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APPENDIX 5

Selected Documents

The Committee examined hundreds of thousands of documents during its investigation. As the Committee requested of various Federal agencies that documents pertaining to the subject of POW/MIAs be provided, it received a massive volume of material. In addition, the Committee generated hundreds of documents, primarily transcribed deposition and hearing testimony.

Committee members and staff spent thousands of hours at the DIA, CIA, NSA, State Department, other agencies, and the National Records Center to review classified and unclassified military records stored there and reviewing materials and identifying documents needed for the Committee's work. To fill the Committee's blanket requests for materials, DoD established a Central Documentation Office for the single point collection of material requested by the Committee.

Much of the material was classified when investigators received it and some of it remains classified. In compliance with Senate procedures, all classified material was delivered to the Office of Senate Security where it was logged in, worked on and stored. All material still classified at the conclusion of the Committee's work was transferred to the National Archives for permanent storage. The material that was declassified, was redacted to protect the names of sources and the way the U.S. collects intelligence. Both classified and unclassified versions were sent to the Archives.

At the urging of the Committee and in response to a unanimous Resolution of the Senate, President Bush issued an Executive Order requiring Executive Branch agencies to declassify almost all material pertaining to the POW/MIA issue. The result was the declassification of more than one million documents. At publication time, these documents were being provided to the Library of Congress for microfilming and indexing, they will be available to the public for a nominal service fee.

To assist the public in understanding its work, the Committee was assisted by a specialist in archival indexing and storage. All Committee documents will have been cross-indexed for location of subject matter and physical location of actual documents. Excerpts from selected documents follow:

01/11/73 Kissinger to Bunker (ironclad guarantees)

Henry Kissinger sends a message to Ambassador Bunker in Saigon. "(Le Duc) Tho and I met for six hours...we completed the text of the Agreement. We also completed the associated understandings. Major ones include...iron clad guarantees on our prisoners in Laos and Cambodia."

01/26/73 Kissinger Meeting with League at White House

Kissinger meets with National League of POW/MIA Families telling them "Understandings on Laos are absolutely clear concerning POW releases in a time frame similar to that in Vietnam...They cannot hold our men for ransom...There cannot be any blackmail by them...In North Vietnam it is almost inconceivable that they will hold any POWs..."

01/27/73 Paris Peace Agreements

"The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam" is formally signed...in Paris by U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers...The cease-fire goes into effect.

Article 21 - "...the United States will contribute to...postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina."

Article 8A - "The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange complete lists...on the day of the signing of the Agreement."

Article 8B - "The parties shall help each... to get information about those military personnel...missing in action,...and to take any such measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action."

Article 22 - ...In a supplementary protocol, it is provided that POWs will be released in approximately equal installments at 15 day-intervals during a 60 day period...

At 12:50 p.m. EST, the U.S. is handed lists from the Vietnamese...containing 717 names of POWs, including 64...reported as having died in captivity...

The lists from the Vietnamese contain no U.S. POWs captured or held in Laos.

01/27/73 Side Understandings

On the Phrase "of the particles" in Article 3 a) and b; of the Agreement - "It is understood...that the phrase "of the particles" in Article 8(a) and (b)...covers all personnel of the parties and from any other country."

The Return of Vietnamese Civilian Personnel Captured and Detained in South Vietnam - "The U.S. reaffirms the statement of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger...that the United States will use its maximum influence to secure the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam..."

Regarding Laos and Cambodia - Message in the Name of the Prime Minister of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, October 21, 1972...(b)...the Americans captured in Laos will be promptly released, before December 30, 1972...(c) ...The DRV side has been clearly informed that there is no American captive in Cambodia..."

"Message from the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Dated October 22, 1972:

The President notes with appreciation the message from the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam which satisfies all his points with respect to Laos and Cambodia as well as U.S. prisoners."

01/29/73 WASAG meeting (hoping for 40-41 POWs from Laos)

WASAG meeting takes place at White House. Dr. Kissinger and another NSC official are both advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department that they are "hoping" for "40-41" American prisoners of war in Laos...

02/01/73 Nixon's letter on war reparations

The North Vietnamese provide a list...which is represented as the list of American POWs captured in Laos. The list is exchanged simultaneously with a private communication to North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong from President Richard Nixon.

The letter from President Nixon reads:

"1. The Government of the United States of America will contribute to postwar reconstruction in North Vietnam without any political conditions. 2. Preliminary U.S. studies indicate that the appropriate programs for the U.S. contribution to postwar reconstruction will fall in the range of 3.25 billion of grant aid over 5 years... 3. The U.S. will propose to the DRV the formation of a Joint Economic Commission... (4.) to develop programs for the U.S. contribution to reconstruction of North Vietnam..."

02/02/73 Nixon to North Vietnam PM (Laos list is unsatisfactory)

...the following message is delivered to the North Vietnamese Prime Minister from President Nixon...:

"The list of American prisoners held in Laos which was presented in Paris on February 1st is unsatisfactory. U.S. record show...317 American military men unaccounted for in Laos and it is inconceivable that only ten of these men would be held prisoner in Laos...implementation of any American undertaking is related to the satisfactory resolution of this problem..."

02/01/73 DIA Analysis of Enemy Lists and List of 82

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense. 1.The enclosure provides a summary of the number of U.S. prisoners reportedly alive and/or deceased...in terms of the Defense Intelligence Agency status. The figures presented vary slightly with official Service casualty statistics.

2.Figures provided are the result of analysis of prisoner files provided...by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong representatives on 27 January 1973.

Analysis of Enemy Lists on U.S. Personnel* - U.S. Personnel Listed as PW by DIA Who are not on Either the Alive or Dead Lists:

USA - 21; USN - 27: USAF - 22; USMC - 3; Civilian - 14; Total 87.

02/06/73 DIA Memo to Kissinger (talking points)

"There are approximately 350 U.S. military and civilians listed as missing or captured in Laos. Of this total, approximately 215 men were lost under such circumstances that the enemy probably has information regarding their fate."

"The PLF list of 10 personnel captured in Laos (provided by DRV on 1 February 1973)...the list consisted of personnel captured by the North Vietnamese in Laos rather than the Pathet Lao... The PLF list did not state whether these men were dead or alive, or whether that are to be released. The PLF list is incomplete..."

"There are approximately 300 crash sites in Laos...Because of the presence of North Vietnamese forces, it can be reasonably assumed that the North Vietnamese would have some knowledge on the fate of missing/captured personnel in these areas."

"There is evidence that the Pathet Lao have information on captured/missing U.S. personnel and should be able to provide a list of alive U.S. PW's and information on the fate of many others.

"The North Vietnamese, because of their presence in parts of Laos, should have more information than provided to date on captured/missing U.S. personnel..."

02/14/73 Joint Communique (creating joint economic commission)

The United States and North Vietnam issue a joint communique to create a joint economic commission to oversee rebuilding Vietnam with U.S. dollars...The communique is a result of Dr. Kissinger's Hanoi visit.

02/21/73 Peace Agreement with Laos

The "Agreement on Restoring Peace and Achieving National Concord in Laos" is signed...Chapter II, Article 5...provides for the release of "all persons, regardless of nationality, who have been captured and detained"..."within 60 days after the setting up of the Provisional National Union Government...After all those who were captured have been returned, each side has the duty to gather information on those missing during the war and report the information to the other side."

03/13/73 WASAG Minutes (Laos POW concerns)

WASAG Meeting takes place at White House.

State: "You won't complete the withdrawal until the Lao prisoners are released?" Kissinger: "Yes, that's right." Defense: "How many are there in Laos?" NSC Staff: "They've told us they hold more American prisoners than the eight on the list we received from North Vietnam." State: "We've had contact with the Pathet Lao several times." Kissinger: "And they have admitted they hold more?" State: "Yes." Kissinger: "I didn't know that. How many more?" State: "They haven't said. They've been giving us the runaround on the details..."

03/14/73 Kissinger Memo to Nixon (recommending bombing Laos)

On March 14th, President Nixon approves a request from Henry Kissinger to plan "for a 2-3 day series of intensive U.S. air strikes against the trail area of Southern Laos to be conducted immediately after release of the third increment of POWs is completed on March 16th"...The purpose of the bombing is described... as a "response to continued North Vietnamese infiltration and logistics activity in the South."

03/21 and 03/22/73 DIA to Moorer on POWs and Moorer Cables

"...The U.S. will complete the withdrawal of its military forces ...in accordance with the terms of the agreement..with the released of all, repeat all American prisoners held throughout Indochina." "Do not commence withdrawal of the fourth increment until the following two conditions are met: (1) U.S. has been provided with a complete list of all U.S. PW's including those held by the Pathet Lao; as well as the time and place of release..." "If difficulties arise during the process of release, then cease all withdrawals until otherwise instructed." "...Our basic concern is the release of the prisoners and we do not object to the PLF playing the central role as ling as the men are returned to us. We need precise information and understanding on the times and place of release of the prisoners on the list provided 1 February...For your information only, the purpose of the above is to try to get things back on track and moving again."

03/22/73 Godley to State (Embassy believes LPF hold POWs)

U.S. Ambassador to Laos, Mac Godley, sends cable to Secretary of State stating Embassy belief that the Lao Patriotic Front holds more U.S. POWs throughout Laos than those names which appeared on the DRV February 1st list. Embassy states, however, that they should concentrate first on getting the 9 POWs back who were on the North Vietnamese list.

03/22/73 Embassy Demarche to Pathet Lao

On the same day, U.S. Embassy in Laos sends demarche to Pathet Lao stating they expect back more U.S. POWs than those on the February 1st list.

03/22/73 Nixon Tapes

March 22, 1973, from 9:11 to 10:35 A.M.

"...Haldeman: The question, uh, with the Congress, if you go on, I mean, Tuesday may be too soon -- from, from the Vietnam viewpoint. If they pull the prisoners, the prisoners, where, and, and the troops out (unintelligible)

President: (Unintelligible).

Haldeman:Better wait and see (unintelligible)

President: The prisoners, oh, the prisoners (unintelligible)..."

03/23/73 Eagleburger Memo

"...the U.S. is prepared to accept release of the ten men on the 1 February list along with the other U.S. personnel being held in NVN as the final condition for complete U.S. troop withdrawal. However, there has been no accounting of U.S. personnel MIA in Laos other than the 1 February list of ten who were probably all captured in Laos by the NVA rather than the Pathet Lao. Hence, assuming all the prisoners currently being held in NVN are released by 28 March, we still have the Laos MIA question remaining unresolved..."

"...there appears to be need for a well-orchestrated plan for solving the problem of our Laos POWs and MIAs. Therefore, I am recommending below a series of diplomatic moves aimed at gaining a proper accounting of our men lost in Laos..."

A."After the recovery of the last prisoners from NVN, Hanoi should be advised unequivocally that we still hold them responsible for the return of all POWs being held in Indochina..."

B."...a strong demarche should be made to the ranking LPF representative in Vientaine...This initiative should plainly and forcefully assert that the U.S. will no longer play games with the POW issue in Laos...we demand their immediate release as well as an accounting and information on all those who may have died. Finally, the LPF should be advised that failure to provide a satisfactory answer could result in appropriate United States actions..."

D."Shortly after 28 March, assuming the LPF have not responded favorably, intensive and obvious tactical air reconnaissance of North and South Laos should commence. Additionally, the movement of a new carrier task force into the waters off Vietnam should be publicly announced..."

"...the evidence indicates that the NVN/Pathet Lao forces have capture U.S. personnel since 1964, and the LPF have provided no prisoner or casualty data at all other that the ten names listed on 1 February..."

03/27/73 Nixon Tapes

Transcript of a recording of a meeting among the President, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and Ronald Ziegler on March 27, 1973 from 11:10 A.M. to 1:30 P.M.

"Ehrlichman: This story and, uh, this one, uh, this, this Watergate thing is potentially very debilitating around, but we have to devote a large part of our time to keeping people busy in, uh...

President: I know..."

President: ...I don't believe that I should go out on national television like tonight or tomorrow and go out on the Watergate Commission and then come on the next day on national television on Vietnam...My view would be to, get the Vietnam out of the way, and maybe get this right if you could. I think that gives you time..."

04/03/73 Richardson note to Rogers (questions, but on to MIAs)

Secretary of Defense Richardson sends a note to Secretary of State Rogers stating, "While there is still some question on whether any of our men are still held, particularly in Laos, our attention must now be focused primarily on the difficult task of accounting for the missing in action."

04/05/73 Godley Cable to Rogers

U.S. Ambassador...Godley, sends cable to Secretary of State Rogers stating they were reluctantly approaching the conclusion that the Pathet Lao did not hold additional prisoners, and that it was time to change the focus to accounting for MIAs as opposed to searching for POWs.

04/06/73 Memo of Senator Brooke meeting with Soth Petrosy

"Senator Brooke's meeting with LPF representative Soth Phetrasy on April 6,: Latter formally stated that LPF holds no more American prisoners in Laos. Soth said only prisoners LPF held were the nine who were returned to USG in Hanoi on March 28..."

04/12/73 Shields Press Conference

The Defense Department sponsors a press conference...in which Roger Shields states, "We have no indication at this moment that there are any Americans alive in Indochina."...Dr. Shields further states that with interviews of returning POWs almost complete, none of the MIAs have been changed to POW status.

Rumors that U.S. servicemen were still held in Laos "do the families a disservice," says Shields.

Prior to the DoD news conference, Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements states to Dr. Shields, in reference to remaining POW/MIAs, "You didn't hear me, they're all dead."

04/14/73 Bunker to State outlining priorities

U.S. Ambassador in Saigon, Ellsworth Bunker, sends message to Secretary of State...Bunker references "informal Washington instructions" that first priority will be recovery of remains of those personnel listed as died in captivity on the 27 january 1973 list. Second priority is described as "seeking information from the other side on specific MIA persons who, according to U.S. records, were believed captured alive... DIA has provided folders on 80 persons in this category. Bunker lists the third priority as negotiating a process for air and ground search of crash sites.

05/01/73 Richardson Memo (phasing out POW/MIA Task Force)

Secretary of Defense Richardson signs the memorandum proposed by ASD Eagleburger on April 25th to phase out the POW/MIA Task Force.

05/23/73 Kissinger meeting with Le Duc Tho

Kissinger asks Le Duc Tho to have an understanding with the U.S. to "not contradict" any U.S. public statements that article 8(b) of the Paris accords applies to all of Indochina. He then states..."Now we should still like a sentence from you which I don't understand why you can't give us -- which says that the DRV has been informed that there are no U.S. prisoners being held in Laos -- that all the prisoners held in Laos have been released. It would be very important for us." Le Duc Tho responds, "I have acknowledged to you that all of them have been released." Kissinger asks, "Then why can't you write it down?"

05/24/73 Shields to Hill

"In a DoD sponsored press conference held April 12, 1973, I made the statement that DoD had no specific knowledge indicating that any U.S. personnel were still alive and held prisoner in Southeast Asia...It was a totally accurate and factual statement at the time it was made..."

"In light of more recent events, I believe that answer is no longer fully satisfactory..."

"...it should be noted that only 10 persons, nine of whom were U.S. were released by the other side as Laos prisoners. Over 300 U.S. personnel remain unaccounted for in Laos."

"...I believe that the DoD position regarding the possibility of men still being held prisoner in SEA should be altered slightly..."

06/13/73 Kissinger Press Conference

"...We are specifically concerned about the following points:

- One, the inadequate implementation of the cease-fire. - Secondly, the continued infiltration into South Viet-Nam and the continued utilization of Laos and Cambodia as corridors for that infiltration. - Three, we were concerned about the inadequate accounting for the missing in action. - Fourth, we were concerned about the violations of the demilitarized zone. - Fifth, we were concerned about the inadequate cooperation with the International Control Commission and the slow staffing of the Two-Party Military Commission. - Sixth, we were concerned about the violations of article 20 requiring the withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos and Cambodia..." "...Under the provisions for missing in action, all sides have pledged that they would make major efforts to help each other to account for the missing in action throughout Indochina, and this is a matter which is of great concern to the United States..."

06/05/73 Hill to Clements (status changes)

Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Hill advises Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements that "As you requested, I have prepared for your signature a memorandum directing that all status changes from missing in action to prisoner of war be cleared by you."

07/17/73 Clements on Status Determinations

"I am concerned that the process for equitably determining status of the missing in Southeast Asia may be unduly influenced by emotional factors rather that the law governing such determinations and the facts bearing on each individual case...."

"The Department of Defense is currently following guidance that finding in which an individual is presumed to be dead will not be made at this time unless the incident occurred over water...It is not our intent to write off our missing men prematurely, but at the same time we cannot condone building undue hope for the family members without justification."

..."the decision to change status should not be unalterably tied to the inspection of combat sites, the recovery of remains, or the personal desires of family members. The decision should be based solely on a thorough study of the available information and a qualitative judgement by the Service Secretaries...Therefore, in the continued absence of progress in accounting for the missing, the Military Services intend to proceed now with a status change in those cases where it is warranted by available information."

09/07/73 Kissinger testimony to Senate on MIAs

Dr. Henry Kissinger, at confirmation hearings...for Secretary of State, is asked by Senator Church the question of how many of the 1,300 MIAs have been accounted for to date.

Kissinger responds -- "I do not believe any of them have been accounted for adequately. It has been one of the unsatisfactory aspects of the implementation of the agreement...In Laos, actually we have more reason for concern, because the ration of prisoners to those that we have reason to believe parachuted is smaller than it is in any other part of this area...we are extremely dissatisfied with the results of the implementation of that part of the agreement, and that is one of the reasons why we cannot proceed in certain other areas such as economic aid negotiations."

09/14/73 Laos Protocols signed

Protocols to the Laos February 21st Cease-Fire Agreement are signed...Article 18 of the Protocols states: "Within 15 to 30 days after the date of the signing of this protocol, each side will inform the Central Joint Commission for the Implementation of the Agreement of the number of the persons captured and detained, and state clearly the nationality of each person,...as well as the list of the captured persons who died during the period of detention." 05/08/76 State to Vietnam (begin new negotiations)

The Department of State sends diplomatic note to Vietnam..."the selective application of past agreements would not be fruitful...the United States believes it would be more useful to discuss issues affecting future relations between our two countries. The humanitarian concern of a full accounting of our missing men will be one of the primary issues of the United States in such discussions. Until this issue is substantially resolved, there can be no real progress toward normalization of relations."

06/19/76 Vietnam to U.S. protest (linking aid to MIA resolution)

Vietnam responds with diplomatic note stating that the "unilateral U.S. denunciation of the Paris agreement is aimed at evading the pledges it has solemnly undertaken...On the other hand, the U.S. demands that Vietnam implement Article 8(b) of the agreement...Obviously it wants to renege on its obligations under the Paris agreement on Vietnam while demanding that the other side implement another article of the same agreement..."

08/02/76 Habib Letter to Montgomery (Kissinger denial of offer)

Under Secretary of State for political Affairs, Philip habib, sends a letter to the Montgomery Commission...In reference to the February 1st Nixon letter to the North Vietnamese on reconstruction aid...Habib states: "The President's message did not contain any pledges of promises of aid...the letter did not specifically pledge to seek any particular sum of money."

11/13/76 Habib to Kissinger (Vietnam is linking aid to MIAs)

Under Secretary of State Philip Habib reports to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, on the November 12th meeting with the Vietnamese....he states that the core of the Vietnamese argument is that Vietnam is "prepared to fulfill fully, and I repeat, fully, our obligations" under the Paris Agreement to account for the MIAs, but that the U.S. should fulfill its "obligation to contribute to binding up the wounds of war and the reconstruction of Vietnam and to accomplish that which was agreed on in 1973 in the Joint Economic Commission."

12/13/76 Montgomery Commission Report (Vietnam is linking issues)

The Report of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons is filed. The major conclusion reads, "No Americans are still being held alive as prisoners in Indochina, or elsewhere, as a result of the was in Indochina."..."lack of direct discussions"... has "prevented the closing of this chapter...The U.S. wishes and serves an accounting for the missing...The U.S. insists on an accounting as a precondition to normal relations. The Indochinese, particularly the Vietnamese, state that reconstruction aid must precede their accounting for our missing."

09/25/85 Brooks Report

In a memorandum to General Shufelt, Commodore Thomas Brooks wrote,

1. "I was not at all pleased with the situation I found when I took over responsibility for the POW/MIA issue. The deeper I looked, the less professional the operation appeared...I found the following to be particular problems:

a. Case files were incomplete, sloppy... and generally unprofessional.

b. There were no action logs in the cases or where there were logs, entries had not been made in a long time.

c. Follow-up actions had not been pursued...obvious follow-up actions were called for but were never taken and years had passed.

d. There was no tickler system to ensure that we followed up on our own tasking...

4. I am not persuaded that enough assets are being dedicated to this problem if it is the top priority problem we claim it is. In particular, I wonder is JCRC is adequately manned...

6. I see the most important thing we must do right now is to be cementing relationships on the Hill...It is clear that Congressman Hendon will be using our files to discredit us...We need to ensure that we have formed the necessary alliances...

7. I am afraid we are in for some troubled times...we will not withstand scrutiny very well...We must make all preparations to minimize the criticism this scrutiny will bring."

03/18/86 Gaines Report

Memo to Director from Kimball Gaines, Chief, Director's PW/MIA Task Force. The memo states,...the "Task Force Charter was to conduct a hardnosed objective examination of PW/MIA substantive issues and procedures and to report findings and recommendations to the Director within thirty days...The Task Force review revealed serious shortcomings in every important area...Findings are as follows:

1.Unhealthy attitudes. 2.Almost total lack of management - working hard but not working smart. 3.Haphazard approach to problems and functions. 4.Too much direct exposure of the working level analysts. 5.Inadequate planning, internal communication, and written guidance. 6.Data base is a wasteland. 7.Working files unprofessional, sloppy, incomplete, no standard procedures. 8.No disciplined, coherent, collection management effort. 9.Too much detective work, not enough analysis. 10.Not nearly enough administrative and intelligence technician support. 11.Significant ADP deficiencies...

05/27/86 Tighe Report

Report from General Eugene Tighe to General Leonard Perroots, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. In the report summary, General Tighe states, "We judge there is no cover-up by the U.S. Government, the intelligence community, nor the Defense Intelligence Agency...There is information, even in our limited sample, which establishes the strong possibility of American prisoners of war being held in Laos and Vietnam. This judgement is based a category of eyewitness reports...allegations by defectors and escapees... and "signals" in the refugee community probably originating with the Vietnamese intelligence services..."

"A longstanding lapse in diligent intelligence work has produced serious gaps in our knowledge about Vietnam's and others' behavior relative to prisoners of war."

He continues in his conclusions that,

1."We have found no evidence of "cover-up" by DIA. 2.It is self-evident that a large number of MIAs may never be properly accounted for. Therefore, false hope should not be offered to those seeking a total accounting of PW/MIA's. 3.DIA holds information that established the strong possibility of American prisoners of war being held in Laos and Vietnam... 5....major improvements in procedures and resources are required for the DIA PW/MIA center to evaluate information properly... 12.The DIA PW/MIA center is organizationally misplaced and probably will perform better directly under the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. 13.The JCRC forward field organization is woefully undermanned. 14.The government handling of the PW/MIA issue is constantly harassed by phonies and profiteers..."

03/23/87 Bush to Perot Letter

Letter from then Vice President George Bush to Ross Perot in reference to Perot's decision to get out of the POW/MIA issue and turn over all materials and information he has to the administration. Excerpts include: "The President determined that Howard Baker would call you the other day,...I am sorry you feel you have had less than full cooperation; but I do understand your decision,...to "get out of it" and convey whatever information you have to the new negotiator..."

"...The administration...will continue to keep this issue on the front burner. We can do no less. We owe it to those who served."

04/08/87 Perot to Reagan Letter

Letter from Ross Perot to then President, Ronald Reagan regarding the POW/MIA issue. He discusses his findings.

"1.We left POWs behind at the end of the war in Vietnam. 2.We knew we were leaving men behind. 3.The men left behind were held in Laos. 4.The evidence that men were held in Laos is substantial... 7.In April, 1973, the Defense Department publicly declared -- that there were no more living Americans being held in Southeast Asia...this was done at a time when we knew we had left men in Laos (and probably in Cambodia and Vietnam)... 9.It is unrealistic to attempt a military rescue of these -- men... 11.There is only one realistic way to gain the release of the -- men -- through negotiation. 12.Several months ago, I recommended appointing a Presidential -- negotiator...General Vessey is an excellent choice...

25. The principal obstacle in obtaining the release of these men -- since the end of the war has been a lack of diligence and follow- through by our government. Choosing a man of General Vessey's stature, giving him a broad mission, supporting him with whatever resources he needs, and having him report directly to you is the strongest possible approach to gaining the release of these men.

Message 91922, 13 Mar 67, from Lieutenant General Wade, Air Force Chief of Staff/

AF personnel will be reported as killed if conclusive evidence of death exists, even though the remains are not recovered, and consist "... of evidence so strong and so convincing as to overbear any possibility of survival... If no such overwhelming proof exists, the member is reported as missing in action and is carried in this status unless and until conclusive evidence of death becomes available... If any possibility exists... that a member could have survived an accident, he must be reported as missing in action."