koreans revealed that at least ten men who were heretofore entirely unaccounted for lived long enough to be interrogated. Unfortunately, their fates have still not been determined.

Assessment of Archival Research

The following preliminary judgements can be made based on the Committee's review, thus far, of Russian archival documents:

. Soviet archivists did an excellent job of record-keeping, and current research efforts have barely scratched the surface of what is potentially available throughout the vast archival system of the former Soviet Union. Even the strategic "fires" and other destructions that have taken place do not seriously detract from completeness;

. The traditional archival community is ready and willing to respond to American inquiries, especially in return for fair compensation;

. Officials of the Security and Defense Ministries are currently more resistant to U.S. inquiries, but this may change if the political situation becomes more stable;

. The time schedule for gradual disclosure of information about American POW/MIAs may be determined as much by the internal political requirements of the Russian regime as by the needs of Americans for that information;

. It could take many years to carry out a comprehensive program of research within the centralized and regional archives of the former Soviet Union, even if the political atmosphere is hospitable to such an effort;

. The Russian archival material passed to the American side of the Joint Commission appears thus far to constitute a carefully-controlled release of information by the Russian government to convince the U.S. side that the Soviet Union did not capture, detain, interrogate, move or eliminate U.S. POW/MIAs.

POW/MIA Family Member Efforts in Russia

Committee and TFR representatives in Moscow have met with the relatives of several American POW/MIAs who might possibly have been on Russian territory at one time. The Committee/TFR staff also made arrangements for the family members to meet with Robert Strauss, U.S. Ambassador to Russia, and with Gen. Volkogonov and other Russian officials. The family members asked the Russian authorities to help find information on the fate of their loved one. TFR members also passed on correspondence from about two dozen individual family members requesting any additional documentation that the Russians may be able to find concerning their missing relatives.

Repatriation of U.S. Citizens Buried in Russia

The Committee notes that a report on the ABC television program "20/20" that four Americans are still buried in Odessa is not accurate. The remains of at least three, and possibly all four, of the individuals have been repatriated.

TFR is looking into the alleged existence of graves of American servicemen from World War II on Iturup Island in the Kuriles. Accordingly, correspondence has been sent to the Russian side requesting a check of the archives of the Far East Military District, the Pacific Fleet, the Central Army, the Foreign Intelligence Service and the Ministry of Interior [MVD] for any information on the location of U.S. graves.

Mutual Cooperation

The effort to find POW/MIAs is a two-way street. The United States Government may be able to overcome some of the reluctance of the Russian Security Services by addressing similar Russian POW/MIA issues where possible. The U.S. should strive to provide the Russians with more information from our records on Soviet MIAs from World War II, Cold War incidents and Afghanistan. Genuine reciprocity may lead to greater progress.

Russian Inquiries on Afghanistan Veterans

The Russian side has asked the American side for information concerning 19 former Soviet soldiers who served in Afghanistan and are currently living in the west, and for information on servicemen presently held captive in Afghanistan. In September, Ambassador Toon provided a document to the Russian side listing Soviet POWs from the Afghan War who resettled in the West.

Soviet Submarine Incident

The Russian side has also requested information on the fate of Soviet submarine 574 which sank in the Pacific Ocean in March of 1968. On September 21, 1992, Ambassador Toon handed over a document to the Russians listing three crew members from this submarine. Moreover, the CIA has provided the Russians with copies of a film made during the "Glomar Challenger's" raising of sections of this submarine in August of 1974.

The Case of "David Markin"

An individual named Viktor Pugantsev claimed to have spent 1982- 1986 in labor camp PL-350/5 near Pechora (some 900 miles northeast of Moscow) with an alleged downed U.S. pilot from the Korean War called David Markin (Marken).

According to Mr. Pugantsev, Mr. Markin told him that he had been shot down about 40 years ago in North Korea, after which he and 50 other U.S. POWs were flown to the Soviet Union. According to the story, Mr. Markin spent the next three decades in one prison or psychiatric ward after another, ending up in PL350/5 in 1982. He was apparently sent to Soviet psychiatric hospitals when he told people he was an American. While there, he claimed to have been put in a straitjacket, given drugs such as aminazin and an unknown drug which caused his hands to "twist inward."

Mr. Pugantsev described the American as a tall, frail, polite, soft-spoken, psychologically-broken and stooped 60 year old, who had a shaven head, scars on his left shoulder and left forearm and a name tag on his prison uniform identifying him as "Markin, D." Although, Mr. Markin kept a low profile in camp, Mr. Pugantsev said he was treated worse than other prisoners and was harassed by guards for minor infractions like wearing his cap askew. Three such reprimands earned him a stay in the "solitary-confinement box" where, according to Mr. Pugantsev, he spent a good deal of time. Mr. Pugantsev maintained that Mr. Markin was still alive at the same camp in 1989.

The Committee and TFR personnel launched an intensive investigation into this matter despite the fact that no David Markin (or any close approximation) appeared on U.S. Government lists of unaccounted for from Korea. Commission investigators flew to Pechora on June 18, 1992. No person or record found there confirmed Mr. Pugantsev's claims. After the disappointing trip to Pechora, Mr. Pugantsev identified another inmate, Vladimir Bageyev, who might be able to confirm his story. Committee investigator Graham flew with a Russian foreign service officer to the city of Elista to interview Mr. Bageyev. Mr. Bageyev confirmed that there was an individual by the name of Markin in Pechora and that this individual matched the description given by Mr. Pugantsev.

In response to this news, Gen. Volkogonov arranged to bring the Director of Operations for the Pechora camp to Moscow to meet face to face with Mr. Pugantsev to determine the truth. Although the meeting took place, the differences in the respective stories could not be resolved. During the course of the discussion, however, additional names of other inmates and camp officials who might be able to provide more information on this matter were disclosed. Seventeen individuals were identified, including 8 officers, 7 inmates and 2 doctors. Five of the eight camp officials provided virtually identical written statements to the effect that there were no Americans at PL350/5 during their tour there. U.S. investigators asked to see the camp hospital records because Mr. Pugantsev, Mr. Bageyev and Mr. Markin were reportedly in the hospital at the same time. The official reply to this request was that the records were destroyed in a fire that took place between August 30 and September 1, 1989.

At the Committee hearings in November, Gen. Volkogonov discounted Mr. Pugantsev's story and suggested that he was motivated by a desire to emigrate to America. Mr. Pugantsev, on the other hand, has told investigators that he has been harassed and threatened as a result of his testimony. He claims that he was summoned to appear at the Security Service [former KGB] office in his native town of Chernovtsy in the Ukraine and queried about his contact with the Moscow POW/MIA team members. According to Mr. Pugantsev, he was told "not to stick his nose where it did not belong." The Committee has continued concerns over reports pertaining to "David Markin."

Future Actions

Levels of Cooperation

The interview program pursued by the American side of the Joint Commission has been extremely pro-active while the Russian side's response has been reactionary at best. The U.S. side has received little response to correspondence requesting that specific individuals be made available for interviews. Part of this problem may be due to the fact that Gen. Volkogonov has only two assistants. It might expedite things greatly if the number of staff people on the Russian side were increased.

The level of cooperation from the Russian side has not met the standard of official statements. For example, a long-standing request to interview 20 intelligence and security service [former KGB] officials who served during the Korean and Vietnamese War eras was made in early June. The request was kicked back and forth between Col. Kobaladze, the Bureau Chief for Public Affairs of the Russian Intelligence Service and Col. Mazurov, the Foreign Intelligence Service representative on the Joint Commission. Finally, after several months, Col. Kobaladze replied by expressing surprise that his superiors wished to answer a type of request that the CIA would not have. He then informed Committee investigators that of the 20 people we requested to interview four were dead, four were unlocate-able, six had no knowledge of American POWs, two worked for other agencies [MFA & MOD], another never worked for them, one was in England during the entire war effort, one could not be identified and one refused to be interviewed due to illness.

There are a number of other examples of a failure to provide basic information about individuals despite the fact that the information must be readily available to the Russian side. For months, the Russians said they were unable to provide information concerning one individual who, when finally located through U.S. efforts, was found to live scarcely a kilometer from the hotel where the TFR team is housed.

Media appeals for people with information on American POW/MIAs to come forward have also met with limited success. Due to doubts about long term political stability in the country, some citizens may feel reluctant to speak out. Several potential interview candidates have requested assurances and guarantees from the highest authorities before they would talk to investigators. Others may be afraid to become involved with foreigners, either because of the sensitive nature of their employment or because of a general apprehension based on what has happened in the past to Russians who had contacts with foreigners.

Trips and Visits

The Russian side has agreed to a 48-hour notice policy for on-site inspections of any camp or archive. Future plans are to visit those camps where Americans were reportedly held.

Planned Interviews

The interview program is critical to developing the body of evidence necessary to open the doors to the official records. Interviews, especially of retired officers, have provided the most lucrative source of new or significant information to date. One key to such an effort is publicity. Therefore, the United States needs to publicize widely the efforts of investigators and the desire to obtain additional information.

Follow-up Action Leads

These include finding and interviewing several former KGB generals, military officers and pilots who are alleged to have been involved in or to have known about the possible transfer of American POW/MIAs during the Korean War and the war in Vietnam. It also may be worthwhile exploring if any of the ex-Republic archives, especially those dealing with KGB documents, might have been capped.

Investigation of Individual Leads

With the break-up of the former USSR, many of the individuals who need to be interviewed and many of the archives of importance are now beyond Moscow's control. More time and effort should be placed on developing parallel programs in some of the other Republics. Moreover, since much of the information developed to date points to the KGB as the institution most likely to have been involved in arranging transfers and escorting Americans onto Soviet soil, the United States may want to look into which former Republic archives containing KGB records were capped after the coup and whether we can gain access to these records.

Conclusions

Gen. Volkogonov's Assessment

Gen. Volkogonov contends that, to his knowledge, no Americans are currently being held against their will within the borders of the former Soviet Union. Although the Committee has found evidence that some U.S. POWs were held in the former Soviet Union after WW II, the Korean War and Cold War incidents, we have found no proof that would contradict Gen. Volkogonov's contention with respect to the present. However, the Committee cannot, based on its investigation to date, rule out the possibility that one or more U.S. POWs from past wars or incidents are still being held somewhere within the borders of the former Soviet Union.

World War II

The Committee found that the Russians have been particularly successful in producing World War II archival documents, and is pleased to report that the fate of some American military and civilian personnel from the World War II era has been determined through recent investigations in Russia. Moreover, archival documents provided by Russia indicate that several hundred U.S. POWs were held against their will on Soviet territory at the end of World War II. In almost all cases, these were individuals who had been born in, or who had previously lived in, the Soviet Union, and who could, therefore, be considered Soviet citizens by the Soviet Government. Many of these individuals served in the Armed Forces of Germany, fought against the Soviet Army and were captured in combat. Some U.S. civilians from this era survived terms in concentration camps and are still alive today, living freely either in one of the former Soviet Republics or in the United States.

Cold War

There is evidence, some of which has been confirmed to the Committee by President Yeltsin, that some U.S. personnel, still unaccounted for from the Cold War, were taken captive and held within the former Soviet Union. This information involves several incidents stretching across the former Soviet Union from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Japan.

The Committee is pleased to report that Task Force Russia has been actively investigating these cases and is keeping surviving family members fully apprised of its progress to date. The Committee notes, however, that progress is, in large part, dependent on cooperation from Russian authorities. In the Committee's November, 1992 hearings, our investigator in Moscow testified that the U.S. was "intentionally being stonewalled" by the Russians on the subject of Cold War incidents, despite pledges of cooperation from President Yeltsin and Gen. Volkogonov. The Committee, therefore, urges the Joint Commission to place special attention and focus on obtaining further information on the fate of those U.S. personnel who are believed to have been taken captive during the Cold War.

Korean Conflict

There is strong evidence, both from archived U.S. intelligence reports and from recent interviews in Russia, that Soviet military and intelligence officials were involved in the interrogation of American POWs during the Korean Conflict, notwithstanding recent official statements from the Russian side that this did not happen.

Additionally, the Committee has reviewed information and heard testimony which we believe constitutes strong evidence that some unaccounted for American POWs from the Korean Conflict were transferred to the former Soviet Union in the early 1950's. While the identity of these POWs has not yet been determined, the Committee notes that Task Force Russia concurs in our assessment concerning the transfers. We are pleased that this subject was raised by the U.S. side in December, 1992 at the plenary session of the Joint Commission in Moscow.

The Committee further believes it is possible that one or more POWs from the Korean Conflict could still be alive on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The most notable case in this regard concerns a USAF pilot named David "Markham" or "Markin", who was reportedly shot down during the Korean Conflict. According to several sources, this pilot was reportedly alive in detention facilities in Russia as late as 1991. Although Task Force Russia has thus far been unable to confirm these reports, we note that the investigation is continuing.

Vietnam War

The Committee is aware of several reports that U.S. POWs may have been transferred to the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War. Information about this possibility that was provided by a former employee of the National Security Agency (NSA), Mr. Jerry Mooney, was thoroughly investigated and could not be substantiated. The Committee notes that Mr. Mooney testified that he personally believed prisoners were transferred to the Soviet Union but that he had "no direct information" that this took place. Other reports concerning the possibility that U.S. POWs were transferred from Vietnam to the former Soviet Union deserve further investigation and followup.

With respect to interrogations, the Committee has confirmed that one KGB officer participated directly in the questioning of an American POW during the Vietnam Conflict. More generally, Soviet military officers have told the Committee that they received intelligence from North Vietnamese interrogations of American POWs and that the Soviets "participated" in interrogations through the preparation of questions and through their presence during some of the interrogations. It is possible that American POWs would not have been aware of the presence of Soviet officers during these interrogations. The Committee has also received information that Soviet personnel operated certain SAM sites in Vietnam which shot down American aircraft during the war.

The Committee notes that the cooperation received to date from Russia on POW/MIA matters has been due largely to the leadership of President Boris Yeltsin. During a visit to Washington last summer, President Yeltsin declared that "each and every document in each and every archive will be examined to investigate the fate of every American unaccounted for." Although there is still much work to be done, Russian officials deserve credit for providing access to archival material, for cooperating in efforts to solicit testimony from Russian veterans and other citizens and for their willingness to disclose certain previously undisclosed aspects of the historical record. The ultimate success of the Joint Commission will be judged, however, on whether the U.S. side is able to obtain full support for its interview program and archival research from all levels of power and authority throughout the former Soviet Union.

President Yeltsin has made a heroic effort to demonstrate his own commitment to full cooperation and Gen. Volkogonov has done a great deal, with limited resources, to meet this standard. Unfortunately, the level of cooperation from within the Russian military and intelligence bureaucracy has been less extensive and has, at times, seemed intentionally obstructive. This may well be due to the uncertainty of the current political situation in Russia. It is vital, therefore, that U.S. officials, both in Congress and the Executive branch, continue to demonstrate to Russian authorities that America attaches a high priority to cooperation on this issue and to ensure that any problems that might develop are raised with the Russians promptly and at a senior level.

The Committee also recommends strongly that the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission be continued and that efforts be made to gain the full cooperation, as needed and appropriate, of the other Republics of the former Soviet Union.

Information from North Korea and China

As part of the Committee's investigation into the fate of those Americans still missing from the Korean Conflict, the Committee Vice-Chairman traveled to Pyongyang, North Korea from December 19- 21, 1992. This trip was especially significant in that it was the first time a United States Senator had traveled to the North Korean capital. Also, for the first time, a State Department official traveled with Senator Smith to Pyongyang, in addition to two staff members working with the Committee. The trip itself was a follow- on to an earlier trip made by Senator Smith to Korea in June, 1991.

The timing of the trip was important in that just a few weeks earlier, the Committee had held the first in-depth Congressional hearings on American POW/MIAs from the Korean Conflict in more than 35 years. In view of the fact that the North Korean Government has provided virtually no information on 8,177 unaccounted for Americans in the last 40 years, the goal of the trip was to establish a dialogue which would encourage North Korea to move the accounting process forward on a humanitarian basis. A second goal of the fact-finding trip was to gain information from North Korea on reports which had surfaced during the Committee's November hearings on the fate of some American POWs.

The Committee is pleased to report that Senator Smith was successful in achieving both of these goals during the trip. Meetings were held with Supreme Assembly Speaker Yang Hyong Sop, Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, and a staff of ministry officials who appeared knowledgeable on POW/MIA issues. The atmosphere was cooperative and it was the sense of Senator Smith and his delegation that North Korea is prepared and willing to move forward on this humanitarian issue without any preconditions. As a sign of good faith, the North Koreans allowed Senator Smith and his delegation to visit their war museum in Pyongyang, although the request had been made only hours earlier. This was the first time any American official had visited the museum. At the museum, Senator Smith was able to view photographs of POWs, documents, letters, personal effects and captured weaponry from U.S. servicemen. Senator Smith's delegation was also permitted to photograph and take notes concerning many of the items in the museum. Important new information was also learned from North Korean officials concerning China's involvement with American POWs.

The principal Committee findings and recommendations concerning this trip are:

. Although the North Korean officials with whom Senator Smith met denied that any American POWs had survived to the present day in North Korea, the Committee cannot exclude the possibility in view of intelligence information which has been received by the United States in recent years. Specifically, the Committee shares Senator Smith's frustration during his trip at not being able to investigate unconfirmed reports that a small number of American POWs may be teaching English at a military language school on the outskirts of Pyongyang. The Committee, therefore, urges the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cooperate fully in the investigation of these recent reports, in addition to other live-sighting reports which have been received by the United States during the last few decades.

. It is likely that a large number of possible MIA remains can be repatriated and several records and documents on unaccounted for POWs and MIAs can be provided from North Korea once a joint working level commission is set up under the leadership of the United States. Accordingly, the Committee strongly urges the Departments of State and Defense to take immediate steps to form this commission through the United Nations Command at Panmunjom, Korea. The Committee also encourages President-elect Clinton, upon taking office, to appoint a high level representative to sit on the commission. The Committee further believes that the proposed joint commission should have a strictly humanitarian mission and should not be tied to political developments on the Korean pennisula.

. Comments made by North Korean officials during the trip substantiated indications that many American POWs had been held in China during the Korean Conflict and that foreign POW camps in both China and North Korea were run by Chinese officials. In addition, North Korean officials confirmed that propaganda photos showing POW camps with large numbers of U.S. personnel had, in fact, been taken in China, not in North Korea as purported by the propaganda publications. The Committee notes that other information from both high level Russian intelligence sources and from several U.S. intelligence reports corroborate the comments made by the North Koreans.

Given the fact that only 26 Army and 15 Air Force personnel returned from China following the war, the Committee can now firmly conclude that the People's Republic of China surely has information on the fate of other unaccounted for American POWs. The Committee, therefore, strongly urges the Departments of State and Defense to form a POW/MIA task force on China similar to Task Force Russia. The Committee also strongly urges the Department of State to raise this matter at the highest levels in Beijing. In this regard, we are pleased that the first round of talks was held in January, 1993. We believe that a proposed POW Task Force on China will need to have several additional rounds of talks with the Chinese in order to search for and receive POW information in China over the coming months.

For the surviving families of those Americans still missing from the Korean Conflict, the perception has been that determining the fate of their loved ones is a task that has not been vigorously pursued by their government. We note that this perception has been fueled by past intransigence and lack of information from North Korea and China. In addition, accounting for POWs and MIAs from the Vietnam Conflict has received far greater media attention in America. The Committee can therefore understand why the Korean Conflict has often been labeled the "Forgotten War" by veterans and POW/MIA family members.

However, in view of the Vice-Chairman's recent trip to North Korea, the Committee believes that a dramatic breakthough has been achieved in terms of establishing a dialogue and gaining access to new information on POWs and MIAs. Consequently, there is now a window of opportunity which the Committee believes should be fully exploited by the United States on behalf of the families of those Americans still missing from the Korean Conflict.