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Normalization Ford 12/01/92 ...I happen to believe that it's very much in U.S. interests to normalize our relationship with Vietnam. I spent two years in Vietnam. I have every reason to know that country and the horror of that war, but I think it's something we need to put behind us, both in a political sense and in an emotional sense, and I think economic and whatever. I think it makes a lot of sense to move forward. Normalization Griffiths 12/01/92 Once we do that, I think that the United States should move forward just as rapidly as Vietnam acts in the context of the roadmap. Normalization Kerry 12/04/92 ...if you read what is in Phase Two, let us say you were to do the business piece that involved permitting U.S. firms to sign a contract, but they cannot execute on it, they cannot execute...you are whetting the Vietnamese appetite.

But Phase Two specifically says continue the rapid repatriation. Vietnam in phase two is not alleviated of any responsibility. Vietnam specifically is required to continue the rapid repatriation of American remains readily available to Vietnam.

Vice Chairman Smith: If they become available after Phase One, true.

Chairman Kerry: So they must continue the process. We have an expectation of the continuation of remains in Phase Two. The roadmap clearly contemplated it, and it leverages it.

Now, let us say a couple of companies move in. Let us say you chose to only let it be certain kinds of companies, whatever. They go in. The Vietnamese start to get excited: Hey, this is working. But you do not get more of those remains. They cannot execute on the contracts. Everybody is going to get angry: Hey, how come you are not able to move forward? Gee, we thought we would be able to make this a real business thing, but where are those remains?

All of a sudden you have increased your capacity to get them. You lose no leverage. You increase the leverage. Phase Two contemplates it. Normalization Kerry 12/03/92 Now some of us may feel, just as policy people all over the agencies may feel, that one step or another may serve better to get some of those answers. But none of us feels that we should give up leverage. None of us feels that we should move to an actual commercial product-moving relationship. Every comment that we have suggested in terms of the roadmap suggests that those who have advocated some step are simply saying, we think we can get more information and still maintain leverage. Normalization Quinn 12/04/92 ...I think it's important to emphasize that we do have a policy in place to deal with Vietnam, the roadmap policy. And it's premised on two underlying pillars. One, that we should speak clearly and authoritatively to the Vietnamese, and so we gave them our policy in writing and we told them that it was approved by the President, by all of the relevant secretaries.

Secondly, the roadmap was premised on both parties taking steps, concomitant steps, to address the concerns of the others. That policy, plus the work of General Vessey, General Needham, all of the people from DOD who have been up here, has produced results and I outlined those in my testimony the other day in terms of offices and prisons access, live-sighting investigation, remains that have been returned. Normalization Quinn 11/15/91 There was also a charge, a criticism, of our overall policy, particularly the State Department's role in the POW/MIA effort, that we are acting at the behest of commercial interests, that we are rushing to normalize relations with Vietnam.

I doubt that those who would charge this have heard from the American businessmen and businesswomen who see me almost every day, and who leave, for the most part, disappointed. I tell them that we will not have the domestic support system necessary for Government or a business to move ahead with Vietnam until we resolve the POW/MIA issue. I add that there is hope for the future, because our policy appears to be working; but the embargo will remain in place until the proof is in.

American economic interests have high standing in our foreign policy, but in the case of Vietnam, these interests are weighed against even higher priorities. It is true we are in a rush, a rush to obtain the fullest possible accounting for the 2,271 American POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War. The uncertainty has gone on far too long. We are doing our best to energize the process and elicit the cooperation we need from the governments in the region.

We have had some notable success in the past year, but more must be done. As we get results, we will take the commensurate steps that will help put the past behind us. The response from Vietnam is slow and begrudging. So, too, will be the pace and scope of normalization. At every opportunity, we remind Vietnam of this fundamental reality. Normalization Quinn 12/04/92 ...the question now is how to keep it going. I believe the record demonstrates [Vietnamese cooperation] that the philosophy underlying our roadmap -- that when each side is taking steps that we're able to move ahead, but that whenever we stop taking those steps that we run the risk of bringing the whole process to a halt. I think it should be that philosophy which continues to guide us in the future. Normalization Quinn 12/04/92 ...If I could just say, I think the explanation you gave of how these steps were supposed to work is exactly right and exactly what was in our minds when we laid them out.

It was intended that as you took them to increase your leverage and too, as you draw nearer to what in our view is what the Vietnamese want from us, that that would impel them to do all the more that they could to respond to what we want from them. Normalization Smith 12/04/92 ...I think we lose all of the leverage that we have by moving to Phase Two at this point, and let me explain very simply why.

We got the information that we received from Mr. Schweitzer when we indicated to the Vietnamese that we knew that they had it. So they provided it to us. Understandable. Now, if we were to go at this point and accept the premise that they have no more remains and move on to Phase Two or accept the premise that all live-sighting reports are resolved and move to Phase Two, not only is there not an incentive for them to provide them to us; there is a disincentive, because if we move into Phase Two and there is a cache of remains somewhere or a group of Americans somewhere still alive, to bring that information forth would immediately stop the process of the roadmap. Offers McCain 09/24/92 Sen. McCain: Let me ask, at any time, did you receive or know whether the Vice President or the President of the United States received information of an offer of Americans for money?

Murphy: I doubt very much that could have happened. It's something that he would probably have discussed with me if he had gotten it separate from me. He never did. I can only assume that it never happened. Offers Perroots 12/01/92 Perroots: ...let me tell you, they turned into being inquisitions. And when I found that out I took steps to alter it. But I was probably to blame. This was part of the whole atmosphere that we generated to make sure that we were responding to virtually every critic, to make sure that nobody could make the suggestion that we were hiding anything.

We trailed that film. It was in Billy Hendon's office that he said he had the names of the people on that film that refused -- it is a two-way street. You have got to have cooperation with the agency responsible for the identification of those people. And there were other inconsistencies in the way the Congressman operated that resulted in our terminating that kind of activity.

Sen. McCain: It is worthy of note, Mr. Chairman, and I was going to wait until the hearing tomorrow, that former Congressman Hendon has also refused to cooperate with a committee request concerning our investigation of fraud and fundraising, and I think that is interesting, particularly coming from people who are demanding full disclosure of all other information... Offers Schlatter 12/01/92 Schlatter: ...the episodes that we underwent was that we would be called to come to this member's office, and in support of his legislation he would have some of his colleagues there. And he would say all right, I want you to read this report. Well, we would take the report out and we would read the report. Well, stop right there. Read that again. So we would read this one sentence again. Now, Colonel or mister or whomever he was talking to, what do you make of that report? Well, we would lay out our investigation and our analytic findings.

We would then be subjected to considerable degree of criticism for our investigations or our findings. The end result was that we chased ourselves round in circles. The same reports were reviewed time and time again, the same questions asked and the same answers given. At one point, the member ordered an analyst to go stand in the corner after...

Sen. McCain: He told an analyst to go stand in the corner?

Schlatter: Yes, sir... Offers Vessey 12/04/92 Chairman Kerry: You have had the opportunity to raise this issue in the most personal way on behalf of the President of the United States?

Vessey: I have.

Chairman Kerry: Have you, in the course of those meetings, confronted the Vietnamese repeatedly with the question of live Americans in their country?

Vessey: I have.

Chairman Kerry: And what have they responded to you each time?

Vessey: We hold no live Americans.

Chairman Kerry: Has money been offered to them, deals been offered to them?

Vessey: No. I have not offered money, but I've made it clear that it is the fundamental basis on which we can move forward in any fashion. Offers Vessey 12/04/92 Sen. McCain: Do you believe that would be a good idea to say to the Vietnamese that we will give you a couple of billion dollars if you will give us any live Americans?

Vessey: I think it's a bad idea.

Sen. McCain: Why do you think that would be a bad idea?

Vessey: Well, there are -- there are rules of international warfare. There's the Geneva Accords. And I believe that we should promote civilized behavior among nations and that we all ought to respect the dead, the captured in warfare according to those rules, and that we should expect nations to abide by those rules. Oral Histories Bell 12/04/92 Chairman Kerry: ...I want to ask you, in your judgment, on the oral histories, do you think that is sort of a gold mine, so to speak, and something we ought to pursue significantly?

Mr. Bell: I think the oral-history program is not only important from the standpoint of the interviews with the individuals for verbal testimony, I think it's also important in that they can identify areas where records are stored or areas where records were stored at one time. And also, a lot of the personnel -- in fact, most of the personnel who participated in the war kept personal diaries, and they retained those as much as possible and they still have those around today. Oral Histories DeStatte 12/04/92 I agree that what we have referred to as the oral history program is very important. As a matter of fact, this is something I've been discussing with my counterpart and the people at the museum. Having a record that documents the fate of the missing person is really only one step in the accounting process. The final step should be, wherever possible, to return the prisoner's remains. And to do that, in many cases, it's going to require the help of witnesses, eyewitnesses. Oral Histories Schweitzer 12/04/92 220 million Americans and 70 million Vietnamese couldn't do this. And yet Colonel Dai and I got together and these things just started coming out. And it was just so natural and so easy for us. There was nothing to it. But, when you look at it is seems mysterious, and I don't think it is. I just think it was the time and it just happened, and it's going to continue happening. It's just the beginning, and I think all the rest is coming. Peace Talks Daschle 09/21/92 Mr. Aldrich, on the 24th of January of 1973 Dr. Kissinger stated at his press conference that there were no secret understandings in the sense of secret commitments. He said that there were statements by each side of its intentions or interpretations of the agreement on which the other side might or might not choose to rely...That is very important public pronouncement, probably equal in consequence, in many respects, to the pronouncement of the President a couple of months later....Dr. Kissinger announced on the 24th that there were no secret agreements, and that was left unchallenged. No one came forth on his staff, in the administration, by the President, to clarify a fundamental mistruth. Peace Talks - Implementation Godley 09/24/92 The Symington Amendment was the final blow. That amendment, as I recall it, limited the dollar value of our military expenses in Laos to $300 million a year. This was to cover ammunition, aircraft sorties, bombs, food, and to pay indigenous personnel.

I don't believe that in the history of warfare there has ever been a military commander operating under such budgetary restrictions. We were beaten, not by the men in the field, but by public opinion at home, and were negotiating from a position of abject weakness... Peace Talks - Implementation Godley 09/24/92 Any efforts to obtain a full accounting of POW/MIAs were doomed to failure unless the North Vietnamese could see some advantage in acceding to our request. Peace Talks - Implementation Grassley 09/22/92 [quoting General Walter's Testimony] "Something like half the prisoners that were known to have been captured alive never came back to France after they reached a deal with the North Vietnamese." Peace Talks Haig 09/21/92 ...the bombing halted and the negotiations began at a time when Hanoi could see clearly that the Congress, the American people and the American psyche no longer had the stomach to do what it had to do. Peace Talks Haig 09/21/92 What I'm saying is be sure you know the constraints that existed, because it's my personal judgment, maybe wrong, maybe naive, that Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon never made a decision that they didn't think (with some probably minor exception) was not dedicated to the proposition that we want to get our prisoners out, all of them, as quickly as possible. And I believe that. So that's my contribution to your deliberation. Peace Talks - Implementation Kerry 09/24/92 I enlisted in 1965, was commissioned in 1966, went over in 1968 twice, came back in 1969, and volunteered, volunteered to go over, volunteered to go down to the southern part where we were fighting in the Navy, and went over to win. But I came back in 1969 convinced that what was going to happen in 1975 was going to happen. And the notion of trying to fight a war with these crazy restrictions that we were trying to fight it with just convinced me that you cannot fight a war that way. Peace Talks - Implementation Kerry 09/22/92 There is nothing in the record that suggests you asked the Congress of the United States for the right to bomb because they were holding prisoners that they would not give back. Nothing. Peace Talks Kerry 09/21/92 I do not want this to be confrontational. It is not meant to be; no member wants it to be. But 20 years later, folks, you know as well as I do that we are here because, for better or worse, the intentions we sought in 1973 have yet to be fulfilled. We do not have a full accounting. Peace Talks - Implementation Kerry 09/21/92 ...The debate is about what happened in this country in our attempts to get our prisoners back and were families dealt with honestly, were the American people dealt with honestly...We are not here..to rehash the war, to renegotiate the agreement. We want to know what decisions were available to us and how we might have made choices to get them back.

Now, you said we did not get a full accounting. All we are trying to do is understand why we were not able to get that full accounting. Was there anything disingenuous in that process of not getting it? Were we lied to? Were families not told the truth? Was it inadvertent, was it simply impossible as a consequence of the circumstances you have described?

Now, I have taken up more than my time here, but I would ask you what it was that prevented us, once we knew that did not have a full accounting, from going to the American people and raising their consciousness around that reality? Would people not have coalesced around the notion that they were not getting back Americans who were supposed to come home? Peace Talks Kerry 09/22/92 A lot has been said and written about the man the committee will hear from today, but the one thing that has never been said about him is that he was out of the loop. Peace Talks Kerry 09/22/92 The pressures on our negotiators during those critical years were real and unavoidable. We had a President elected in 1968 who took office in 1969 on a pledge to end U.S. participation in the war. We had a public hungry for that moment, anxious for the goal to be achieved. And we had a complex set of political and military objectives throughout Indochina that were at risk. We had a very determined and skillful adversary, and we had tantalizing but imperfect information about the number and status of prisoners in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Peace Talks - Implementation Kerry 09/22/92 [citing Kissinger's memoirs] But what is very clear, we were willing to move heaven and earth to support President Thieu, we were willing to move heaven and earth to enforce the bombing on the violations for infiltration, but we never talked about moving heaven and earth to have that full accounting and never did the American people learn, never did this come to the Congress. And I think it would have been one of the great levers that you had, but it was not there. Peace Talks - Implementation Kissinger It did not matter whether we could have added one or another clause to the agreement. The provisions with respect to the missing in action were perfectly plain. They just didn't carry them out. Peace Talks - Implementation Kissinger 09/22/92 Most commentators -- I would say all commentators, Congressional or media -- opposed any effort to stand up to Hanoi, arguing that the United States had no right to retaliate at all against the North's blatant violations. ...By the middle of April, Hanoi's violations were overwhelming. Peace Talks - Implementation Kissinger 09/22/92 Unfortunately, it was also no secret that these efforts to pin Hanoi down amounted to firing empty cannons. In theory we had three sources of leverage available: bombing the North, offering economic aid to Hanoi and giving military and economic aid to Saigon to deprive Hanoi of the hope of military victory.

The Congress took all three levers away, denying us both the carrot and the stick. When the Congress eliminated our leverage, we were trapped in the classic nightmare of every statesman. We had nothing to back up our tough words, but more tough words. Peace Talks Kissinger 09/22/92 ...Hanoi sensed our leverage was rapidly eroding. A host of congressional resolutions made it clear that we would have no support for military action. Peace Talks - Implementation Kissinger 09/22/92 It is totally inappropriate for those who prevented any sort of military action to blame those of us who wanted to enforce the agreement because they can find this or that document that gave one or other reason. Peace Talks Kissinger 09/22/92 Monday-morning quarterbacks can argue that the Paris Peace Accords were not perfect. I agree. To me, the ideal outcome would have been an American victory. But, Mr. Chairman, we had to deal with the war in the specific circumstances we faced.

Even with the perspective of 20 years, I am convinced that in those circumstances, no better agreement was obtainable. For example, just as I was leaving for the final negotiations in January 1973, the House and Senate Democratic caucuses each passed, by very large margins, resolutions calling for legislation to cut off all funds for the war. ...since Congress removed both incentives and penalties for Hanoi's compliance, how exactly would any achievable amendment have changed Hanoi's behavior? Peace Talks - Implementation Kissinger 09/22/92 The problem with the Paris Accords was not with the words, but with their implementation by North Vietnam. ...the U.S. Congress even more vigorously, and successfully, undercut our ability to enforce those accords. Peace Talks Kissinger 09/22/92 We have had many disagreements on policy, and honorable people will differ about this. But on the fate of our prisoners, Mr. Chairman, there can be no division. We had all an equal concern. Peace Talks Kissinger 09/22/92 There were also numerous Congressional resolutions. Most were Congress resolutions which were not binding. But whether they passed or not, they were all known to the Vietnamese and weakened our negotiating position. 35 of these resolutions were introduced in 1972 alone.

...During this period many political leaders, including Senator McGovern and 30 other U.S. Senators, were calling for unconditional, unilateral withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam without any formal North Vietnamese commitment or the concurrent or even subsequent return of our MIAs and POWs, or accounting for the missing in action. . . .

At the same time, members of the American peace movement were spreading the word that they had been told by the North Vietnamese that setting a deadline for our withdrawal would create favorable conditions for the subsequent release of American prisoners of war. Peace Talks Kissinger 09/22/92 Privately, you see, the problem was they were counting a great deal on our domestic opposition, so they were going extremely slowly in the negotiations. Peace Talks - Implementation Kissinger 09/22/92 Oh, it's a fair question, Mr. Chairman, and the answer to it is that this body prevented the enforcement of the agreement. When we spoke of iron-clad guarantees we never thought we were dealing with a bunch of Lord Fauntleroys whom we could hand a document to. We thought we had the right to enforce the agreement, which was then taken away from us. Peace Talks Kissinger 09/22/92 From the day we entered office, we had no more consistent goal than the release of the brave Americans held prisoner throughout Indochina and a full accounting of their missing colleagues. The negotiating record makes clear that this matter was insistently raised with the North Vietnamese. There was no issue on which American officials, from the President on down, were more adamant. Yet here we are 20 years later being pilloried in leaks without a shred of evidence, with the unforgivable libel that we knowingly abandoned the very group whose suffering was the biggest single incentive for our exertions. Peace Talks - Implementation Kissinger 09/22/92 The problem with the Paris accords was not with the words, but with their implementation by Vietnam. From the very start, Hanoi began violating the accords. The record shows clearly that while the executive branch tried strenuously to bring pressure on Hanoi, in particular those relating to POWs and MIAs, the U.S. Congress even more vigorously, and successfully, undercut our ability to enforce those accords. Peace Talks - Implementation Kissinger 09/22/92 If the Vietnamese violated these provisions it was not because of any omission by the responsible U.S. officials but because we had been stripped of the weapons we might have used to enforce that commitment. Peace Talks Kissinger 09/22/92 We had, in meetings with many groups, said forever that if we got the terms we asked for we would end the war. That we were not pursuing the war and that we were not making these proposals as gimmicks; we meant it. Peace Talks - Implementation Kissinger 09/22/92 Despite all these obstacles, strenuous negotiations resulted in a joint communique on June 13th, reaffirming and strengthening all the POW provisions, ...We made no secret of our outrage with Hanoi's violation. Peace Talks - Implementation Kissinger 09/22/92 I therefore cannot accept, Senator Kerry, that information was knowingly kept from the American public. Nobody had a monopoly of anguish in that period. Nobody had any conceivable interest in deceiving the American people. Peace Talks Kissinger 09/22/92 In response to my presentations, Le Duc Tho disdainfully read me editorials from the American press and speeches from the Congressional Record. Peace Talks Kissinger 09/22/92 [quoting from his 1973 statement] "...as for us at home it should be clear by now that no one in this war has had a monopoly of anguish and that no one in these debates has had a monopoly of moral insight. And now that at last we have achieved an agreement in which the United States did not prescribe the political future to its allies, an agreement which would preserve the dignity and self-respect of all parties, together with healing the wounds in Indochina we can begin to heal the wounds in America." Peace Talks Kissinger 09/22/92 If Saigon collapsed, the residual American force would become hostage. The number of our prisoners would increase exponentially. In the end, we achieved the terms we set out to obtain, and which our critics had repeatedly told us were unattainable. In the process, we dramatically improved the conditions for the return of American forces. We demanded and obtained release of all prisoners. Peace Talks - Implementation Kissinger 09/22/92 Only when our leverage was in the process of being dismantled, while the Saigon Government was disintegrating, in the absence of a cease-fire, would we be permitted to talk about our prisoners under conditions of unspeakable chaos. Peace Talks - Implementation Kissinger 09/22/92 Nobody ever questioned that the accounting for the missing was unsatisfactory. We raised it at least 60 times during 1973. The only difference is that we did not know of confirmed prisoners. And had we known it, we would have taken the most drastic steps. As I will say in my statement, but it is better clearly understood now, I advocated the resumption of military operations to enforce the agreement starting in the middle of March, 1973. Peace Talks - Implementation Kissinger 09/22/92 ...we never accepted that They're all dead, and continued to express our dissatisfaction with Hanoi's failure to account for the MIAs. Peace Talks Laird 09/21/92 I knew about the secret negotiations probably as soon as Ambassador Harriman went over there. I was a member of the -- we had, at that time, a smaller committee in the House of Representatives that handled highly classified operations. As a member of the Defense Appropriations Committee, I was informed of those negotiations as they went forward in Paris. And I was kept informed regularly, of course, as Secretary of Defense. Peace Talks Lord 09/21/92 I believe the final agreement was the best possible one at the time, given the mood in America and the pressures on the U.S. side. It was a far better deal than almost anyone on the American scene thought possible, and that almost all of Congress and the media and certainly the demonstrators were calling for.

It is unfair, retrospectively, to forget the atmosphere of the times in evaluating the agreement today. It is unfair to examine our maximum positions during the course of the negotiations and complain that they were not all realized in the end. By definition, any agreement had to be a compromise and reflect the realities of both the battlefield and American domestic support. Peace Talks - Implementation Moorer 09/24/92 The country was in a state of near anarchy,... Peace Talks - Implementation Moorer 09/24/92 ...I don't think that any nation has ever fought a war with 500,00 troops and let the capital of the opposing nation have a sanctuary. Peace Talks - Implementation Richardson 09/24/92 The question is one of what the public will support, what Congress would support in the circumstances, what the international political costs are of a new use of force. And, indeed, I don't know exactly when the vote taken by Congress was, but it was not long after that Congress specifically prohibited the use of force for this or any other purpose having to do with Vietnam. Peace Talks - Implementation Richardson 09/24/92 those of us here in Washington and in the Government -- when you and your fellow prisoners of war returned, it was a tremendously, to me, moving and exciting moment. I had the opportunity then to talk with many of you, and it was an indelible experience.

And I think that this feeling, very broadly shared, may have had something to do with the whole feeling that peace had been achieved, the prisoners were home, it was over. It had been truly a nightmare.

All I can say is that it would have been a very tough call, when the North Vietnamese in effect abrogated the whole agreement by re-invading or invading South Vietnam. Then surely had the political -- had it been politically feasible, bombing and, I think, other military responses should have been initiated. Peace Talks - Implementation Robson 09/24/92 Chairman Kerry: After that initial 60-day period beginning with 29 January to the end of March, what happened in terms of your effort to gain accounting for those people? Can you describe that for us?

Mr. Robson: Yes, sir. We had that series of folders, as I said, approximately 80. I don't remember the exact number. But we also developed some more information. I say we, the services, JCRC, and the intelligence agencies developed more information which was fed to JCRC in Thailand, which in turn was passed back to us, and we ended up with a total of 104 folders with information on people that the enemy should be able to tell us about with any great amount of difficulty. And I personally passed that list and stuff to them, I believe, on the 17th of April.

Chairman Kerry: What kind of response did you get?

Mr. Robson: Nothing. Peace Talks - Implementation Robson 09/24/92 Chairman Kerry: ...When we deposed Colonel Bernie Russell, who is --

Vice Chairman Smith: The U.S. head of the Four-Party Joint Military Team, he said otherwise. He stated that in early May the Vietnamese were linking U.S. aid commitments to cooperation with the MIAs. And when the vote came, or when the word was passed down to the Vietnamese, or passed to the Vietnamese that there was no aid forthcoming, or at least not in the immediate future, that they stopped cooperating.

Colonel Robson: There is no contradiction there, sir. That's exactly what happened.

Vice Chairman Smith: What?

Colonel Robson: When they got the word that the aid was cut off, they just --

Vice Chairman Smith: Bailed out.

Colonel Robson: Just started bailing out. I mean, they'd sit and talk to you. Peace Talks - Implementation Robson 09/24/92 Chairman Kerry: When you say nothing, they just --

Mr. Robson: They took it and they said we will study it. The same thing they told Dr. Kissinger in Hanoi.

Chairman Kerry: So in effect, the process that was put in place to get the accounting was truly not working almost from the beginning. Peace Talks Schlesinger 09/21/92 ...but one must assume that we had concluded that the bargaining position of the United States in dealing with Vietnam, North Vietnam, was quite weak, we were anxious to get our troops out, and that we were not going to roil the waters if that could be avoided. That would be my judgement. Peace Talks - Implementation Secord 09/24/92 Sen. Brown: But faced with the cutoff of funds, what would you have recommended? What should we have done? What should the Administration have done faced with the cutoff of funds for military alternatives?

Secord: If the Congress totally tied our hands with respect to ability to wage another offense, another bombing campaign, then what I alluded to earlier seems to be the only option. That would be to mount an intensive intelligence operation using all of our intelligence community and really putting some dollars behind it. Peace Talks - Implementation Shields 09/24/92 Chairman Kerry: But you did choose 14 that you did know were prisoner.

Dr. Shields: No, we did not -- Senator, we did not know they were prisoner. We knew that they could have been prisoners. We never had any intelligence that they actually entered the prison.

Chairman Kerry: That's not what you said on that day.

Dr. Shields: I don't know the press conference transcript.

Chairman Kerry: I will show you. "These 14 individuals were at one time identified by the DRV as having been captured, but were not listed on the so-called complete list provided on 22 December." We carried them as POW. We believed they were POW. We held a press conference saying they are POW. Peace Talks - Implementation Shields 06/25/92 Shields: I believe we failed to get as complete an accounting as we could have gotten at that time, yes, I do. There is no question about it. In mind, had Article 8B been implemented, we would have had the accounting that we desired.

Chairman Kerry: And your interpretation of why it was not implemented is?

Shields: We never had access to the areas where we needed to go. We needed to go into the areas where our men were lost. We needed to begin with the incident of loss and track down what happened to them from that point... in the area of Laos, we did not have access. We were not allowed to go. The government was hostile. The same was true of North Vietnam. Peace Talks - Implementation Shields 06/25/92 The record of our efforts to implement Article 8(b) have been well documented. Without cooperation from the other side, the JCRC sent teams into the field to investigate crash and suspected grave sites. An extensive and sophisticated underwater search effort was made off the cost of South Vietnam at suspected crash site locations.

The last U.S. military man to die from hostile fire in Vietnam in a U.S. initiated action was killed in December, 1973. He was a member of a JCRC field team, and with the ambush of that team and his death, our field efforts ceased. Peace Talks - Implementation Shields 06/25/92 Shields: Now, the families had all of the information which we had available. The family of Richard Van Dyke, now living I think in Salt Lake City, knew about his case. They knew about what the men in the prison camp had to say about him. They knew about Commander Ford. So this information was passed onto families. It was not information that anyone tried to hide.

Chairman Kerry: But the point is, obviously, that here we are 20 years later with a list called, discrepancy cases. And General John Vessey who will testify later, who is an extraordinary public servant, who has devoted his time going over there, has a list of people that 20 years later we are saying to the Vietnamese, hey, wait a minute, we thought these folks were alive. Now, if 20 years later we are doing that, it just occurs to me that 20 years ago the presumption, the information, the probability, the expectation,... were a hell of a lot higher, and the moment was riper.

Shields: Certainly, Senator. We had at the time of the Paris Peace Accords an Article 8B which, as Mr. Sieverts has pointed out, contained all of the authorities we needed for an accounting.

Chairman Kerry: So there was a real failure to pull off the Accord itself and get the accounting?

Shields: Absolutely. Peace Talks - Implementation Shields 06/25/92 Even though we were not having the cooperation that we needed, we made overtures to the Vietnamese time and time again. A Presidential commission went to Hanoi and to Vientiane, Laos, in 1977 appointed by the President, manned by distinguished Americans, specifically for this purpose of accounting for the missing. We had a complete set of hearings, and numerous hearings within the Congress on this issue, and the Department of Defense spoke out and maintained contact with families, and let the families know exactly where this issue was. So if there was not a hue and cry in the country, it was not for want of effort on our part. Peace Talks - Implementation Shields 06/25/92 We pinned our hopes on article 8(b). We negotiated. We staffed the FPJMT in the field. We had the JCRC in the field... We did not have access to Laos. We did not have access to North Vietnam. We did not have access to most of the areas in South Vietnam where we thought we could go. The man who was killed, Captain Reese, was killed in an area which we felt was under friendly control. As it turned out, of course, it was not.

So we could not go into the field, we were limited to negotiations, a part of a treaty which was never observed, and never implemented. We faced extraordinary difficulties in those days. Peace Talks - Implementation Sieverts 06/25/92 ...our overriding objective during this entire period was to assure that all our prisoners were returned, and to assure that we were pursuing all available means to secure the fullest possible accounting for our men. Peace Talks Sieverts 06/25/92 ...the January, 1973 Paris Agreement was the first agreement ending an armed conflict that contained such extensive provisions for accounting for the missing and dead. Peace Talks - Implementation Smith 09/22/92 ...we did have iron-clad agreements with the Vietnamese but what happened is they did not comply with those iron-clad agreements. Peace Talks Smith I think it is important to understand the politics of the times, people in the streets protesting the war, 300 men dying every week. And those were the times that you entered onto the political scene with the President, and there was a great amount of political pressure to end the war, trying to end the war in an honorable way. And you proceeded into negotiations to try to do that, since there did not seem to be the political will to win it militarily. So these were difficult times, and you insisted on many matters concerning POWs and MIAs in those negotiations.

The issue, as far as I am concerned, is did the Vietnamese and the Lao respond to what you insisted on? Peace Talks - Implementation Vessey 06/25/92 Chairman Kerry: Do you share a feeling that climate of 1973 may have contributed to... and attitudinal approach that accepted a sort of willingness to, perhaps, ask some tough questions and deal with some realities?

Vessey: ... there were many people interested in this issue at the time. There were unanswered questions at the time.

At the same time, the country seemed to be desperate to get out of Vietnam and be separated from that issue. And I think that people made the decisions that they thought were the best decisions at the time, based on the information that they had. Peace Talks Walters 09/21/92 I think it was Ambassador Lord who said, you know, we cannot second guess every aspect of it...I am here to talk about POW/MIA, and what we knew about that and how that issue figured into these negotiations, and perhaps some larger issues about the negotiations and how they may have impacted our ability to get the full accounting that we sought. Perot Childress 08/12/92 It is my opinion...that Mr. Perot's trip was counterproductive to U.S. efforts. Perot Kerry 08/11/92 We may leave some questions out there because we are not capable, as humans, of resolving all of this 20 years later. But the record will be more complete. And the evidence will be greater and I think the effort more significant -- thanks, in part, to your participation and contribution. Perot Perot 08/11/92 Mr. Perot: ...The POW project had to be a completely private project, otherwise it would have had no credibility with the Vietnamese, and these were the people we were trying to impact.

Chairman Kerry: But that was your suggestion that it be kept private?

Mr. Perot: ...No, I think that was actually Dr. Kissinger and/or Colonel Haig said this has to be done privately.... Perot Perroots 08/12/92 Mr. Perot's activities during my tenure had no adverse affect on my mission. I considered his efforts to be a reflection of his patriotism and sincere concern over the issue and that still applies. He made no mention of any enumeration nor any offer by the Government for any payback. Perot Perroots 08/12/92 Soliciting Mr. Perot's support as a member of my advisory board and authorizing him access was my idea. Perot Perroots 08/12/92 The White House had acknowledged Mr. Perot's efforts in support of the POW/MIA issue and commended him for his efforts.

In view of his past activities, I made a decision to provide him access and to keep him personally involved for our mutual benefit. Photos Gray 12/04/92 Mr. Gray: We talked to the sources who sent these photos out. The individual that sent them out said he was never told that these were American prisoners. He was told simply by the source of the photo to find out who these Americans are. But en route to the American embassy in Bangkok the story became that these are American prisoners.

Sen. McCain: You do not know who put the names on them.

Mr. Gray: Well, we asked the source who said -- the ceramic merchant in Khompong Chang, Cambodia, why did they -- the photos that came forward as those of American prisoners. He said, well, if the Vietnamese who gave him the photos were looking into these photos, then they had to be American prisoners, but he was never told they were prisoners.

Now, the names were not associated when he sent those photos forward. None of the names were associated. The only names associated with the photos were actually the ones written on the photos, Chester Wimmer and others, names which were not of Americans who were missing. So not until later in the year of 1990 were names associated with the photo.

We determined that the names Robertson and Stevens actually came from a handbill that had been out in Southeast Asia since 1987. And it said across the top $1 million dollar reward being offered for American prisoners and the two photos across the bottom were Robertson and Stevens. Photos Kerry 12/04/92 [to Chambers] I think an interesting example of that was your own explanation of what happened on the Lundy-Robertson-Stevens photo where it went from one person as a photo of Americans and by the time it got out of the car it was a photo of prisoners, and by the time it got somewhere else it had names of people, and by the time it got to America it was on the front page of Newsweek with three people, startling new evidence, and so forth. Photos Sheetz 12/04/92 The photographic experts who used the computer-enhanced techniques at the U.S. National Labs to determine if the alleged Robertson-Stevens-Lundy photograph was accurate, they noted that the handwritten sign that the Senator is referencing was not on the original photograph, that was a paste-on, and then the photograph was re-shot. There was no question about that. Priority Apodaca 11/06/91 Earlier this year, I was actively involved in a highest national priority, Operation Desert Storm... I don't know if this is a good comparison, but if the POW/MIA issue has the highest national priority, why are hundreds of remains still in Vietnam today? Why are agencies allowed to not follow through on reports? Why can't we find the fingerprint records for almost 25 percent of those still missing?

I would not be so upset if the Government had called this a high national priority, but they didn't. For years it has been the highest national priority, and for years I've wondered. Priority Childress 12/01/92 ...in January of '82 ...In the intelligence area, manpower and priorities were at an all-time low and I believe the POW branch had only nine personnel assigned. Priority Childress 12/01/92 Let me put it in a perspective. When we talked at the national level about a matter of highest national priority, we were referring to not just resources that the director of DIA or someone in the Pentagon could put to the problem based upon the priorities we were giving them in the national documents. There's a difference between implementation of the priority which allows them to move forward or tells them how are you doing, moving forward, and saying that, well, we didn't have enough people. Priority Gaines 12/01/92 Sen. Daschle: ...give me your sense of which of these criteria...had the most to do with our failures over the last 10 or 15 years? Colonel Gaines?

Colonel Gaines: I would like to offer that lack of priority as the one. Priority Kerry 12/01/92 It is hard for me to believe. I mean, if you have got 70 people responding to this committee's requests. We have got a staff of 15 or 20 people working on it. We have got 58 people in Vietnam. This is 1992. Here you are with files that, by your own admission, were not organized. Are you saying to me you could not find people to organize the files? You could not put people to the task of collecting the lists? You could not bring all the documents into one house?

I have to tell you, as I sit here, it just strikes me that this is one of those Government euphemisms that -- and I do not blame you guys. I do not think any of you made this policy...you were not the policymakers, you were carrying it out. But I think a lot of you folks were left dangling in the dark. Some people paid lip service to the notion this was the highest priority, but in fact, as you just said, it was not resourced, and that is the way you get things done, is resources. It does not do you any good to have a policy up here, and then you do not have the resources... Priority Kerry 12/01/92 Chairman Kerry: In all of your reviews, did you find that this was indeed treated as and resourced as a nation's highest priority?

Mr. Wiand: No, Senator, I did not.

Colonel Hargis: ...no, I do not...

Mr. Nagy: No...

Admiral Brooks: Most assuredly not...

Colonel Gaines: No... Priority Kerry 06/25/92 I want to, obviously, point out that the committee feels very strongly that the effort of the last year, two years, has increasingly been augmented, that the Bush Administration and the Department of Defense and Secretary Cheney have put money and personnel where they have put their stated priorities. And today we can boast greater attention to this issue and greater effort to put it to rest than at any time, I think, in the history of this issue. So it is not something that, I think, we are achieving and we are doing it on a good schedule. Priority Nagy 11/06/91 ...The kind of assets that we have now applied against the problem would have been best applied then [20 years ago]. I can't recover from that, and I can't apologize enough to the families personally. Priority Perot 08/11/92 Chairman Kerry: Mr. Perot, does all this not really stem from the fact that in reality, despite all the rhetoric about highest national priority, this issue has been bouncing around with no real general -- you know what I am saying, no person really having seized the cudgel and managing it. Is that not accurate?

Perot: Yes sir, it's like a ship without a rudder. Every now and then a group will get interested and then let several years go by and then, another group will get interested, but there's no consistent logical program to resolve it. Priority Perroots 12/01/92 There was no question within the agency that the POW/MIA issue was the top priority. We gave it not only top budgetary priority, but top disclosure in terms of exposure. Priority Williams 12/01/92 Chairman Kerry: And the fact is I just have a sense that there was a kind of disregard, is a polite way to put it, for the real relevance of this, for what some of that evidence might really have meant. And it was kind of a convenient political highest priority but not really the highest priority. The highest priority was figuring out what the Russians were doing with missiles; the highest priority was responding to Grenada, Panama, a lot of other priorities. But this just was not there. That is my sense. Much more there today in 1992 than it ever has been at any proceeding time in history since 1973.

General Williams: I think that is a fair statement. I wold also say, though, that it was not until probably 1982 that the Reagan administration had a chance to reverse the long decline in intelligence manpower. The agency, DIA, had gone from -- had about a 35 or a 40 percent reduction, and you do not just reverse that in the program and budget cycle immediately. But you are absolutely right.

Chairman Kerry: And also, with the demise of our position in Southeast Asia we lost our on-the-ground assets. We were basically shut out for the 4 years after Saigon fell in 1975. There are clear things that ad into this that we need to take into account. And I acknowledge all of those.

General Williams: And you are correct about your impression.